Material and Social Relations in Friedrich von Hardenberg's Heinrich von Afterdingen

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MATERIAL AND SOCIAL RELATIONS IN FRIEDRICH VON HARDENBERG'S

HEINRICH VON AFTERDINGEN

By

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MATERIAL AND SOCIAL RELATIONS IN FRIEDRICH VON HARDENBERG'S *HEINRICH VON AFTERDINGEN*

**Abstract**

In an attempt to widen interpretations, this study first explores the myths associated with Friedrich von Hardenberg, commonly known as Novalis, which have resulted in the neglect of material interpretations of his works. After an introduction to Hardenberg's theory of the Self and Karl Marx's theory of alienation, an analysis of Hardenberg's most widely read work, *Heinrich von Afterdingen*, demonstrates how Hardenberg was as concerned with the material and the social relations among human beings and their labor as he was with their spiritual endeavors. The self-development of Heinrich, the main character in *Afterdingen*, is chronicled in this study with special attention given to his material existence as well as the material existence of the people he encounters. This study demonstrates that *Afterdingen* can be read as a handbook for the development of the Self according to the theories of Hardenberg and Marx, in which the Self cannot favor the spiritual realm, or inner existence, at the expense of its material and social relations. Rather, these two spheres are both important for full self-development.
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INTRODUCTION: THE JENA ROMANTICS AND THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS

The circle of thinkers who congregated around the German city of Jena at the very end of the eighteenth century until the beginning of the nineteenth century have come to be known as the Romantics. This designation was made around 1805, but referred in fact to a different group of thinkers who met after the early Romantics in Jena had disbanded. The definitions and connotations of Romanticism have undergone many changes throughout history and only reached their contemporary meaning in the mid-nineteenth century. The development of the term romantic is chronicled by Ernst Behler in his work, German Romantic Literary Theory. Behler explains the term romantic as it was used in the late-eighteenth century as consisting of two parts: the chronological and the typographical. The chronological links the term to the tradition of epic literature in the Middle Ages. This literature was held in low-esteem and was not considered part of the canon. The typological refers to the compositional and structural variations prominent in Romantic literature. The negative connotations of the term, especially in its association with literature of the Middle Ages are evident. The movement was quickly seen as reactionary in its idealization of the Middle Ages, a view which lasted well into the nineteenth century and was echoed by Heinrich Heine in The Romantic School: "But what was the Romantic School in Germany? It was nothing other than the revival of the poetry of the Middle Ages." Behler goes on to define the meaning of the word, citing members of the Jena Romantics, who although they never labeled their movement Romantic, did write about the term. In their analysis, the historical and chronological
arguments identifying their literature as reactionary disappears and is replaced with an abstract notion typical of the Jena Romantics. The romantic is synonymous with the poetic and is something that absorbs its audience. Any notion of completion of the romantic is dispensed with, which meant that the Jena Romantics did not have to offer an ultimate goal for their poetic endeavors: "Romantic poetry, precisely because of its incompletion, is infinite" (Behler 29).

Behler's analysis focuses exclusively on literature. However, in *The Romantic Imperative*, Frederick Beiser points out the fallacy of this approach by stating that Romantic aesthetics derived its meaning from its ethical and political values: "The ethical and political have primacy over the literary and critical in the sense that the romantic devotion to aesthetics was ultimately guided by their ethical and political ideas" (24). The often esoteric writings of the Romantics were rooted in solid ethical and political convictions. It was not their heads that were in the clouds, but rather their aspirations. The fallacy of studying only the literature of the early Romantics has led to a lack of attention being paid to their foundational principles resulting in two unfortunate phenomena outlined by Beiser:

First, most philosophers ignore the subject because they think that the central concerns of early romanticism fall within the realm of literature. Second, the subject has been almost the exclusive preserve of literary scholars, who do not focus sufficient attention on the fundamental metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, and political ideas that are the real foundation of early romanticism. (8)

In this study, I will focus on the ethical and political foundations of early Romanticism, those which, according to Beiser, have been neglected in scholarly work.
Apart from the problem of defining Romanticism in a concrete all-encompassing manner, the problematic of seeing intellectual and literary movements as necessary progressions through history needs to be addressed: "[I]t is premature and almost nonsensical to believe that progress must of necessity come about." Intellectual and literary movements such as the Enlightenment and Romanticism have as their goal the progressive development of human potential. In true romantic fashion, this study rejects the notion that abstract concepts, such as "progression," pertains to anything but individuals. Human progress is possible, but it must start with the individual before the progression of society is possible. Marx and Engels described the communist revolution, which might some day take place, as starting with individuals and then working in a hierarchal fashion upwards: "In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to." 

Inevitable universal progression over time through intellectual and literary movements forming new syntheses, such as the shift from Enlightenment to Romanticism, is an illusion. "Progression" in the sense of shifting cultural movements is nothing more than addition, where addition is deprived of all positive connotations outside of a mathematical number sequence. For example: $1 + 4 = 5$ is not progress, rather addition. Addition necessitates subtraction. Following the Saussurean linguistic model, where meaning is derived from polar opposites, addition has no meaning without subtraction. Progress is therefore addition and subtraction. However, subtraction pertaining to movements is not absolute. Rather, elements are consciously deemphasized. Progress defined in this manner presupposes the intertextuality of movements. Romanticism is
comprised of additions to and subtractions from Enlightenment concepts, additions and
subtractions from concepts represented in movements of opposition within the
Enlightenment, such as Storm and Stress and Pietism, as well as movements before the
Enlightenment. Romanticism, or any subsequent movement for that matter, must bear the
weight of what came before. Additions and subtractions of concepts are borrowings from
previous movements or reactions to concepts based on their presence or lack thereof
within a movement. An example of one concept emphasized in Romanticism is feeling.
This is an addition as a reaction to the lack thereof in the Enlightenment, which
emphasized reason. The Romantics subtracted the rules governing form that was
prevalent during the Enlightenment and also in Classicism. The Romantics were not
concerned with their works forming a harmonious whole or employing the symmetry that
is required in a classic tragedy. Rather, they favored a mixing of genres and a
fragmentary writing style. These additions and subtractions are what constitute the shift
in movements; however, they cannot be seen as progression. Progression of human
potential, or that of becoming completely human, is left to individuals within each
cultural, intellectual, or literary movement. One of the individuals that sought true
progression for himself and provided guides for others on how to reach their potential
was Georg Philip Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg.

Friedrich von Hardenberg, who is better known by his pseudonym, Novalis, was
part of the Jena Romantics. His body of work illustrates how prolific the thought of Early
German Romanticism was. Hardenberg was not only a great poet, but also a brilliant
theoretician and a successful salt mine assessor. Had he not died of tuberculosis at an
early age, there is no telling with how many fields he would have occupied himself.
Despite the great variety of his writings, the typical perception of Hardenberg does him little justice in that he normally is thought of merely as a Romantic poet, and sometimes as one who has completely lost touch with reality. This false conception is due to the many myths associated with him. When speaking of Hardenberg today, one usually refers to him by his pseudonym, Novalis. This is symptomatic of the strength that the myths have gathered over many years. In this study, in an attempt to distinguish between the man and the persona, I will only refer to Novalis when speaking of the mythical perception of Hardenberg. Accordingly, the initial sections of my study will attempt to debunk some of the myths associated with Hardenberg so that my larger task, that of showing the emphases of material and practical existence in Hardenberg, can be taken seriously. These sections will be followed by an introduction to Hardenberg's philosophy, specifically his theory of the Self. Then, an examination of the concept of alienation, or estrangement, in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts by Karl Marx will demonstrate how the idealist philosophy of Hardenberg and the material philosophy of Marx are quite similar in their conclusions about the constitution of a developed Self. Hardenberg and Marx would normally be considered to be at opposite ends of the critical spectrum, but this study will demonstrate that that is not necessarily the case. The link between the theories of Hardenberg and those of Marx will then be examined in Hardenberg's most well-known work, Heinrich von Afterdingen.
Notes


2 Ernst Behler, German Romantic Literary Theory (Cambridge: UP, 1993).


No serious attempt to discover the real Friedrich von Hardenberg is complete without dealing with the various long-held myths pertaining to his life. The mystery that frequently shrouds his life-story is the result of these myths, or "distancing agents," which in turn came about because of unreliable accounts about Hardenberg's life, because of many letters as well as journal entries, and because of the blind eye that many have had for the concrete actions over the course of his life. Normally, I would refrain from devoting a large portion of a study such as this on biographical information about the author. I agree with Friedrich Nietzsche in *The Genealogy of Morals* where he assigns preference to an artist's work over the artist himself: "[I]t is always well to divorce an artist from his work, and to take him less seriously than it. He is after all, only a condition of the work, the soil from which it grows, perhaps only the manure on that soil. Thus he is, in most cases, something that must be forgotten if one wants to enter into the full enjoyment of the work". In this case, however, it seems appropriate to provide some background material. Generally, biographical information often can limit interpretations of a work, since the reader may tend to read a text looking for biographical information. In other cases, the biographical information with which the reader is already familiar also can limit interpretations of a text, as is the case with Hardenberg. John Hawes, a Franz Kafka scholar, found that in order to find new ways of interpreting Kafka, the myths associated with him must first be clarified. This is the task that he sets forth in his very recent work, *Why You Should Read Kafka Before You Waste Your Life.* He speaks of an
innocent method of reading Kafka, in which myths and biographical information does not limit interpretation:

I suggest we need a brand-new theory of how to read Kafka's writing. The oldest theory of all. The theory used by Kafka's first readers, who—lucky them!—knew nothing of Felice, Milena, Hermann Kafka, the diaries [...]. We can't read Kafka's writing in this innocent way. The trouble with being human (as Adam and Eve found out) is that you can't unknow things. Since we inescapably know things about Kafka, the only option we have is to know them properly.

(188-89)

In order to more properly know about Friedrich von Hardenberg, and since "unknowing" the information with which one already is familiar is very difficult, it is necessary to discuss certain myths, and I will discuss the following three myths in this chapter: the "Sophie myth" has received the most attention and has served to distract readers from other aspects of Hardenberg's life. Another myth is one that portrays Hardenberg as a dreamer who is completely devoid of any grasp of reality. The pseudonym, Novalis, which Hardenberg used only four times in his life, serves as another distancing agent, turning the man into a persona. In this chapter, I disrupt these distancing agents in order to portray a more accurate picture of the "real" Friedrich von Hardenberg.

Sophie

The common knowledge many have about Hardenberg is limited to very few aspects of his life. Anyone acquainted with his work from a literature course is certain to know that he died very young and that he developed a sudden infatuation for Sophie von
Kühn, who was twelve years old when their first meeting took place in November of 1794, and that his infatuation with her pervaded his work and thoughts even after her death in March of 1797. There is a void of knowledge about Hardenberg’s biography before he met Sophie, and the period between Sophie’s death and that of Hardenberg's is thought to consist only of mourning and a longing for death so that he could be reunited with her. The real situation is much more complicated and is riddled with documented "concrete" events that even rival the myth that Sophie was the center of Hardenberg’s life while she was alive, let alone after her death. In order to examine this myth, looking at the period before their meeting is also relevant and reveals part of Hardenberg’s character while problematizing the religious aspect of their meeting.

Hardenberg began studying law at the age of nineteen in Leipzig, where he became acquainted with Friedrich Schlegel. The account of their meeting that Friedrich Schlegel gave his brother, August Wilhelm Schlegel, is one of admiration. He praised Hardenberg's enthusiasm and intellect and spoke of his desire to educate or mold the younger student: “[H]e speaks three times more and three times faster than we do—the quickest powers of comprehension and receptivity. The study of philosophy has given him a prodigal ease in the construction of fine philosophical thoughts. [...] The relationship to one younger affords me a novel, voluptuous pleasure to which I surrender.” The relationship, which is portrayed in Schlegel's words as something intoxicating with a dynamic of power, leads to many flirtatious endeavors, for which the university in Leipzig was renown (Donehower 38). This then results in Hardenberg's nickname, “Fritz the Flirt.” This flirtatious aspect of Hardenberg’s university career was obviously well-known and was praised by Hardenberg himself in a religious fashion. He
referred to Schlegel as a “High Priest” and said: “Through you, I have learned to know heaven and hell–from you, I have partaken of the tree of knowledge” (Donehower 41). Even the end of a serious relationship with Juliane Eisenstuck, whom he met through Schlegel–who had been involved with Juliane's sister–did not disrupt his love of flirtation. Schlegel responded to the tone of Hardenberg’s letter in reaction to this event in the following manner: “I think you have incorrectly named your condition health [...] To be sure you have suffered much as a result of her, but I hope that you will suffer even more. Only because I have always thought that the motivating goal of a richly promising talent cannot be the blithe state of a happy butterfly” (39). Hardenberg suffered as a result of the termination of his relationship with Juliane, but his suffering was mild and deemed healthy. Schlegel’s prescription of suffering in order to motivate talent is eerily far-sighted considering the deaths that soon affected Hardenberg to such a great degree; however, the praise of flirtation as a religion would continue. Hardenberg wrote in a letter to his younger brother Erasmus: “Flirting is a charming but ticklish enterprise. May God in his goodness preserve one from ambition and the irresistible hankering to be the darling of any one girl” (42). These words were written at the beginning of November 1794, the same month he subsequently met Sophie von Kühn.

The meeting with Sophie on November 17th was a life-changing moment according to Hardenberg, whose letter detailing the meeting unfortunately has been lost. The reaction to this letter from his brother Erasmus, however, was not. Erasmus, taking into consideration Hardenberg’s flirtatious escapades explains in a very sensitive and politely drawn-out manner, that he is the victim of passion, nothing more. After admitting that Hardenberg’s letter was astonishing and shocking (it said that he saw into Sophie’s
heart in a quarter hour), Erasmus catalogues the effects that passion has on individuals:

“When they are violent [passions], they rob us of the capacity for free thinking and action. [...] The suddenness, surprise, and overwhelming decisiveness mark this as a manifestation of passion. And wouldn’t such a passion be capable of blinding you in a moment?” (46). The second half of the letter is a plea for Hardenberg to consider his own past, of which no secrets had been kept between the brothers, when thinking about a marriage proposal to Sophie after their first encounter: “[Y]our soul [is] always hungry for new activities and accordingly used to change. Now, pay close attention!–In accordance with these premises, is it wise that your ever active spirit [...] should choose to settle its affections year-in-year-out on one single being?” (46-47). Erasmus obviously has in mind the words of Hardenberg’s letter that had been written at the beginning of the month. He then continues to speculate about what might happen if Hardenberg and Sophie actually marry, and turns Hardenberg’s words against him in a direct quote:

“Finally, dearest Fritz, you yourself write: ‘as soon as I receive a general nod of favorable approval, the time of the blossoming of my inclination is past.’ Is it possible that you should not receive this nod of approval in answer to a girl who has given you her pledge” (47). Erasmus clearly believes that Hardenberg, overcome with unbridled passion, is overreacting to a “nod of approval” that he has gotten many times in the past and certainly will receive in the future. Pursuing this particular nod so forcefully, Erasmus fears, will lead to boredom, “the condition that you so long have dreaded” (48).

The allure that Sophie had for Hardenberg is explained by Arctander O'Brien in terms of his fear of realized sexual activity. O'Brien highlights the quotes in Hardenberg's correspondences about flirting and conceptualizes them in the term "absolute flirtation":
"Hardenberg posits happiness as the result of enjoying favor everywhere, while succumbing to its particulars nowhere. 'Everywhere and nowhere'–the future poet of the Absolute awakens as absolute flirt" (34). O'Brien points out Hardenberg's relief after his relationship with Juliane came to an end and cites how uncomfortable he was when flirting became seductive. Hardenberg wrote to Erasmus, for example, that he did not want to be the "darling of any one girl," but his discomfort, resulting from seduction, might keep him from being anyone's darling. Sophie provided the solution to this problem. Sexual activity with someone so young was out of the question, but flirtation in light of this deferral reached the absolute: "The perfect flirtation hovers at the ideal distance for the immediate delights of deliciously sustained deferral" (O'Brien 40). This interesting sexual dimension is a much more plausible reason for the allure that Sophie had for Hardenberg. Despite the praise that Hardenberg lavished upon Sophie, which O'Brien calls his most effective work of fiction (29), and contemporaries such as Ludwig Tieck, who had never met Sophie, among others, also praises her. Yet, Sophie's own journal paints a very different picture of the situation and remains the only preserved documentation of her personality. Some of the highlights that specifically mention Hardenberg are:

Jan. 7. Today Hardenb. rode away again early and again nothing much happened.

8. Today we were alone again and again nothing much happened.

9. Today we were alone again and again nothing much happened.

10. This morning a messenger came again from Sachsenburch [sic] and invited us to meet father there the next day mother answered it. In the afternoon Hardenberch [sic] came too. (Donehower 52)
These are typical of most of her journal entries. There is not even an entry for March 15th, the day Hardenberg proposed to her. The entries cited show her boredom and general disinterest in the affairs of daily life and in Hardenberg. They also dispel the notion that Hardenberg saw something in her beyond the attainment of absolute flirtation.

A character sketch about Sophie, entitled *Klarisse*, written by Hardenberg over a year after their secret engagement and two to three months after their official engagement, includes many sobering statements uncharacteristic of the persona of Novalis, someone allegedly feverishly infatuated with a young girl. This collection of short sentences is riddled with general compliments, such as, "[h]er decency and yet her innocent good nature" (quoted in Donehower 61), and, "[h]er spirit of observation. Love of children. Love of order" (62). Yet, his sobering statements, rather than pointing out merely minor faults, border on the horrific: "She won't let my affections bother her. My love often oppresses her. She is cold through and through" (62). Such observations serve to disrupt the idealization that is the hallmark of their relationship to outsiders and they also problematize Hardenberg’s writings about Sophie after her death, many of which have a religious tone, even setting her name side by side to the name Jesus. Though his writings about Sophie after her death frequently have a religious dimension, Hardenberg did not wait to unite with Sophie in the afterlife, rather he got engaged to Julie von Charpentier less than two years after Sophie’s death. His engagement to Julie, certainly calls the mythical aspect of his relationship with Sophie into question. It is either “an embarrassment, an inexplicable infidelity to a sacred love” (O’Brien 66), or a humanizing aspect that brings Hardenberg down to earth.
Novalis the Persona

The pen-name Novalis is a distancing agent that has come to represent the mythical aspect of the man, Friedrich von Hardenberg, in a concrete way, and that appears on all of his writings still today. The name Novalis was derived from a thirteenth-century relative of Hardenberg’s. Herr von Hardenberg started to call himself “von Rode” after the name of an estate that he had acquired. The Latin version of “von Rode” is “de Novali,” meaning “one who clears new ground for cultivation” (Donehower 6).

Bruce Donehower points out that this designation reflects Hardenberg’s ambitious nature as well as his view of the importance of his enterprise in inaugurating a new form of literature and thinking. The "ground" of thought up to that point had to be cleared so that this form of thinking could grow. Hardenberg viewed himself as one of the important agents in this deconstructive process of past traditions and also then as a pollinator of a new form of thought: “Such persons implicitly act as heralds of a new age or order, seed bearers, revolutionaries, or pioneers” (7). Pollinator is an appropriate term considering the opening lines of a collection of Novalis's philosophical fragments suitably entitled Pollen: “Freunde, der Boden ist arm, wir müssen reichlichen Samen / Ausstreun, dass uns doch nur mässige Ernten gedeihn.”

The political slant to Hardenberg’s pseudonym is explored in more depth by O’Brien. The transformation of “de Novali” into “Novalis” carries with it political discretion. Many German writers, including Goethe and Schiller, added von to their names at the time when the Holy Roman Empire was issuing the final patents of nobility. Hardenberg replaced the old aristocratic de or von with the possessive s: “The slight change retained a quiet trace of Hardenberg’s lineage, but avoided the conspicuous
aristocracy and awkward parechisis of ‘von Novali’” (O’Brien 3). This change was symptomatic of the sensitivity with which Hardenberg wanted his writings to be approached during the Terror in the wake of the French Revolution. Hardenberg was walking a tightrope here between the reactionary aristocratic element in his pseudonym and the new revolutionary definition thereof. The destruction of the old that is made explicit in the definition of his chosen pseudonym would not be readily welcomed by all, but at least could be masked by maintaining the old and hinting at the new in this clever language play.

**The Divine Dreamer**

For many, Hardenberg’s life also ended when Sophie died; thereafter he usually was only known by the pseudonym and in persona of Novalis. Friedrich von Hardenberg, the human being, is masked in the mystical intrigue of lost love and poetic signs. However, life for Hardenberg began years before he met Sophie and continued for him until March 25, 1801, the day of his death. It is what came after his death that fueled the myth of Novalis, the poet, the dreamer, the mystic, the non-person. Ludwig Tieck's biographical account, published with the third edition of Hardenberg’s works, is a primary source of the myth of Novalis, the persona, at the expense of Hardenberg, the man. Tieck commits the "cardinal error" mentioned above by Beiser by trying to equate Hardenberg with his literary works. The subject of Tieck’s “biographical account” is necessarily Novalis, not Hardenberg, and Tieck must have been fully aware of his construction, as is made clear by the title: *Biography of Novalis*. He mentions the name Friedrich von Hardenberg only once, even then putting Novalis in parenthesis. In the brief biographical information on Novalis before he meets Sophie, Tieck writes that his
spirit “seemed to awaken from a slumber” (Donehower 127) after overcoming a case of dysentery when he was nine years old. Despite Tieck’s assurance that Novalis did awake from his slumber, Hardenberg seems not to awake from a slumber in Tieck’s biography, a continuity which is made clear in his description of Hardenberg’s death: “Toward nine o’clock he asked his brother [Karl] to play something for him on the piano, during which he fell asleep. Friedrich Schlegel came soon afterward into his room and found him very peacefully in slumber. [...] His usual friendly countenance looked unaltered, the same as if he were still alive” (134). Tieck constantly describes Novalis as a mythical being and even goes so far as to reify Hardenberg into a painting reflecting this tendency: “In profile and expression, his face closely resembled St. John the Evangelist, as we know that face from the lovely, large painting by Albrecht Dürer” (134). Novalis’s manner of speech also helps to create and perpetrate the view of his other-worldliness. When describing Novalis’s manner of conversation, Tieck asserts that he could reveal the depths of his soul “as though he were speaking under the sway of invisible worlds” (134). This eerie observation at best negates any human aspect of Novalis, and at worst makes one infer that Novalis was possessed by demons or some sort of spirit, depending on what one thinks of the “divine Dante,” to whom Tieck later compares Novalis.

August Cölestin Just wrote a contrasting biographical testimony ten years before Tieck. Just was very familiar with many aspects of Hardenbergs life, as he had met him in 1794 and witnessed his professional endeavors instead of being familiar only with his literary work, whereas Tieck did not meet Hardenberg until 1799 and knew only his literary life. Just’s biographical testimony refers to Hardenberg by his real name and professional position in the title: *Friedrich von Hardenberg, Assessor of Salt Mines in*
Saxony and Designated Department Director in Thuringia. This attempt to write something genuine about Hardenberg, the man, as opposed to Novalis, was met with a negative reaction from those who did not want the mythical aspect of Novalis to die with Hardenberg himself. One reader commented about Just’s approach in a letter to a friend: “[I]t makes a rather extraordinary and disturbing impression to think of Novalis as an official or director of a salt mine. That is horrible!!” (Donehower 3-4). But Just’s biography is not about Novalis. In fact, Just only mentioned Novalis once, when he referred to the edition of Hardenberg's writings that Schlegel and Tieck had published. He went on to add that “[o]ne would do him a disservice [...] to judge these [his writings] as fully rendered masterpieces or to read them as expressions of the entire human being” (Donehower 123). Tieck’s biography of Novalis in 1815 is a disservice, pandering to the marketability of a mythical figure. In contrast, Just’s biography is a testament to the genius of Hardenberg, which Just defines as:

[The person possessing] outstanding spiritual abilities to learn every science easily, to penetrate a subject to its depths, to seize upon it with certainty, order it with wisdom, and judge it with the soundest critical faculties; he possesses these same strengths in all his spiritual faculties, the same ease in directing these strengths and abilities toward this or that object, and the same joy and love in their employment. (111)

Just describes many aspects of Hardenberg's genius: his skill as an administrator; his ability to read quickly and still recall every detail of what he had read months later; his interests in human rights and the state; and his ambitious plan to unify all arts and sciences. Just, however, does not praise Hardenberg’s personal qualities and professional
life at the expense of his relationship with Sophie. The slant that Just takes on the relationship with Sophie emphasizes Hardenberg’s steadfast capacity to reason, his intellectual industriousness, and even his humor. For example, Sophie’s illness gave Hardenberg the motive to familiarize himself with medicine and healing; his productivity in writing continued despite this hard time, and Just mentions a humorous poem on the subject of purchasing a garden. One section reads: “Sie sprach so sanft: / ‘Verdammt, Mann! / Ein jedes hat allhier so einen Gartenfleck, / Und wir – was haben wir? – wir haben einen – / Es ist nicht auszustehn, wo soll ich Kaffee trinken?”

The effectiveness of Tieck’s account of Novalis, as opposed to Just’s testimony of Hardenberg, is evident in the essay of another famous German writer: Heinrich Heine. In *The Romantic School*, Heine strikes a parallel between Novalis and the girl who introduced Novalis to him, whose name, coincidently, was Sophia. He met her as she was reading *Heinrich von Afterdingen*, the book that Heine says gave her tuberculosis. The myth of Sophie is also transposed over the life of Sophia, who takes on angelic qualities as she nears death: “[S]he was now of a spiritual beauty and sight of which moved me most grievously. […] I finally asked, ‘Mademoiselle Sophia, how are you?’ ‘I am well,’ she answered, ‘and shall soon be even better.’ And she pointed out the window to the new graveyard” (80). Sophia bequeathed *Heinrich von Afterdingen* to Heine after her morbid longing for death was granted. Whether she succumbed to the Novalis myth herself, or rather was the victim of Heine’s imagination and propagation of the myth is not clear.

Hardenberg does not lose any appeal as a man, writer, scientist, or philosopher, even after one examines the myths that surround him. On the contrary, his true genius
emerges: he is not part of a divine being, but rather has an astounding capacity for
knowledge and competency in a variety of fields. This expanded view of Hardenberg,
which goes beyond the mythical aspects of Novalis, will support my further examination
of Hardenberg's philosophy and theories and will help contextualize his work and give it
more depth.
Notes


4 Bruce Donehower, ed., The Birth of Novalis (New York: State U of New York P, 2007) 37. All subsequent references to letters, diaries, and biographical accounts come from this source unless otherwise noted.

5 Novalis, Fragmente und Studien (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2001) 5. Subsequently referred to as PF.

6 Novalis, Werke, Briefe, Dokumente (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1953) 483. Subsequently referred to as WBD.
One of the fields of knowledge that Hardenberg took a great interest in was the philosophical studies of his time. He, and many others in the Jena circle, most notably Friedrich Schlegel, was largely influenced by J.G. Fichte. In October, 1795, Hardenberg began his ambitious philosophical work, *Fichte Studies*, written in response to Fichte’s *Science of Knowledge*.¹ He completed it almost a year later in September of 1796.²

During this time period and well after, Hardenberg engaged in discussions about Fichte’s philosophy with F. Schlegel in a process they termed, *fichtesieren* or “fichtecizing.” Fichtecizing does not by any means denote a "herd/master" discussion of a contemporary philosopher, but rather entails an analytical approach to Fichte meant to inspire new ideas that go beyond the master: “[It] hints at an ironic mimicry that does more than imitate. Fichtecizing implies not only identification, but distance, and Hardenberg himself uses the word in both senses” (O’Brien 82). Hardenberg uses *Science of Knowledge* as a point of departure to introduce what he felt was left out or glossed over in Fichte’s work. The result is a complicated theory that plays with Fichte’s propositions, while also trying to appropriate and simultaneously distance itself from it, which has parallels to contemporary, twentieth-century critical schools, such as deconstructionism and the poststructuralism of Jacques Lacan. It also demonstrates the path toward personal development in a social manner at odds with the narcissistic labeling that characterizes many Romantic texts.

Fichte begins *Science of Knowledge* with the fundamental proposition of self-positing, expressed as $A = A$, or I am I. The self posits itself absolutely in an original act
(Tathandlung): “The self’s own positing of itself is thus its own pure activity. The self *posits itself*, and by virtue of this mere self-assertion it *exists*” (Fichte 83). The self is a unity according to Fichte. Thus, A=A entails the absolute positing of opposites as well as the absolute positing of the self: "Every opposite, so far as it is so, is so absolutely, by virtue of an act of the self, and for no other reason. Opposition in general is posited absolutely by the self" (103). Fichte's theory does not leave room for anything outside of the self, since the self is an absolute sphere. Hardenberg critiques this notion in his *Fichte Studies* and asks the question: "Has not Fichte too arbitrarily packed everything into the I?" (FS 7).

According to Hardenberg, the "subject itself is always already split into self and other."³ "In order to determine the I we must refer it to something. Reference occurs through differentiation – Both [occur] through the thesis of an absolute sphere of existence. This is mere-being – or chaos" (FS 6). For Hardenberg, it is impossible for the I to contain the other within it absolutely, since the I can only be distinguished in reference to something else, i.e. the non-I. He does, however, retain Fichte's notion of the self as an act. The I and non-I are encompassed by an absolute sphere which Hardenberg calls "chaos" or "God": "The act by which the I posits itself as I must be connected with the antithesis of an independent Non-I and of the relationship to a sphere that encompasses them – this sphere can be called God, and I" (FS 7). The self is not a unity, rather a relationship between the I, the non-I, and the absolute sphere, making otherness central to subjectivity (Mittman 50).

Hardenberg uses paradoxical logic to describe the relationship between the I, the non-I, and the Absolute: "Consciousness is a being outside of being that is within being
What is outside being must not be a proper being. An improper being outside being is an image – So what is outside being must be an image of being within being. Consciousness is consequently an image of being within being” (5). He goes on to formulate a theory of signs and representation central to his rethinking of A=A that is similar to the mirror stage in Lacanian theory. Azade Seyhan highlights the visual aspect in Hardenberg's theory of the self by pointing out that an eye is needed for the representation of the I. If the other is an "image of being within being," one would have to be able to see this image and have it reflect back on the I, or eye, as with a mirror. In this fashion, the Self is conscious of the non-I and of its own self-positing as a representation of an image. The I is only aware of itself as distinct from the Non-I because of the image which the I creates, meaning: "[T]he I is as much other, or Non-I, as it is I" (Mittman 50). The tension between the I and the Non-I, one of continual dividing and uniting, shows the displacement or flux of the subject. The subject is in a constant state of hovering, or schweben, between the I and the Non-I. The Self is found in this act of relating in the relationship between the I and the Non-I, which both are encompassed by an absolute sphere.

The absolute sphere cannot be fully comprehended by the subject. As noted above, Hardenberg describes it as "God" or "chaos." Chaos is indifference, a sphere without differentiation and therefore without opposites, and yet paradoxically, it is also a sphere where the difference between the I and the Non-I are maintained. The absolute sphere, in so far as it can be comprehended by the subject, is also in a state of flux as the Self relates to it. The Absolute can only be understood negatively, meaning the Self can only define the Absolute by what the Self is not. It is not presentable in a positive sense.
The Self longs to attain the absolute, a realm beyond differentiation. The Self is suspended between the limitation and definition of self as distinct from the Non-I and the Absolute, which remains the potential development of the Self: "[W]e only know the self, be its name Ego or God, insofar as we know the Self, and we only know the self insofar as the subject reflects the object and vice versa" as Géza von Molnár says it. The appropriation of the Absolute is the goal of self-development. The pure activity of the Self in suspension between the Non-I and its relation to the absolute sphere is itself the attainment of the Absolute. O'Brien formulates this as follows:

One gains entrance to the Absolute only through the back door, that is, one 'attains' it, ironically, by renouncing it—and finding out that one 'already' had it in the activity of seeking and renouncing it. To 'attain' the Absolute means merely to recognize that one already operates in accordance with it—the Absolute is not the goal, but the principle of our activity. (115)

The Non-I, in addition to being a limiter to the Self, plays an important role as a conductor to the Absolute (Molnár 66). The Non-I possesses this revelatory function in Hardenberg's theory of love, or that of the subject becoming object. In his theory of love, the Non-I is given a new designation: You. The transformation of the Non-I into the You, or the process of the subject becoming object sounds like a narcissistic concept, one in which the subject mistakes the other for himself.

In his psychoanalytic study of Hardenberg entitled Fatherland, Kenneth Calhoon echoes this charge using as his example Heinrich and Mathilde’s relationship in Heinrich von Afterdingen when Heinrich talks about being the mirror of Mathilde’s being:

“Mathilde’s prominence as the ultimate narcissistic object is betrayed by the imagery
Heinrich employs to describe their affinity [...] Heinrich has placed himself in the position not of Narcissus, but of his reflection—a reversal that simply underscores the view that confusion of the self for an Other is the essence of narcissism” (Calhoon 82). Heinrich and Mathilde's relationship is a representation of a perfect love, of the transformation into the You, which I will discuss in more depth in the analysis of Heinrich von Afterdingen; it is not a representation of narcissism. This view is held by James R. Hodkinson in his study on women and writing in Hardenberg. He explains that the You does not demonstrate a “narcissistic illusion of inter-subjectivity” (141), but rather an “ethically sound attempt to rethink radical subjectivity” (140). It was made clear above that Hardenberg makes otherness central to subjectivity. His fundamental critique of Fichte’s I=I is that Fichte put too much into the I. Hardenberg contends that the Self hovers between the I and the Non-I, or Other—an Other which is outside of the Self—but remains fundamental to self-consciousness as “an image of being within being” (FS 5). A passage from the Allgemeine Brouillon defends Hodkinson’s position regarding Hardenberg’s rethinking of subjectivity:

We now behold the true bindings connecting subject and object—behold that there is also an external world within us, united in an analogous manner with our internal being, just as the external world outside us is united with our external being; and hence the former and latter are joined, like our internal and external realms. (AB 151)

The You is not an interaction limited to the Self, but includes the internal world as well as the external world within the subject, since otherness is central to subjectivity.
Hardenberg echoes this passage in another passage in the *Allgemeine Brouillon* that contains his theory of love:

Nature will become moral–when out of a genuine love of art–it devotes itself to art–does what art wishes–and when art, through a genuine love of Nature–lives for Nature, works in accordance with Nature. Thus both must act at the same time, out of their own choice–and for their own sakes–and out of this foreign choice for the sake of the other. They must encounter the other in themselves, and themselves in the other. (AB 12)

Nature and art in this passage can just as well be read as Self and Other. Art being the creation of the Self, and Nature being the external world. The free agency required of both Self and Other to transform into the You is highlighted by the word “choice.”

*Genuine love* is not the Self or Other working for itself, but rather each using their individual free agency as objects external to each other to encounter each other and form a union. Hardenberg’s concept of the You and the transformation of the Self and Other into the You carries with it social and ethical implications. The Self is not narcissistic. It longs for self-fulfillment and the approximation of unity with the absolute sphere through the appropriation of others, which in turn redraws the circumference of the absolute sphere as it expands. These Others are external to the Self, but also part of the subject. The You is the closest approximation of unity between the I, the Non-I, and the Absolute. To achieve unity, the Self cannot act alone, but must leave itself open to the free agency of the Other.

The Self is then pure activity in which the I becomes conscious through the representation of itself as opposed to an Other, or Non-I. The subject is in a constant state
of hovering, or schweben, between the I and the Non-I. The I longs to be united with the Non-I and the Absolute, both of which are beyond the realm of knowledge of the subject. The subject distinguishes itself from the Absolute in a negative relation, but attempts to replicate their unity through the appropriation of Others and of experiences. This causes the circumference of the absolute sphere to be redrawn and expand as the realm of consciousness of the subject expands. Hardenberg’s inclusion of otherness as central to subjectivity gives his philosophy a social aspect in that the self desires a close connection with others, dispelling any preconceived notion that people are not social beings in Hardenberg’s philosophy.
Notes


KARL MARX AND ALIENATION

The early writings of Karl Marx, especially the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*,¹ are also a useful tool in interpreting Hardenberg’s work. The contrasts between the two philosophers are great and fundamental. In fact, it would be difficult to imagine two figures whose personas are at such odds as Novalis and Marx: Novalis, his face as innocent as a child's and radiant like an angel's, longing to leave the confines of the earth in order to experience a fuller life in spirit with his lost love Sophie; and Marx uniting workers with grease-stains on their uniforms to fight against the dominant power structure underneath every major industrial center in the world, all of which look like the set of Fritz Lang’s *Metropolis*. In other ways, however, the two men are very much alike: both are concerned with the full development of individuals, and both formulated explicit social theories on how to achieve this goal. Highlighting the social aspect of Hardenberg's ideas, as well as some of Marx's will give the reader further insight into Hardenberg's work, specifically into *Heinrich von Afterdingen*.

There are many essential differences between Marx and Hardenberg, the greater of which lies in their basic approach to their respective philosophies. Hardenberg writes in abstractions. He writes about potential *unities* and an *absolute sphere*. These abstractions are frequently presented in contradictory terms in which tension governs their relations. The absolute sphere, for example, is a realm in which all oppositions disappear, but also a realm, in which the oppositions between Self and Other are held separate. Such a use of abstractions has fed into the mythical representation of Hardenberg as Novalis. Marx, on the other hand, avoids abstractions in order to study
human beings in their concrete, or material, social setting. He looks upon his endeavor as a natural scientific enterprise, where notions that cannot be proved empirically are not helpful, but rather constitute illusions, which he portrays as being negative. Marx’s critique of the Young Hegelians in *German Ideology*, which reduces their efforts to the status of word-games, fits very well into a critique of Hardenberg, also an idealist: “They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world” (41). After a brief discussion of the most important theory in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, alienation, I will demonstrate that there are similarities between Marx's and Hardenberg's thought, and that these are useful in illuminating their work.

Alienation is a complicated concept with far-reaching implications for humankind, in its relationship to objects of production, nature, and other people. Erich Fromm gives a concise definition of alienation in the introduction to *Marx’s Concept of Man*:

> Alienation (or “estrangement“) means, for Marx, that man does not experience himself as the acting agent in his grasp of the world, but that the world (nature, others, and he himself) remain alien to him. They stand above and against him as objects, even though they may be objects of his own creation. Alienation is essentially experiencing the world and oneself passively, receptively, as the subject separated from the object.³

Marx frames his discussion of alienation in three categories: man’s alienation from the product of his labor, man’s alienation within labor to the act of production, and man’s alienation from nature, which is also shown to be his alienation from other men.
Marx gives two examples for how the object of labor is turned into an external alien and hostile force to the worker. He first compares this to the relationship between man and God, writing that the “more of himself man attributes to God the less he has left in himself” (EPM 80). The worker expends his energy to make a product that is external to himself. The more energy he expends in his labor, the less he belongs to himself. The second example is man’s relationship to nature. Nature provides man with a means of existence in two ways: first, it provides the objects that make labor possible and then also provides the means of existence for the worker. Appropriating man's means of existence through labor in fact deprives him of his means of existence: “[T]he sensuous external world becomes progressively less an object belonging to his labor or a means of existence of his labor, and [...] it becomes progressively less a means of existence in the direct sense, a means for the physical subsistence of the worker” (80-81). Being a worker and a subject are intertwined in such a way that one cannot exist without the other.

Second, man is also alienated through the act of production itself. Marx calls this active alienation. The worker’s labor is also external and opposed to the worker in that the labor exhausts the worker mentally and physically, keeps the worker from feeling at home when working, and only indirectly satisfies his needs, that is, it is a means through which he can satisfy his needs. Labor is also external to the worker, because it does not belong to him since he works for someone else. The work is forced, not voluntary. The result is that the worker becomes an animal and the animal becomes a worker: “[M]an (the worker) feels himself to be freely active only in his animal functions—eating, drinking and procreating, or at most also in his dwelling and in personal adornment—while in his human functions he is reduced to an animal” (82). Marx goes on to explain
that although the above activities are also human, they are mere abstractions outside of the context of other human activities.

Alienation from nature and from other men is the result of the reversal of the means and ends of human activity. A man’s conscious life activity, his being, which separates man from animals, becomes a means for his existence. Man is alienated from his being since the object of his production, nature, or species life, is external to his being rather than being objectified through labor: “The object of labor is therefore, the objectification of man’s species life; for he no longer reproduces himself merely intellectually, as in consciousness, but actively and in a real sense, and he sees his own reflection in a world which he has constructed“ (84). The similarity of this idea with the conscious subject as seen in Hardenberg's work is unmistakable. Man distinguishes himself as an image reflecting off of the Other, as in a mirror. The alienation from nature and oneself in conscious activity also results in alienation from other men. Man does not live alone, but with other men. It follows then that if man is alienated from his own being in the reversal of his conscious life activity, he is also alienated from other beings, whose activity is also reversed.

Alienation has an effect on the senses, in much the same way that it affects the relationships between man and product, activity, nature, and other men. There is a difference between human sense, the human ear for example, and crude senses. In order for people to employ their senses as human beings, instead of as animals–in the case of crude senses–the object of the senses must be a social one; man must be a social being, and society must become a being in the object. The senses operate in their human form when the subject becomes the object:
It is only when objective reality everywhere becomes for man in society the reality of human faculties, human reality, and thus the reality of his own faculties, that all objects become for him the objectification of himself. The objects then confirm and realize his individuality, they are his own objects, i.e., man himself becomes the object. (EPM 108)

This passage sounds much like Hardenberg when he speaks of love and the transformation of the object and subject into a You. This is the condition in which the subject is most fully developed and closest to the absolute sphere. This condition is contrasted by Marx with the condition of animals who are alienated and unconscious of their social activity in nature. For Marx, a starving man performs his natural functions, for example, eating, as would an animal. The object of this function, food, is enjoyed by him only in an abstract form. He cannot appreciate the true beauty and taste of it, because the food is not a human object. The less alienated a person is, the more effective the senses are.

There are many passages in Marx that show trains of thought similar to Hardenberg. While critiquing Hegel, Marx uses language similar to Hardenberg's in his critique of Fichte: “A being which does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural being [...]. A being which has no object outside itself is not an objective being. A being which is not itself an object for a third being has no being for its object” (EPM 141). This could just as well be a critique of I=I in Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, which, as discussed above, Hardenberg wanted to go beyond, because he felt that Fichte put too much into the I. Both Hardenberg and Marx insist on an object, a Non-I, external to the I. They both also insist on the subject becoming the object in order for the full development of
individuals to take place. Erich Fromm uses this relationship between the subject and object to interpret Marx’s theory of love. He states in *Marx's Concept of Man* that, in love, subject and object cannot be separated (28). Hardenberg’s theory of love is identical. Even though Hardenberg speaks in abstractions, such as the Absolute, and Marx focuses on man’s material social relations, they both come to the same conclusions. The theories of Marx and Hardenberg inform each other, if on different planes and with different ideas of material existence, all of which, however, relate together in interpretation. This relationship informs the following discussion of *Heinrich von Afterdingen*. 
Notes

1 Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," Marx's Concept of Man, trans. T.B. Bottomore (London: Continuum, 2004). Subsequently referred to as EPM. I am using the edition that appears in Marx's Concept of Man by Erich Fromm. The Manuscripts were written in 1844 and published later.


In the following discussion, I interpret Hardenberg’s major work of fiction, *Heinrich von Afterdingen*, as a narrative of self-development, in a general sense, following Hardenberg's theories. It could be interpreted as the story of the development of a gifted poet, although the universality of the work is not best served by this interpretation, which is also flawed in that Heinrich, the main character, does not compose a single poem in the plot, even though he often muses on the subject. Admittedly, the author includes much in the work to invite such an interpretation, but poetry is described in very universal terms in *Afterdingen*, whose message should not be limited to composers of verse. Various myths concerning Novalis, which I will point out throughout this discussion, are also suggestively written into the text by Hardenberg. Yet, *Afterdingen*, being a work of fiction, should not necessitate a reenvisioning of its author, no matter how prevalent the myths are.

The focus of my interpretation is the social aspect of *Afterdingen*, specifically in the context of Karl Marx's early works. The esoteric writing in *Afterdingen* often conceals the material and social aspects discussed in the work. The goal of this study is not to devalue one aspect in favor of the other, but rather to show that the theories of Hardenberg and Marx are not necessarily mutually exclusive and that they inform each other in their goal of societal and self-development. Already the dedication, which introduces *Afterdingen*, highlights its social aspects. The first word of the dedication is *du*, signaling a familiar, and trusting social relationship. The remainder of the work tells the
tale of a youth becoming a nonalienated, social being, not the tale of a lonely, wandering poet striving to live for himself outside of and parallel to society.

The spelling of *Afterdingen* used in this discussion keeps in spirit with my attempt to distinguish between Novalis and Hardenberg. Hardenberg never used the spelling, *Ofterdingen*, which was a change made by the editors of the first publishing of the work after his death. O’Brien points out that *Afterdingen* has a political reference to *Afterding*, a term for the Franconian judicial assembly in the middle ages (15), which has its roots in the traditional Germanic assembly (*das Ding*).

*AFTERDINGEN* begins with, or has its false beginning, with the narrator’s discussion of an encounter with a stranger, as well as Heinrich’s dream. Heinrich distinguishes the mysterious world of the stranger, which is what caused Heinrich to dream in the first place, from the material world in which Heinrich lives. Heinrich is immersed in thought about the stories the stranger told him, especially about what the stranger said about the blue flower, whose reference is highlighted above all by Heinrich’s use of a definite article. The distinguishing factor between the two worlds is sensual alienation: “[I]n der Welt, in der ich sonst lebte, wer hätte da sich um Blumen bekümmert, und gar von einer so seltsamen Leidenschaft für eine Blume hab ich damals nie gehört” (9) (“In the world where I had always lived, who ever bothered about flowers? Besides, such a strange passion for a flower is something I never heard of before”). The mysterious world is a foreign concept to Heinrich, which can only be approximated in his dreams. The mention of this world, where people do care about flowers, is a foreshadowing of the world of which Heinrich eventually will become a part. The beginning sentences are displaced as an actual beginning in two ways. First, the beginning—Heinrich contemplating by
himself—is predicated on an earlier beginning which remains mysterious, that of the stranger's origin. Second, the beginning is also the end; it is a speculation of a world devoid of alienation. The dream-world that Heinrich perceives in his dream is the kind of world that he will inhabit in the unfinished second part of Afterdingen.

Heinrich's dream, inspired by the stranger's stories, is a foreshadowing of future events in Afterdingen as well as a symbol of his birth, underscoring the universality of the work. Afterdingen is the story of a life, and the dream is the birth sequence. In his psychoanalytic interpretation of Afterdingen, Calhoon points out that the cave which Heinrich enters is described much like a womb (78). The walls of the cave are moist, and there is a pool in the center of the chamber in which Heinrich has an irresistible urge to bath. He leaves the cave by means of a stream connected to the pool. After a slumber within his dream, Heinrich finds himself in a field during a curious time of day. Night and day are combined in the description of the sky at this particular time: "[D]as Tageslicht das ihn umgab, war heller und milder als das gewöhnliche, der Himmel war schwarzblau und völlig rein" (11) ("[T]he daylight round about him was brighter and milder than ordinary daylight, and the sky was dark blue and wholly clear" [17]). This strange mixture of light and dark in the description of the sky is typical of Hardenberg's writing, in which he dispels traditional oppositions in favor of blends that approximate unity. Heinrich's disrupted focus at this point in the dream is also highlighted in this description. Heinrich focuses on one particular thing in the field: the blue flower.

The blue flower is drawn to Heinrich, just as he is drawn to it. At the end of the dream, Heinrich also sees a girl's face in the flower, which he will recognize later as his love, Mathilde. The blue flower, which has become a symbol of longing referred to by
contemporary scholars (Calhoon, Seyhan, Hodkinson) for the entire Early German Romantic movement, has been interpreted many ways in Heinrich's dream and throughout the novel where it appears. Calhoon interprets the blue flower as a symbol of auto-eroticism and an act of self-creation (6). The flower's stem grows as the petals become shinier (Afterdingen 11). This idea of self-creation fits into Hodkinson's interpretation of the blue flower as representing the Non-I or You. Heinrich objectifies himself through reflection on the Non-I (Hodkinson 173), which for Henrich is Mathilde, and for his father it is Heinrich's mother. The blue flower can be interpreted in so many different ways that Alice Kuzniar's comment that the flower is uninterpretable because it has a false origin, in that it came from the stranger³ could prove to be correct. It is displaced as a symbol. However, instead of giving up trying to interpret this persistent image in Afterdingen, it can be interpreted as the social determination of Heinrich's unconscious. Heinrich does not feel the same after hearing about the flower from the stranger, and the face that he sees in the flower at the end of his dream he later identifies with Mathilde. Thus the objectification of his Self through reflection on the Other demonstrates the social nature of Hardenberg's philosophy, where otherness is central to subjectivity. Heinrich's longing for the blue flower and its reciprocal response towards Heinrich both demonstrate the natural longing of humans for social relationships, echoing Marx's claim that humans are by nature social beings. That humans are social beings and are conscious of their relations with other humans, is what separates humans from animals, who are not conscious of the relating in their relations with other animals (GI 51). Heinrich’s dream is the perfect occasion to demonstrate his conscious social nature,
since dreams are a window into the unconscious, the realm that holds one’s deepest longings.

Heinrich is awoken by his mother and the monotonous realities of everyday—in that his father scolds him for sleeping too late and not helping him work. Heinrich counters his father's position with a description of his curious dream, but his father has a different opinion of the meaning of dreams:

Träume sind Schäume […]. Die Zeiten sind nicht mehr, wo zu den Träumen göttliche Gesichte sich gesellten, und wir können es nicht begreifen, wie es jenen auserwählten Männern, von denen die Bibel erzählt, zumute gewesen ist. Damals muss es eine andere Beschaffenheit mit den Träumen gehabt haben, so wie mit den menschlichen Dingen. (12)

(Dreams are spindrift [...]. The times are past when divine apparitions appeared in dreams, and we cannot and will not fathom the state of mind of those chosen men the Bible speaks of. The nature of dreams as well as of the world of men must have been different in those days. [18])

Heinrich's father, much like Hardenberg by means of the novel, romanticizes the past to suggest that dreams were more meaningful then, that they were even divine messages. Dreams have since lost their importance because "[i]n dem Alter der Welt, wo wir leben, findet der unmittelbare Verkehr mit dem Himmel nicht mehr statt" (13) ("In the age we live in there is no longer any direct intercourse with heaven" [18]). Dreams are no longer meaningful for Heinrich's father, because they have no practical purpose. If one cannot communicate with a divine realm and receive revelations relevant to material existence through dreams, their importance is confined to the subjective whims of fantasy. Heinrich
attempts to assign a meaning to dreams in defense against his father: "Mich dünkt der Traum eine Schutzwehr gegen die Regelmäßigkeit und Gewöhnlichkeit des Lebens" (13) ("Dreams seem to me to be a defense against the regularity and routine of life" [19]).

Here, Heinrich is using what Michael Löwy and Robert Sayre call "critical irrealism" to show his father that dreams can be meaningful against the regularity and the ordinary of their contemporary time. Critical irrealism "designate[s] the opposition between a marvelous, imaginary, ideal, utopian world and the gray, prosaic, inhuman reality of the modern world. Even when it takes the superficial form of a flight from reality, this critical irrealism can contain a powerful implicit or explicit negative charge challenging the philistine bourgeois order." Heinrich's dream is, therefore, not a form of escapism alienating him from his material existence, but rather a means by which he can criticize his material existence, recognizing that it is incomplete, in that it does not allow for his full development. Heinrich's father seems to be touched by his son's defense of dreams, and after some prodding, tells about a dream of his own, which is remarkably similar to his son's dream. He too dreamt of a cave and ended up in a field where his attention was drawn to a certain flower, whose color he cannot recall. His guide in the dream tells him that he has seen "das Wunder der Welt" (17) ("the greatest wonder of the world" [22]). The guide also says that if the meaning of the dream was revealed to him, he would be blessed with "das höchste irdische Los" (17) ("the highest earthly lot" [22]). After this part of the dream, Heinrich's father dreams that he sees his wife holding a child that takes on divine properties, growing radiant and beginning to fly overhead. Interpreting this child to be Heinrich invites a mythological reading of the rest of the work. The “highest earthly lot” could actually signify Heinrich’s future treasure after he
finds the blue flower and its meaning in his life. If this is so, one would expect that Heinrich would transform into a supernatural being by the end of the novel. This is consistent with the view of Hardenberg as a divine dreamer with little interest in the material world. However, it must be noted that the guide's promised treasure is confined to the earth even though the meaning of the dream is revelatory. The symbolic dream-language of the unconscious cannot be confused with its implications for material existence. The blue flower continues to represent the social nature of man in Heinrich's father's dream. The recognized ideal of social relationships, the You or the subject transforming into object and vice versa, is part of self-fulfillment. This ideal, with its material implications, is precisely what is represented symbolically in both Heinrich’s and his father’s dream.

When Heinrich is twenty, he and his mother leave home in order to visit Heinrich’s grandfather, whom Heinrich had never met, in Augsburg. They depart with a group of merchants, who are going to Augsburg on business. The narrator prefaced the conversation between Heinrich and the merchants with an idealization of Heinrich’s time as a critique of the modern world in which the narrator lives. The narrator speaks of the "idyllic poverty" of Heinrich’s age, which affects the relationship of the senses of those in poverty with objects and the outside world:

Eine liebliche Armut schmückte diese Zeiten mit einer eigentümlichen ernsten und unschuldigen Einfalt; und die sparsam verteilen Kleinodien glänzten desto bedeutender in dieser Dämmerung, und erfüllten ein sinniges Gemüt mit wunderbaren Erwartungen. Wenn es wahr ist, dass erst eine geschickte Verteilung von Licht, Farbe und Schatten die verborgene Herrlichkeit der sichtbaren Welt
offenbart, und sich hier ein neues höheres Auge aufzutun scheint: so war damals
überall eine ähnliche Verteilung und Wirtschaftlichkeit wahrzunehmen; da
hingegen die neuere wohlhabendere Zeit das einförmige und unbedeutendere Bild
eines allgemeinen Tages darbietet. (19)

(An *idyllic* poverty adorned those times with a peculiarly earnest and innocent
simplicity; and in that semidarkness these treasures gleamed all the more
significantly for being sparingly distributed, and they filled the thoughtful heart
with wondrous hopes. If it is true that only a skillful distribution of light, color,
and shadow reveals the hidden glory of the visible world and that a new and
higher kind of eye appears to open here, there was likewise to be considered at
that time a similar distribution and economy everywhere; whereas the more
prosperous modern age presents the monotonous and more humdrum picture of a
commonplace day. [25])

The idealization of the past in this passage and in Heinrich's father's critique of the
meaning of dreams calls the meaning of past into question. If any past can be idealized,
the same conditions which are being praised can also be realized in the present since the
present is a future past. Dreams do not have to be meaningless in Heinrich's time, and the
idyllic poverty of that same period can exist in the narrator's contemporary time. The
idealization of the past in *Afterdingen* is a critique of the present, or of any period, in
which the ideals are lacking, but in which these ideals can be realized in the future.

In the above passage, the narrator refers to a "higher kind of eye" in opposition to
the regularity of everyday life. This corresponds to the human eye versus the crude eye as
presented in Marx's *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*. The description of sight in
Afterdingen is developed human sight, where the objects are not alienated. The word geschickt, or skillful, is telling, in that it demonstrates the difficulty of realizing developed human senses as opposed to crude senses. Human senses are not a given. They need to be cultivated. They are the result of skillful processes, which humans themselves are responsible for undertaking. Hardenberg refers to his own role as the artist or author of Afterdingen, by referring to skillful processes in terms of the "distribution of light, color and shadow." This distribution is determined by nature, which humans cannot affect, but in referring to his own role of representation in the novel, Hardenberg hints at the active role that humans play in the cultivation of their senses. Outside of the novel, it is the human senses that perceive nature.
Notes

1 Novalis, Heinrich von Ofterdingen (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2004). All German quotes are from this edition.


The merchants with whom Heinrich and his mother travel begin to praise Augsburg as an ideal place to live. People are prosperous there in a variety of trades including the arts. After hard work during the day, the people of Augsburg have time to enjoy leisure activities such as social gatherings and artistic endeavors. Despite the rhetoric of the merchants in describing Augsburg as a haven for artists, they themselves possess little to no knowledge of the arts, having neglected them because of arts' supposed lack of practicality. This neglect is also shown in the merchant's disagreement with Heinrich over the value of spiritual matters when they discuss Heinrich’s chaplain. Heinrich defends the chaplain’s occupation with the spiritual realm as a defense against the monotony of everyday life: “[S]ollte nicht jene höhere Kunde ebenfalls geschickt machen, recht unparteiisch dem Zügel menschlicher angelegenheiten zu führen? sollte nicht jene kindliche unbefangene Einfalt sicherer den richtigen Weg durch das Labyrinth der hiesigen Begebenheiten treffen” (24) (“[s]hould not that higher knowledge likewise impart skill in guiding quite impartially the reins of human affairs? Should not that detached childlike simplicity hit upon the right path through the labyrinth of our mundane affairs” [29]). According to Heinrich, the chaplain is engaged in critical irrealism, using the spiritual realm, or “higher knowledge,” to combat the mundane, which can dangerously trap us in its labyrinth. In this passage, Heinrich is also countering the merchant’s argument that spiritual matters have no bearing on earthly existence. On the contrary, spiritual matters are an integral part of man’s practical existence and prevents man from getting trapped in the labyrinth of the mundane.
After observing Heinrich's interest in poetry, the merchants admit that, although they find it pleasing to the senses as a representation of nature, they know little about the subject. For Marx, the merchant’s appreciation of poetry would not be above the level of an animal’s. They know poetry only as a pleasing sensory phenomenon, but since they have nothing invested in poetry, they are alienated from it. In order to experience poetry as a human, one must find the objectification of man in it; in other words, the object of poetry needs to be recognized as a human object. Marx says that “[s]ense which is subservient to crude needs has only a restricted meaning. For a starving man the human form of food does not exist, but only its abstract character as food. [...] it is impossible to say in what way this feeding-activity would differ from that of animals” (EPM 108). The merchant’s sense of poetry is restricted, because it serves no practical purpose for them. It is not a human object for them, which is why they do not have more than an animalistic interest in it.

Even though the merchants do not understand poetry, they indulge Heinrich’s interest in it with two stories. The first story is about a poet sailing on a ship. The poet had accumulated much wealth over time and was in possession of a vast treasure on the ship. After discussing the situation among themselves, the sailors decide to take the poet’s treasure away and throw him overboard. The sailor’s mysterious reverence for poetry is demonstrated by their refusal to listen to the poet sing, which is his last request, after which the poet would jump overboard without a fight: “[Die Schiffer] wußten recht wohl, daß wenn sie seinen Zaubergesang hörten, ihre Herzen erweicht, und sie von Reue ergriffen werden würden” (29) ("[The sailors] knew very well that if they heard his magic song, their hearts would be softened and they seized with regret” [34]). The poet sings a
song, jumps as previously agreed, and is miraculously rescued and brought to the shore by sea creatures. The sailors are left with the treasure, which was quite clearly the seed of their own destruction from the very beginning of the story. They are unable to split up the treasure evenly and, instead, kill each other fighting over the treasure. The few who survive are unable to control the ship on their own and end up crashing into the coast.

Removing the poet from the ship in favor of material possessions has disastrous consequences for the sailors. The treasure is not nearly as important to the poet. He had offered to willingly hand over the treasure to the sailors if they agreed to keep him on the ship. This offer did not satisfy the sailors for whom the treasure was more important than the life of a poet. The treasure is important to them because it signifies wealth and riches, but the meaning it has for them is left very much in doubt. Like the merchants who tell the story, the sailors are preoccupied with objects that, in their view, have a practical use. In the short term, taking the treasure and killing the victim seemed to be the most practical option. The story represents, albeit in a fantastic manner, the human need for poetry, or art in general, in direct opposition to the animalistic desire of material riches. The sailors knew that a song would make them regret their decision, so they did not listen. However, they underestimated their individual greed for wealth. O’Brien states that the ship story is Hardenberg’s response to Plato’s Republic, in which the artists are expelled from the republic. Hardenberg’s warning is that the state will fail (O’Brien 291-93). The story is a warning to groups who hold the practical above art. The practical, in this case as well as in the case of the merchants who narrate this story, is an abstract form of alienation. They feed on the treasure as animals feed on food, without an appreciation for the social value of their objects and without being consciously aware of their separation.
from nature. The plot of this story feeds into the mystical quality of Novalis, in that poets are superhuman beings who can summon the power of nature in their defense in the face of danger. Without the fantastic elements, it is a reformulation of Heinrich's concerns with the merchant's opinion of his chaplain. The practical is praised at the expense of spiritual matters or poetry.

The second story the merchants tell is much longer and more complicated. Rather than giving a corresponding warning against preferring art at the expense of the practical, as the story seems to do in the beginning, the story of the kingdom of Atlantis develops both the artistic and the practical spheres in an organic unity, which eventually brings prosperity to the kingdom. The king of Atlantis embodies the artistic at the neglect of the practical. His love for art is only overshadowed by his love for his daughter, for whom he allegedly would do anything. Unfortunately, the latter point is contradicted by the king's lofty idea of his heritage, which is sung to him everyday, as he is constantly in the presence of singers and poets who praise his kingdom and intoxicate him with grandeur, which he may or may not merit: "Seine Dichter hatten ihm unaufhörlich von seiner Verwandtschaft mit den ehemaligen übermenschlichen Beherrschern der Welt vorgesungen, und in dem Zauberspiegel ihrer Kunst war ihm der Abstand seiner Herkunft von dem Ursprunge der andern Menschen, die Herrlichkeit seines Stammes noch heller erscheinen" (33) ("His bards had constantly celebrated his kinship to former semidivine rulers of the world, and in the magic mirror of their art the superiority of his lineage over the origin of other men and the glory of his dynasty appeared to him to shine even more" [38]). As a result, the king is very protective of his daughter and will not allow her to marry anyone who does not match the grandeur of their alleged family heritage. The
continuation of the kingdom under their family's rule, the practical consideration when selecting a suitor, is lost in the king's exalted image of his legacy.

However, one day while on a walk in the woods, the princess by chance meets a father and his son, who represents the practical. The son occupies himself solely with the natural sciences, in which his father had instructed him. The meeting between the son and the princess as symbols for poetry and science results in a higher consciousness that touches both of them deeply. The princess describes her mood after the meeting as a partial revealing of the supernatural: "Die Prinzessin hatte sich nie in einem ähnlichen Zustande befunden […]. Ein magischer Schleier dehnte sich in weiten Falten um ihr klares Bewußtsein. Es war ihr, als würde sie sich, wenn er aufgeschlagen würde, in einer überirdischen Welt befinden" (36) ("The Princess had never felt as she did when she slowly rode home […]. A magic veil hung itself in great folds around her clear consciousness. She felt as though she would find herself in a supernatural world if the veil were drawn aside" [40]). After experiencing this heightened revelatory consciousness, she no longer feels the same when she returns to her village. She feels alienated from the kingdom of poetry at the neglect of practical matters.

The two were destined to meet again, which is obvious after the son finds a ruby from her necklace in the woods near his home. When the princess noticed that it was missing, she went looking for the stone and sees the son again. The princess then begins to visit the son more often and the two exchange the secrets of their trades with each other. The princess teaches him music, and he teaches her about the natural sciences. Once while they were walking in the woods, a strong storm makes it dangerous to continue and forces them to seek shelter in a cave. The situation is described in a mystical
fashion so that divine providence seems to have provided the situation in which they are able to consummate their love. Their love-making seems to be sanctioned by a higher being: "Eine höhere Macht schien den Knoten schneller lösen zu wollen, und brachte sie unter sonderbaren Umständen in diese romantische Lage" (41) ("A higher power seemed to want to undo the knot more quickly and under strange circumstances brought them into this romantic situation" [44]).

Caves in Heinrich von Afterdingen always signal an important event in self-discovery. This cave scene mirrors Heinrich's first dream, which represented the birth of his Self. And here, it is in this cave that the princess and the son are joined, symbolically creating a Self in which poetry and science are combined in a unity. Upon awakening, they feel, just as Heinrich did after his first dream, that they are entering a new world. Something more tangible also soon would be entering a new world, which necessitates the princess, who was forced to disclose her true identity, to spend a year in the home of the father and son so as not to wound the king's pride. The king is devastated by her disappearance, also because it could result in the end of his dynasty, even if his lack of practical sense may have had the same results. The princess and the son, however, enjoy sensations of mystical proportions during their time together.

After one year, the two return to the kingdom during a festival. The son begins singing to attract the villagers' attention. The villagers' reaction to the son, who, because of the princess, had taken up incorporating singing into his study of the natural sciences, again encourages and perpetuates the myth of Novalis as the divine dreamer who embodies a unity of poetry and the natural sciences: "Ein solcher Gesang war nie vernommen worden, und alle glaubten, ein himmlisches Wesen sei unter ihnen
erschienen" (45) ("Such as song had never been heard, and all believed that a heavenly being had appeared among them" [48]). The son sings another song, in which he prophesizes, as heavenly beings do, that he will become the king's son. The father brings the baby to the king as the son explains the origin of the baby in song. The daughter then appears, and the king invites them all to his kingdom and accepts them all as family. The kingdom thrived through the union of the princess and the son. The throne was given an heir, the practical solution to the king's worries, and the kingdom's poets celebrated in their usual joyous fashion.

The merchants, with whom Heinrich and his mother traveled to Augsburg, taught Heinrich useful lessons in self-development through their two stories. With the ship story, they warned about the dangers of neglecting art, evident in the fate of the sailors who had favored wealth (a practical advantage) over the unifying power of poetry that threatened their sinister plans. With the story of the kingdom of Atlantis, they warned of the dangers of the opposite situation in which the practical is neglected at the expense of art. Due to the king's pride in his dynasty, exacerbated about by the intoxication of song, the king refused his daughter's hand to every suitor who came to court her. The rest of the story of Atlantis is devoted to the ideal unity of the practical and spiritual, represented by art and science. This unity saves the kingdom in the "practical" matter of self-preservation and in the "spiritual" matter of everyone's happiness. These stories, which the merchants do not fully understand and which contradict many of their statements in conversation with Heinrich, conclude the section of Heinrich von Afterdingen, in which Heinrich's Self is developing in response to "indirect methods," such as dreams and stories. In the
following chapters, his development is in response to direct contact with other individual selves, who embody the ideals of a more fully developed Self.
After the first day of travel, the merchants, Heinrich, and his mother arrive at a castle and encounter a group of soldiers who had fought in a recent crusade. Heinrich listens to their stories and songs, which tell of the wonders of warfare and the camaraderie of the soldiers. An excitement for the wars seizes Heinrich when he is allowed to hold the sword of the lord of the castle: "Heinrich nahm es in seine Hand, und fühlte sich von einer kriegerischen Begeisterung ergriffen. Er küßte es mit inbrünstiger Andacht" (51) ("Henry took it in his hands and felt gripped by a war-like enthusiasm. He kissed it with fervid admiration" [54]). The song that the soldiers sing excites Heinrich further because it poeticizes their camaraderie: "Heinrich's ganze Seele war in Aufruhr […]. Er eilte ins Freie, sein ganzes Gemüt war rege" (54) ("Henry's whole soul was in a tumult […]. He hastened out into the open; his whole soul was excited" [57]). According to Molnár, Heinrich's naive enthusiasm for the crusades is the result of his longing to discover the "underlying unity of mankind" that is represented through the language of poetry:

Heinrich gained the ability to look through the veil of war's divisiveness to the underlying unity of humankind for which all individuals long as the true home of their language and identity. The language is the language of poetry, which spoke directly to his heart in the crusader's song […]. Each time he felt himself addressed in this manner, the confines of his individuated selfhood expanded in an awareness of his identity with others. (Molnár 139)
However, the language of poetry, when used by Zulima, a victim of the crusades, persuades Heinrich that war is not a means for discovering the unity of mankind. Heinrich's immediate identification with Zulima is not surprising, because the verses of her song are very similar to Heinrich's dream: "Hier, wo um kristallne Quellen / Liebend sich der Himmel legt, / Und mit heißen Balsamwellen / Um den Hain zusammenschlägt […] / Fern sind jene Jugendträume! / Abwärts liegt das Vaterland!" (56) (Here around the crystal fountains / Heaven bends in eastern mauve / And from balsam-fragrant mountains / clings around the sacred grove […] / Dreams of youth are transitory, / Distant lies my fatherland" [58-59]). Zulima was taken away from her fatherland, and her image of it is as distant as a youth's dream. Similarly–and symbolically–Heinrich was taken away from his transitory dream, his "fatherland," when he was awakened by his mother. He is now on the journey in hopes of finding the blue flower once again.

Heinrich's initial excitement about the crusades and the veiled camaraderie with the soldiers changes after meeting the crusade victim Zulima. He realizes that violence among men is violence against the Self as well. Molnár explains war in *Heinrich von Afterdingen* as the result of self-centeredness. Molnár writes that self-centered people "recogniz[e] others not as fellow beings but only as agents to be employed for [their] gratification" (153). They tend to define their worth in terms of possessions:

[T]hey may be personal possessions on whose terms the individual status is determined; in a wider sense, they may be shared, like the land of the tribal or national society on whose terms the self relates to others, or like the common objects of worship, the holy places, the divine symbols […]. However, when it happens that the relative social or religious frameworks of definition are
challenged by alternative versions, the self's very identity is at stake. Such
insecurity may, if sufficiently acute, result in war. (153)

The crusades, which were fought over, among other matters, territory and religious sites,
contradict Hardenberg's theory of self-development. The dissolution of the distinction
between Subject and Object cannot be realized in the self-centered, or Subject-centered,
person. The items which are being fought for are valueless if pursued by a self-centered
person. According to Marx, objects have human value only insofar as they are social, that
is, that the objects are consciously produced with the understanding that individual labor
is the means to a social end (EPM 107). Having many self-centered people fight for them
does not make them social, rather it is the knowledge that the objects are for the benefit
of humanity that they are social. The crusader's religious fervor blinded them to their
ultimately selfish acts, which really are in opposition to humane acts that would not result
in the victimization of people like Zulima. The crusaders in Heinrich von Afterdingen
fight selfishly over objects, possessing no real value, and in so doing hurt themselves by
hurting others, since the distinction between Subject and Object is an illusion that one
must strive to overcome, as referenced earlier in Hardenberg.

In the next village where the travelers stop to rest, they encounter an old miner.
The old miner is an actual, living model of a worker who is not alienated from his labor,
the product of his labor, or himself. The miner tells of the joys of his occupation and
compares his spiritual contentment in his work with the material necessities required for
the body: "[M]ir schienen sie (die volle Befriedigung eines angebornen Wunsches) so
unentbehrlich zu sein, wie die Luft der Brust und die Speise dem Magen" (64-65) ("[T]o
me they [the complete satisfaction of an inborn desire] appeared as indispensable as air
for the lungs or food for the stomach" [67]). The miner discusses further the value that his occupation has afforded him in connection with the objects of his labor: precious stones. The miner does not wish to possess the precious stones that he finds. It is rather the search for them, his labor, that gives them value: "Sie haben keinen Reiz mehr, wenn sie Waren geworden sind" (67) ("They have no charm for him any more once they are turned into commercial articles" [69]). Despite the miner's disinterest in commodities, he does uphold the fetishism of commodities as a natural order when referring to the lofty place that the precious stones receive. The miner brings the stones to the surface "damit er an königlichen Kronen und Gefäßen und an heiligen Reliquien zu Ehren gelangen, und in geachteten und wohlverwahrten Münzen, mit Bildnissen geziert, die Welt beherrschen und leiten möge" (65) ("so that he might attain to honor in royal crowns and vessels and holy relics, and might rule and direct the world in the form of respected and well-preserved coins adorned with portraits" [67]). The commodities acquire a mystical character and can symbolically rule by adorning royalty and providing material wealth. In *Capital*, Marx explains that the mystical character of commodities results in the fetishism thereof, which is also evident in the miner's remarks. The commodity has no value in itself: "[T]he commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of labour within which it appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the commodity and the material [dinglich] relations arising out of this."¹ The value of commodities is a social construction that is reproduced by the miner's willingness always to put the precious stones in what he assumes to be their "rightful" place. The miner's obliviousness to the artificialness of the value assigned to precious stones on the surface,
or above ground, does not however affect the joy in spirit and body that he receives from searching for them.

Near the village is a cave, which the villagers think is filled with monsters and dragons. The old miner decides to explore this cave and offers to take those who are willing, including Heinrich, with him inside the cave. This is the third cave that appears in *Heinrich von Afterdingen*. Much like the previous two caves, the cave in Heinrich's dream and the cave in the story of Atlantis, it signals an important revelation of the unity that is essential to Heinrich's self-development. It is the most mysterious and mystical of the caves, because the distinction between past, present, and future, as well as that between dream and reality is dissolved.

Once in the cave, Heinrich and the old miner begin to hear someone singing from deeper within the cave. They come to encounter a man, who had been living in the cave for many years. Time has no authority over this man and his age is not recognizable by Heinrich or the miner: "Es war ein Mann, dessen Alter man nicht erraten konnte. Er sah weder alt noch jung aus, keine Spuren der Zeit bemerkte man an ihm" (79) ("It was a man whose age one could not guess. He appeared neither young nor old; one could detect no marks of time on him" [80]). Just as descending into a cave is a descent through time since the older rock is deeper in the cave, the man in the cave, Friedrich Hohenzollern, imagines himself as a dream of the future in a time of peace when the past violence, resulting in the formation of the cave, seemingly has come to a stop. Heinrich's experience in the cave is also characterized as a time-warp: "Wie lange Jahre lagen die eben vergangenen Stunden hinter ihm, und er glaubte nie anders gedacht und empfunden zu haben" (89) ("The hours just gone by lay behind him like long years, and he imagined
he never had thought and felt otherwise" [90]). Heinrich happens upon an artifact that illustrates the time-warp of the cave more tangibly. He opens a book in Hohenzollern's library and is fascinated by its mysterious nature. The book has no title, no ending, and is written in a language that Heinrich cannot understand. The pictures in the book contain figures that are familiar from the past, including his own figure; images of the present, including a picture of Heinrich, the miner, and Hohenzollern; and encouraging scenes depicting his future. The book in the cave parallels *Heinrich von Afterdingen* and highlights its relevance for Heinrich as well as for readers outside the novel. Heinrich recognizes a path for self-development in the mysterious book, just as readers can read *Heinrich von Afterdingen* as a guide-book toward self-development, according to Hardenberg's theories. Hardenberg's work is depicted as being important to its reader at a time of literary, philosophical, and political change. Callhoon points out that the book makes an argument in favor of the relevancy of dreams, a tendency in Romantic works, against Heinrich's father's insistence that only older texts have useful knowledge to impart: "The structural counterpart of the manuscript in Hohenzollern's cave is the spring at the heart of Heinrich's dream-cave; both are sources (*Quellen*), and the association of written text and dream contradicts Heinrich's skeptical father who declares that old texts are the only 'sources' of true revelation" (102). Hardenberg is incorporating a defense of the timelessness of his theories and the legitimacy of his enterprise in cultivating new soil, as his pseudonym, Novalis, suggests.
Notes

ARRIVAL IN AUGSBURG AND THE ENCOUNTER WITH MATHILDE AND KLINGSOHR

Leading up to Heinrich's arrival in Augsburg, he encountered people from many different walks of life and had the opportunity to learn lessons in the art of self-development through stories and personal examples. In theoretical terms, Heinrich's Subject incorporated many Objects through *active passivity*, the reciprocal relationship of two Subjects simultaneously active in their incorporation of the other and passive in allowing the incorporation to take place (Molnár 113). The lessons given and received in this process reflected the blending of the spiritual and material spheres. The alienation, which characterizes figures such as Heinrich's father and the merchants and which is lacking in the old miner, is illuminated through critical irrealism, the opposition of the fantastic elements of dreams and stories to the monotonous alienated activity of modern man. Although Heinrich's development is not finished upon his arrival in Augsburg, he is very aware of the journey that he has taken and its significance for his understanding of the world and himself: "Mannigfaltige Zufälle schienen sich zu seiner Bildung zu vereinigen, und noch hatte nichts seine innere Regsamkeit gestört. Alles was er sah und hörte schien nur neue Regel in ihm wegzuschieben, und neue Fenster ihm zu öffnen. Er sah die Welt in ihren großen und abwechselnden Verhältnissen vor sich liegen" (94-95) ("Diverse circumstances seemed to have united in his development, and as yet nothing had disturbed his inner activity. Everything he saw and heard seemed merely to push aside new door-bolts in him and to open new windows for him. He saw the world lying before him in its great and changing relations" [94]). Heinrich's Self has expanded greatly
in its incorporation of Objects and has allowed the circumference of the absolute sphere to be redrawn in ever bigger proportions. During his time in Augsburg his development in the realization of love, or in Hardenberg's theory, the You, continues. There, he also acquires a mentor who guides him in his further development.

From this point Heinrich's development advances particularly because he encounters two important individuals: Klingsohr, a wise poet, and his daughter Mathilde. Upon Heinrich's arrival, his grandfather is having a party, at which Klingsohr and Mathilde are both present. Heinrich at once notices Klingsohr as being one of the figures he saw in Hohenzollern's book and thus immediately wants to make his acquaintance. Heinrich's grandfather apologizes to Mathilde on behalf of Heinrich, who failed to notice her before he noticed her father. After introducing Heinrich to Mathilde, his grandfather parts with these amusing words: "Eure glänzenden Augen werden schon die schlummernden Jugend in ihm wekken. In seinem Vaterlande kommt der Frühling spät" (98) ("Your shining eyes will surely awaken his dormant youth. Spring comes late in his home land" [97]). The meeting between Heinrich and Mathilde is the culmination of a long foreshadowing in *Heinrich von Afterdingen*. Not only does Heinrich recognize that it was her face that he had seen in the blue flower in his dream, but also his mother had made a comment about meeting a girl in Augsburg at the outset of their journey: "[D]ie Reize einer jungen Landsmännin würden die Trübe Laune ihres Sohnes vertreiben, und wieder einen so teilnehmenden und lebensfrohen Menschen aus ihm machen, wie er sonst gewesen" (18) ([T]he charms of a girl in her native Augsburg would dispel the gloomy mood of her son and restore his former cheerful and sociable spirit" [24]). The merchants also join in talking about the girls in Augsburg at the beginning of the journey: "[G]ewiß..."
sind in ganz Deutschland keine unbescholtenere Mädchen und keine treuere Frauen, als in Schwaben. Ja, junger Freund, in der klaren warmen Luft des südlichen Deutschlands werdet Ihr Eure erste Schüchternheit wohl ablegen" (22-3) ("[C]ertainly in all Germany there are no girls more blameless and no wives more faithful than those in Suabia. Yes, young friend, in the clear warm air of southern Germany you will no doubt slough off your sober shyness" [28]). The preparation for meeting Mathilde had been long underway.

It would be a mistake to consider the relationship between Heinrich and Mathilde as a realistic representation of a relationship between two adolescents. They are infatuated with each other immediately and soon are reduced only to saying each other's names. Mathilde's speech is very limited when conversing with Heinrich, and she fades away in a dream almost as quickly as she appears at the party. Mathilde highlights her diminished role in her own dialogue: "[M]ir ist, als finge ich erst jetzt zu leben an" (118) ("[I]t seems to me that I am only now beginning to live" [116]). Mathilde plays no role in Heinrich von Afterdingen at all except to function as a symbol for the You.

The realization of the You is the closest approximation of unity between the I, the Non-I, and the Absolute. The I and Non-I must be passively active towards one another, making love an art not a given. The unity of these spheres for Hardenberg is his definition of perfect love. He uses the term perfect love, because although love can be experienced, the unity of the I, the Non-I, and the Absolute, can never be attained and must settle for being approximated. Perfect love only exists in theory because the Self is always in a state of becoming, or a state of constant activity incorporating Objects. The Absolute is impossible to attain. Hardenberg describes his theory of love in the Allgemeine Brouillon:
Nature will become moral–when out of a genuine love of art–it devotes itself to art–does what art wishes–and when art, through a genuine love of Nature–lives for Nature, works in accordance with Nature. Thus both must act at the same time, out of their own choice–and for their own sakes–and out of this foreign choice for the sake of the other. They must encounter the other in themselves, and themselves in the other. (12).

Active passivity and the otherness in subjectivity in Hardenberg's theory are highlighted in the above passage. As previously mentioned, this definition of love is echoed by Erich Fromm in Marx's Concept of Man: "By relating himself to the objective world, through his powers, the world outside becomes real to man, and in fact it is only 'love' which makes man truly believe in the reality of the objective world outside himself. Subject and object cannot be separated" (28). According to Fromm, love is the answer to alienation in Marx. Love, in Hardenberg, is the key to self-development, meaning that the developed self is one that is not alienated from the Self's Self. Mathilde represents the other Self, or I, which is acting reciprocally with Heinrich. Heinrich says that after meeting Mathilde he feels like he did in his first dream when he glimpsed the blue flower, the event that started his journey of self-discovery. Mathilde's life becomes synonymous with Heinrich's inner self. In one of his dreams, she appears in a boat that begins to be pulled under water. Heinrich tries hard to swim out to rescue her, but he can never quite reach her, no matter how far or fast he swims. She drowns. Mathilde's death, which is only presented in this dream and not in the narrative outside of a dream, underscores the constant activity of the Self in approximating the unity between the I, Non-I, and the Absolute through active passivity. Mathilde's death demonstrates the fleeting nature of
the You. Love is not automatically maintained, but must be cultivated like any other art. In *The Art of Loving*, Fromm say that love is an art that continuously must be sought after: "[T]he mastery of [an] art must be a matter of ultimate concern; there must be nothing else in the world more important than the art. This holds true for music, for medicine, for carpentry— and for love."¹ In the unfinished second part of *Heinrich von Afterdingen*, Mathilde appears once more to Heinrich and answers his question as to where they are going in a curious fashion: "Immer nach Hause" (164) ("Home, all the time" [159]). The Self is always in state of coming to the Self's Self.

This idea of identifying the Self with the Other is seen by some scholars to be narcissistic. For example, Kenneth Calhoon, as referenced earlier, said that Heinrich is the embodiment of narcissism because he confuses himself for Mathilde and mistaking another for yourself is narcissistic: "[C]onfusion of the self for an Other is the essence of narcissism" (Calhoon 82). Gail Newman is of the same opinion as Calhoon. According to Newman, the entire work of Novalis (Newman refers to Hardenberg exclusively as Novalis in the referenced article) has a tendency toward narcissism. She points out that the relationship between Heinrich and Mathilde is an allusion "to the myth of the boy who fell in love with his own mirror image" (66). She also points out that the style of the dialogue highlights what she calls narcissism, that is, the merging of subject and object: "Readers find themselves confronted by a sea of quotation marks that renders it difficult to discern who is speaking at any given moment" (66). However, I am of the same opinion as Hodkinson, who says that the relationship is not narcissistic, but rather a form of radical subjectivity, since the nature of self-development necessitates communion with other selves (143). According to Hardenberg, self-development is impossible without the
appropriation of Others. Other subjects have the same freedom of appropriation as does the Self.

Mathilde's father, Klingsohr, is a well-known poet in Augsburg and the embodiment of the developed Self. He immediately sees Heinrich's potential and accepts him as an apprentice in order that he also might become a great poet. Klingsohr speaks of poets and poetry in a much broader sense than traditional ideas of poetry: "Es ist recht übel […] daß die Poesie einen besondern Namen hat, und die Dichter eine besondere Zunft ausmachen. Es ist gar nichts Besonderes. Es ist die eigentümliche Handlungsweise des menschlichen Geistes. Dichtet und Trachtet jeder Mensch in jeder Minute?" (117) ("It is too bad […] that poesy has a special name and that poets make up a special guild. It is not anything special at all. It is the peculiar mode of activity of the human mind. Does not everybody use his mind and his imagination all the time?" [116]). Poetry here is defined as the activity of the Self. Heinrich von Afterdingen is about poetry in this broad sense. Heinrich has aspirations of becoming a great poet, but does not once write a poem in the novel. Heinrich von Afterdingen's plot has its roots in a historical event in which the historical Heinrich won a song-competition in Wartburg in 1206 (Calhoon 102). Hardenberg used the historical poet, Heinrich, as the basis for Heinrich in Afterdingen. This knowledge that Afterdingen is based on a historical figure, who was a poet, is what could lead readers to read Afterdingen as the story of a poet instead of a story about general self-development. The use of a historical account of an actual poet is irrelevant to an interpretation of Afterdingen as an allegorical narrative demonstrating Hardenberg's philosophy.
Klingsohr and Heinrich have a lengthy discussion about the nature of poetry, war, and language, and Klingsohr starts giving Heinrich advice on how to become a great poet. His advice is the same advice that Heinrich had received indirectly through stories and dreams and directly through characters he met along his journey, such as the old miner. Klingsohr recommends experience as the foundation of poetry (116) and also says that spiritual matters cannot be emphasized at the neglect of material or practical matters:


(Nature is one thing to our enjoyment and our soul, another to our intellect, to the directive ability of our cosmic forces. One must be careful not to neglect either one for the other. But one can unite the two and thereby be in excellent fettle. A pity that so few apply their minds to a free and able inner activity and by a thorough discrimination secure the most purposeful and natural use of their mental powers. [108])

To optimize the use of one's mental faculties, Klingsohr advises a delicate balance between the use of reason and the soul, or the spiritual realm. The realm of the soul has been shown to encompass the search for meaning in the imagination and in dreams, as opposed to, for example, Heinrich's father's objection that one cannot derive any meaningful message from dreams. The soul also encompasses the engagement with the arts as did the important characters in the ship story and the story about Atlantis, as well
as experiencing joy in one's labor, as is the case with the old miner. The miner is not
alienated from his labor or the product of his labor. His work inspires him instead of
exhausting him. His labor is not forced, but rather he chose the life of a miner because it
appealed to his natural inclinations of discovery. He does not assign a natural value to the
precious stones that he finds, which have no value as such, but rather readily gives them
to those who have assigned a value to them.

Reason has been shown to include the investigation of matters of the soul, as
evidenced by Heinrich's preoccupation with the meaning of his first dream and the wealth
of information he discovers as a result. The meaning of Heinrich's dream is not evident to
him at the beginning. He must search for the meaning following clues, such as those in
the book in the cave, which illustrate his past, present, and future. Klingsohr makes the
importance of reason even more clear in another passage:

Ich kann Euch nicht genug anrühmen, Euren Verstand, Euren natürlichen Trieb zu
wissen, wie alles sich begibt und untereinander nach Gesetzen der Folge
zusammenhängt, mit Fleiß und Mühe zu unterstützen. Nichts ist dem Dichter
unentbehrlicher, als Einsicht in die Natur jedes Geschäfts, Bekanntschaft mit den
Mitteln jeden Zweck zu erreichen, und Gegenwart des Geistes, nach Zeit und
Umständen, die schicklichsten zu wählen. Begeisterung ohne Verstand ist unnütz
und gefährlich, und der Dichter wird wenig Wunder tun können, wenn er selbst
über wunder erstaunt. (109-10)

(I cannot sufficiently urge you laboriously and diligently to cultivate your
intelligence, your natural impulse to know how everything happens and logically
and sequentially hangs together. Nothing is more needful for the poet than insight
into the nature of every occupation, acquaintance with the means to attain every end, and presence of mind to select the most fitting means according to time and circumstance. Enthusiasm without intelligence is useless and dangerous, and the poet will be capable of few miracles if he himself is astonished by miracles.

[108-09])

This is a plea to occupy oneself with science, the exploration of the logical order of things through rational thought. He is advocating analytical thought over blind action. Klingsohr confirms what others, whom Heinrich encountered along his journey, had taught him. One must work at a delicate balance between the soul and reason, or between the spiritual and the practical.
Notes

CONCLUSION: THE GOLDEN AGE OF HARDENBERG

In this study I have demonstrated that, in his writing and in his personal life, Friedrich von Hardenberg was concerned with man's material existence. A man of his genius, as August Cölestin Just, with whom Hardenberg worked as salt mine assessor, suggests in his biographical testimony of Hardenberg (Donehower 110-11), could hardly neglect material existence and only focus on his inner life or on spiritual matters. Just points out that Hardenberg was a genius because of his abilities in his profession as salt mine assessor, not despite them: [T]his person possesses outstanding spiritual abilities to learn every science easily, to penetrate a subject to its depths, to seize upon it with certainty, order it with wisdom, and judge it with the soundest critical faculties; he possesses these same strengths in all his spiritual faculties" (111). Practical and spiritual matters are both emphasized in Just's definition of genius. Hardenberg's genius, according to Just's definition, is very present in *Heinrich von Afterdingen*. Using various theories of Karl Marx, especially those concerning alienation, in an interpretation of *Afterdingen* illuminates the emphases that Hardenberg put on material existence. According to Hardenberg's own theory of self-development, it would be absolutely impossible for the Self to develop at all without relationships with other Selves. The Self's activity necessitates a Non-I. If it were true, as the Novalis myths would have one believe, that Hardenberg was mostly concerned with himself or his spiritual being only, Hardenberg would have no authority to write a theory in which otherness is central to subjectivity.

Heinrich's Self is the one which is portrayed in *Afterdingen*. After many encounters with Others, he symbolically realizes the You in his relationship with
Mathilde. Some of the Others that he encounters are imperfect models of Selves. The
merchants and Heinrich's own father are examples of these. The encounters with the old
miner and Klingsohr reveal to Heinrich that people do not have to be bound by alienation,
but rather can reach a high level of self-development. Hardenberg died before he could
finish Afterdingen. The second part remains a fragment and was not discussed in this
study. The first part of Afterdingen leaves Heinrich in the care of the great poet Klingsohr,
who advises Heinrich to make full use of his mental faculties in science as well as art.

A complement to this study would be an exploration of fantastic elements in the
writing of Marx. This element of Marx's writing is highlighted by Daniel Bensaïd in
Marx for Our Times.¹ Bensaïd writes of the commodity in Capital in a fantastic fashion:
"The totality inhabits each link, each fragment, each detail of the chain. Yet there is one
that encapsulates and discloses the whole: being, Proust's madeleine, the commodity"
(242). Capital begins with the commodity. Bensaïd charts the mystical character of the
commodity, an imperfect beginning according to Bensaïd, in Marx's attempt to find its
lost unity "in the organic life of capital" (243). Bensaïd does not spend much time on this
subject, but the foundations for further study are present in his work.

A complementary endeavor focusing on the fantastic elements in Marx is very
difficult considering the distortions of Marx's theories. The name Karl Marx carries with
it much historical and ideological baggage. I do not feel that Marx has gotten the
attention he deserves in the United States, even on university campuses. The political
theory course that I took on this campus presented a completely backwards perspective
on materialism that resulted in my having almost no interest in Marx for many years
afterward. The leading view of Marx was one in which he was only concerned with
material possessions and ensuring that everyone in society had possessions. Fromm addresses this widespread falsification in *Marx's Concept of Man*: "I want to emphasize the irony which lies in the fact that the description given of the aim of Marx and of the content of his vision of socialism, fits almost exactly the reality of present-day Western capitalist society" (2). Marx wanted to liberate man "from the chains of economic determinism" (2) so that man could focus on self-development and, as Fromm points out, "spiritual emancipation" (2). If a study of the fantastic elements in Marx were to be done, it would be worth considering including a section on the falsifications of Marx's theories. Such a section would be as necessary as is the section on the myths associated with Hardenberg as in this study.

Hardenberg frequently wrote about a "Golden Age," a time in which his theories would be realized. It is written about in a variety of contexts, in "both his mystical and his practical projects" (O'Brien 113). O'Brien explains its usage as an "intersection of the practical and the Ideal" (113). A passage in the *Allgemeine Brouillon* illustrates this intersection:

Note that all treatment of error leads to error [to truth]. (Idealization of realism—and realization of idealism leads to truth. One works for the other—and hence indirectly for itself. In order to work directly for idealism, the idealist must seek to prove realism—and vice versa.—The *proof of realism* is idealism—and vice versa. If he wishes to prove idealism directly, he arrives at 0.—i.e. he forever turns round in a circle—or better, he remains in the same spot—All proof proceeds toward its opposite. […]. There exists a sphere in which every *proof is a circle*—or an
error–where nothing may be demonstrated–that is the sphere of the developed
Golden Age. (115)

The practical and the ideal are expressed as realism and idealism. Idealism must prove its
opposite in order to prove itself, because they are both part of the intersection, or a part of
the unity in which the proof is a circle, that of the Absolute. In my study, idealism and
materialism have been used to enhance the meaning of the other. The Golden Age
escapes complete realization, just as the Absolute cannot be fully attained, but only
approximated, by the I. However, the attempt at approximation is necessary for the Self
to develop, as is the realization of man as an end and not just as a means in order to
escape alienation. Both alienation from labor and from the product of labor, as well as the
inactivity of the Self, stifle self-development and result in estrangement from oneself and
from society. Otherness is essential to the Self in Hardenberg and Marx because humans
are social beings. Heinrich von Afterdingen demonstrates this ethical realization, the
intersection of the practical and the ideal, in its full implications not just for dreams and
poetry, but also for labor in the material relationship between humans.

I have shown that the writing of Karl Marx complements that of Hardenberg. In
this study, I have broken down the myths surrounding Hardenberg and demonstrated that
he is not "just" a poet shrouded in mystery and obliviousness. Rather, his novella
Heinrich von Afterdingen aptly illuminates the importance of man's material existence in
self-development. Heinrich von Afterdingen describes the importance of man's material
existence as well as his spiritual existence and exemplifies how they are complementary,
rather than mutually exclusive. This relationship can be detected in many of Hardenberg's
works if one is willing to see through the myths that limit the interpretation of
Hardenberg. The Golden Age of so-called "Novalis studies" can be attained in this manner.
Notes

BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX A:

IMPORTANT DATES CONCERNING FRIEDRICH VON HARDENBERG

1772  2 May: Friedrich von Hardenberg born in Oberwiederstedt, in Thuringia.

1784  Family moves to Weißenfels near Leipzig.
     Father appointed director of the Saxon salt mines.

1786/1787  Hardenberg makes his first serious attempts at poetry.

1790  Meets Friedrich Schiller at the University of Jena. He also takes care of Schiller when he is sick.

1791  Attends the University of Leipzig.

1792  Meets Friedrich Schlegel in Leipzig.

1794  First meeting with Sophie von Kühn at Grünningen

1795  Becomes secretly engaged to Sophie in March.
     His study of Fichte begins in the fall.
     Appointed to Saxon salt mines directorate as assistant in December.

1797  19 March: Death of Sophie
     His brother Erasmus dies one month later.

1798  Publishes Blütenstaub (Pollen), Blumen, and Glaube und Liebe under the pseudonym "Novalis."

1799  Appointed associate director of Saxon salt mines.
     Meets Ludwig Tieck in Jena.
     Writes Die Christenheit oder Europa, Geistliche Lieder, Hymnen an die Nacht, and begins Heinrich von Afterdingen.

1800  Finishes first part of Afterdingen.
     Becomes ill with tuberculosis.

1801  Hardenberg taken to Weißenfels.
     Dies on 25 March with Friedrich Schlegel at his side.
APPENDIX B:

ABBREVIATIONS OF WORKS

Friedrich von Hardenberg:


Karl Marx: