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Review of: Sense, Understanding and Reason (A Digest of Kant's First Critique)

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be consciously aware of the strengths and weaknesses of his approach. Further, each field poses its own particular problems which are dealt with individually as a result of the great variety of articles. The caliber of the contributors combines with the importance of the subject to make this book a significant contribution to the general study of religion.

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Because of the ever more numerous and detailed studies of Kant's first Critique, the writing of a succinct exposition of the Critique has become an ever more urgent and difficult task. N. A. Nikam has met that demand to the extent that he has furnished a generally faithful and useful account of the Critique's main arguments. The presentation follows the line of argument as found in the Critique with two exceptions: In Nikam's discussion the transcendental deduction of the categories precedes the metaphysical one; the various investigations of the self are concentrated in the discussion of the paralogisms.

There are limitations to the usefulness of the book. Some are technical. There are hardly any verifiable references to the original text, so that the student is unable to use Nikam's digest as a guide to the pivotal passages in the (very unevenly structured) Critique. There are no references to secondary sources which would indicate what is generally accepted in Kant scholarship and what is disputed. Other deficiencies are stylistic. Some parts are needlessly repetitious (pp. 7, 13, 14) while others are elliptical to the point of being unintelligible (pp. 19, 29, 30, 85, 110). In the latter category, there are assertions that would require an elaborate argument in order to appear plausible. In the absence of such arguments, many would say that these assertions are simply careless or mistaken. Finally, there are systematic shortcomings. One fundamental claim and intent of the Critique is quite disregarded. It is Kant's attempt to go beyond the philosophical concern with things and problems to the conditions of the possibility of things and problems. This is the transcendental step that Kant takes. Nikam explicitly identifies "transcendental" with "a priori" (pp. 4-5), whereas Kant, being notoriously lax with terms though nonetheless rigorous in his thinking, incidentally uses these terms as synonyms. Nikam's identification quite consistently leads to an interpretation of the transcendental deduction as the establishing of a hypothesis that explains the facts of knowledge, a hypothesis that can be checked against these facts (pp. 46-47). But what Kant wanted to show was that the categories (Nikam's "antecedent conditions") are fundamentally and necessarily constitutive of every fact so that without and prior to the categories we have no access to facts nor to a method of verification in Nikam's sense. Kant's enterprise might be inherently impossible, but that would have had to be argued explicitly. Apart
from some general references to the Vedânta in the Preface (pp. vii-ix), there is no mention of Indian or Eastern philosophy.

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The author does not divide Hinduism into historical periods, but treats it as a whole and as derived from the ancient Vedic revelation. In this respect, according to Lemaitre, her book could have been entitled “Vedic Religion” or “Sanâtana Dharma.” (The term “Hinduism” was chosen, however, because it is used by European Indologists.) She does recognize that there is “no single religion in India but rather a combination of related religions” representing different facets of the Vedic tradition, which is the initial source of the mutually compatible sects in India.

This fourteen-chapter book is broad in its scope and clear in its succinct treatment, and its frequent quotations from hymns and texts are well chosen. Thus, Hinduism is comfortable and informative reading—especially if one is a Catholic, for Hinduism is the first volume to be published in The Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Catholicism dealing specifically with a non-Western religion. The book, therefore, is primarily meant for the general reader: the serious student will find nothing new in its parade of ideas and quotations, presented without any analysis in depth.

Hinduism covers not only the topics usual in an introductory volume, e.g., the Six Philosophical Systems, Brahman, Creation, Karma, Death, and Yoga, but also includes terse descriptions of eleven sects of Vaisnavism, seven sects of Saivism, the Castes, the Temples, Holy Places, and Pilgrimages—an array which tends to overburden the more important basic issues of the Hindu religion. But at least this wide scope makes one aware of the diversity inherent within the religion as a whole, which is the author’s main purpose. As such, Hinduism is a useful book: no Westerner can read it without experiencing a broadening of his mental horizons and without realizing that Hinduism goes a long way toward the elimination of many misunderstandings; for example, the common assumption that Hinduism represents a withdrawal from life.

Lemaitre’s book leaves the reader with a better understanding of the religious roots of Indian culture, and more keenly aware of its prevalent belief that God can be realized in many ways as the supreme goal of human existence.

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