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AMERICAN IMPERIALISM

AND THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII

by

Ruth I. Hazlitt

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts.

State University of Montana

1933

Approved:

[Signatures]

Chairman of Examining Committee

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Chairman of Graduate Committee
Since the Congress of Berlin modern economic imperialism has been definitely recognized as the dominant factor in international relations. No longer does it appear as the old colonialism of the mercantilists but now, transformed by the Industrial and Commercial revolutions, it has become "the process of discovering foreign market, of establishing permanent foreign economic interests, and of exercising political pressure upon the regions in which the economic interests exist." Economic penetration, commercial treaty, protectorate, and annexation are the keywords of imperialism's new program. Although its chief exponents are still to be found in Europe, imperialism is not a sectional movement. It is, instead, a stage which results when a highly developed economic organization piles up a surplus and forces manufacturers and capitalists to look for new markets and for new investments. This economic condition was first evident in European states.

In the post Civil War period the United States was reach-

ing the stage which is a forerunner of foreign economic imperialism. Her population rose from 31,443,321 in 1860 to 52,622,250 in 1890.² A large percentage moved to the cities during this period and the number of cities over 10,000 more than trebled.³ At the same time the number of farms more than doubled.⁴ The Homestead Act made Western land available to any one who would live on it and the frontier which in 1860 extended through central Minnesota southward, "bulging beyond the 97th meridian in portions of Kansas and Texas," was practically gone by 1890.⁵ An important factor in the rapid settlement of the West was the extension of the railway system. A bill for the building of the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific which were to unite to form the first transcontinental railroad, was approved in 1862 and after this time railway construction advanced rapidly, reach-

². Census Reports, 1860, Population, p. 597; Abstract of the Eleventh Census, 1890, p. 3.
⁴. Abstract of the Eleventh Census, 1890, p. 60, number of farms in 1860 were 2,044,077 while in 1890, the number was 4,564,641.
ing a total of 163,562 miles in 1890. Likewise, the high prices of farm products, the labor surplus following the Civil War, the development of mining in several Western states, and the influx of immigrants in the East were instrumental in causing the disappearance of the frontier.

The introduction of farm machinery, the improvement in methods of grain transportation, and specialization in agriculture resulted in a great increase in the output of cereals. In the period between 1860 and 1890, production of wheat mounted from 173,104,924 to 468,373,968 bushels; production of corn from 838,792,742 to 2,122,327,547 bushels; production of oats from 172,643,185 to 809,250,666 bushels; and production of barley from 15,825,898 to 78,332,976 bushels. By 1875 American wheat was beginning to influence the world market, and by 1880 an era of depression had set in in French, British, and German agriculture, partly due to the low prices brought about by this new competition. In an effort to offset American and Russian competition at a


time when cost prices were rising, Germany enacted the Tariff Law of 1879. As the decline in prices of cereals continued in Germany, the duties on foodstuffs—mainly meat and grain—were increased in 1885 and again in 1887. France, too, during this period set out to develop a more general system of protection for her farmers. Her efforts resulted in the Tariff of 1892.9 As a result of the growth of protection in Europe and the constantly increasing agricultural surplus, by 1890 the American farmer was forced to look for other markets.

Industry, intrenched behind high tariff walls, with a broad domestic market, immense natural resources cheaply secured, and a plentiful supply of cheap labor coming from Europe, was able to make gigantic strides during this period. The number of manufacturing establishments increased from 140,433 in 1860 to 322,638 in 1890 and the annual value of manufactured products at the same time rose from $1,885,861,676 to $9,056,764,996.10 Up until 1880 the domestic market was great enough to absorb all manufactures, only fourteen percent of the total exports being manufactured goods in that year. However, in order to keep invested capital employed at

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the point of most economical production, it was necessary to find a sale for all it could produce and this fact compelled American manufacturers to keep searching for greater markets for their trade.\textsuperscript{11} The emphasis in the makeup of American exports shifted from raw materials to manufactured products after 1880 and from that time the importance of Europe as a market began to decline. After 1885, commerce with North America, South America, Asia, and Oceania commenced to mount.

As a result of the quickening of industry capital accumulated rapidly. The wealth of the United States had more than quadrupled between 1860 and 1890, and had increased one-third between 1880 and 1890.\textsuperscript{12} As the wealth increased, it tended to become concentrated in the hands of a few. By 1890 it was held as follows:\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l}
1890---$65,037,091,197 \\
1880---$45,642,000,000 \\
1860---$16,159,816,068
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{12} Eighth Census, 1860, Mortality and Miscellaneous Statistics, p. 295; Abstract of the Eleventh Census, 1890, p. 189.  
\textsuperscript{13} Richard Franklin Pettigrew, \textit{Triumphant Plutocracy, the Story of American Public Life from 1870 to 1920} (New York, 1921), p. 122.
During the post war period this capitalist class had invested their money chiefly in American industries but by the end of the nineteenth century they were ready for investment abroad.¹⁴ They had reached the stage which in Europe had forced investors into Africa and Asia.

Since 1844 when Caleb Cushing had been sent to open China, the foreign policy of the United States had been increasingly concerned with the promotion of her trade abroad. As a result, when the shift from export of raw materials to the export of manufactured goods made it necessary for American manufacturers to turn from Europe as a market to the undeveloped countries which had need for such products, they

called upon the government of the United States for help. At the same time American capitalists were finding government support essential in their attempted economic domination of foreign territories and were beginning to exert a growing pressure for the expansion of the commercial empire of the United States through the political domination of territory in the form of spheres of influence, protectorates, and dependencies. Although the most of the United States and Alaska had been acquired by the American government since 1800 and attempts had been made to obtain Cuba, San Domingo, Haiti and the Danish West Indies, the annexation of foreign territory for the reasons urged by the American imperialists represented a distinct departure in foreign policy. We find therefore, that by 1890 the United States was arriving at the stage recognized by Europeans at the time of the Congress of Berlin. Economic penetration of backward countries had already begun and the stage was set for territorial acquisition, the political phase of imperialism.

As early as 1873 Hamilton Fish, then Secretary of State, showed his understanding of the importance of Hawaii as a source for raw material, a field for American investment, and "a resting spot in the mid-ocean, between the Pacific Coast and the vast domains of Asia, which are now opening to commerce and Christian civilization." Americans had been in-

interested in Hawaii since these Islands were discovered by Captain Cook, an English navigator, on one of his exploring voyages in the North Pacific. On his last voyage Captain Cook had learned the value of the fur trade between China and the Northwest coast of America and it was this trade that first made the Islands well-known and gave them a place of importance in the commercial world. In 1786, Joseph Barrell, a Boston merchant, formed a stock company with a capital of $50,000 for trade in furs, sandalwood, cocoanut oil and other products of the Pacific islands the the Alaskan and Oregon coasts. Two vessels, the Columbia, commanded by Captain Robert Gray, and the Lady Washington, commanded by Captain John Kendrick, left Boston in 1787 and were the first American ships to visit Hawaii. During the same winter there came to the Islands the Eleanora and the Fair American commanded by Captain Simon Metcalfe and his son who had been trading for furs on the American coast. To punish the natives for stealing a boat and putting to death the sailor in it, Captain Metcalfe fired upon a large number who came out to trade, killing more than one hundred. A few days later a chief retaliated by killing all of the men on the

16. This was possibly a rediscovery as there is some evidence to show that Juan Gaetano, a Spanish navigator, discovered them in 1555. If so, he made no effort to benefit from his discovery.

Fair American except Isaac Davis who escaped alive. Davis and John Young, the boatswain of the *Eleanora*, also a captive, were taken under the protection of Kamehameha, who made them his advisers. They were instrumental in helping him to force the entire Archipelago to acknowledge him as Kamehameha I, the first of the line of Hawaiian monarchs.  

It was in this period that Captain George Vancouver made his three visits to the Islands. The Nootka Sound controversy which nearly involved Spain and England in war was adjusted when Spain yielded and signed the Nootka Convention at Madrid in 1790. Captain Vancouver was sent to receive the restitution of the territory from Spain, and to explore. His winters were spent in the Sandwich Islands where he received the cession of Hawaii to Great Britain for protection against enemies, with the understanding that the native religion, government, and social system should not be disturbed. As this cession was not accepted by England nothing resulted from it.  

The publication of accounts of these voyages familiarized sea-men with the Islands so that every ship in the Pacific began to stop there and Honolulu became a regular market for

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supplies. Many fur-traders came to secure provisions, to obtain Hawaiians for sea-men, or to spend the winter dressing their furs and buying sandalwood. Among them were a large number of Americans and by 1816 they were so influential that their arguments caused the Hawaiian king to expel the Russian American Fur Company from his country. The fur traders had discovered the value of the sandalwood in Hawaii and by 1810 it had become the predominant interest there. The importance of this trade was largely due to conditions peculiar to the Islands. As the chiefs realized the demand for the wood they made it a government monopoly and forced the people to cut it, usually without compensation. Since it cost them practically nothing they were willing to pay for their purchases in lavish amounts of sandalwood. As the wood was easily sold in China where it was in demand for incense in joss houses, the fur trader found it to be a valuable asset in commerce. So many of these traders were from Boston that the Hawaiians usually spoke of America as

21. The Russian American Fur Company, chartered by the Tsar of Russia, had secured a monopoly of the fur trade in Alaska and wished to establish trading posts in California and the Hawaiian Islands in order to get supplies. Their representative, Dr. Scheffer, whose actions were later repudiated by the directors of his company, attempted to make a settlement in Hawaii and to get Kauai away from the control of Kamehameha. Ralph S. Kuykendall, A History of Hawaii Prepared Under the Direction of the Historical Commission of the Territory of Hawaii (New York, 1926), pp. 92-96.
Boston and of the Americans as Bostonians. The outstanding American engaged in this trade was John Jacob Astor of New York. Astor had been carrying on commerce with China for sixteen years when he discovered the possibilities of sandalwood in connection with his China trade. Part of his cargo from New York was usually exchanged for furs along the American coast and the remainder for sandalwood in Hawaii. Astor's great resources enabled him to sell goods at very low prices on short credit, giving him an advantage over others who were often obliged to take notes payable in sandalwood. As his cargo was usually the first on the Canton market, he received good prices for it and bought teas, silks, nankeens, spices, etc. which he then bartered to the Hawaiian chiefs and to the Russians and Spaniards along the American coasts in return for sandalwood and furs. These were again sold in Canton and this time the Chinese cargo was usually taken back to New York. Astor was engaged in the selling of sandalwood during its best years, from 1816 until 1828. Among other traders who dealt in sandalwood were Captain Kendrick, Captain William Cole, Captain Brewer, and Roquefeuill. As early as 1890 Kendrick's men began to

22. The Indians of the Northwest usually called all Americans Bostonese for similar reasons.
buy sandalwood and ship it to the Canton market. Much later, in February 1823, Captain William Cole came to the Sandwich Islands in the Paragon, owned by Josiah Marshall of Boston. They brought with them the frames of two schooners which were set up at Honolulu and used for gathering sandalwood. John Dominis, second mate of the Paragon was destined to become the father-in-law of the Hawaiian Queen Liliuokalani. Charles Brewer, another member of the Paragon's crew later became master of a vessel and engaged in the Hawaiian trade, finally setting up a commercial house in the Islands. Roquefeuil was commander of an expedition sent out by M. Balguerie of Bordeaux with the object of getting goods for the China trade without the expenditure of money. This was in 1816, toward the end of the fur trade, and Roquefeuil had difficulty in getting a cargo of furs, so he began to buy sandalwood also. In 1821 and the first half of 1822, the exports of this product amounted to from $350,000 to $400,000 at $10 per picul while in the year 1836 only $26,000 worth was sold at $7 per picul. This

26. One picul equals 133-1/3 pounds.
decline was due to the destruction of the sandalwood forests. No care was taken in securing wood for sale, the quality became poor, and the price diminished. A decisive factor in their disappearance was the tax collection of 1827 enforced by the king and chiefs in an attempt to pay debts of $150,000 owed to Americans. "A tax of one half a picul of sandalwood or four dollars in money" which was levied "on every native of the Sandwich Islands," resulted in the ruin of the forests by the cutting of 25,000 more piculs of wood and left many chiefs still in debt.\(^{27}\) It was at this time that Astor decided to withdraw from the Pacific trade after twenty-eight extremely successful years.\(^{28}\)

During the period of the sandalwood trade many whaling ships began to stop in the Islands for rest, repairs, and supplies. From forty to sixty American whale-ships were sometimes found at anchor at one time in Honolulu harbor in 1823. During the period between January 1, 1836 and the end of 1841, four-fifths of the three hundred and fifty eight American vessels anchoring in Honolulu harbor were whalers, and each of these spent an average of seven hundred dollars while on shore.\(^{29}\) The discovery of valuable whale fisheries


\(^{29}\) Carpenter, op. cit., p. 36.
in the Okhotsk sea and in the Arctic ocean north of Bering strait gave an impetus to the industry which was at its height between 1840 and 1860. As Japan was closed to commerce the whaling vessels continued to come to Hawaii for supplies, an average of four hundred arriving each year. Most of the American whale fishing had been transferred to the Pacific and a large majority of these ships were from the United States. The American promoters of this fishing discovered that a great saving in time and money could be made by storing the whale oil in Hawaii for trans-shipment in other vessels, and the Islands became more essential to the industry. The whale-ships at the same time contributed to Hawaiian economic life through import duties and port dues which helped the government treasury, by furnishing work for the merchants and mechanics, and by securing to the farmers a market for their meat and vegetables. In 1859 the discovery of petroleum dealt a severe blow to whaling and the scarcity of whales together with the destruction of whaling-vessels in the Civil War and in the ice pack of 1871, further diminished its importance. 30

In 1820 the American government considered her interests great enough to warrant the appointment of Mr. John C. Jones

to go to the Islands as the "Agent of the United States for commerce and seamen." Disturbances caused by deserting sailors together with the question of the sandalwood debts led to the sending of two American warships, the *Dolphin* and the *Peacock*, on a visit of friendly inspection in order to settle the disputes. After adjusting the conflicting claims, Captain Thomas Ap Catesby Jones, acting for the United States, made a treaty with the Hawaiian government providing for perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries and for the protection of American trade in the Islands. This was signed in December 1826, and although it was never ratified by the government of the United States, the Hawaiians considered it as binding upon themselves.  

About the time of the beginning of the whaling industry American influence was strengthened by the coming of the missionaries. They arrived at an opportune moment for Kamehameha II had just overthrown idolatry and Hawaii was a country without a religion. This gave the American evangelists an opportunity to intrench themselves strongly in Island life and politics.

In 1809 Captain Brintnall had brought Ophuahaia (Obookiah), a Hawaiian boy, to New Haven, and it was his desire for the Christianizing of his homeland that inspired

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the sending of missionaries there. Obookiah was educated through the kindness of Americans and returned to his home as a missionary. The New England church became interested in the movement and in 1819 a band was organized in Boston and sent to Hawaii. Soon a chapel and a school-house were built, the language was reduced to writing, and spelling books were printed for the people. The civilizing and Christianizing movement had begun. Eight years later, four hundred forty native teachers were helping the Americans in their work and in 1836, thirty two additional missionaries were sent out.\(^3\) The missionaries soon became of prime importance to the chiefs and were their advisers on almost all questions. Because of their civil influence they were strongly opposed by Richard Charleton, the British consul-general to Hawaii and the Society Islands. He saw that they were introducing republican principles which would draw the Islands closer to the United States and which he feared would eventually make them an appendage of that republic.\(^4\)

During the next decade foreign interests became so predominant in Hawaii that some people began to believe she would soon lose her independence. In 1836 while the guns of the *Actaeon* were commanding Honolulu, Charleton induced the

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34. Ibid., 62.
king to conclude a treaty with the British government providing for the protection of the persons and property of British subjects residing in the Islands. At the same time he used every opportunity to attempt to secure the intervention of the British government in Hawaiian affairs. France who in this period was posing as the defender of Catholic missionaries throughout the Pacific, now took advantage of the Hawaiian persecution of the Catholics as a pretext for interference in the government. Following the example of the English, Captain Laplace used the guns of the frigate _Artemis_ to force Kamehameha to sign two treaties, one providing for the safety of the Roman Catholics and the other for a general treaty of friendship and commerce.  

Under these circumstances it seemed advisable to the king to obtain an acknowledgment and guarantee of Hawaiian independence from the three great powers, France, Great Britain, and the United States.

In December 1842, King Kamehameha III sent two commissioners to Washington to call the attention of Secretary Webster, and through him, of the government of the United States, to the relations of the two countries and to suggest a definite recognition of the Hawaiian government as an independent nation.

independent civilized power. The commissioners were successful and in a few days Secretary Webster expressed the attitude of the State Department toward the acquisition of foreign territory saying that "the Government of the Sandwich Islands ought to be respected; that no power ought either to take possession of the islands as a conquest, or for the purpose of colonization, and that no power ought to seek for any undue control over the existing government or any exclusive privileges or preferences in matters of commerce." President Tyler made their mission the subject of a special message to the Senate on December 31, 1842, and upheld Secretary Webster's pronouncement which was the first public statement of the greater interest of the United States in Hawaii. He spoke in opposition to foreign control as follows:38

"It can not but be in conformity with the interest and wishes of the Government and the people of the United States that this community...should be respected and all its rights strictly and conscientiously regarded.... Far remote from the dominions of European powers, its growth and prosperity as an independent state may yet be in a high degree useful to all whose trade is extended to those regions, while its near approach to this continent and the intercourse which American vessels have with it--such vessels constituting five-sixths of all which annually visit it--could not but create dissatisfaction on the part of the United States at any attempt by another power, should such attempt be threatened or feared, to

38. Ibid, 63.
take possession of the islands, colonize them, and subvert the native government."

The United States was soon given an opportunity to carry out her implied promise to protect the Islands. This was occasioned by the unfriendly visit of the British ship Carysfort on the pretext that the right of a British subject had been infringed. Threatening to use force, if necessary, Lord George Paulet demanded what amounted to the cession of Hawaiian sovereignty to Great Britain. Seeing no other way out, King Kamehameha agreed, stipulating that it be subject to any arrangement that might be entered into by commissioners to be appointed to lay the matter before Queen Victoria. Lord George Paulet accepted the cession and raised the British flag over the Islands. At once the King sent a message to President Tyler asking him to use his influence to persuade the Queen to withdraw from Hawaii. It happened that before the Paulet affair took place, Mr. Webster, in view of the recent French aggressions and of the attitude of Charleton, had sent a note to Edward Everett, United States minister at London, calling his attention to Mr. Tyler's recognition of Hawaiian independence, and stating that the President "would exceedingly regret that suspicion of a sinister purpose of any kind on the part of the United States should prevent England and France from adopting the same pacific, just, and conservative course toward the government and people of this remote but interesting group of
Islands." 39 Mr. Everett replied that Lord Aberdeen had expressed the intention of Great Britain to recognize the independence of Hawaii. Furthermore the British government had informed the French ambassador at London that England could not agree on any encroachments on the Sandwich Islands and the ambassador replied that none were contemplated by France.

At this juncture the very emphatic protest of Secretary of State Legare was sent to Edward Everett and presented to the British government. Mr. Legare pointed out that the United States had no wish "to plant or to acquire colonies abroad" but that the peculiar relations between Hawaii and ourselves might make us "feel justified, consistently with our own principles, in interfering by force to prevent its falling into the hands of one of the great powers of Europe." 40 The appeal of Mr. Legare and of the Hawaiian commissioners which Kamehameha sent to the Queen, was successful and the action of Lord Paulet was disavowed. Edward Everett in a dispatch to the State Department concerning the disavowal stated: 41

"Had intelligence been received here of Lord George Paulet's occupation of them before her promise

41. Ibid., p. 77.
was given to recognize them, England, I think, would not have given them up. As it is, an understanding between the great European powers, amounting, in effect if not in form, to a guaranty of their independence, is likely to take place. This is the only state of things with which the United States could be content. As it will be brought about without involving us in any compacts with other powers...."

In November, 1843, a convention was entered into between France and Great Britain, recognizing the independence of Hawaii. The Sandwich Islands were at last admitted to the category of civilized nations.

American influence now tended to become predominant. For several years the United States had been trying to negotiate a treaty with Hawaii giving rights to her similar to those gained by France in 1839. She did not succeed until 1850. At this time the first fully completed treaty between the United States and Hawaii was proclaimed. It resembled the commercial treaties negotiated by the United States with other nations and was to remain in force except as modified by later conventions, until the annexation of Hawaii. American influence was increased when the French consul in 1849 supported by two warships, seized Honolulu and the French government refused to interfere. In self-defense the Hawaiian king signed a secret proclamation placing the Islands under

43. Ibid., pp. 75-82.
American protection. Mr. Webster immediately returned this document to the King and warned the American minister, Mr. Severance, not to allow any direct interference by the United States navy as it was the province of Congress to declare war. In an official communication inclosed at the same time, Mr. Webster stated that the United States would uphold Hawaii's independence in spite of the attempts of the great commercial powers of Europe to take the Islands. He pointed out that they were ten times nearer the United States than Europe and that five-sixths of their commerce was with this country. As a threat he added that the Navy Department would be ordered to keep a fleet in the Pacific sufficiently large as to protect the American and Hawaiian interests there. Copies of this letter were sent to the French government and, unable to mistake its meaning, they quickly disclaimed any intention of alienating Hawaiian independence.

After 1850 events in the United States were at work changing public sentiment toward Hawaii. The acquisition of Oregon Territory in 1846 and of California in the Mexican War, had brought America nearer Hawaii and had increased the interest in trade. The discovery of gold in California brought

many people to the western coast and many of them became interested in expansion saying that "manifest destiny" required that the United States include all of North America and Hawaii. The Hawaiians now became alarmed. Bands of filibusters had been organized in California to conquer Mexico and perhaps Hawaii. In the Islands themselves an annexationist sentiment had grown up, resulting in political disturbances which King Kamehameha III feared were the forerunners of revolution. As a result, when petitions were presented him asking that a treaty of annexation to the United States be drawn up, he consented. This treaty, made for use in case of emergency, was never signed by Kamehameha as he died in 1854. Had he signed it, it would not have been approved by the President of the United States because of three clauses: one providing for $300,000 a year to be paid to the chiefs, one calling for payment of $75,000 yearly for ten years for educational purposes, and one providing for the admission of Hawaii as a state.

Before the decline of whaling another industry, sugar production, was coming to the front. As early as 1802 a Chinese had made sugar on the island of Lanaii. Since the

soil and climate were adapted to the growing of sugar cane, cultivation on a small scale began. About 1830 when it became evident that the sandalwood trade was gone, the chiefs started to develop the natural resources of the Islands. Up until this time the natives had been discouraged in industry by the land system and the absolute control of the chiefs over their labor. Foreigners could neither buy land nor rent it on favorable terms and it was not until 1839 that the first successful sugar plantation was established. At that time an American firm of Ladd and Company was granted a fifty year lease of a tract of land at Kola, Kauai with the right to hire natives, raise cane, and manufacture sugar.47 By 1840 the exports from January until September included sugar worth $18,000 and syrup and molasses worth $73,000.48 During the next few years several plantations were started and when the settlement of California furnished a convenient market for Hawaii, it became evident that this was to be the big industry of the Islands.

There were two handicaps in the trade with California. One of these was the competition of Philippine sugar and the other, the United States tariff placed on this import. Many of the planters were Americans and they desired annexation to the United States in order to avoid the payment of a tariff.

47. Kuykendall, op.cit., p. 201.
48. Ibid., 140.
The Hawaiian government believed that the same end could be secured by a reciprocity agreement. Practically all of the Hawaiian-American relations from this time until 1898 consist of the attempts of the sugar planters to secure and maintain a satisfactory market in the United States. Reciprocity agreements were proposed by the Hawaiian government as early as 1848 and 1852 but were unfavorably received in the United States. In 1855 a third reciprocity treaty was negotiated and although favored by President Pierce and Secretary of State Marcy, it failed to receive a two-thirds vote in the Senate. 49

During the Civil War the question of a treaty was set aside by Mr. Seward, then Secretary of State. The need for reciprocity was not so pressing as the sugar industry was exceedingly prosperous and the amount of sugar exported by Hawaii rose from 1,500,000 pounds in 1860 to 15,000,000 in 1865. 50

After the war prices dropped, a crisis came, and people began to discuss reciprocity again. With the consent of Mr. Seward a fourth treaty was drawn up, ratified by the Hawaiian government, and approved by President Johnson. At this time there was some talk of annexation. King Kamehameha V was in poor health and had named no successor. Edward McCook, United States Minister Resident in Hawaii, wrote that if the American

government, upon the King's death, would indicate any desire to annex Hawaii, a plebiscite would show the residents of the Islands to be unanimously in favor of the move. Mr. McCook in this letter summarized the interests of America in the Islands as follows:

"They are the resting place, supply depot, and reshipping point of all our American whaling fleet. They are the sources from which the Pacific States receive all the sugars they consume. The greater part of the agricultural, commercial, and moneyed interests of the islands are in the hands of American citizens. All vessels bound from our Pacific coast to China pass close to these shores."51

He saw a menace to American interests in the attempt being made by the Hawaiian government to secure a commercial treaty with Japan, and in the English sympathies of the governing officials. The desirability of a lawful and peaceful annexation of the Islands, providing the natives were willing, was expressed by Secretary Seward in 1867. American sentiment, however, was unfavorable at this time as elections were approaching and the political parties, still concerned with economy and retrenchment, were unwilling to consider national extension.52 In 1870, the fourth reciprocity treaty which had been pending for three years, was rejected by the Senate.

The condition of the sugar industry continued to grow worse causing a business depression as well. This was

52. Ibid., 135-146.
heightened by the decline of whaling. As King Kamehameha was growing more feeble, Mr. Henry Peirce, new minister to the Islands, suggested in a letter to the president that the time for closer political union between the United States and Hawaii was drawing near. Although Mr. Grant considered this letter important enough to send to the Senate, that body took no action. Upon Kamehameha's death, Lunalilo, by birth the highest of the chiefs, succeeded to the throne. The agitation for annexation was continued both by "many persons in the islands representing large interests and great wealth," and in America by "those of influence and of wise foresight who see a future that must extend the jurisdiction and the limits of this nation...." The Hawaiian government, Mr. Peirce believed, would never propose annexation however much the people as a whole wished it. If the great interests of the country demanded annexation, the planters, merchants, and foreigners would probably induce the people to overthrow the government and establish a republic. This republic would then ask for admission into the Union.

The death of Lunalilo in 1874 made it necessary for the Hawaiian Legislature to choose a new king. One candidate

54. Ibid., 15.
55. Ibid., 149, 150.
for the throne, Kalakaua, was favored by most of the
foreigners, especially the Americans, and by a large number
of the natives while the other, Queen Dowager Emma, widow
of Kamehameha IV, was supported by English interests and
by many Kanakas. Kalakaua was elected by a vote of thirty-
nine to six. This decision precipitated a riot among the
followers of Queen Emma which was quelled only by marines
landed from the British and American warships anchored in
the harbor. Kalakaua favored closer relations with the
United States and in the autumn of 1874, although opposed by
the French and British commissioners, he set out on a visit
to Washington. Success in obtaining a reciprocity treaty
was hoped for by offering Pearl river harbor in exchange.
This concession was not required, however, as an agreement
passed Congress without it. The new treaty, for which
Hawaii had striven twenty-seven years, provided that unre-
fined sugar, rice, and other Hawaiian products should be ad-
mitted into the United States duty free; enumerated a list of
American products to be admitted to Hawaii duty free, and
stipulated that as long as it remained in force the Hawaiian
king would not make any grants of territory or of special
privileges to another power. After seven years the treaty
could be ended by either party by giving one year's

56. House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII,
The treaty was a "conspicuous exception" to the commercial policy of the United States at this time. The spread of manufacturing in the West had strengthened the protectionist sentiment and in 1875 tariffs were being restored to their war-time amounts. The cause which had finally brought the United States to sign the treaty was the growing trade of Hawaii with Australia, New Zealand, and British Columbia. The State Department had heard that the entire sugar crop of 1876-77 was to be sold to the British and it felt that unless the United States made some concessions, Hawaii would in time become an English colony. This was an action which the American government could not permit. Even the War Department had recently begun to show an interest in their future and in May, 1873, under confidential instructions from Secretary of War, W. W. Belknap, Admiral Schofield had made an investigation of the Sandwich Islands in order to ascertain the defensive possibilities of their ports, examine their commercial facilities, and collect all the information possible on other subjects "in reference to which we ought to be informed in the event of a war with a powerful

maritime nation...." 59

The results of the free admission of sugar into the United States were surprisingly far-reaching. The treaty not only advanced economic development in the Islands, but also changed their relations with the rest of the world, and led to their final loss of independence. In reality a customs union was formed including Hawaii and the United States. Reciprocity granted the equivalent of a bounty to the Hawaiian sugar planters for sugar remained the same price on the American market. Some objections were made by Great Britain and Germany, both claimed the same privileged treatment by Hawaii as was given to the United States by the treaty of 1875. Although England's demands were backed by the "favored nation" clause in her treaty of 1852 with Hawaii, Secretary Blaine declared them "inadmissible" and the Hawaiian government backed him by upholding America's right, according to the treaty, to exclusive privileges. 60

Hawaii immediately became a field for very profitable investment of American capital and an extraordinary increase in sugar planting took place. In 1883 Consul Daggett sent a statement from the Saturday Press of Honolulu showing the

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60. Ibid., p. 16.
principal sugar plantations in Hawaii. Forty eight of the sixty nine plantations were owned by Americans. The comparative valuations of sugar interests by nationalities were as follows:

1 space = 1/2 million dollars

American 
British 
German 
Hawaiian 
Chinese 

J. Scott in his REPORT UPON THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR THE YEAR 1877, gives us some interesting suggestions of the immediate effects of the reciprocity treaty. The price of real estate, he tells us, advanced rapidly. In 1875 the assessed valuation of the real estate of the kingdom was $6,490,600. By 1876, "in anticipation of the ratification of the treaty," it had increased to $7,624,061 and by 1877 it had mounted to $8,500,000. This increase was mostly in sugar and rice lands.

Value of total sugar interests $15,886,800
American $10,235,464
British 3,180,050
German 970,046
Hawaiian 641,240
Chinese 560,000

One half of the Lahaina plantation had recently sold for $500,000 when before the signing of the treaty the entire plantation would have brought much less than that amount. Many new plantations were being established, most of the capital invested belonging either to American citizens or to Americans who had become naturalized citizens. Claus Spreckels was probably the leading example of capitalistic investment in Hawaiian sugar. A refiner in California, he opposed reciprocity until the treaty went into effect and then took advantage of it to make another fortune. In 1884 he owned the majority of one plantation in Hawaii and had minority interests in four others. He, together with his friends, was at this time able to control one-fourth of the sugar crop.  

The sudden leap in sugar exports to the United States is shown in the following graph:  

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64. Sugar exports to the United States as follows:
   1870--14,557,711 lbs., Commercial Relations, 1870, p. 261.
   1871--18,135,500 lbs., Commercial Relations, 1872, p. 606.
   1875--38,392,862 lbs., Commercial Relations, 1878, p. 804.
   1880--63,427,972 lbs., Commercial Relations of the United States, 1880 and 1881, p. 1124.
Reports from the Consuls of the United States, No. 81, July, 1887, p. 38: 1886--216,223,615 lbs. (practically)
As all of the labor and land were absorbed by the sugar industry, it became necessary to import almost everything used in the Islands. The amount of imports from the United States increased rapidly during this period, making an im-
mense jump between 1876 and 1883.

65. Hawaiian imports from the United States:
1875—$947,260, Commercial Relations, 1877, p. 626.
1877—$1,545,136, Loc. cit.
1878—$1,889,759, Commercial Relations, 1878, p. 802.
1880—$2,671,823, Commercial Relations of the United States, 1880 and 1881, p. 1122.
1881—$3,233,856, Loc. cit. (Cont. p. 35.)
The growth of the new merchant marine made up of vessels built expressly for the service, was encouraged by this shipping. American mercantile houses transacted the entire commerce both ways and by 1894 were carrying annually about $12,000,000 worth of merchandise at high rates.

After 1883 the reciprocity agreement which had brought this increased prosperity became subject to termination at a year's notice. Hawaiian sentiment ardently desired its extension for the progress of the Islands was dependent on the sugar industry which in turn depended on reciprocity. Many petitions for the abrogation of the treaty were sent to the Forty Seventh Congress by various American interests and a joint resolution providing for its termination was reported from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 66 The remarks of Representative Randall L. Gibson of Louisiana are probably typical. He attacked the treaty on two scores, first, that it had had no beneficial effect on our commerce, and second, that it had no political advantages for our country. He pointed out that at the time of the passage of the act the

65. (Cont.)
Data for 1883 from Consular Report No. 44, August 1844, p. 690.
1883-4,048,486
Data for 1886 a computation based on statistics in Consular Report No. 81, p. 89.
1886-$3,717,811.
Secretary of Treasury had said that the increased exports to Hawaii would be equal to the duties surrendered on Hawaiian exports. This had not worked out, Mr. Gibson claimed as in 1881, for example, there was an increase of $2,072,609 in American exports over the 1875 record, while the duties surrendered amounted to $2,400,000, resulting in "an undisputed donation of that amount as a subsidy out of the Treasury of the United States to the sugar and rice planters of Hawaii".67 This would soon break down every sugar refining industry in the East, West, and South and would be a great discouragement to the American planters. Furthermore, Mr. Gibson claimed, we gained no political advantage that we did not already have, therefore there was no advantage for us in reciprocity with Hawaii. Many others felt this way also and when the treaty was sent to the Senate it decided, in secret session, to stipulate the cession of Pearl Harbor for naval and commercial purposes. The convention had not yet been ratified when Mr. Cleveland became President. In his second annual message he committed himself in favor of the renewal of the convention for Hawaii had become practically an "outpost of American commerce and a stepping stone to the growing trade of the Pacific."68 The renewal

passed and when the amendment concerning Pearl Harbor was
ratified by Hawaii in 1887, the first step was taken by
the United States in securing territorial rights in Hawaii. 69
England quickly realized the value of the cession and pro-
tested. She suggested that the United States join in the
Franco-English agreement of 1843 by which those two nations
agreed never to seize Hawaii, either directly or as a pro-
tectorate. Secretary Bayard refused to join in guaranteeing
the neutrality of the Islands and declared in a note to the
British premier that there was nothing in the cession of
Pearl Harbor to impair the political sovereignty of Hawaii. 70
As a result, nothing came of the British protest. President
Cleveland, in fact was not averse to the annexation of Hawaii
if the inhabitants of the Islands really wanted this step
and his biographer, McElroy, says that there is no indica-
tion that he did not agree with the views of his Secretary
of State Bayard, who later declared: "The obvious course was
to wait quietly and patiently, and let the islands fill up
up with American planters and American industries, until they
should be wholly identified in business interests and political

69. Foreign Relations, 1887, No. 381, 382, 383, 384; and
same year, 1877, the United States opposed a suggested
British loan of two million dollars to Hawaii with the
government revenues as security. Allan Nevins, Grover
sympathies with the United States. It was simply a matter of waiting until the apple should ripen and fall." 71

Most of Kalakaua's reign was spent in political strife. The cause for this trouble was the underlying difference between the political views of the king and those of the party who opposed him. Kalakaua believed that a king had absolute power as was permitted by the Hawaiian constitution of 1864. This constitution gave the king complete control of the cabinet through his power to appoint and dismiss ministers, also practical control of the legislature through his power to appoint them to public office. In addition to making use of these privileges, Kalakaua took the right to change the constitution as he desired and to influence elections. By 1880 he had working with him, two adventurers, Walter Murray Gibson, professional politician and editor, and Celso Cesar Moreno, a professional lobbyist. Through their influence, the king in 1880 executed a coup d'etat and appointed Moreno premier, causing much dissatisfaction. For the first time the opposition to him united, forcing him to remove Moreno. In 1882 Gibson became premier and it was understood that he had the backing of Spreckels, who was rapidly becoming the power behind the throne. 72

72. In 1877 Mr. Spreckels had brought about the resignation of the Cabinet in order to secure one which would grant him a long term water privilege on the island of Maui.
first measures brought before the Legislature was an act
to convey about 24,000 acres of the crown lands of Wailulu
to Spreckels, for the purpose of compromising his claim to
an undivided share of the crown lands purchased from the
half sister of Kamahameha IV. The cession of the island of
Wailulu to Spreckels and the distrust of Gibson caused a
reaction among the natives and the election of many Reform
members to the next Legislature. Kalakaua, meanwhile, had
had himself re-crowned, much to the disgust of the high
chiefs and many foreigners who considered the ceremony as
another step in the king's plans to make himself absolute.
He was now aspiring to extend a Hawaiian protectorate over
the other Pacific islands, sending commissioners to various
islands and warning the Great Powers of Europe against any
further annexations. As his absolutist schemes advanced, he
came into conflict with Mr. Spreckels who by 1886 had between
$600,000 and $700,000 invested in the Hawaiian government.
The trouble was brought to a crisis by Kalakaua's attempt to
secure a loan from London. Spreckels and the cabinet opposed
this loan unless the debt to the sugar planter was paid
first. The Legislature's vote was 23 to 14 against the
cabinet and Spreckels in disgust severed his connections with
the government. Acting as his own prime minister with the
assistance of Gibson, the king now began a period of misrule
which culminated in the revolt of 1887.

Kalakaua's opposition believed that the government of Hawaii should be a constitutional monarchy with the power in the hands of the people. Early in 1887 they organized as the Hawaiian League. Two factions developed, the majority desiring a limited monarchy and the radical minority favoring the establishment of a republic and annexation to the United States. In case the king refused to grant a constitution, all were to join in overthrowing the monarchy. The publication of reports of scandals in connection with the granting of opium licenses was the signal for a revolution which resulted in the constitution of 1887 making the king responsible to the cabinet, widening the franchise so as to include resident foreigners of English or American descent, and placing the election of nobles in the hands of voters of foreign birth or foreign ancestry. As Kalakaua was strongly opposed to this constitution he set out to abolish it. Political unrest became greater and a revolution was attempted or actually took place nearly every year between 1887 and 1895. In 1889 the United States marines, for the second time since the establishment of the Hawaiian monarchy, were called

74. Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 270.
upon to intervene in an uprising in order to protect Ameri-
can property. This insurrection against the government,
which was led by Robert W. Wilcox and Robert Boyd, two half-
caste Hawaiians, was defeated on the day it began. It was
thought to have been instigated by Liliuokalani in an
attempt to dethrone her brother Kalakaua who had lately
named her as his successor.\textsuperscript{76}

The years between 1887 and 1890 were golden years for
the sugar planters of Hawaii. The export of sugar continued
to increase rapidly, dividends on plantation shares were
large, and the price of sugar land was high. The sugar was
sold to the Spreckels refinery which had a monopoly of sugar
refining on the Pacific coast and forced them to accept
slightly less than the entire amount of the remitted duty.
Before 1890 the planters were not united and accepted varying
prices for their sugar but after that time they combined and
made contracts for a year or more, all planters to receive
the same price. In 1889 Spreckels came up against the Ameri-
can Sugar Refining Company, a combination controlling produc-
tion in the east. The eastern company established a rival
refinery in California and Spreckels built one in Philadelphia.
In 1892 Spreckels joined the American Sugar Company and as
there was not enough business on the Pacific coast for two

\textsuperscript{76} Carpenters, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 158.
refineries, his rival, the branch of the Sugar Trust, was discontinued, giving him even more control over the Hawaiian planters. By this time, however, other factors had begun to undermine the prosperity of the sugar-growers. There was a surplus in the United States' Treasury so large that the administration decided to devote part of the McKinley Tariff Bill to reducing duties on commodities. Choosing sugar, the most remunerative item of the old tariff, they repealed the duty on it and provided for a bounty of two cents per pound to be paid to sugar-growers in the United States. Short of complete destruction, the McKinley Bill of 1890 was probably the greatest calamity that could have descended upon the Hawaiian sugar men. It removed their advantage and placed them on the old basis of twenty years before. The price of sugar is said to have fallen in one day after the passage of the Bill from $100 to $60 per ton.  

Consul-General Severance in 1892 reported that the operation of the McKinley Bill had caused a loss of over $5,000,000 to the planters in the year following its passage.  

This resulted in a depression in the Islands and the desire to restore the old profitable relations with the American market led directly to the Hawaiian revolution of 1893 and to the treaty of annexation arranged by the

78. Consular Reports, No. 142, p. 412.
King Kalakaua died in 1890 while in the United States and his sister Liliuokalani ascended to the throne. Her political views resembled those of her brother but her friendship was with England rather than America and she opposed the Pearl River clause of the reciprocity treaty. Although she disliked the constitutional limitations on her power, no great strife occurred until 1892. The parties in the Legislature of 1892 were so evenly divided that long debates ensued over the principal questions, which concerned the Queen's control of the cabinet, an opium license bill, and a bill to give a franchise to a lottery company. The Queen favored all three measures and all three were defeated. Determined to remove the cabinet whose members included nearly all the principal business men of Hawaii, she appealed to the supreme court for their sanction of such a step, and they decided that the cabinet had been automatically dismissed by the death of Kalakaua. The Queen now began a long struggle over the composition of a new cabinet. She persisted in submitting to the Legislature the names of men whose character made them unfit for the ministry. The continued opposition of the Legislature finally forced her to agree to an acceptable list of fairly capable men, a distinct triumph for the Reform Party. This was unsatisfactory to Liliuokalani who desired a weak cabinet so that she could revise the constitution of 1887.
as her next step toward reestablishment of absolutism.

Just before the close of the Legislature in 1893, during the absence of some of the Reform Party, the opium and lottery bills were brought up again and passed and the cabinet dismissed. In return for her support of the lottery bill the Queen was to be allowed to proclaim a new constitution restoring the old despotic authority to the ruler. It was to be directed against the interests of the Americans as it provided that all white men, unless married to native women, were to be absolutely debarred from the suffrage. The Americans and other whites were seriously alarmed for they foresaw that the final result of such a policy would be either to drive them from the Islands or to place their property at the mercy of anyone who wished to take it. As news of the new constitution began to spread, the excitement became so great that some of the Queen's new cabinet, fearing a revolution, refused to sign it, and the matter had to be postponed. In order to prevent violence of any kind the Queen called out the royal troops plus an unauthorized force of five hundred men and secured control of the capital.

The cabinet feared for their personal safety in the event of mob violence and appealed to the citizens for aid. Some

of the citizens, feeling that the legal authorities would
be unable to handle matters, should further trouble arise,
issued a call for those in opposition to the Queen to form
troops and to organize a committee for protection. A group
met in the office of William O. Smith and provided for the
appointment of a committee of public safety of thirteen to
maintain the peace. The committee called a mass meeting for
Monday afternoon, January 16, to decide what steps should be
taken. Alarmed by this time, the Queen issued a proclamation
promising to abide by the constitution of 1887, and at the
same time, her sympathizers called a rival mass meeting for
Monday afternoon in order to draw people away from the
revolutionary assemblage. The two meetings were in session
at the same hour. The citizens at the armory empowered the
committee of public safety to "further consider the situation
and further devise such ways and means as may be necessary to
secure the permanent maintenance of law and order and the pro-
tection of life, liberty and property in Hawaii." 80 The
committee soon decided to establish a Provisional Government
for the management of affairs until annexation to the United
States was secured, and appointed Sanford B. Dole, James A.
King, Peter C. Jones, and William O. Smith to make up the
executive council. Due to the danger of conflict many United

States' citizens asked the American minister to have a force of marines landed from the *Boston*, a naval vessel in the harbor under the command of Captain G. C. Wiltse. Captain Wiltse describes the proceedings in the capital in a letter written on January 18, to B. F. Tracy, Secretary of the Navy.

"At 4:30 p. m., January 16, I landed the ship's battalion under command of Lieut. Commander William T. Swinburne.

"One detachment of marines was placed at the legation and one at the consulate, while the main body of men, with two pieces of artillery, were quartered in a hall of central location near the Government building.

"On Tuesday, January 17, a provisional government was established and the Queen dethroned.

"The Provisional Government took possession of the Government buildings, the archives, and the treasury, the Queen acquiescing under protest. The Provisional Government was recognized as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States minister."

During the next few days the Provisional Government was recognized by all of the powers who had representatives in Honolulu. On January 19, the new officials sent a commission to the United States by special steamer for the purpose of negotiating a treaty of annexation. The five members of the committee were William C. Wilder, L. A. Thurston, W. H. Castle, H. P. Carter, and Mr. Marsden, who together represented a large proportion of the property holders and commer-

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cial interests of the Islands. Paul Neuman, the attorney of Liliuokalani, left on the same steamer in order to present her side of the revolution, and in case of annexation to secure for her as large an annuity as possible. Also at this time, the Queen sent a letter to President Harrison asking him to restore her to the throne and saying that she had yielded because she did not wish to come into conflict with the United States' troops which, she claimed, were landed to aid the revolutionists.

In Washington the commissioners were favorably received.
The State Department since the Civil War had been decidedly jingoistic in attitude due largely to Seward and Blaine. During his year as Secretary of State under Garfield, Blaine inaugurated a comprehensive foreign policy which resented vigorously European interference in North and South American affairs, particularly in regard to an interoceanic canal, and attempted to make the United States the arbiter of the disputes of the Latin American states, whether among themselves or with some foreign power. Mr. Blaine was made Secretary of State again in the Harrison administration, and again he pursued his policy of interference in the domestic affairs in

Latin America using the threat of war to coerce them. His jingoism together with the extreme position taken by Congress nearly involved the United States in war with Great Britain over the seal-fisheries, in 1889. In this same year the American commissioners went to Bismarck's Berlin Congress where the Samoan affair was to be considered, and it was their cable saying that Bismarck flew into a rage whenever German domination in Samoa was questioned, which occasioned Blaine's famous reply: "The extent of the Chancellor's irritability is not the measure of American rights." As a result of the American stand in the affair, the three powers, Germany, England, and the United States entered into a treaty which guaranteed the autonomy of the islands, restored Malietoa to his throne, and provided for a tripartite protectorate over Samoa. This was certainly a departure from the traditional policy of avoiding "entangling alliances". In fact, the editor of the Nation describes Blaine as being popular with the people because of "his somewhat boisterous and often fantastic expression of that longing for the spread of American influence and domination abroad, known as 'Americanism', which constitutes the conscious patriotism of large bodies of the less thoughtful voters", and which "more than compensated for

all his shortcomings" as a statesman. 85

This policy was approved by John L. Stevens, who was appointed as United States minister to Hawaii in 1889. His reports not only gave detailed accounts of internal affairs in the Islands but also described their material resources and possibilities. In a confidential dispatch written November 20, 1892, two months before the Hawaiian revolution, he took up the question as to what should be done with the Islands. "One of two courses seems to me absolutely necessary to be followed," he wrote, "either bold and vigorous measures for annexation or a 'customs union', an ocean cable from the Californian coast to Honolulu, Pearl Harbor perpetually ceded to the United States, with an implied but not necessarily stipulated American protectorate over the islands. I believe the former to be the better," he continued, "that which will prove much the more advantageous to the islands, and the cheapest and least embarrassing in the end for the United States." In discussing the sugar bounty, he advised a stipulation in the treaty that Hawaiian planters would be paid a bounty of only six mills per pound rather than the two cents given American growers, and this to last only as

85. The Nation, Vol. LVI, p. 75; Carl Russell Fish, The Path of Empire, A Chronicle of the United States as a World Power (New Haven, 1921); Mrs. Alice Felt Tyler, The Foreign Policy of James G. Blaine (Minneapolis, 1927); Edward Stanwood, James Gillespie Blaine (New York, 1905); Nearing and Freeman, op. cit., p. 243.
long as the bounty-system was maintained. This small bounty would be enough to carry the planters through the depression occasioned by the McKinley Tariff. In closing his report, Minister Stevens made an even more definite expression of his conception of future American relations with Hawaii saying that although the American government must decide which of the two lines of policy and action must be followed, it was certain "that the interests of the United States and the welfare of these islands will not permit the continuance of the existing state and tendency of things. Having for so many years extended a helping hand to the islands and encouraged the American residents and their friends at home to the extent we have, we can not refrain now from aiding them with vigorous measures, without injury to ourselves and those of our 'kith and kin' and without neglecting American opportunities that never seemed so obvious and pressing as they do now." 86 The arrival of the Hawaiian commissioner seeking annexation was no surprise, therefore, to the Secretary of State who by this time was John W. Foster, Mr. Blaine having died about February first. Mr. Foster, another follower of Blaine's foreign policy, soon negotiated the treaty of annexation and rushed it to President Harrison who desired to settle the question before he went out of office on March

fourth. In the absence of telegraphic communication, Secretary Foster in making out his report had to place entire dependence upon Steven's dispatches and the statements of the commissioners sent to Washington by the Provisional Government. As one would expect, these all emphasized the blamelessness of the American part in the Hawaiian revolution, and this attitude was reflected in Mr. Foster's recommendations and in Harrison's message to the Senate. Mr. Foster pointed out in his communication to the President that the "unconstitutional and intemperate acts of the Queen" were the immediate cause of the revolution, that the American marines took no part at all in effecting the change, that the Provisional Government took possession of the Government buildings without the help of the marines, that the Provisional Government was then recognized by Stevens as having obtained full de facto control, that this same government was recognized by representatives of the other nations, and that instructions had been sent to Stevens approving his action as far as it coincided with standing instructions to the legation, and disavowing any steps in excess of such instructions which might seem "to have been asserted to the impairment of the independent sovereignty of the Hawaiian Government by the assumption of a formal protectorate." 87 President Harrison similarly assigned

as the cause of the recent trouble the "reactionary and revolutionary" policy of Liliuokalani which placed in peril the foreign investments and the "decent administration of civil affairs and the peace of the islands." Very firmly he asserted that the American government did not promote the subversion of the monarchy. There are two courses possible, to establish a protectorate or to annex the Islands, he believed, and the latter would be preferable from both the American and the Hawaiian points of view and would keep the other great powers out. He therefore strongly recommended prompt action in order to restore peace in the Islands. The press and the people of the United States seemed to favor his action and a rhyme about

...Liliuokalani

Give us your little brown hannie!

became popular everywhere. News of Minister Stevens' establishment of a protectorate pending the settlement of the negotiations in Washington merely encouraged annexationist sentiment among the American people. Opposition papers pointed out that the revolution was a huge business scheme on the part of the sugar planters, the real cause being the forty two and two-thirds per cent reduction in the price of sugar.

89. Nevins, op. cit., p. 552.
The editor of the *Nation* brought out the fact that the sugar details of annexation were under discussion before there was a revolution. The five-year contracts of the Western Sugar Refining Company of San Francisco which were made with the leading Hawaiian planters included a clause stating that in case an arrangement should be made whereby the United States would pay a bounty to the Hawaiian planters, the latter would give a share to the Refining Company.\(^{90}\) Mr. Thurston of the Hawaiian Annexation Committee not only verified this report concerning the sugar contracts but also added that the Trust had said, "If you don't like these terms, eat your sugar."

In the rush at the close of the Harrison administration, the annexation bill was not passed. There had been many rumors concerning Cleveland's attitude, the majority believing that he would probably favor the treaty. At the time of the elections of 1892 the Hawaiian trouble had not arisen so the President could find but little in his party's platform to indicate his course of action. This platform in discussing foreign affairs had pointed out that the Democratic party was the only one that had "ever given the country a foreign policy consistent and vigorous, compelling respect abroad and inspiring confidence at home," and went on to "view with

alarm the tendency to a policy of irritation and bluster which is liable at any time to confront us with the alternative of humiliation or war." President Cleveland had already shown himself directly opposed to this practice of "irritation and bluster" for which Secretary of State James G. Blaine had been largely responsible. He had a very definite foreign policy of protecting the weak and helpless nations at a time when their domination was the aim of every other great power and he was old-fashioned enough to desire to avoid "entangling alliances" with foreign nations having advised against the participation of the United States in the tripartite protectorate of Samoa. During a conference with Gresham, Carlisle, and Lamont before the inauguration, the first steps in the Hawaiian affair were planned, leading on March 9, 1893, to the recall of the treaty from the Senate. Cleveland did this, because the provisional government did not appear to have the sanction of either popular revolution or suffrage, because the uprising and negotiations had been conducted with such haste, and because Liliuokalani's statement that she yielded on account of the support given by the United States troops to the Provisional Government, did not agree with President Harrison's pronouncement that the Ameri-

can government had not in any way promoted the Hawaiian revolution. In order to learn the truth of the matter, the President appointed James H. Blount as his personal representative to investigate the Hawaiian trouble. Mr. Blount was given paramount authority in all matters touching American relations with the Provisional Government.

Most of the people believed that the removal of the treaty was merely a temporary measure and not a great deal of notice was taken of it. However, when Blount directed Admiral Skerrett to lower the United States flag from the Hawaiian Government Building, the Republican press began to rave about the stigma on our national honor while the Democrats answered that Steven's action in establishing a protectorate was disavowed by Mr. Harrison and that President Cleveland was merely taking our flag off other people's property. During his stay of several weeks on the Islands, Commissioner Blount conducted a detailed investigation which led him to conclude that Minister Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government when the Queen's government was still in full control of the palace, the barracks, and the police station. Furthermore, "at an early stage of the movement, if not at the beginning, Mr. Stevens promised the annexationists that as soon as they obtained possession of the Govern-

ment building and there read a proclamation..., he would at once recognize them as a de facto government, and support them by landing a force from our war ship then in the harbor." Minister Stevens kept his promise, Mr. Blount found, in fact, "this assurance was the inspiration of the movement, and without it the annexationists would not have exposed themselves to the consequences of failure," for they had practically no military forces. Thus, the action of the American minister and of the troops landed from the Boston were responsible for the establishment of the Provisional Government and its continuation was due to the fact that the Hawaiians believed they would be attacking the United States' Government if they attacked it. The annexationists dared not put the question to a vote for if aliens were excluded from voting, annexation would be defeated by more than five to one. Secretary of State Foster was not to be blamed for the stand he had taken, Mr. Blount felt, because he was deceived by the misleading reports of Minister Stevens and by the statements of the Hawaiian commissioners. The latter conclusion, as well as all of the Commissioner's findings, were confirmed by Charles Nordhoff, a veteran Washington correspondent sent out by the New York Herald to

94. Taken from summary found in Secretary Gresham's report, House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII.
make an independent investigation. Due to a leak in the State department, Blount's report was prematurely published late in November. Some of the editorial comment following its appearance is quoted by McElroy in his biography of Grover Cleveland.95

"No one unprejudiced," states the New York Herald in an editorial of November 22, "can read Mr. Blount's report without the conviction that it goes into the archives of the State Department at Washington as the darkest chapter in the diplomatic annals of this country."

The editor of the New York Times believed that it "reveals a conspiracy...which if not repudiated by this nation, would sully the honor and blacken the fair name of the United States."

If the people of the country accept Mr. Blount's report, declared the Savannah Morning News, they "cannot do otherwise than sustain the position taken by the President and his Cabinet. The only way to create a sentiment against that position is to show that Mr. Blount's report is not correct."

Friends of Stevens and of the treaty immediately began working through the press and through Congress to discredit the Commissioner's facts. They claimed that in his investigation he talked merely with the supporters of "the lady who

looks like the inside of a package of Arbuckle's coffee," and declined all offers of the friends of the Provisional Government when they desired to assist him. Taking the revolution and subsequent events step by step, they showed the innocence of Stevens and the "gross inaccuracies" of Blount's report. The Congressmen from Maine who had long been personal friends of Stevens, testified as to his honor and pointed out that Secretary Gresham as an inveterate enemy of Blaine and of ex-president Harrison had ample motive for attacking Blaine's friend and Harrison's appointee. A detailed reply was issued by Mr. Stevens in answer to Blount's charges. In this the Minister maintained that his actions were above criticism and that he had merely carried out the spirit of the only instructions he had for precedent in such an emergency. These had been sent to Minister Merrill at the time of the revolution of 1887 by Secretary Bayard, who wished all precautions to be taken for "the just protection of the interests of American citizens in the Islands. While we abstain from interfering with the domestic affairs of Hawaii, in accordance with the policy and practice of this government," Mr. Bayard had written, "yet obstruction to the channels of legitimate commerce under existing law must not be allowed, and American citizens must be protected in their persons and property by the representatives of their country's law and power and no internal discord must be suffered to impair them."
In addition in his defense Mr. Stevens said that he raised the American flag over the Hawaiian Government Building because the Provisional Government, being only two weeks old, had no trained troops for its use. Furthermore, the temporary protectorate was sufficient to keep Japan and England from intervening, should they desire to do so, and was probably the best method available for preserving Hawaii for the United States.\footnote{Cong. Rec., 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVI, Part 1, pp. 190-195.} In spite of annexationist attempts to prove the contrary, however, the agreement of Nordhoff and other disinterested spectators with Blount caused the majority to believe that the revolution was practically a put-up job of Stevens and probably to some degree a commercial speculation.

It required more than two months for President Cleveland to formulate a definite policy on the basis of Blount's report. Secretary Gresham believed that since the Queen had thrown herself on the mercy of the United States and had been betrayed, justice demanded that steps should now be taken to restore her. Just what steps should be taken was difficult to decide so the advice of the various members of the Cabinet was asked. The opinion of Attorney General Richard Olney furnished the basis for the plan finally adopted. After summarizing the origin of the "Stevens's government" he suggested:
"1. All the resources of diplomacy should be exhausted to restore the status quo in Hawaii by peaceful methods and without force.

"2. If, as a last resort, force is found to be necessary...the matter must be submitted to Congress for its action.

"3. In addition to providing for the security of the queen's person pending efforts to reinstate the queen's government...the United States should require of the queen...authority to negotiate and bring about the restoration of her government on such reasonable terms and conditions as the United States may approve and find to be practicable.

"Among such terms and conditions must be, I think, full pardon and amnesty for all connected with the Stevens government who might otherwise be liable to be visited with the pains and penalties attending the crime of treason."\textsuperscript{97}

Combining Gresham's suggestion with Mr. Olney's opinion, President Cleveland directed Albert S. Willis, the new minister to Hawaii, to secure from the Queen a grant of full amnesty to the revolutionists and then to advise the Provisional Government of the decision and ask them to relinquish the authority to Liliuokalani. If this could not be done by peaceful means Mr. Willis was to report the facts back to

\textsuperscript{97} McElroy, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. II, p. 59, 60.
Washington for the President had no intention of using force to restore her since that would require the authority of Congress.\footnote{House Ex. Doc. No. 48, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII, p. 171.} What would happen in the event of a refusal from either party, no one had considered.

Part of the official action had become public and many speculations were being made as to the matter when President Cleveland sent his First Annual Message to Congress on December 4, 1893. It was very disappointing, revealing far too little of the official action to be satisfactory to the senators and representatives. Beyond all question, it stated, "the constitutional Government of Hawaii had been subverted with the active aid of our representative to that Government and through the intimidation caused by the presence of an armed naval force of the United States, which was landed for that purpose at the instance of our minister." Due to our guilt, the President felt that the "only honorable course for our Government to pursue was to undo the wrong that had been done by those representing us and to restore as far as practicable the status existing at the time of our forcible intervention." He explained that he had sent a new minister to Hawaii in order to carry out this plan, promising, as soon as he had notice of definite results, to send the information together with Blount's report to Congress.
for consideration.\textsuperscript{99}

Meanwhile, Minister Willis had not yet had much success in securing "definite results" in Hawaii. When he had asked Liliuokalani, in his first interview, if she would, upon restoration by the United States, grant full amnesty to the revolutionists, she had refused. Instead of granting amnesty she would follow the laws of Hawaii which direct that such people be beheaded and their property confiscated.\textsuperscript{100} This was rather discouraging to the minister who began to wonder how the government could be sustained if it were restored. "It would fall to pieces like a card house," he wrote to the President.\textsuperscript{101} Mr. Cleveland began to see where Secretary Gresham's policy was leading him and determining to turn the whole affair over to Congress, he asked Carlisle and Olney to prepare a special message for him.\textsuperscript{102} This document was sent to Congress on December 18, 1893. Appealing to the traditional standards of the American republic, the President opened with a challenge:

"I suppose that right and justice should determine the path to be followed in treating this subject. If national honesty is to be disregarded and a desire for territorial extension, or dissatisfaction with a form

\textsuperscript{99} James D. Richardson, \textit{A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897} (Washington, 1901), Vol. IX, p. 441, 442.
\textsuperscript{100} House Ex. Doc. No. 70, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII, pp. 1-4.
\textsuperscript{101} McElroy, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. II, p. 63.
\textsuperscript{102} Nevins, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 559.
of government not our own, ought to regulate our conduct, I have entirely misapprehended the mission and character of our Government and the behavior which the conscience of our people demands of their public servants."

After stating his reasons for withdrawing the treaty from the Senate, Mr. Cleveland proceeded to convict Minister Stevens, showing that he "zealously promoted" annexation because he desired that it should be during his ministry, and that he was not "inconveniently scrupulous as to the means employed to that end." His reports after March 8, 1892, denoted an increasing annexationist feeling and prepared the reader for his statement of February 1, 1893: "The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it." The Committee of Safety whose aim was annexation, were in communication with him and on January 16, being "unwilling to take further steps without the cooperation of the United States Minister," they sent him a note representing that the public safety was menaced and concluding: "We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces." Becoming frightened by their action, the Committee withdrew their request, but it was too late as the note had been forwarded to the Boston. That evening the detachment of marines was landed, this demonstration being virtually an act of war as there was no evidence that they were actually needed for the protection of American
property. On the following day, by rather devious methods, the Provisional Government was proclaimed and was recognized by Mr. Stevens "pursuant to prior agreement," although it was actually neither a government de facto or de jure. A note found in the legation files at Honolulu addressed by the head of the Provisional Government to Stevens expressed appreciation of the minister's recognition, stating that the Provisional Government was "not yet in the possession of the station house (the place where a large number of the Queen's troops were quartered), though the same had been demanded of the Queen's officers in charge."

Since the United States was now allied with the Provisional Government, Mr. Cleveland's message continued, the Queen knew she could not withstand the power of our country, and believing that she could safely trust to our justice, she surrendered to her enemies. With her protest in their hands, they turned to the United States to sell her kingdom and very nearly succeeded. "The control of both sides of a bargain acquired in such a manner," Mr. Cleveland said of the Harrison treaty, "is called by a familiar and unpleasant name when found in private transactions," an accusation which we scrupulously avoided in former days. But our duty did not end with having refused to "consummate this questionable transaction" for our country must attempt to make all possible reparation to the wronged queen. On the other
hand, since the members of the Provisional Government were "led to their present predicament of revolt...by the indefensible encouragement and assistance of our diplomatic representative," their safety should be considered too. The State Department in following this policy had tried to persuade the queen to promise amnesty to the revolutionists as the main condition of her restoration, but had met with failure. Since she had refused to accept the condition, the plan had gone no farther and "public misrepresentations of the situation and exaggerated statements" of public sentiment had made successful executive mediation nearly impossible. Since the matter had gone beyond the bounds of the presidential authority Mr. Cleveland was transferring the entire problem to Congress, promising his cooperation whenever necessary.

The discussion at the time of the publication of Blount's report was as nothing compared to the criticism which broke forth as a result of this message. The country was instantly divided into two parties upon the question, the Republicans and part of the Democrats denouncing his course, while part of the Democrats applauded the high moral stand he had taken. The Senate decided that since they had heard the annexationist arguments approving the actions of Stevens and the Pro-

visional Government, and Mr. Cleveland's message opposing
them, they would authorize the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations to inquire into the matter and decide which was
really right. The Senate, as a matter of fact, had felt
for many months that the President was exceeding his con-
stitutional authority and they wished to discourage such
tendencies. As far as the Hawaiian question was concerned,
however, they might as well have saved their time for it
was already being taken out of their hands by other forces.
On the day upon which the special message was sent to
Congress, Liliuokalani had finally consented to grant amnesty
to those who had been instrumental in overthrowing her, and
on the same day President Dole had asked Mr. Willis if his
actions were hostile to the Provisional Government. The
minister answered by demanding the surrender of the consti-
tutional authority to the Queen. President Dole refused,
claiming that the United States had no right to interfere
with a de facto government, denying the charges made by
Blount, and refusing to restore the government to
Liliuokalani. Mr. Willis recognized the truth of his claim
but decided to try a ruse before giving up his efforts.
Making use of the fact that the revenue cutter Corwin had
just arrived with dispatches whose contents were unknown to
Dole, the Minister had troops drawn up on the decks of the
Adams and the Philadelphia, as though they were to be landed
to make an attack. This attempt to "bluff out" the Pro-
visional Government failed to convince Dole and it now be-
came clear that the matter was settled since President
Cleveland had no right to use force and evidently public
sentiment did not back his policy to that extent.

News of Minister Willis's attempt to use force, an
action certainly contravening the spirit of his instruc-
tions, resulted in demands for the impeachment of Cleveland.
During the long debate which took place before his Hawaiian
message, the idea of manifest destiny had become popular
and each believer in this doctrine now felt himself per-
sonally thwarted by the attempt to restore the Queen. In
February the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs was
submitted to Congress by Senator Morgan of Alabama, a member
of the President's party. The conclusions of the report, all
of which were accepted only by Mr. Morgan, absolved President
Cleveland from any irregularity of conduct and defended
Minister Stevens from most of the charges against him. "In
his dealings with the Hawaiian Government, his conduct was
characterized by becoming dignity and reserve," the report
read, and "the only substantial irregularity that existed in
the conduct of any officer of the United States or agent of
the President, during or since the time of the revolution
of 1893," was Mr. Stevens' action in establishing a protec-
torate. The four other Democrats on the committee, Senators
M. C. Butler, David Turpie, John W. Daniel, and George Gray, agreed in the belief that the President committed no irregularities in the appointment of Mr. Blount or the instructions given him, but they disagreed regarding the exoneration of Minister Stevens. They believed his conduct to be "seriously reprehensible and deserving of public censure" because it "was directly conducive to bringing about the condition of affairs which resulted in the overthrow of the Queen, the organization of the Provisional Government, the landing of the United States troops, and the attempted scheme of annexation." Both Mr. Butler and Mr. Turpie favored annexation but did not wish to take advantage of internal dissension in the Islands as a pretext.

The four Republican members of the committee, Senators John Sherman, William P. Frye, J. N. Dolph, and Cushman K. Davis, differed from Mr. Morgan's first conclusion and issued a statement of their own. They believed (1) that Blount's appointment was unconstitutional, (2) that placing the Honolulu naval forces under Blount and Willis was unlawful, (3) that Mr. Blount's order to lower the flag was unlawful and his intercourse with the Queen both unconstitutional and contrary to international law, (4) that Cleveland had no authority to reopen the Hawaiian question after Harrison had settled it by recognizing the Provisional Government, and (5) that the actions of Blount and Willis
were all recognized as attempts to carry out the President's expressed policy. 104

After the publication of this report, the "Hawaiian Question" took on a partisan aspect. Congress had three alternatives before her, namely, to recognize the Provisional Government, to restore the Queen, or to take a plebiscite. 105

The supporters of Mr. Cleveland ignored the findings of the Senate Committee and argued that annexation should not take place until a plebiscite had been taken in the Islands. Additional reasons for delay advanced by them were the distance of Hawaii from our coast, its uselessness as a naval strategic point, the impossibility of admitting its heterogeneous population to citizenship, and the nationalistic feeling of the natives. Those favoring annexation urged the great preponderance of American capital and influence in the Islands, their value from a military and naval point of view, and their commercial opportunities, as reasons for their immediate acquisition. As the discussion went on, it became evident that the House was unwilling to take steps to restore the Queen by force while the Senate

believed that the United States should keep out of Hawaiian affairs for the present and should insist that other nations do likewise. This was tantamount to recognizing the Provisional Government and postponing annexation until a more convenient time. With this encouragement the Dole government proclaimed the Hawaiian Republic on July 4, 1894, and as its stability was evident, President Cleveland withdrew the American war vessels and gave it formal recognition. Having thus recognized that Dole's government was "able to speak with the voice of Hawaiian sovereignty," McElroy, Mr. Cleveland's biographer, believes that the President was illogical when he subsequently refused its request for annexation. The royalists, as a result, believed that he still favored their cause and tried unsuccessfully to enlist his aid in their last attempt against the Dole government, the revolt of 1895, which met defeat.

Affairs in Hawaii were much relieved by the passage of the Wilson-Gorman tariff. By December 4, 1893, the Wilson bill, representing Mr. Cleveland's tariff ideas, was ready to present to Congress. Placing lumber, coal, iron, wool, raw sugar and refined sugar on the free list and cutting down the duty on manufactured woolens, linens, and cottons, it brought a storm of opposition. To this the various sugar interests contributed for it struck a blow at both the sugar trust which was subsidized by the McKinley bill and the sugar growers who had been the recipients of a bounty since 1900. The Wilson tariff passed the House but met with so many amendments in the Senate that its entire nature was changed. Here the sugar trust was so successful in securing protection that the Senate appointed a committee to investigate their methods. H. O. Havemeyer, president of the Sugar Trust, admitted on the stand that the Trust regularly contributed to campaign funds - to the Republican fund in a Republican state and to the Democratic fund in a Democratic state. These contributions were concealed on their books as "expenses". He also admitted that the Trust kept lobbyists in Washington while the Wilson bill was before Congress in order to influence the Congressmen to favor the sugar interests. 107 Both Senators McPherson and Quay admitted

having purchased sugar stocks while the debate was in progress, Senator Quay expressing his intention to continue. Nothing was done in regard to Havemeyer and the senators escaped with a censure. After a two-months' tariff war the compromise Wilson-Gorman bill was passed, providing, among other changes, for a forty-per cent ad valorem duty on raw sugar and one-eighth of a cent a pound on refined.

The reciprocity treaty between the United States and Hawaii was still in force, being subject after 1894 to termination at a twelve months' notice. As a result, the restoration of duties on sugar placed Hawaii on the old profitable basis, at the same aiding them indirectly by ruining the Cuban sugar business and precipitating a revolution there. An idea of the effect on sugar crops may be gained from the following figures which were made public by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association. The increase in the output, most noticeable in 1895-96, continued until 1908 when it reached one billion pounds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Output (tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1890-91</td>
<td>146,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891-92</td>
<td>122,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892-93</td>
<td>152,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893-94</td>
<td>166,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894-95</td>
<td>149,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895-96</td>
<td>225,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896-97</td>
<td>245,555</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

108. Cuba had no reciprocity treaty with the United States. She had developed sugar planting under the encouragement of the McKinley bill.

As prosperity returned to the sugar industry, it returned to all Hawaii. Total imports rose from $5,339,785 in 1895 to $6,063,652 in 1896. Of this amount, $4,516,319 worth were from the United States in 1895 and $5,464,208 worth in 1896. In 1896 American ships carried exports valued at $13,502,410 and imports valued at $7,164,561. Of the entire export and import trade in 1896, the United States had 82.53 per cent; Great Britain 7.93; Germany 2.96; and Hawaii 5.26.\(^{110}\)

The revival of Hawaiian trade and industry had the effect of lessening the pressure of the annexationists for the time being. Having had one demonstration of the entire dependence of Hawaiian progress on the desires and whims of American politicians, they were not likely to drop all agitation, however. Annexation was the step which would place them permanently within the bounds of American protection and assure them of unremitted prosperity.

During the debate on the Hawaiian question British public sentiment had urged this country to take over the Islands and become an imperialistic nation. Now, in the latter part of 1894 and in 1895 the British minister took a step which eventually provided the annexationists with one of their most telling arguments. This was the request for the cession

of Neckar Island, French Frigate Shoal, or Bird Island for the purpose of establishing a station for a submarine telegraphic cable there. On account of the distance between Vancouver and the Australian coast, the proposed termini of the cable, it was desirable to have a station in mid-ocean between these points. A spur was to be extended to Hawaii. Since the Hawaiian government had agreed by the reciprocity treaty not to allow any nation to land a telegraphic cable upon its shores without the previous consent of the United States, they submitted the matter to the United States without even expressing an opinion. On January 9, 1895, President Cleveland submitted the British request to Congress recommending that it be granted, "especially in view of the fact that our own communication with that country would thereby be greatly improved without apparent detriment to any legitimate American interest." Congress did not agree with the President. It believed that Great Britain wished to establish this cable mainly for military purposes and that it would lead to British superiority over the United States in case of a war involving the Islands. As a result the request was not granted. Undaunted, the British now tried another method. A few months later, two men came to Honolulu where they excited suspicion by their persistent inquiries.

111. Richardson, *op. cit.*, Vol. IX, pp. 559-60.
concerning the exact status of Neckar Island. As this island had never been formally claimed, the Hawaiian government began to suspect a plan to seize it for Great Britain. A party was therefore sent out to take formal possession and the efforts of Great Britain ceased. The indignant American Senate, strongly resenting this attempt, passed a resolution to the effect that any interference of a foreign nation with the Hawaiian Islands would be regarded as an act of unfriendliness toward the United States. This showed a growing consciousness of the fact that Hawaii was a part of the so-called "American system," and gave a decided impetus to sentiment favoring acquisition.

In 1896 this sentiment was embodied in a plank of the Republican platform stating that "the Hawaiian Islands should be controlled by the United States, and no foreign power should be permitted to interfere with them."112 One of the men helping to draw up this declaration was Joseph B. Foraker who made the nominating speech for McKinley at the St. Louis convention. In speaking of the stand taken on the Hawaiian question, Foraker said that it was in "exact accord" with some remarks that he made at a banquet given on February 22, 1896, in honor of his election as senator. At this time he

had said: 113

"The time has come when there is an emphatic demand for a wise, broad, patriotic, progressive aggressive American statesmanship. I do not like the idea of our being unable to step out at either our front door or back door, on the Atlantic or the Pacific side, without seeing England's flag floating from all the islands that meet our view, with her guns pointing wheresoever she will. When the Sandwich Islands come knocking at the door with a republican form of government and the American flag, I say, let them in."

These were the ideas of the great majority of Republicans, Mr. Foraker said, and Mr. McKinley had known these to be his sentiments when asking him to attend the convention and assist in making the platform. No such beliefs were in the minds of the Democrats who were looking around for another issue to revive their rapidly waning prestige. They did not even mention Hawaii. The public reaction against all of Cleveland's policies was so great that the Republicans claimed without much contradiction that they "could nominate a rag baby and elect it President" that year. 114

Almost immediately, upon the return of the Republicans to power, a new treaty was drawn up. It was submitted to the Senate on June 16, 1897, accompanied by a message from President McKinley. 115 After mentioning various events in

American relations with Hawaii, he summarized the policy of the United States toward them as one which has consistently favored their autonomous welfare, with the exclusion of all foreign influence save our own, to the extent of upholding eventual annexation as the necessary outcome of that policy."
The failure of annexation in 1893 "may not be a cause for congratulation," Mr. McKinley continued, but it "is certainly a proof of the disinterestedness of the United States, the delay of four years having abundantly sufficed to establish the right and the ability of the Republic of Hawaii to enter, as a sovereign contractant, upon a conventional union with the United States, thus realizing a purpose held by the Hawaiian people and proclaimed by successive Hawaiian governments through some twenty years of their virtual dependence upon the benevolent protection of the United States. Under such circumstances," the President concluded, "annexation is not a change. It is a consummation." 116

The annexation treaty of 1897 was also accompanied by a report from Secretary Sherman stating that Hawaii was sending to the United States "not a commission representing a successful revolution, but the accredited plenipotentiary of a constituted and firmly established sovereign state." 117

117. Ibid., 74.
This change nominally placed Hawaii in a position much stronger than that of 1893. Since no criticism could be made of the Republic as the representative of Hawaiian sovereignty, manifest destiny was clearly the issue. President McKinley now invited delay, urging "due deliberation" upon the Senate, in great contrast to President Harrison's message of 1893 asking for prompt action. In fact, Senator Davis, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, admitted that the sending in of the Hawaiian treaty at this time was only a political move and that no attempt would be made to ratify it at the present session. The editor of the Nation accused the Administration of "playing fast and loose with the Hawaiians in order to crowd through its tariff."118

Delay in dealing with the Hawaiian question had always seemed to redound to the credit of the annexationists, and the passage of time seemed to demonstrate as to the truth of their thesis. Soon after the treaty was sent to the Senate, imperialists were furnished another argument when the Japanese government instructed their minister to formally protest against the annexation for the following reasons:119

"First - The maintenance of the status quo of Hawaii is essential to the good understanding of the Powers that have interests in the Pacific.
"Second - The annexation of Hawaii would tend

to endanger the residential, commercial, and industrial rights of Japanese subjects in Hawaii, secured to them by treaty and by the Constitution and laws of that country.

"Third - Such annexation might lead to the postponement by Hawaii of the settlement of claims and liabilities already existing in favor of Japan under treaty stipulations."

Although Japan had made no protest in 1893 when annexation was contemplated she had since then defeated China and had suddenly become the leading nation of Asia. The Japanese poured into the Islands so rapidly after 1893 that the Hawaiian government feared an attempt on the part of Japan at control through colonization. Convinced that many Japanese were entering in violation of the immigration laws, one thousand were refused admission in 1897. Their government protested and demanded indemnity, thus leading to a complicated discussion which was in progress when the protest to the United States was made. In response to Secretary Sherman's suspicions that Japan wanted Hawaii for herself, Minister Hoshi issued a statement saying that she had "absolutely no designs of any kind whatever inimical to Hawaii." She was intervening only for the purpose of safeguarding the rights of twenty-five thousand of her subjects resident in the Islands. Mr. McKinley found it hard to fully credit this statement and so did thousands of annexationists who now

120. The Nation, Vol. LXV, pp. 79, 80.
argued that Hawaii would soon be a Japanese colony if the United States did not take her. Eventually Japan withdrew her protest and the matter was dropped.

On September 16 the treaty of annexation was signed by the Hawaiian Senate and its friends believed that when Congress met in December it could be rushed through without much trouble, probably before the holiday recess. President McKinley in his December message touched upon the question very lightly saying he thought that "every consideration of dignity and honor" required that the treaty be ratified. "Fifty Opinions of the President's Message" were printed by Public Opinion on December 16. Republican, Democratic, and Independent comment of the fifty newspapers were given separately. All of the Republican organs except the Omaha Bee were silent on the subject of Hawaii. The Bee criticized the President's failure to present some practical reasons for annexation and believed that he took a "singular view...of a scheme concocted and promoted by a few political adventurers.

121. George F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years, (New York, 1906), Vol. II, pp. 305-309. Some even advocated the establishment of a protectorate saying that Hawaii would not be able to maintain herself against Japan while waiting for the treaty.
123. Senate Journal, 55th Cong. 2d Sess., pp. 4-11.
... No less remarkable," the Bee continued, "is the statement of the president that the Hawaiians 'have come of their free will to merge their destinies in our body politic', the fact being that the native Hawaiians have had no opportunity to express their will except through public meetings and these have shown that they are almost unanimously opposed to annexation."  124

The "Hawaiian grab" was mentioned by seven of the other newspapers quoted, three Democratic and four Independent.  125 These were the Louisville Courier Journal, the Pittsburg Post, the St. Paul Globe, the Boston Herald, the Indianapolis News, the Pittsburg Chronicle-Telegraph, and the Detroit Free Press, and all expressed themselves adversely upon the part of the President's message dealing with Hawaii which the Chronicle Telegraph characterized as "mere twaddle".  126

In the three months debate which followed, "manifest destiny" in Hawaii was considered from every angle and opposition to the policy gradually increased. On February 24, 1898, the Nation in describing the progress of the discussion, said that while the scheme was sure to be opposed from

125. Pittsburg (Pa.) Post calls annexation the "Hawaiian grab".
the first by nearly all of the Democratic Senators, it was now fought openly by such Republicans as Senator Morrill of Vermont and Senator Gear of Iowa. All through the north the Republican press was turning against annexation. As public sentiment declared against "manifest destiny", the senators who had been without strong convictions in the beginning had tended to turn against it too. As a result, one opposition senator estimated that at that time there would be more than forty votes against the treaty.  

By March the Administration had ceased to push annexation with much force and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had recognized the impossibility of securing a two-thirds vote. They abandoned the treaty about the middle of March. Senator Hanna's support of the President's imperialistic policy seemed to have availed nothing and the accord of the Four, Senators Aldrich, Allison, O. H. Platt, and Spooner, was set at naught. But "manifest destiny" was not defeated, it was merely gathering forces for a final attack. Less than a month later, Beveridge, then a candidate for the Senate was re-stating the doctrine of all imperialists in his "March of the Nations" speech. Asked to make a talk on Ulysses S. Grant, he "threw a bombshell among the tables

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When he began in the strain": 128

"He (Grant) never forgot that we are a conquering race and that we must obey our blood and occupy new markets, and, if necessary, new lands....

"American factories are making more than the American people can use; American soil is producing more than they can consume. Fate has written our policy for us; the trade of the world must and shall be ours. And we will get it as our mother (England) has told us how. We will establish trading-posts throughout the world as distributing points for American products. We will cover the ocean with our merchant marine. We will build a navy to the measure of our greatness. Great colonies governing themselves flying our flag and trading with us, will grow about our posts of trade. Our institutions will follow our flag on the wings of our commerce. And American law, American order, American civilization, and the American flag will plant themselves on shores hitherto bloody and benighted, but by those agencies of God henceforth to be made beautiful and bright....

"If this means the Stars and Stripes over an Isthmian canal...over Hawaii...over Cuba and the southern seas...then let us meet that meaning with a mighty joy and make that meaning good, no matter what barbarism and all our foes may do or say."

Events again began shaping themselves in a manner to demonstrate the arguments of the annexationists. On April 19, a joint resolution of Congress empowered the President to intervene forcibly in Cuba and establish peace there. The Navy Department, foreseeing that in case of a war with Spain it would be desirable to attack her dependencies, had already sent Admiral Dewey to Hongkong where he was ready to leave for the Philippines at a moment's notice. His

order came from Secretary Long on April 25: 129

"War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavor."

Obeying orders, Admiral Dewey, on May 1, took Manila bay. Owing to lack of a sufficient landing force he did not occupy Manila itself until August 13. Now the value of Honolulu as a port of call for coal and fresh provisions was shown. When reenforcements were sent to Dewey, the Hawaiian government, which under international law should have at once declared her neutrality, declined to take this step and permitted troops to land for supplies. The Spanish consul at Honolulu immediately protested at her grant of the use of her harbors to a belligerent nation. The Hawaiian government declared that the United States was her best friend and she would welcome the American troops in her harbors and on her shore. This was in reality a declaration of alliance with the United States though no formal alliance existed. This action, together with the foreshadowed policy in the Philippines made certain that annexation would come soon.

In the meantime, the Republicans, finding it impossible

to secure a two-thirds majority in the Senate, had decided to use the method of joint annexation which required only a majority in each house. When introduced in this way, however, a bill gained no special consideration and had to take its chance along with the rest of the business of Congress. It particularly required cooperation from the speaker for it was perfectly possible for him to refuse opportunity to bring such a resolution before the House. Now it happened that Thomas B. Reed, Speaker of the House, was one of the few Republicans from New England who had not departed from the standards of his forefathers to embrace imperialism. His position as Speaker had prevented his taking part in the former debates on the Hawaiian question but his stand on the matter was well known. This country should "grow up to the territory we have already" and try to create a fully united nation, he had written in an article on naval affairs.\(^{130}\) In spite of the protests of members of his own party, he opposed the introduction of the annexation bill all through April. After the capture of Manila bay, annexationist sentiment again became so strong that Speaker Reed had to give in. The Newlands resolution was brought before the House on May 4. Even then,

he refused for three weeks to permit a rule for its consideration. On May 24, the Republican members circulated a petition requesting Chairman Grosvenor to summon a caucus "to consider the Hawaiian resolution with a view to its prompt and speedy consideration and to transact such other business as may be necessary." Seeing that the question would have to be fought out sooner or later, Speaker Reed capitulated and on June 2 it was announced that the Hawaiian measure would be passed before the adjournment of the House. A few days later unanimous consent was given to Mr. Hitt's resolution to set aside the order of business on June 11 and proceed with the Hawaiian debate until June 15 when a vote should be taken. Thus began the first great Congressional debate over "manifest destiny" in its modern sense of economic imperialism.

Chairman Hitt of the House Committee on Foreign Relations fired the opening gun. Always a successful pleader, he seldom attended the House sessions except when a question concerning our foreign relations was up for consideration. Now he launched into a powerful support of the Administration measure. For many years, he pointed out,

Hawaii had contemplated union with America, two voluntary attempts having been made in 1851. This being true, the question for discussion was whether the Islands were of any value to the United States or not. Believing the affirmative, Mr. Hitt set out to prove his case by referring to the opinions of such naval experts as Admiral Walker, Captain Mahan, General Schofield, Admiral Belknap, General Alexander, Admiral Dupont and Chief Engineer Melville. All of these, Mr. Hitt said, have testified as to Hawaii's strategic importance in the defense of our Western coast. They believe furthermore, that the American possession of Hawaii would diminish the necessity for a naval force in the Pacific while in the hands of an enemy it would furnish a secure base for active operations against our coast. Although we have Pearl Harbor, Mr. Hitt continued, no less an authority than General Schofield, after a three months survey decided that we needed the Islands too, to prevent all neutral complications. Moreover since the Pearl Harbor grant was made in return for reciprocity it would cease with the cessation of reciprocity, an event likely to occur in case of their annexation by another power. That other powers realized their value was evidenced by the representatives which seventeen nations kept continuously at Honolulu as well as by the Japanese protests to the United States. The campaign in the Philippines had made
some action imperative for if we recognized Hawaii's neutrality we would lay her liable to damages to Spanish shipping by our use of her ports. Since annexation was really not a departure from the established customs of our country due to the necessity of our possessing Hawaii for "the defense of our Western shore, the protection and promotion of our commercial interests, and the welfare and security of our country generally," the few objections made in regard to race, leprosy, etc. were negligible, Mr. Hitt concluded. 133

He was answered by three powerful anti-annexationists, the first being Mr. Hugh Dinsmore of Arkansas, who said he hoped the debate would not become a partisan affair. Although previously favoring annexation, Mr. Dinsmore confessed that his study of the question had made him its opponent. In the first place, he contended, we have no constitutional authority to take Hawaii except as a territory to be admitted as a state, an utterly impossible procedure. In the second place, there is no necessity for our espousal of a colonial policy—a step which would involve us in practically every European controversy that occurred over territory. In the third place its loss would not be a calamity as we could use our coaling station at Unalaska,

while its acquisition would undoubtedly require a navy in the Pacific and fortifications on our Western coast. 134 Champ Clark next took up the attack on the imperialists and struck some strong blows in his party's behalf. No real gain will come from such a step, he said, for it is not like our past acquisitions of territory—it is not open to development. The reason this proposition is being pushed so hard is because $5,000,000 of Hawaiian bonds have been sold in this country at about thirty cents on the dollar and annexation will guarantee their payment. Furthermore, if admitted as a state, Hawaii will have two senators and a representative whose votes the Republicans need, also three electoral ballots which McKinley will need in 1900. If Hawaii is annexed, our colonial policy will have commenced. A bill has already been introduced by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to purchase the islands of St. Thomas, St. Croix, and St. John, and many here are talking of annexing Puerto Rico, the Philippines, the Canaries, and the Caroline islands. 135

"This annexation scheme is in flagrant violation of that basic principle of our Republic, for many thousand Hawaiians...have solemnly protested against the sale and delivery of their country to us by a little gang of adventurers who, claiming to be the whole thing, are offering us a property of which they have robbed the rightful owners."

135. Ibid., p. 5788-5795.
The propaganda these adventurers have openly carried on in Washington has been a disgrace and no other government on earth would permit the agents of a foreign country to come to its capital and interfere openly in its affairs. In conclusion, Mr. Clark took a shot at manifest destiny, the darling of the annexationists, defining it in the words of Rob Roy:\textsuperscript{136}

"The good old rule, the simple plan
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can."

The third of the trio for the negative was Henry U. Johnson of Indiana. He maintained three propositions, first that the acquisition of Hawaii is not necessary as a war measure in our conflict with Spain, second, that it is not necessary to prevent its falling into the hands of another great power, and third, that Hawaiian annexation is inherently wrong and an opening wedge to lead to further additions of territory. Since Hawaii is not fit to be admitted as a state it would have to be governed as a conquered province, a proceeding for which there is no American authority. The other colonies which we would secure, once launched on this scheme, would all have to be governed in contravention of republican principles with the result that in time of war they would become the liability to us that Spain's has been.

\textsuperscript{136} Cong. Rec., Vol. XXXI, Part 6, p. 5788-5795.
to her. The whole affair would be mere presumption on our part, Mr. Johnson felt, for any country which supports a document like the Monroe Doctrine, has no right to meddle in Asiatic affairs. 137

On June 14, William Sulzer of New York made a speech in support of the bill. Up to the present, he told the House, the Democrats have always been the annexationists, for every increase of national territory except Alaska has come under a Democratic administration. Grover Cleveland alone opposed this policy in his attempt to restore Liliuokalani, a proceeding not favored by American sentiment. The contemplated acquisition would neither be a departure from our past policy nor from the Monroe Doctrine as Hawaii is a contiguous territory which is necessary to our preservation. In obtaining the Islands we would merely emulate the example of European powers who realize that the destiny of a nation depends upon its control of markets and will step into the Pacific themselves unless we watch our rights and protect our interests there. Our first step in preservation must be, then, the annexation of Hawaii, the key to the whole situation. 138 William Hepburn, Mr. Sulzer's colleague, agreed in accusing the Democrats of

138. Ibid., Part 6, p. 5905-5907.
changing sides on the annexation question and read the Ostend Manifesto as an example of their former attitude. Denying that the possession of Hawaii necessarily committed us to a colonial policy, he saw no harm in imperialism if it did result. Three legitimate ways of acquiring territory are recognized—by purchase, by conquest, and by discovery, he pointed out. Unless we wish defeat for our forces, we all hope that Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines will be ours by conquest. No one knows exactly what we will do with this territory but we will probably retain parts as coaling stations for commerce has greatly changed and to-day we must have these friendly ports or "drop out of the procession of nations in their great effort to capture the commerce of the world". The discussion was brought to a close by the taking of the vote. The joint resolution of the majority was passed by two hundred and nine to ninety one. It was then referred in the Senate to the Committee on Foreign Relations which reported it without amendment on June 17. On June 20, it came up for consideration.

The Ohio Republicans had already sounded the keynote for the Senate debate by endorsing in their platform "the steps now being taken by Congress and the President", and

by expressing an "urgent wish that the same be fully accomplished at the earliest practicable date by the passage by the Senate of the joint resolution..." Annexationist sentiment was so strong that the opposition saw no chance of escape unless through "filibustering". Three months of deliberation had defeated the Hawaiian bill in the last Senate and delay might be successful at this time. In general the line of argument resembled that put forward in the House. Senator Morrill of Vermont spent much time in denouncing the reciprocity treaty of 1875, that "enormous blunder" which was the cause of the present trouble, having encouraged the sugar barons to increase their exports to the United States from twenty six million to four hundred forty three million pounds. This treaty should have been terminated long ago, he believed, or at least modified so as to have remitted not more than ten or twenty per cent of the duties. In addition he made a strong point of the fact that Hawaii was not fit to become a state. Were it annexed, it could never be admitted to the Union, he pointed out, for the varied races there would never be fit for American citizenship and they could not be driven out because their labor is indispensable. The alternative, colonial government, is not very inviting when

we look at the continuous strife in the colonies of other countries. 141 Senator Morrill was strongly supported by William B. Bate of Tennessee. Senator Bate opposed the resolution on two grounds, the policy and the right of annexation. Characterizing the action as an abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine and the inauguration of an Oriental policy, he denounced such a change on the ground that our government was not fitted to administer it. One of the first steps would be the creation of a colonial department, the second, an increase in the army and navy. This great change would come as a result of a movement of doubtful constitutionality, adopted because of its expediency. "The entering wedge to a series of troubles in our country which could not be controlled...in after years," it might result in the control of our government by the army, Mr. Bate feared. 142

Senator Hoar's stand as revealed on July 5, differed somewhat from that of the majority. The Nation said that he was trying to oppose imperialism without cutting loose from his party (the Republican) which had recently voted almost unanimously for annexation in the House. Then too, he did not wish to take issue with the McKinley

142. Ibid., p. 6517-6528.
administration which was "pushing the scheme with utmost zeal".\textsuperscript{143} Not long before speaking, Senator Hoar had had a conference with the President in which Mr. McKinley had told him of the landing of Japanese emigrants with military training at Honolulu and of the evident determination of Japan to secure the Islands. He went before the Senate therefore, determined to outwit Japan.\textsuperscript{144} Mr. Hoar began by saying that while he opposed the acquisition of Cuba or the Philippines from Spain, the fear of imperialism was a needless alarm in the case of Hawaii. This question is not one of empire in the Pacific but of how far our boundaries shall extend in the Hawaiian islands for we already have Pearl Harbor. Having exercised dominion over this group for two generations, we now have a relation to them that no one else can share and their annexation would be "an extension of the domain of peace upon the habitable globe." It would not be right to annex them in violation of the will of the people Mr. Hoar agreed. However, as there has been no attempt to overthrow their government since the end of Mr. Cleveland's administration, it would seem that they acquiesce in the change. The alternative will undoubtedly lead to Japanese domination there through immigration, a move which the

\textsuperscript{143} The Nation, Vol. LXVII, p. 2.
United States could never permit. As "prevention is better than cure", a peaceful settlement now is better than a future war between America and Asia over the Islands. Very optimistically, Mr. Hoar concluded by propounding a rule for solving the "greater and more dangerous problem which is upon us in the near future":

"We will acquire no territory; we will annex no people; we will aspire to no empire or dominion, except where we can reasonably expect that the people we acquire will, in due time and on suitable conditions, be annexed to the United States as an equal part of a self-governing republic."

The Senate by this time had grown weary of the debate which was keeping them in Washington during the hot weather. On July 6, 1898, they passed the joint resolution by a vote of forty two to twenty one, and on July 8, it was approved by President McKinley. Thus the sugar planters reaped the benefits of a century of American penetration in Hawaii and the United States announced to Europe that she too, was commencing a career of foreign economic imperialism.

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