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ASSESSING THE ROLE OF SHAME AND HONOR DURING THE ALTA
CONFLICT

By

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Thesis

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Abstract Title:
Assessing the Role of Shame and Honor During the Alta Conflict

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Abstract:

For nearly a century the Sami peoples of Norway were subject to colonial policies of assimilation and integration. According to historians of the Sami, colonial processes stigmatized Sami individuals and the Sami culture, producing feelings of shame. The concept of shame, for both individuals and groups, centers on experiencing fear, pain, and/or uneasiness, and requires a judging audience. Honor is about individuals transcending self-interest and the need for individuals and groups to acquire self-esteem for that purpose; it also requires a judging audience. Concepts of shame and honor played an important role during the Alta conflict; a watershed moment in recent history of Sami, Norwegian relations. The conflict arose in the 1970s, when Norway decided to build a hydroelectric power plant on the Alta-Kautokeino River, resulting in the flooding of Sami villages, farmland, and pasture land. Sami individuals of the boarding school generation, now educated in the same manner as Norwegians, organized collectively and protested against the proposed construction of the dam. While Sami individual and group activism failed to halt the project, it did signal a change in the political power structure between Sami peoples and Norway from one based on Sami subordination to one based on mutual respect. This helped change Sami identity from being seen as inferior to one deserving of respect, collectively and individually; which in turn elevated the status of Sami individuals and the Sami culture.

Key Words: Shame, Disrespect, Honor, Recognition, Respect, Pride, Alta Conflict, Sami
Introduction

The Sami are historically known as Europe’s most peaceful people (Lehtola 40). Veli-Pekka Lehtola, noted Sami writer, lecturer, and literary studies scholar, states in “The Sámi People Traditions in Transition,” that, the only serious act of recorded collective violence committed by the Sami prior to the Alta Conflict occurred on Monday November 8, 1852, in Guovdageaidnu (Kautokeino) Norway, (Lehtola 40). It is an incident considered by many historians to be an isolated event.

Known historically as the “Guovdageaidnu uprising” (also known as the Kautokeino revolt), the incident was a combination of continued and increasing social, economic, political frustrations and religious fervor. Dr. Risto Pulkkinen, “The Saami A Cultural Encyclopedia,” suggests that “…long lasting social and economic conditions arising partly from the exploitative attitude of Norwegian traders towards the Saami,” and partly from the Sami objecting generally to “…the intrusion of Norwegians into the traditional habitat of the Saami people…” (158) helped initiated this violent reaction by the Sami.

During that time period the Sami faced an increasing Norwegian presence, according to Lehtola, “Norwegian colonization pressures in Sápmi, after a century long pause had again begun to grow in the 1800s, and now received state support” (40). Lehtola and Pulkkinen both agree that when analyzing the events that occurred prior to the revolt a major precursor may have been a reaction to the closing of the border between Norway and Finland. The closing resulted in various traditional livelihoods of reindeer-herding Sami being forced suddenly into crisis. Many Sami had to abandon

1. Sami (pronounced Saw-me), has other spellings; those being Sámi, Saami. I point this out because often these spellings appear in quotes, yet they mean the same thing.
high quality lichen pastures and leave age-old migration routes, thereby changing many aspects of Sami social, economic and political life (Lehtola 40; Pulkkinen 158). In all respects, the Sami were experiencing an “invasion” by Norwegian settlers, causing environmental and economic stressors. In many cases, the local courts and newly written laws supported the new colonists, often allowing them to acquire the best netting and fishing grounds. The Sami responded to the injustices by trying to secure their traditional rights through the Norwegian legal system. The result was the Sami suffering many legal defeats (Lehtola 40). To further compound the environmental and social conditions of the time, religion also had a share in the altercation.

Headed by leader and church founder Lars Levi Laestadian, the Laestadian faith “…with its ecstatic elements” found favor with many Sami people, and “…flourished in the early 1850s in Norwegian Lapland” (Pulkkinen 158). Laestadianism preached a strict adherence to gospel law with a focus on “cleansing,” a religious process whereby Sami society could be ridded of alcohol and other vices (Lehtola 40). During this time in Sami history, liquor had become a part of Sami life in Northern Norway, being considered a “particular cause of wretchedness among them” (Pulkkinen 158). Lehtola states that the vice of alcohol originated to the area by way of Norwegian colonists who, finding agriculture in the barren north difficult, discovered economic security in the production and selling of alcohol. Over time, the consumption of alcohol within Sami society established a foothold in many Sami markets and siidas (Lehtola 40). These

2. Laestadianism actually began about 1875. At the time the church operated within the Evangelical-Lutheran churches in Nordic countries, even spreading to North America because of immigration. It was a continuation of Laestadius’s revivalist movement, which began in 1844. Laestadius radically changed after the death of his son Levi and from his reading of Luther, he was considered pious in nature, but a stern preacher. Laestadianism, at the time of the uprising, was spreading into Finnmark (the northern regions Norway), as a result Laestadius become associated with the uprising and from that time on he had to “defend himself against accusations of stirring up the people.” Today, a majority of Sami still recognize one of the Laestadian religious branches as their faith (Lehtola 40; Pentikäinen 167-170).
took on not only a nationalist expression, but religious as well, and may have contributed to the resulting violence that took place in November of 1852 (Pulkkinen 158).

Lehtola says that even though the religion in of itself attacked the use of alcohol and other worldly vices, the Guovdageaidnu fanatics went even further. “They wanted to cleanse the whole region of ‘contamination’…feeling that they had received God’s spirit these believers began to feel they were above the law” (Lehtola 40). In Sami social society, these conditions took on not only a religious but also a nationalist expression; a combination of social conditions that can be viewed as contributing greatly to the resulting violence that took place in November of 1852.

On the 8th of November of 1852 a group of “Sami religious fanatics” seized a local storekeeper and police officer, killed them both and set fire to their houses. Before ending, the group nearly beat a local preacher to death. The Sami community’s response to the incident interestingly was one of general disapproval for both the uprising and the violence (Lehtola 40; Pulkkinen 158). While historically the uprising has often been portrayed as being motivated by religious zealousness, this study finds that there is ample evidence to support Lehtola’s premise that this event can also be viewed as societal in nature (Lehtola 40). In fact, Lehtola points out that even today, the reality of shame concerning this event still creates social pain, so much so that residents of Guovdageaidnu in 1980 rejected plans by the Nordic theatre to create a drama of the event stating that “…descendants of people imprisoned for the uprising; to them the wounds were still too painful” (Lehtola 40). It is also interesting to note that even as Norwegian encroachment increased in the mid- and late eighteen hundreds and colonial social and economic subjugation in one form or another would surround the Sami for
decades, there are no other collective violent incidents attributed to the Sami people as severe as this one until the Alta Conflict. It was in “1979-80, at the height of the Áltá Conflict, some hardline [sic] Sámi brought forward the Guovdageaidnu event as the first milestone of the Sámi struggle as a nation” (Lehtola 40). For the Sami then, the Alta Conflict like the Guovdageaidnu event, was a ‘Sami struggle as a nation;’ a struggle for the recognition and respect of and for Sami identity.

**Problem Statement**

The Alta Conflict was a result of a clash between the Norwegian government’s decision to build a dam on the Alta-Kautokeino waterway in northern Norway, and the Sami rejecting this idea. The original plan included submerging the Sami village of Masi, putting an end to a migration route used by reindeer-herders on their way to calving grounds, and loss of important economically viable hunting and fishing grounds much of which many Sami in the area relied upon for their livelihoods (Lehtola 40). To lay a foundation for assessing the role that honor and shame played in the Alta Conflict a short historical perspective is required.

For nearly a century, Sami peoples in Norway were subject to the colonial policies of assimilation or “Norwegianization,” as it is sometimes called. The policies that were put in place forced Sami children into boarding schools, almost eliminated their language, and altered their livelihoods and culture (Gaski 219; Minde 76). According to scholars of Sami history, “Many Sami thus learned to despise their own background—their ethnic identity simply became no more than a social stigma” (Bjorklund 7). In addition to the internalized oppression, racism in north Norwegian society led to Sami people being made fun of or simply ignored. In turn, this left many with feelings of
shame and self-contempt, feelings that very often became the norm. However, distinguished Sami scholar Veli-Pekka Lehtola notes that when the self-esteem or self-identity of a minority population is challenged, the individuals in that society identify with that challenge and attempt to remedy the situation (70). In the late 1960s the Sami began to meet the challenge of revitalizing their indigenous identity. In general, the Sami movement started with the first “boarding school generation,” who were educated in the ways of the Norwegian society and prepared to enter into social, political, and academic discourses surrounding Sami concerns. The most defining moment occurred with the Alta conflict, a dispute that started in 1970 when the Norwegian Water Resources and Electricity Board (NVE) proposed the construction of a hydroelectric power plant on the Alta-Kautokeino River. At the end of the decade, the final decision was made to move forward with the project, which set off a series of events that would last the better part of two years. In the end the protest failed to stop the construction of the dam, but it did signal a change in the political power structure and elevated the cultural and social status of the Sami as a people—not just nationally, but internationally as well (Korsmo 165; Lehtola 9-70; Minde 75).

The Sami political path went from the assimilation policies of colonialism to an international agreement on human rights to an agreement on the collective rights; one that not only recognizes the injustices suffered, but tries to ameliorate them as well. This can be compared with what Kwame Appiah, noted philosopher, scholar, and author of The Honor Code, terms a “moral revolution” (xii-xiii). He posits that identity connects these moral revolutions with an aspect of our human psychology. It is our constant concern for status, respect, and recognition. “We human beings need others to respond appropriately
to who we are and what we do. We need others to recognize us as conscious beings and
to acknowledge that we recognize them” (Appiah xiii). Similarly, Sami persons are
psychologically embracing Sami identity, and in doing so become a self-identified
collective, and in turn become the ‘other’ in the eyes of the dominant society. In doing so,
the Sami were expressively connecting with the ‘other’ (their own Sami identity); they
were looking for change consistent with their norms, values, and ideologies, thereby
having their identity recognized as being distinct participants in Norwegian society.

Focusing on dueling, foot-binding, and the Atlantic slave trade, Appiah finds that honor
played a key role in bringing these immoral acts to an end (Appiah xii-xiii). Appiah’s
ideas are comparable to the challenges Sami peoples faced due to colonialism.

Ultimately, the Sami overcame the barriers Norway put in place, which is nothing short
of a cultural revolution with international links and dimensions. The Samis went from
being disrespected to being internationally acknowledged and respected within a few
decades. A watershed moment for Sami peoples, the Alta conflict provides the backdrop
from which to assess the role shame/honor played in the dispute.

This research investigates the ways shame and honor played a part that helped
define the Sami renaissance and the ensuing Alta Conflict. I argue that both shame and
honor concepts were not only prevalent throughout the conflict, but, in this event, I have
found that both shame and honor concepts played important roles in achieving intended
and non-intended results in the ethnic revival of the Sami identity. With the primary
focus being on the Sami as an Indigenous people in Northern Norway, I situate Sami
historical events in relationship to the Alta Conflict within a historical and cultural nexus
of events. In this research a number of different concepts pertaining to shame and honor
are put into context first; then those are applied to the Alta Conflict and finally to the historical events in order to answer the question of the role honor and shame played in those events.

**Concepts of Shame and Honor**

**Colonialism and Shame**

Public opinion in the aftermath of the Guovdageaidnu uprising interpreted the event as an “outburst of unorganized, primitive rage” (Lehtola 41). Five of the Sami who participated in revolt were given death penalties; three of the sentences were eventually commuted to life in prison. Twenty-two of the other Sami who were involved received prison sentences. The youngest, age 18, was released when he was 33 years old. The leaders of the revolt, Ásllat Haetta and Mons Somby, were beheaded in 1854. “Their bodies were buried ‘outside’ of Bossegohppi cemetery” (Lehtola 41). They were, however, buried without their heads, because “their skulls were sent to Oslo for anthropological study” (Lehtola 41), since they were of scientific interest for their combined anatomical characteristics of being supposedly both a primitive people and criminals (Lehtola 41). The process of Sami colonization had begun.

From the 1500s onwards Nordic governments had attempted to bring the northern regions of Scandinavia under their influence. The first attempt was through the establishment of a church in 1252 in Tromsø, Norway and another in Vardo, Norway in 1307 as a technique to convert the Sami from traditional religious beliefs to the more predominant culturally established religion of Christianity (Beach 7). “The major transition of the Saami to Christianity, however, occurred in the 1600s, although
shamanism\(^3\) was to persist in places hundreds of years later” (Beach 7). It is important to note the role the church played in the early colonization process of the Sami. Beach points out that:

The Church played a prominent role in Saami education. The early markets, to be held once a year in fixed places, were occasions when the Saami also registered themselves and paid taxes to the Crown. It is evident that much of the colonial administration was facilitated by the Church. At this time, missionary activity was also a means for a kingdom to establish political control (through and with tax rights). (Beach 8)

It was a rather slow process; even well into the 1700s, courts consistently favored the Sami position over that of the colonists. Under the ideologies of Social Darwinism\(^4\) the formal colonization or Norwegianization, as it is sometimes called, of the Sami people began. There was an emphasis on the superiority of European individuals and societies. “This justified developing the ‘lower’ cultures since they were presumed to be dying” (Lehtola 44). Because of this, “…the Saami were often considered being of lower order, who should not be given the same legal status as Nordic peoples nor stand in the way of a higher civilization” (Beach 8). Civilizing Sami people into the ways of the dominant society was the intent behind Norwegianization policies, and remained so for about another century.

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3. “The traditional shamanism was an integral and essential part of the hunting culture. Shamanic activities were related to crisis situations in a village or family; the noaidi attempted to find a remedy. The greatest crisis for this people dependent on nature were illnesses and problems concerning obtaining a livelihood (Lehtola 28-29) The term ‘noaidi’ is the Sami word for shaman or spiritual leader (Lehtola 21).
4. Social Darwinism draws upon Darwin’s theory of “natural selection,” “survival of the fittest” and applies those theories to peoples and human cultures. Basically, it is the belief that people of certain races, lower status classes are considered to be biological inferior; whereas, wealthy and dominant peoples and cultures are biologically superior (Haldene 375). This can often result in paternalism, which is viewed in dominant peoples/cultures having a natural authority over inferior people/cultures, as a as a parents natural authority over their children. In action, Social Darwinism can lead to extreme acts of racism, slavery being one example. It should be noted that, Darwin was a strong opponent of slavery, and did not regard blacks “as any way inferior to whites” (Haldane 373, 375).
The main goal of Norwegianization was to assimilate the purportedly inferior and backwards Sami into the dominant culture. At first the Norwegian boarding school policies coerced the Sami into learning the Norwegian language; although they were not officially forced to give up speaking their language,⁵ they simply could not buy land from the State without the capacity to speak Norwegian—along with having limited ability to participate in the economic system. Later, Sami children were forced to attend boarding schools, where they could only speak Norwegian. It was not uncommon if Sami children were caught speaking their own language by their instructors, they were subject to belittling and/or punishment. This led to overt and covert racism, which caused many Sami to limit speaking their language in front of Norwegians (Lehtola 44-45). The Norwegianization policies that were enacted hampered the economic system of the Sami.

The traditional economy of the Sami was fishing and hunting, reindeer herding and crafting. In some areas of Norway the Sami were not allowed to settle as colonists. Norwegian settlement of the land was to establish an agricultural and farming system, which was seen as a superior way to utilize land and resources. The closing of the borders between Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia limited Sami hunting, some inland fishing, and reindeer herding. The coastal Sami (now thought of as foreigners) “could not own fishing equipment...they could only be assistants to Norwegians” (Lehtola 44). The laws furthered the social and economic divide between Samis and the Norwegians,

⁵. The Sami languages belong to the Finno-Ugrian language family. That means that Sami is related to Finnish, not the Scandinavian languages nor Russian or any Indo-European language. It is thought that the ancestors of the Sami and Finnish spoke a common language some 3000-4000 years ago. Once groups became isolated from one another they split into different dialects. Over time Sami languages borrowed from Germanic, Finnish, Scandinavian, and Russian languages. In time, languages became so different that some Sami peoples could not understand each other. “Ten Sami languages are distinguished by region and the main ones have been divided into different dialects; one of the languages, “is no longer a living language” (Lehtola 11).
and the Sami were legally reduced to the role of subordinate.

During this time in Norwegian history, Norway was experiencing a revitalization of their language. Beach states that because that due to the Norwegians historically being “…annexed by the Danes, only to be forced into union with the Swedes… combined with the fear of ‘Finnization’ brought a surge of Norwegian nationalistic fervor toward the turn of the century” (Beach 8). Norwegian as a language was experiencing “…a ‘renaissance’—all, unfortunately, to the detriment of the Saami who became severely stigmatized (Beach 8). The Sami soon realized that any kind of advancement in Norwegian society was only open “…to those who ‘went Norwegian’” (Beach 8). The combined effects of Norwegianization were clearly meant to assimilate the Sami, and eradicate their cultural identity. They were being made ashamed of being Sami on the most basic levels; their ways were regarded as “savage,” a racist tag often applied to Indigenous people.

Sami identity—like identity in all cultures—is rooted in language. Albert Memmi, author of many sociological studies centered on the subject of human oppression (Biography Reference Center, Memmi), makes the comment in his book Colonizer and the Colonized,

Whenever the colonizer states, in his language, that the colonized is a weakling he suggests thereby that this deficiency requires protection. From this comes the concept of a protectorate. It is in the colonized’s [sic] own interest that he be excluded from management functions, and that those heavy responsibilities be reserved for the colonizer. Whenever the colonizer adds…that the colonized is a wicked, backward person with evil, thievish, somewhat sadistic instincts, he thus
justifies his police and severity. After all, he must defend himself against the
dangerous foolish acts of the irresponsible, and at the same time—what
meritorious concern!—protect him from himself! (Memmi 81-82).

Memmi’s remark suggests that colonizers justify their actions in order not to feel anxiety,
or the pain that comes from being ashamed, due to their actions. Moreover, the colonizer
is able to displace any shame that may be experienced to that of the colonized—today,
these ideologies, besides generally being racist, construct the “other.”

Norwegian attempts to stigmatize and eradicate the Sami language had lasting and
widespread consequences on the identity of Sami individuals. Minde mentions,

It was not the <<real>> history of the Sami which was of significance, but rather
contemporary perception and experience of the Sami’s past. And within this
horizon of understanding, all things <<Sami>> were regarded as beggarly, old-
fashioned, reactionary and – in many circles - heathen. The asymmetric power
relations between Norwegians, the Norwegian general public and the Sami
relegated features of Sami culture to the private sphere, while attempts were made
to conceal that culture in the public sphere (Assimilation 10).

Minde contextualizes further explaining that, “the fear of being confronted with self-
denial of one’s Sami past or the shame associated with incidents from one’s
schooldays may be reasons why life interviews with people from the transitional
districts are so superficial and general when they touch on childhood and
schooldays” (Assimilation 10). He seems to be addressing the question of scholarly
evidence and articulation of Sami shame; he goes on to say that,
…during an interview with an elderly couple… the wife had said that her teacher laughed at and mimicked them because they knew only the Sami language when they started school (in the 1920s), [and] her husband interrupted her with the following reminder: “Enough has been said now. Let me tell you, your story has been so thorough and correct that you need add neither A nor B.” It was obvious that a subject had been broached in which they soon reached a pain threshold (qtd. Minde 1993:24f.). This type of reaction is typical of meetings between a dominant culture and a minority culture (Minde Assimilation 10-11).

The compulsion by many Sami to conceal their identity by mitigating their language in public or outright discarding it has far reaching cultural consequences. Even speaking fluent, un-accented Norwegian would not have been good enough to suppress the Sami identity; they also hid their manner of dress, crafts, religion, yoiks (vocal genre, also spelled “joik.”), along with other cultural identification in order to avoid public exposure and shaming.

**Shame and Honor**

Shame and honor, central foci of this research on Sami identity, are conceptual constructs that help define the norms and values of a culture. They are embedded in individuals who share the same ideologies, and together they make up the consciousness of a culture. Since an individual’s identity is psychologically part of the cultural consciousness, any break from the group means that there is the potential for psychological change, in both the individual and group. The concepts that are consistently referred to are: morality as a shame/honor concept; shame/honor as contrasting concepts; and, shame/honor as separate concepts. In order for shame/honor to
have an impact on an individual and/or group an audience is required, which determines whether shame/honor is warranted. In addition, higher beings, such as God, can also be an audience; and in most instances such social constructs would be an aspect of that society’s morality.

Thomas Scheff, Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, lists “sense of honor, sense of pride, and self-respect,” as examples of terms related to shame (92). Robert Michels says, “Shame is related to guilt, pride, and hubris” (2). Don Cohen identifies what he calls, “The Four Horses of Abasement, which are…shame, guilt, embarrassment, and humiliation” (1075). Kressel and Wikan note, “There is a proliferation of terms, such as shame, disrepute, disgrace, humiliation, bashfulness, humbleness, etc., on the one hand, and honour, esteem, nobleness, prestige, dignity, respect, glorification, eulogy, homage, etc. on the other hand” (168). To summarize, the range of shame/honor cognates described here connotes the diversity in which these concepts can be viewed and applied to actions, situations, and behaviors. The concepts of shame/honor are often written and portrayed as if they apply only to the individual; however, cultures are a collective of the individual consciousness, and as such, the effects from experiencing collective shame/honor is greater than that of the individual—the collective uses shame as a method for internal group control. This occurs because the group determines when shame/honor should be invoked, in order to create group control. You cannot have one without the “other”; and it is the “other,” the group’s opinion towards the individual, the individual’s opinion towards the group, and individual’s opinions of each other that matter—in other words, the interaction between individuals of a group. Michael J. Casimir and Susanne Jung say that,
Bearing all these warnings in mind, we have to be very careful when translating or rendering the culture-specific concepts in which we are interested here into our Western concepts of honour and dishonour. Nonetheless, we think that there is strong basis for inferring…that the central meanings and rules of conduct described and the overlapping central connotations found allow comparisons and some general statements, while still being able to describe some of the differences as well (267). Of the cognates listed, only a few are consistently referenced throughout this paper: The prime cognate is “recognition” since the term requires an audience. For “shame,” these terms are self-respect, or more precisely, a lack of self-respect, and because of the different ways that audiences recognize one another, one cognate that was not mentioned by Casimir and Jung, but I believe to be appropriate and will be included in this research, is “disrespect.” My reasons for the inclusion of “disrespect” in this study is, first, showing disrespect is a form of shaming, no matter the scale; second, not recognizing another is disrespect, which again is a form of shame. The same can be said of honor, in this instance giving recognition is a form of honor, no matter the grade. And, showing another respect is a form of honor, no matter the degree. As such, “honor” cognates also are consistently referenced in this study. Such prime terms are “respect,” “recognition,” “disrespect,” and “self-respect.” Other related terms just mentioned are normally reference in quotation marks, if the term is emphasized within the text being referenced; other than that those terms are rarely used.

Western philosophers for millennia consistently have equated shame with a painful emotion. Nathan Rotenstreich (1914-1993) sees shame as an emotional experience when one is depressed, dishonored, humiliated, disgraced, publically
criticized, and/or exposed for a misdeed. He further elaborates that “shame” is a “painful emotion,” whereby there is an understanding that the emotion stems from the misdeeds of one’s character (55). John Hollander, former Sterling Professor Emeritus of English at Yale and poet laureate of Connecticut (Poetry Foundation), also defines shame as being a “painful emotion” that results because of the capacity of self-conscious to know “dishonor and ridiculousness.” It is the circumstance in which the “modesty and decency” of a person has been offended; and it also comes from the honor or disgrace of others, when one considers it “one’s own” (1062). Arnold Isenberg, in “Natural Pride, Natural Shame,” agrees with the idea that shame is a painful emotion, noting that shame is a result of fear brought on by the thought that one’s own actions are viewed in the terms of the “other” (11). Léon Wurmser, Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, (Biography Reference Center Wurmser), sees shame as the fear of disgrace from being dishonored; the feeling that one senses when one is disrespected; a character trait that is meant to help prevent shameful acts; ignominious experience; and focus on a “respect toward others, and towards oneself” (121).

Again, focusing on historical Western philosophers, Casimir and Jung suggest that honor is not only how a person values his or her self-worth, but how society views that same self-worth; and how a person values his or her self-worth, or “inner honour,” is equated with “dignity” (232). Furthermore, honor is a fundamental and intrinsic characteristic found in all of all humans (232). While honor may be found in all humans, it comes in the form of hierarchy. Casimir and Jung provide evidence of this when writing,
In the Christian tradition of the Middle Ages, however, honour should belong to God alone; and blasphemy, the violation of His honour, was related to the arch sin of human pride and arrogance…it was also proclaimed that “His Grace” provided honour and status to the ruling elite because of their virtues, and it can be seen that honour and dignity were always distributed unevenly…They had social value and were linked to power and economics (232-233).

Under this interpretation it can be assumed that honor is distributed in a hierarchal manner. Honor distributed out of hierarchy, would start with God then go to royalty to nobility, and to workers and peasants. Honor, in modern polity terms begins with the international political body⁶, then National, regional and local political body. Hierarchy in economics terms would begin with corporations and corporate executives. Down the ladder are managers and foremen, then workers (statuses rendered in each case can be determined in relation to income). Finally, the unemployed and those in poverty have the least status. When considering the Alta Conflict, the international political arena sat atop the ladder (due to the United Nation Declaration of Human Rights—as is discussed later). From there it descended to the national (Norwegian), regional, and local political bodies. Citizens (Sami and Norwegian) are at the bottom rung. In addition, each of the actors just mentioned comprise an audience, an essential shame/honor concept.

From a shame/honor perspective the concept of “the other” requires that two agents recognize each other; and, from my perspective, the degree of recognition given can vary from extreme respect to disrespect when: (1) group[s] of equal status recognize each other; (2) group[s] of unequal status recognize each other; (3) individual[s] of equal status recognize each other; (4) individual[s] of unequal status recognize each other; (5)
individual[s] and group[s] of equal status recognize each other; and, (6) individual[s] and group[s] of unequal status recognize each other; (7) when the degree to which individual[s] and/or group[s] feel the pain that results from shame can vary from no pain to extreme pain; (8) when the degree of pride/self-esteem individual[s] and group[s] have can vary from not having any to having an extreme amount; and (9) when the desire of individual[s] or group[s] to gain honor can vary from no desire to an extreme desire.

**Shame as a Moral Concept**

The “impression of dishonor” can give rise to the “element of pain,” or the fear of being shamed in the eye of the judging public (Lansky, Morrison 167). “To lose our reputation is just the other face of dishonor; it is dishonor per se and a result of the deed which gave rise to the impression of shame” (Rotenstreich 71). This means that conceptualization of shame can be internalized as a fear of experiencing an emotional moral concern (Lansky, Morrison 167). Shame resulting from doing something that is not honorable alienates the individual from the group, and the alienation goes hand in hand with the growing of virtue—giving for the greater good. When a person actively avoids alienation, then he or she will seek conformity to group norms, and in doing so become virtuous in the eyes of a judging public. In this way a person is contributing to the greater good of the group, he or she is showing pride for the group. This cannot happen if a person is not concerned with his or her own virtue. Therefore, pride helps a person actively replace shame with virtue, thereby, contributing to the virtue of the group. From this perspective, the purpose of pride is to provide hope in attaining virtue. Unlike shame, this moves us to virtue through anxiety. If one can feel a sense of shame then one will be filled with the sense of wanting to live honorably (Hanson 155-156; Isenberg, 6).
Perhaps this is what Karen Hanson means when she says, “It may be possible, thus to take some pride in shame” (155-156).

Peter French’s assessment posits that shame arises as a result of a person’s realization that he or she has come up short of some standard deemed important. Those unable to feel this emotion are not committed to any sort of standard, leaving them prone to a sub-standard “moral sense.” The key here is that violating a commitment to a standard lowers one’s opinion of oneself, so having shame shows that an individual is seriously committed to maintaining the standards that produce honor. Shame makes us aware of our shortcomings and leaves us feeling deficient because of them. This is what French calls, “shame’s painful emotive element” (9). Therefore, “honor is typically intertwined with shame and mirrors many of its characteristics” (French 5). French says that the “audience” is also an essential element of shame. The audience determines the parameters around why someone warrants critical evaluation and the severity of the sanctions imposed for violating norms. The agent can also critically evaluate oneself against group norms (French 9). This means that an agent can evaluate his or her moral compass against that of the group. Shame lets an individual know when the moral compass of oneself and/or the group has been breached; if not, then the individual becomes the “other” in the eyes of the group. This allows individuals to find others with compatible ideologies, in part, because the judging audience is pointing them out.

Honor as a Moral Concept

The philosopher Immanuel Kant is often referred to as the “spokesman of guilt cultures,” which structure morality according to the definitions provided by the legal system. Guilt ties to honor/shame in important ways, and yet not all philosophers,
sociologists, and anthropologists, classify honor as having an intrinsic moral worth.

According to David Sussman,

> The general picture that emerges from Kant is that concern for honour is an embryonic form of moral concern which should ultimately be assimilated into a properly moral conception of self-respect. Desire for honour, taken as a longing for the actual esteem of others (and the public tokens of such esteem) needs to develop into proper love of honour. The primary concern of this love is that we should do nothing that would objectively merit the scorn of others, regardless of how they actually come to think of us (301).

For Kant the love of honor is the anticipation for moral concern which in turn inspires people to “respect social etiquette.” As Kant understands it, virtue is honor’s constant companion and is the key to “sociability” (Sussman 299-301). Sara Scott, psychotherapist at the United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy (Biography Reference Center Scott) says, “To be accepted, we need to comply with a social order that accords us respect or shame...” This means that shame is linked with “…unconscious codes of honor…shame is the absence of self-love. Without self-love we have no pride. Pride is linked to our sense of self-respect, which is dependent on the respect we gain from others” (89). Scott’s notion of self-love is similar to Kant’s love of honor. For her, pride is internal; it centers on an individual’s pride or self-respect; unlike social etiquette, which is external, it requires an audience. The process seems to be circular in that social etiquette is also the staging of the internalized self-respect. Both Scott and Kant more or less are saying the same thing; they both see pride as the motivation behind acquiring honor. However, Scott’s thinking is more seamless in that it focuses on the quality of an
individual’s self-worth which then produces a sense of self-love, a component needed for self-pride. In contrast, Kant’s thinking seems to be more linear; one has no other choice but to have a love for honor and the overt sense of pride needed to acquire it.

When looking at Robert Ashley’s treatise, “Of Honour,” French found that there were two concerns in regard to upper-class late-Elizabethan men. One was that they were simply bestowing honor upon themselves, which had no real value or meaning. The second was that they were engaged in overly zealous pursuit of social recognition and honors. Both were considered to be serious moral mistakes or inadequacies. “Ashley claimed that honor is the most divine of attributes because it is offered up both to God and to those who are held in the highest regard among humans” (1-2). For Ashley, external means that one’s respect transcends social etiquette. God is the determinant of respect. It is possible that an individual can have the respect of an audience, but not of God, and vice versa. Because of this, a person is not dependent upon the audience for respect; it can be achieved by the individual from within.

Some scholars do not, however, see shame as a moral concept. E. L. Constable, for example, uses the term “double shame,” as a description which he sees as “the causes of the other’s humiliation, and that of one’s own indignity at allowing that humiliation to occur to the individuals, groups, or causes, one respects…such experiences of shame and humiliation do not yield moral lessons, a morality, or moral maxims, nor do they tap affectivity in a simplistic appeal to one’s emotions” (649). Courage, not morals, is what’s at work here. It is the ability of an individual consistently to push, prod, or goad him- or herself into not letting down his or her principles or expectations in the face of the audience/other, then remake or remold one’s own sense of responsibilities, in regards
to the other (Constable 649). French also gives an example of why he considers shame not to be a moral issue, stating, “It is generally agreed that shame, rather than involving transgressions of moral codes or laws, relates to failures, shortcomings, feelings of inadequacy and inferiority, and the unwanted exposure of weaknesses or the fear of such revelations” (5). Seeing shame and honor as inextricably linked helps to clarify both terms.

**Shame, Honor as Contrasting Concepts**

According to French, “Honor is typically twinned with shame and mirrors many of its characteristics” (5). The bulk of the literature that looks at historical aspects of shame/honor often associate shame with women and honor with men. If shame/honor are analyzed through a gendered lens, then it means any discussion surrounding the concepts, should be viewed as contrasting terms or at least on a continuum between feminine and masculine poles. One of the most recognizable examples in western society is the Genesis story found in the Bible. When assessing Masaccio’s painting “Expulsion from the Garden of Eden,” Agnes Heller and Hollander provide an example when noting that Adam and Eve avoided eye contact as they covered their nakedness in shame. Before Adam and Eve ever experienced the pangs of shame, honor and chastity were unknown. No morals were needed, as there were no “others” to level blame upon them; Eve and Adam could not be publically disgraced as there was no public. In essence, prior to their expulsion from the Garden, Adam and Eve were a kind of “single self” (Heller 1015; Hollander 1065, 1066). Halvor Moxnes goes further in looking at the connection between gender and shame/honor concepts in her article “Honor and Shame,” and sees “the basis for the link between men and honor, on the one hand, and between shame and
women, on the other, in cosmological presuppositions.” Basically, this means that males are seen as having the primary role in procreation; whereas women have only a secondary role, making them inferior and leaving them susceptible to the feelings of shame (Moxnes 32). Paul Friedrich makes a similar comparison when discussing “honor” in Iliadic culture, noting that, “Women do have honor by precedence, and they may win honor by good works, such as fine weaving… but the main concern of women is not increasing or exulting in her honor but with keeping from losing it, with not dishonoring men on whom she depends” (295). Such a strong female/shame and male/honor dichotomy results from power disparities between women and men in patriarchal societies. For the Sami, colonization disrupted the normal and traditional roles that Sami men and women had long held. When considering the changes in Sami traditional society, Rauna Kuokkanen in *Sámi Women, Autonomy, and Decolonization in the Age of Globalization* points out that “Christian ideology … introduced a hierarchical understanding of genders, prioritizing men and resulting in a feeling of low self-esteem for many Sámi women” (4). She goes further to state that both Laestadianism and Christianity have “…affected Sámi society for several generations” (Kuokkanen 4) affecting modern “…perceptions of and attitudes toward women in Sámi society (Kuokkanen 4). This is also consistent with colonist relationship with indigenous cultures; and modern nation-states relationship with indigenous peoples. In short, if shame and honor are analyzed against gender it means any discussion surrounding the concepts can be contextualized as contrasting terms.

Associating shame with women and honor with men has remained entrenched in English literature and linguistics throughout the ages. One reason for this is that the
English word “shame,” which is of German origin, is cognate with their word “scham” 6 and which has the connotation of physical and sexual modesty. The word Schand, a cognate of Scham generally “has the ‘public’ meaning of disgrace, dishonor, discredit, ignominy, infamy, insult, etc.” (Hollander 163). However, in modern English from about the mid-fifteenth century to World War I, it was easy to think of honor as gendered.

Male honor tended to come through battle, business, and/or following various group codes, and female honor tended to come through chastity meaning that women’s honor was dependent on men. Hollander gives an example of this when saying, “Until fairly recently to marry a woman one had slept with or impregnated was to make an honest women of her, it was not that she would subsequently desist from lying, cheating or stealing, but simply that she would be, by virtue of being married, chaste” (161-168). From this perspective female honor is dependent upon male honor; and male shame is dependent on female chastity (Hollander 1061-1068). In either case, when the concepts of shame and honor are assessed from a gender perspective, the two can be viewed as contrasting concepts.

When referring to the writings of philosophers such as St. Thomas and Baruch Spinoza, Nathan Rotenriech notes, “shame [serves] as the phenomenon opposite of honor.” Spinoza thought that pleasure accompanied with the fear of experiencing shame meant that people “will style honor;” a contrary emotion, however, “will style shame” (58). This is consistent with Friedrich’s assessment, which indicates that the rules that

6. The Germanic word shame (scham/schand), most likely, derives from the Indo-European meaning “to cover.” Hollander (1064, 1072) says, “It is out of a shameful sort of shamefulness that Germanic languages reached out desperately to cover the nakedness of their bodily terminology with the cloak of Latinity, even to the extent of calling sexual organs pudenda, paralleled by the use of shame as a noun to designate sexual parts,” which meant one “should either feel ashamed, be ashamed, or ashamed to mention), was typically a medical term, which nearly always referred to female genitals.” The German language incorporated the term pudenda into its vocabulary, enough so that they called sexual organs “pudenda,” “paralleled by the use of shame as a noun to designate sexual parts. German, Yiddish, Hebrew, and some Slavic language all have variants of “scham” and “schand” (1064, 1072).
govern what is and what is not appropriate conduct can often be viewed as “codes of honor.” Breaking the covenant can injure an individual’s honor leaving a feeling of shame, humiliation, disgrace, and so on (281). Focusing on the New Testament, Halvor Moxnes referred to J. C. Barona’s claim “that honor and shame on the one hand and society on the other are linked in a dialectic relationship” (19-26). This means the concepts of both shame and honor are societal codes that establish the boundaries of a distinct group of peoples. Another consideration is that the root word of shame (scham) is also paired with honor; although the relationship derives in a different way. In this case shame is associated with women; it is gender related, and as such the only contrast to women (except for maybe children) are men. Consequently, shame/honor can be assessed as contrasting concepts. But this does not mean that shame/honor has to pair together as contrasting concepts; instead, both concepts can be viewed and assessed separately.

**Shame, Honor as Separate Concepts**

Unni Wikan, social anthropologist at the University of Oslo (Biography Wikan), questions whether shame and honor are contrasting concepts. She thinks it is possible too much focus is placed on honor, as if it were the dominant force of the two terms, perhaps because shame does not carry the same allure. This means that since honor is usually the more heavily weighted force of the two, they are less likely to be paired with each other and therefore assessed as separate concepts. Thus, the notion that shame and honor need to be compared and assessed as contrasting concepts is now being questioned. Wikan does, however, say that this perspective has not gone away; instead, it is mostly seen in
honor cultures, such as in some Mediterranean societies (635-636). According to her, the
distinction that separates shame/honor is that each relate differently to behavior.

Whereas honour is an aspect of the person, shame applies to the act only…since
both shame and honor are ascribed through social interaction, any assessment of
either must be anchored in a contextual analysis to determine, in each instance,
the nature of the public which has the power to grant or withhold honour or shame
(635-636).

Halvor Moxnes also thinks the concept of honor should be looked at as a system. For
him, the core element of honor is public recognition by someone of the same social
standings. This comes from a person’s level of honor, what is commonly called
“ascribed honor,” a form of honor that a person is born with. At this time the person’s
“general status honor,” is acquired, which is the status a person possesses in the eyes of
the dominant group. It stems from group membership, not from something any
individual has done. This stands in contrast to honor based on one’s own deeds, or
acquired honor. This type of honor can be won on a daily basis depending upon one’s
actions in the eyes of the judging public. Crook backs up both Wikan and Moxnes in
mentioning that honor can be either ascribed or acquired. For her ascribed honor is not as
dynamic as acquired honor, which is contested daily (593). Wikan, Moxnes, and Crook’s
viewpoint is that the dominant group determines the status of both individuals and
groups. In other words, one is not reliant upon the other; honor can be acquired on its
own, and it does not automatically imply that shame is being alleviated because of its
presence. Likewise, the alleviation of shame does necessarily translate into honor.
Hence, social interactions are the determining factor as to whether an individual or group’s status is either gained or lost.

Focusing on theories of biblical scholars and philosophers, Crook distinguished between what she calls, “honor virtue” and “honor precedence.” Similar to acquired honor is honor precedence. It is seen as being external, as always being on display in the public arena, or what she calls the “public court of reputation.” In this way honor is contested, it is antagonistic in nature and can be won or lost because of it. In contrast, honor virtue relates only to one’s internal consciousness, how honor can be acquired through one’s god, which means that one’s thoughts and deeds are always exposed. The benefit in making this distinction is that it allows for more specificity in how the honor and shame dynamic is understood. Crook concluded that honor precedence, “creates a tension between ideal and practiced.” Tension, then, creates the scenario whereby individuals of lower status can challenge those of the upper class through the “public court of reputation” (597-609).

Another concept of honor is what Baxter and Margavio calls “status honor,” or the social rankings which connect a person to the group through respect, and where respect is aspects of both appreciation and contempt. They go on further to say that, “Status honor implies a social ranking which ties persons to groups in relations of deference where elements of appreciation or derogation obtain.” The concepts of honor that are either ascribed or acquired contain similar aspects to that of status honor. Like ascribed honor, status honor is based on one’s birth attributes; and similar to acquired honor, or honor won or lost on a daily basis, status honor is also concerned with education, occupation, accomplishments, and so forth. Additionally, there is an
emotional component, which arises when a person’s character is put on display during social interactions with others (400).

**Distinguishing between Shame and Guilt Concepts, Shame and Guilt Cultures**

According to Sussman, shame/honor cultures are concerned with an agent’s character. The group then assesses the agent with respect to the social roles that she/he occupies. It is worth mentioning that when a group focuses on an individual they are in essence creating the “other.” Any ethical failings are viewed, not as a transgression, but as an incapacity of the “other” to meet the expectations of the group—groups can also be considered the “other” by either an individual or a less dominant group. In contrast, guilt cultures view morality through the lens of a formalized legal system, emphasizing ideas of authority, obligation, and responsibility. Cultures such as these understand moral faults primarily as “transgressions” or “failings of the will” creating differences between shame/honor and guilt cultures (299-300). The former puts a great deal of responsibility on the group when considering individuals who are incapable of meeting the expectations of a group. The latter puts responsibility on the individual to meet the expectations of the group. Although, a formal legal system does allow for an individual to remedy his or her moral failings, the literature in this study found no references that guilt cultures take into account whether an individual has the capacity to meet the expectations of the group. This in turn leaves certain individuals in the realm of being the “other,” with little ability to remedy the situation. Both styles of cultures can also be put in terms of being either “individualistic” or “collectivistic” in nature.

Using ancient Mediterranean societies in comparison with modern North American societies, Crook makes the distinction that collectivistic social structure do not
mean individuals have no sense of self; nor does it suggest that individuals are void of ambitions. As a whole though, collectivistic people tend to govern, or be governed, by communal expectations, instead of individual desires and aspirations (598-599). “These are tendencies: the ancient Mediterranean was no more 100 percent collectivistic than modern North America society is 100 percent individualistic” (Crook 599). Crook further explains that, “There are elements of each found in the other, but the occurrence of collective concerns among North Americans (e.g., peer pressure) does not diminish the dominance of individualistic ideology” (599).

Honor cultures, according to Crook, are “…defined by the seriousness with which the people who inhabit it protect their honor and fight to retrieve it if it has been lost. This phenomenon can only exist in concert with the perception that access to honor is limited” (593). This implies that people of a group feel one another’s shame and honor intensely. In contrast,

If there is enough honor to go around, losing a little here and there would carry no consequences. This is an important distinction to draw, for it is also what distinguishes honor and shame cultures from non-honor and shame cultures: a non-honor and shame culture might well know honor and shame, but it does not see honor as a limited good and thus does not contest it with the same intensity (Crook 593).

To précis, this lessens the need for an individual to contest honor with another individual and can be viewed as both individualistic and collectivistic in nature. This occurs because individuals of a group are not competing over a limited resource—honor in this case—instead, all individuals of a group are equally capable of remedying shame and/or
gain honor. The Sami, due to over a century of colonization and forced integration, were well enmeshed into the Norwegian culture that adheres to a formal legal system associated with guilt cultures. Therefore, Sami people are part of a guilt culture to one extent or another, an extent difficult to assess. However, Norway is also a social welfare state; they take responsibility for all Sami and Norwegians individuals alike, which can be said to have aspects of shame/honor cultures. From this perspective the Sami culture and Norwegian culture have features of both shame/honor and guilt cultures. The need to address whether the Sami culture is a shame/honor or a guilt culture would be redundant; the same could be said of the Norwegian culture. Therefore, I did not focus on whether Sami and mainstream Norway cultures are either shame/honor and/or guilt cultures, since neither shame/honor or guilt cultures are fully individualistic or collectivistic. For purposes of this study, shame and guilt are considered as separate concepts, because despite the fact that guilt definitely played a role during the Alta conflict (as some of the Sami activists did break the law), honor/respect, in lieu of shame, was the main motivation and driving force for Sami peoples. Thus, analyzing the shame/guilt as contrasting concepts can become muddled. So in order to paint a clearer picture of shame’s role during the conflict it is more advantageous to analyze the shame/guilt as separate concepts.

Shame and guilt are often paired with each other; yet the two concepts can be distinguished from one another. Scheff highlights these differences when commenting that shame creates a sense of weakness, a detachment from one’s identity, a hope that one could disappear altogether. Shame is a social emotion that makes people emotionally interdependent. The interdependence of those experiencing shame is consistent with
shame concepts already put forth; as individuals experiencing these emotions unite because of it. Alternatively, guilt is associated with an act, and concerns itself with what a person did or did not do; it is normally very specific and stays close to the surface. There is a sense of power in guilt, in that an individual has the ability to produce harm, or whatever it takes to bring guilt to the surface, then has the power to make amends in order to rectify the situation. It is very individualist in nature and confirms the significance of the isolated individual (92).

The main difference here is that guilt is about the individual not the group as a whole, whereas, shame can be experienced by both individuals and groups. An individual can alleviate guilt through a set process that everyone has agreed to follow (the law) to ameliorate it. It is a series of prescribed steps meant to address the guilt of an individual. Similarly, shame cultures also have prescribed steps to address issues associated with shame. Traditionally, in some shame cultures honor can be attained through ways such as ceremony, council, and an agent’s active attempt to regain and/or earn honor. Concerning the Sami, no literature was found that directly addressed the way Sami society apply shame to an individual, or how one can free themselves from shame, traditionally or contemporarily. Although, a modern Canadian Aboriginal community helps paint a clearer picture of how some modern indigenous peoples are trying to liberate a person from their shame, and replace that shame with honor.

The Canadian Aboriginal community was experiencing excessively high rates of abuse, often sexual, and often within families. There is an underpinning of drug and alcohol abuse, and family violence behind the community’s problems. This prompted a loose coalition of community members to team up actively to confront the problem.
The community strategy the team developed involves a detailed protocol leading all the participants through a number of steps or stages. They include the initial disclosure of abuse, protecting the child, confronting the victimizer, assisting the (non-offending) spouse, assisting the families of all concerned, coordinating the team approach, assisting the victimizer to admit and accept responsibility, preparing the victim, victimizer, and families for the…Special Gathering through the creation of a Healing Contract, implementation of the healing contract, and finally, holding a Cleansing Ceremony…” (Ross 32-33).

The goal is meant to restore the balance and to involve all—the victim, victimizer, families, and community. It is a holistic approach, using ceremonies and formal group circles as a way to communicate clearly with each other. Just as importantly the community approach was often chosen over incarceration by judges. And by all accounts, when compared with the Canadian provincial and local legal systems, this process was quite successful (Ross 33-44).

Michael Lewis says that shame is a product of cognitive understanding of the need to evaluate one’s own actions in regard to one’s own set of standards and rules. The process of self-evaluation against the global evaluation of oneself results in the individual’s experiencing very negative and painful emotions. In fact, Lewis stresses in great detail the physical effects resulting from shame: avoidance of eye contact, confusion, lack of sleeping ability, and a wish to disappear or even die. He goes on to say, “Individuals do take specific actions when shamed by which they try to undo the state…shame is not produced by any specific situation but rather by the individual’s interpretation of a situation. Even more important, shame is not necessarily related
to the public or private nature of the situation” (75-76). While guilt may be closely associated with shame, it nonetheless is not considered in this study.

**Assessing the Concepts of Shame and Honor**

Both Constable and French put forth the idea that the concept of shame is not of a moral concern. Constable says that shame does not impart any morals for either groups or individuals, but he does not say why the concept is not a moral issue. He simply says that shame does not tap into or appeal to one’s emotions, and provides no example as to why shame is not a moral maxim, leaving his notion of shame as something unto itself (649). French provides a little more understanding about why the concept of shame does not produce a sense of morals saying,

…shame rather than involving transgressions of moral codes or laws, relates to failures, shortcomings, feeling, of inadequacy and inferiority, and the unwanted exposure of weaknesses or the fear of such revelations. Suffering shame is an identity crisis. Shame anxiety…is a feeling of radical isolation from one’s social image…an experience of the disappearance of self (5).

Looked at this way, shame is part of an individual, or an individual’s emotion, which is seen as being separate from the morals one is meant to abide by (French 5). In other words, being ashamed does not ultimately make the individual more moral. Because of this, morality as a shame/honor concept is not considered in every instance, although, when appropriate this study does integrate and assess through the lens of morality as a shame/honor concept.

Like shame, the concept of honor as part of morality is consistently found in the literature. The literature that supports honor as a moral concept describes it very in
similar manners. For example, the desire to acquire honor will thwart individuals from committing any misdeeds or violating a social moral. Similarly, the seeking of honor means that if one is capable of feeling the pain of shame, then out of fear of experiencing shame one avoids committing any shameful acts. In addition, honor derives out of a search for approval or esteem from the other, the audience that either bestows honor on individuals, or voids it—shaming being one way of doing so. Perhaps this is the reason Kant says that one needs to develop a “proper love of honor” in order to gain or maintain a sense of social decency. Kant’s “love of honor”—the idea that if one loves honor one will seek out honor and social decency—is what Sara Scott means by self-love. The thought here is that for one actively to seek being socially accepted, the procurement of self-love/self-respect is a highly valued and a needed element for sociability (social decency). It is compliance with a social order that determines the level of respect or shame accorded to an individual (Scott 89). This means that shame is linked with unconscious codes of honor, and, “that shame is the absence of self-love. Without self-love we have no pride. Pride is linked to our sense of self-respect, which is dependent on the respect we gain from others” (Scott 89). The absence of self-love then is an absence of the love of honor. No self-love—no love of honor—no respect. Both perspectives are virtually the same in that the end goal of each is for an individual to gain and/or maintain honor and pride, which creates a desire to avoid shame. But by transcending self-interest or the desire to pursue honor for its own sake, one avoids making moral misdeeds.

Shame and honor as moral concepts make up the bulk of the literature reviewed and are viewed in the following framework: shame leads one out of honor, and the breaking of moral codes; or, honor leads one out of shame, and the observance of moral
codes. The majority of those readings use gender as a marker for shame/honor, then the coupling of these concepts become written as if they are two sides of one coin. Another consistency found in the literature is that both shame and honor require an audience whose opinions decide the boundaries as to whether shame or honor should be invoked or revoked. By “audience” I am referring to a cultural context or community “staging” area of honor and shame. These trends are consistent with Western ideologies and literature; however, literature fixed on contemporary concepts of honor and shame now questions whether they are contrasting aspects of each other. Wikan thinks that the connotations surrounding honor make it more alluring than shame; making it easier for them to be assessed as separate concepts (635). Both shame and honor as moral concepts are considered in this study. The following are the synonyms of shame/honor; and the terms associated with shame/honor concepts that are the focus of this study.

1. Shame—disrespect, lack of respect, humiliate, lack of recognition
   a. Audience: court of public opinion, judging public,
   b. Moral aspect: following cultural codes, breaking cultural codes

2. Honor—respect, disrespect, recognize
   a. Ascribed Honor—predetermined by a larger audience, status honor
   b. Acquired Honor or Honor Precedence—external and contested,
   c. Moral aspects—following cultural codes, breaking cultural codes

Methods

In order to assess the role of shame and honor during the Alta affair, this study performs a literature review consisting mainly of secondary resources as the approach for gathering information. First, I present an historical background of the Sami, then a
review of Sami colonization using shame/honor concepts. A discussion, then a conclusion follows. The bulk of the literature in this study was retrieved from the University of Montana library, which contains an extensive database. In addition, literature was gathered from the University of Tromsø library, which has a comprehensive database, and a literary section devoted solely to Sami and indigenous peoples. I reviewed only English language literature, because the predominance of Sami and Norwegian literature is also written and/or translated in English and, moreover, I do not read Norwegian. Literature that focused on the concepts of shame and honor was compiled from the University of Montana. Research that focused on Sami peoples and the Alta conflict was retrieved from both the University of Tromsø and the University of Montana. Also, literature centered on other indigenous peoples, in addition to the Sami, was attained only from the University of Montana.

The methodology used in this study is based on a “relativist viewpoint,” in that data for understanding the Sami struggle for recognition up to and through the Alta conflict is limited, and is being tentatively seen as a struggle of an Indigenous people, yet a people influenced by European values and norms. Lewis provides a basis for understanding why a relativist methodology is appropriate. According to him, each individual and group experiences honor—an American adult as well as a Sami child—and the fact of experiencing honor (and one might add “shame”) is true for every culture (194). But while each individual and culture experiences shame and honor, those experiences are still relative to the context within which each individual and each group live, because relativism considers the emotional state of individuals and groups, and emphasizes that emotional states are “related to what causes them” (194). So from a
relativist viewpoint, shame and honor may be experienced by each individual and group, yet the degree, and perhaps type, of shame and honor experienced is relative to each individual and group. This is also true of honor; in this instance the desire and the importance of honor, pride, self-esteem is relative to each individual and group. Knowing this, a relativist approach allowed for the flexibility to generalize shame/honor concepts associated with the actions and events relative to the the Alta Conflict, without having to parse the degree to which each individual/culture experienced shame and honor during the Alta conflict. Further study of the Sami recognition process would best include Norwegian and Sami language materials; thus, this study rests on above stated limitations.

Applying a relativist approach also contextualizes the differences between individual and cultures (groups) and connects those differences, i.e., feelings and emotions are found in all individuals, yet, groups as a whole are usually not associated with having feelings or emotions. Using a relativist approach, allows for the presumption that an individual’s experience of shame/honor is the same as that of the group. In other words, crowds can be said to have moods or be angry—e.g., the Ku Klux Klan displays and acts on these types of emotions. Further, honor/shame in one group can also be compared with another group; while groups may experience shame/honor differently, that experience is relative to a variety of conditions. Colonialism is an example of how various conditions produce various experiences, and how those experiences are relative to the individual or group. Samis exemplify this, since colonialism experienced by Sami peoples is different from what American Indians experienced, i.e., the level of violence experienced, the amount of land, resources, and/or cultural losses experienced, and
injustices suffered, etc. However, shame/honor concepts are general enough that individual, individual/group, or group/group experiences of shame/honor are relatively the same or, can be seen as differing in degree but not type. This allows shame/honor concepts to be contextualized and applied to individual relationships, individual/group relationships, and group/group relationships.

Sami History

The Sami are one people divided by four borders—Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia—and are the only ethnic group to be recognized as an indigenous people in the European Union (Lehtola 9). Sami identity was recognized in western literature as far back as the Roman era, Veli-Pekka Lehtola writes. Cornelius Tacitus referred to the Sami in the book *Germania*, which first appeared in 98 A.D. Evidently the “Sámi entered into the trade circle of the Romans,” and furs were the basis for trade, a fact which then developed into the Sami being designated as a ‘wilderness supplier’ culture. This is reflected in archeological finds from the Iron Age found throughout the Sami area. For about the next thousand years Sami life revolved around hunting, fishing, and gathering. The emergence of states brought about changes for the Sami and their interests. As the fourteenth century drew to a close, “State borders in the North were still undefined.” However, by the 1500s, sizeable change prevailed for basically two reasons: One, the Sami began to domesticate reindeer; and two, Norwegians, Swedes, Finns and Russians began to encroach and settle into the Sápmi (Sami homelands), pushing them further north. For centuries, Sami and settler alike generally lived peacefully next to each other, even intermingling at times. The idea of State territoriality, at the time, tolerated Sami territoriality. Even well into the 1700s, when conflicts arose local, and the rising
state courts would consistently rule in favor of the Sami; mostly in relation to land and resource disputes (Karppi 394-396; Lehtola 22-32; Pietikäinen 637).

Things began to change in 1751 when “special rights” for Sami were included in the Lapp Codicil—an appendix of the Strömstad Border Treaty. Irja Seurujärvi-Kari, lecturer in Sami Studies at the University of Helsinki, says that, “…in the present political context [the codicil] has been called the Magna Charta of the Saami…” (Lapp 185). According to Lehtola, “The most important article concerned the Sami’s rights to move freely across the borders. It guaranteed the rights of the Sami to move in their traditional way, disregarding the borders from the inlands to the coast, and confirmed their right to hunt, move reindeer herds and even to sell” (Lehtola 36). But the drawback of the Lapp Codicil was that it demarcated the borders between Norway and Sweden. So, while the treaty sought to foster the conservation and preservation of the Sami people, it also separated them into different political systems (Lehtola 36). This separation produced a political challenge for the Sami, because while the treaty provided them with political recognition and a heightened social status, the newly formed border separated the Sami into different political systems with different policies and laws.

The traditional governmental system of the Sami called siida consisted of families and extended families that had designated boundaries. Before the Codicil, treaty borders were designed to follow siida boundaries; now, Sami reindeer herders, fishermen, hunters, had to follow designated borders, with designated, but different regulations. In the 1800s, Sami peoples were again separated when Sápmi (Sami homeland) was divided into four parts. This was a result of Finland becoming part of the Russian Empire; and, the demarcation of Norwegian and Swedish borders in 1751. In 1826, an area that had
been jointly taxed by Russia and Norway was made a part of Norway (Henriksen 28; Seurujärvi-Kari Lapp 9). This further separated Sami peoples and fostered the likelihood of conflict and social injustice. The border agreements in 1852 made the boundaries of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia (where the Sami still live today) and negated the Strömstad Treaty. As a result, reindeer herders were not allowed to cross borders, and Norway made it more difficult for foreign people to fish in the Arctic Ocean, including Sami. Conflict inevitably led to the closing of the Norwegian and Finnish border, which in turn caused cultural upheaval in Sami society. Lehtola comments that “the border closures cut off traditional, long migration routes which had shaped reindeer Sami society for hundreds of years” (Lehtola 36). It was not just a coincidence that the Guovdageaidnu uprising happen a few months after the border closing that affected hundreds of Sami reindeer herding families. The closing of border crossing also signaled the end of fishing for the Sami in the Arctic Ocean on the Finnish side of the border. Norway had already restricted fishing rights on some of the most important waterways used by the Sami by 1871. “The first official regulations for the Deatnu in 1872-1873 brought an end to the fishing weirs stretching clear across the river that were jointly used from the Norwegian and Finnish sides (Lehtola 37). In addition, Sami living on the Norwegian side and the Sami living on the Swedish side used the resources in conjunction with one another (Lehtola 37). The loss of this ability disrupted not only their economic system, but cultural continuity of their culture, and all are examples of food and social injustice.

Beginning in the 1850s, for nearly a century, Sami peoples living in Norway were continually subjected to Norwegianization policies. One such policy forced children into
boarding schools and, for the most part, left the Sami people illiterate in their own language and bereft of their cultural knowledge. They were also expected to succeed in a school system where competency and success were determined through the language and culture of the majority population (Norwegian). In the early 1900s the Sami began to organize politically for social and economic reasons. Between 1906 and 1908 they established five different local organizations. Throughout the first half of the 20th century the Sami kept organizing to confront Norwegian assimilation policies, and restore their ability of self-determination, in order to manage their affairs within their own cultural and social framework. Only after WWII, when human rights became an international concern, did Nordic states start taking notice of Sami issues. By the late 1980s a Sami parliament was established. At that point Sami identity had gone from their being overshadowed by the cultural genocidal policies of assimilation to their being included in the Norwegian Constitution to their realizing policies directed positively toward Sami issues. In other words, the Sami identity went through a process of political recognition. For the next couple of decades the Sami would come to play an important role in helping to bring about the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Today, it is still a significant document in its final version, for both content and collaboration. Notably, the UNDRIP extends human rights to include collective rights; it also brings recognition to the colonial injustices suffered by much of the world’s populations (United Nations Draft declaration). The ethics of nation-states take a step forward. While the declaration is not legally binding, it nonetheless puts pressure on nation-states to recognize indigenous peoples, such as the Sami, as being socially and culturally distinct and having a right to continue as distinct
peoples. Such recognition allows indigenous peoples the capacity for self-determination in order to maintain or adapt their cultural identity as they see fit.

**Shame, Honor, and the Politics of Sami Identity: Before, During and After the Alta Conflict**

Before the Second World War few examples exist that the Sami compared their situation with other indigenous peoples. According to Minde the first signal that a Sami indigenous identity began to surface can be found in the 1963 journal of “The Sami People.” The article referred to the Sami as the “Indians of Sweden.” About 1970 though—the beginning of the Alta conflict—the Sami indigenous perspective began to expand (Minde The Challenge 79). The message that the Sami have the same problems other indigenous peoples have, and they should address them together, dominated the headlines of Norway’s largest newspaper in the 1970s. This was a result of a trip made by Canadian leader George Manuel, who took the time to go to a Sami town, while participating in the “UN’s first environmental conference in Stockholm, as a Canadian delegate” (Minde The Challenge 81). Manuel’s visit was meant to attract media attention in order to push the message of international solidarity among the world’s indigenous peoples (Minde The Challenge 83). “Encountering representatives of other indigenous peoples obviously created great enthusiasm amongst the representatives of all Sami. But the respect for and the perceived legitimacy of these organizations was very low within the Norwegian political structure concerned with Sami matters” (Minde The Challenge 83). Indigenous peoples at that time were coalescing, making a bigger audience from which Norway could be publically judged. Also, the effort by indigenous peoples who are seeking to have their cultural identity respected can be looked at as if they are seeking the love of honor, or another way to put that is that they are readily looking for enhanced
self-respect. From a relativist point of view, Canadian and Sami societal honor/shame codes may differ, but the need for Indigenous solidarity created a larger, category of likeness between the two groups. Basically, groups recognize each because of sharing similar circumstances in turn groups then share in the similar goal of creating solidarity between groups.

One of the first Sami political organizations to be established was organized in 1948— the Norske Reindriftsamers Landsforbund (NRL), or the Saami Reindeer Herder’s Association of Norway. It is the central reindeer herding organization in Norway, the consequences of whose founding can be viewed in different ways (Siilanpää 89). One is that they were given at least a certain amount of respect by being recognized as an organization; another is that by Norway recognizing reindeer herders, they were allowing the Sami to have an economic resource, maintain their livelihood, and more importantly, retain some respect for a significant cultural identifier. This designation, however, can limit Sami identity to that of needing to be a reindeer herder, and in turn, reduce the Sami as a judging audience— unless you are a reindeer-herder Sami. Further, facets of the Sami culture become an “other” to one another; i.e., reindeer herding Sami vs. coastal Sami, lending to one becoming the more dominant. This helps set the conditions by which some Sami would want to hide their identity, from both Sami and Norwegians alike; thereby helping fissure the Sami identity. Looking at the coastal Sami, Einar Eythórsson, gives an example of this, saying, the first Sami organization formed in 1903, was dissolved in 1921 due to resources being exhausted, and because reaching “geographically scattered Sami communities was difficult” (154), thus limiting the importance and effectiveness of the coastal Sami’s public opinion, including those that
involve their cultural identity. One of the leading Sami figures during the first association, Isak Saba, was the first Sami to become a member of the Norwegian Parliament; another, Anders Larsen, became editor of the first Sami newspaper. They were both coastal Sami from the fjord districts, a fact which indicates that ethno-political mobilization, at this stage, was no less relevant among the coastal Sami than among inland reindeer herders. “But when the second ethno-political mobilization among the Sami came about after the second world war, the coastal Sami had ‘mysteriously’ disappeared from the scene” (Eythórsson 154). In part, this was due to the continuation of assimilation policies, nonetheless, it can create a power vacuum that gives the dominant population—reindeer-herding Sami in this case—an added advantage to fill the vacuum.

Of the coastal Sami, Eythórsson notes, “…as pariah people they were also recognisable [sic] as a subject people, exposed to the exercising of power on the part of Norwegian authorities, and thus involved a certain power relations. This particular relationship with the majority population, as defined by the others as well as by themselves, formed their ethnic identity” (154). This means the dominant population has the ability, from their perspective, to recognize and give more credence to cultural markers they deem worthwhile.

In this case, when compared with Sami peoples as a whole, coastal Sami and reindeer-herding Sami are cultural markers in their own right; this is because each has distinct modes of economy, derived from equally distinct environments. Yet,

The coastal Sami were not subject to the romantic image sometimes attached to the more exotic reindeer herders inland. Their mixed economy, with fishing and
animal husbandry main components, resembled the way of life of the Norwegian
population in the coastal districts. A popular myth (without any roots in historical
knowledge) was that they were a marginal and degenerated group, descended
from reindeer herders who had lost their animals and moved to the coast, where
they lived a miserable life in poverty and ignorance…The stigma attached to the
coastal identity left little room for ‘resistance’ to Norwegian domination. Rather
than sticking to their position as a ‘pariah cast’ in Norwegian society, many
coastal Sami gave into the Norwegian assimilation policy. Sami identity could be
played out ‘backstage’ in the fjord communities, but in ‘frontstage’ interaction,
where representatives of the majority were present, presenting oneself as Sami
became taboo (Eythórsson 154).

Not only is this an example of colonialism’s ability to make someone so ashamed of their
culture that they will avoid, even disregard, cultural practices like language, arts, dress,
and mannerism. It is also an example of the value and power “recognition” has in
accomplishing that feat. Recognition, warranted or unwarranted, the degree of
recognition, positive or negative, sets the tone as to how much respect is allotted. In turn
this helps determine the status honor and ascribed honor of both a culture and its
members.

In the mid-1950s, Norway’s labor government examined the concerns about the
Sami, through a Sami committee that consisted of scholars, state officials, and prominent
Sami. Norway was trying to adhere to a more principled goal of recognizing and
respecting Sami identity when they formed the Sami Commission in 1956. The intent of
the Commission was to look at the Sami situation and propose specific economic and
cultural actions that could be taken, in order to help the Sami become competent and take part in Norwegian society. In 1959, they published a report that suggested a wide range of actions to improve social, cultural, and economic conditions and to make fundamental changes in state policy in order to address concerns about the Sami situation. The report also emphasized cross-border Sami solidarity, in order to regain a sense of cultural cohesion and mutual respect among the Sami of northern European states. Both state authorities and politicians received the report favorably; however, at the local and regional levels of the north it was rejected, except for a few local exceptions. Because of this, any clear reform was inhibited, although the action did recognize that past assimilation policies should be formally abandoned (Niemi 336-337; Stordahl 4).

However, local politics are often where the most racist atmosphere exists for marginalized peoples—Jim Crow laws ⁷ in the American South being one example of this. Put another way, no matter how well-intended a policy is it does not mean state, regional, and local governments will actively implement or adhere to it.

The Commission’s report was distributed to the various administrative authorities for comment. In 1963, the Ministry of Education submitted the report to the Norwegian Parliament, which agreed that previous minority policies were no longer adequate if the

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⁷ In the early 1900s, almost all State Constitutions of the American South “…created the legal justification for the segregation of races and was the product of white supremacist ideology” (Inwood 564). State amendments (which would become better known as the Jim Crow laws), were meant legally to disenfranchise blacks (and poor whites); including measures such as, the segregation of schools, the banning of interracial marriage, and severely limiting the ability of black people to vote (Inwood 367-368). Alabama’s, “1901 Constitution required that voters own at least 40 acres of land or $300 of personal property. The most obvious consequence of these provisions was the virtual elimination of African Americans from the state’s voter rolls. In 1900, over 180,000 African Americans were registered to vote in Alabama; by 1903 a mere 3,000 remained eligible to vote. By 1942 it is estimated that 600,00 whites and 520,00 African Americans were made ineligible to vote as a result…severely limiting the ability of new political groups from organizing or expanding their political base” (Inwood 368). Compounding the issue is that the 1901 Constitution also sought to “limit the autonomy of local governments,” which, severely restricted “the power of counties and local governments from engaging in civic and municipal improvements” (Inwood 568). What makes the Alabama Constitution remarkable “…is the fact that it was never rewritten. While the amendments that relate to segregation have been invalidated through federal legislation, the Alabama Constitution continues to concentrate power in the state legislature in such a way that it is almost impossible for communities to address inequalities in the state and to improve the conditions of the economically marginalized. In this way the legacy of white supremacy and Jim Crow segregation continues to shape the political, economic, and social landscapes of Alabama…” (Inwood 566).
Sami were to become equal members of the Nation. This equality defined the Sami as individual citizens and not as members of a distinct ethnic group or nation. And this can be seen in the distinctions that were made between “Sami-speaking Norwegians” and “Norwegian-speaking Norwegians.” So while the Sami Commission talked about mutual respect and recognition among ethnic groups, the Ministry and Parliament were talking about respect among individuals. This meant that gaining equality based on cultural distinctiveness was largely impeded (Stordahl 4-5).

For the Sami, state contributions in the initiative were general, and for the most part, were the same contributions it gave all of its citizens, such as welfare programs, schools, social services, public housing, and so on. The Land Sales Act of 1902, which had a clause that prevented Sami from purchasing land unless they could prove they had Norwegian language skills, was removed. This allowed the Sami a choice to use Sami language in schools. In addition, the Sami were able to replace the Norwegian place names on official state maps with Sami names (Stordahl 4-5). The Norwegian government was showing the same respect as it would every other citizen, because the intent of a welfare state is meant to provide all citizens with the ability to access its benefits equally. The minimization of inequalities ascribed honor and the status honor of the Sami was elevated. Because of this, the Sami could diligently attempt to acquire honor and self-respect, both of which could be said to help ameliorate, for those experiencing shame, at least some of the shame. Also, from an indigenous perspective, the Sami gained a measure of self-determination, a concept that, in theory, should bring continual recognition and respect to indigenous peoples.
It was at the time of World War I when “President Woodrow Wilson linked the principle of self-determination with Western liberal democratic ideals and the aspirations of European nationalists” (Anaya 98). After World War II and under the umbrella of human rights, the rights of self-determination for indigenous peoples was acknowledged in the UN Charter and in UNDRIP which,

…contains specific recognition of the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination. The draft declaration, borrowing from the self-determination language of the international human rights covenants, state: “Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (Anaya 112).

In addition, the right of self-determination means that indigenous peoples can develop their lands and resources in the manner they determine. Another understanding of self-determination is that indigenous groups and group members “…are entitled to be full and equal participants in the creation of the institutions of government under which they live and, further, to live within a governing institutional order in which they are perpetually in control of their own destinies” (Anaya 113). Because of being denied self-determination international indigenous rights groups suggest that,

Insofar, as indigenous peoples have been denied self-determination thus understood, the international indigenous rights regime prescribes remedial measures that may involve change in the political order…in accordance with the aspirations of indigenous peoples themselves…the development of ‘special
measures’ to safeguard indigenous ‘persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and environment (Anaya 113).

Lastly, self-determination means that states that negotiation with indigenous peoples be done in good faith. Inasmuch, as there is the right of self-determination for indigenous peoples that right cannot be “…exercised to the detriment of the independence and territorial integrity of States…states expressing support for recognizing indigenous peoples’ right of self-determination did so with the understanding that this right does not imply a right of secession” (Anaya 112). It is safe to say that the principles of self-determination were the end goal of the Sami before and after the Alta Conflict. Self-determination for the Sami would mean that they are recognized and respected for having control of their future political, socially and culturally.

In 1964, under the guidance of the Sami Committee, a new state organization Norsk Sameråd (the Norwegian Sami Council) was established. It was thought that the Norwegian Sami Council should be a broad-based coalition, an independent Sami political organization that could help strengthen “Sami self-recognition as an ethnic group” (Minde The Challenge 78). The Council was very careful politically with regard to the authorities, which was evident when they voted early on in favor of the Alta hydro-electric project (Minde The Challenge 78). Actions by the Norwegian Sami Council, from an honor perspective, can be viewed as Sami peoples following the status quo of Norwegian society. This could be due to wariness towards Norwegian government and society, or because the Council thought this was best for Sami peoples in general. In the first instance, the Council does not seem to be overly desirous to acquire honor or self-respect. But, as a political body, the Council by default brought political recognition to
Sami identity, which in turn, cannot help but enhance Sami status honor and ascribed honor.

Environmental injustices, and the conflicts that normally surface because of injustices, are political issues; especially in the case of disadvantaged peoples, such as minorities, ethnic minorities, and those of low socioeconomic status. As Odd Kristian Dahle notes in a paper presented for Higher Education for Peace, in a conference held May of 2000 in Tromsø Norway, “Many of the conflicts around the world are well rooted in the question of rights to use the natural resources. As well as environmental questions, such conflicts often also involve ethnic minority groups, and therefore, also involve the question of human rights” (Dahle 1). A Sami individual is in the category of being an ethnic minority, which means that human rights are a concern; however, collective rights are also a concern, not just because environmental injustices normally involve a collective of individuals, instead of just one person. But a collective of individuals, such as the Sami, has an added advantage when addressing environmental injustice conflicts; simply because the opinions and judging power of an audience made up of Sami and non-Sami alike, expands, making them more visible and more recognized, no matter the amount of respect that is actually given.

**The Alta Conflict**

The same then could be said about the Alta conflict. Essentially, in order to understand the role of shame/honor during the event, the role shame/honor played pre-Alta conflict, should be contextualized and analyzed from this framework. And since the Alta conflict was a pivotal time for Sami, and since it dissects the Human Rights Declaration and UNDRIP, then shame/honor concepts should be considered beginning
with the Human Rights era, mainly because this is at a time when honor began to take on a different meaning.

The Alta conflict, also known as the Alta affair, the Alta case, the Alta incident, and more; is recognized as the defining moment in the recent history of the Sami. The conflict came about as a result of the Norwegian Water Resources Board (NVE) decision, in the late 1960s, to initiate plans to exploit the Alta-Kautokeino watercourse for hydropower, which included creating a large reservoir at the Sami village of Masi. The Alta-Kautokeino watercourse begins its journey deep in the western part of Northern Norway, meandering its way through the plains of Finnmark past the Sami villages of Kautokeino and Masi and into two lakes. “At this point the river changes character completely. It cuts through mountains in great rapids toward the sea, through the largest canyon in Northern Europe, reaching the Alta valley and finally the sea” (Andersen and Midttun 318). Salmon spawn profusely there making Alta-Kautokeino River a rich fishing area, “not only for commercial fishing but for sport fishing and related tourism” (Andersen and Midttun 318). The main project included building a dam 110m high in Chaucho Canyon on the Alta River. Besides submerging all of Masi village, it also included flooding a 40 km stretch of the river valley. Revised a number of times, the plan was originally designed to produce 1400 Gwh. Instead the hydro-power output, in the end, was reduced to 625 Gwh (Andersen and Midttun 318-319; Dalland 194).

For more than 12 years the Alta conflict was “… surrounded by great uncertainty and conflict. Even though Parliament twice (in 1978 and 1980) decided on construction, plans were not implemented until 1981” (Andersen and Midttun 318). The conflict vaulted Sami identity onto the world’s political stage, signified a change in the political
power structure, and elevated the cultural and social status of the Sami as a people. As Minde states, “The Alta affair, which on one level was about the damming the Alta river as part of a gigantic hydro-electric power project in the Sami heartlands, changed the status of the Norwegian Sami, past, present and future” (The Challenge 75). Lehtola supports Minde pointing out,

The most important turning point in Sami political and cultural history was the Alta Conflict, a movement in the early 1980s, which spoke out against a hydro-electric dam proposed for the Alta River. This gave impetus to the Sami culture and resulted in important changes in Sami politics in Norway, and inspired a whole generation of Sami… (9).

This resulted in a more modern definition of Sami identity being asserted as a collective identity, “based on the concept of ‘we and other’, or minority versus majority…” (Seurujärvi-Kari Alta Dispute 11). The most significant change the Alta conflict brought about when considering shame/honor, was the ability of the Sami to acquire enough recognition and respect to become viable political actors, nationally and internationally. On the national level this came about in 1988 when an amendment to the Norwegian constitution was adopted, “which placed the legal obligation to protect Saami language, culture and societal life on the Norwegian authorities” (Broderstad 158). Some combination of Norwegian socialist national consciousness and Sami “otherness” lent them an authority and power to gain recognition that other Indigenous people elsewhere—people even more disenfranchised and “shamed” than the Sami—might not have had.
This means that as a result of the Alta Conflict, the Sami culture went from having limited recognition and respect to having a heightened ability to remedy the situation resulting in the Sami peoples being formally recognized by Norway. Internationally, the concept of collective identity found its way into the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Ratified September 13, 2007, UNDRIP to date remains a significant document that, not only did the Sami play an instrumental role in developing, but recognizes indigenous peoples as being socially, culturally, and politically distinct peoples. This resulted in the Sami (along with the world’s other indigenous peoples) moving from being unrecognized politically, to being formally acknowledged for having both human rights and collective rights. The notoriety the Sami peoples amassed, nationally and internationally, meant that Sami identity was visible and recognized; therefore, Sami peoples (and indigenous peoples in general) became a highly visible audience unto themselves, capable of holding their own court of public opinion.

This means that from the Alta conflict to the UNDRIP, shame/honor concepts not only played a role in helping draft the document, but were effective in its ratification. This is because the Sami, along other indigenous peoples formed themselves into a large audience that helped them remain visible, more recognizable, not only showing their desire and drive for self-respect, but achieved higher levels of cultural recognition, because of it. This can be seen by the fact that the Sami became international political actors, showing at least a measure of respect for the Sami culture. All told, this means that efforts to understand the role that shame/honor concepts played in helping the Sami become recognized as international political actors must include the role shame/honor
played during the Alta conflict, since it is recognized as the key transitional event that helped bring recognition and acceptance of the Sami culture. In other words, if the Alta conflict did not happen there would have been no guarantee the Sami would have become a visible and viable political actor.

According to some thinkers in Western societies the connotation of honor changed after World War I. In part, as James Bowman in “The lost sense of honor” states, the First World War showed—or was taken to show—that individual acts of bravery and heroism on which honor depends has been rendered meaningless” (43). This can be seen in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. By attaining rights, mostly meant for individuals, the Sami have more ability to challenge those of higher status. When enough success in elevating the status of honor is achieved, the honor market is saturated over time. This why Bowman thinks it takes several generations for the meaning of honor to change (36).

For the Sami, those generations accomplished an increase in honor status after World War II in the form of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ratified by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948 (United Nations Universal). This loosened the reins on one’s status honor, but this worked for and against the Sami. It benefitted the Sami as it started the process that would result in an increase of recognition and respect, not just nationally but internationally as well. However, the steps forward in the establishment of Sami recognition were interrupted when the Germans left northern Norway after their occupation. As the German soldiers retreated, Lehtola states that they
burned the Province of Lapland in Finland and the provinces of northern Norway including Sápmi…especially along the main roads…the farther North in Finnish Lapland, the greater the destruction…Eanodat and Anár (Anaar) municipalities were 80 to 90 percent destroyed…Likewise, northern Norway was destroyed at the coast and in large centers…(Lehtola 52).

For Lehtola, this kind of destruction helped set the stage for future assimilation policies aimed at the Sami (52), groundwork which had been established long before the German soldiers began their “scorched-earth policy” (Beach 9). Henry Minde explains in “Assimilation of the Sami – Implementation and Consequences” that,

Given the development of historical realities…The Breakthrough for the policy of assimilation was not unique in the world in the 19th century. Just across the Finnish border and in the Baltic, attempts at such a policy were called <<russification>>, and further afield in Central Europe the Bismark’s German Reich revealed the harmonisation policy of <<germanification>>, and in far-away USA the non-violent ⁸ policy in respect of the Indians was called <<americanisation>>. The policy of assimilation was, in other words, inseparable from the emergence of strong nation states. Thus, it was not the advancement and the existence of a policy of assimilation which made Norway different from other states, but rather the determined, continuous and long-lasting conduct of that policy (Minde Assimilation 8).

⁸. While the intent behind American colonial policies may not always have been intended to promote violence, it is the opinion of this author that the outcome nevertheless was quite violent. It is my belief that American Indians, as already mentioned, experienced such acts more readily when compared aside Sami peoples. Memmi, reinforces my assumptions when evoking colonization in America, stating, “…it is undeniable that the famous national epic of the Far West greatly resembles systematic massacre. In any case, there is no longer much of an Indian problem in the United States” (149). I would, however, dispute that the so-called “Indian problem,” has yet to be fully resolved in the U.S.
Lehtola points out that, “The destruction of centuries old settlements meant an interruption in material culture” (52) which in turn promoted the need for constructing new roads which brought needed jobs into the area and with these jobs came “…large numbers of people to participate in the reconstruction” (Lehtola 52). The influence of outsiders began to change Sápmi as the reconstruction design was Finnish not Sami, helping set the stage for assimilation policies aimed at the Sami to continue (Lehtola 52).

As Norway rebuilt they did it through the construct of the welfare state, whereby all its citizens would participate in a fair and equitable society. This period of time is referred to by Hugh Beach in “The Saami of Lapland” as the “rationalization period” (Beach 8). In other words, Norway rationalized why it was okay to ignore Sami interests in favor of state interests. “The conflicts between herders and farmers, which had once preoccupied the authorities, subsided and the emerging welfare States turned their attention to maximizing profits for the sake of higher living standards” (Beach 9). From the State’s perspective, once the Sami experienced the benefits of the welfare state “…based on humane values of caring and compassion” (Beach 9), they would willingly want to conform, integrate and blend into the majority population. The Nordic States also “…sought to raise the living standard of the Saami and considered that doing so would automatically help preserve Saami culture” (Beach 9). Norway’s policy to build in the manner of a welfare state, however, became a double-edged environmental justice sword, for both the Sami and Norway.

The aims of Norway’s reconstruction policies during the rationalization period (post-War to the mid-1960s), were to make sure people’s needs were met and to make sure members of every class had enough of the resources to signify them as human. This means that Norway’s form of a welfare state is class-oriented, but there is also an
emphasis on everyone being accountable to the society as a whole, even those of the privileged class. Putting responsibility on all Norwegian citizens, regardless of class, helps explain why after the war there was an atmosphere of minority acceptance by the Norwegian government and society. Another way to put it is that Sami identity as a distinct indigenous people was being recognized and given at least a measure of respect because of it. Norway’s new minority outlook of acceptance was a result of their efforts and influence in the drafting of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Willingly or begrudgingly Norway began to base minority policies on equal rights (Minde, The Challenge 76-77; Niemi, National 416-417; Stordahl 3). This is consistent with the notion of a welfare state. During the Sami renaissance (1960s) Sami were purposely seeking recognition and respect, which is consistent with the concept of honor.

As noted earlier, it takes several generations for honor to change meaning. For the Sami, a couple of generations removed from the Human Rights Declaration put them at the doorstep of the Alta conflict. In order to better understand the Sami drive towards recognition, post-Human Rights, the historical events during that era are presented.

In 1947, Norway established a committee for coordinating education. A year later the committee submitted an in-depth report that proposed the implementation of a new orthography for the Sami language and improvements in Sami education. The report led to the publication of a Sami language book in 1951 (Seurujärvi-Kari Saami Affairs 342).

Language is a key component in gaining social justice, which derives out of higher levels of recognition, for the Sami, by Norwegians and other Sami. It creates solidarity between Sami peoples, and helps maintain and transmit traditional knowledge.
for endeavors such as reindeer herding, fishing, and farming. This makes Sami language a key ingredient in the local agricultural system and subsistence living of the Sami; basically their whole food system. The same year the Sami language book came out a state-run Domestic Science School for Samis was also instituted. Around the same time the Tromsø Teacher Training College began teaching the Sami language. In turn, the Sami began to implement their own modes of teaching, such as, “nomadic Sami classes” for reindeer herders (Lehtola 60). Having their language recognized gave the Sami an improved ability to reestablish respect for their cultural identity, which allowed Sami individuals to gain higher levels of solidarity. Another aspect of language, when considering the Sami, is the creation of a larger audience and the heightened level of visibility and recognition for themselves due to language commonalities. Sami identity, then, was persistently exposed to the dominant society reminding all they were a distinct people. In essence, the Sami used their distinct languages as a way to embrace themselves as the “other.” So what was once considered a bane for many Sami became the means by which they directed focus onto themselves. Basically, the Sami are forcing Norway to recognize their culture by unabashedly displaying it in front of a judging public, and in doing so, become ever more recognized. The Sami are not so much shaming Norway into recognizing them; instead they are deliberately seeking respect by showing self-respect. In short, the Sami are exhibiting pride for their culture. They are telling ‘others’ they are prideful and there isn’t much anyone can do about it. As such, there are aspects of the Sami reassigning themselves to a higher level of status honor by seeking out acquired honor. The Sami of Norway, Sweden, and Finland (and later Russia) were re-establishing their cultural identity through the process of recognition.
The process perpetuates itself in the sense that more recognition develops more recognition as groups become larger, more recognizable and more formidable—at least in appearance. Recognition comprises a means through which shame can be thrown off and honor embraced.

After the War the power structure in Norway developed over time; it was divided into distinct networks, each with direct links to politicians and bureaucrats. Because of this each distinct network creates defenses and developed its own particular standards, for its own special interests. Henry Minde provides an example of this stating,

The Ministry of Agriculture…had a co-ordinating [sic] role, of sorts, in the Sami question. The historical background to this was that the interests of reindeer herding often conflicted with those of agriculture. There was therefore a tradition for the Ministry to interpret Sami rights in a consistently narrow fashion. It was adverse to new kinds of ideas and Sami political demands. This proved fatal for any broader development (The Challenge 77).

Each network had its own agenda, as can be seen by the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture did not view reindeer herding as a form of agriculture. This showed a lack of respect by the governing body towards the Sami and their livelihood, as the enterprise of reindeer herding was not as valued as Norwegian agriculture. Essentially, the Ministry of Agriculture was not giving any honor to the Sami; this is from the perspective of valuing one form of economy over the other. The statement does show that the Sami had some political involvement; therefore, there are some aspects of honor as the Sami were politically involved, even though their interests merited little honor, other than being recognized, however slight it may be.
The first joint meeting by Sami reindeer herders was held in 1947 in Norway. The purpose of the first meeting (which ultimately did not manifest) was to produce a reindeer herding organization. At their second meeting an organization, the Reindeer Herder’s Association, was successfully established. In 1948, the group became an occupational union through which they could negotiate with the Norwegian government and provide expert advice, such as on reindeer legislation (Seurujärvi-Kari Alta Dispute 247).

In 1956 the first Sámi Conference was held. Three years later the Sámiraddi (Sami Conferences) were established and set to take place every third year. From then on Sami became ever-more visible, to the point that Norway recognized them as a “collective,” a “Peoples” (Lehtola 60). According to Seurujärvi-Kari, the pan-Sami movement “got under way in 1953 in the form of a Nordic Saami Conference in Jokkmokk,” Sweden (Saami Movement 350). Reetta Toivanen says, in “The Development of Sami Civil Societies,” the theory of civil society is more than just participation in a civil nation. It puts responsibility on individuals and groups to become involved, to address the power structure inherent in said society, and to change the inner structures of the society itself in order to foster the development of democracy (129-130). It is not by chance that the Sami organized their movement in a manner similar to the formation of the Scandinavian social order. The character and establishment of the Sami rights movement have substantially been co-created by the Nordic civil societies. Thus “…the public sphere is a hegemonic concept that is open only for groups who have adapted to the structures of the public sphere” (Toivanen 130). “Mimesis” was essential for the Sami to bring (positive) attention to themselves in the public court. “The process
of imitation seems to be the identity strategy that is most readily accepted by the Nordic states” (Toivanen 130). In western societies, one avenue towards ‘mimesis,’ is western education.

For the Sami, increased participation in western education systems helped change the view of them, as indigenous peoples. Aided by the changing ideological climate at the time an “increasing number of young Sami people began to study at the old universities in the south throughout the 1960s and 1970s, in Norway as well as Sweden and Finland. One example of the Sami using education was to organize for political purposes. In this instance, it can be seen as an effort to, by the Sami to help rectify years’ worth of indifference and/or a lack of recognition—politically and socially. Also, it allowed the Sami to remain involved in the political process for future purposes such as keeping their interests in the limelight.

Basically, by entrenching themselves politically, the Sami began to force Norway to recognize and respect them as political actors with rights. However, being involved politically means that Sami interests can be lost to the political process. But it does not mean Norway is showing the Sami a lack of respect just because their interests are not always fulfilled. Organization and mobilization are examples of Sami peoples taking notice, recognizing, and identifying with each other through shared circumstances. This is consistent with the concept of one overtly seeking self-respect in order to acquire honor and a better reputation in the court of public opinion.

In the late 1960s the Sami continued to organize; a time Lehtola calls the “Sámi Renaissance.” The movement was consistent with the worldwide effort of minorities to “defend their rights,” and in general, started with the young people of the “first boarding
Sami were now educated in the same manner as other Norwegian citizens. Education in this instance is an aspect of Toivanen’s assessment that the Sami were able to take their education and imitate the dominant society. In this manner the Sami renaissance continued to broaden their political scope; locally, nationally, and internationally. As Minde puts it,

Changes during the 1970s in the international engagement of the Sami people can only be understood when seen in the context of the general re-evaluation of Sami culture that was also occurring at the same time. The Sami language was no longer ‘a dying language’, but a ‘mother tongue’. Joik, which had earlier been characterized as a ‘horrible drunken commotion’, was now accepted as ‘folk music’ and later as ‘music under the stars’. From being perceived as ‘immigrants’, the Sami people now has a strong claim to have come into existence as a group of people in their own right in Nordkalotten. The Sami’s past came under the heading of ‘ethnography’ but also ‘history’, like that of the Norwegians. Viewed as a whole, this supported the radical Sami culture flowering, which was disputed among the Sami themselves, but which was extended considerably throughout the 1970s in cultural and institutional terms (The Challenge 80).

The acceptance Sami cultural symbols would prove significant during the Alta Conflict. What also helped during that time, according Minde, was that the Sami language was no longer in dire straits. They were recognized as having history, art forms, and a political voice. Basically the Sami used the atmosphere of the day in order to help sway policies that could reinforce them culturally. Broadening Sami recognition meant that both the
Sami and Norway would be judged singularly and inevitably they would be judged one next to other (The Challenge 80).

At a conference in 1971, the Sami agenda focused on their right to be acknowledged as a distinct ethnic group, be given aide, and having influence when considering issues that concern them. In 1974, at the next conference, the Sami adopted a declaration of rights and resource management. The Sami were not identified as an ethnic minority, but now the Sami could be referred to as indigenous people by other Sami, other indigenous peoples, and Norwegians. Therefore they had rights to land and resources.

Later the Sami (along with many of the world’s indigenous peoples), would take the steps to change the term “rights” to “inalienable rights.” It is also how the pan-Sami movement and the Nordic Sami council took part in starting a collaborative organization for all of the world’s indigenous peoples, that helped pave the rights and secure the foundation (Minde The Challenge 81) for permanent recognition. Minde provides a good example of the process by which indigenous peoples including the Sami, organized for similar purposes. He says,

The indigenous peoples’ movement started to work in alliance with the growing and strengthening environment movement. It should be noted that this was an ambiguous alliance, in terms of the indigenous peoples’ own agenda…On the one hand indigenous peoples’ movement was in danger of being caught in the role of ‘noble savage’: Comparing their own culture with fragile plants in need of protection was an appeal to paternalistic attitudes in the western world. On the other hand, the alliance formed the basis for a co-ordinated policy that in many
places resulted in indigenous people being given stronger political influence, improvements to their legal status and a redistribution of society’s goods in their favour. The Alta affair in Norway is a good example of this (The Challenge 87).

When considering the Alta conflict, the main goal of the Sami was to gain recognition, politically and socially: yet when considering Sami peoples, one must consider that goals of reindeer herders would be different than the Coastal Sami; the goals of Sami in Norway, Sweden, and Finland would differ simply because policies in each nation would have some differences; and finally, addressing issues locally, nationally, and even internationally would naturally vary accordingly. To put it in terms of shame/honor, the Sami (and non-Sami), organized for environmental purposes and then changed the discourse; the Sami made it an issue of Sami identity through inclusion into the political sphere, at least for some semblance of social justice and self-determination. Those individuals who opposed the Alta project and organized because of it, started to realize the environmental degradation, and outright destruction, of habitats along the Alta-Kautokeino watercourse. They also realized that the destruction of the Alta river system was also an issue of Sami identity and continued to remain involved in order to continue to progress and become recognized as actors in the political process.

The loss of Salmon fisheries, both commercially and recreationally, and the loss of some the last areas needed for reindeer pastures impacted local residents the most (Briggs 151). This is why Chad Briggs in “Science, local knowledge and exclusionary practices: Lessons from the Alta Dam Case,” says that, in a situation such as Alta, “…where the environmental and social effects would be felt entirely by local populations, and where benefits were not clearly visible in the short term, local
opposition to central authority was more likely” (154). Local residents then, because they share similar circumstances, take notice and come together as a result. This is representative of a shame/honor concept. What is worth noting about the Alta Conflict is that Alta has a history of radical left politics, it was the “stealing’ of the river” metaphor, that provoked memories of resistance during the Second World War II (Briggs 154). It is, however,

...interesting that a number of the local opposition leaders were veterans from the war, some of whom lived in the Alta valley as guerrilla fighters during the German occupation. A number of sources have mentioned the importance of resistance during the war to those protesters, and one of the protesters was quoted as saying, ‘The Germans could ruin our homes and leave them in ashes, but they could never take the river from us!’ (Briggs 154).

At this time, the NVE was not very adept when handling situations such as this; making matters worse, the administration did not have much experience in inclusionary practices. “In the face of questions regarding the state’s legitimacy to undertake such a project, the locals and the Saami experienced marginalization of their knowledge and experiences with the river” (Briggs 154).

These examples of ‘experience sharing’ are the first aspect of the shame/honor concept of why people organize into groups. In this instance, World War II veterans tended to be one group who not only shared past experiences, but now shared in their opposition to the Alta project. The marginalization of the Sami and non-Sami is another example of a circumstance around which people organized. At least in the case of the
Alta Conflict, outside groups became ever-more visible to each other; and in this way they created a larger audience by organizing and working together as groups.

The thought of flooding the two Sami villages, Alta and Kautokeino, stirred up a great deal of agitation when the news was announced. As a result the Sami began to protest when the NVE and state authorities visited. This attracted the attention of the Norwegian and international press, which in part may have been due to the timing of the protest, not just the actions, because protests “…against dam proposal in 1970 was the same year as the first European Year for Nature Conservation in Norway, the year of the first Earth Day celebrations” (Briggs 154). This shows how and why outside groups recognized each other—not just locally, but nationally and internationally, and then responded: they shared the same circumstances and end goals. Another example of this came in 1975 when the first official protests from outside groups occurred. This happened

“…when Norwegian Friends of the Earth (Naturvernforbund, or NVF) filed a complaint with the Norwegian Storting’s Ombudsman for Public Administration. NVF claimed that were errors in earlier drafts of the planning process required the Alta dam case to be reconsidered, and that it should not be given legislative approval (Briggs 152-153). This was the first point at which a Norwegian national organization had become involved in the controversy, and the NVF was to play a major role throughout the rest of the conflict. The NVF was not only concerned about the effects of the Alta plan itself, but wanted to improve the political process by which such projects were considered (Briggs 152-153).
Here we see a group, NVF, putting itself in front of the court of public opinion, and beginning to change the discourse from one of being an environmental issue to that of being a political issue. This meant that varying groups had two circumstances to rally around. For the Sami, the Alta Conflict also shifted from an environmental issue to an issue of Sami identity; this is because the degrading of an environment, especially one such as Alta, where Sami identity—reindeer herders, fishermen, etc. was ethnically connected with their terrestrial surroundings.

There were several groups, domestic and international who opposed the project. The first such group was the Sami. It was not until around the beginning of the 1960s that Sami ethnic identity as an indigenous people became part of the public and international discourse, as a Sami audience. Yet, locally and within their state, the Sami were, for the most part, were not acknowledged as an indigenous group living within Norway. The Sami saw their way of life being endangered economically and culturally due changes the dam project would bring to local life and Sami identity. More importantly, the Sami had previously voiced concern to local and state governments over other hydro-projects proposed on their land. Briggs reinforces this by stating that,

It is important to note, however, that Alta was not the first case in which the Saami had voiced reservations concerning hydro-projects in Finnmark. The NVE already had a good deal of experience in developing dams and reservoirs in the region, many of which directly or indirectly interfered with Saami life and activities. Many Saami did not share the desire for industrial growth held by those in the development agencies, at least not if it were to come at the expense of identity (152-153).
For centuries, the Sami had been herding reindeer in and around Alta. Their concern was that any disturbance of this activity “…could be interpreted as a direct affront to their culture. The village of Masi and the large reindeer herds of the region constituted important factors in such identity, notions not shared by the NVE or those in the region who favoured construction” (Briggs 153). In this way the Sami subjected themselves to the opinions of those who wished to see the project completed—Sami, non-Sami, and Norwegian officials. This continued onto the international stage when indigenous peoples throughout the world continued to organize for the same purpose, that is, to be recognized as distinct cultures with the right determine courses for their cultures.

In 1970, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) was founded in order to secure and protect all of the interests of indigenous people. Seurujärvi-Kari states that the WCIP “was defined as the reinforcement of unity among indigenous peoples, the exchange of information and the strengthening of national organizations of indigenous peoples” (World Council 437). The focus was to protect the political, economic and social rights of indigenous peoples, and above all to create and reinforce the rights, including the cultural rights, of indigenous peoples. The comment just mentioned depicts concepts of social justice and the broader network of food and agricultural concerns. Social justice, in this case, includes the cultural integrity of Sami society, and the social rights to maintain that integrity, which translates into their necessities being fulfilled, including being part of the political process. From an honor perspective this meant Sami identity remained open and recognized, and was viewed as a characteristic self-respect and a strong desire for honor.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) also played a role in Sami efforts. It was established after World War I. The by-laws of the ILO Constitution say, “There can be no lasting peace without social justice” (ILO); social injustices, such as those found in the policies of colonization, are an example individuals/groups organizing for of the same reason.

In 1946, the ILO became a specialized arm of the United Nations. “The Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention” was the first UN Convention that addressed indigenous issues. Ratified by 27 countries, Convention 107 was adopted by the UN, in 1957. It is a broad instrument that covers issues such as land, territories, and resources, and indigenous identity; these are the same issues that brought about the Alta conflict. ILO 107 was adopted by the UN and has since been replace with ILO 169.9

Also, in the 1950s and 1960s a number of federal government programs and policies enacted increased the funding available for Native political organizations in both the United States and Canada. Rima Wilkes, states,

…funding meant greater stability, recognition, and in some cases, a larger constituency to represent. In the United States, the funding led to the founding of organizations such as the National Indian Youth Council (established 1961), the AIM (established 1968), and the Native American Rights Fund (established 1970;

9. At a UN Convention in the late 1980s ILO 169 replaced the former ILO 107. Some of the main differences between the two are as follows: No. 107 was founded on the idea that Indigenous tribal peoples were temporary societies who were fated to disappear because of modernization, Indigenous tribal peoples where referred as populations, and integration into the modern society was encouraged—in other words, post-War assimilation policies. ILO 169 however, is based around the belief that indigenous tribal peoples are permanent societies; they are referred to as “Peoples,” and instead of integration, “Recognition of, and respect for, ethnic and cultural diversity,” becomes the goal. ILO 169 is a legal and binding agreement; although it was adopted by four significant countries did not ratify it, those being the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, they have since ratified the document. It should also be noted that much of the language that comprised ILO 169, Recognition and respect are the key words here; recognition means at least a measure of respect; respect derives from being honored by getting recognition (Anaya 144 ILO). In addition, these are the instruments that continue broadening indigenous cultural rights, along with indigenous international groups, or NGO’s.
Nagel, 1996). In Canada, increased federal funding meant three large organizations (National Indian Brotherhood, Congress of Aboriginal People, and the Native Women’s Association of Canada) were in place by the early 1970s…To a varying extent, some of these organizations would play important roles in the mobilization in both countries. By the 1970s, the courts in both countries also began to acknowledge and favorably recognize title and treaty rights. Furthermore, the civil rights movement in the United States provided an important role model for Native Americans as well as for other groups, such as women…and Latinos…These changes brought different Indigenous peoples together in new ways and led to a reclaimed ethnic pride (512).

Here we see organizations organizing for the same purposes, in this case with an outcome of reclaiming their “ethnic pride.” Additionally, a collective of indigenous organizations broadened their visibility due in part to becoming an ever growing audience, which in turn means indigenous peoples were seeking respect in the form of recognition. It can also be seen as an aspect of having a love of honor, and/or a high level self-respect for themselves. The International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), founded in 1975, was formed as a result of environmental concerns that were directly affecting minorities. “Many social anthropologists who had been doing research in Latin America became advocacy researchers and formed a network that founded the International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA)” (Minde The Destination 54). The organization arranged a conference in Copenhagen in 1973, and “was a preliminary interlude in the Sami’s international focus” (Minde The Challenge 82). In 1977 the Sami were asked to attend the circumpolar Inuit conference from which Sami representatives
gained a sense of “Arctic brotherhood,” after they listened to James Wah-shee, a young Indian leader and aboriginal activist from Canada who was a significant intermediary among indigenous peoples. The speech that was presented,

…calls attention to the power of indigenous peoples to safeguard nature and manage resources in freedom, and to respect their family and land. The Sami at the conference are said to have undergone an experience that gave them inspiration and belief to continue working in collaboration with other indigenous peoples (Minde The Challenge 83).

The speech was quoted in a Sami newspaper (Minde The Challenge 83), and, from a shame/honor perspective, is an example of how groups come to be aware of shared experiences, such as the contentious tendency of colonialism, then respond to it by collaborating into a larger, more visible and recognizable audience. In this instance, a collective of indigenous peoples organizing is the outcome of people[s] sharing similar experiences, then acting/mobilizing because of it. In shame/honor terms, this exemplifies a lack of recognition and respect, and the organization and mobilization that deals with those issues. For indigenous peoples, this puts responsibility on local, national, and international communities to address why indigenous cultures are often ignored or made to be insignificant.

In 1970, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) was founded in order to secure and protect indigenous rights—and again, this represents a shame/honor concept that explains why groups came to recognize one another. The purpose of WCIP, according to Seurujärvi-Kari,
…was defined as the reinforcement of unity among indigenous peoples, the exchange of information and the strengthening of national organizations of indigenous peoples…to protect the political, economic and social rights of indigenous peoples and above all to create and reinforce the rights, including the cultural rights, of indigenous peoples (World Council 437).

The above depicts aspects of shame/honor reflected in the Sami efforts at patently seeking self-respect and an elevated “status honor.” At a conference in 1971, the Sami agenda focused on their right to be acknowledged as a distinct ethnic group, to be given aid, and to have influence when considering Sami issues. In 1974, at the next conference the Sami adopted a declaration of rights and resource management. The Sami were not identified by the Norwegian government as an ethnic minority, but it was now acceptable to refer to them as indigenous peoples. Because of this they supposedly had the rights to the land and resources that was traditionally theirs. This helped the pan-Sami movement and the Nordic Sami council that took part in starting a collaborative organization for all the world’s indigenous peoples, which in turn helped paved the way for further rights (Minde The Challenge 80). However, some questioned the Sami as being indigenous.

During a 1975 conference that notion was put to the test, and then put to rest. The Latin American delegates who had also experienced land colonization were suspicious of the Sami and questioned their indigenous status. Minde points out that,

As far as they could tell, the Sami were white European people who had no reason to be there. There are two circumstances which turned the situation to the Sami’s advantage. The first was that the leader of the IWGIA, Helge Kleivan, spoke up. He outlined the history of the Sami people in Spanish, in such a way that it was
accepted that they were “White Indians.” Secondly, they were thoroughly convinced that the Sami were genuine indigenous people when the artists made their appearance, especially when Ailoahaš (Nils-Aslak Valkeapää) began a modern joiker. In this way, and well before the Alta affair, the Sami passed the test that resulted in them being credited with the status of indigenous peoples on an international scale (Minde The Challenge 85).

The fact that they were accepted by other indigenous peoples as indigenous strengthened their position within Norway as well as internationally. This brought about the building of an audience that would help keep Norway’s actions in the eye of public opinion, during and after the Alta conflict. This was a key event in the building of a coalition, which included the Sami, that would carry indigenous rights all the way to the UNDRIP.

Respect for Sami identity as an indigenous peoples, is another shame/honor issue. In 1982, the Working Group of Indigenous Peoples (WGIP) operating under the United Nations was established and was divided regionally between indigenous peoples who played an instrumental role in drafting the UNDRIP. This was and still is today a significant and monumental achievement for the group (Seurujärvi-Kari Working Group 436-437). For the Sami, it was the Alta Conflict that helped propel them into being valid participants in the working groups, which helped get the UNDRIP drafted and ratified.

The only real inconsistency that was found in the literature on the Alta conflict was the actual year the original plans for the construction came out. According to Ande Somby “The Alta-Case: A Story About How Another Hydroelectric Dam-Project Was Forced Through in Norway,” the Norwegian Water Resources Board (NVE) submitted plans in the middle of the 1950s (57-58). Anthony Cohen, in “Culture As Identity: An
Anthropologist’s View,” states, plans for the dam originated in 1970 (202). Thomas Mathiesen in “Civil Disobedience at 70° North” estimates that the first proposal for the Alta Dam project began in the late 1960s (1). Chad Briggs’ “Science, local knowledge and exclusionary practices: Lessons from the Alta Dam Case” makes the case that Norway was considering plans for a dam as early as 1921 (151). Those plans were substantial and would have submerged almost all of Finnmark tundra and wiped out a core area for traditional reindeer herding and salmon fishing. The Sami at the time had very little political clout, but Somby states that, “Even if the Sami People did not have very sophisticated level of their organizations—somehow the NVE understood the signals of the society and backed out with the plans” (57-58). Whether this was a product of Sami activism or not, there is still a certain level of respect shown, if for no other reason because recognition is a form of respect.

The Human Rights Declaration is an example of recognition and respect. Also, the Declaration becomes a focal point, whereby people who share circumstances, can become aware of each other and then organize for the same purposes. Mostly symbolic in terms of its enforceability, it has slowly grown to have some meaning behind it. Prior to the Declaration it is quite possible that the local residents would not have been given any consideration. But with human rights on the world stage, many would have had their “status honor” lifted, at least a little, and could not go unnoticed by others. It is a case of the lower classes recognizing others of lower class. If shame is the act of disappearance, then the Human Rights Declaration would provide the avenue whereby disenfranchised individuals (indigenous, ethnic minorities, and the poor), recognize each other, and the circumstances they shared. This is also an example of what Michael Lewis means in
“Shame The Exposed Self,” when he says that people who are embedded in culture will extrapolate an abstract variant of self and join into action. Besides their own culture, indigenous peoples are embedded with various cultures—dominant/non-dominant, international, nation-state, regional, local. In addition, many of these cultures advocate for human rights, bring attention to the historical injustices of colonialism, and attempt to ameliorate some of the injustices associated with colonialism; including re-establishing cultural identity, albeit altered. Nonetheless they can become viable participants in the court of public opinion (199).

Lead activists actually started protesting against the project as early as 1970. The initial plans called for flooding the Sami Village of Masi and displacing about 500 residents. The townspeople, many of them Sami, demonstrated with banners written in Norwegian, leading Myrdene Anderson, in “Transformations of Centre and Periphery for the Saami in Norway,” to say, “Neither demonstrations nor public written messages are indigenous modes of communication. This demonstration was clearly modeled after mass actions elsewhere in the world. It gained publicity, and it was successful” (120), in the sense that the final plans for the dam, throughout the course of the 1970s, were reduced considerably. Svein A. Andersen and Atle Midttun state in “Conflict and Local Mobilization: The Alta Hydropower Project” that the project was redrawn, in order to tap into the energy without flooding the town, but ecological and cultural consequences were still of utmost concern (Andersen and Midttun 319).

In its final form, the plan involved hundreds of square kilometers that would be affected by road construction, etc. Vital grazing areas for thousands of reindeer who belonged to some of Norway’s 2000—3000 nomadic Sami would be displaced or
disturbed. The plan would cause further changes downriver, such as affecting wild salmon populations and viable hunting areas. Agriculture and other interests of non-Sami populations would also be affected, making these cases all environmental justice concerns. “And it certainly involves a destructive change in the beauty of one of the largest and most remarkable canyons in Europe” (Mathiesen 1-2). The degradation of scenic beauty was only one concern for the Sami, because nature, in function and form, attracts outsiders from the dominant society, meaning that Norway played a role that helped the Sami identity become more recognizable to both the government and larger Norwegian society.

Although minimized in scale, the project nonetheless had far-reaching implications ecologically and culturally for both Sami and non-Sami alike. Land and resources are part and parcel with maintaining cultural boundaries and identities. Sami identity revolves around the environment in ways that are different from the way dominant society relates to the environment. This means that their identity is subject to the environment; as such, maintaining their environment becomes just that much more integral and important.

Richard Weir Jones-Bamman provides an example of the Sami’s relationship with their environment. Traditionally, the notion of owning land was alien to the Sami. In “As long as we continue to joik, we’ll remember who we are.” Negotiating identity and the performance of culture: the Saami joik,” Jones-Bamman writes,

Indeed, the source of conflict between Scandinavian and Saami cultures began, with, and continues to be plagued by different aspirations for the land: on the one hand, it is understood to be property, capable of being bought and sold…fair to
manipulate and exploit; on the other hand, it is seen as something which is fundamental to the self-definition of a people as a distinct culture—in Saami terms one does not possess the land, one is a part of it (70).

The Sami often single out a particular entity within their environment, like a rock formation, which would often serve as a place for rituals. The focus of ceremonies includes successful hunts, maintaining the health of individuals, families, communities, and/or the Sami culture. Also, shamans normally presided over rituals, aided by joiking and drumming.

The belief system of the Sami included a number of supernatural beings who lived beyond the tangible world, “…but who played a role in everyday Sami life” (Jones-Bamman 72). One of the more powerful beings was “Jabmieka, who controlled the underworld, where the spirits of deceased Sami came to rest, although the supernatural beings often brought physical and mental ailments to the deceased relatives. Other spirit beings are considered “guardians;” this group includes three feminine spirits who oversee and safeguard the Sami household. A third example is spirit beings/assistants/helpers, conceived in animal form, that shamans or (noaidi) are supposed to interact with, and to some degree control (Jones-Bamman 72). Furthermore, shamans could transform themselves into one of these spirit beings, providing them, …the opportunity to find game, or lost individuals and objects. With the help of the bird…he could soar through the cosmos or simply glide over Saamiland seeking the best herds of wild reindeer. The fish…gave him powers to cross lakes, rivers, and even seas. In the guise of the powerful reindeer bull…the noaidi
often sought to entice large herds of wild reindeer, thus contributing to the entire
good of his entire siida (Jones-Bamamn 79).

In simple terms, drumming and joiking which help shamans, along with individuals, to
transcend to the spirit world is a form of recognition, humility, respect, even self-respect.
In the first instance, the shamans/individuals are recognizing the importance of their
environment; they are showing respect by singing to the environment and by drumming
to the rhythm of their particular geography. Humility is to stand in face of their
environment and offer their respect. Finally, since the Sami consider themselves as a part
of the environment, not separate, then by celebrating their environment they are honoring
and showing respect for themselves too. It was these same cultural symbols that would
play a role during the Alta Conflict that helped the Sami identity and culture get re-
recognized by Norwegian and Sami individuals, and the state government.

In 1978, at a UN conference, the Sami received a little more recognition when
Norway’s Secretary of State openly associated the Sami with being an ethnic group. This
act coupled with Norway’s instrumental role in getting indigenous issues raised at the
conference garnered enough backing to provide support for indigenous peoples to help
maintain their traditional way of livelihood, and not to have their land and resources
taken from them. Norway’s double standard from what was being said internationally
and what was happening at home created an inconsistency that did not go unnoticed.
“During the Alta affair, this helped to emphasize the disparity between what was said
internationally and what was done on a national scale” (Minde The Challenge 88-89).
An example of this type of rhetoric can be seen by the fact that a few months before the
conference, Norway made the decision to allow the Alta hydro-electric power project to
move forward, before going on to advocate on behalf of indigenous peoples rights. “Once
the public became aware that this process could influence the ensuing treatment of the
Alta affair” (Minde The Challenge 89) then, “Sami organizations and some parliamentary
districts raised demands that Norway should immediately ratify the ILO Convention 107”
(Minde The Challenge 89). (ILO 107 predecessor to ILO 169, which to date, has more
cloth than the UNDRIP). The issue received even more attention when a public report
that came out in the fall of 1980 pronounced (Minde The Challenge 89) that Sami
peoples were indigenous. Norway, for the most part, had honored the minimum
requirements of ILO 107. Their lack of concern in this matter helped strengthen the
notion that the Alta conflict “had changed character” (Minde The Challenge 89).

The intensity of the conflict was one way that it had changed in character. This
happened as a result of increased media attention, locally, nationally, and internationally;
and indigenous peoples taking note of the events of the Alta conflict and the political
climate throughout the world at that time. Norway also was subject to an international
audience and its vast opinions. Whether that is why Norway seriously started to notice
the Sami and their political rights cannot be determined without interviewing some of the
political actors at the time or studying extant political documents. But Norway did step
up and began to take notice of Sami peoples and the rights it takes to maintain and
develop Sami identity.

In 1979, the NVE decided to build the Dam further upstream. When the word got
out, plans to stop construction began. The tactic chosen by project opponents, both Sami
and Norwegian, was to block the road where construction equipment was hauled.
Environmentalist and outsiders, only a small number of them being Sami camped out and
blocked work crews. This early incident is also part of the culmination of indigenous peoples staking claim to be recognized. And again, the more they recognize each other’s situation, the larger the court of public opinion became. At least from a minority perspective it helped strengthen the collective goals among various interest groups with different agendas (Minde The Challenge 90-91). Minde provides an example of Norway’s indifference toward the Sami at the time, saying that,

We know that during the hunger strike of 1979 Prime Minister Oddvar Nordli turned to his advisors and asked them to provide documentation about what Norwegian Sami politics actually consisted of. The only thing the civil servants could provide was to dust down the government’s parliamentary report on the Sami Committee’s proposal dated 1962-63 (The Challenge 90-91).

At least on the part of the Prime Minister, the issue of Sami identity was not at the core of the Alta conflict; instead, it remained an environmental/political matter. It must also be pointed out that during the conflict there were differences of opinion about the project among local Sami and Norwegian residents.

Some Sami were decidedly split on whether the protests were a good thing or not, and the official Sami organizations of the day were unclear in their support. “Differences of opinion did exist about the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed dam, but some who seemed to be for the dam were actually just against the demonstration”¹⁰ (Anderson 120). The demonstrations’ purpose appeared to be more of just a “…stalling tactic at least until winter arrived” (Anderson 120). By October it was evident that the government had no intention to “honour its promise to investigate possible damages to

¹⁰. Reading Norwegian might be essential to answer the question of the actual Sami support for the Alta for the Alta Conflict, but even then conclusions would be tentative at best.
reindeer pasturage and sensitive wildlife areas” (Anderson 120). It is not possible to say whether the governments back and forth stance on the Alta project signaled an effort on the government’s part to make sure they got it right, or simply political window-dressing. In any case, during the next two years the conflict became an unstoppable force.

The conflict erupted in July of 1979 and throughout that summer and fall several thousand Sami and Norwegian activists ended up camped at a place called Stilla, or “Zero Point” as it would come to be called. The camp was strategically placed at the end of a road needed to haul construction equipment. The police attempted to remove the demonstrators so the machines could do their work, but they simply came back. Officers finally gave up trying to remove all of the protestors. Seven young Sami, who had formed the Sami Action Group (SAG), went to Oslo and erected a lavvu (Sami tent very reminiscent of tepees used by North American Plains Indians) on the lawn outside of the Parliament building, and began a hunger strike. The police removed the lavvu, only to see a new one erected, which they also removed. The end of this phase saw the seven Sami along with hundreds of Norwegians still attempting to make their point (Somby 58, Paine 179). And the Samis did so by displaying their own culture as unique and separate from the dominant society in which they lived.

Because cultures are reliant upon symbols to help keep their boundaries from becoming blurred, the removal of cultural symbols such as the lavvu can be seen as an effort to diminish the integrity of the group. Symbols become indelible markers with which group members can identify, and they force non-group members to recognize their identity. Anthony Cohen talks about how the Sami use of their material culture during the Alta Conflict, noting that,
…it is very everyday emblems of their culture, by which they have been
recognized and stigmatized in the past, which they now turn against the state to
denigrate it and to proclaim their moral cause. The strikers shrewdly used their
own symbols—lavvo, joik (ballad) passivity—to politicize their culture and to
transform the value of their identity…‘Saami ethnicity was demonstrated on the
basis of self-ascription and self-advocacy.’ As a strategy of assertiveness, this
reversal of stigma has become characteristic during the quarter of a century:
blacks became “beautiful”; ladies became “women”; Eskimos and Lapps became,
respectively, Inuit and Saami (203).

The Sami remained visible; aided by the spectacle of their cultural material objects they
persisted in the eye of public opinion. In essence they exhibited their distinctness and
displayed a sense of self-respect for their culture. For the Sami, displaying their material
culture was a bold statement in itself; the lavvu just mentioned, joiks, drumming,
(previously mentioned), and traditional garments worn by the Sami called Gákti, are all
very distinct aspects of their material culture. Lehtola gives an explanation of the
material culture of the Sami; using the Gákti as an example, and phrasing their garment
style in terms of, “the language of clothing” (12). According to Lehtola,

One of the most distinct symbols is the Sámi garment. When Sámi gather
together from distant places the surest way of recognizing each one’s home is to
look at their clothing. The design and decoration of clothing differ from place to
place. From the general distinguishing features of the garment a Sámi
traditionally identifies the other’s home area and, from subtle differences, even
their home village and family (12).
The character trait of a Sami can be discerned through his or her clothing; such as, if one is wearing his hat correctly, whether his or her reindeer boots are bound properly, or his or her tunic or brooch is straight. Lehtola states that,

The garment is a symbol of a Sámi person’s identity. It has many subtleties that are difficult to describe, and that contain Sámi cultural vocabulary and codes, just like the shades of meaning in the language. Especially in the earlier days, at church gatherings, or at the markets, the way a person was dressed was always observed. The worst thing that could be said of a badly dressed woman was that she was a *rivgu* (not a Sámi) (12).

Sami dress is also very colorful. Along with elaborate design, Sami attire makes him or her very much standout; as a group they would bring even more attention. The Sami by reestablishing their traditional garb were attempting to remove the social stigma once associated with their style of clothing. By doing so they showed pride and respect for their identity and culture by independently choosing how they would present themselves to the dominant culture by the way they chose to dress. Having pride, and presenting that pride by wearing their traditional garb in the face of public opinion, is another way of saying that the Sami have pride, or honor, for their culture—even a love of honor. Also, concerning shame/honor concepts, the Sami who wore traditional garb would visibly bring attention to their culture. In this way other Sami people may be more inclined to gravitate to groups who are proud of their culture. In turn, this creates a larger audience who are focused on the same intent, which in this case is to bring attention to their culture and make Norway honor their
culture by recognizing them as being socially acceptable, and as politically viable participants. The attention they brought to themselves worked.

Media played an instrumental role in helping the Sami turn the Alta Conflict from being just an environmental issue, to an issue of Sami identity. Newspapers devoted a great deal of time and column space focusing on the issue of Sami identity during the conflict. According to Mathiesen, “The amount of newspaper space devoted to the issue from 1979 on has never been calculated, but it is clearly large indeed” (2), Sami and other activists helped cause the government to acquiesce and postpone operations so Parliament could review the case. The government decided to appoint a committee to look into the legal matters of Sami land and water rights (Mathiesen 2). Parliament reviewed the case for the third time in the spring of 1980, and again concluded that construction plans should carry on. Parliament also decided that the Sami who had camped outside Oslo would be tried for breach of public order in Municipal Court. In a two to one vote the Sami lost and were given symbolic fines. Further, the Sami, Norwegians with fishing rights, and a conservation group looked to the courts to halt construction of the dam. The spring and fall of that year saw three court cases pertaining to the issue, one of which halted construction again until the court could hear the case. Right before Christmas in 1980, by a four to three margin the court said the project was legal, but lambasted the government for not doing enough preparatory work on the construction plans (Mathiesen, 2). In this case, the use of everyday cultural items is not a determinant of whether the Sami purposely used shame as a tacit for heightened recognition. From the perspective of a shame concept, the Sami are a part of the Norwegian legal system; thus shame/honor takes on a different dimension than it might
in another place and between a different nation-state and the Indigenous people of the place, because shame can be replaced by guilt. The reduced sentences of the Sami, may have absolved them of their deed, but it nonetheless keeps their identity in the court of public opinion. The concept of honor is they are reminding the “other” that they have pride in being the “other.”

The decision to allow preliminary work on the dam project to begin was appealed, but the Norwegian government chose not to wait for the new verdict and resumed construction based on the lower court’s ruling. Major confrontations again took place. The government gave the police chief in the area the task of organizing the largest police contingency since World War II. Acting on behalf of the Norwegian government, on a bitterly cold night that saw temperatures dip to minus 20° Fahrenheit, about 600 Norwegian Police Officers or about 10% of the entire force went in to remove the protesters. According to Dalland,

On that day about 600 Sami along with other local people and hundreds of environmentalists were arrested over a 16 hour period. Of the first about 600 arrested about 300 were from Finnmark and 161 from the Alta district. The Alta demonstrators were in fact more numerous than even these figures suggests (197). There were more than 1000 peoples of all ages and all with different interests—other than bringing the project to a halt. The people that amassed were Sami reindeer-herders, Sami and non-Sami fishermen, farmers, scientists, students, and professors of law, among others (Dalland 197-198). The literature did not turn up any precise figures as to how many activists were actually Sami or environmentalists or citizens or outsiders. Nonetheless, this is representative of individuals recognizing each other because of
sharing a common cause. There may be different reasons individuals were protesting, but the demonstrators did form a collective, a judging audience. “The protesters offered passive resistance (many were shackled together, and had to be cut loose from one another)” (Andersen and Midttun 319). They were chained to the rock at Zero Point, but there were no obvious signs that any violence took place. The authorities were much better prepared and removed the demonstrators under the scrutiny of newspapers, television, and radio in all corners of Europe (Andersen and Midttun 319, Mathiesen 2). The incident, though, like the previous was not welcomed by all.

The assimilation policies aimed at eradicating Sami identity had been in effect long enough to erode and remold generations’ worth of Sami identity. As a result some Sami preferred just to leave things as they were. Svein Andersen remarked,

The Alta case created strong feelings in the community. Loyalties to central political authorities were confirmed by supporters organizing a counter-mobilization, against the protestors. Newspapers were full of stories about broken friendships and marital problems reflecting that the parties had taken different stands on the issue. Local opinion formation was, it seemed, intense and polarized (319).

In the case of the Sami, the shame/honor concept could be viewed as a way to throw off the stigma associated with the more traditional Sami culture. In addition, each group, because of varying opinions, was demanding self-respect and was doing so by displaying their own group opinions.

The protestors who were forcibly removed on that cold day received very stiff fines for their participation, but the conflict only intensified after this happened. While a
fine on the Sami protestors is a form of punishment, it is not meant to embarrass an individual; instead, its function is to simply remind them of what not to do. Essentially they were being taxed for bad behavior, or to put it another way, they were helping pay the policemen for having to remove them. “Large groups of demonstrators continued resistance under heavy media coverage, by entering the construction area on skis across the mountains” (Mathiesen 3). Many arrests continued to be made; tents and equipment continued to be confiscated. To make things worse (for the government) the Prime Minister resigned, the country was thoroughly shaken, and “A group of fourteen women, some of them mothers of those on hunger strike, met with the New Prime Minister in Oslo but received no promises. Simultaneously, five Samis commenced a hunger strike in Oslo” (Mathiesen 3). This way the Sami continued to get media coverage, and in all senses became the judging audience, backed by many Norwegians who opposed the project and a broad array of international supporters, notably the United Nations. With this support they had now stepped on the doorstep/toes of the Norwegian government by becoming increasingly noticed (Mathiesen 3). “The newspapers followed the five Samis from day to day, partly in front-page headlines, and, to avoid the possibility of forced feeding, some of the Sami moved to Stockholm in Sweden, which spread the newspaper coverage once more to the neighboring country” (Mathiesen 3). Not only were the Sami living in Sweden being added to the public court of opinion, but non-Sami Swedish citizens were as well. Norway at this point was saying one thing and doing another. In other words the Sami were reminding Norway that it was difficult for them to justify supporting human rights, while ignoring the rights of the Sami. Exploiting Norway’s duplicity made others stand up and take note. Furthermore this is an example how the
discourse during the Alta Conflict shifted from being an environmental issue to an issue about Sami identity. This expanded Sami and non-Sami court of public opinion, and gave some security that there will always be an audience peering in on Norway.

Bringing even more attention to the situation, the fourteen Sami women, after the prime Minister had left her office, commenced their own protest by remaining in her office. The women bided their time by singing hymns until the police finally had to carry them off (Mathiesen 3). The Prime Minister the women confronted was Gro Harlem Brundtland¹¹ who was of Sami heritage. In this way the Sami women became their own audience, and can judge two different agents; the Prime Minister as an individual outside of government, and as an individual inside the government.

Sami organizations also used what they considered “their” history. “It was argued that construction was in conflict with the provisions of the Act of Cultural Remains, an act which demands prior investigation of possible cultural—archeological deposits” (Mathiesen 3). An announcement was made that essentially ended and continued road construction at the same time. What this meant was that road construction would continue to a certain point, then stop so cultural remains could be investigated. “Slowly those parts of Norway which had been engaged in the conflict returned to normal. The Samis discontinued their hunger strike, the demonstrators in the North terminated their skiing expeditions, and the Government assured everyone that it had certainly not given into the pressure, only to the letter of the law” (Mathiesen 3). Ironically, Norway in this

11. Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland was born in Oslo Norway and became Norway's first female prime minister. Gro Harlem studied medicine in Oslo, married in 1960 and had four children. She joined the Labour Party in 1969 and was appointed minister of the environment in 1974. Gro Harlem Brundtland became not only the first woman prime minister of Norway but also the youngest prime minister ever appointed in Norway since the creation of the office in 1814.
case was using the legal system too. Time became an ally of the government, as the issue
died down from lack of media coverage. No more sensationalism, no more symbolic
images flooding the populace’s mind, no more dinner tables talks, and water cooler
conversations.

The situation took a dramatic turn in March of 1982. “Two Sámi tried to blow up
a bridge on the part of the road that had already been built” (Lehtola 77). This road led
straight to the construction site where the dam was to be built. Niillas A. Somby, one of
the two men who participated in the incident, accidently severed his hand due to the
detonator being pressed too soon (Lehtola 77). The reaction of Sami peoples in regards
to this act was conflicted. Some disapproved of what they had done (in attempting to
sabotage the bridge), and some thought it was necessary and justified. One example of
conflicting feelings over this act occurred when “Aslak Nils Sara, the Sámi member of
the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP), dissociated himself completely from
it” (Lehtola 77). There are two interesting facts in this situation that contain shame/honor
concepts. First, Niillas Somby who lost his hand in the incident placed the severed limb
on a Norwegian law book and took a picture of it. This act can be seen as a way to shame
Norway; or, it could be a way of demanding recognition and respect for the Sami; and if
that is case then the act is an example of having a strong desire for honor. As with the
earlier hunger strikes, Samis were willing to put their lives on the line for their belief in
themselves and their sovereignty. Second, Niillas Somby was sent to prison, but when he
was out of prison to attend a court date, he fled the country and found his way to Canada.
“There he was not granted political asylum officially; he was adopted by an Indian band
for his protection and concealment. Later Somby returned to Norway to finish his prison sentence” (Lehtola 77).

This is consistent with the respect and recognition that the world’s indigenous peoples were showing each other at this time. They were in the process of developing a coalition that has continued to build on itself organizationally since the Human Rights Declaration was ratified until the ratification of the UNDRIP. It is also a similar phenomenon to individuals who come to realize that they have had similar experiences, such as living with a lack of recognition from dominant others, which is needed for self-determination, the avenue towards self-respect. Further, Niillas A. Somby did show Norway, or at least Norway’s legal system, respect by returning and completing his prison sentence. No evidence was found in the literature regarding why Niillas Somby returned to finish his sentence—was it self-impelled, coercion from family and friends, or simply pressure for the Norwegian government?

**Assessment and Discussion**

The concepts of shame/honor encompass the lives of individuals and cultures. Culturally, they are constructed to produce the parameters for the norms and values that determine one’s cultural identity. Reviewing shame/honor concepts, it was noted that shame/honor can be viewed as concepts of morality—or not. It was shown that both Constable and French do not see shame as a concept of morality. Basically, Constable does not think that shame either taps into or appeals to one’s emotions (649). French, however, does see shame as being part of an individual or an individual’s emotions; instead, he sees shame as being separate from the morals. Basically, a person may conform to social norms, but that could be due to a need to ease the pain a person may be
experiencing. However, it does not necessarily mean a person is trying to remedy shame out of moral concern (5). Simply put, being ashamed does not necessarily translate into making an individual more moral. Nonetheless, in regards to this thesis it was determined that both shame and honor as moral concepts are assessed by this author, when appropriate, concerning the events surrounding the Alta conflict. This is suitable since some of the events during the conflict, as well as the overall process, involve moral issues.

Shame as a moral concept stems from a person’s fear of experiencing shame, it is this fear that leads one to adhere to the moral codes of her or his culture. Shame that results from an individual doing something that is not honorable alienates the individual from the group. Yet, alienation goes hand in hand with the growing of a person’s virtue, or moral compass, as she/he will seek conformity to group norms, and in doing so become virtuous in the eyes of a judging public. And by doing so, people contribute to the greater good of the group; they are showing pride for the group. This cannot happen if a person is not concerned with his or her own virtue. Consequently, pride can help a person actively replace shame with virtue. Therefore if one can feels a sense of shame then one will be filled with the sense of wanting to live honorably (Hanson 155-156; Isenberg 6). Those unable to feel this emotion are not committed to any sort of standard, leaving them prone to a sub-standard “moral sense.” The key here is that violating a commitment to a standard lowers one’s opinion of oneself, so by having shame it shows that individual is seriously committed to maintaining the standards that produce honor. It was also noted, an “audience,” or court of public opinion, if you will, is necessary to the concept of shame; as the audience determines why someone warrants critical evaluation
of his or her actions, and the sanctions imposed for violating group norms. Shame that accompanies such actions causes an individual to become the “other” in the eyes of the group. This allows individuals to recognize ‘others’ who share compatible experiences and ideologies; and organize out of sharing similar circumstances; and, as in the case of the Sami, attempt to remedy the stigma of shame associated with Sami individuals and culture. Audiences in this instance comprise the Sami in relation to other Sami, other indigenous groups, and Norwegian and international community—social and political. Each audience, then, is capable of holding a court of public opinion.

It was also posited that morality is an honor concept. When individuals have internalized the group’s unconscious code of honor, they will seek the virtue of honor over the disgrace of shame. Pride is what helps drive one to self-respect and is meant to actively replace shame with the virtue of honor. Desire for “pride” is another honor concept, which simply means the effort that individuals/groups put into gaining honors. When individuals have a strong desire for pride/self-respect, they are contributing to the group’s moral compass and the greater good of the group. The basis of unconscious codes of honor for the Sami can be seen from various perspectives; those being whether Sami unconscious codes of honor come from their own codes, from Norwegian codes or from a combination of both. All told, the Sami movement can be viewed as Samis having the pride needed for self-respect; and the sustained effort of the Sami to acquire honors (recognition) is an example of having a “desire for pride.” Both of these mean there is contribution to the moral compass and the virtue of the Sami culture. This can also be said of Norway. In this case, Norway’s role in helping further human rights became an issue, when considering the Sami, because Norway’s rhetoric on human rights
did not match their actions. But, in the end Norway did what can be considered “the honorable thing.” By recognizing the Sami, Norway gave them at least some measure of respect. This study was not able to determine from the literature whether Norway was displaying a strong desire for pride, whether they were embarrassed into recognizing Sami identity, or whether they felt they had no other choice but to acquiesce.

It has also been established that both shame and honor require an audience, or judging public from whom people can be adjudicated as to whether they are shameful, or whether they are honorable. Shame has been found to be a painful emotion that arises from one’s misdeeds. It is an emotion that one often chooses to hide or avoid. Honor has been found to be both ascribed, that with which one is born and which is predetermined by others; and acquired, honor which is contested on a daily basis. The ascribed status of the Sami was they were considered inferior, backwards, lower class, antique culture when compared to Norway’s modern and superior culture. But the role of honor during the Alta conflict, when considering the Sami, is that they deliberately tried to acquire honor and contested for it on a daily basis.

Finally, it was established that certain cognate words are pathways, so to speak, to understanding the associated concepts of shame/honor. No literature was found that directly related Sami pre-assimilation structure of honor. Although it is fair to say that, at least in the twentieth century, basic forms of respect and honor for the Sami could be as simple as performing a yoik correctly, dressing the right way; basically, following cultural order. Honor today, in the western world though, has lost much of its connotations of yesteryear. “True, the word honor does still appear in our public discourse, but nearly always in a context designed to stress its archaic and lapidary
character—in the phrase “Duty, Honor, Country”” (Bowman 34). This phrase was emphasized throughout both World Wars. Remarkable acts of courage, self-sacrifice, and commitment shown by average women and men, meant that honor was based on these criteria, thus changing the meaning honor for succeeding generations. Now honor was not just a masculine right it was within the domain of women. Also, honor afforded individuals of wealth and power changed accordingly. With the addition of an international human rights agreement, all individuals were recognized as having rights. Austin Badger’s paper “Collective v. Individual Human Rights in Membership Governance for Indigenous Peoples,” mentions that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights emphasizes the individual, but it lacks the language that protects “culturally distinct indigenous communities” (486). As noted before, indigenous peoples organized and worked in unison, since the inception of the human rights agreements, to include the term ‘collective’ in the language of future human rights agreements—UNDRIP contains the language that peoples have collective rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights then is the instrument that recognized and honored individual rights. In this way honor was distributed to all individuals, which could be said to have diluted the historic implications of honor.

Bowman provides an example of the word ‘honor’ being diluted, and attributes it to a change in language. In 2002, Bowman mentions that the word ‘honor’ has a “musty old-fashioned” connotation to it, which makes us hesitant to use the term “ourselves and nervous” when other people do. A brigadier general in an interview…was repeatedly asked why ‘we’—the American people—should believe that what he was saying was the truth. Exasperated, the brigadier finally answered:
‘Well, as a commissioned officer in the armed forces, I can assure you that what I’ve said is the truth’ (33).

The reason Bowman believes the word ‘honor’ was missing in the general’s statement is that,

“…the officer thought that he would look silly, and pompous, and out-of-date if he had said ‘on my honor as an officer and a gentleman’—and yet he was clearly, if rather comically, hoping that the mention of his commission would convey this idea to the reporter” (33).

According to Bowman without the language of honor neither the general nor the reporter seemed to understand that the officer had “…grounds for complaint against the impudence…” of the reporter’s question. Basically, the reporter

…was already calling into question his honor, and under the old dispensation, his victim would have been perfectly within his rights to box the man’s ears, horsewhip him, or otherwise administer some humiliating physical chastisement. For these things too are part of the language of honor that we no longer speak (34).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights would contain the language that helped dilute the notion of honor. By giving equal rights to all individuals, their ‘ascribed honor’ would be elevated; basically on par with individuals whose ‘ascribed honor’ was already well elevated and well established, thereby diluting the meaning of honor since now it was distributed to all—no matter how meager it may be. Recognition and the respect that goes with it is a concept of honor, hence the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the language of equality it contains, would water-down the meaning behind honor.

The foundation of needing an audience, as previously explained, is an essential shame/honor concept and the most prevalent shame/honor concept found in this study. Without an audience the rest of shame/honor concepts are rendered pointless. The Alta conflict provides a powerful example of the importance of an audience. This can be seen by considering the role of the Sami in relation to an audience, which was to: (1) get the Norwegian Government and citizens, other nation-states and their citizen’s, other indigenous peoples, and the international political body to recognize them as indigenous peoples; (2) treat them with respect; (3) remain subject to the court of public opinion; and, (4) dispense with their own opinions. With respect to other indigenous peoples, similar audiences with similar goals can often become a larger, more visible, more judging audience. Also, indigenous peoples can be seen as important audiences, because these audiences are basically peers of the Sami, in the sense that their goals were essentially the same— recognition and respect. The reason for this is that respect is a two-way door; meaning respect is mutual. In other words, if one audience levels a non-favorable judgment on another, the judged may or may not be affected because as already noted, the extremity with which individuals or groups experience the pain of shame is subjective to each agent. So in order for shame to work one would have to have respect for those inciting shame upon them; without it, it would be easy to ignore others’ opinions about them. A judgment by peers, however, carries more weight, simply because of close similarities, such as experiences, ideologies, and goals, making their opinions matter.
The Alta Conflict covered a broad span of issues from national politics to international politics; from environmental concerns to cultural concerns. These same issues also carry many concepts of shame/honor. In regards to national and international politics and shame/honor concepts, an audience is required. In this case, the Sami are one audience, and the national and international political bodies are each their own audiences. The goal of the Sami was fairly simple, to get both political bodies to recognize them as indigenous, and to treat them with respect. This study found that the 1948 United Nation Declaration on Human Rights, without which none of this may have happened, signaled a change whereby now nation-states were showing indigenous peoples respect derived from recognition. The majority of the readings point to the Human Rights Declaration as that pivotal moment where indigenous peoples began the process of becoming recognized at the international level. For the Sami, however, research showed that after the Second World War, Norway continued old assimilation policies with the hope being that the Sami would want to partake in the equity of the welfare state. The implementation of ILO 107 in many ways continued the process of assimilation, although Norway did not ratify the agreement. From a shame/honor perspective post-War polices that basically continue assimilation policies can be looked at two ways. On the one hand, assimilation policies continued, which means at that time the Norwegian government was not taking the Sami culture seriously, as can be understood through observing their actions, which were obviously ambivalent towards the Sami, or at least the Sami as a cultural entity. It also may be looked at as if Norway thought it was doing the right thing.

ILO 169 is quite a bit different in that Norway ratified this treaty. From a shame/honor perspective, Norway’s actions can be seen as an attempt to avoid pain
arising from the possibility of being shamed; it can be viewed as Norway’s desire for self-respect/honor; or as a way for them to alleviate shame and change the opinions of an international audience. For the Sami, ILO 169 is an example of them organizing with other indigenous peoples/audiences, for the same purposes—in this case, to address historic injustices. Those efforts helped bring about ILO 169, a document which now portrayed indigenous peoples as permanent societies, and which was meant to provide recognition and respect for the ethnic and cultural diversity of indigenous societies. In addition, ILO 169 is technically a legal and binding agreement. So technically, the Sami culture was now recognized and respected on a permanent basis. This agreement is also an example of how acquired honor, which is contested on a daily basis, elevated the Sami’s ascribed honor, and inevitably, their status honor in the eyes of the dominant society.

The international audience Norway faced was comprised of both nation-states and a collective of international indigenous organizations; including the WGIP, WCIP, and IWGIA. During the time of the Sami renaissance indigenous peoples throughout the world experienced a definite lack of recognition by the dominant societies they live under. Wilkes (510), focusing on American Indians and Canadian Aboriginals, provides an example saying,

During the latter decades of the 20th Century, Indigenous peoples in both Canada and the United States engaged in wide-scale political mobilization. In the United States, protests that took place constituted a national social movement known as the Red Power/American Indian Movement (AIM). By contrast, in Canada, the protest that took place tended to remain localized.
Further, Indigenous peoples in United States and Canada are examples of peoples who share similar unwanted experiences. Again, Wilkes provides an example of shared experiences noting,

Indigenous peoples in both countries have ongoing grievances and grievances about the past…Other problems faced by Indigenous peoples in both countries included forced assimilation and abuse in residential schools… (511).

Another similarity Sami, American Indian, and Canadian Aboriginals share is having their cultures labeled as inferior and backwards. Basically, all three cultures are not recognized for having any value and worth. ILO 107 is another example of a shared experience, or having to share the same experience. In this instance, ILO 107 was based on the notion that Indigenous tribal societies were temporary societies that would inevitably succumb to modernization with some encouragement. Basically, ILO 107 promoted post-War assimilation policies (Anaya 144). From a shame/honor perspective the research establishes that this is another example of an agent’s recognizing that each share similar circumstances then organize and attempt to address the causes of their experiences. This, then, can set the stage whereby those of lower status challenge those of higher status.

Both American Indians and Canadian Aboriginals were shown more respect in their respective countries through governmental efforts to enact programs and policies. This helped indigenous peoples in both countries establish organizations, leading to more respect and “…greater stability and recognition, and in some cases, a larger constituency” (Wilkes 512). To some extent, these
organizations played important roles that led to the mobilization of indigenous peoples; and,

By the 1970s, the courts in both countries...began to acknowledge and favorably recognize title and treaty rights. Furthermore, the civil rights movement in the United States provided an important role model for Native Americans as well as for other groups...These changes brought different Indigenous peoples together in new ways and led to a reclaimed ethnic pride (512).

This is reflective of what the Sami experienced in Norway. Right after the war Norway initiated the North Norway Plan, which provided financial and technical aid during post-war reconstruction, although, as already mentioned, this plan had assimilation qualities because post-World War planning and funding centered on rebuilding Norway in an equitable manner. In the wake of the war Sami organizations began to surface, such as the Sami Council, which wanted to “re-organize minority policies,” and by 1959 they had submitted recommendations to the Norwegian Parliament. It took four years, though, before Parliament considered the recommendations that would strengthen the recognition for Sami identity. Literature of the day also produced higher levels of recognition for the Sami. After the 1963 article, *The Sami are the Indians of Sweden*—which was the “anchoring of a new identity”—the perspective centered on the Sami, and colonized people in general, began to broaden (Minde *The Challenge* 77-79). This in part was due to literature the Sami were exposed to at the time. Minde states that,
There was a constant flow of books from abroad that made a strong impression. The background to, and ideology of, ‘Red Power’ in the United States became known in Scandinavia with Vine Deloria’s book *Custer died for your sins* (in 1969, published in Sweden in 1971). The way in which the Prairie Indians lost their lands, their livelihood, and their lives, in the space of one short generation, was brought to life in Dee’ Brown’s *Bury my heart at Wounded knee* (1971, published in Norway in 1974) (Minde The Challenge 79).

The study shows that Indigenous peoples at this point were recognizing each other’s situation; they organized because of it and as an audience they continued to expand and become ever more visible and then challenged those with higher status. Another significant aspect of indigenous peoples noticing each other is that they did it partially through literature. Another consideration is that literature is a way for indigenous to write, or in some cases, rewrite their history. Finally, it takes self-respect/pride for oneself and respect for one’s culture, enough so, that one is willing to subject one’s literature and arts to the opinions of the public.

The Alta conflict itself was rife with aspects of shame/honor. As soon as the hydro-electric project was announced the Sami, Norwegians, and environmentalists alike organized and began to protest. Shame/honor when considering protests (peaceful protests) can be seen in a couple of different ways. The first is that if the protesters are purposefully trying to shame Norway into submission, it could be as simple as commanding respect for themselves and their culture, or it could be meant to provide the audience to judge the other, or a combination thereof.
The reduction on the part of the Norwegian government in the original size of the project could be viewed as showing respect to the Sami, but I would take exception with that, since Norway would put the project on hold then pick it up later, at one time even dismissing it altogether. After a while their behavior seemed like placation, which may not be directly related to shame, but the actions definitely show a lack of respect, if not outright disregard for the Sami.

The action by protesters who blocked the road can be viewed as an attempt to shame the government; it can be viewed as a way to gain self-respect, and it can be viewed as the love of honor. It also can be seen as a moral issue on both sides of the aisle, forcing the hand of the police is a high-level of disrespect. Hauling the demonstrators away is not a tactic of shaming, nor is it an acknowledgement of disrespect; it could also be a tactic to remove the spectacle of shame/honor from the public. The reason this is not an acknowledgement of disrespect is that the protesters have an avenue to remedy any shame associated with their actions through the legal system. However, choosing to negotiate with the protesters would have been a sign of respect by Norway. The research has established that the legal system can be considered to be an emotionless system; as such, shame would have no role in the system. There are, nonetheless, aspects of shame/honor during the protests. First, the Sami could be considered not to be showing respect towards themselves or the Norwegian Government and Police Officers.

Respect is present during the protests though; this comes from the mutual respect the Sami and environmentalists showed each other. They were willing to put any differences aside in order to help each other fulfill their specific agenda. For the Sami,
they wanted their environmental concerns recognized; and, they wanted their culture recognized; and, control over the future of their culture. The removal of the tents, again, comes from an emotionless entity of the legal system that is supposed to objective when making decisions; therefore, disrespect is not what is at issue here. In this instance, the end goal of shame is subjugation.

The research found that it is relevant to consider the “culture of environmentalism.” In other words, environmentalists, like any cultural subgroup, want to have some control over their social structure; and to do so means remaining visible and recognized in front of a judging audience. In addition, the Sami and environmentalists were, at least, showing some respect towards each other. This is also another shame/honor aspect worth considering and worthy of future research.

The attempt to blow up the bridge cannot help but be seen as a concerted effort completely to disrespect or even disregard the government. This is evident by the backlash that was received, even by contemporaries. Anybody who agreed with what Niilas Somby did is also showing an aspect of shame/honor as a concept of morality. He was shown respect by Canadian Indians who sheltered him. Right or wrong they were still giving him respect, despite what he did. The most obvious example of shame in this incident is the placing of the severed hand on a Norwegian law book and taking picture. It is one of the more recognizable symbols of the Alta conflict. The image says, “This is what they are doing to us…” etc. “severing Sami people from their land.” This leads to the most significant aspect of shame-honor during the Alta conflict, which is the use of cultural symbols.
The whole of the Alta conflict can be considered culturally symbolic, because the core issue for the Sami during the conflict was to bring attention (recognition) to their culture; and one way to get recognized was to display their identity in front of a judging public. Notably, Sami dress, dwellings, *joiks*, drums and their arts are the main symbols that played a pivotal role during the conflict. One symbol the Sami brandished was the *lavvu* they set up outside Parliament. The research suggests that the act of camping in public meant the Sami were dedicated to getting recognized and respected. And that Sami peoples had found the pride and identity linked with the reversal of shame and the growth of honor within Sami society; the Sami were no longer willing to hide an identity that was once deemed by the dominant society as inferior. From a shame/honor perspective this is an example of having self-respect/pride, an obvious desire for recognition/respect; and a love of honor. So what was once considered an inconsequential culture by Norway, or the dominant society, was now a source of pride for many Sami; so much so that some Sami shamelessly let everyone know they were proud and dedicated to revitalizing and sustaining their culture, and were no longer ashamed to parade their identity in public.

Another symbol of the Sami culture is their distinct style of dress. The power of this symbol is that when coupled with the traditional *lavvu*, Sami identity becomes ever more visible to the view of others. This means, as noted above, some Sami were extremely dedicated not only to removing the social stigma attached to their identity, but to replacing it with respect. The Sami also exhibited their arts and crafts—drumming and *joiking*—again, combined with other cultural material objects Sami identity becomes further entrenched in the minds of the judging public. The opinions that arise can range
from extremely favorable to extremely unfavorable. Part of the significance behind *joiking* is that at one time, like the Sami language, it was forbidden. Lehtola gives an example of significance of cultural arts as cultural binders when talking about Nils-Aslak Valkeapää, “poet, writer, joiker musician, composer, photographer, painter, pictorial artist, cultural politician, and performer” (130). Valkeapää, who Lehtola calls a Sami ambassador,

…was the most prominent proponent of the ‘Sami Renaissance’, which began at the end of the 1960s. Through his appearances and concerts he brought back value and dignity to the despised and rejected yoik tradition and revived its popularity with youth. His classic record *Joikuja* (1968) was the first modern day recording of Sámi music. He dashed the myths about Sámi in polemic and mettlesome book *Terveisiä Lapista* (Greetings from Lapland, 1971). With his collections of poetry he took a lyrical stand in the Sámi music in new directions, combining yoik and western musical forms, even the symphony. In his paintings and photography Valkeapää showed paths toward new directions (131-132). Valkeapää used his artistic expression to bring recognition and pride to Sami traditional art forms in order to bring respect to their culture and identity.

The study found that one of the more influential symbols established in the Alta conflict centers on the attempt to sabotage the bridge needed to haul equipment to the Dam’s construction site. Like the protests, this incident in itself is a symbol, as is evident by the simple fact that this is an act that can become indelible in the minds of both the Sami and Norwegians. This is also true of the picture depicting the severed hand of the activist placed on a Norwegian legal code book. In this case, the power of the image is
more a post-conflict symbol. Although the literature did not turn up a date as to when the picture was taken, it nonetheless can still be considered a post-conflict symbol, simply because the photograph resides at the Tromsø Museum (to be discussed later), in northern Norway. This means that as long as the image remains in the public sphere, and in an educational setting, it remains a symbol; a symbol of the seriousness the Alta conflict represented, and the struggle for Sami recognition. Because of its raw imagery, viewing it can result in one experiencing raw emotions; which can be a permanent reminder of the efforts, and the lengths to which the Sami were willing to become recognized. Symbols help to develop an identity—the Sami culture in this instance—that in time becomes a ‘perpetual entity’ that exists in the ‘psychological space’ of an individual’s mind. They also help create and maintain myths and mythological worlds for the Sami people’s identity as a culture. They become recognized for their distinctive features which in turn creates ‘fascination’ in individuals. This transforms a symbol from a simple object to the sublime. The more clearly symbols are displayed the more fascinations they have. Simply put, they can be “powerful animating ideas” that enhances the totality of the archetype and its potentiality (Randazzo 50, Ryland 385-388). This can be seen clearly in the symbolic representation of the Sami flag, their manner of dress, their arts, and the picture of the severed hand.

The Sami also during this time, created a visual symbol to unite themselves as peoples, while making a statement of separation from the dominant populace in the creation of their own national flag, creating one nation that crosses international borders. Flags are a symbol of unity and pride for that unity, and for the Sami this all came together during the Alta Conflict. According to Lehtola “The flag became an important
symbol of the new Sámi movement. It was first hoisted during the Áltá Conflict; the present design combining colours in a circle signifying unity was approved at the Sámi Conference in 1986” (56). In turn, this action both strengthened Sami pride, and serves as a constant reminder of that pride; and brought recognition to the Sami as a distinct people with serious intention to reestablish respect of their own cultural identity.

Conclusion

From beginning to end, shame and honor played an instrumental role during the events of the Alta conflict. Shame and honor concepts have been a part of human experience since time immemorial. They are cultural constructs that maintain boundaries. Philosophers over the years have tried to decipher how they work and how people experience them. From that, there are some overarching themes to shame and honor. One is that they are viewed as binary concepts, at least through most of history. The second is that contemporary writers and philosophers are now approaching them as if they are separate concepts. They have mostly been seen as moral concepts, but the main aspect of shame and honor is they require an audience for them to be effective. The Sami went from having their culture disrespected by the dominant society—a condition that can either shame people out of owning their cultural identity, or at least cause them to hide their ethnic identity—to the empowerment of the UNDRIP, which is about giving recognition and the respect back to the Sami and other indigenous peoples of the world. The Sami were able to resurrect their cultural identity and overcome continued attempts to be homogenized into the dominant society. By imitating the paradigm of the dominant society they were able to reinstitute Sami individual and group identity bringing back
value, honor and respect to their own ethnicity. The Alta conflict became a watershed moment in reclaiming Sami identity and Sami pride. This watershed moment brought environmentalists, Norwegians and Samis together as one voice raising an environmental justice issue. This in turn brought national and international attention to the Sami peoples. Because of this recognition the Sami connected with other indigenous groups creating the foundation of unity whereby they became recognized as indigenous peoples with rights. The recognition forced the Norwegian government to reassess the rights of Sami peoples giving way to Norway identifying the Sami as indigenous peoples in the Norwegian Constitution. The Sami, then, with the support of the Norwegian Government instituted the Sami Parliament, and also were instrumental in the development of the UNDRIP. As result of being recognized they shed the stigma of being inferior or backwards, and shed the notion that they were a dying ethnicity. As a result the Sami put to rest the principles of social Darwinism. It is fitting then that in the 1990s Norway returned the skulls of the two Sami men that were taken to “Oslo for anthropological study…Both skulls were returned and buried in their home communities” (Lehtola 41). All told, the efforts by the Sami increased their ability for self-determination. Because of their persistent actions, the Sami can now steer the course for their culture, instead of watching it from the rearview mirror.
Works Cited


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