Aristotle's doctrine of inherence

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ARISTOTLE'S DOCTRINE OF INHERENCE

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the distinction Aristotle makes between being 'in' a subject and being 'said of' a subject. This investigation will be focused on what Aristotle means when he says that something is 'in' a subject; for convenience this will be referred to as Aristotle's doctrine of inherence. This is only one approach to Aristotle's philosophy; there are many others. An approach to Aristotle's philosophy by way of his doctrine of inherence has the merit of being small enough to be dealt with in a thesis of this size and still be central to Aristotle's philosophy as a whole. Aristotle needs the notion of inherence to explain the way in which non-substances depend on substances. He needs this sort of dependence relation if substance is to be the focus of his science of being qua being.

Thus this thesis, as an investigation of Aristotle's doctrine of inherence, is primarily an investigation of a crucial concept in Aristotle's philosophy as it is located in the Categories. Secondarily, it is an exploration of parts of Aristotle's philosophy which are integral to his notion of inherence. As such, this thesis is an attempt to explain Aristotle's doctrine of inherence using his terminology. This is done with the recognition that this terminology is not always clear, although attempts are made at times to clarify crucial concepts. This manner of approach has the disadvantage of leaving some crucial concepts unclarified.
It has the advantage of relating what Aristotle is saying about inherence to some of these crucial concepts, with the result that these concepts may be more easily approached. It has the additional advantage of exhibiting the way in which Aristotle uses his words, making Aristotle's philosophy as a whole more accessible. This is in keeping with the limited compass of this thesis. Approaching Aristotle in this way opens other topics for consideration with the goal of obtaining a better understanding of the way in which Aristotle understood the world. As Aristotle becomes more fully comprehended, it is increasingly possible to use his insights in dealing with contemporary philosophical questions.

What this thesis will attempt to accomplish may be indicated by briefly introducing the doctrine of inherence. In stating this doctrine Aristotle sets forth two conditions for something to inhere in something else: (1) the inherent is not a part of that in which it inheres, and (2) the inherent is inseparable from that in which it inheres. Both of these conditions are negative; that is, they explain what the relation of inherence is not. It is not a whole/part relation, and it is not a relation of separables. This thesis attempts to explain what Aristotle meant by these two conditions. Explaining this entails an examination of Aristotle's account of substance and an explanation of his doctrine of inherence as it relates to his doctrine of substance. This is, then, an account of the function which Aristotle's doctrine of inherence performs in his philosophy and a discussion of the manner in which this doctrine enables Aristotle to overcome what he took to be the problems which his account faced.

However, such an account is not complete. Aristotle is explaining inherence by asserting its difference from two other relations.
But difference is a two term relation. As his account stands, only one term of the relation is clear; it is clear what the relation of inherence is not. And it is relatively clear how this relation functions in Aristotle's philosophy. But it is not clear what kind of a relation inherence is. Aristotle himself, in fact, never faces this question, and this perhaps accounts for the fact that he only explicitly discusses this relation in the *Categories*.

In accordance with this manner of dealing with Aristotle, this thesis has the following outline. The present chapter, the introduction, is a brief account of the approach to Aristotle taken in this thesis followed by a brief outline of the thesis. Chapter II sets out the interpretation of Aristotle's categories which will be offered. It is one reading of Aristotle's doctrine of the categories which has a certain plausibility, while at the same time demonstrating Aristotle's relevance to current philosophical questions. Aristotle's doctrine of the categories serves as an introduction to his philosophy as a whole as well as an introduction to the *Categories*, the work in which Aristotle discusses his doctrine of inherence. Thus the second chapter provides a general introduction to Aristotle's philosophy and an introduction to the question of inherence.

The particular focus of this chapter is Aristotle's science of being qua being. By employing his categories Aristotle was able to list the kinds of being in the world. Since Aristotle recognized no genus of being, he asserted that it was substance which had being primarily, while all other kinds of beings had their being only by reference to substance. Thus Aristotle's science of being qua being is the science of the being of substance.
Chapter III expands this account by examining the two crucial notions in such a science: substance and priority. If the central reference of being which is the foundation of Aristotle's science of being qua being is substance, then substance must in some sense be prior. This, of course, entails that non-substances must be posterior and, hence, in some way dependent on substance.

Chapter IV is a statement of the conditions under which a non-substance may be said to inhere in a substance. It consists in drawing out the implications of the two conditions for inherence as stated in the *Categories*. This necessitates a discussion of priority and substance and, accordingly, develops the discussions in Chapters II and III.

Chapter V is an examination of the cogency of other commentators' accounts of Aristotle's doctrine of inherence. This is partly an arbitration of the debates of those commentators whose views are examined, and partly a reinforcement of the account of inherence suggested in Chapter IV.

Chapter VI will be the conclusion. It sums up the central points made throughout the thesis and offers some suggestions as to how an account of the doctrine of inherence opens further topics for consideration. In keeping with the exploratory nature of this thesis, the conclusion suggests some ways of carrying on the task of understanding Aristotle's view of the world.
CHAPTER II

THE FUNCTION OF THE CATEGORIES IN ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY

Aristotle's most complete treatment of his doctrine of the categories occurs in the Categories. According to Chapter 4 of the Categories there are ten categories: substance, quantity, qualification, a relative, when, where, being-in-a-position, having, doing, and being-affected. Aristotle also lists these ten categories in the Topics. (T. A 9. 103b 22-24) Elsewhere Aristotle lists sometimes eight (M. A 7. 1017a 25; P. E 1. 225b 5; A. Po. A 22. 190a 31), sometimes six (E. N. A 4. 1096a 23), and sometimes four categories (P. A 7. 190a 31). Other references to lists of categories are followed by the phrase καί τὰ ἄλλα.


2Except where otherwise indicated, references to Aristotle's works will be included in the text. They will refer to The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941). The works of Aristotle in this volume will be abbreviated as follows:

C. - Categoriae
D.I. - De Interpretatione
A. Po. - Analytica Posteriora
T. - Topica
P. - Physica
E. N. - Ethica Nicomachea
D.A. - De Anima
M. - Metaphysica
Po. - De Poetica

Thus (T. A 7. 103b 22-24) refers to the translation of the Topica in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon as cited above. The reference is to Book A, Chapter 5 page 103b, lines 22 to 24. The pagination is in accordance with that of the standard Berlin edition.
indicating that these lists are not complete. Having enumerated the categories in Chapter 4, Aristotle discusses the various categories in Chapters 5 through 9.

Aristotle introduces his list of categories as a list of "things said without any combination." What he means by this is not completely clear. From his examples, however, it would seem that he intends his list to be of things named in such a way that they are not characterized by their names; i.e., his list is of the kinds of things which may be introduced into sentences as subjects, providing that the sentences are subject-predicate sentences. This is illuminated slightly by a passage in the Topics. (T. A 9. 103b 20-104a 2) According to Aristotle, a man may state the what-is (есть предмет), sometimes translated essence, of something which is placed in front of him. Thus if a horse is placed in front of him, he states the what-is of the horse and in so doing signifies a substance. If a white color is placed in front of him, he states the what-is of the color and in so doing signifies a quality or qualification. Thus Aristotle seems to take "things said without any combination" to refer to things which have a determinate character or nature, and which can be signified by stating what that determinate character or nature is.

Elsewhere in the Topics (T. A 5) Aristotle considers the relations which hold between the subject and predicate of a subject-predicate sentence.

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sentence. He finds that there are four of these relations: definition, property, genus, and accident. Of these only the definition yields the what-is of some particular. And it is the definition which identifies the particular. Sentences in which some of the other subject-predicate relations hold serve to characterize the particular. In such a characterization a subject in the category of substance may be indicated and it may have something from some other category predicated of it. An example of this would be the sentence, "Socrates is white." Here the sentence is composed of expressions signifying things in two different categories. A definition, however, signifies in only one category, or signifies only one type of thing. It is these types, composed of things having essences, which Aristotle is listing in his table of categories and which may be indicated 'without any combination.'

If "things said without any combination" is regarded as indicating the types of essenced things, the categories become less an account of expressions and more an account of the kinds of things which are designated by those expressions. Aristotle is then classifying types of existents on the basis of the way in which those types of existents are spoken of. This interpretation fits the context of the Categories quite well. Throughout the first five chapters of the Categories Aristotle is discussing names and those things to which the names apply. He is also distinguishing types of existents on the basis of linguistic evidence. Thus in Chapter 1 Aristotle is classifying things according to whether or not they have the same names. In Chapter 2 he is classifying things on the basis of whether or not their names may be 'said of' a subject or the quality named may be said to be 'in' a subject. In Chapter 3 Aristotle discusses the relations between things on the basis of the relations which
hold between the names of those things used as predicates. Finally in Chapter 5 Aristotle discusses substance as that which is primarily called substance. In the first five chapters of the *Categories* Aristotle is therefore classifying things by means of the distinctions which occur in the ways in which those things are spoken of.

This is in harmony with what Chapter 4 says as well. Aristotle opens this chapter by stating, "Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or ... ." The things said so signify because the list of categories is a list of the kinds of things that are in the world. Expressions which are "without any combination" signify these types of existents and in so doing make it possible to talk about them. In effect, then, by talking about the different kinds of names which are given to things, Aristotle is also able to classify the different types of existents in the world. Some philosophers have argued that Aristotle is here classifying some sort of linguistic expression. However, this view is misleading. He is, certainly, in part classifying linguistic items, but only as he also classifies the types of existents. If he were merely concerning himself with linguistic expressions, he would have noticed that his categories are performing two separate functions as seen in Book H, Chapter 2 of the *Metaphysics*. The fact that he never considered any relation between words and things to which they refer indicates that he did not hold a view of language which would require such a relation to be established. This in turn

1Aristotle, *Categories* 4. 1\textsuperscript{b} 25-26, trans. J.L. Ackrill.  
3*Infra*, pp. 11-12.
indicates that he did not classify words which signify qua signifying in this way.

Given this interpretation of "without any combination" the last few lines of Chapter 4 fall into place. Here Aristotle states that these things said "without any combination" are neither true nor false. It is with a combination of these expressions that affirmations are produced. Thus in an affirmation not only is some term indicated or introduced, it is characterized as well. In subject-predicate sentences this characterization may occur in any of four forms: predication of definition, predication of property, predication of genus, or predication of accident. In other sentence forms this may occur in different ways. But the point is that if there is a subject indicated, and if the characterization is in fact a characterization of that subject, then the affirmation is true. Thus not only are the categories a list of things in the world, they are also a list of the constituents of affirmations. Affirmations are therefore composed of names which indicate the types of existents in the world. And if the structure of the sentence which is composed of those names is the same as the thing in question, the sentence is true.

For these reasons, then, Aristotle is using his list of categories in the Categories to enumerate the types of existents in the world, and hence, the kinds of expressions used to talk of these types of existents. This list is not, therefore, merely a list of expressions, nor is it a list of kinds of things. It performs both functions at the same time. Aristotle, of course, did not distinguish these functions nor treat them as different.

As might be expected, Aristotle in some places treats his list of categories as a list of kinds of linguistic expressions and the kinds
of things to which such expressions are applied. Consider the change apparent in Aristotle's categories in the *Metaphysics*. Here he treats his list of categories as performing a different function. Aristotle states, "The kinds of essential being are precisely those indicated by the figures of predication; for the senses of 'being' are just as many as these figures." (M. Δ 7. 1017a 23-24) The word 'essential' in the above passage is the Greek word καθ' αὑτὸν; Ross sometimes translates this as 'in virtue of its own nature'. The word 'essential' in this passage, then, plainly indicates that the categories classify the senses of 'being' (τὸ ἐστὶ) when 'being' is used in saying what some "thing" is. Thus Aristotle is using the "thing" whose "nature" is being given using the verb ἐίναι to give a particular sense to the verb. If the thing in question is, say, white, 'ἐίναι' used to indicate its "nature" will be placed in the category of qualification. If the "thing" is, say, man, 'ἐίναι' used to indicate its "nature" will be placed in the category of substance. In this way Aristotle regards the table of categories as an enumeration of the different senses of being and, hence, the different kinds of being which make up the world. Thus Aristotle is using the categories for what modern philosophers might feel to be two purposes. He is classifying the senses in which 'ἐίναι' is used and he is enumerating the different kinds of being in the world.

1E.g., M. Γ 1. 1003a 21.

2The Greek word for what will here be indicated by the expression ""thing"" is τὸ ἄλλος or τὸ άλλος which means literally 'this'. Aristotle uses this word in a variety of ways. In view of the inconvenience of 'this' as a translation of τὸ άλλος, the expression ""thing"" will be used.

3The Greek word here indicated by the expression ""nature"" is τὸ ἀλλός which is literally translated 'what'. "Nature" is used for convenience as above.
Keeping these two passages in mind, a few conclusions may be drawn. Aristotle is using his categories to perform what modern philosophers would take to be two distinct functions, each of which is composed of two related functions. First he is using the categories to list the types of existents and the expressions which serve to indicate these types. Second he is using the categories to list the senses of \( \tau \alpha \delta \nu \) and, hence, the kinds of being that there are in the world. But while modern philosophers would consider these to be different functions, these two general functions are not different for Aristotle. This becomes evident upon an examination of Book H, Chapter 2 of the *Metaphysics*.

Early in this chapter Aristotle concerns himself with the different senses of 'is' (\( \varepsilon \varepsilon \zeta \zeta \)). Accordingly, some particular defined by its matter is a threshold "because it lies in such and such a position, and its being means its lying in that position . . . ." (M. H 2.1042b 25-26) In this passage the "nature" of a threshold defines the sense of \( \varepsilon \varepsilon \zeta \zeta \) used in stating this "nature." Later in this chapter, however, Aristotle seems to look at this differently; he defines a 'threshold' as "'wood or stone in such and such a position.'" (M. H 2. 1043a 7) Here, then, Aristotle is using the definition of a threshold to define, not the sense of \( \varepsilon \varepsilon \zeta \zeta \), the being of a threshold, but the sense of 'threshold'. Modern philosophers would regard Aristotle as having missed a distinction in such a treatment of the definition of 'threshold'. From their point of view Aristotle's reasoning seems to be circular. He seems to be saying that the definition of threshold defines the kind of being which that threshold has and in so doing defines 'threshold', while he also seems to be saying that a threshold is defined by using a certain sense of \( \varepsilon \varepsilon \zeta \zeta \). This shows that Aristotle does not distinguish the mode of being which a
thing has from its existence as a thing. However, Aristotle does not note any difference in the way in which he is using his definitory phrase. He passes without difficulty from using "wood in such and such a position" to give sense to ἐντὸς to using it to give sense to 'threshold'.

In summary, Aristotle's talk about the categories in different places suggests he is using the categories to perform two different functions. However, the ease with which he passes between them suggests that he probably did not recognize them as different. Thus Aristotle's categories represent the answers to what modern philosophers would consider to be two separate questions: "What is?" that is, what are the different types of existents? and "How is what is?" or what is the kind of being which each type of existent has?

But the categories do not represent Aristotle's only consideration of the senses of ἑστία. The categories are in fact only intended as a classification of the "essential" (нологικά) kinds of being or of the natures of the kinds of being that there are. But this is only one of the ways in which ἑστία is used. Aristotle provides two different lists in considering the various senses of this verb. The first of these classifications is a classification of the kinds of subject-predicate sentences and has already been discussed. The second classification is found in the Metaphysics (M. Δ7); here Aristotle considers four ways in which things may be said to be. This classification distinguishes "essential" (нологικά) being from the other senses of being.

In the first sense 'being' and 'is' mean that a statement is

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true." (M. Δ 7. 1017a 32) Accordingly, 'not being' means that a statement is false. Obviously Aristotle is here pointing to the 'is' of assertion or judgment. To use his example, to say "Socrates is musical" is to say that it is true that Socrates is musical. Hence, Aristotle regards statements about facts and statements asserting the truth of those facts as mutually entailing. (D.l. 9. 18a 40-b 4)¹

In the second sense 'ευκαλ' is used to indicate potentiality or actuality. This may be explained using Aristotle's example of the corn: 'we say of that which is not yet ripe that it is corn.' (M. Δ 7. 1017b 8) Aristotle's point is that something may be corn in either of two ways; it may be corn potentially in the case of the unripened ear, or it may actually be corn in the case of the fully ripened ear. Certainly of these two the first is the most difficult to understand. The point seems to be that the unripened ear is corn in its to-be-ness for it will be corn or it is striving to be corn. In this passage, however, Aristotle does admit that "when a thing is potential and when it is not yet potential must be explained elsewhere." (M. Δ 7. 1017b 9)

The other two senses of 'ευκαλ' contrast with one another and are presented in that way by Aristotle. A thing may be said to be either "in an accidental sense" (και ευκαλ) or "by their own nature" (και θε' αυτωκαλ). (M. Δ 7. 1017a 7-8) Aristotle considers accidental being first and considers three ways in which something is said to be in an accidental sense.

"Thus when one thing is said in an accidental sense to be another, this is either because both belong to the same thing, and this is, or because that to which the attribute belongs is, or because the subject which has as an attribute that of which it is itself predicated, itself is." (M. Δ 7. 1017a 20-23) ¹Bochenski, op. cit., p. 31.
Aristotle's example of the first case is, "he who is pale is musical." (M. Δ 7, 1017a 15) The pale is musical in an accidental sense because both the pale and the musical belong to the man who is. "The man is musical" (M. Δ 7, 1017a 14) is the example given of the second case; the point here is that musical is an accident of man since the musical belongs to man and man is. The final example is, "the musical is a man." (M. Δ 7, 1017a 16) In this sentence the musical is an accident of man because the subject, man, which is, is predicated of musical.

What is common to all of these cases is that some attribute belongs to a subject which is; all attributes depend for their being on the being of the subject. This, of course, leads to the fourth use of 'ἐν' in that the nature of any particular is given by stating the being of that particular καθ' αὑτάκι. This use of 'ἐν' serves to identify the particular or tell what it is. The subject of a predication is not, therefore, a Lockean "something I know not what," but a particular thing, a "nature"; it is correspondingly indicated by giving its genus and differentia. 'ἐν' is then used accidentally when it serves to state that some "nature" belongs to something which it is.

The subject of a sentence then serves to identify the "nature" and this "nature" is said to be something accidentally in that the such and such which it is said to be attaches to it. This example fits the second case only, but it can easily be extended to the other cases as well.¹

These considerations lead directly to Aristotle's fourth sense of 'ἐν', the sense in which things are said to be in virtue of their own natures (καθ' αὑτάκι). Aristotle explains this sense by saying

that it is the sense analyzed by the table of categories. It is this sense of the verb which gives the "nature" of each of these. Certainly there are problems in stating the conditions under which something is defined and is not having some accident predicated of it. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not discuss this question here. In this section of the Metaphysics he is content to say that things said to be in virtue of their own natures offer the being of the thing, while accidents have being only if that of which the accident is said to be is in virtue of its own nature.

Of course, even though the accidental and the "essential" use of a verb are exclusive, it does not follow that the first two senses are exclusive as well. Something may be said to be in virtue of its nature and this will be true, and the something will be either actually or potentially. Whether the accidental use of being includes a potential use is a more difficult question and need not be discussed here. The significant issue for present purposes is that Aristotle is using his table of categories to list the different ways in which some "thing" is in virtue of its own nature, and that a classification of the different senses of 'είναι' used in this way excludes an accidental use of the verb.

Given then that Aristotle is using 'είναι' in a variety of senses, which are classified by the table of categories, it can be seen that different ways of being are called by the same name. This introduces the doctrine of equivocation. Aristotle introduces this in the Categories. (C. 1. 1a 1-6) His point in that work is that two things may be called by the same name and have different definitions. His word for such things
is ὑμνύμα which is translated either as equivocal,\(^1\) homonymous,\(^2\) or ambiguous.\(^3\) It refers to the things which are called by the same name; it does not refer to the name which is used to refer to two or more differently defined things, although its use may be extended from things to words.\(^4\) Thus if Aristotle is to have different kinds of being he needs to employ some form of his doctrine of equivocity. This leads, once again, to the categories.

The particulars in the different categories are in different ways. Thus what is said to be illuminates the sense or way in which it is; qualities have being differently than substances. Red is, but it is not in the way in which man is; each has a different kind of being. As mentioned, Aristotle uses the definition of that which is (the existent) to give sense to the way in which it is. But Aristotle is also aware that each thing which is does not have its being in a different way from all other things. If this were the case, then 'εἶναι' would be used in an indefinitely large number of senses. In that case it would not have a definite meaning but an indefinite one. According to Aristotle, however, an indefinite meaning is no meaning at all, and Aristotle is certainly aware that 'εἶναι' has a meaning. (M. Γ 4. 1006\(^{a}\) 29-\(^{b}\)11) This being the case, the senses in which the word is used must be limited, and if this is the case, there must be a certain number of ways in which things are. This,

\(^1\)Aristotle, Categories 1. 1\(^{a}\) 1, trans. Harold P. Cooke.

\(^2\)Aristotle, Categories 1. 1\(^{a}\) 1, trans. J.L. Ackrill.

\(^3\)Owen, op. cit., p. 74.

\(^4\)Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (2nd ed. rev. Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951), p. 120.
of course, entails that there be a certain number of types of things. Aristotle's method for determining what these types of things are is hinted at in the Topics. (T. A 9. 103b 29-40) He seems to have arrived at this by noticing the ways in which the question, "What is this which is before me?" is answered. The different sorts of answers to this question provide the list of categories. The categories, among other things, then serve to limit the senses of 'εἴσοδος' and hence the kinds of being that compose the world.¹

But in limiting the senses of this crucial verb, the categories also limit its use in another way. Each thing which is, is an object of some sort, these sorts being classified by the categories. To say that "red is," for example, is to say that "red is a color of a certain intensity," where 'red' is understood to indicate some particular red.² Thus Aristotle is using 'εἴσοδος' as a set of predicates; each use of this verb involves an allocation to the categories. This makes his use of 'εἴσοδος' quite different from the use of 'to exist'. 'Existence' is simply not always a predicate and some philosophers have held that it is never a predicate. 'εἴσοδος', on the other hand, is always a predicate; Aristotle never uses is as "parasitic upon all predicates,"³ nor does he seem

¹Owen, op. cit., pp. 76-78.

²The relation between statements about particulars and statements about universals has been considered by Owen in "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology" as cited above. To say that "ice exists" is to say that this particular piece of ice is frozen water, and to say "ice is no longer frozen" is to deny it. With particulars this makes sense. But if this same paraphrasing of statements concerning universals is employed, the denial of a statement like "ice exists" becomes self-contradictory. Aristotle handles this by making universal statements depend on particular statements. Thus to say in general that "ice exists" is to say that there is at least one particular piece of frozen water. To deny this is to say that there is no such particular.

³Owen, op. cit., p. 84.
Aristotle's account of being is always an account of being such and such. This has important consequences for his *Metaphysics.*

Aristotle is intent upon establishing a science of being qua being (τὸ εἶναι ἑαυτῷ), while at the same time regarding a science of being as genus impossible. Aristotle was convinced that there was no such genus of being. And even when he starts considering his own science of being in Book Gamma of the *Metaphysics,* he does not make it a science of the genus of being, even though the science is itself generically one. (M. Γ 2. 1003b 22) Rather it is a science of being-ness (οὐσία) or substance.

Given Aristotle's use of 'εἰναι,' he quite properly rules out any consideration of a genus of being; there is simply not a kind of thing which all other things are. His argument against such a position has been succinctly stated by I.M. Bochenski as follows:

1. for all A: if A is a genus, there is a B which is its difference;
2. for all A and B: if B is the difference of A, then A is not the genus of B. Suppose now that there is an all-embracing genus V; then, for all A, V would be a genus of A [by definition]; but, as V is a genus, it must have some differences, say B [by (1)]; now V cannot be a genus of B [by (2)]; consequently V is not the all-embracing genus and we get a contradiction.3

1Of course, he does have a notion of existence included in his use of 'εἰναι.' Thus sometimes he uses εἰναι to mean existence, but he does not note that this is a different sort of use and would be able to explain such a use in some general way using his notion of being as a predicate. In this thesis when it is apparent that the use called for is a use of εἰναι signifying 'existence,' the word 'exist' will be used as meaning the same as that meant by the use of 'εἰναι' in question. Likewise, when it is clear that Aristotle is talking about things which exist, the word 'existent' will be used as has been the practice.


3Bochenski, op. cit., p. 34.
What this argument does, of course, is to reject a science of the generic sense of being when such a sense is only considered as a predicate. It does not harm a science of being which views being as non-predicative, although this was certainly not Aristotle's view.¹

His science of being cannot therefore be a science of the genus of being, and Aristotle is forced to give some explanation as to how it can be a science of a body of knowledge at all. This issue is focused on Aristotle's account of equivocation. According to Aristotle there are three kinds of equivocation. The first is of little philosophical importance.² This is accidental equivocation which is explained quite straightforwardly in the opening chapter of the Categories. (C. 1. 18 1-6) In this case two things are equivocal in that they have the same name but they are defined differently. Aristotle's example of it here is animal (ἰάλος); a picture of an animal is called 'animal' and a man or any other beast is called 'animal'. But the definition of a picture, even if that picture is of an animal, is not the same as the definition of a beast of some sort. It just so happens that they are called by the same name.

There are two other ways, however, in which things may be similarly expressed although they do not have the same definition; these two kinds of equivocation are of more philosophical importance. The first of these kinds of equivocation is analogy. Aristotle defines


²However, as G.E.L. Owen points out, Aristotle may have used this sort of notion in attacking the Platonists. Vide "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle," in Plato and Aristotle in the Mid Fourth Century (Goeteborg: Almquist and Wiksell, 1957), p. 174.
the analogous as follows:

... for proportion (αναλογία) is not a property of numerical quantity only, but of quantity in general, proportion (αναλογία) being equality of ratios, and involving four terms at least.

Thus the just involves four terms at least, and the ratio between the first pair of terms is the same as that between the second pair.

But Aristotle also uses analogy in other ways; for example, he considers it to play a role in metaphor:

Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy. ... That from analogy is possible whenever there are four terms so related that the second (B) is to the first (A), as the fourth (D) to the third (C).... (Po. 21, 1457b 7-18)

These two quotes show that Aristotle finds analogy to be used in different ways; they also show that Aristotle finds analogy to have four terms. These four terms serve to distinguish analogy from the last kind of equivocation, that by reference (πρός ἐν).

The kind of equivocation which Aristotle calls "by reference" (πρός ἐν) is integral to Aristotle's conception of a science of being. Things are equivocal in this way because they are said to be something because they are "related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and [each] is not said to 'be' by mere ambiguity." (M. Γ 2. 1003a 33-34) "Ambiguity" in the quote is the Greek word ἀμφώνομαι which is the word translated by 'equivocation' in the Categories. Aristotle's point in saying this is that things are sometimes called by the same name by accident as discussed above; but they may also be called by the same name because they are related to one central point. Some commentators have

1Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, E 3. 1131a 30-b4, trans. H.Rackham.
referred to this central point as the "focal meaning" of the term.\textsuperscript{1} This is perhaps slightly misleading since Aristotle is talking not so much about meaning as about the thing and not the meaning which is focal, or central. The phrase "focal meaning" does, however, imply that there is a central point which accounts for other things related to this point being called by the same name. Aristotle illustrates what he means by this in Book Gamma of the \textit{Metaphysics}:

> Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is capable of it. (M. Γ 2. 1003a 34-31)

Aristotle's point is this: Health is a balance of the hot and cold elements in the body. (P. H 7. 246b 5) But many things are called healthy and this is because they are all related to this balance of elements. But each is related in a different way, hence Aristotle's phrase 'central reference'. It is clear here that Aristotle is talking about things, but it is also clear that he is taking his evidence from the way in which things are spoken of. "Focal meaning" is then a description of what modern philosophers would take Aristotle to be doing. This use, however, is apt to suggest that Aristotle is only concerned with words and not things, but that is patently false.

Having given an example of the way in which all healthy things are related to health, Aristotle compares this to the way in which all things that are, are related to one central kind of being:

> So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but they all refer to one starting-point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or

\textsuperscript{1}G.E.L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 175.
destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of one of these things or of substance itself. (M. N 2. 1003b 6-10)

The starting-point to which Aristotle is here referring is, of course, substance (οὐδέν); this might literally be translated as being-ness although there are reasons why such a translation might be misleading, given the way in which Aristotle uses 'οὐδέν'. The literal translation, although it will not be used here, needs to be mentioned since it brings out the relation between 'ιδία' and 'οὐδέν' as a relation between a participle and the noun derived from the participle. This relation is not plain when given the English words 'being' and 'substance'. What Aristotle is literally saying, then, is that the starting point in virtue of which all beings are said to be is substance or being-ness.

The examples Aristotle gives in explaining how all senses of being refer to one starting point are of two kinds. Seen in one way, things in the examples may be said to be either actually or potentially. Seen in another way, some of the examples may be said to be because they are in one of the various categories; these things are said to be actually. The only things said to be potentially are substances. The contrast between these then comes in the category of substance. Otherwise, the examples are drawn from the various categories or things which would be in one of the various categories. This is the case with the last example, that of negation; Aristotle clearly points out that non-being is also classified by the categories. (M. N 2. 1089a 15-18) Thus the categories here function, as in other places, to classify the different kinds of things that are (i.e., the types of existents) and the different ways

1Owens, op. cit., pp. 139-140.
that they are (i.e., different modes of being which they have). Substance
is more complex than the other categories since things may be substance
either potentially or actually. But the other categories very straight-
forwardly classify what is. Aristotle's point, then, is that all things
which are in the categories, are because they refer to substance or depend
on substance. Having established that substance is that in virtue of
which other things are said to be, Aristotle is not able to assert that
his science of being will be a study of the causes and principles of sub-
stance. (M. Γ 2. 1003b 21-23) Thus it is only by using a notion of
equivocation that Aristotle is able to set his science of being on its
feet. Correspondingly, this sort of equivocation is of central impor-
tance in the categories.

The categories, therefore, occupy a key position in Aristotle's
metaphysics. In classifying the types of existents and their respective
modes of being, the categories allow Aristotle to treat '.ipvλ' as equiv-
ocal προς ύλ. Everything which is said to be is said to be by reference
to substance which is in the primary sense. This could perhaps be
expressed by saying that each of the other categories is a category of
the manifestations of substance. Thus, qualities are qualities of sub-
stances, being affected is being affected of substance, etc. Each of
these categories is composed of things each of which is said to be because
it has to do in some way with substance. But it is important to note that
in doing this Aristotle is doing neither linguistic nor non-linguistic
philosophy. Aristotle never considers a theory of meaning nor does he con-
sider that there is a philosophical problem here. Some modern commenta-
tors have said that Aristotle regards language as mirroring the world, but
Aristotle does not regard the world and language as two different things, and he never attempts to discover any relation between them. Rather, he seems to consider the word 'man' as part of that which it denotes or as a part of the definition of man. This does not mean, of course, that Aristotle is unaware of the difference between words and things. But it does mean that Aristotle regards the world as intelligible through the manner which men have of speaking of the world. He doesn't seem to consider language understood as about something as a different entity from that which it is about. This accounts for the way in which Aristotle shifts easily between linguistic considerations and non-linguistic or partially non-linguistic ones.

Read in this spirit Aristotle has importance for contemporary philosophy. Aristotle is not a naive realist reifying a set of objects which he is investigating, but rather a sophisticated thinker who is investigating what is to be understood as composing the world. Aristotle's thought now emerges less as an account of the essence of things which a bad historical tradition has encouraged us to find than as a way of understanding what it is for men to be in the world and what men understand that world to be. Viewed in this light Aristotle is of contemporary significance.

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1 Ibid., pp. 129-131.
CHAPTER III

THE PRIORITY OF SUBSTANCE

Aristotle's doctrine of the categories is, consequently, the foundation of his science of being qua being. It enables him to assert that substance is in the primary sense and is the central reference for all other kinds of being. Thus his science of being qua being is not a study of a generic sense of being. However, if he is to have a metaphysics focused on the being of substance, it is essential that substance in some sense be prior. There must be an asymmetrical dependence between substance and the other categories. Thus an account of Aristotle's science of being qua being must account for the manner in which substance is prior and also account for the dependence of the other categories upon substance. The purpose of this chapter is to show how Aristotle handles the priority of substance. This is conceived as a preliminary to the manner in which he handles the dependence of the other categories upon substance using the relation of inherence. As Aristotle only discusses the inherence condition specifically in the categories, an account of substance which is preliminary to an account of inherence must also relate Aristotle's discussions of substance in the Categories and in the Metaphysics, where Aristotle introduces his science of being qua being.

To facilitate the discussion of substance in the present chapter, the following distinction can be made. An event may be spoken of as either recurrable or nonrecurrable depending on the criteria used to identify that
event. If the criteria used to identify the event are the comparative relations, similarity and difference, then the same event may occur many times since it will be the same type of event. On the other hand, if the criteria are the relations of similarity and difference used in the context of space and time, then different events can occur only once. For example, a billiard ball may strike another billiard ball many times; i.e., the event which is the same in terms of the comparative relations may occur many times, but a particular case of one billiard ball striking another billiard ball, the red ball striking the white ball on a particular table at a particular time, can occur only once. To say that a non-substance is nonrecurrable is, then, to say that it is in a particular place during a particular time and that even if it is of, say, a quality, the same kind as another quality which is in a different place, it may be distinguished from that quality by its spatial and temporal place.

This distinction will be useful in giving an account of primary substance, since Aristotle views primary substance (as that term is used in the Categories) as something which is because it is changeable. This view is articulated in the Physics where Aristotle's purpose is to discuss nature (φύσις). Nature may be understood in three ways in light of the distinctions which Aristotle makes in Book B of the Physics. Here Aristotle distinguishes three different senses in which nature may be taken. In the first sense nature is "the immediate substratum of things which have in themselves a principle of motion or change." (P. B 1. 193a 28-29) Alternatively nature may be understood as "the shape or form which is specified in the definition of the thing," (P. B 1. 193a 30-31) or it may be understood as that which is "exhibited in the process of growth by which its nature is attained." (P. B 1. 193b 13-14) But while
nature may be understood in these three senses, it is the job of the physicist to be concerned with nature in only one way. "The physicist is concerned only with things whose forms are separable (χωριστον), indeed, but do not exist apart from matter." (P. B 2. 194b 13-14) In terms of the three senses of nature, the physicist is then concerned with the first and third senses primarily and with the second sense only as it is a requisite for understanding either of the other two senses. For in the second sense of nature, nature as form, nature is conceptually separable since the form is conceptually separable from matter. The physicist, then, is concerned with change since both of the other two senses of nature have to do with change, the first with motion and change, the third with growth. Matter, of course, is something which Aristotle uses to account for change by making the matter the potential while the form is the actual. (D.A. B 1. 412a 10) So in saying that the physicist's subject matter is the form as not conceptually separated from the matter, Aristotle is in effect saying that the physicist studies things as changing and these things are concrete individuals composed of both form and matter. This serves to mark physics off from first philosophy which studies the being and essence of the conceptually separable form. (P. B 2. 194b 14-15)

In the Categories Aristotle is also concerned with the concrete individual which he there refers to as the primary substance. (C. 5. 2a 11) It is this same concrete individual with which Aristotle is concerned in the Physics although he does not analyze it as primary substance, but rather as form and not separable from its matter. Hence in both the Physics and the Categories Aristotle is concerned with the concrete individual,

1 Cornford translates χωριστον here as "conceptually separable" in Physics, A 2. 194b 14. Trans. Cornford, infra, pp. 32-33n.
although his account of it in the Physics is more complete than that given in the Categories. Extrapolating from the Physics to the Categories, then, it would seem that Aristotle is concerned in the Categories with the concrete individual which he understands as being a part of a changing order of nature, and a part of that order as changeable. As a part of this order, the primary substance is something which is identified in terms of the spatial and temporal framework of ordinary experience, and which is then a factor in the occurring of nature.

If primary substance is to be understood, however, it must not be merely understood as something which is nonrecurrable; were this the case, the world would be filled with individuals and there would be no knowledge. So in order to have knowledge Aristotle also needs to have something which may hold true of many things; he needs a universal, or something which occurs but which is recurrable. He also must have this universal as something present in the individual rather than separate from it as he takes Plato to have argued. His approach to this question, accordingly, is a criticism of Plato.

It is from this perspective, that the thing must be the same as its essence, that Aristotle attacks Plato. The view which he attributes to Plato is the view that a thing is not the same as its essence, and it is the same as what it is only because it participates in the form of what it is. Aristotle's argument then runs as follows. The initial assumption of Aristotle's argument is that the law of the Excluded Middle applies to the question with which he is dealing. Thus it is either true or it is false that a thing is the same as its essence. Initially Aristotle makes what he considers to be the Platonic assumption and assumes that a thing is not the same as its essence. This assumption in effect
says that there are things prior to individual substances; the things Aristotle has in mind here are, of course, the Platonic Forms or what he takes these forms to be. Now if the Forms are prior, then they will either be severed from their essences or they will not. (By severed from their essences Aristotle means that the Forms will not be self-predicating.) If the Forms are not severed from essences, then the difficulty known as the Third Man Argument follows immediately; Aristotle has discussed this elsewhere and does not bring it up here.\(^1\) Attacking the other horn of the dilemma, Aristotle proceeds to consider the consequences of having the thing and its essence severed. According to him, the principal difficulties with this position are the following: (1) It will not be possible to have knowledge of individuals, and (2) the Forms will have no being. Aristotle then gives the following reasons for holding these positions. Knowledge is of the essence, so if the Form is severed from its essence there can be no knowledge of the Form. Aristotle also states that the Forms are in all cases severed from their essences. This being the case, it must be true of the Form of being. But if it is true, being will not be. According to Aristotle, it is also the case that the Forms all have being or they do not. (Modern philosophers would say that the Forms have the same ontological status.) Hence, if it can be shown that one Form does not have being, then no Form has being. Thus the Form which accounts for being in particulars will itself not be, and hence the cause of being is not a cause of being. These two possible cases in which a thing is not the same as its essence thus both lead to difficulties. In the second case, in which a thing is severed from its essence, the difficulty is a

\(^1\)Cf. M. A 9. 990b 17-991a 8.
contradiction. To say that a thing is not the same as its essence then leads to either a contradiction or a failure to explain what it purported to explain. Aristotle rejects both of these alternatives and concludes that a thing is the same as its essence. (M. Z 6. 1031a 18-b28)

Having established that a thing is the same as its essence, Aristotle continues in Book Z of the *Metaphysics* to investigate the nature of essences. He concludes that the essence of something, its τὸ πνεύμα τοῦ ἐννυμάτου, is the form and that the form which is the substance of a thing is the cause of its being. (M. Z 17. 1041a 7-b 33) Thus the being of the form, which is the substance, is the primary kind of being, and it is this which the science of being qua being must study. Consequently, a house is a house and not bricks and stones, because the matter is actualized by the form. (M. Z 17. 1041a 10) Thus the form constitutes the determinateness of the particular, and it is the form which is the same as what a thing is. Having established this, however, Aristotle is in difficulties. Each thing is the same as what it is, but there are many things; for example, there are many dogs. Thus Aristotle seems to be in the position of saying that the same thing is in many places at the same time. He is, however, determined to make sense of his position and to do so he introduces his notion of matter.

When Aristotle says that two men are the same, like Callias and Socrates, they are the same insofar as they are both men, but they are different insofar as they have different matter. (M. Z 8. 1034a 7-10) The scheme Aristotle is setting up is then one of the following sort. It is the form which provides for the determinateness of the particular, and the particular is the same as its essence. Thus Socrates is a man and Callias is a man and since they are both men they are the same, both being
identical to the same thing. However, if they are the same, there are not two particulars, Socrates and Callias, but there is only one thing, the form of man. On the other hand, both Socrates and Callias are material things, and as material they are two and not one. Matter gives Aristotle a principle of individuation. In this way Aristotle avoids what he considers to be the Platonic problem, that of the "self-subsistent Forms."

Of course, Aristotle's account is sensible only if he has an account of the three forms of substance. Substance may be either form or matter or a combination of the two which is the concrete individual. (M. H 1. 1042a 25-33) In the Categories and in the Physics Aristotle's discussions of substance are discussions of the concrete individual, while in the Metaphysics Aristotle's discussions of substance are primarily discussions of form. But he seldom discusses matter; this is due to his view that "matter is unknowable in itself." (M. Z 10. 1036a 9) Usually Aristotle's discussions of matter or remarks on matter are parts of larger discussions of change. Change, then, is crucial in some respect to Aristotle's account of matter and, hence, crucial for his account of substance.

When Aristotle discusses change, he explains change in terms of contraries; for example, the white changes to the non-white. (P. A 5. 188b 22-26) Such coming-to-be also always involves some substratum. (P. A 7. 190a 33-b 4) Substratum, of course, is also something which can be understood in more than one sense; it may be either the form, the matter, or the concrete individual. (M. Z 3. 1028b 33- 1029a 5) But in the discussions of change it is apparent that the sense of substratum with which Aristotle is concerned is matter, for it is the matter that gives the
thing a capability to be or to not be and, hence, to change. (M. Z 7. 1032a 15-26) Thus in discussing change Aristotle brings in matter, although strictly speaking it is the potential which is, in a sense, the matter which Aristotle uses to account for change.

From this it can be concluded that Aristotle gives his account of matter in terms of change; change itself he accounts for with a notion of potentiality which is, in a sense, the matter. Since matter is unknowable in itself, it follows that to talk about matter is to talk about some formed thing as material. This, in effect, is to talk about a concrete individual as changeable. Thus, when Aristotle talks about matter in the Metaphysics he talks of it in terms of the matter for something else; i.e., he talks about it as changeable.1 Of course, this is only one sense of matter. Aristotle talks of matter in other ways, for example, as intelligible rather than perceptible, and this probably does not imply change. (M. Z 10. 1036a 10) The important point, then, is that Aristotle accounts for change using a notion of matter as potential. This is probably the primary sense of matter; at any rate, it is the one crucial for this discussion since Aristotle can talk about matter in connection with experience only by talking about things as material and these are things which are changeable.

This account of matter, in turn, throws light on what Aristotle means when he says that things are individuated by their matter. This is in keeping with his account of essences in which he puts forward the view that a thing is one as what it is, but many as material. For according to Aristotle a substance, be it form or concrete thing, is a substance

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1E.g., M. 7. 1049a 21-23.
because it conforms to the two criteria Aristotle sets forth for substance: separability (\(\chi \nu \rho \iota \varepsilon \tau \varepsilon \nu \)\(^1\)) and thisness. (M. Z 3. 1029\(^a\) 28-29) But the criterion of separability is equivocal. Thus with respect to form, one form is conceptually separable from another form if it can be distinguished from that other form by means of the comparative relations of similarity and difference. On the other hand, with respect to substance as the concrete thing composed of both form and matter, one thing is separable from another if it is related to the other thing by the relations of similarity and difference and is separable spatially. To be separable spatially is, of course, to be an object in experience—a perceptible substance, and this for Aristotle means to be changeable.

Summing this up, it may be said that Aristotle is advocating a view in which substance may be seen in two ways. Seen in one way, a thing is what it is as a particular because of the form. In this case two individuals are the same if they have the same form and are, therefore, not two but one. Particularity is then accounted for by the ways in which forms are different from and similar to other forms. Looking at substance in the other way, two individuals which have the same form are two and not one insofar as they have different matter; that is, because they are perceptibles which are therefore changeable. They are individuated in that they are spatially separable from one another.

Such is Aristotle's account of substance. It is this account of substance which forms the core of Aristotle's science of being qua being.

\(^1\)\(\chi \nu \rho \iota \varepsilon \tau \varepsilon \nu \) has two distinct senses: it may mean either 'spatially apart' or it may mean 'distinct' or 'of a different type.' Aristotle uses \(\chi \nu \rho \iota \varepsilon \tau \varepsilon \nu \) in both of these senses. The first sense will be here indicated as 'separability', while the second will be indicated as 'conceptual separability'. This distinction will also be kept when the concept indicated by \(\chi \nu \rho \iota \varepsilon \tau \varepsilon \nu \) is not introduced using a noun.
But, of course, if it is to form the core, then there must be an asymmetrical dependence relation between the category of the substance and the other categories. In other words, substance must be prior in some sense. To determine the way in which substance is prior, Aristotle's major discussions of priority will now be considered.

The most complete discussion of priority and posteriority is found in Book A of the *Metaphysics*. Aristotle is careful to point out initially that prior and posterior are contrasting notions; that is, something is called prior with respect to something which is posterior. Aristotle then proceeds to outline the four major senses of prior; there is no inclusive generic sense of prior. In the first sense something is prior in that it is nearer to some beginning. It is a generic sense with respect to the species senses under it. In the first species sense, the beginning from which priority is determined may either be a place fixed by nature or it may be a chance object. Aristotle provides no examples for this sort of priority, but he might have suggested that Piraeus is prior to Thebes in that it is nearer to a certain place, say Athens. Another species of priority which Aristotle mentions is temporal priority; that is, nearness to a fixed beginning is temporal nearness. In this type of priority that which is prior may either be that which is nearest to the present or it may be that which is farthest from the present. Thus in one sense the Trojan war is prior to the Persian, if priority is measured in terms of that which is further from the present and in another sense the Persian war is prior to the Trojan war since it is nearer to the present. In a further species sense something

\[1\] M. Δ 11. 1018b 8-1019a 14.
may also be prior in movement, making that which is nearer the first mover prior with the prime mover being absolutely prior. In another species sense priority is determined by power. Modern philosophers might express this sense by saying that there is a causal priority, in which the effect is posterior to the cause. In the final species sense priority in terms of nearness to some beginning may also be determined by arrangement. For example, in an orchestra the first violin is prior to the second violin, since the second violin is second because there is a first violin which is arranged ahead of the second violin. These are the species senses which fall under the generic sense in which something may be prior by being nearer to some beginning.

The second sense of priority which Aristotle discusses is priority of knowledge. Things which are prior in knowledge are prior in definition, definition being of the universal. Having said this, Aristotle follows with what seems to be a rather puzzling statement: that in definition the accidental is prior to the whole. The puzzle is that Aristotle would talk about definition as having a priority not co-extensive with the priority of substance. The substance of a thing as its form is the essence of the thing and it is this which is the definition in words. Now, however, Aristotle wants to talk as though the definition is not the essence of substance in words. This would make musical prior to musical man, although Aristotle also recognizes that man is prior to musical in terms of the fourth sense of prior. Here, however, Aristotle is using 'definition' in a way different from the way he often uses it; here he is talking of defining an accidental or actual

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unity as opposed to an essential (και δὲ ὁ ὀρθός) unity. This justifies the statement he makes in formulating this distinction in another place: that priority in definition and priority in substance are not co-extensive. For in the primary sense of definition only substance can be defined. Thus Aristotle's claim that the priority of definition and the priority of substance are not co-extensive is to be understood in terms of a more general sense of 'definition' than that used in Book Z of the Metaphysics (M. Z 5. 1031a 1), a sense in which accidental unities are also definable. It does not then vitiate the claim that this essence is the definition in words (the primary sense of definition in Book Z) and that, hence, the priority in definition is also a priority in the world.

The third sense of prior is the priority of attributes of prior things. Aristotle takes as his example of this sort of priority the priority of the straight over the smooth. Straightness is an attribute of line while smoothness is an attribute of surfaces; straightness is prior in this sense to smoothness because the line is prior to the surface. The line is prior to the surface in the fourth sense of priority also in that the line is the limit of the surface.  

The crucial sense of priority is the fourth sense in which things are prior in terms of substance; that is, substances can "be" without other things "being", but those other things cannot "be" without substance. Modern philosophers would express this by saying that substance alone is capable of independent existence, while non-substances depend on substance for their existence. Aristotle also notes that priority in

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this sense is primary; it is this kind of priority which is the central reference for the other senses of priority. While discussing this sense of priority, Aristotle additionally observes that the parts are potentially prior to the whole although they are posterior in actuality. Actuality, of course, is prior to potentiality. (Μ. B 8. 1049b 4-5) These then are the main senses of priority, the priority of substance being the crucial one.

It is this sense of priority which is crucial in Book Z of the Metaphysics as well. Aristotle states that substance is prior in three ways when he begins his search for substance. Substance is prior in time, prior in definition, and prior in knowledge. The explanation Aristotle gives of "priority in time," is that substance alone is capable of independent "being," while other things depend on substance for their being. This sense of prior (capable of independent being) is then the crucial fourth sense of prior mentioned in Metaphysics Book A, Chapter 11. Substance is also prior in definition since the definition of anything is either a definition of substance or the definition of a thing which depends on substance for its being, in which case it is defined with reference to substance. This sense of priority presupposes that substance is prior in its capacity for independent being, and hence priority in definition depends on priority in time. In the third sense Aristotle holds that substance is prior in order of

\[1\] M. Z 1. 1028a 31-b 1.

\[2\] That Aristotle should consider the primary sense of priority to be priority in time seems strange. It suggests that perhaps he is thinking of the priority of the prime mover, although he gives no hint as to the connection which he has in mind between priority in time and the priority of substance.
knowledge. This is because something is known when it is known what it is, and this means when its "nature" which is its substance is known. Substance again is understood as prior in time. Here in the Metaphysics, then, Aristotle also asserts that the crucial sense of priority is that sense of priority which substance has as an independent being, although he recognizes that substance is prior in other ways as well.

Aristotle makes a similar claim in the Categories, although in the Categories he does not mention this claim in connection with the priority of substance nor when he discusses priority does he indicate that anything is prior in the sense in which he takes substance to be prior in the Metaphysics. He merely asserts that if primary substances were not, then nothing else could have being either. (C. 5. 2a 33-b 7)

Given these various discussions of priority, it is now apparent that substance is prior because it alone is capable of independent being. Other senses of priority depend on this sense. Of course, this is not a simple ontological priority as some might be tempted to believe. For since the world is intelligible when taken up in language, it follows that the priority in definition depends on the priority in being and vice versa. Thus Aristotle does not distinguish epistemological and ontological inquiries in the way in which modern philosophers might want to distinguish them.

Given this, it remains to ask why Aristotle should hold that substance is prior insofar as it is capable of independent being. Of course, he does need substance to be prior in some sense if he is to

1C. 12. 14a 26-b 23.
have a science of being qua being,\(^1\) but it would not have to be prior in exactly this sense. To show how it functions in Aristotle’s philosophy, it will be necessary to return to a consideration of substance.

Aristotle identifies primary substance in different ways in some of his different works. In the *Categories* the primary substance is clearly the concrete individual, while in the *Metaphysics* it is clearly the form. Many scholars have advanced interpretations of Aristotle which indicate why this is so;\(^2\) most of these interpretations, however, depend on the chronology of Aristotle’s writings, a subject fraught with much debate.\(^3\) Without going into these scholarly explanations, it may be safely said that the doctrine which Aristotle advances in the *Categories* is only a part of the fuller account which he advances in the *Metaphysics*. However, this fact in itself does not prevent a discussion of what Aristotle is doing in the *Categories* in light of what he is doing in the *Metaphysics*. If sense is to be made of Aristotle’s account of substance, then it must be made by considering parts of that doctrine in light of the whole, fully developed form of the doctrine. Thus the account of inherence will be taken up in light of what Aristotle does in the *Metaphysics* with substance.

As mentioned earlier,\(^4\) Aristotle’s account of substance is an

\(^1\)Supra, pp. 21-23.

\(^2\)For a clear statement of one view consult Chung-Hwan Chen, *op. cit.*., and "Aristotle’s *Categoriae* as the Link Between the Socratic-Platonic Dialectic and His Own Theory of Substance in Books Z and H of the *Metaphysics*," *Atti del XII Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia*, IX, 1960, pp. 35-40.

\(^3\)Cf. Owens, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-106.

\(^4\)Supra, pp. 25-33.
attempt to overcome what he considers to be the Platonic problem, the view that a thing is separated from its essence. In doing this he states that a thing is the same as its essence and that the particularity of the natural kinds is accounted for by form. His two criteria for something being a substance are separability and thisness. He needs these criteria in order for knowledge to be possible as shown in the eighth aporia. (M. B 4. 999a 24-b 25) In that aporia he states that for knowledge to be possible the things known must have unity, identity, and must have at least one universal attribute. Thus when in the Metaphysics Aristotle sets up his criteria for substance, it conforms to the conditions set forth in this aporia. What he called identity he refers to in Book Z as thisness, the having of a determinate character. And a thing is separable, conceptually or spatially, only if it is one thing; this gives the unity to a thing. Aristotle than handles the universality by making his criterion of separability an equivocal one. Seen in one way, things are conceptually separable if they are similar and different (this provides for the particularity) and seen in another way, they are spatially separable given that they are determinate (this accounts for the individuation of particulars). The relational framework makes the distinction between the doctrines of substance in the Metaphysics and in the Categories possible. In the Categories Aristotle is considering only one kind of separability as a criterion for substance, while in the Metaphysics he is considering the criterion to be an equivocal one. Seen in this way, his doctrine in the Categories is an integral part of his doctrine in the Metaphysics, or it is at least an anticipation of that doctrine.
CHAPTER IV

ARISTOTLE'S DOCTRINE OF INHERENCE

In asserting that the category of substance is prior (in the primary sense) in being capable of independent being, Aristotle is correlative to asserting that non-substance categories must be posterior in being capable of independent being. Thus non-substance categories depend on the category of substance for their being. Aristotle's most explicit treatment of the dependency of non-substance categories upon the category of substance is found in the Categories where he attempts to account for this dependence with his notion of inherence. The locus of these discussions is Chapter 2, although Aristotle mentions this doctrine in other places as well.\(^1\) His move is an attempt to assert the priority of the being of substance (hence the category of substance) by arguing that individuals in non-substance categories depend for their being on individuals in the category of substance.

In Chapter 2 Aristotle is concerned with two sets of distinctions, the first of which is the distinction between forms of speech which are combined and forms of speech which are uncombined.\(^2\) The second distinction is between things which are 'said of' a subject and things

\(^1\)G.E.L. Owen in "Inherence," Phronesis, X (January, 1965), p. 97, gives the following locations for Aristotle's discussion of the inherence-'said of' distinction: Categories 1\(^a\) 20-29, 2\(^a\) 11-14, 2\(^a\) 27-26, 2\(^b\) 15-17, 3\(^a\) 7-32, 3\(^b\) 22-24, 11\(^b\) 38-123, 17, 14\(^a\) 16-18; Topics 127\(^b\) 1-4.

\(^2\)Supra, pp. 6-7.
which are 'in' a subject. By considering this distinction Aristotle is able to divide "the things there are" (C. 2. 1a 20) into four different groups, and it is in the course of making this division that Aristotle gives a succinct statement of the conditions under which something may be said to be 'in' a subject. (C. 2. 1a 22-24) "By 'in a subject' I mean what is in something not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in."¹

Proceeding, then, to the first group, it is apparent that Aristotle has in mind things which are 'said of' more than one subject. In this group fall those things which are 'said of' a subject but which are never 'in' a subject; e.g., Aristotle states that man is 'said of' the individual man but is never 'in' an individual man. The second group is composed of things which are never 'said of' a subject but which are 'in' a subject. In this group Aristotle places such things as "the individual knowledge of grammar" and "the individual whiteness."² In the third group are things which may be both 'said of' a subject and 'in' a subject, such as knowledge of grammar. Finally, the fourth group consists of things which are neither 'said of' any subject nor 'in' any subject. The individual man and the individual horse serve as Aristotle's examples for this group. This, then is the context in which Aristotle distinguishes the inherence relation from the 'said of' relation.

But this distinction must also be understood in light of the first distinction made in Chapter 2, the distinction between combined and uncombined forms of speech. As mentioned earlier, the combined

²Ibid., 2. 1b 25-28.
distinction serves to mark off those forms of speech which name things that are without defining those things. But in dividing forms of speech into these two groups, Aristotle is also aware that the name of some thing may be the name of either an individual or the name of a group or species. Accordingly, Aristotle follows his distinction between combined and uncombined forms of speech with a distinction between individuals and their species and genera, both in the category of substance and in the other categories as well. He does this by introducing both the relation of inherence and the relation in which something may be 'said of' a subject. Thus in noting the ways in which names of things may be the names of either individuals or names of their species and genera, Aristotle is also marking out the relations which hold between the things which are.

However, there is also one other relation which is crucial for Aristotle's purposes which he discusses in the Categories; this is the relation of predication. This relation is also contrasted with inher­ence as discussed below. But in order to understand what Aristotle is doing in the Categories it is necessary to distinguish between the relations indicated by 'said of' and 'predicated', both of which are, at one time or another, contrasted with the relation of inherence. To clearly mark out the relation of inherence, it will be useful to say a few words to distinguish the relation of predication from the 'said of' relation. This will also enable the relation of inherence to be distinguished from the 'said of' relation.

According to Ackrill, the 'said of' relation is a relation between individuals in a category and their species and genera.¹ Aristotle also

¹Ackrill, op. cit., p. 75.
makes it plain that what is 'said of' that which is predicated of a sub-
ject may also be 'said of' that subject. (C. 3. 1b 10-11) For example,
if rational animal is predicated of Socrates as in the sentence, "Socrates
is [a] rational animal" and man is 'said of' rational animal as in the
sentence,"[A] rational animal is [a] man" then it follows that man may
be 'said of' Socrates. This, of course, only holds for a specific sense
of predication. It does not hold in a case in which, say, Socrates is
said to be white and white is said to be a color. If this relation did
hold in such a case, then it would be correct to say that Socrates is a
color. The relation which Aristotle has in mind, then, as relating the
'said of' relation to predication holds only for some special sense of
predication. As argued below, this special sense of predication is the
predication of definition as opposed to the predication of the name.

Aristotle hints at different senses of predication in Chapter 5
of the Categories. (C. 5. 2a 19-26) Here Aristotle states that if some-
thing is 'said of' something else, then the name and definition of what
was 'said of' the subject must also be predicatable of the subject. On
Ackrill's account this is sensible, for if the genus or species is 'said
of' an individual then it would follow that both the name and the de-
finite of the species or genus in question is predicated of the individual.
The fact that Classical Greek has no indefinite article throws further
light on what Aristotle sought in talking about predication of names and
predication of definitions. Without the indefinite article, sentences

1 It also serves to indicate why some of the other schools of
Greek philosophy had some of the difficulties which they had. The lack
of this part of speech accompanied by the consequent failure to distin-
guish the 'is' of predication from the 'is' of identity may have accounted
for some of the difficulties of Megarians as mentioned in Metaphysics, H.
Press, 1924), p. 244.
such as "Socrates is [a] man" and "Socrates is white" have the same surface grammar, although the 'is' in each sentence functions differently. The distinction between these two uses of 'is' seems to be what Aristotle is concerned with in discussing the predication of the name and the predication of the definition.

Usually, however, when Aristotle talks about predication in the *Categories* he is talking about the predication of the definition. Thus when he speaks of distinguishing predication from inherence (being predicated of a subject as opposed to being 'in' a subject), he states that the name of the inherent may be predicated but that the definition of the inherent cannot be predicated, this being the quality which distinguishes being predicated of a subject from being 'in' a subject. (C. 5. 2a 26-33) He must also be referring to the predication of the definition when he discusses the relations which hold between the 'said of' relation and predication. His account of this relation simply does not fit if he is referring to the predication of the name.

Predication, then, seems to be a relation which is understood primarily in terms of the predication of the definition although it may also be the predication of the name and perhaps other sorts of predication as well. Aristotle probably regarded predication as a relation which held some form between the noun phrase and the verb phrase of sentences when these phrases are joined by some form of 'εἶναι' and also between the things spoken of in such sentences. Given this, the 'said of' relation becomes a special case of the relation of predication. The 'said of' relation holds between the individual and its species or genus. The predication of definition is then a more explicit form of the 'said
of relation, the definition being the what-is of the particular. The 'said of' relation is then a partial definition which holds between a species or a genus and an individual which falls under the species or genus but which does not give a complete identification of the particular, as does a definition. The predication of a name then becomes the relation which holds between a subject and anything which it is said to be. And this relation seems to then be merely a relation which holds between parts of speech; in terms of the things which are spoken about, the predication of a name sometimes indicates one relation (e.g., inherence), sometimes another (e.g., the 'said of' relation).

The difficulties of making sense of what Aristotle is doing here are enormous. If Aristotle's account is approached from a position which considers subsequent philosophical developments, he seems to be suggesting that the generic sense of predication is the relation which holds between the subject and the predicate of subject-predicate sentences. Modern philosophers would consider this to be a distinctively linguistic relation. But the species senses of this at least include the predication of the definition and the predication of the name. The predication of the name again seems to be a distinctively linguistic relation. However, when Aristotle talks about the predication of the definition, the relation to which he is referring does not seem to be distinctly linguistic. Modern philosophers would again say that such a relation was ontological. But the fact that Aristotle does not distinguish the ontological and the linguistic enable him to treat predication of the definition and predication of the name as species senses under a generic sense of

\(^1\) Supra, pp. 6-7.
Having now distinguished predication from the 'said of' relation, it will be possible to explain the way in which Aristotle sets predication in opposition to inherence. Aristotle explicitly states that primary substances are the entities which underlie all other things, and that all of these other things are either predicated of or inherent in primary substance. Further, it is because the primary substances are subjects for all the other things and all other things are predicated of them or 'in' them, that they are called substances most of all.

Aristotle makes it plain that the 'or' in the above quotation is an exclusive one. The definition of an inherent is never predicatable of the subject which the inherent is 'in'. The 'said of' relation is a relation between the genus and species and the individual which falls under them. Prime examples of genera and species are found in the category of substance where they are called secondary substance. And Aristotle makes explicit the fact that a secondary substance can never be 'in' a subject. Aristotle does not mention whether the species and genera in non-substance categories may be both 'said of' and 'in', but his treatment of primary substances indicates that he would not regard them as being 'in' that which they are 'said of'. This does not, of course, mean that a species or genus in a non-substance category can be both 'in' a subject and 'said of' a subject. It does mean that a species or genus can be 'said of' one subject and 'in' another. This


2Since Aristotle views the 'said of' relation as a special case of the relation of predication, it is a corollary of this that all things other than primary substance are either 'said of' primary substance or 'in' primary substance. (C. 5. 2a 33-34)
passage then shows that Aristotle conceived inherence and predication as opposites or contraries given that they both depend in some way on primary substance.

The contrariety which Aristotle here has in mind is the contrariety between inherence and the species sense of predication which has been referred to as the predication of the definition. It could not be the predication of the name which he has in mind since the name of an inherent may be predicated of a subject. The definition of white cannot be predicated of Socrates, for example, although the name certainly can be, since it is true to say that Socrates is white. This condition also serves to distinguish the relation of inherence from the 'said of' relation, for the definition of that which is 'said of' a subject is always predicable of the subject. Thus the definition of the genus or species of the subject is always predicable of the subject, the genus and species being those things which may be 'said of' a subject. This is as expected since the 'said of' relation is merely a special case of the predication of the definition.

Having then subsumed the 'said of' relation under the predication relation, the marks used to distinguish inherence from the 'said of' relation also serve to distinguish it from predication. The following two conditions distinguish inherence from the 'said of' relation. What inheres in something is (1) not in it as a part nor (2) is it separable from that in which it inheres. In terms of (1) that which is 'said of' an individual, namely its genus or species, is a part of the thing for it is a part of the definition of that thing, the definition being the essence in words.¹ Parts of the formula, for Aristotle, stand in the

¹Chung-Hwan Chen, Phronesis 11, p. 56.
same relation to the formula as the parts of the thing do to the thing. (M. Z. 10. 1034b 20-23) By saying this Aristotle seems to be saying that a part of the definition constitutes a thing. Aristotle does not deal at length with relations and does not talk about "whole/part" relations of which this seems to be one. Condition (1) serves to distinguish inherence from the 'said of' relation, since what is 'in' something is not a part while that which is 'said of' something is a part. In terms of (2) the secondary substance, 'man' can be 'said of' many men, and it is separable from any given individual man. Inherence is different from the 'said of' relation and this difference is marked off by these two conditions.

Since the 'said of' relation is merely a special case of the predication of the definition, the conditions (1) and (2) above also serve to distinguish inherence and predication (as a definition). For while that which is 'said of' an individual is a part of it, that which is predicated as a definition of it is what it is and serves to identify it. What is predicated (as a definition) of a thing is what that thing is. Thus, what the thing is and the thing are one and the same; e.g., Socrates is the same as a rational animal since that is what he is. Consequently, there is no relation which holds between the thing and what is predicated (as a definition) of it, while that which inheres in a thing is related to it, but the relation is not a whole/part relation since the inherent is not a part of that in which it inheres. Accordingly, that fact that conditions (1) and (2) characterize inherence as a relation also serves to distinguish it from predication, since predication is not a relation.

The opposition of predication and inherence then is intelligible
in terms of identity. That which is predicated of the thing is what that thing is and is identical to it. On the other hand, that which inheres is related to a particular and is not identical with that particular. Aristotle illustrates this difference by saying that although it might be true to say that a man is blind, it would never be true to say that a man is what blindness is. (C. 10. 12a 35-41)

In the predication of the definition the verb 'is' is always used essentially and, consequently, the subject and the predicate are always in the same category. In the relation of inherence, however, the verb 'is' is never used essentially and the subject and the predicate are not necessarily in the same category. It remains to be shown under what conditions something does inhere in another thing. To do this a preliminary look at Ackrill's account of the conditions under which something may be said to inhere will be useful.  

The second of the conditions set forth by Ackrill is the most straightforward and can be discussed first; the first condition will be discussed last since it depends on the third. Ackrill's second condition is that stated by Aristotle as "by being present in something not as a part." This condition not only serves to mark off the relation of inherence from the 'said of' relation and predication, but it also marks off inherents from parts of the material of which the concrete thing is made. (M. Z 10. 1035b 18-23) This condition then serves to exclude certain other things from the group of inherents. Its function is clear, and hence, what Aristotle is saying is clear given the difficulty of the relation of the whole/part relation.

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1 Infra, pp. 60-63.
Ackrill's third condition, however, is less clear. Aristotle states this by saying that what is 'in' a subject "cannot exist separately from what it is 'in'."\(^1\) Ackrill states this as "A is inseparable from B."\(^2\) The obvious question, of course, is "In what way is it that the inherent is inseparable from that which it is 'in'?" This question may be answered in two parts. The first part of the answer consists in showing that the things which inhere are individuals and not universals. The second part of the answer then focuses on the way in which individuals are inseparable from that in which they inhere.

A clear statement of the first part of the answer is given by Ackrill who states: "The inseparability requirement has the consequence that only individuals in non-substance categories can be 'in' individual substances."\(^3\) As an example of this, Ackrill suggests that while there could be generosity without their being Callias, Callias' generosity would not and could not be without Callias. Ackrill then concludes that "the inherence of a property in a kind of substance is to be analyzed in terms of the inherence of individual instances of the property in individual substances of that kind."\(^4\)

This analysis is supported in two ways by the text. It is supported by the structure of Chapter 2 of the Categories when Aristotle indicates that he wants to draw a distinction between the species and genera in the category of substance and in the non-substance categories.

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\(^1\)Ibid., 1. 1a 23.

\(^2\)Ackrill, op. cit., p. 74.

\(^3\)Ibid.

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 75.
as well. And it is also supported by the manner in which Aristotle makes these distinctions. What Aristotle is trying to do by distinguishing things which are 'said of' other things and things inherent in other things can be seen by comparing Chapter 2 of the Categories with Chapter 5. In Chapter 5 Aristotle makes the crucial distinction between primary and secondary substance. Primary substance is that which is neither 'said of' nor 'in' any thing, e.g., the individual man or the individual horse. Secondary substance, on the other hand, is that which is 'said of' individuals but is not present 'in' individuals, e.g., man or horse; secondary substances are the species and genera of primary substances. (C. 5. 2\textsuperscript{a} 11-b 6) This distinction between primary substances and secondary substances is the same distinction Aristotle makes between the first and fourth groups of things in Chapter 2 which is the distinction between the individual and its species or genera.

The second group is composed of things which Aristotle states are present 'in' a subject but not 'said of' it, like a certain whiteness or a certain point of knowledge. Taking as a general example of this group that of a certain whiteness, it follows that the particular whiteness cannot be used in defining the thing. It cannot be 'said of' the thing, hence it is neither its genus nor species and consequently it does not enter into the definition of that thing. On the other hand, to define the certain whiteness it is necessary to define it by adding a determinant, namely, that in which it inheres. (M. Z 5. 1031\textsuperscript{a} 1-3) Of course, strictly speaking, the individual is never defined. When Aristotle speaks of the definition of an accidental unity he may have in mind the definition of

\footnote{Supra, p. 42.}
a concrete thing treated as a universal. (M. Z 10, 1035b 28-32) In such a case a definition of the concrete treated as universal will have the same relation of parts as the concrete thing which it is. Here is the point: White is defined by reference to that in which it inheres in the concrete as universal. If it were to be defined as 'in' the individual (rather than the universal), then it could only be defined by reference to that individual. Now since the concrete is only treated as universal, it is the case that the concrete thing is an individual. This suggests that both the thing and its attributes are in some sense individual.

The third group which Aristotle discusses comprises those things which are both inherent and which may be 'said of'. In this group is knowledge. According to Aristotle, this knowledge is present 'in' the mind and it is also 'said of' grammar since grammar is a kind of knowledge.¹ In this particular case the certain piece of knowledge is 'in' the human mind and inseparable from it. On the other hand, it is a part of the definition of a kind of knowledge, knowledge of grammar. As such it may be 'said of' grammar. Aristotle's point in saying this is that knowledge cannot be without being 'in' some mind which entails that it be 'in' some particular mind.² On the other hand knowledge as particular is always some kind of knowledge; hence, knowledge is a genus under which certain species and individuals fall. The third group is then composed of things which inhere 'in' secondary substances (something which they can do only if they inhere 'in' some primary substances)

¹T. Z 5, 142b 31-35, trans. Forster.
²Supra, pp. 17n.
and which also define those individuals which do inhere in primary substances. This group is then composed of species and genera in non-substance categories.

Aristotle's manner of framing these distinctions thus suggests, at least, that he is making a distinction between particulars and their species and genera both in the category of substance and in other categories as well. This is also supported by the fact that in the first paragraph of Chapter 2 Aristotle is concerned with marking off those expressions which indicate things which are enumerated under the different categories. His analysis is then geared to show that these expressions may indicate either an individual or its species or genus. In addition J.R. Jones offers other arguments in support of this position.¹

Jones' first argument is philological. When Aristotle talks about secondary substance, such as man and horse, he uses the definite article, the phrases for man and horse then being ὁ ἄνθρωπος and ὁ ἄλογος. As Aristotle later remarks, however, these expressions suggest that what is being discussed is the individual horse or man, rather than the species horse or man. (C. 5. 3b 12-17) Having used the definite article to indicate the species or genera and not having an indefinite article, Aristotle must find another way of making plain when he is talking of the individual and when he is talking about the genus or species. To do this he imports the indefinite pronoun τίς and combines it with the phrases he uses to indicate the secondary substance. Thus when he talks of the individual horse the expression he uses is ὁ τίς ἄλογος. But not only does Aristotle use the indefinite pronoun τίς to distinguish the

¹J.R. Jones, "Are the Qualities of Particular Things Universal or Particular?" Philosophical Review LVIII (March, 1949), pp. 154-156.
primary substance from the secondary substance where it is clear that the primary substance is the individual and the secondary substance is either the genus or the species; he also uses it to distinguish different kinds of whiteness. Thus when he talks of the inherence of a certain whiteness he uses the expression τὸ τί λευκόν to indicate that whiteness. By analogy then it seems that Aristotle is making the distinction between individuals and their species and genera in both of these cases.

The second argument is more philosophical. Aristotle states that what is one in number and individual may be present 'in' a subject as is the case with grammatical knowledge. (C. 2. 1 5-9) This is said in the context of saying that things which are individual and one are never 'said of' a subject. Given the opposition of inherence and the 'said of' relation, it follows that things which are individual and one, like a certain point of grammatical knowledge, qualify as inherents. This indicates that there are non-substance individuals.

In the third argument Jones again notes the Greek expression. When in the third group Aristotle is talking of the inherence of knowledge in the mind and the fact that it can be 'said of' grammar, Aristotle is careful to omit the indefinite pronoun τίς. This is essential, for the relation between knowledge and grammar is one between the genus and its species, and not a relation between the individual and its species or genus. The relation between the individual to its genus or species is one of instance to universal. τὸ τί λευκόν is then an instance of τὸ λευκόν. Now it would ordinarily be supposed that a

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1 Ibid., pp. 154-155.
2 Ibid., p. 155.
white thing would be a particular instance of whiteness. However, for Aristotle white things are substances and cannot be instances of white. The only way of reading this passage is then to take τὸ τὰ λευκὰ to mean a particular white.¹

According to these arguments and the structure of the passage, it would seem that Aristotle does want to make a distinction between individuals and their species and genera in non-substance categories. To do this he must talk about particular and individual non-substances. Thus when Aristotle says that an inherent is 'in' a subject (subjects being individual substances), he is in effect saying that an individual non-substance is inseparable from the individual substance which it is 'in'. But in order to see what this inseparability entails, it is necessary to look at what inherents are primarily 'in'.

Summing up the previous account of substance,² it can be said that primary substance as form is what is occurrable; it can occur many times. On the other hand, primary substances as the concrete object is that which occurs and does not recur. It is a constituent in a world order in which substances change in a non-random fashion. Given this account of primary substance, it follows that to talk of something as inherent in a substance is to talk of something which occurs with a primary substance, but which is inseparable from that in which it inheres. This inseparability then means that the inherent occurs or is occurrable with and only with that in which it inheres, and that it does not and cannot occur apart from or without that in which it inheres. This

¹Ibid., pp. 155-156.
²Supra, pp. 25-33.
inseparability from primary substance is then a dependence on primary substance. An account of this dependence can be approached by a consideration of Ackrill's first condition for the inheritance of a non-substance.\footnote{Akrill, op. cit., p. 74.}

Aristotle clearly wants to describe the relation between substances and non-substances by saying that non-substances are 'in' substances. According to Ackrill, what Aristotle probably had in mind in formulating the relation in this way was a number of cases in Greek in which it would be normal to describe non-substances as in substance. For example, it would be common to say things like, "heat in the water" and "courage in Socrates."\footnote{Ibid.} But as Ackrill is aware, this is not a natural way of describing all non-substances. Reasoning in this way, he suggests that the relation of inherence might be spoken of in ways other than saying that a non-substance was 'in' a substance. He then formulates the first condition for a non-substance inhering in a substance as

\[ A \text{ is 'in' } B \text{ (in a technical sense) if and only if (a) one could naturally say in ordinary language either } A \text{ is in } B \text{ or that } A \text{ is of } B \text{ or that } A \text{ belongs to } B \text{ or that } B \text{ has } A \text{ (or that ...).} \ldots. \ldots. \footnote{Ibid.} \]

In criticism of Ackrill, Moravcsik has stated that the above condition is merely a verbal condition; what is needed, he suggests, is an ontological condition to match the verbal condition.\footnote{J.M.E. Moravcsik, "Aristotle on Predication," Philosophical Review LXXVI, (January, 1967), pp. 87-88.} As will be shown later, Moravcsik's statement of this is inadequate.\footnote{Infra, pp. 69-70.} What needs to be shown is how and why Aristotle would regard substance as prior so that
non-substances depend on substance. Once this has been done it is merely a matter of convenience to describe this relation by using a technical sense of 'in'. To describe this relation by using 'in' is perhaps the primary way of describing this relation, but it need not be the only way. This Ackrill accounts for by leaving an ellipsis after his last way of speaking of the inherence relation. But because of this ellipsis this condition does not serve to mark off inherence from any other relation. It merely states that Aristotle must be able to speak about the terms of this relation in such a way as to exhibit that they are related. Given Aristotle's view that the world is intelligible as it is taken up in language, this is of course true. Consequently, the ontological condition, which Moravcsik suggests must match the linguistic condition, is not so closely associated with this condition as it is with the inseparability condition. Non-substances are not separable from the substances which they are 'in' because substance is prior and if it did not have being, then nothing else would have being. Approaching the subject in this way it is plain that the suggested ontological condition which must match Ackrill's first condition is concerned with the priority of substance.

Aristotle has accounted for the particularity of substance by its form and has individuated different instances of the same form using his notion of matter. However, such an account is sufficient only for substances, since only substances (concrete individuals) are composed of matter. Thus his account of the particularity and individuation of non-substances will have to be different. Of course, with his explanation of form he will be able to say that each instance of some particular non-substance is the same as its essence. But this
leaves unsaid how some particular thing can be in many places at the same
time. If he is unable to have the same thing in many places at the same
time, he will be forced into the following dilemma: either he will have
to make what he considers the Platonic assumption and assert that a thing
and its essence are severed or he will have to assert that the same thing
can be separated from itself. In order to overcome these difficulties,
Aristotle makes non-substances dependent on substances; this gives sub­
stance priority in being capable of independent being. Consequently,
non-substances are dependent on substances; Aristotle accounts for this by
making non-substances inhere in substances.

Given this, Aristotle is able to say that a non-substance is what
it is by using the comparative relations of similarity and difference.
This accounts for the particularity of non-substance. Non-substances are
individuated by the matter on which they depend for their being. They
are 'in' the concrete thing which is form and matter. Thus even though
non-substances are not composed of matter, they are of or 'in' the con­
crete thing. It is by using the relational criteria which matter brings
to the criteria for distinguishing form that Aristotle is able to give
his non-substances individuation. Forms are alike or different. Indi­
viduals having the same form are one or many, depending on whether or not
they are separable. But non-substance individuals can only be separable
if they are 'in' that which is separable in a primary sense: substance.
Aristotle is therefore able to individuate non-substances by having them
depend on matter for their being. Thus the individual non-substance is
'in' the individual substance, meaning that the individual non-substance

\[\text{1Supra, pp. 33-40.}\]
is not a part of the substance, but is inseparable from the substance which it is 'in' and cannot be without this substance. This is a relation between individuals in substance and non-substance categories. Since the individuals in these two categories are not individuals but particulars, when distinguished by the comparative relations, then as particulars non-substances also inhere in substances. Non-substances could not fail to inhere in the particular when they must inhere in the individual. Aristotle, then, draws the same distinctions in substance and non-substance categories and he explains essences the same in substance and non-substance categories. The form provides the particularity while the matter provides the principle of individuation. He relates substance and non-substance categories with the relation of inherence according to which a non-substance is not a part of a substance but is inseparable from substance in the sense that it derives its being from the substance with which it is associated. Thus as an essence a non-substance is inherent in a secondary substance, and as an individual a non-substance is inherent in a particular substance. It is with this account that Aristotle endeavors to understand the world as a world in which a thing is the same as its essence.
CHAPTER V

ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF INHERENCE

This thesis is not the only recent discussion of Aristotle's doctrine of inheritance. The three most significant discussions of this topic have been advanced by J.L. Ackrill, G.E.L. Owen, and J.M.E. Moravcsik. Ackrill attempts to briefly state the conditions under which something may be said to be 'in' something else. Ackrill's account is criticized by Owen, and this debate is arbitrated by Moravcsik. Moravcsik also offers some suggestions on the problems to be faced in any attempt to come to terms with Aristotle's doctrine of inher­ence. This chapter will take up the points argued by these three commentators.

Ackrill's book, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione, is subtitled A Translation with Notes. Slightly less than half of this book is taken by the translation, while the remainder contains Ackrill's notes on these two works. It is in these notes that Ackrill offers his account of inheritance. Discussions of inherence are found in the notes on paragraphs beginning with lines 234 and 1120. The main discussion,

Minor discussions of this topic occur in Anscombe and Geach, op. cit. and in J.R. Jones, op. cit. These discussions are not significantly different from those of Ackrill, Owen, or Moravcsik to warrant discussion here.

Ackrill, op. cit.


Moravcsik, op. cit.
of course, occurs in connection with Ackrill's remarks on Chapter 2 of
the Categories where Aristotle gives his most explicit formulation of
this distinction. Here Ackrill spells out the three conditions under
which something may be said to inhere:

A is 'in' B (in the technical sense) if and only if (a) one could
naturally say in ordinary language either A is in B or that A
is of B or that A belongs to B or that B has A (or that . . . ),
and (b) A is not a part of B, and (c) A is inseparable from B.¹

What Ackrill has said is correct, but his account is hardly com­
plete. His statement of the inherence conditions is mostly a restatement
of the conditions which Aristotle states. Ackrill only adds the first
condition, which serves merely to point out that the relation can be
spoken of.² Thus the work of distinguishing the inheritance relation from
other relations is carried by Ackrill's restatement of Aristotle's condi­
tions for inherence. Such an account leaves certain questions unanswered.
For example, why does he include the condition concerning ordinary lan­
guage? What does it mean to say that A is inseparable from B? Ackrill's
account must be judged a failure insofar as he has failed to answer
these questions.

Aside from brevity, there is one other difficulty with Ackrill's
comments. This occurs in connection with the comments on Chapter 5 of
the Categories.³ Here Aristotle makes the claim that everything which
is not a subject (primary substance) is either present 'in' a subject or
is 'said of' a subject. (C. 5. 2³ 33-34) On the basis of this claim he
is able to assert that "color is in a body and therefore also in an

¹Ackrill, op. cit., p. 74.
²Supra, pp. 56-57.
³Ackrill, op. cit., p. 83.
individual body; for were it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all.\textsuperscript{1} This follows because everything which is not a primary substance (concrete individual) must either be 'said of' a primary substance of 'in' a primary substance. So if color is 'in' a body (any determinate physical thing) then it must be 'in' some primary substance since everything must be 'in' or 'said of' a primary substance. Anything which was not a primary substance and did not qualify for either of these relations with primary substance could not exist. According to Ackrill, however, Aristotle's comment here is "compressed and careless."\textsuperscript{2} What Aristotle should have said, according to Ackrill, is that it would not be 'in' a body at all if some instance of it were not 'in' some individual body. This comment, however, ignores the subtlety of the tools which Aristotle is using.

Aristotle's view of substance as mentioned before,\textsuperscript{3} can be seen in two ways. These two views are consequently present in his account of inherence. Thus a color is 'in' a body as what it is; that is, a color 'in' a body is the same as its essence. So every occurring of that color is the same as its essence and, consequently, identical with every other occurring of the color. In this case there is only one thing: the essence of the color. Taking up with the other view of substance, a thing is the same as what it is in terms of similarity and difference, but it is not the same as itself insofar as it is 'in' different individual substances. Here there are many, as determined by the spatial relation of separability.

\textsuperscript{1}Aristotle, \textit{Categories}, 5. 2\textsuperscript{b} 1-4, trans. Ackrill.

\textsuperscript{2}Ackrill, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{3}Supra, pp. 25-33.
Thus by saying that a color must be 'in' an individual body, Aristotle is saying that color, as what it is, must be 'in' some individual. And it is this individual body which provides the individuation of the occurrings of the color in question. These occurrings are individuated by being separable; they are separable because each occurring is 'in' a particular piece of matter, these pieces being separable. Thus Aristotle is saying that a color would not have being if it were not 'in' at least one individual substance as what it is. It may, of course, be 'in' many individual substances as what it is. Since the individual substances which a particular non-substance is 'in' are separable, it follows that the occurrings of the particular non-substance are also separable. Contra Ackrill, then, Aristotle is not being careless by saying that it is the instance of the color which is 'in' an individual substance. Rather he is defining the instance or occurring of that color as the same as its essence but 'in' some individual substance and consequently individuated as an occurring of that color.

Owen's article will now be discussed. This article is a confessed attempt to "nail" a dogma which accompanies the inherence/'said of' distinction. Before stating this dogma, Owen outlines his own position on inherence in an analysis of Chapter 2 of the Categories. In this analysis Owen agrees that Aristotle is distinguishing between individuals and their species and genera in the category of substance as well as in non-substance categories. His account of this distinction, however, is quite different from any recently advocated view.

According to Owen the individuality of the individual substance is just that it is wholly determinate and not predicable of anything less general. Paralleling the individuality of substances is the individuality
of non-substances. They are individuals precisely because, says Owen, they are not predicable of any less general thing in the same category. Taking color as an example, an individual color like steel blue is an individual in that it cannot be predicated of any less general color, although as an adjective it can be predicated of many things. Owen is taking the position that an individual color is a particular shade of color and not a particular occurring of a shade of color. In other words Owen is saying that an individual color is not individual because it is spatially separable (as dependent on matter) from other instances of the same color. Rather Owen is saying that a color is an individual because it is one of a finite number of discriminate colors. Thus it is an individual not as spatially separable, but as conceptually separable.\(^1\)

Having set forth his account of inherence, Owen states what he takes to be the dogma concerning inherence. This dogma asserts that an individual in a non-substance category cannot be present 'in' more than one individual substance.\(^2\) Owen also cites Ross,\(^3\) Jones,\(^4\) Anscombe,\(^5\) and Ackrill\(^6\) as the advocates of this view. Owen's article, then, represents a criticism of the views offered in these sources as well as the view adopted in this thesis.

There are, however, problems with Owen's position regarding the

\(^1\)Owen, Phronesis X, pp. 97-98.
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 99.
\(^4\)Jones, op. cit.
\(^5\)Anscombe and Geach, op. cit.
\(^6\)Ackrill, op. cit.
individuality of substance and non-substance individuals. It is in fact true that individuals in the category of substance are not predicable of anything less general since there is nothing less general in the category of substance. However, Owen fails to note Aristotle's principle of individuation. If Aristotle is to have individuals then he must be able to individuate them. Since Owen holds that an individual in a non-substance category is a particular of which there may be many instances, he must hold that non-substance individuals are individuated by their similarities and differences. But Aristotle uses these relations to distinguish essences; to distinguish individuals he uses his notion of matter. (M. Z 8. 1034\textsuperscript{a} 5-8) Thus as explained\textsuperscript{1} Socrates and Callias are the same as form since they are both men, but different as matter since they are separable. This separability individuates them. Derivatively, Socrates' white (the occurring of white 'in' Socrates) is individuated from Callias' white (the occurring of white 'in' Callias) by being separable. In this way Aristotle is able to explain how there can be many occurings of one thing.

On Owen's account, however, it is difficult to see how Aristotle could account for one thing occurring many times. Thus while he states correctly that an individual cannot be predicated of anything less general, this is not a means by which individuals can be individuated. To get this principle of individuation, Owen would have to turn to Aristotle's notion of matter, since this is the principle Aristotle mentions. Were he to do this he would have different instances of whiteness individuated as separable. By claiming this Owen is placing himself in the following position. He is choosing to reserve the word 'individual' for indicating

\textsuperscript{1}Supra, p. 59-60.
a specific essence; in the case of colors a set of such essences would have a finite number of members. Thus Owen would be able to say that each member of this set could be 'in' many individual substances at the same time. He would account for the fact that particular non-substances could be one and in many places at the same time by saying that each instance of a particular non-substance would be separable from every other instance. Thus he would individuate instances by having them be separable. His account of what Aristotle is saying is then no different from the account given in this thesis. Owen merely has chosen to use the word 'individual' in one way while in the present thesis a different use has been chosen. His criticisms then in no way affect the substantive portion of the view taken here. Most of his criticisms are based on misunderstandings of this position.

These misunderstandings come out quite clearly in his first argument. Owen contends that it can be said and is true to say that pink is 'in' a body, but since pink is not an individual, pink can be in no given particular body.\(^1\) This criticism fails. It is true to say that pink is 'in' an individual body; but this is merely to say that pink is 'in' a separable and this is, of course, what it means to be an instance of pink. For that color which is 'in' an individual body is the same as its essence and this is pink. This gives one side of Aristotle's doctrine. Looking at this from the other side, what it is to be pink may be in many places at the same time. This individuates the occurings of pink.

Owen's second criticism is also based on a misunderstanding.

\(^1\)Owen, *Phronesis* X, p. 100.
He takes up Aristotle's example that knowledge is predicated of grammar (since grammar is a kind of knowledge) and 'in' the soul:

Some [things] are both said of a subject and in a subject. For example, knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and it is also said of a subject, knowledge of grammar.

Aristotle's failure to distinguish the kinds of knowledge which inhere in the soul, Owen thinks, indicates that Aristotle did not distinguish the individual knowledge as that which is only 'in' one individual soul. Had he, he would have been certain to point out that in one case the knowledge he is discussing is 'in' a particular soul and in the other case knowledge is 'said of' many souls. Owen also makes the stronger claim that this passage is not open to a reading which would entail that knowledge must be 'in' a particular soul for it to have being at all. Presumably, Aristotle would not be able to say that knowledge is or may be 'said of' grammar as a kind of knowledge, if knowledge depended for its being on any particular soul. But this argument also fails. Aristotle is here talking about the species and genus in a non-substance category. Thus he is talking about knowledge as what it is, being 'in' or depending on substance. This knowledge which is 'in' a substance is a genus under which there are many species. Knowledge is also used in defining these species, since it is the genus of which there are many species, as is the case in knowledge of grammar. The point here is that if there is to be knowledge, then there must be instances of knowledge. And these instances must be occurrences of knowledge which occur with and not without primary substance. Knowledge as form is dependent on substance since it could not have being

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1Aristotle, Categories 2. 1a 29-b 2, trans. Ackrill.

2Owen, Phronesis X, p. 100.
if there was no substance. On the other hand, each occurring of knowledge occurs with and not without some primary substance. It is also plain that the occurings of what occurs in the occurings are, on Aristotle's account, mutually dependent. Seen in this way, Owen's objection fails in that the view which he is criticizing entails that if knowledge is to be, it must be 'in' some individual.

Owen's next argument is a criticism of Ackrill's account of Aristotle's statement concerning color 'in' an individual. (C. 5. 2a 36b 3) This passage, however, has already been explained in connection with Ackrill and need not be dealt with here.¹

Another argument which Owen brings to bear on this subject is the following:

Then there is the paradox of the breakdown of categories. The dogma says that each particular item in categories other than substance must be identified as the such-and-such quality (or quantity, or whatever) of so-and-so. The consequence of this is that members of subordinate categories are seconded in one sweep to the category of relative terms. At any rate they satisfy Aristotle's criteria for relatives, including the last and strongest, quite as well as his own examples. (8a 35-8b 15)²

This argument, however, is vitiated by Aristotle's disclaimer in the preceding line: "the fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else does not make it essentially a relative." (C. 7. 8a 34) Such a disclaimer does not aid in clarifying Aristotle's account of relatives, but it does show that the dogma would not "second" everything into the relative category.

Owen's final argument is what he calls the paradox of implication. Owen states this as "if X is an individual, the statement that a

¹Supra, pp. 62-64.
particular Y (say a particular color) will not entail, but actually pre-
clude saying that Y is without qualification in X. It soon becomes
evident what qualification Owen has in mind. According to Owen, the
dogma entails that to predicate of anything requires that the predicate
be identified by means of that in which it inheres. Thus if Socrates
is pink (Owen's word for λευκόν), then it is incorrect to say in an
unqualified way, "Socrates is pink." What is correct to say is, "Soc-
rates is Socrates' pink." This criticism, of course, misses the point.
Socrates is pink insofar as what it is to be the color of Socrates is
what it is to be pink. Thus the color of Socrates is pink and that is
what it is to be pink, but as the pink which inheres in Socrates, it is
an occurring of pink.

Thus Owen has advanced a number of points against the view that
inherents cannot be 'in' more than one individual. His objections to
the alleged dogma, however, fail, for Owen misunderstands the view
which he is criticizing. His criticisms are based on the restrictions
which he places on his use of 'individual'; he only applies 'individual'
to particular essences which are the least general in their respective
categories. Thus his arguments against the present view are based on
his account of the view which would entail that an individual is a
particular essence. Thus Owen is criticizing the position which would
hold that these are essences which can only be 'in' one individual sub-
stance. Owen's arguments against such a position are of course justi-
fied, but he takes these arguments to be criticisms of the view which
in fact holds that occurings can only be 'in' one individual substance.

1Ibid.
His criticisms are consequently based on a misunderstanding.

The dispute between Ackrill and Owen is arbitrated by J.M.E. Moravcsik. Moravcsik gives a partial review of Ackrill's notes on the *Categories* with a few suggestions for further examination. By restricting his discussion to the relations 'said of', inherence, and predication, Moravcsik is also able to discuss the subtleties of Aristotle's account of these relations as well as indicate the problems which any prospective commentator must face.¹

Moravcsik begins by distinguishing the three crucial relations with which Aristotle is dealing in the opening chapters of the *Categories*. The first relation which Moravcsik discusses is predication (which he calls predication'). This is the linguistic relation as understood in the ordinary sense. It has two ontological relations underlying it. These two relations are the 'said of' relation and inherence (which Moravcsik refer to as predication" and inherence, respectively).² It is in this framework which Moravcsik proceeds to investigate his topic.

His formulation of the differences between these relations in terms of the ontological/linguistic distinction is, however, open to question. Moravcsik gives no rationale for viewing Aristotle as a philosopher who could make the ontological/linguistic distinction, but confidently posits his account of these relations. The main thing which Moravcsik overlooks is Aristotle's account of being. Aristotle does not have the problem of explaining the relation between words and things. This enables him to use linguistic evidence to substantiate

¹Moravcsik, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-96.

²Ibid., 83-85.
what modern philosophers might call ontological claims. This is largely because, as a modern philosopher might express it, he views the world as intelligible as taken up in language. Thus for Aristotle the problem concerning the relation between language and the world does not arise.¹

To put forth a view based on the assumption that Aristotle is able to take up this question and yet fail to provide any justification for taking this interpretation is to miss the point of what Aristotle is doing in the first chapters of the Categories.

Nevertheless, having established this account of the distinctions which Aristotle employs, Moravcsik plunges ahead to defend Ackrill against the "sharp" criticism of G.E.L. Owen.² As Ackrill's position has already been defended against Owen, Moravcsik's attempts to do this need not be dealt with here.

This accomplished, Moravcsik continues by pointing out some difficulties in the manner in which Aristotle formulated his account of inherence. The first difficulty arises in connection with sentences which seem to indicate the inherence of non-substances in other non-substances. Moravcsik's example of this is "sound has pitch."³ This would seem to fulfill the conditions necessary for something to inhere in something else, but although it is not certain how Aristotle would handle such a case, the outlines of his treatment are clear. Aristotle would probably have analyzed sound as motion in air.⁴ Thus sound would

¹Supra, pp. 23-24.
³Ibid.
⁴Aristotle (pseud.), Problems A 11. 899a 33-36, trans. E.S. Forster.
be a certain being-affected of air; occurings of sound would be 'in' air as individuals in the category of being-affected. Sound being dependent on air, it would follow that pitch would also be dependent on air, although whether or not Aristotle would have said that pitch inheres in the sound or in the air remains uncertain. Generalizing from this case, it may be said that inherents which seem to be 'in' non-substances are dependent on the same individual substances as those things in which they seem to inhere depend. Which way Aristotle would choose to describe this relation remains uncertain, although it seems plain that Aristotle is concerned primarily with things which are 'in' substances.

The second point which Moravcsik develops concerns the way in which Aristotle would deal with size and shape. Moravcsik questions whether they would properly be called inherents.\(^1\) It would be possible for Aristotle to argue that size and shape are not inherents, although whether he would have done so again remains in doubt. As mentioned earlier, Aristotle utilizes a notion of matter to obtain a principle of individuation.\(^2\) And as a principle of individuation, matter employs the relation of separability. But for something to be spatially separate entails that it have size and shape. Thus where size and shape are not a part of the essence of something, they would be in matter as the conditions under which something may be spatially separate. This is the position which Aristotle could take on the question of size and shape. He probably would not have done so, for to do so would have

\(^1\)Moravcsik, op. cit., p. 90.
\(^2\)Supra, pp. 25-33.
engaged him in a more explicit treatment of relations than he was capable, given the time in which he lived. It would have also forced him to see that his account of substance depends on the comparative relations and the spatial relation. These could not well inhere in substance or be 'said of' substance as the account of substance depends on these relations. However, Aristotle does not deal at length with relations and does not discover these problems.

The final difficulty which Moravcsik brings out concerns the form/matter distinction and its relation to the inherence/'said of' distinction. Moravcsik wonders why Aristotle does not explain the relation between these two distinctions. It is true, as Moravcsik suggests, that Aristotle may not have formulated the form/matter distinction when he wrote the *Categories*; nevertheless, it is apparent how he could have handled such a distinction.

Leaving inherence, Moravcsik also has a few things to say about the 'said of' relation. He takes this to be one of the ontological configurations which underlies predication, predication being a linguistic relation. According to Moravcsik this has the consequence that Aristotle is correct in stating that the 'said of' relation is transitive. He is also correct in that this entails that the ordinary linguistic relation is not transitive. The incorrectness of this interpretation of these two relations has been shown. But it is also in doubt as to whether the ordinary linguistic relation of predication is not

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1 Moravcsik, *loc. cit.*
2 *Supra*, pp. 38-40.
3 Ibid., pp. 91-92.
transitive.\textsuperscript{1} It is especially strange that Moravcsik should make such
claims about predication when he admits that no adequate account of
predication has been given.\textsuperscript{2}

Following this, Moravcsik offers a few criticisms of Acrill's
account of the 'said of' relation. On the basis of an example of his
own choosing Moravcsik argues that the 'said of' relation may not be
equated with essential predication. As has been shown above this claim
it true, but only because the 'said of' relation is a shortened form
of the relation of essential predication or the predication of the defi-
nition.\textsuperscript{3} Thus the 'said of' relation is not significantly different
from essential predication. Turning to Moravcsik's example, his mis-
take is apparent. In his example, Moravcsik takes three sentences:
Socrates is a man. Man is a species. Socrates is a species. He then
argues that if the 'said of' relation is equivalent to essential predi-
cation it will follow that the third sentence is true. The mistake
here is that man in the first sentence is a class of beings. In the
second sentence it is the name of a species. Thus man is used differ-
ently in the two sentences which Moravcsik uses as examples, and this
mistake vitiates his contention that the 'said of' relation is not
equatable with essential predication.

Moravcsik concludes his article by pointing out the relevance
of Aristotle's account of priority to his account of inherence. He
does not, however, see that the significance of priority for this

\textsuperscript{1}Cf. Fred Sommers, "Predicability," Philosophy in America ed.
Max Black (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1964), pp. 262-
281.

\textsuperscript{2}Moravcsik, op. cit., pp. 80-82.

\textsuperscript{3}Supra, pp. 45-46.
doctrine is found in connection with Aristotle's discussion of essences. Rather he asserts that more will be known about Aristotle's doctrine of priority when his account of modalities is more fully explicated. Certainly this would be illuminating, but it would not show how Aristotle's doctrine of inherence fits together with his account of essences. In this concluding discussion Moravcsik offers no substantive theses.¹

This concludes the criticisms of commentators who have discussed the question of inherence. All of them have tried to consider this doctrine apart from the mainstream of Aristotle's philosophy. Insofar as they have done this they have failed to make explicit what Aristotle sought in his discussion of inherence and why he made such a seemingly obtuse distinction.

¹Moravcsik, op. cit., pp. 93-96.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This concludes the present thesis. It has been shown that on at least one reading Aristotle's science of being qua being is the science of substance in which substance is understood to be capable of being independent while all other things depend for their being on substance. But in order to have such a science Aristotle needed a way of expressing the relation between independent substance and dependent non-substance. For this Aristotle introduced the notion of inherence. Thus it is through the relation of inherence that Aristotle is able to include non-substances in his science of substance without introducing a generic sense of being.

To do this, of course, Aristotle needed to be able to overcome what he considered to be the Platonic problem, that of self-subsistent substances. This was performed by his theory of substance. According to this theory, substance may be understood in three ways: as matter, as form, and as the concrete thing which is both form and matter. Using this analysis, Aristotle was able to say that any given concrete individual is the same as what it is to be that concrete individual; e.g., Socrates is identical with what it is to be a man. He is the same as his essence. Viewed in this way Socrates is the same as his essence and Callias is the same as his essence. Thus Socrates and Callias are identical to the same thing. This being the case they are identical to
each other. Accordingly as form they are one rather than two, since they are both identical with the form of man.

However, looking at this in another way, Socrates and Callias are two and not one, for each is in his own matter. What Aristotle is doing here is positing two different forms of relatedness for determining oneness and manyness. The form of man which is Socrates is identical to the form of man which is Callias. Thus there is only one form, the form of man. Seen as the concrete (form and matter) Socrates is individuated from Callias, since Socrates and Callias are separable. As separable, they are two and not one. Thus Socrates and Callias are one in that they have an indistinguishable form. They are many in that they are separable. By using this theory of substance outlined above, Aristotle is able to have knowledge which is of the universal, while having this knowledge apply to each particular. In this way he does not need self-subsistent forms in order to have knowledge.

This account, of course, is the one which applies to substance. Aristotle extends such an account to the other categories by having individuals in these categories depend on substance. Thus he accounts for knowledge of particular non-substances in the same way that he accounts for the knowledge of particular substances. A non-substance, say yellow, is the same as its essence. Take two yellows, the yellow of Socrates (called yellow₁) and the yellow of Callias (called yellow₂), which are the same shade of yellow. Then yellow₁ is identical with the essence of what it is to be yellow as is yellow₂. Since they are identical to the same thing, seen in terms of the relations of similarity and difference they are the same color. In this respect they are one. Now Aristotle needs to account for their manyness. He does this by
making all non-substance individuals depend on substance individuals. Thus yellow\textsubscript{1} and yellow\textsubscript{2} are one as form, but many as separable. And they are separable simply because they are 'in' separable individuals, Socrates and Callias. Using this notion of inherence, then, Aristotle is able to have knowledge of non-substances only because he is able to have knowledge of substances.

One problem which might be mentioned with such an account as Aristotle has given is his difficulty in dealing with relations. Aristotle has a category of relatives, but these turn out to be things like double, half, and greater. (C. 4. 1\textsuperscript{b} 30) He never discusses relations like space and time, though his account of separability presupposes spatial relations. Thus he could not account for such relations as being dependent on substance even if he were to explicitly deal with these relations. This suggests that if a philosopher were to attempt to deal with relations another account of essences would be necessary.

Aristotle, however, does not make the inherence/'said of' distinction in his later works. But as J.L. Ackrill has said, even though Aristotle only makes explicit this distinction in the Categories, "the ideas they [the terms of the distinction] express play a leading role in nearly all Aristotle's writings."\textsuperscript{1} This is evident in many places and on different topics. For example, even though in the Metaphysics Aristotle does not rely on an explicit formulation of the distinction to show that non-substance individuals are dependent on substance individuals, he still states that non-substance individuals do so depend. But he does not discuss the relation between them. What

\textsuperscript{1} Ackrill, op. cit., p. 74.
Aristotle says on this topic in the *Metaphysics* is that the being of substance is the central reference for all other kinds of being and, consequently, the being of all other things. Thus substance is prior and non-substances depend for their being on substance, although within the *Metaphysics* Aristotle gives no rationale for holding such a position. It is in the *Categories* that his doctrine of inherence gives some hint at what he may have had in mind. He also uses similar concepts to define the realm of science. There can be a science of beings which are unities in virtue of their own nature rather than actual or accidental unities. This leads Aristotle into the question of how some things can be more dependent on certain kinds of substance than others. For example, both health and red are attributes of men and neither is a substance. But there is a science of health: medicine. There is not a science of redness in men. This topic is closely connected with inherence for Aristotle must be able to account for how non-substances are dependent on substances. The different ways in which these substances have non-substances dependent on them is crucial for Aristotle's account of the realm of scientific inquiry. To mark out this realm of inquiry, he needs to explain how a non-substance can be dependent on a substance. Aristotle's doctrine of inherence is an approach to this topic. This is also closely related to the essential/accidental distinction. Aristotle needs to have some way of explaining the relation which holds between a substance and its accidents or attributes. For example, how is it that one man can be tall and another short? How is it that an accident attaches to a substance? These are crucial questions. Aristotle's account of inherence is perhaps a first approach to such problems; this account gives some of the ways in which a non-substance is attached to a substance. In these ways, then,
Aristotle's account of inherence is closely related to questions which run throughout the core of his philosophy.

Thus while it is true that Aristotle did not explicitly make the inherence/'said of' distinction in his later works, the distinction may serve as an introduction to Aristotle's philosophy. It leads naturally to the questions outlined above which are at the heart of what Aristotle is dealing with in his philosophy. Seen in this way the inherence/'said of' distinction made in the limited context of the Categories provides a focus narrow enough for fruitful study, and central enough to furnish leads into the heart of Aristotle's metaphysics.
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