Cadiz expedition of 1625

Daniel O. Magnussen

The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation
Magnussen, Daniel O., "Cadiz expedition of 1625" (1964). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 1729.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/1729

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.
THE CADIZ EXPEDITION OF 1625

by

DANIEL OSAR MAGNUSSEN

B.A. Montana State University, 1963

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY

1964

Approved:

[Signature]
Chairman, Board of Examiners

[Signature]
Dean, Graduate School

[Date]
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL SCENE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE ROYAL NAVY DURING THE REIGN OF JAMES I</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. PREPARATIONS FOR THE EXPEDITION</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE VOYAGE</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE ATTACK</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. RETREAT, RETURN, AND RECRIMINATIONS</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPENDICES</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. BIOGRAPHIES AND SQUADRON ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. ROSTER OF REGIMENTS AND OFFICERS</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS NO. 2</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS NO. 3</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. COUNCIL OF WAR MEMBERS</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BIBLIOGRAPHY | 143 |
LIST OF MAPS

ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND THE IBERIAN PENINSULA ............................................ 55
THE BAY OF CADIZ ......................................................... 61
CHAPTER I

THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL SCENE

In 1618 Europe became embroiled in a long and involved series of conflicts which historians have termed the Thirty Years War. The roots of these conflicts may be traced back to the founding of Protestantism in 1519. Europe was in a state of confusion and emotional ferment, most of which was due to the religious differences between Catholics and Protestants. On the surface, these appeared to be the two basic religions, but the latter was divided within itself due to the advent of Calvinism. Lutheranism had spread rapidly since its beginnings, but had been slowed by the spread of the moralistic Calvinist teachings. Since 1560, the flood of the Catholic Counter-Reformation had been washing back over some of the areas which had deviated from Rome. Vicious struggles developed over whose was the true religion. The scene for larger contests had been set by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, which permitted a ruler to decide which religion would be followed in his state. The use of state borders to separate religions developed hatreds which had not previously existed. Man could now be hated for his religion as well as for his language, customs, habits, or dress.

In addition to religious ferment causing splits and conflicts in Europe, dynastic difficulties were a part of the problem. Although the great struggle began as a religious clash, there were dynastic overtones which ultimately came to outweigh the religious aims of the
participants. The two principal dynasties were the Hapsburgs of Spain and the Empire, and the House of Bourbon in France. Although both were Catholic, they were extremely jealous of one another; to the dismay of the Pope, they worked to the detriment of each other. In addition to these, there were other outstanding dynasties such as the Hohenzollerns in Brandenburg and Prussia, the Stuarts in Britain, the House of Vasa in Sweden and in Poland, the Oldenburgs in Denmark, and the House of Orange in the Netherlands. While these all played various important roles at one time or another during the great struggle, it was the Bourbons and Hapsburgs who played their parts out to the bitter final curtain.

One other dynamic force felt during this period was the grim overseas economic rivalry between the maritime states. Spain and Portugal had dominated the exploitation of the New World and the East Indies and the resultant trade with these areas, but they were now being strongly contested by the Dutch, French, and English. The era of colonization was under way with the latter three powers vitally interested in establishing permanent settlements. Portugal and Spain had maintained military outposts on the far sides of the world for over a century. They had, however, been more interested in conquest and exploitation than in colonies per se. The struggles for trade and colonies, plus the search for natural resources such as rich minerals, spices, fisheries, new and exotic foods, silks, furs, and the like, had become increasingly bitter. England, France, and Holland had been firmly demanding trade rights in the newly discovered lands, while Spain and Portugal had been refusing just as steadfastly to
grant these privileges. England and Spain fought a long war, which ended unresolved in 1604, over this point. The rising Dutch had been more successful in the East Indies, wresting some islands from Spanish control from which they had extended their activities. In the field of overseas operations, it was state versus state, regardless of religious affiliation. Out of the colonial struggles there developed the doctrine of the two spheres, which meant that Europe was one sphere for the operation of international law and the New World another; arrangements made in one sphere did not necessarily apply in the other. Thus, while two nations might be fighting in a distant land, they could be on amicable terms in Europe. While the Thirty Years War began as essentially a religious conflict between Catholic and Protestant, it must be kept in mind that other forces, chiefly dynastic and economic, were also at work.

The Holy Roman Empire was ruled by a Hapsburg, Matthias (1612-1619), who controlled most of Germany. His was a loose form of control, however, much looser than the Hapsburgs preferred. The Emperor was actually dependent upon the various states of the Empire, as he had no way of enforcing his edicts should the larger princes choose to dissent. Since the advent of Protestantism, several of the larger states had adopted this faith; these included the Palatinate, Saxony, and Brandenburg. With but seven electors in the Holy Roman Empire, the Hapsburgs were naturally deeply concerned lest another state be lost to Protestantism and the balance of power along with it. On the eve of conflict the German world was divided fairly evenly between Protestants in the north and Catholics in the south, with this religious
barrier establishing natural tendencies toward dislike and distrust. It was on this religious frontier of hatred, fear, and apprehension, that the battle lines would be drawn with the states of Europe choosing which side they thought best suited their interests. At the outset, their choice was influenced by religious considerations; for the most part it became Catholic versus Protestant.

Spain, ruled by Philip III (1598-1621), was still the dominant and most powerful nation in Europe; with her vast possessions in the New World, the East Indies, plus the Spanish Netherlands, the Franche Comte, the Kingdom of Naples, the Duchy of Milan, and her close family relationship with the Holy Roman Empire, this Spanish-led dynasty exerted more of an international influence than merely that of a single state. Spain's war with England had been ended by James I (1603-1625) shortly after his accession to the throne, leaving the overseas economic question still unanswered. Ending this war was the primary act of James, the man of peace, and Spain, through the dexterity of her sly ambassadors, managed to keep England off balance in her foreign relations throughout his whole twenty-two-year reign. In this way Spain kept England neutral when she might have been a determined enemy. Spain maintained her position as the most powerful nation in Europe by lining her coffers with gold and silver from the New World. She financed her military projects and economic aims in this manner, relying on the seemingly endless stream of wealth from across the seas.

The Dutch had revolted against the oppressive Spanish rule in the last half of the 16th century. Through their own valiant efforts
and with outside help from England and France, they cleared the seven northern provinces and established a republic. At the truce, declared with Spain in 1609 and known as the Twelve Years Truce, the Netherlands was partitioned. The seven northern provinces, those that formed the Union of Utrecht in 1579, became Dutch, while the ten southern provinces remained under Spanish rule and were known as the Spanish Netherlands. The Protestants in the south either fled north to the new republic or recanted and became Catholic, with the result that the number of Protestants increased in the north while the Spanish Netherlands became solidly Catholic, although small minorities existed in both areas. The Dutch however, were not united Protestants as their faith was split between Lutheranism and Calvanism.

Since the signing of the Twelve Years Truce the Dutch had become increasingly stronger and were able to stand alone. The Dutch, in fact, were engaging in trade and hostilities in the East Indies which Spain resented because it cut into her trade in this area. The Dutch, through their rapid rise in commerce, were also resented by England, chiefly, as well as by Denmark and Sweden. In addition, the Netherlands themselves were too valuable to be given up lightly and there seemed little doubt but that Spain would resume the war when the Twelve Years Truce expired in 1621.

The Spanish plan in the event of new hostilities was to attack the Dutch from the south and east, from bases in the Spanish Netherlands and from German territories within the Holy Roman Empire. They

1Hubert G. R. Reade, Sidelights on the Thirty Years War (London, 1924, 3 vols.), I, 3-4.
realized that it would be too difficult to attack from the sea inasmuch as powerful Dutch forces ruled the North Sea and the English Channel. In addition, there was no way of telling in which direction England might move and she, in any event, could make action impossible through the Channel and North Sea if she chose to do so. If Spain were to conduct a land campaign against the Dutch without recourse to the sea lanes, long military supply lines must be kept open from the Mediterranean north through the Alpine passes, through French or German territories, to the Spanish Netherlands. This, of course, would require the consent of various rulers, and Spain did not consider this impossible inasmuch as the Hapsburgs were overlords over most of the German states through the limited powers of the Emperor Matthias. There was also a marriage tie between the Spanish Hapsburg Princess, Anne, daughter of Philip III, and the ruler of France, Louis XIII (1610-1643). This marriage was but a temporary deceptive bond which veiled the fear, animosity, and distrust between Bourbon and Hapsburg and which remained as an underlying factor in the deepening European situation. However, for the time being, Spain felt that she could depend upon the cooperation of France.

France had been internally torn in the last half of the 16th century by her religious civil wars, which were ended by King Henry IV's issuance of the Edict of Nantes in 1598 which granted religious toleration to the Protestant minority. In the early 17th century, France was in the process of recovery and reorganization, of rebuilding her shattered economy, and of re-establishing peace among her loyal sons. The monarchy, though Catholic, found itself protecting
the Protestant minority, the Huguenots, against the wishes of the Catholic majority. The Popes, Clement VIII (1592-1605) and Paul V (1605-1621), found themselves favoring the French Bourbons over the Spanish Hapsburgs because as temporal rulers over the Papal States, they respected and feared the Hapsburg dominions, and scented the possibility of expansion of this power into their own Italian domain. Thus, the jealousy between the two leading Catholic states, France and Spain, was a wedge driven into what should have been the clear alignment of Protestant against Catholic states, and while the Popes should have seen it as their duty to align the powers over which they were the nominal spiritual head, they did nothing. The Bourbons were also in a position to deny, if they chose, the Spanish aim of reconquering the Dutch Netherlands. Spain could be blocked by sea as well as by land, and this consideration did little to make the Hapsburgs happy over their relationship with France.

Should France block her supply lines to the north, Spain would then have to seek routes farther east; even though the route were through the St. Gotthard, the Valtelline, or Brenner passes, the northern part of the route must needs pass through the German states of the Empire. At first glance this was not a problem inasmuch as the Empire was headed by an Austrian Hapsburg, Matthias, whose political and religious sympathies were ostensibly the same as those of the Spanish branch of the dynasty. There were, however, a few flaws in the Spanish strategy. The Rhine was necessary to Spain for rapid and easy transport of her forces enroute to Flanders. The Rhine flowed through territory ruled by the Count Palatine, Frederick, one of the seven
electors of the Holy Roman Empire, and he was a Protestant. Farther to the east lay Saxony, another electorate ruled by a Protestant. The Palatinate could block Spanish efforts along the Rhine to reach the Netherlands. It would be possible to go around the Palatinate to the east, but Saxony, ruled by a Protestant, would be in a position to make this move hazardous. There were also smaller German Protestant states which could cause trouble should the occasion ever arise. The prospect may have made even powerful Spain hesitate, had not another development come about within the Empire which embroiled Spain and much of Europe for the next thirty years.

Bohemia, a relatively small province in Hapsburg hands for almost one hundred and twenty years and peopled principally by Czechs, dominated three other provinces in close proximity to her, Silesia, Lusatia, and Moravia, over whom the Bohemian King had sovereign rights. In 1618, religious strife was common to the area with Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, and the Utraquists founded by John Hus, contesting for supremacy. The monarchy was Catholic while the greater part of the nobility were Lutheran, and yet the nobility supported the monarchy out of fear of the Calvinist minority. Catholicism was the official religion, while the other three were granted toleration. Emperor Rudolf II (1576-1612) attempted to withdraw this toleration from the Protestants in 1609, but even the Catholic nobility would not support this move and the Emperor was forced to grant a letter of majesty which guaranteed Protestants their right to worship.

Rudolf II, both the King of Bohemia and Holy Roman Emperor, had made Prague his imperial capital. He was succeeded in 1612 by
his brother Matthias, who although also wearing both crowns, moved the imperial capital to Vienna. The Bohemians resented this move, feeling that they were being downgraded into an Austrian province. Matthias, at his coronation, was already an elderly man and, in addition, had no heir or any prospects of ever having one. The Hapsburg dynasty decided that another Hapsburg, Archduke Ferdinand of Styria, although not in the direct line of succession, would be the successor to both crowns of Matthias. Since this would not present much of a problem within the hereditary dominions of the Hapsburgs, the Spanish head of the family, King Philip III, readily consented, on the condition that Ferdinand, as King of Bohemia, would let Spanish troops pass through and assist them through the German states northward to the Netherlands. This succession presented a different problem in Bohemia and in the Empire itself, inasmuch as here the crowns were elective. The views and actions of the Catholic Ferdinand toward Protestantism and popular government in Styria were well known and the Bohemians were not likely to go along with this upstart. So, in order to give Ferdinand the advantage of having the right of succession while the Emperor was still alive, Matthias brought pressure to bear upon the Protestant Czechs and conspired to have Ferdinand elected as his successor to the Bohemian throne in June 1617.

By May 1618 the Czechs, who were better organized, overthrew the Emperor's representatives in the well-known "defenestration of Prague." The revolt of the Czechs ran into leadership difficulties

---

and they finally accepted military help from the Palatine Elector, Frederick, and the Duke of Savoy, to hold off the imperial armies moving to suppress them. Frederick had a plan by which he hoped to establish peace in Bohemia. He aimed at having the Protestant Union, of which he was head, form an army, and with this plus Bohemian forces, persuade the Elector of Saxony, John George, to join the movement and thus prove to the Emperor Matthias that the Protestants were united and would use arms if necessary. Thus, Protestantism would be guaranteed in Bohemia, and the Empire would have a warning against any action directed toward the German Protestant states.

On 20 March 1619 the Emperor Matthias died, thereupon precipitating another crisis, namely, a meeting of the seven electors of the Holy Roman Empire to select a new Emperor. This meeting was called to meet at Frankfort-on-Main in mid-August. A few days before this imperial meeting, the Bohemians met to elect their new king with only the Electors of the Palatinate and of Saxony under consideration. Frederick of the Palatinate was elected king by one hundred and forty-six votes to seven. A few days later, and without the news from Bohemia having been received, Ferdinand of Styria was unanimously elected as the new Holy Roman Emperor, with even the absent Frederick's deputy voting for him. Ferdinand had been deposed by vote in Bohemia and elected to the imperial throne at the same time.

Frederick hesitated briefly, not sure of just which action he

\[^{3}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p.} \ 79.\]
\[^{4}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p.} \ 89.\]
should pursue. He felt that his quarrel with the Empire was one of political considerations while there was a moral issue at stake in Bohemia. He believed that the latter outweighed the former and in September 1619 Frederick agreed to accept the Bohemian crown. This was an open act of defiance and cost him the friendship of Maximilian, the Catholic Duke of Bavaria. In moving to Bohemia and taking armed forces with him, Frederick left the Palatinate and the Rhine exposed; Spain and the Empire soon moved to attack. In July 1620, Maximilian of Bavaria, with the army of the Catholic League commanded by Count Tilly, attacked Bohemia, and Marquis Ambrogio Spinola led Spanish forces up the Rhine from the Spanish Netherlands. By November, Frederick, having been easily defeated, slipped away toward Brandenburg. Even the Protestant Elector of Saxony had turned against him and Spain now occupied his beloved Palatinate.

No Protestant state had come forward to save Frederick and the Bohemians from defeat, as the Protestant princes believed that the armed struggle would end with the sacrifice of Frederick. Now, suddenly, the other European powers realized the danger of Spanish troops holding the Palatinate and the Rhine. Spanish as well as Austrian Hapsburg power was now in a position to consolidate its position and possibly extend its domains northward to the Baltic. So now began the desperate alliances to block the efforts of the Hapsburgs; those rendering military or monetary assistance were Denmark, France, England, Brandenburg, and the United Provinces. France, now under the guidance of Cardinal Richelieu, felt in particular that the Hapsburgs were encircling her. Richelieu began to spin the web
of his alliance system; by 1624 there were alliances between France and Holland; England then joined, as did Sweden, Denmark, Savoy, and Venice, while Brandenburg allied herself to Holland. The Valtelline, that strategic valley between Milan and Austria, through which the Spanish legions moved north, was occupied by Savoy and Venice in late 1624. Also, in the spring of 1625, the Duke of Savoy encircled Genoa and prevented its use by Spain. The "Spanish Road" between the Mediterranean, the Palatinate, and Flanders, was now blocked.

Seven years of varied fighting had now passed without any decision being reached; the wars were expanding into areas other than that of Germany. The blocking of the Valtelline, however, had divided the Hapsburg dominions from one another, throwing them on their own resources. If the northern states could properly form a joint military force, the time was ripe for some decisive stroke.

Ever since Frederick had been driven from Bohemia and his homeland, the Palatinate, all of Europe had watched closely to see what course of action James I of England would take in this vital matter concerning his only daughter, Elizabeth, and her husband, the Palatine Elector. Since coming to the English throne from Scotland in 1603, James had kept England out of war and in so doing had allowed his military and naval forces to seriously deteriorate. James considered himself essentially a man of peace and desired no further role for himself than that of "Peacemaker" among the European powers. He had lent himself as "mediator" in peace treaties between Sweden and Denmark, and Sweden and Russia, but now he was faced with the prospect of his own daughter being pushed from her throne by Catholic forces
and made to flee. When Frederick accepted the Bohemian throne, James made it known to all the rulers of Europe that he had not known or even suspected this project.⁵ James was determined to stay out of this entanglement and stubbornly resisted all pressure to go to the aid of his daughter. He did, however, countenance the sending of two thousand troops under the command of Sir Horace Vere in 1621 to aid the Dutch.⁶ These troops were not to represent England, however, nor would they be paid by her; they were in the service of the United Provinces and were so supported and paid.

James, a much more astute individual than he has often been considered, realized that England was in a poor position to do battle with Spain or the Empire either on land or on sea. Therefore, a notable change in British policy took place; prior to this, James had no policy other than hesitation, vacillation, and indecision. Since the end of the war with Spain in 1604, James had endeavored to work amicably with the Hapsburgs, seeing clearly that the prospects of war were unfavorable. Yet, somehow, Frederick and Elizabeth must be restored to the Palatinate, so James decided to use diplomacy and marriage as his means. His aim was to marry his son, Charles, the Prince of Wales, to a Spanish Infanta, and with friendly relations thus established, the new King of Spain, Philip IV, who had come to the throne in 1621, would influence the new Emperor Ferdinand to


restore Frederick to the Palatinate. As early as 1617, the Spanish Ambassador to England, Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuna, Count of Gondomar (1567-1626), had influenced James and dangled the Spanish marriage before him as a rich prize. In 1622, James took action to secure this plum by sending the newly created Earl of Bristol to Spain to arrange the match. This did not prove to be fast enough and in February of 1623, the impatient Prince Charles, along with George Villiers, the Duke of Buckingham (1592-1628), his father’s court favorite, went to Madrid to personally woo the Infanta.

The Spanish King, Philip IV, and his chief minister, Don Gaspar de Guzman, Count of Olivares, could not, however, see any great advantage to be gained for Spain by pressuring the Emperor to restore Frederick to the Palatinate. They had no objection to drawing out these pseudo-negotiations as long as possible to keep England friendly, however, and thus holding a potentially powerful enemy at bay. Pope Gregory XV also hoped that, through Spain, better conditions might be secured for Catholics in Great Britain, and stated that unless this came about he would not grant the required dispensation to permit the marriage. Gregory XV died in 1623 and was succeeded by Urban VIII, who was just as interested in promoting this Anglo-Spanish marriage.

While the real attitude of Spain toward the marriage appears to have been one of delay and deception, the Popes were apparently sincere in their aims although they were evidently unaware of the strength of Protestant feelings in England. Quite naturally, the Popes believed

---

that the marriage would eventually lead, through the requirements in
the dispensation and the children, to the return to Catholicism of
the reigning family in England. While James no doubt was right in
his attempt at an understanding with Spain concerning the war in Ger-
many, he would have had to agree to concessions to English Catholics
which would have gone against the sentiments of his people; had this
come about he might have been on dangerous ground concerning the
security of his crown.

Late that summer, Buckingham, finally realizing that they had
been duped by Gondomar and Olivares, convinced Charles of this fact;
they returned to England in October shame-faced and with rage in
their hearts toward Spain. Upon their return, all England went wild
with joy at the realization that there would be no Catholic marriage
for the heir to the throne. Parliament now demanded action of some
sort against Spain and the Emperor. With Charles and Buckingham also
pressuring him, James finally gave way, permitting an alliance to be
made with the other Protestant powers to regain the Palatinate and
restore Frederick to his throne. Twenty thousand soldiers were con-
scripted and sent to the United Provinces under the command of Ernest,
Count Mansfeld, an outstanding German professional soldier. These
English levies were again to be under the command and control of the
United Provinces. Parliament had been clamoring for naval action,
but James stubbornly refused, insisting instead upon military action
in the Palatinate.

In the midst of these preparations, James I died, on 27 March
1625. Charles I, on accession to the throne, advised by Buckingham,
and with the support of Parliament and the English people, made immediate plans for a naval expedition against Spain. Their policy was a continuation of that of James, but they intended more direct action against Spain than the hesitating, indirect type propounded by the late sovereign.

In retrospect it may be seen that there were several contributing factors for the long-delayed decision for England to wage war against Spain. The religious issue of Catholic versus Protestant was paramount and in most cases determined which side a state would take in the Thirty Years War. There were exceptions to this, such as Saxony, and later France, but in the main the Thirty Years War was one of religion with secondary dynastic considerations. Another factor was Spain's denial of trading rights to England in the New World. This had been one of the reasons for the war begun under Elizabeth and ended by James in 1604 with the question unresolved. Another reason was the desire of Charles I to restore his sister, Elizabeth, to her Palatinate throne. While Charles was no doubt as disinterested in the Palatinate as James had been, he felt morally bound to try to recover Elizabeth's throne. Another major factor was the influence of Buckingham. As court favorite and chief minister, Buckingham felt that he and Charles had been played for fools by Spain in the negotiations over the marriage treaty; little doubt appears that both thirsted for revenge. Buckingham saw himself not only as a great diplomat, but as a master strategist, and it was he who planned the naval attack against the coast of Spain. The main desire for war of the English people, however, was over the religious issue.
CHAPTER II

THE ROYAL NAVY DURING THE REIGN OF JAMES I

Elizabeth's principal legacy to James I was that great and powerful institution, the Royal Navy. In 1588, the year of the defeat of the Spanish Armada, the Royal Navy was at its pinnacle. The year of the expedition to Cadiz, 1625, saw it near its nadir. In 1603 this tool of international power fell into the unsteady hands of James I, who apparently did not know how to use it effectively, if at all. The Royal Navy in 1603 was the best then afloat. It may not have been the largest, but it was the most effective, and much of this was due to its commanders and the men who manned the fleet.

The decline of the Royal Navy, however, did not begin abruptly in 1603, nor did it begin after this date. The actual decline of the Royal Navy had begun during the last fifteen years of Elizabeth's reign, after the defeat of the Armada in 1588; in fact, even during this great spectacle shortages of powder had developed causing ships of the line to give up their pursuit of the heavy sailing Spanish ships. Admiral Sir William Monson in his Naval Tracts described the neglect of the Navy during the latter part of Elizabeth's rule when Sir Richard Leveson was unable to attack the Spanish treasure flota returning from the New World because of his weakened squadron; half of his ships had been left in Plymouth due to the lack of sailors to man them. He also spoke of many of the old Elizabethan sailors preferring to sail on merchant vessels where life, food, and pay were
better than in the Royal Navy. The tough, famed, old Elizabethan sea
dogs, Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher, Wynter, Grenville, and Burroughs,
were all gone by the beginning of James Stuart's reign. Charles
Howard, Earl of Nottingham, the commander in 1588, remained Lord High
Admiral until 1619. It was under his administration that the unscrup-
ulousness, malpractice, dishonesty, graft, and bribery in ministering
the Royal Navy reached its peak. While Nottingham served in his
capacity as grand strategist of the fleet, it is apparent that he
took little interest in naval administration, operations, or logis-
tics. He was now very old and much of what he should have known
escaped him. Actually many of his troubles can be traced to Sir
Robert Mansell, a relative, who had been appointed naval treasurer
in 1604. The treasurer, who was responsible for the finances of the
navy and charged with their supervision, profited personally from
his under-the-counter dealings, ordering materials three or four times
over for the same purpose and trafficking in differences in prices
paid for matériel and that charged to the Crown. Cheating on allow-
ances, fraud, embezzlement, the sale and purchase of places, all of
these were charged to Mansell and he was finally removed in 1618 after
fourteen years of corruption.¹ Oddly enough, his dismissal did not
result in loss of court influence. Incapacity in one's position or
dishonesty did not bar one from the King's favor, and when Mansell was
relieved of his duties as treasurer, he was made lieutenant of the

¹See Oppenheim, A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy
and of Merchant Shipping in Relation to the Navy: from MDIX to MDCLX
with an Introduction Treating of the Preceding Period (London, 1896,
Admiralty for life on a pension.² In addition, he was selected to lead the Algiers expedition of 1620-21.

Many of the sailors preferred to serve on privately-managed ships rather than in the King's ships. Due to the poor condition of men and ships, disease was an extremely great problem; the crews themselves were often the dregs of the waterfronts and poor crews will result in poorly-operated ships. The sailors were not properly fed, paid, or quartered; even if their conduct was good, severe punishments were meted out for the smallest of misdemeanors. Flogging, keelhauling, tongue-scraping, ducking, and weights hung around their necks, were common punishments for bad conduct.³ As an odd corollary, psalms were sung at the changing of the watches on shipboard, and religious services were required to be held at least twice each day, but such things as edible food, prompt payment of wages, hospitalization, and adequate clothing for the crews were neglected. Small wonder that men would go to any lengths to avoid serving in the Royal Navy or when pressed into service, they often deserted.⁴ Personnel employed as shipkeepers at the large naval shipyard at Chatham included tailors, bakers, weavers, husbandmen, barbers, mechanics, and many varied occupations other than that of experienced naval personnel. An inventory at Chatham by Joseph Downing in 1625 stated that one of the

²Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of James I, 1611-1618, Preserved in the State Paper Department of Her Majesty's Public Record Office (London, 1858), VIII, 541.
³Oppenheim, Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 188.
⁴Ibid., p. 187.
primary reasons for the navy being weakly manned was that the boats-
wains and gunners pressed persons of any trade, kept them for a few
years, and then dismissed them, so that no care was taken to develop
able seamen. The report further stated that the guarding of the
navy's ships by insufficient shipkeepers who did not know their busi-
ness would result in: general carelessness of service; lingering of
the crews on shore, and disorderly conduct there; and damage to the
ships through negligence or ignorance. It is apparent from the fore-
going facts that Royal Navy ships were not being properly maintained
even when inactive.

Because merchant ships formed the larger part of the Royal Navy
during times of crises, it is imperative to consider them in addition
to the Royal Navy. When a crisis arose, as the threat of the Spanish
Armada in 1588, the sovereign would call the merchant ships to assist
those regularly assigned to the Royal Navy. Although normally lightly
armed, the commercial ships were usually better maintained and were
better "sailors" than the navy's ships. Because of the poor pay and
ill treatment received in the Royal Navy, many skilled seamen turned
to private or commercial shipping for employment. Their choice was
poorly timed because England was hard hit by the falling off of her
commercial shipping during the reign of James I. It was a lamentable
period for the English merchant marine, for the Dutch, with less
costly-built ships, lower pay for their private sailors, and cheaper
shipping rates, cut heavily into England's sea trade. In 1620 the

---

6 Oppenheim, Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 199.
number of London-owned ships had fallen to one-half of what it had been in past years; many ships were sold to other countries for want of their employment.\(^7\) The owners took substantial losses in selling their vessels, sometimes as much as one-half or two-thirds of the original costs of the ships. The Levant Company found its trade ruined by pirates in the Mediterranean and even more so by the inroads made by Dutch merchants, who also controlled the extensive trade with Scandinavia. The Muscovy Company could only employ two vessels where-as in the past it had been seventeen. Most of the coal traffic from Newcastle was now borne in foreign vessels and the Hollanders had also taken over the fisheries, even those in English waters. The only area in which English seamen maintained their supremacy was in the Iceland and Newfoundland fisheries; the Greenland fisheries, on the other hand, were being strongly contested by the irrepressible Dutch. In the most prosperous overseas operation, namely, the East India Company, England had to face the fact that the Dutch East India Company's profits were larger than that of her Company's.\(^8\) Little wonder, then, that many loyal Englishmen turned to piracy as practically the only way left in which they could survive while plying their own seaman's trade with its hard-earned skills.

Pirate ships, manned by motley international crews, swarmed in the Mediterranean, the Bay of Biscay, the Irish Sea, and the English Channel. Complaints from ship owners were constantly being received

\(^7\)Cal. St. P., Domestic, 1611-1618, p. 607.
\(^8\)Oppenheim, Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 200.
and little was done by England to curb the depredations of these daring sea raiders. Since James had come to the throne, the pirates had grown even bolder. The maladministration of the Royal Navy was now seriously felt as little was done by the few poorly-manned and ill-maintained ships supposedly guarding Britain's shores. The condition of the ships did not meet that of the pirates. The Royal Navy ships were old, foul-bottomed hulks for the most part and could not match the pirates in either vessels, equipment, crews, or gunnery. The Venetian Ambassador to England noted that the Narrow Seas were infested with these sea-robbers, who had become all the bolder "because the King seems to have sunk into a lethargy of pleasures, and will not take any heed of matters of state." If the English were slow to move against the pirates in the English Channel, the Dutch were not. In 1611 a fleet was organized under their Admiral Lambert to wipe out these freebooters. To the shame of the Royal Navy, permission was granted to this fleet not only to perform police work in English waters, but even to enter Irish harbors to track down the pirates. England not only stood this blow to her national pride, but amnesty was offered to those pirates who were English subjects in the hope of employing them in the Royal Navy. The pirates spurned the offer, realizing that the inactive fleet offered little chance of employment. Between 1609 and 1616 the

---

9 Horatio F. Brown, ed., Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Relating to English Affairs, Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice, and in Other Libraries of Northern Italy, 1603-1507 (London, 1900), X, 90.


11 Ibid., p. 25.
Algerian pirates captured four hundred and sixty-six British ships and made slaves of their crews. The light on Lizard Head in Cornwall, which acted as a beacon for mariners, was even in danger of being extinguished as claims were made that it was a guide more for pirates than for other ships. To such a state had the Royal Navy and the merchant marine sunk under the sovereignty of James I, the "Caledonian Solomon."

Among other things ship owners and commercial captains bitterly resented was James' cancellation of all existing Letters of Marque and his subsequent refusal to issue more. It had been the practice of Henry VIII and Elizabeth to issue Letters of Marque to private shippers who could arm their vessels and defend themselves. This document, for the privateer, became in effect, his passport, his license, his identity card, and his commission. This paper, signed by the sovereign, stated that the privateer was not acting on his own, but was acting for his country against her enemies. It was the only real evidence that the privateer captain had to prove that he was not a pirate. When captured, he would be treated as a prisoner of war, albeit a private one, but without the Letter of Marque he would be executed for piracy. James stopped issuing these Letters of Marque, but his fellow-rulers did not. This made it near-fatal for the privateers, who had to respect other nation's Letters of Marque, while they could produce none to protect themselves. Thus,

---

12 Oppenheim, Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 198.
13 Ibid., p. 199.
English private shipping operated with great disadvantages. In years past, the privateer, should he lose his property to an enemy, could take back from another the value of the good which he had lost. The English ship owner could not expect protection from the Crown inasmuch as the Royal Navy was very small and the King's ships were usually laid up for repairs for one reason or another. It is understandable, then, that this was a recessionary period in English trade and shipping.

The power of the pirates continued unchecked until the suffering London merchants and ship owners took matters into their own hands in 1617. They requested six Royal Navy ships be loaned to them to form the nucleus of a squadron which they would control themselves while underwriting most of its costs. The goal of this squadron was to be an attack on the pirate stronghold, Algiers, on the North African Coast, in the hope of exterminating them once and for all. The merchants offered the Earl of Southampton forty thousand crowns if he would command the squadron for them, but the Spanish Ambassador, Count Gondomar, who had James' ear as usual, contrived to block and delay the merchants' plans, not wanting an English squadron in the Mediterranean. James finally refused the loan of the ships unless his own officers were in command. The merchants then withdrew their offer of partially financing the venture, to the satisfaction of the Spaniards, who were wary of English intentions. By now, however, the


\[\text{15}\] Penn, Navy Under the Early Stuarts, p. 48.
King's attention had been drawn directly to the condition of his Royal Navy, and in 1618 James ordered the appointment of a commission to inquire into its condition and alleged abuses. The Duke of Buckingham, James' court favorite, had long desired to head the administration of the navy, and he, no doubt, greatly influenced James in the creation of this new commission. In May 1618, Sir Robert Mansell, Treasurer, was replaced by Sir William Russell, a merchant, who paid Mansell for the position. Russell's appointment was not limited to financial matters, especially the proper keeping of accounts. In February 1619, Buckingham bought out the Lord High Admiral, the Earl of Nottingham, who was then retired with a substantial pension. With control of the Royal Navy removed from the feeble fingers of Nottingham and the grasping ones of Mansell, the commissioners and Buckingham immediately began to institute reforms to negate the past years of abuses and corruption. The commissioner's first report of their plans and findings was tendered to James in September 1619. The report stated their plan of reducing expenses from fifty-six thousand pounds to thirty thousand pounds per year; to increase efficiency; to build two new ships per year; to repair those ships "rotting" in the shipyards; and to construct new docks at Chatham. It was further resolved that a minimum of thirty ships should be maintained until the figure of forty had been achieved, by the addition of the two vessels which had been ordered to be built each year.

---


The commission was partly made up of merchants; in the future it could be expected that the Royal Navy would be run on a business-like basis. This, finally, was progressive action. Although it took many years for the Royal Navy to recover and work its way out of the cul-de-sac into which it had been blindly sailed, at least it had a fair wind and proper direction.

Later in that fateful year, 1619, Buckingham, in his new role of Lord Admiral, influenced James to the extent that plans were laid for the fitting out of an expedition against Algiers to wipe out the pirates operating from this strategic harbor. A fleet of twenty-five ships was decided upon and work was begun to make them ready for sea. It was discovered that the ships of the Royal Navy were in such poor condition from their years of inactivity, that it would take much longer than anticipated to make them seaworthy. Because of this and the usual lack of King's money during the reign of James, it was not until October 1620, that the fleet sailed under the command of Sir Robert Mansell, now in Buckingham's favor. Oddly enough, this was the first English fleet to sail the waters of the Mediterranean as a political force, and it was at a time when England's naval reputation was at its lowest point in her proud history. An English squadron under Essex had raided and put the torch to Cadiz in 1596, but had not entered the Mediterranean. This new venture in 1620 did nothing to enhance England's now tarnished reputation. Mansell blundered from place to place, twice sailed to Algiers, twice accomplished nothing, found no pirates to destroy or even to pursue, and finally returned to home waters eleven months later.
War clouds hung over Europe on his return in 1621. With Frederick driven from Bohemia and the Palatinate, James and his ministers were glad to see Mansell's fleet return to home waters, despite the ignominious failure in the Mediterranean. Mansell received the blame for the failure of this expedition, although he had been severely limited in his actions by his superiors at home and allowed no latitude for his own decisions. This expedition, although a failure, marked the first attempt of England to influence the European situation by the presence of a fleet in the Mediterranean. It is remembered for its failure, but there is little doubt but that its presence irritated Spain. Actually the efforts of Gondomar to neutralize the English fleet had seen its employment in the last place Spain wanted it—in Spanish waters! Spain only breathed easier when the fleet was called home. The method of employment of the fleet, however, only served to point up the weakness of the English naval administration, its indecision, and lack of proper control over fleet elements.

Of the ships themselves, their condition and use during the tenure of James I, they were not much of a threat of any sort, except during the last years of the reign when they were being rebuilt and new ships were being added to the fleet. From 1603 to 1619, only five totally new ships had been added, and two of these were but small pinnaces, in comparison to the thirty-five new ships added during the

---


last eighteen years of Elizabeth's reign. After the naval commission took over the administration of the fleet in 1619, ten new ships were added, two per year except in 1621, the last additions during James' reign. It was the gap of sixteen years in James reign during which the Royal Navy was neglected and allowed to deteriorate. It took the Royal Navy thirty years to recover from this neglect because while the deterioration might be recognized, the resulting damage to ships, materiel, crews, discipline, and morale cannot be repaired easily, especially when such a long period of time had been involved during which the rot had eaten deeply. Fortunately for the Royal Navy, for James, and particularly for England, the Royal Navy was not seriously called upon for action during the reign of the "Wisest Fool in Christendom." There is little doubt that had it been called upon it would not have been able to deliver, as its command and administration would have broken down under the stresses of warfare. The work of the commissioners compared to the confusion and chaos that preceded their taking office had been miraculous, but their efforts were often hampered by lack of royal direction and always by lack of money.

Although James had been instrumental in the resurrection of the Royal Navy and had started it on its long road to recovery, he must still bear the brunt of the responsibility for the condition into which it had sunk. As early as 1608 James had been aware of the peculations and misdeeds of his Royal Navy administrators. That he had chosen

---

20 Ibid., pp. 120-21.
21 Ibid., p. 215.
to do nothing, to let matters rest, to favor those persons involved in the maladministration of naval affairs, and to risk the security of the nation itself, has been detrimental to James' memory. He is remembered for these latter things and not for beginning the recovery of England's lost naval prestige. The foregoing marks the status of the Royal Navy at the accession to the throne of Charles I on 27 March 1625. Inasmuch as England's fellow nations had little regard for her as a power in 1625, it must have been apparent to them that the weapon with which Charles was about to wage a war had been considerably dulled and blunted during his predecessor's reign.
CHAPTER III

PREPARATIONS FOR THE EXPEDITION

As early as 1620, Charles and Buckingham had urged James to take an active role in the war sweeping over Europe. Stubbornly, James had resisted their influence, hoping that a peaceful settlement could be reached. When Charles and Buckingham had returned empty-handed from Spain in October, 1623, after failing to arrange for an acceptable marriage treaty, they again pleaded for a war against the now-hated Spaniards. The Privy Council and Court had been in almost complete agreement with the young, hot-blooded pair, and yet James had resisted.

By January 1624, however, James had, to a great extent, yielded. Writs had been issued for a new Parliament. Ambassadors of war had been ordered to Savoy, Venice, Denmark, Sweden, and the courts of the north German princes. An alliance had been made with the Dutch Republic to assist them with troops. A marriage linking Charles and the French princess, Henrietta Maria, youngest daughter of Marie de Medici, had been proposed by Buckingham; Lord Kensington had been dispatched to Paris to sound out the French on the project. Spain, alarmed at the turn of events, had realized what a hostile English fleet in the Atlantic and Mediterranean could mean, and also that she had made

enemies out of Charles and Buckingham. On 13 January 1624, the Spanish Ambassadors, Inojosa and Coloma, had informed James that before the end of August, that part of the Palatinate occupied by Spanish troops would be turned over to England. Any other points in doubt were to be settled by negotiation. James, the man of peace, had considered this carefully and had agreed to consult the Commissioners for Spanish Affairs, a body of twelve of his leading Privy Councillors. The Commissioners had informed him that there was no reason to persist with the Spanish proposal. The Spanish proposals had then been refused. Buckingham had reached a greater position of power than ever before; James had yielded right into his inexperienced hands. War with Spain had been considered, had been found a necessity, and no other justification had been required.

Even when James was master of his house, however, there had been a divergence of opinion as to future war plans. Commons demanded aggressive action against Spain and as little as possible in Germany, while James wanted just the reverse. With Buckingham and Charles in control, the major effort would be directed against Spain, the Spanish fleets, and the West Indies, with military operations confined to a minor role supporting the Dutch Republic. When James faced Commons in March 1624, he refused to explain his war plans, claiming that he was not dependent upon Parliament for military advice, but upon a Council of War, which he would appoint. All war plans must be left to the King, but he promised to call Parliament in the autumn when he

---

would give an account of his expenditures and ask their sanction for further prosecution of the war. In March, the Parliament voted him three hundred thousand pounds, about one-third of that which had been considered as necessary for the contemplated alliances and projects.\textsuperscript{3}

In January, Letters of Reprisal had been granted to merchants and ship owners. These were equivalent to the Letters of Marque mentioned in Chapter II, and had authorized the seizure of Spanish or Dutch ships in reprisal for loss of their own.\textsuperscript{4} It had been many years since this odd form of protection had been granted to the ship owners and was welcomed with relief. These acts had been handled differently than in the past, however, as these matters were controlled by the Admiralty. To obtain a Letter of Reprisal, the ship owners had to first produce evidence of their losses. When they seized a Spanish or Dutch ship, it had to be brought to a port where an Admiralty Court would judge the disposition of the ship and cargo, insuring that the captor would receive the value of his previous loss, with the balance to the Crown.

In February, in an effort to strengthen the English fleet, the Privy Council directed Sir John Elliott and James Bagg, vice admirals of Cornwall and Devon, to seize all English seamen serving on Dutch ships which were in harbors in their areas of control.\textsuperscript{5} These trained seamen were to be employed in the Royal Navy now preparing for action,

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., pp. 31-32.
\textsuperscript{5}Ibid., 39, 677.
and on 18 April, orders were issued to fit out twelve ships of the Royal Navy.  

On 21 April a Council of War was appointed with the supposed responsibility of advising the sovereign. Its members were men of talent and ability: Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke; Sir Thomas Button; Lord Carew, Master of the Ordnance, and former President of Munster; Sir Edward Cecil; Lord Chichester, the soldier and statesman; Sir Edward Conway; Sir Oliver St. John, Lord Grandison, former soldier and Lord Deputy of Ireland; Sir John Ogle; and Sir Horace Vere, some of the best military brains of the time. The tenth member was Sir Robert Mansell. It must be pointed out that of ten members of the Council of War, nine were soldiers, and only one, Mansell, had any naval experience—hardly enough experienced seamen to plan an expedition which depended so much upon the navy. These men were selected, no doubt, because they had fairly recent military experience either in the Netherlands or in Ireland, and because England possessed few senior naval officers with combat experience. Furthermore, the appointment of Ogle, Vere, Conway, Cecil, and Mansell, smacked of favoritism a la Buckingham.

To point up the odd relationships of the times, England had a military alliance with the Dutch Republic, and yet had issued Letters of Reprisal to be used against the Hollanders as well as against the Spaniards. Bitter rivalries existed between the overseas commercial

7 Ibid., p. 220.
enterprises of the two nations and in May, news of the Amboina massacre had reached England. Amboina, an Indonesian island in the Moluccas, the center of the clove trade, had been taken by the Dutch from Spain in 1607. By the treaty of 1619, English traders had been given rights to operate on the island. In a dispute, ten Englishmen had been tortured and put to death. When the news reached England, there had been an outcry at first, but this died away quickly as the public had not been interested in charges against an ally, particularly when the common enemy had been Catholic Spain.

In the continuing naval build up, the Council of War issued orders on 19 May to fit out thirty merchant vessels in addition to the twelve Royal Navy ships previously ordered to be made ready. On June, by another treaty recently negotiated, England agreed to send six thousand soldiers to the Dutch Republic to aid them in their fight for independence and to eventually recover the Palatinate. Except for a formal declaration England was in fact involved in the general war. The King, however, adhered to the technicality and hesitated, before issuing an open declaration of war. He refused to risk an open war with Spain unless he knew who his allies would be. That he wanted France, in particular, to side with him was clear. French aid in the overall project was tempting indeed; whether he could convince one Catholic state to wage war upon another remained to be seen.

On 17 May, the Earl of Carlisle was dispatched to Paris to work with Lord Kensington, who had been there for some months, in an effort

---

8Penn, Navy Under the Early Stuarts, p. 107.
to consummate the plans for the French marriage. The negotiations droned on through the summer months with neither side willing to meet the other's demands. England pressed for a military alliance against Spain and the Empire, while France insisted that English Catholics be allowed to worship in freedom. James, upon the urging of Bucking-
ham and Charles, finally gave in. He promised Parliament, however, that no such compromise would be included in any treaty with France.

To get around this promise, James made the Catholic religious freedom issue binding in a separate letter, receiving only verbal promises from Louis XIII in exchange. To avoid facing Parliament, James pro-
rogued that body until 26 February, using the excuse of the plague, which made London an unsafe place to meet. He hoped that once the marriage was consummated and the bride was safe in England, the circumstances of her coming would have been forgotten. The marriage treaty was signed by the ambassadors on 10 November 1622.\(^9\)

In a flash of his old self and still disliking the idea of a direct contest with Spain, James had convinced the Council of War in October that more military aid should be furnished to the Dutch Repub-
lic. It is not known what arguments he used to sway this group, but on 3 October and 22 November, warrants had been issued to empower the payment of fifteen thousand pounds for the costs of levying troops for Count Mansfeld, and forty thousand pounds to pay these soldiers for two months.\(^{10}\) On 29 October orders had been issued to levy twelve

---


\(^{10}\)Cal. St. P., Domestic, 1623-1625, pp. 348, 386.
thousand men to be ultimately sent to the Netherlands under Mansfeld. These troops were to be used only for the recovery of the Palatinate. Plans for this project, apparently the King's own, were completed without any agreement with the German princes. James seemed to believe that his army sent into the Palatinate against Spanish, Austrian, and Bavarian troops, was a different matter than actual direct war with Spain. The theater of conflict seemed to matter a great deal to James. He expected coordinated action from France to assist in the passage of Mansfeld's forces, but France had already secured the Valtelline, her primary interest, with the assistance of Venice and Savoy, and thus had no use for Mansfeld or his troops. To the dismay of James, France had refused to let Mansfeld land; thus, the latter and his wretched army had been forced to land at Flushing, in the Netherlands, on 1 February 1625. This motley army suffered from the outset from a lack of food, shelter, and clothing, and had embarked with only four or five day's supply of rations. In the cold and snow of the continent, sickness broke out; by March, roughly three thousand of the original force of twelve thousand men were capable of bearing arms. The prospects of Mansfeld's ever reaching Germany with this wasted force grew dimmer every day.

In the midst of these events, the unhappy James died on 27 March 1625. Henceforth, Charles and Buckingham were free to pursue their own course without interference. On 9 May, Charles directed the establishment of a Committee of his Privy Council consisting of

\[\text{\footnote{Donald Nicholas, \textit{Mr. Secretary Nicholas (1593-1699) His Life and Letters} (London, 1955), p. 10.}}\]
Buckingham, Pembroke, Ley, Conway, and Brook, to advise him on foreign affairs. One of their first actions was to secure a loan of forty thousand pounds in Amsterdam to assist Mansfeld and his suffering troops. A congress of the northern powers was to meet at the Hague, but inasmuch as this had been slow in assembling, Charles made a separate agreement with the King of Denmark, who would enter the war with a subsidy of thirty thousand pounds per month from England. He made all of these plans without the advise or consent of Parliament, an obstacle which Charles believed he could surmount through his personal popularity. Thus did Charles badly misjudge the temper of his first Parliament.

Buckingham first expounded his grandiose idea of a naval attack upon Spain in December 1624. After James' demise he proposed going ahead with this venture. Twelve Royal Navy ships, twenty armed merchantmen, and fifty colliers, to serve as transports, were ordered to Plymouth in June. Buckingham proffered thirty thousand pounds of his own funds to begin the operation. On 5 May, the Privy Council sent warrants to the various counties by which ten thousand landsmen were to be pressed to serve as soldiers with the fleet. The local authorities were directed to march their levies to Plymouth by 25 June. On 16 May, some of the northern counties were directed to send levies to

---

13 Ibid., p. 41.
the port of Hull, near the mouth of the River Humber, on the North Sea. The reason for the diversion was to ship two thousand of these pressed men to the Netherlands in exchange for two thousand seasoned English troops, which were to be used to steady the untrained, raw recruits reporting to Plymouth. Buckingham did this without consulting the Dutch, who, to his chagrin, refused to part with the two thousand experienced English troops under their control. They finally consented, but insisted that whole companies be replaced, so that some inexperienced men would be taken along with the seasoned veterans. The Dutch changed their minds, however, as they considered their army to be too weak without the English veterans, and the original two thousand untrained men were then shipped to Plymouth. Buckingham also invited the Dutch Republic to join the naval attack on Spain; they consented to provide twenty ships. At the same time the Dutch indicated that they would bring to trial those responsible for the Amboina massacre, a move which served to clear away any dissension which had existed.

On May Day 1625 Charles married Princess Henrietta Maria by proxy in front of the west doors of Notre Dame Cathedral. Charles was represented by the French Duke of Chevreuse, a distant relative through his great-grandmother, Mary of Guise. For the sake of a close union with France, the marriage treaty bound England to grant religious toleration to Catholics, a policy which, when known, would cost

---

15 Ibid., p. 54.
Buckingham and Charles the popularity which they momentarily enjoyed. It was a risky arrangement indeed, for no one knew in which direction the French might turn. No peace had yet been reached between the Catholic government of France and Prince Charles Soubise and his Protestant Huguenots of Rochelle. The English people, favoring the Huguenots, closely watched their treatment by the French, while the French observed the treatment of English Catholics. It seemed impossible for the two nations to work together in harmony; except for loans concerning English warships, they never reached a state of compatibility. Buckingham made a personal visit to the French Court in mid-May, believing that through his glittering presence he would be able to persuade France to a joint campaign against Spain. Louis XIII agreed to donate one hundred thousand pounds toward the war expenses of the King of Denmark; to continue his share of Mansfeld's costs for seven months more, and to provide him with two thousand French cavalry. Beyond this he could not be moved. Buckingham hoped for a grand diplomatic success which would ultimately result in a tremendous military and naval victory over Spain. He needed this desperately because he realized that he and Charles would be in dire trouble when the news of the concessions to English Catholics reached the ears of Parliament and the public. But he returned bitterly disappointed, having yielded a great deal with little in return.

On 18 June, Parliament finally met, having been prorogued again by James at its last scheduled assembly in February. It was an

---

18 Ibid., p. 181.
incredibly difficult task which Charles now faced. He must persuade the Commons to grant him fantastic sums of money to attempt schemes which they knew nothing about and on which their advice had not been asked. These proposed projects, of which the Commons were unaware, were extremely expensive. Requirements for the next year included three hundred and sixty thousand pounds for the King of Denmark; two hundred and forty thousand pounds for Mansfeld; one hundred thousand pounds for the troops in the Netherlands under the Dutch; three hundred thousand pounds for the fleet: a rough total of one million pounds! This figure, over three times the amount of the subsidies granted in 1624, was an unheard of sum. Commons was reluctant to grant supply without knowing where and how it was to be used. Charles, a blind believer in the divine right of kingship and his royal prerogative, refused to tell them anything. At the last meeting of Parliament, James had promised an explanation of his policy, but Charles ignored the promise and believed that the Commons, through their faith in him should grant the sums asked without his having to furnish any explanation. On 30 June he received two subsidies, a total of around one hundred and forty thousand pounds. This was a bitter pill for Charles to swallow. Desperately needful of money, he was blocked at every turn by his own stubbornness. Even his income from tonnage and poundage was in jeopardy. Since the days of Henry VI the duties on imports and exports had been granted for the lifetime of the sovereign in the first session of his rule. It was proposed by Sir

---

19 Ibid., p. 187.
20 Ibid., p. 200.
Walter Erle of Dorsetshire that these monies, which could be better used elsewhere, should be held in abeyance for a year so that the whole matter could be studied further. No action was taken in either direction, so there the matter was allowed to rest.

Buckingham then selected Sir John Coke to inform Commons as to the amounts required by Charles to carry out his policies. The amounts, though understated, shocked Commons; in fact, they did absolutely nothing. Parliament was then adjourned until 1 August; it was to meet at Oxford because of the plague. The meeting at Oxford was entirely fruitless for Charles and Buckingham. It consisted of twelve days of argument and debate, during which time Buckingham himself defended his foreign policies, but the Commons would not bend. The difference of opinion between Parliament and Crown had boiled down to a power contest with neither side prepared to surrender its rights. Un fortunately for Charles, the Commons controlled the purse strings and he was cut off from his sources of revenue. On 12 August, amidst great bitterness and dissatisfaction on both sides, Charles prorogued the Oxford Parliament.

On 14 August the Privy Council met at Woodstock and agreed that the fleet preparations should continue. On 23 August, they levied certain of the counties for an additional one thousand nine hundred and fifty pressed men and ordered them to be at Plymouth on 12 September. This body also issued a warrant on the same date directed to mayors and sheriffs to assist the following gentlemen, the leaders in

---

the expedition then forming, to get to Plymouth with all possible speed: Sir Edward Cecil, Lord Viscount de Valentia, Sir William St. Leger, Sir Edward Harwood, and Sir John Burroughs. On 14 May, Buckingham had written to Sir Edward Cecil, then serving in Holland, offering him the post of Lord Marshal, or second in command, of the expedition preparing to attack Spanish shipping. This came as a great surprise to Cecil, who had seen little service outside of the Low Countries, although he had been appointed as a member of the Council of War by James in 1624. Not until 5 September did Cecil reach Plymouth, where shortly he received an even greater surprise.

At Plymouth the fleet preparations had been going on since the end of April. Ships, seamen, and provisions were everywhere. The merchant ships, consisting mainly of East Coast colliers and traders, were reported ready and had been provisioned with bread, beer, pork, beef, butter, cheese, rice, oatmeal, ling, cod, and oil. Some of these items were already spoiled. Some provisions, especially the bags of biscuit, were short in weight. Disease raged among the pressed soldiers and sailors assembled at Plymouth, and hardly a boat went ashore without some of its men deserting. The ships were leaky and many had defective equipment. The St. George was fitted with sails which had been on the Triumph in 1588 while the shrouds had been on

---

22 Ibid., p. 137.
23 Penn, Navy Under the Early Stuarts, p. 139.
24 Reade, Sidelights, pp. 473-74.
the old Garland built in 1590. The Lion, under command of the Rear Admiral, Sir Francis Steward, was in such poor condition she had to be left behind when the fleet eventually sailed.\(^\text{26}\) The few professional officers who were there warned the Council and Buckingham of the type of results to be expected with such quality of men, materiel, and provisions. The veteran soldier, Sir John Ogle, was temporarily in command of the troops at Plymouth pending the arrival of the Lord Admiral, Buckingham, and the Lord Marshal, Cecil. Although Ogle possessed but one eye, it was that of a professional soldier, and the more he saw of the raw, untrained recruits arriving in Plymouth, the less he liked them.\(^\text{27}\) For some weeks prior to Cecil's arrival, Ogle asked Lord Conway to release him from his assignment. Buckingham, well knowing Ogle's capabilities and reputation, offered him the post of colonel-general of troops, second only to Lord Marshal Cecil. Not even this lucrative post could tempt Ogle after seeing the tools of war provided him. In early August, Buckingham decided that he would not go on the expedition as supreme commander. When Ogle heard that Buckingham would not sail, he had no qualms about declining the appointment offered him.\(^\text{28}\)

Why in the final analysis did Buckingham decide to remain at home? There is little reason to believe that he thought the expedition

\(^{26}\text{Ibid., p. 220.}\)


\(^{28}\text{Ibid., pp. 126-27.}\)
would fail, because it would have been more of a detriment to him had he known this and let it happen than had he merely cancelled the expedition's plans. He stood to lose more through the failure of the expedition than had he decided to employ the men and ships elsewhere. A more likely reason was that his presence was required at the long-deferred conference to be held at the Hague in the attempt to establish a northern alliance of powers against the Hapsburgs. The Duke always had great confidence in his own abilities; perhaps, he thought he could do more for England and himself in the role of diplomat. Although he relinquished command of the expedition to Cecil, Buckingham retained the title of generalissimo of the fleet, to the great amusement of the sailors. Sir Edward Cecil was then placed in an odd predicament by Buckingham's sudden decision to offer him the supreme command of the armada. To refuse such an opportunity would be throwing away any future advancement; in accepting, he would be placed above many men who were his superiors in rank. To counter this latter problem, during a visit of Charles and Buckingham to Plymouth, the Duke obtained an immediate peerage for Cecil, who was created Viscount Wimbledon, on the ground that this additional rank would enable him to better control his subordinates.

It is rather difficult to understand why Cecil was selected to command this expedition. He had no naval experience whatsoever, yet this was to be a joint land-sea operation. His only military experience had been in the Low Countries serving with the methodical Dutch. He had a reputation for being a good officer, but had no outstanding talents as such. He had never enjoyed an independent command, although
he had been appointed a member of the Council of War and stood high in Buckingham's favor. The latter, however, was no measurement of talent, merely an indication of patronage. In any event, it was a strange business, the shifting of responsibility and the rapid rise to the peerage by a stranger to the limelight.

However weak his powers as a naval commander might have been, Cecil still had a soldier's eye for troops, and he detected that something was wrong with those under his command at Plymouth. He wrote to Lord Conway on 8 September trying to find out why the troops had been levied in the spring for service in the fall inasmuch as no attempt had apparently been made to train them. Buckingham also recommended untrained officers to him, he complained, officers with no experience in the field and in whom he had no trust. The soldiers had not been trained in the use of their weapons which had been stored on board ship all summer.29 The soldiers, moreover, were in arrears and the farmers of Devon upon whom they were billeted had refused to supply rations to their unwelcome guests as soon as they discovered that they could not pay. The citizens of the southern counties bitterly resented having soldiers and sailors thrust into their homes and this later came to be one of the principal grievances against Charles. The penniless recruits formed into hungry bands roving about the countryside killing and eating sheep before their owner's eyes.30 Such was the army that England was going to send forth to war. They were an

30 Ibid., p. 95.
undisciplined rabble even before boarding ship. Small wonder that Cecil requested three thousand additional troops and asked for an immediate press of five hundred men to replace those sick and deserted. In response, on 12 September, the Privy Council issued orders to four southern counties for an immediate levy of five hundred pressed men, to be delivered to Plymouth as soon as possible. This was, however, a case of too little, too late.

By the time these soldiers set sail England broke with Spain. Charles recalled his agent, Trumball, from his post at Brussels in the Spanish Netherlands, the last agent residing in Hapsburg dominions. Letters of Marque were issued to those privateers wishing to prey upon Spanish shipping. Charles was still interested in the northern series of alliances; despite his direct action against Spain, he had no idea of abandoning the original goal of restoring Frederick Wittelsbach to the Palatinate. Thus, the idea of an attack against the coast of Spain to assault Spanish shipping, including the annual treasure fleet from Spanish America, must be considered as part of the overall plan centering on the Palatinate. Charles, through the influence of Buckingham, the master strategist, had, no doubt, believed that the fleet action would cripple Spanish power; this diversion would pave the way for Mansfeld, the Dutch, the Danes, and the north German princes to reconquer the Palatinate. Truly, the idea of restoring Frederick to the Palatinate had been the only reason Charles and Buckingham could

31 Ibid., p. 98.
produce for beginning a war against Spain. Their tool, through which they hoped to begin this chain reaction, was finally ready. On 5 October 1625, the fleet departed Plymouth harbor and stood out to sea.
CHAPTER IV

THE VOYAGE

On the afternoon of 5 June the great fleet, after having set sail in the morning, returned to Plymouth Sound. The wind had shifted to the southwest and had begun to blow hard. Cecil, after carefully considering the shift in the wind, chose to return rather than risk the ships in the foul and misty weather. He was also fearful of running on to the Eddystone Rocks, which lie some twelve to fifteen miles out in the Channel. He was, moreover, concerned lest the fleet would be blown up the Channel in the opposite direction to that in which it wished to sail, if the wind remained southwest and mounted in intensity, as the sailors indicated it would.\(^1\)

By the next morning, however, the wind so increased in velocity that the open Plymouth Sound itself seemed to be unsafe. Cecil, after consultation with some of his English and Dutch captains, decided that the fleet should make an orderly movement into Plymouth harbor for further protection. He, therefore, gave orders as to which ships and in what order should move first, also directing that no one would go ashore without his permission. While Cecil was making up his mind, several ships moved toward the inner sanctuary, and soon the rest followed in wild confusion, jostling and jockeying for position to get in as soon as possible. No attention had been paid to Cecil's instruc-

---

tions in their rabid desire to seek safety.

Later that same day, Cecil received a curt letter from Sir John Coke, one of the King's principal secretaries of state, who had remained in Plymouth to oversee the departure of the fleet. No news other than the departure of the fleet would be welcome, Coke stated, and Cecil's honor was involved in the return of the fleet for having listened to those who pretended the safety of their ships. Wars require hazards to be taken and if the safety of ships were his primary concern, they should have been left at Chatham. In reply to this rebuke, Cecil wrote Coke that the only orders which had been obeyed by his captains were those that he had personally followed up. Assuring Coke that he would not waste another hour or minute, he promised not to rely upon the advice of captain or master of any of his vessels in the future.

Because the winds remained contrary for several more days the fleet remained in the harbor, whereupon on 8 October Cecil received another sharp rebuke from Coke. Word had reached the secretary that Sir Thomas Love, captain of the Anne Royal, Cecil's flagship, had issued orders to the fleet in his own name and that this had been partially responsible for the confusion in the fleet two days earlier. Coke rhetorically asked Cecil that if those next to him, such as Love, usurped his authority, what obedience could he expect from those farther down the chain of command? He also informed Cecil that the

---

3Ibid.
4Oppenheim, Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 220.
fleet was undisciplined because of a lack of orders from its commander; advised him to call his captains together and inform them as to whose orders they would follow in the future. Replying the same day, Cecil informed Coke that the fault of Captain Love had been through ignorance rather than arrogance; he then thanked the secretary for his sound advice.

While the fleet was still lying to in the harbor, Cecil discovered that the Lion, flagship of the Rear Admiral, Sir Francis Steward, was taking water so badly that it had to be docked for repairs. For some undisclosed reason Cecil also decided that Steward should remain behind with the Lion; in so doing, he removed the one senior commander who had had any previous naval experience.\(^5\) William Feilding, Earl of Denbigh, was then advanced to the post of rear admiral; his principal qualification was that he had married Susan Villiers, sister of the Duke of Buckingham. Just before noon on that same day, 8 October, the wind became favorable and all ships were ordered to make sail. Because of the low tide and the crowded harbor, the fleet did not clear the harbor until between five and six o'clock that afternoon. The fleet was now divided into three squadrons: the admiral's, vice admiral's, and rear admiral's, commanded respectively by Cecil on the Anne Royal, the Earl of Essex on the Swiftsure, and the Earl of Denbigh on the St. Andrew.\(^6\)

The military forces were organized into ten regiments, each

\(^5\) Penn, Navy Under the Early Stuarts, p. 70.

\(^6\) See Appendix A for biographical data.
about one thousand strong, under the command of the following officers: the first, Sir John Proude in the absence of the Duke of Buckingham; the second, Cecil; the third, Sir Henry Power, Viscount Valentia; the fourth, Sir Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex; the fifth, Sir William St. Leger; the sixth, Sir Charles Riche; the seventh, Sir Edward Conway; the eighth, Sir Edward Harwood (or Harewood); the ninth, Sir John Burgh (Burroughs); and the tenth, Sir Henry Bruce. Each regiment was further organized into eleven companies, with the exception of the Duke's regiment, which contained ten companies. There were also ten large brass cannon, along with many smaller field pieces, with fifty horses assigned to pull this artillery, and approximately the same number of the use of the chief land commanders.

On 3 October while still in Plymouth harbor, Cecil had prepared a set of instructions "for the better government of his majesty's fleet." These instructions, although written before the first sailing of the fleet, had not been delivered to the principal ships, and this was effected on 9 October at sea. The instructions, general in nature, are remarkable in the thoroughness of their coverage, although apparently based in part on earlier regulations by Sir William Gorges, and

7Note: In Glanville's Voyage to Cadiz, p. 2, Essex has the third regiment and Valentia the fourth, while the Appendix, p. 122, lists them in reverse order. Inasmuch as regiments were assigned by rank, the former is assumed to be correct.

8See Appendix B for officer's roster.

9Glanville, Voyage to Cadiz, p. 3.

10Ibid., pp. 4-7.
later by Sir Walter Raleigh. Cecil, a soldier, was, no doubt, advised by Sir Thomas Love in preparing these instructions, although much was taken from the Duke of Buckingham's instructions to Cecil.\(^{11}\)

Two days later, on 11 October, a second, condensed set of instructions was issued to the commanders.\(^{12}\) That same day, a calm having set in, Cecil summoned a Council of War to meet on board the Anne Royal to decide upon a course of action to be followed should a sea-fight develop with a Spanish fleet or any other enemy. At the Council meeting, Sir Thomas Love read, with Cecil's approval, a new set of instructions which Love had drawn up.\(^{13}\) Probably both Cecil and Love were instrumental in writing these instructions although Love is credited with the work. Love was an excellent ship captain, but there was nothing in his record to indicate that he had ever commanded a ship in a sea-fight. These instructions, instigated by Cecil because he did not believe that the first set provided an adequate order of battle such as he had been accustomed to in the military service, reveal that a military mind was involved in their preparation. It would be a methodical military mind that would expect sailing ships to move in fixed lines, to present broadsides three ships at a time, and then to retire so the next three ships could fire. In the 17th century no two warships were built alike, sailed alike, or handled alike, which would almost preclude their sailing in the fixed forma-

\(^{11}\)See Appendix C.  
\(^{12}\)See Appendix D.  
\(^{13}\)See Appendix E.
tions prescribed by these fighting instructions. There is much to be said that is favorable, however, particularly that of an organized battle plan, in the careful provisions for mutual support, and a reserve held back until needed. These instructions are military in scope, with each ship in the fleet assigned to a certain squadron, division, rank, file, and station, much in the manner of military units. After much discussion among the commanders and ship captains, it was decided that there was much good in these articles. Consequently, there were some additions and alterations until Cecil and the whole Council passed and confirmed them.

At the Council of War held on the high seas on 11 October, Cecil ordered that rations for soldiers and sailors be reduced so that five men would be consuming the amount normally allotted to four. This move, reflecting a lack of confidence on the part of Cecil, betrays the fact that the fleet had been poorly provisioned before leaving Plymouth. A commander normally would employ this type of


\[15\] An interesting sidelight concerning Article 17 of the first set of instructions, regarding the display of red, blue, and white pennants to indicate squadrons, appears wherein Sir Julian Corbett, in his Fighting Instructions, claims that this is the first known occasion of colored flags being used in this manner. M. Oppenheim, in his Administration of the Royal Navy, states that the Cadiz fleet of 1596 had four large flags, one white, one orange tawney, one blue, and one crimson, which indicated the four squadrons of the fleet. He says that "this appears to have been the earliest distinction of squadrons by flags, afterwards shown by the red, white, and blue. It would appear that the Cadiz fleet of 1596 should bear this honor.

\[16\] Glanville, Voyage to Cadiz, p. 23.
measure on a homeward-bound voyage, with provisions running low, certainly not at the beginning of a voyage, if the fleet were adequately victualed. An action such as this would be bound to have a detrimental effect on the morale of the soldiers and sailors, who would immediately sense something amiss, and cause doubts about their leaders.

The next day the fleet ran into a heavy storm which lasted for two days and caused a great deal of damage to ships, men, and materiel. The Anne Royal suffered a sprung mainmast, one man lost overboard, her long boat smashed, and two heavy cannon broke loose causing damage before being secured.\(^7\) The Long Robert foundered with one hundred and seventy-five sailors and soldiers lost. A long boat crew of the Convertive was also lost while attempting to pick up men of the Long Robert.\(^8\)

At a Council of War called on 18 October, it was disclosed by the various commanders reporting to Cecil, that a great many of the ships' small boats had been damaged by the tempest. Great quantities of fuses and gun powder had been soaked, bread and other provisions ruined, plus many of the ships leaking badly. It was also brought to light that many of the muskets were defective. Some did not have touch holes through which the powder in the firing chamber was to be ignited; bullets provided did not properly fit the weapons; and bullet moulds could not be found with which to make more ammunition.\(^9\)

---

\(^7\)Ibid., p. 21.  
\(^8\)Ibid., pp. 26-27.  
\(^9\)Ibid., p. 28.
wonders whether Cecil slept properly that night, if he had at all thus far.

On the morning of 19 October the high land around Cape Mondego on the Portuguese Coast was sighted. That same day the vice admiral and rear admiral with about forty ships rejoined the main fleet, having been separated in the recent blow. One of the rear admiral's ships had captured a small Portuguese caravel, the master of which stated that he had heard that the Spanish fleet from Brazil would be protecting the treasure fleet from the New World, that a fleet was preparing in Spanish ports for the same purpose, and more disturbing, that he had heard some two months before of the great fleet of over one hundred sail preparing in English ports.20 This news was rather perturbing to Cecil, inasmuch as he had counted upon surprise being one of his major factors in conducting the English attack, wherever it might take place. To prevent news of the fleet's sailing leaking out, all ships, other than those of the Royal Navy, had been refused permission to leave English ports21 from 31 August to 14 October, after the fleet had been at sea for six days.22 Because of the time element, the six-day start, and the great storm, it was not believed that news of their sailing had yet reached Spain. There was no reason to doubt the word of the Portuguese master, who had come to the fleet seeking water, because, had he so desired, his fast sailing caravel

20 Ibid., p. 31.


ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND THE IBERIAN PENINSULA
could easily have outsailed any ship in the English fleet. Even though
word of their preparations had filtered out through intelligence chan-
nels, it was not considered possible that the news of their sailing
could have gone before them.

The next day in the vicinity of Cape St. Vincent, at Portugal's
southwestern tip, Cecil called another Council of War, this time to
decide upon the objective which they should first pursue. One of
the primary handicaps under which Cecil suffered was the absence of
any approved plan of action when the fleet left England. It seems
incredible that a fleet of this size would be sent out without a defin-
ite objective, but such was the case in this expedition. A Council of
War had been held at Plymouth with both the King and Buckingham present.
Lisbon, Cadiz, and San Lucar, the seaport for Seville, had been consi-
dered as points of attack, but the final decision had been left for
Cecil's shipboard Council of War to decide after arrival in the gen-
eral area. The following clause in the King's letter of instructions
to Cecil explains in part how the fleet came to sail without a defin-
ite objective:

And though that which we have the least in contemplation
is the taking and spoiling of a town, yet if you shall find
any rich town, that without any great hazard you may take,
you may do well to remember the great cost we have been at in
this fleet,--attempt the taking of the town, and, being gotten,
be very careful for the gathering together and possessing of
the riches towards the defraying of the cost of the fleet.

Here is seen the ridiculous picture of Charles sending out a

\[23\] See Appendix F for list of members.

\[24\] Dalton, Life of Cecil, pp. 158-60.
great fleet hoping to capture treasure without any great risk. Apparently, he expected his admiral to destroy Spanish shipping, capture the treasure ships, sack a town if one were found available, all "without any great hazard." While yet in England and having received these instructions, Cecil, after finding how he was bound by their terms, had insisted upon the following clause being inserted:

And that although we give you a strict care of the preservation of our navy, yet it is not our meaning that thereby you shall have any doubt to undertaking any enterprise that may be dangerous, so long as it is by the advice of the council of war, for we know very well that there is no great enterprise can be taken without danger; but only we do by these recommend the care of our fleet to you so much as in you lieth.

This final clause is specially noted in the King's instructions as having been "put in by consent, but with the advice of my Lord Cecil." So, for the outset, Cecil was hampered in his conduct of the operation by having to abide by the decisions of his Council of War, all of whom were subordinate to him. While placing the commander on the same level with his underlings, he was still charged with the responsibility for the conduct of this expedition. One can only ask why would Cecil, used to military command, accept such a post wherein his hands were tied by his subordinates. Perhaps it was an effort to evade responsibility. It is little wonder that Cecil had a discipline problem because his juniors could exercise control over him through the Council of War.

In his instructions, Cecil had been given three projects as

\[25 \text{Ibid.}\]
follows:

1. First, to destroy the King of Spain's shipping.
2. Secondly, to possess some place of importance in his country.
3. Thirdly, to hinder his commerce and especially the arriving of the plate fleet as the principal project.

There is little doubt that the King, Buckingham, and later, Cecil, were strongly influenced by the previous successful attacks on Cadiz. Sir Francis Drake had sailed into the Bay of Cadiz in 1587 and remained inside for thirty-six hours, during which time he destroyed and captured thousands of tons of shipping. He practically annihilated the Cadiz division of the Armada, then preparing, wreaked considerable havoc in the storehouses and dockyards, and revictualled his entire squadron with the captured supplies. Drake had then taken up station off Cape St. Vincent, prevented the Spaniards from concentrating their scattered squadrons, raided the coastal trade, and proceeded to destroy the fisheries along the coast. He occupied Sagres, on the tip of Cape St. Vincent, for several weeks, had his ships cleaned, fumigated, pumped dry, and gave his men a rest on shore. In 1596 this action was repeated by an expedition under the command of the Earl of Essex, Lord Thomas Howard, and Sir Walter Raleigh. After a stiff fight only decided by the superiority of the English gunnery, the Spanish merchant fleet was destroyed, the city sacked and burned, and a considerable amount of treasure was brought home to England.

The foregoing had been successful twice within living memory.

---

26 Glanville, Voyage to Cadiz, pp. 32-33.
28 Ibid., p. 120.
Now, in 1625, Cecil called a Council of War on 19 October, to discuss the various possibilities which the present expedition might undertake. Having already passed Lisbon, San Lucar and Cadiz were discussed, as well as Gibraltar and Malaga. The ship captains pointed out that the entrance to San Lucar, Seville's port at the mouth of the Guadalquivir River, had many sand bars and that the large Royal Navy ships could only enter there during the higher spring tides. Subsequently, Gibraltar and Malaga were discarded and all attention was focused on the Bay of Cadiz. St. Mary Port (Puerto de Santa Maria), on the northeastern side of the bay, was decided upon as a landing site because of its excellent low shore, and once this was taken, it would be only twelve miles north along the coast to San Lucar should opportunity arise to strike in that direction. Spanish ships and galleys were certain to be found in the Bay of Cadiz and these were to be destroyed by naval action. Cecil then ordered, with the advice and consent of the Council, that the whole fleet was to bear in for St. Mary Port and execute a landing. He further ordered that the Vice Admiral, Essex, and his squadron would lead, followed by his own squadron, and then by the Rear Admiral, Denbigh, and his squadron. Cecil declared that he intended to take St. Mary Port chiefly to resupply the fleet with fresh water, and that when the fleet had come to anchor, he would advise what next would be done. The Council of War was then dissolved, the fleet made sail for the Bay of Cadiz, arriving at the entrance to the bay about three o'clock on a Saturday afternoon, 22 October 1625.  

---

29Glanville, *Voyage to Cadiz*, pp. 33-36.
CHAPTER V

THE ATTACK

In 1625, Cadiz was one of the two principal seaports of south-western Spain, the other being Seville. Known in various languages as Cades, Cales, Cadice, Cadix, Cadis, and Gades, it was situated on the low, rocky, limestone extremity of a narrow, sandy peninsula or spit projecting about five miles into the Atlantic, in a northwest-easterly direction from the Isla de Leon. The island, of which it was a part, was separated from the mainland by a narrow channel known on its southern end as the Rio Santi Petri and on the north as the Carraca Channel. The isthmus and headlands on the mainland to the north nearly enclose the splendid bay, over thirty miles in circuit, to which Cadiz owes its commercial importance. The outer bay, affording extensive anchorage varying in depth from six to ten fathoms of water, stretches from the promontory of Rota to the mouth of the Rio de San Pedro, a distributary of the Guadalete River, which enters the bay opposite Cadiz. The inner bay, guarded at its narrow entrance by Fort Puntal on the isthmus, also provides good anchorage, although in shallower water. The entrance from the Atlantic to the bays is somewhat obstructed by low shelving rocks, Los Cochinases and Los Puercas, just north of the city, and by shifting mud banks deposited by the rivers.

1See map on following page.
The city, only six to seven miles in circumference, was peculiarly restricted by its position, being practically hemmed in by the sea and surrounded by a fortified wall. It possessed only one land exit; a gate leading to the isthmus. The fortified wall around Cadiz had been largely redesigned and rebuilt following the successful raid in 1596 under the leadership of Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, and was now a more formidable structure. Higher and strengthened, it had gun batteries at intervals on all seaward sides, plus trenches, gunports, and bastions to repel invaders on the side facing the isthmus. The general air of cleanliness, due partly because the houses were whitewashed every year, was, however, deceptive, as the drainage of the low-lying city was quite inadequate; and refuse, thrown over the sea walls, collected in heaps along the shore. The water supply was also poor. Any water, other than that collected in cisterns from the roofs, had to be brought into Cadiz from the Isla de Leon or the mainland, as no known springs or other source of fresh water existed at the time. The lack of water, as well as the absence of garden space to grow vegetables, tended to make Cadiz an easy mark for a siege inasmuch as there was no natural way to produce food and drink.

It was upon this placid bay and serene city that Cecil and his Council of War decided to expend the armed might of England. It will be remembered that the King's Council of War consisted of ten members, nine of whom possessed military experience, the tenth member, Mansell, coming from the Royal Navy. In selecting leaders for this expedition,

---

2Dalton, Life of Cecil, p. 172.
the Council of War had completely neglected to appoint anyone with naval experience. It would appear that the Council's structure was responsible for this error. Thus, it was that this armada went into this attack led completely by landsmen. The Admiral, Cecil, the Vice Admiral, Essex, the Rear Admiral, Denbigh, and the Vice Admirals of their squadrons, Lords Delaware, Valentia, and Cromwell, were all of military experience. Their previous time at sea consisted of crossing from England to Holland, or to Ireland, as passengers!

It was on a Saturday, about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the English fleet arrived at the Bay of Cadiz. The entrance to the bay was slightly more than three miles wide, from the city across to the nearest point, the castle of Santa Catalina, just west of St. Mary Port. The Vice Admiral, Essex, was leading his squadron in the Swiftsure; according to this vessel's journal, he was one and a half leagues ahead. This was a tactical error on his part. Twelve gallies were seen anchored off St. Mary Port, the principal objective of the fleet, with twelve to fourteen ships anchored off Cadiz. Essex, recalling the glorious deeds of his noble sire in this same bay twenty-nine years before, sailed right at the ships anchored off Cadiz, leaving his squadron to follow as best they could. It cannot be said that Essex had disobeyed his orders in dashing upon the Spanish ships in the Swiftsure, for Articles 7 and 10 of the original fighting instructions issued by Cecil had provided for his vice admiral or rear admiral

---

taking independent action should the opportunity arise. However, it would appear that Essex, as squadron commander, should have brought his squadron into the bay as a unit, thus permitting more effective use of their fire power than merely one ship making a head-on attack. Essex was fortunate that the Spanish ships did not offer battle because in the ships lying off Cadiz were warships of the Admiral of Naples and his vice admiral, 52 and 42 guns, respectively, compared to the 42 of the Swiftsure. The Spaniards, rapidly aware of the squadrons behind the Swiftsure, quickly cut their cables and fled down the bay ahead of the vice admiral, up into the Trocadero Channel, a narrow waterway leading to the town of Port Royal (Puerto Real). The Spanish ships moved up this channel as far as they could, thrusting their prows into narrow little creeks, hoping that the English ships would not follow. The Admiral, Cecil, had now entered the bay, and seeing his subordinate in pursuit of the Spanish ships, crowded all sail on to the Anne Royal while shouting orders right and left for the other ships to join in the chase. The Anne Royal sailed right through Essex's reluctant squadron which showed no inclination to fight. Only two Royal Navy ships came up to join in, the Rainbow and the Reformation, but when Essex saw the Spanish ships evading him, he merely dropped anchor off Cadiz. Essex later said he had not received any orders to chase and capture any Spanish ships, but merely to anchor in Cadiz Bay and await further orders from Cecil. According to his

---

1. See Appendix C.
statement, he was then guilty of disobedience, for he had been ordered to anchor off St. Mary Port on the other side of the bay. In any event, had Essex chosen to bring his squadron in as a unit, he would have had a much better opportunity to spread out and head off the fleeing Spanish ships.

As the Swiftsure had swept past Cadiz, the guns of the city had fired at her, as had the fleeing Spanish ships, but no damage had been incurred. The Swiftsure’s accurate gunners, however, managed to sink one galley before the rest escaped. The city’s guns kept up a sporadic firing at the other English vessels without success. All English squadrons then entered the bay and cast anchor, the squadrons of Cecil and Essex before Cadiz, while Denbigh’s anchored off St. Mary Port, the latter being the only one in the agreed-upon position. Cecil immediately had the signal flag hung out which summoned a Council of War to be held on the Anne Royal. This practice of calling a time-consuming Council of War upon any occasion indicates the weakness and poor quality of the expedition’s command structure. Here an attack was halted while the councillors assembled to discuss how to proceed. Even the assembling of the group consumed several hours as Denbigh’s squadron located on the far side of the bay, required the use of a small boat which was rowed several miles to and from the Anne Royal. Preplanned moves with options should have been established. An agreed-upon system of signal flags could have indicated which plan or option was to be put into operation. Another tactical error, which the ship captains must certainly have been aware of, was the entry into the bay.

---

7Journal of the Swiftsure, 22 Oct. 1625.
at high tide, thus enabling the Spanish ships to flee into the Trocadero Channel, a move which they could not have made at low tide.\(^8\) English seamen should have known this, being familiar with the European tidal patterns, because even John Glanville, secretary to the admiral, knew of this and so recorded it in his carefully-kept journal. Cecil, a landsman, was poorly advised by his ship captains. They had known all about the tides and sand bars at San Lucar and the beaches at St. Mary Port, but they were unable to mention the tides in the Bay of Cadiz to their commander.

While the Council of War was gathering on the Anne Royal, a man named Jenkinson came aboard at the risk of his life, as the guns of Cadiz fired at him as he came out to the flagship. He, a master of an English ship loaded with fish lying off Cadiz, happened to be in the city trying to sell his cargo when the fleet arrived.\(^9\) Jenkinson brought intelligence that the arrival of the fleet came as a complete surprise, that Cadiz was lightly garrisoned, poorly prepared, and the people were already blaming the Count de Olivares for provoking the English into making this attack.\(^10\) The Englishman further advised that most of the ships which had fled up the Trocadero Channel were from Naples, lately arrived for special service in Spain, but that the main Spanish fleet, which had been in Brazil, was now in either Malaga or Gibraltar. The latter, if true, was of great import, for Gibraltar

\(^8\)Glanville, Voyage to Cadiz, p. 39.

\(^9\)Ibid., p. 140. Dalton, Life of Cecil, p. 165, says the English vessel was loaded with salt. The former would appear correct, for if the master were selling his cargo, it would be fish, not salt. The Isla de Leon's chief product was salt.

\(^10\)Glanville, Voyage to Cadiz, p. 140.
lay but one hundred sea miles away. Jenkinson also reported that news had reached Cadiz just the night before about the huge fleet preparing at Plymouth and of the English King's visit to the fleet, but there had been no news of where the fleet was to sail or when it would depart. Thus, one of the cardinal principles of war, that of "surprise," had been achieved by the fleet, but what advantage, if any, could result from the prompt exploitation of this principle?

The Council of War recognized that they had surprised the defenders of Cadiz; that the town was not well-provided for; and that a sudden attack might carry the city before it could be reinforced with men, ammunition, and rations, those elements required for a prolonged defense. The ship captains pointed out, however, that it would be unwise to consult or think of attempting to take Cadiz before a safe harbor had been provided for the ships, which were the chief bulwark of England and the only hope of the expedition's safe return. They recommended that Fort Puntal be taken at once as this area not only provided the best anchorage, but was within range of the fort's guns. It was further decided that nothing more would be done toward effecting a troop-landing in the vicinity of St. Mary Post inasmuch as it was now reported that the waters in that area were too shallow, being but ten or twelve feet at high tide and five or six feet at low tide. This would require the ships to remain far out and the troops to be rowed ashore over a lengthy distance. It was, therefore, resolved that an immediate sea bombardment be launched against Fort Puntal.

\[1\] Ibid., p. 44.
Five Dutch ships, three Royal Navy ships, and twenty New Castle colliers, were selected for the task.\textsuperscript{12} The Dutch ships moved in and began the bombardment of the fort, but the ebb tide prevented the larger Royal Navy ships from joining them. The English colliers, taking advantage of the now-gathering darkness, made no move to join the Dutch ships, although they had been ordered to do so. The Dutch ships fired over five hundred rounds at the fort, with unknown effect; the fort returning a ratio of about one round to ten Dutch. Two of the Dutch ships ran aground during the fight, and being stationary targets, were seriously damaged by the fort's gun fire.

On the following morning, 23 October, the Dutch Admiral, William de Nassau, came on board the Anne Royal and complained bitterly to Cecil that he had not received any assistance from the assigned English ships and that the fort might have been taken had the commanders of the colliers followed their orders.\textsuperscript{12} Here again the weakness of the English command structure is evident as apparently there had not been any check or follow-up made once the orders had been issued. There were ninety-two English vessels present, plus fifteen Dutch, so from the time of the bombardment of Puntal in the early evening of the 2d, until the morning of the 23d, all English vessels simply remained at anchor. It would appear that inasmuch as only twenty-three English vessels had been ordered into the attack on Puntal, that some other simultaneous action could have been undertaken.

An extremely serious tactical blunder had been made by the English commanders. All ships of the fleet had entered the Bay of Cadiz

\textsuperscript{12}Journal of the Swiftsure, 22 Oct. 1925.
and had come to anchor. No effort was made to provide security of any type. Had a Spanish fleet appeared from the Straits, the English would have been bottled up in the bay where maneuver would have been severely restricted, allowing an outside fleet, to windward, to enjoy the tactical advantages of maneuverability and concentration of fire power on the English ships as they emerged from the bay a few at a time. To make matters worse, Spanish galleys crept up the western shore of the Isla de Leon under cover of darkness that first night; by morning Cadiz had a garrison of four thousand soldiers.\(^1\) By their failure to take adequate security measures, the city now had a strong garrison to defend it. Had one squadron, or even part of one squadron remained on patrol outside the bay, these reinforcements could have been prevented from reaching Cadiz by sea. However, reinforcements could have reached Cadiz along the narrow isthmus because of the English failure to put a force ashore upon arrival to cut this life line leading to the city. The principal of "surprise" was thus lost for not cutting this peninsula and failing to take adequate security measures to prevent reinforcements arriving by sea. Landings could have been made on either side of the isthmus during the night, and the initial attack on the whole complex should have been made at night from the seaward side of the island which would have provided even a more complete surprise. The arrival of the fleet should have been coordinated so as to arrive at night rather than bowling into the bay in broad daylight. The arrival came at a most inopportune time, in late afternoon so that little could be accomplished prior to nightfall.

\(^1\)Dalton, Life of Cecil, p. 172.
In the cold, early, morning light of 23 October, Cecil had to face the hard fact that his command was faltering and that his orders had not been followed. He finally ordered the colliers to advance and attack Puntal upon threat of death. The colliers reluctantly moved up behind the Dutch and the Royal Navy ships now involved in the continuing attack on Puntal, but these hesitant warriors remained in the background, firing over the Royal Navy ships, while keeping them between themselves and Fort Puntal. Their fires were completely ineffectual; Cecil ordered them to cease fire after one round struck the *Swiftsure* in the stern, passed through the great cabin, the captain's cabin, and lodged in the master's cabin.\(^1\) In this heavy engagement, Captain George Raymond of the *Great Sapphire*, the ship's master, Mr. Kenton, and several seamen were killed.\(^2\) Despite the silencing of most of the fort's guns by the Royal Navy, Puntal gave no sign of surrender. About noon, Spanish gallies were seen moving from Cadiz across the bay to St. Mary Port, and although they were pursued and fired upon, the swift little gallies could not be caught. It was believed that they had carried much of the removable wealth of the city, and steps were taken to prevent any recurrence. Here again was lack of foresight, as this should have been anticipated.

Around four o'clock in the afternoon Cecil ordered Sir John Burroughs' Regiment ashore. The landing was to be made between Cadiz and Puntal. One boat tried to make a landing directly beneath Puntal's

\(^1\) *Journal of the Swiftsure*, 23 Oct. 1625.

\(^2\) Glanville, *Voyage to Cadiz*, p. 45.
walls, resulting in the deaths of several officers and men for this foolhardy act. The actual landing then was made some distance off towards Cadiz. When the defenders of Puntal saw the large force that had landed and was deploying towards them, they quickly surrendered. The remainder of the garrison were allowed to march out with the honors of war because of their gallant defense of the fort, and they rapidly disappeared towards Cadiz. Cecil then ordered a garrison of two hundred English soldiers under Captains Gore and Hill to enter the fort and hold it. An inspection of the fort disclosed that although it was designed to serve as a gun platform for thirty or forty guns, only eight were actually mounted. With the fort secured, the inner harbor could be used as a fleet anchorage as well as the outer harbor, with all ships safely out of cannon shot of the town. Cecil then ordered that all regiments, artillery, and horses be put ashore; this work lasted throughout the night. By Monday morning, 24 October, all soldiers were ashore except for six or eight hundred men in the rear admiral's squadron riding at anchor before St. Mary Port.

The expedition of 1596 had gone through almost the identical pattern. Daylight arrival, conference, wait until the next day to attack, landing between Puntal and Cadiz; but the garrison of Fort Puntal had not waited for them and retired to the city. From then on, however, the Cadiz venture of 1596 was different. A small force had been sent towards Cadiz and the Spaniards had come out to meet it, and driven it back towards Puntal. The main English force, lying in wait,
had fallen upon them and as the Spaniards retreated, the leading English forces had followed so closely that they had been able to scale the city walls along with the last of their beaten foe. They had thus gained quick access to the city and it fell rapidly into English hands.  

In 1625, Cecil called a council of the colonels on shore to meet at Fort Puntal to decide upon the best course of action to pursue. A rumor developed that enemy forces were marching toward Cadiz; Cecil, as commander, believed his presence would be best served with the troops meeting this new enemy. He appointed Denbigh as admiral to act as such during his and Essex's absence on shore, and instructed him to go on board the Swiftsure, call a Council of War to determine how the following three points should be resolved: to make provision for feeding the land forces while they were on shore; to look after the safety of the English ships; how the ships which had fled up the Trocadero Channel might be attacked. The Council of War which Denbigh held directed that the commanders of all ships which had sent soldiers ashore should send that many rations to the beachhead, a total quantity to cover a period of seven days. The first three days' rations were bread and cheese, the last four days' bread and beef, with beer or cider as drink. Each captain was to bring these provisions to the commander at Fort Puntal as soon as ready, and to secure a receipt when delivered. The commander of Puntal was to issue

---

18Glanville, Voyage to Cadiz, p. 50
19Ibid., p. 52.
these provisions to the troop units upon request, and a careful account was to be kept of amounts issued and to whom. On the second point referred to the Council, it was decided that all ships of the admiral's squadron would group themselves near the Anne Royal at anchor between Cadiz and Puntal. The ships of the vice admiral's squadron would gather about the Swifsure near Fort Puntal, and the rear admiral's ships would remain near the St. Andrew, at anchor near Santa Catalina point. For the third point, the Council of War deemed it a shame that these vessels up Trocadero Channel had been neglected so long. It was considered possible that should a Spanish fleet arrive off Cadiz, that the expedition might be attacked from two sides, having to face the fleet outside the harbor as well as those ships up Trocadero Channel. Of the points considered, the latter was judged to be the most important of all. It was decided that Sir Samuel Argall, acting vice admiral of the fleet, would lead an attack against the Spanish ships in the Trocadero Channel; preparations soon began to ready the ships for this purpose. How the attack would be accomplished was to be left to the judgment of the commanders of the ships involved.

At this same Council meeting the problem of how to supply the land forces with powder and shot was discussed. The Council could have settled the problem then and there, but chose not to do so because it was not one of the three points which Cecil had directed them to consider. They also believed that the problem was the responsibility of Viscount Valentia, Master of the Ordnance, despite the fact that

---

20 Ibid., p. 55.
Valentia was on shore commanding his regiment. The Council apparently preferred to operate only within certain limits which had been prescribed; to go beyond these limits or to take independent action did not seem to occur to them. The success of the whole venture might hinge on one of these actions, but they preferred to jeopardize this success rather than to extend themselves in any way.

In the expedition of 1596, after the forces had been landed between Fort Puntal and Cadiz, Sir Conyers Clifford, with a brigade of three regiments, had been sent to the narrowest part of the sandy isthmus, just beyond Puntal toward the main part of the Isla de Leon, to block any enemy forces coming from that direction. Clifford, however, either misunderstanding his orders or having been dissatisfied with the minor role assigned to his command, had pushed on to the extreme eastern side of the island, three leagues away, and had occupied the Suazo bridge, the only bridge to the mainland.

In 1625, Cecil, with seven or eight regiments, marched southeast down the isthmus and by nightfall was several miles into the body of the island, supposedly on his way to the Suazo bridge, where he expected to meet the Spanish forces. The hour being late, Cecil decided to remain in his present position for the night. To prevent the Spanish forces in Cadiz from attacking his command from the rear,

---

21 Ibid., p. 56.
22 Firth, Stuart Tracts, p. 113.
24 Glanville, Voyage to Cadiz, p. 56.
he ordered the regiments of Sir John Burroughs and Sir Henry Bruce to return to the isthmus and also for them to keep the road open to his position. Upon halting, it was discovered that the soldier's knapsacks were empty and the whole command was without food. This did not particularly worry Cecil at the moment because he knew that he had left orders for the ration supply problem to be resolved by Denbigh and the Council of War. He naturally expected provisions to be on their way up to his hot, dusty, tired, and thirsty command. What Cecil did not know, however, was that when the rations on the ships had been delivered to Fort Puntal, the commander had refused to accept them, saying that he had not been given any orders to this effect. Further delays were caused by an ambush conducted by soldiers from Cadiz attacking the men and horses that were finally beginning to move rations towards Cecil's command. Thus, Cecil, the uninformed commander of the land forces, knew nothing of the long delays nor of the shoddy way in which his orders had been carried out. Cecil has been vastly criticized over the centuries for taking troops inland without an adequate ration supply. There was a colonel general, nine colonels, and innumerable captains and lieutenants in Cecil's command. The commander bears the responsibility, but should not be charged with every detail. John Glanville, in his journal, The Voyage to Cadiz, states that many of the soldiers did not bring rations with

25 Ibid., p. 59.
26 Ibid., p. 58.
27 Dalton, Life of Cecil, p. 178.
them, or else they had consumed at one meal those rations which should have served them for several days. This would indicate that much of the fault lay with the individual soldier. This, also, shows a lack of control in the lower levels of command.

In any event, Cecil believed that provisions were enroute. When a large supply of wine was discovered in some houses adjacent to their camp site, Cecil ordered that a butt (barrel) be made available to each regiment so that the men might refresh themselves. The soldiers, tired and hungry, promptly drank more than they should have, becoming drunk and unmanageable. The officers were unable to control them, despite persuasion, commands, threats, and finally blows, to which the soldiers paid no attention. Cecil ordered that all remaining barrels be broken, but the men dipped up the flowing wine from the cellars with their hats. By morning, the entire command was sick, disorganized, demoralized, and unfit for even the simplest sort of duty. Cecil called a council of his colonels, and considering the unserviceableness of the troops, their lack of provisions, and the unlikelihood of the Spaniards attacking, it was agreed that it would be futile to march to the Suazo bridge and that it would be better to return to the isthmus. Therefore, Cecil and the army retraced their steps to Puntal, having accomplished nothing in their fruitless quest.

Undue stress had been placed on securing the Suazo bridge, probably because it had been occupied by Sir Conyers Clifford, perhaps

---

28Glanville, *Voyage to Cadiz*, p. 60.

29Ibid., pp. 59-60.
by mistake, in the expedition of 1596. Charles Dalton claimed that the "bridge ought to have been occupied by the English before the enemy had time to send succour across it to Cadiz. . . . Whatever Cecil's reasons were for going to the bridge, it certainly was a position he ought to have had in his own hands from the very first." Admiral Sir William Monson, writing in his Naval Tracts, made the same claim; because he had been on the previous expedition, which had been a blundering success, he was unable to resist his acid comparison of the two ventures. Cecil had, undoubtedly, been influenced by the tactics of the previous expedition. There can be no sound tactical reasons for a force of this size to attempt to secure the Suazo bridge. Should a force such as Cecil's reach the bridge and attempt to prevent its use to the Spanish forces, or to destroy it, crossings could be made at other points. Enemy forces could have crossed the Rio Santi Petri and endangered the flanks or rear of the English forces concentrated at the bridge, or landings could have been made from the seaward side of the island to cut off the forces at the bridge. Crossings could have been effected using fishing boats which are readily available in the area. Rivers have never been an effective barrier to military forces, and the Rio Santi Petri was neither wide nor deep from the bridge to its southern mouth, although it was reportedly navigable from its northern mouth to the bridge.

---


unit would have been the most effective force to use against the bridge. This type of unit could have reached the bridge quickly from the isthmus, destroyed it, and then retired. This would have only a delaying effect, but would have been the better tactic in this sort of situation so as to gain sufficient time to turn the command's full effort against Cadiz. The effect of surprise, which had initially been on the side of the English, had been dissipated by the indecision, council meetings, and delays, allowing the city to be reinforced while the hesitant English command accomplished next to nothing. Once the Spanish had reinforced their garrison, there was no reason for them to offer battle as they were secure, and this is just the exact tactic which they employed. They knew that the English force, with but ten thousand soldiers, could accomplish little on the Isla de Leon. The reinforced Spanish garrison defending the walls of Cadiz in a limited area due to the narrowness of the isthmus, would have been able to successfully defend because the English had to come at the city from only the shore side and in a confined space, thus limiting the attacking force while giving the advantage to the defenders behind stout walls. The Spanish tactic of offering no resistance was excellent inasmuch as they had the English forces actually contained on the island.

While these events were taking place on land, Denbigh played the role of admiral of the fleet. On the morning of 25 October he called a Council of War to meet on board the Anne Royal. The Council directed Sir Samuel Argall, the vice admiral, to use his squadron in an attack upon the ships in Trocadero Channel, which they supposedly
had been preparing for. The Dutch ships were also invited to participate. It soon developed that there were so many sailors of Argall's squadron ashore that the ships were undermanned. It proved necessary to have the commander at Fort Puntal round up these men, notifying them that failure to board their ships involved the death penalty. Another instance of the lack of control on the part of ship's officers for permitting so many sailors to go ashore.

Cecil came on board the Anne Royal about two o'clock in the afternoon and directed that no more soldiers be sent ashore unless he so ordered. This is the first indication that a change of plan was about to develop. Cecil then returned to shore, leaving the sea-command still in Denbigh's hands.

As soon as wandering sailors, tide, and wind would permit, Argall moved his squadron in the direction of the Trocadero Channel. A Dutch boy, who had been held prisoner on one of the ships in the channel, was taken along as guide. He had escaped to the English fleet. Upon reaching the entry to the channel, it was discovered that the Spaniards had already sunk four ships across it, leaving but a narrow opening through which one ship could pass. The ships farther up the channel were so disposed that their broadsides could be concentrated on this narrow opening. It was further suspected that Spanish artillery was also planted ashore covering the same entry. The commanders of the vessels supporting the Royal Navy ships showed a backwardness in complying with Argall's commands; discretion here

\[33\] Glamville, Voyage to Cadiz, p. 63.
\[34\] Ibid., p. 64.
outweighed valor as far as Argall was concerned, and consequently no attack was forthcoming.\textsuperscript{35}

Cecil again consulted with his colonels and members of the Council of War as to whether or not they could break off their futile plan with honor, and reembark the troops. It was held that it would not be a matter of dishonor, because no attack had been made on Cadiz itself. The town of Cadiz was considered to be too strongly fortified to take without a long siege, for which the fleet was not provisioned. The city would be too difficult to attack as only one narrow avenue of approach along the isthmus was feasible. Because of this, the defenders would have a decided advantage, and while the town might be taken through siege and starvation, the fleet was in no better position than the townspeople with regard to food and water. The English soldiers, untrained and in no condition to conduct open warfare, were unfit for any future military plans.\textsuperscript{36} The decision was thus made to try and intercept the Spanish treasure fleet.

Sir Thomas Love reported to Cecil that while on the long and frustrating march, he had noted ten or twelve tuna fishing boats along with a great supply of nets and corks near the southern edge of the inner bay. Cecil determined to destroy this material, but to save the boats for use in the fleet. On the morning of 26 October, seven or eight regiments were marched back to this place and the above was accomplished.\textsuperscript{37} Cecil also ordered Denbigh to issue a warrant to all

\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Tbid.}, p. 65.
\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Tbid.}, pp. 55-56.
\textsuperscript{37}\textit{Tbid.}, p. 67.
ship captains and pursers to meet him at Puntal in the afternoon to
determine the status of provisions in every ship, thereby securing a
better understanding of their condition and to decide how to proceed
in the future.

At this time, Denbigh received a message from Argall, still
watching at the mouth of the Trocadero Channel. He had not made an
attack and was not about to, but because his honor was involved he
would not leave his post until ordered to do so. He requested that
several ship captains be sent to his position to determine whether
or not an attack would be considered possible. Denbigh, believing
this to be reasonable, ordered Sir Thomas Love and Sir Michael Geere
to view the problem. These gentlemen did not perform this service for
their compatriot, and Cecil, hearing of the affair, sent a warrant to
Argall relieving him of his assignment inasmuch as he believed in his
wisdom, valor, and integrity.38

Cecil decided that he wanted to garrison Fort Puntal and attempt
to keep it permanently. This would have been an unfortunate move on
his part as there is no reason to believe that the English would have
been able to defend it against superior Spanish forces, which were
bound to appear. Cecil was, fortunately, overruled by the Council of
War. The Council, in one of its few wise decisions, believed that
the fort could not be held; that it was of no great importance to
hold it; a strong fleet would be required to do so; it would not give
England command of any real Spanish territory, and it would not

38 Ibid., p. 72.
effectively hinder the enemy as he could still use the Bay of Cadiz out of command of the fort's guns.\textsuperscript{39}

It was decided to remove the eight cannon from Fort Puntal, the English taking six; the Dutch were rewarded with two for their valiant efforts. As many ships as possible were now brought in close to Puntal, and the difficult task of embarking the expedition began. Thus, because of indecision, hesitation, poor administration, lack of cooperation, misunderstanding, and pure incompetence, the English efforts on the Isla de Leon came to naught.

\textsuperscript{39}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 71.
CHAPTER VI

RETREAT, RETURN, AND RECRIMINATIONS

The English fleet lay patiently in the Bay of Cadiz. The sick and tired soldiery began to reembark on the afternoon of 27 October, the work progressing through the night. When the citizens of Cadiz perceived the change in English plans, they fired off their cannons and muskets in triumphal volleys of relief.¹ The horses, artillery, and provisions were shipped on the morning of the 28th, with great care being devoted to the horses so that the Spanish could not claim that the English had fled in such haste that their horses were left behind.² Once all were boarded, the fleet moved to the mouth of the bay, dropped anchor, and awaited a favorable wind. As soon as the Anne Royal dropped her hook, Cecil called a Council of War.

After deliberation, the Council resolved that the fleet should put to sea in an effort to intercept the Spanish treasure fleet. The following reasons were advanced: their chief strength was in the fleet at sea; no harbor would now be safe for them where shipping might be found to attack; while the sea was friendly to them as well as to their foe, the shores were friendly only to the enemy; a contrary wind might keep the fleet long in harbor, which could be disastrous if they were trapped; the treasure fleet must soon arrive, or else it

¹Journal of the Swiftsure, 27 Oct. 1625.
²Glanville, Voyage to Cadiz, p. 75.
would not be coming this year. Several questions relating to water, a point of rendezvous, and the disposition of sick and wounded men were raised, but it was deemed wise to discuss these matters with the captains and masters and then hold another Council of War the following day. On the 29th it was decided that the entire fleet should cruise some sixty leagues west of Cape St. Vincent, remaining between thirty-six and one-half degrees and thirty-seven and one-half degrees north latitude, while waiting for the treasure fleet. If strong westerly winds developed, forcing the ships into the Straits, the rendezvous point would be at Budgeroe (Burge), just west of Malaga. Should southerly winds force the ships northward, the rendezvous would be at the Isles of Bayon, on the west coast of Galicia, where fresh water might be obtained. Concerning water for departing the Bay of Cadiz, several ship captains alleged that there were only two fresh water wells in St. Mary Port which could take care of but a few ships in a day. Much precious time would be lost, and water could not be obtained without landing forces in strength. The decision was made to sail without fresh water. The fleet would thus put to sea again without having procured fresh water since leaving Plymouth three weeks before. Inasmuch as the entire fleet would be sailing in the direction of England when departing the Bay of Cadiz, no decision was made

---

3Ibid., pp. 76-77.
4Budgeroe: Assumed to be Burge, a place marked on an 18th century map, just west of Malaga, as if it had a tower on a hill, which would make a good sea-mark. Glanville, Voyage to Cadiz, p. 78.
6Glanville, Voyage to Cadiz, p. 79.
as to the disposition of the sick and wounded men, other than that they would be sent home at the first convenient opportunity. The horse ships would accompany them. That same morning the fleet sailed out of the Bay of Cadiz.

Cecil was called upon to settle a question of precedence which had arisen among Valentia, Cromwell, and Delaware, involving their squadron identification flags. Cecil proposed, in his peculiar hesitant manner, that the matter be settled by the Council of War, but the Council refused to do so, saying that it had all come about by an act of Cecil's, when he had assigned Sir Francis Steward's flag to Delaware before leaving Plymouth. Valentia and Cromwell were viscounts, while Delaware was but a baron, and the former believed they should have had precedence. Cecil was finally forced to a makeshift decision to appease Valentia and Cromwell. The matter remained unresolved. 7

At another Council of War, held on 1 November on board the Anne Royal, inquiry determined that numerous seamen were ill. Of two hundred seamen on the Swiftsure, sixty were indisposed; of two hundred and fifty on the St. Andrew, thirty; of two hundred and twenty on the St. George, sixty; of one hundred and eighty on the Bonaventure, fifty; of one hundred and eighty on the Convertive, fifty; and of two hundred and fifty on the Rainbow, sixty. 8 The Council decided that the twelve most unserviceable ships would return to England carrying the sick, the wounded, and the horses as soon as Cape St. Vincent was cleared.

7 Ibid., pp. 83-88.
8 Ibid., p. 90.
At this same Council, Sir John Proude accused Captain Squibb, of the Lion, of cowardice and neglect of duty in several past actions, while the Earl of Denbigh accused Captain Oxenbridge, of the Dragon, of firing on fortifications without orders at Santa Catalina point in the Bay of Cadiz. No action was taken, although punishments had been recommended by the accusers.

The Council of War, meeting again on the Anne Royal on November, decided that the fleet would remain at sea until 20 November, and then return to England. Selecting a date was necessary to prevent ships from returning to England on their own should they become separated from the fleet. All ships were provisioned for a period longer than this, but the captains and masters who claimed to know the most about Spain's merchant marine said that the treasure fleet was either in port, would arrive at the very latest by the 15th, or would not come at all this year. The captains were also informed that they had not been following the sailing instructions issued to them at sea on 11 October; they were ordered to do so under threat of imprisonment. A password, "St. George," was devised to prevent strange ships from filtering through the fleet under cover of darkness and getting away. It was further ordered that an inventory be conducted in each ship to determine the number and name of those sick and wounded to be returned to England. The condition of each ship, its water, and provisions would also be reported.

During the Council meeting, Sir John Wattes, Captain of the St.
Andrew, proposed an attack on the Madeiras inasmuch as the fleet was already so far south. He said he should be heartily sorry to have to return home without having performed some service.\textsuperscript{11} The islands were rich, he contended, and would yield good pillage towards relieving the King's costs of the expedition, and would encourage the soldiers and sailors after their ill bargain at Cadiz. He further stated that it would be dangerous to rendezvous in the Straits near Malaga because of the aroused enemy, opposed to the weakened condition of the fleet. Also, that the Madeiras lie better for a straight wind for England than from the area off the Straits. The Captains and masters on the Council, however, negated the proposal on several grounds. They claimed that there were any number of forts well stored with ordnance in the Madeiras; that soldiers and ammunition were placed in such a manner as to hinder the fleet's approaches to land; there was no harbor at all, only some wide and unsafe roads lying dangerously open to the winds; that the seas were very deep and the best places to anchor are mostly in water of thirty fathoms or more; that the landing of men would be difficult because of the high surf on the beaches; and that there is but one place to land out of shot of the forts and the way from there to the chief town is so narrow that an army could be cut off while using it.\textsuperscript{12} After hearing these allegations, the Council took no further action, leaving the matter unresolved.

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., pp. 97-98.
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., pp. 98-99.
On 9 November, the fleet was in the latitude of thirty-seven degrees, their appointed station. Cecil issued instructions as to how the squadrons were to function during their wait for the Spanish treasure fleet. They would cruise between thirty-six and thirty-seven degrees north latitude, with the squadrons spread out in a rough line, yet within sight of one another. It was estimated that the line of ships would extend over a degree of latitude roughly, or close to seventy miles. All ships were ordered to lower sails and heave to each morning, to observe all around carefully for an hour or two, and then set sail. All ships were given permission to chase any suspected enemy ships, and a system of recognition signals was devised by striking or raising topsails to prevent the ships from chasing each other needlessly. All captains were ordered to remain in their squadron divisions, except in a chase, and to report daily to their squadron admirals. Failure to follow these orders would result in removal from command and disgrace.\(^\text{13}\)

On the 11th, Cecil had the flag hung out for a Council of War, but due to the dispersal of the fleet, the entire group could not be brought together. There were about thirty ship captains on board the Anne Royal when Lord Delaware arrived with news that the sickness had spread so greatly among his men that unless he were provided with replacements, his ship, the St. George, could not be controlled. Cecil called the captains together and ordered that each would provide two healthy men for the St. George while they would take back two sick men

\(^{13}\text{Ibid.}, pp. 103-105.\)
from her. While this may have seemed a sensible move to Cecil in the light of his times, should the sickness prove to be communicable, he had provided the best means of spreading it through at least one-third of his fleet. That same day Cecil dispatched the twelve ships to England with sick and wounded men rounded up from the widely dispersed ships of the fleet.\textsuperscript{14} All sick and wounded personnel were not evacuated because some ships could not be located, and the rough seas and blustery weather made transfer from ship to ship very difficult.

While the pestilence in the fleet may have been caused by a variety of circumstances, there appears to be little doubt that much of it stemmed from the consumption of spoiled food and drink. Sir George Blundell wrote to the Duke of Buckingham on 3 November that "every man cryes out for victuall, and some drink beverige of sider that stinkes worse than carrion, and have no other drink; it hath throwne down so many men that in some shippes they have not enough to trim there sayles."\textsuperscript{15} Sir Michael Geere wrote to his son, "I greve to wright of many other abewses as in our vittils, our fleshe, cut at halfe the kynges allowance, & that so stinks that I presume hathe ben the cause of the deathe & sickness wch is amongst us; no dog of par­rish Garden I thinke will eate it."\textsuperscript{16} The poor sanitation, spoiled provisions, men living under crowded shipboard conditions, lack of fresh water, and the improper preparation of food, must have all

\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Tbid.}, p. 106.
\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Dalton, Life of Cecil}, p. 206.
contributed immeasurably to the sickness found in the fleet.

On the 14th, Sir William St. Leger and Captain Porter of the Convertive notified Cecil that they did not have sufficient men to hoist or take in their sails. They would have to let the ship drive before the wind unless more men could be obtained. Cecil directed that some of the ships which had not provided men for the St. George under similar circumstances would send one man each to the Convertive.

On 17 November, the Earl of Essex appeared with his squadron, having been separated from the main fleet for a full week by adverse winds. His ship, the Swiftsure, had but thirty-three men in sound condition out of a complement of two hundred and fifty seamen. A Council of War, called this same day, discussed how to proceed on the 20th, sail to the Isles of Bayon, or directly for England. After a lengthy debate, the Council decided that the fleet should sail for England, but those ships in dire need of water could go independently to Bayon. The Councillors also decided that the fleet should immediately run as northerly a course as possible. Thus, the fleet actually began its homeward voyage on 17 November.

The next day was cold, rainy, and blustery. Because this condition held until 2 December, the homeward-bound fleet became widely scattered. The sickness also increased. One hundred and thirty men on the Anne Royal, for example, were not fit for duty. The number of fatalities increased and their bodies were disposed of over the

17Glanville, Voyage to Cadiz, p. 109.
18Ibid., p. 113.
19Ibid., p. 116.
side in the tradition of the sea. After a day of fair winds, the tempest began anew on the 4th and continued to blow hard. About four o'clock in the afternoon of the 8th, the lookout on the Anne Royal sighted the Scilly Isles, just off Land's End in Cornwall, the southwesternmost point in England. They were quite alone. The winds were from the southeast, however, and the Anne Royal was totally unable to touch any part of England. They desperately made sail for Ireland, and put into the harbor at Kinsale, County Cork, on 11 December. The Anne Royal did not have enough men to lower her sails and consequently the noble gentlemen on board had to perform this necessary task with the assistance of their servants. There were one hundred and sixty sick men on board; one hundred and thirty had died and had been cast overboard.\(^{20}\) The Anne Royal had over six feet of water in her hold; estimates were that she could have survived but a day or two longer at sea.\(^{21}\) Cecil remained in Kinsale, along with Sir Thomas Love, while the Anne Royal was being refitted. Due to the magnitude of the work required, the commander of the ill-fated expedition did not reach London until 2 March 1626.

Meanwhile, the Earl of Essex arrived at Falmouth in Cornwall on 5 December on the Swiftsure with several other ships of his squadron. The Swiftsure had but forty men fit for duty and could not be moved from Falmouth.\(^{22}\) One of Essex's ships, the Mary Constant, had


\(^{21}\) Glanville, Voyage to Cadiz, p. 120.

\(^{22}\) Cal. St. P., Domestic, 1625-1626, p. 171.
foundered in the gale with the loss of one hundred and twenty men. Only the ship's officers, plus two army officers, managed to survive.\(^2^3\) As soon as he landed, Essex hurried to court to inform Buckingham and the King of the reasons for the expedition's failure.

During December 1625 and January 1626, the battered ships of the storm-shattered, disease-ridden fleet came staggering home, the next seemingly in worse condition than the previous one. As the unsteady, under-manned ships reeled into whatever port they could reach, the soldiers and sailors were taken ashore and billeted upon the people in the surrounding areas. These men were in terrible condition, sick, diseased, little or no clothing, weak, dirty, and penniless. Sir John Eliot, Vice Admiral of Devon, in writing to Secretary Conway, gives the following description of the plight of the soldiers and sailors in the Plymouth area:

The miseries before us are great, and great the complaints of want and illness of the victual. There is now to be buried one Captain Bolles, a landsman, who died since their coming in, and with much grief expressed the occasion of his sickness to be scarcity and corruption of the provisions. The soldiers are not in better case. They are in great numbers continually thrown overboard, and yesterday fell down here seven in the streets. The rest are most of them weak, and unless there be a present supply of clothes there is little hope to recover them in the places where they are lodged.\(^2^4\)

Despite several pleas to the Privy Council by the Commissioners at Plymouth for money with which to clothe and provision these men, little was done until the following February when the necessary funds were made available.\(^2^5\)

\(^{2^3}\)Dalton, Life of Cecil, p. 19\(^h\).
\(^{2^4}\)Cal St. P., Domestic, 1625-1626, p. 18\(^h\).
\(^{2^5}\)Ibid., p. 25\(^l\).
As early as 29 October, when the fleet departed the Bay of Cadiz to begin its fruitless search, the various noble leaders of squadrons and ships had begun writing dispatches to the Duke of Buckingham and Secretary Conway informing them of what was transpiring on the expedition. This was unfortunate because many versions of events were depicted, often slanted by the role of the writer. At the conclusion of the voyage, this volume increased as each writer sought to justify his own actions, often at the expense of some other member of the expedition. The majority of those writing to Buckingham upon their return did so rather than face him. Sir William St. Leger said that he was ashamed to face either the King or Buckingham. Sir John Burroughs, writing to Buckingham, had similar views:

The ill success of this journey makes us so ashamed that, for my part, I am afraid to appear to you but in paper, and, I am sensible that my reputation must be blemished amidst the throng, yet comforted that your grace is so wise and just as to ask account of every man's part, and, where you find most faults there to lay most censure, and then I hope if others find pardon I may be included.27

All of these gentlemen were quick to place the blame for the failure of the expedition on anyone but themselves. All the other leaders would fly to the Duke with open mouths to blame Cecil, Sir William St. Leger wrote, yet those that blamed Cecil the most were not blameless themselves. He personally was ashamed, moreover, for other men's actions, but not for his own.28 In another letter to Buckingham, St. Leger blamed the Council of War for not wanting to do anything; they

26 Ibid., p. 180, and on microfilm, P.R.O. 698, S.P. 16/8.
neglected the King’s service and they never decided anything with judgment or courage. Cecil, furthermore, did not possess the qualities of a general.29

Sir Michael Geere, in writing to his son, accused Cecil of merely going to sea after Cadiz to waste time, and that this resulted in many unnecessary deaths plus risk to the ships.30 Peculiar as it may be, Sir Michael Geere was the only derelict officer singled out by Cecil in his letters to Buckingham and to Conway. Cecil said, "I cannot forbeare to let you know that of all the kings Captns Sr Michael Geere hath carried himselfe worst in his Maties service, and hath much deceaved my expectation."31 One would assume that Cecil, of all the people on the expedition, would have the most complaints and individuals to name for dereliction of duty. Instead, Cecil singled out only Geere for direct criticism while having praise for several.

Cecil was critical in general, however, of several members. He confessed to Secretary Conway on 27 February 1626, upon his arrival at Plymouth from Kinsdale:

Thus you see how ill fortune hath haunted us. But that which troubleth me most is to have so many come home before me, in so unfortunate a journey, when there are so many mouths open to do ill offices, and untruth hath most creditt, and maketh most impression at the first. By two kinds of people especially, which I only suspect. The first is such as did rather envie the greatness of my command then pittie the greatnes of my cares and paines. The other are such as have suffered much miserie and wante, and could not have so much

---

29Ibid.
31Glanville, Voyage to Cadiz, p. xlv.
as they desired, nor do what they listed. I must confess there was never any thing that did trouble me more at my going out then that I had not means to give everyone content; for although it was not my fault, yet I knew it would fall on me; for they durst not lay it upon any one else, and being full, utter it they must. And it is one of the dangerous pointes in command to command without money, and to have little money to content them, for there is nothing that will make a man more hated or slandered than that; for to punish and not to pay is ever received in an army to tir-annie. But if his Matie have receaved any service by it, I shall carry my cross chearefullie, for that I suffer for his sake.32

Poor Cecil! He apparently never wished to offend anyone and had tried to appease all. Too new to the middle nobility, he had not had sufficient time to learn to use the power of his new station before sailing on the expedition. Cecil, in addition to acquiring a new title, that of Viscount Wimbledon, had also received a nickname, "Viscount Sit-still," before he was even able to return to England and defend himself.33 Cecil had been surprised, no doubt, at having been raised to a viscountcy suddenly in the previous September. He apparently was not satisfied with the name "Wimbledon," although he had selected it himself. He had appended the following to a dispatch to Sir John Coke written on board the Anne Royal in November 1625, begging Coke to procure a title change for him:

I am to make an humble suite to your Honor, that in regard his Matie was pleased by my Lord Duke's meanes, to give me the choice of what place I desired my viscountship, which (at first) I did choose of Wimbledon, that now, upon better consideration, I may have it to bee Lord Cecyll, Viscount Latymer, because it was the antient Title of my grandfather by my mother's

32 Ibid., pp. xlv-xliv.
side, and now extinguished. This Favour, if you can procure mee, you shall for ever bind mee to bee your servant.\textsuperscript{34}

Inasmuch as no changes were made in his official title, it must be assumed that either Coke would not take any action, or that Cecil was out of favor. It was probably the latter, for Cecil was denied access to the King for over two months after his return. On 28 April he wrote to Buckingham complaining bitterly about not being able to see his sovereign to present his side of the expedition's story.\textsuperscript{35} However, Cecil's title was not the element which concerned him most. He was right in the middle of a national tempest and ill winds were beginning to blow.

Parliament met on 6 February. If the affairs of the realm had been in a poor state when the previous Parliament had refused to grant supplies to the monarch, they were now in a worse condition. A public inquiry was being demanded into the condition of the troops at Plymouth and the abject failure of the Cadiz expedition. Complaints had arisen in the past few months, the principal one being Buckingham's attempt to pawn the crown jewels in Amsterdam in an attempt to raise money to carry out his and Charles' political schemes. The Commons determined to attack the man, Lord Admiral Buckingham, because he was considered to be the cause of the recent national disgraces. A leader was necessary whom the Commons would support, and soon one appeared. It was Sir John Eliot.

Sir John, in his position as Vice Admiral of Devon, had seen

\textsuperscript{34}Dalton, \textit{Life of Cecil}, p. 219.
\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., pp. 255-56.
the Cadiz expedition sail. He had also witnessed its ignominious return, plus the condition and treatment of the troops. He was a sincere patriot; his sense of national pride had been deeply hurt by this disgrace to English arms. He had been a great friend of Buckingham's and was, consequently, reluctant to do anything that would harm the Duke's position; yet England's loss of honor wounded his pride and stung him into attacking his erstwhile friend. At the beginning of the parliamentary session, he rendered a strong speech asking that an accounting be made for all monies supplied since 1623, claiming that mismanagement of public affairs had cost thousands of lives in Holland, the Palatinate, and on the Cadiz expedition.

Having aroused the members of Commons by his bold words, Sir John went on to the disgraces which had lately occurred to the armed forces. He did everything but name the author of England's misfortunes. His fiery words follow:

And now, Sir, I beseech you, cast your eyes about! View the state we are in; consider the loss we have received; weigh the wrecked and ruined honour of our nation. Oh, the incomparable hopes of our most excellent sovereign, checked in their first design! Search the preparation; examine the going forth; let your wisdoms travel through the whole action, to discern the fault, to know the faulty. For I presume to say, though no man undertook it, you would find the Ancient Genius of this kingdom rise up to be the accuser! Is the reputation and glory of our nation of a small value? Are the walls and bulwarks of our kingdom of no esteem? Are the numberless lives of our lost men not to be regarded? I know it cannot so harbour in an English thought. Our honour is ruined, our ships are sunk, our men perished; not by the sword, not by the enemy, not by chance; but, as the strongest predictions had discerned entire design; he had the whole command by sea and land; and yet he thought it sufficient to

put in his deputy and stay at home! That for which the whole kingdom must be troubled was not thought worthy of his person; but a deputy, a substitute, must discharge it; and what encouragement that might give to the affections of the people, I leave to all men that have reason to determine. But was this our first miscarriage? Before this, Sir, we had the action of Count Mansfeldt, and that was so miserable, and the men there sent so managed, as we can hardly say they went. Sure it is that they did nothing, and yet how few returned! The handful likewise which was sent to the Palatinate, not seconded nor supplied, it is known what fortune they achieved. I might speak also of the action to Algiers and others of that nature, and ask who it was that in all these had the king's ear at pleasure, and fashioned reports and propositions at his will? We might remember, too, besides these actions and engagements, the treaties and negotiations that have been; the infinite expense they have cost and the nothing they have returned. Nothing, but loss and dishonour to our nation! And from it all such discouragements might well arise now, considering the abuses of ministers yet too potent, as, should a supply not be forthcoming at this time, might justly make apology for the subject.38

Though Sir John Eliot attacked Buckingham in Commons, he was favorably inclined toward Sir Edward Cecil, "a substitute." He felt that Cecil should have had better employment because of his years of service and experience. Eliot said that "facility was the greatest prejudice he was subject to, which rendered him credulous and open to those that were artificiall and obscure. Whereby he became exposed, and subservient to their wills, and was drawne to tread those paths which themselves refus'd to walk in."39 It is thus apparent that Sir John did not blame Cecil for the expedition's failure, but put the blame on Buckingham and the preparations for the voyage.

Statements had been made by members of the expedition as to the poor quality of men supplied, the spoiled provisions, the tainted

38Ibid., pp. 517-18.
39Ibid., p. 1449.
drink, and the leaky condition of the ships of the fleet. James Bagg, one of the principal provisioners at Plymouth, wrote to Buckingham in defense, claiming that had the expedition been successful, it would then have been said that never before had an army and fleet been better manned, armed, provisioned, and clothed. But now, he said, these claims are made to cover their own shame, and he urged the Duke not to listen to their complaints. The provisioners of the fleet and the naval dockyard officials responsible for the condition of the ships, should have been included in the official inquiry, but were able to evade any involvement. Cecil was not so fortunate.

On 6 March, Cecil was summoned to appear before the Lords of the Privy Council to answer charges which had been made by some of the commanders under him in the expedition, namely: the Earl of Essex, Viscount Valentia, Viscount Cromwell, Sir Charles Rich, Sir Edward Harwood, Sir Edward Conway, Sir Michael Geere, Sir John Burroughs, Sir John Watte, and Sir John Chudleigh. Of these officers, only Harwood and Burroughs were professionals. Prominent among those who did not accuse Cecil were Sir William St. Leger, Sir George Blundell, Sir Richard Greenville, and Sir Thomas Love. Cecil had to defend himself not only against charges of mismanagement in the Cadiz expedition, but also had, as a Council of War member, to withstand the investigation

\[^{40}\text{Cal. St. P., Domestic, 1625-1626, p. 182.}\]

\[^{41}\text{Dalton, Life of Cecil, pp. 251-52.}\]

\[^{42}\text{Tbid., p. 253. Note: On p. ix of Glanville's Voyage to Cadiz, the editor, Rev. Alexander B. Grosart, states that among others, Sir Thomas Love was passionately strong against Cecil. This is not borne out in any of Sir Thomas' letters.}\]
which the House of Commons was making into the conduct and operations of the Council. Dr. Meddus, a prolific contemporary letter writer, wrote to Rev. Joseph Mead the following description of that which transpired when Cecil appeared before the Council:

The same Monday afternoon, Viscount Wimbledon and the colonels of the army came before the lords of the council, where the viscount, to his much prejudice and disadvantage, fell into a passion, saying, that never men was abused as he; that before his going and since his return, there had been libels and ballads to his disgrace; and that some had wished before departure that the voyage might rather not prosper than he should have the honour of it. Whereupon my Lord Essex asked him whether he were the man that had made such wishes against him, and so Colonel Burrows and the rest in order did the like, saving only Sir William St. Leger and Sir George Blundell, who of all the rest did only adhere unto him.  

The Council of War was in a most difficult position. They had selected the leaders of the expedition. Buckingham was the chief member of the Council and the most powerful man in England. To try Cecil was to try their own policies. Cecil was a member of the Council and had been carrying out their orders. How then would it be possible to try one of their own who was protected by their most powerful member? Buckingham had to protect Cecil, even as he himself was protected by the King, for an attack on Cecil was tantamount to an attack on himself. Furthermore, Cecil had accepted the expedition's command and responsibility which should have been borne by the Duke. Buckingham must have realized this as he stood by Cecil, using the great power of his offices to stifle the compliants. It now remained to be seen if the Duke would be as fortunate.

The Council of War, as previously mentioned, was to appear

\[\text{Williams, Court and Times, p. 87.}\]
before Commons to answer how they had recommended dispensing the mon-
ies granted to the Crown. Dr. Meddus, writing to the Rev. Joseph
Mead on 10 March, described their appearance:

  On Tuesday morning, the Council of War presented themselves
before the House of Commons, where being demanded whether they
had issued the moneys according to the order in the statute,
their answer was, that they were not bound to give the House
of Commons an account of what they had done. . . . On Wednes-
day afternoon, the lawyers of the House discussed the question
whether the council of war were bound by the statute to give
an account of their proceedings to the House of Commons, and
concluded that the council of war was bound to do it. . . .
On Thursday morning, the Commons propounded a new question
to the same council: namely, whether in this last action at
sea, and formerly also, their counsels, about the issuing of
money had been put in execution, and examined every one of
them apart. My Lord Grandison's answer was he was not bound
to give an answer. Sir John Ogle required more time to give
his answer, and so did the Earl of Totnes. Whereupon Saturday
is set down as a peremptory day for them all. My Lord Conway
and Sir Thomas Button being sick, a committee is sent to each
to examine them. Sir Horatio Vere, Baron Tilbury, is freed
from all question by the House in respect of his absence, and
the Lord Brooke by reason of his eye and impotency. But when
this question is done, the Commons have five more questions
in readiness in the Speaker's hand for the same Council of
War to answer. My Lord Wimbledon (Cecil) was not as yet
questioned by them but will be today.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 87-88.}

  The Council was faced now with a real dilemma. Should they
refuse to answer to Commons, the grant of money to the King might be
delayed or even denied. If they gave Commons the whole story, they
would be involving themselves as well as the government, and placing
themselves also at the mercy of the relentless Commons. It was at
this point that Charles rescued them. He directed them to reply to
Commons as follows:

  We have endeavoured to give all possible satisfaction to this
honourable house, touching the question you have been pleased
to propound unto us. And, taking into our consideration the duty we owe as counsellors of the warre unto his Matie, and the due respect we have unto this house, in discharge thereof we have humbly besought his Matie's pleasure therein, whose hath bin gratiously pleased thus to direct us.

His Matie hath given us leave to give an accompt of our warrants to the Treasury, for the disbursement of the subsidies last given in the time of his Royall father, which is clearly warranted by the Act of Parliament. But, concerning or counsells and the following thereof, his Matie hath directly forbidden us to give any accompt, as being against his service to divulge those secretts, and expressly against our oath as counsellors of warr.¹⁵

This firm, decisive reply kept the Commons from continuing their inquiry and protected Sir Edward Cecil from being questioned by this body.

The House of Commons, having failed to secure answers from the King, now turned its full fury upon the Duke of Buckingham. Here they would not be put off, for they declared publicly that the Duke was "a common enemy both of church and state."¹⁶ The Commons prepared impeachment proceedings against the Lord Admiral even though they fully realized that Charles would do his utmost to protect his favorite.

Amerigo Salvetti, representing the Grand Duke of Tuscany, wrote to his patron on 27 March, describing some of the principal charges brought against the Duke:

The principal accusations brought against his Excellency, moved by a certain Doctor Turner, are divided under six heads as follows:

1st. Whether the reputation of His Majesty's fleet since the Duke of Buckingham has been Admiral has not diminished and the dominion of the neighbouring seas been almost lost?

2nd. Whether in consequence of the innumerable and profuse donations bestowed on the Duke and his relatives the country has not been impoverished?

¹⁵Historical Manuscripts Commission Reports, Eleventh Report, I, 51, on microcard.
3rdly. Whether the assumption by the Duke and his relatives of the principal offices of the kingdom has not been the cause of the present disorders?

4thly. Whether the sale by the Duke of offices and dignities both spiritual and temporal to unworthy persons to the exclusion of candidates of merit is not the cause of disorder and injustice?

5thly. Whether the presence at court of his mother and godfather who are papists does not show that he patronizes others of that sect?

6thly. Whether being Grand Admiral and General he ought not to have gone in person with the fleet, and whether its failure is not to be attributed to the selection of little experience to command it?

It is said that the members of Parliament wish to inquire into other matters, but I am of opinion that they will in the end be obliged to be quiet as I see no chance of their success, even in the smallest degree, unless the King sided with them which no one believes possible.

The pursuit of Buckingham grew so hot that Charles sent Sir John Eliot and Sir Dudley Digges, the two most outspoken members of the House, to the Tower for their inflammatory statements. It now became a contest between King and Commons, with each demanding something from the other. The King wanted his supply and Commons wanted Buckingham removed from office. Furious because two of their members had been imprisoned, Commons resolutely kept on with their impeachment plans. Amerigo Salvetti, writing to his patron, describes the situation as of 3 April:

Although the King last week informed Parliament, by word of mouth, that it ought without loss of time to devote its attention to the question of supply, instead of bringing personal charges against the Duke of Buckingham, it evidently will not abandon the course which has been taken. The members

16 Ibid., p. 51.
on the contrary persevere zealously in their inquiries into the causes of existing burdens. Such inquiries naturally lead to reflections on the administration of the Duke, and many name him in the most open manner as the author of existing evils. They are not likely to give up the habit of doing so, till they have matured the terms of his impeachment, which with the support of the house of Lords, they will submit to his Majesty petitioning him for justice.

The King is anxious to prevent this catastrophe, partly because he has already declared his determination to protect the Duke. . . .

Charles decided upon a new tactic: being frank and friendly with the Commons. Salvetti, in a later portion of his report of above date, describes this action:

He (Charles) exhorts the Members to consider the present state of his affairs, and calls upon them to unite together and to take prompt measures to aid him, so that the favourable season may not be lost for making all the preparations necessary for defence and offence, and especially for succoring the King of Denmark with present and future supplies of 30,000 £ sterling, as well as 20,000 £ for the Count of Mansfeldt, besides what is required to pay for the maintenance of 6,000 English troops in Holland.

What is of still more importance, they must also provide the money required for the cost of the navy and for the defence of Ireland which will amount to millions. With regard to the statement of grievances, His Majesty will hear it, provided that there is no attack on his government, or on that of his father the late King of happy memory, and that it is expressed in a moderate and temperate manner. . . .

The House of Commons decided that they would grant supply to Charles, but only in the amount of about three hundred thousand pounds. Furthermore, they would not pass the act until such time as the King would give them a direct reply to the list of grievances which they were in process of preparing. Charles, seeing that there was no other way to protect the Duke, dissolved Parliament on 15 June. . . .
By this action, Charles preserved the Duke of Buckingham in his several offices, but lost any chance of securing a supply from Parliament. But more important, although he saved one friend, Charles lost the respect of Parliament and of his people. This rash act to save his Lord Admiral also ended the parliamentary inquiry into the unconstitutional acts of the Duke, wherein he made national commitments without the approval of Parliament. One of these major commitments was the Cadiz expedition. So, here died the inquiry which might have proved many things about this ill-planned, fruitless, inhuman, and costly foray which must be considered as the low point in English naval history.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The Cadiz expedition of 1625 was a series of logistical and tactical blunders, one compounding another, with the result that the whole operation was a miserable failure. On the strategic level, however, the overall objectives of the Cadiz expedition must be considered as sound. Had the expedition been able to move along the Spanish coast destroying shipping, it would have dealt Spain a heavy blow. Had the expedition been able to take some port on the coast of Spain and held it, the fleet would have been able to operate from a sanctuary. Had the expedition been able to capture the treasure fleet intact, or in part, it would have cut off the flow of Spanish bullion used to finance her wars. This would also have given Charles and Buckingham the necessary funds to expand their aims in the Palatinate. Had the expedition succeeded, it would have rescued Charles and Buckingham from the desperate position into which the latter had maneuvered them.

The expedition failed, however, on the planning level, that area between strategy and tactics. Had the logistical planning been sound, the ships would have sailed with adequate provisions, enabling them to go on to other objectives after the debacle at Cadiz and in flota-watching.

The expedition was poorly planned and executed. The soldiers and sailors, pressed into service in May, were not employed until
October when the fleet put to sea. This is not objectionable in itself, for an army requires training, but these men were not trained during their long five-months sojourn at Plymouth. The time could well have been used to train them into some semblance of a fighting force, but this was totally neglected. This army was an undisciplined rabble during its entire period of service. England had yet to learn that thousands of men pressed into service against their will did not constitute an army. The provisions, stocked on board the ships for the same five-month period, became so spoiled that the soldiers and sailors became ill, thus further reducing their effectiveness. One cannot censure the provisioners of the fleet too harshly; having expended royal funds to purchase rations for the ships when ordered in the spring, they had no other monies with which to replace the spoiled provisions. The fault here lay in not setting a target date toward which all elements could work, and then adhering to this date. Also, someone with an understanding of provisioning should have checked the quality of the provisions provided.

Some of the lesser coastal ports of Portugal, then under Spanish rule, should have been considered as points to seize temporarily to replenish provisions and water. No record can be found of even such a suggestion being made. The squadrons could have made several coordinated raids to split the defending forces should any have been in the selected areas. Nothing in this line of approach was suggested. It would have been possible to have the fleet operate from these Portuguese ports while watching for the wraith-like treasure fleet. Drake had done this in 1587 with a much smaller force, even managing
to overhaul his ships in the process and give his men a rest on shore while reprovisioning the fleet.

The administration, planning, and control used in 1625 were poor during all phases of this operation. Even had Cadiz been taken, there would have been little found in the way of food and water as these requisites for subsistence must be brought into the city from the mainland. This is an excellent example of poor logistical planning. This must be considered as a direct result of James' policy of neglecting his military and naval forces for over twenty years. There apparently was no one on the expedition used to thinking along these lines.

The military tactics used were as deplorable as the naval techniques. A night landing should have been made on the south side of the isthmus leading to Cadiz which would have cut off the city before the Spaniards would have been aware of the presence of an English fleet. Considering the tactics which were employed, the fleet should have arrived in the early morning to utilize as many daylight hours as possible, but they merely blundered into the bay late in the afternoon, losing their visibility in a few hours. Rapid, decisive action should have been taken immediately, but instead a Council of War had to be called, thus wasting further precious hours. There were enough ships and troops so that several things could have been accomplished at once. One squadron could have attacked Fort Puntal, another gone after the ships in the Trocadero Channel, while the third could have been putting troops ashore. Mass inactivity was the actual result. The effect of surprise, a cardinal principle on an expedition like
this, was allowed to slip away.

Another principle of war, security, was totally ignored. This permitted the city to be reinforced by night, and had a Spanish fleet been in the vicinity they would have had no difficulty in bottling up the English fleet in the bay. Once ashore, Cecil's aim of seizing the Suazo bridge was unnecessary, and extremely poor tactics, not worthy of his rank or years of military experience. He might have been cut off had the Spanish been more aggressive. Cecil's tactic was apparently predicated upon the bridge having been taken in the raid in 1596, although no attention was paid to its having been taken at that time through a misunderstanding or an error on the part of the commander. The proper tactic would have been to defend along the narrow part of the isthmus, supported by the fleet's guns from either side.

Poor naval techniques were also used during the watch for the treasure fleet. There seems to have been little reason for selecting a point sixty leagues (one hundred and eighty miles) west of Cape St. Vincent and ordering the fleet to cruise not over an area of one degree on a north-south axis. This is roughly seventy miles, while the shortest straight line distance from Cape St. Vincent, southeast to the nearest point on the North African Coast, Cape Spartel, near Tangier, is roughly one hundred and eighty miles. This distance could have easily been screened by the plus-ninety ships in the English squadrons. The fleet, west of Cape St. Vincent, was not in a good position to intercept the Spaniards unless it came in a direct line from the Azores to Cadiz. With Spain involved in a European war, and with news of
English fleet preparations in the wind, it could be expected that the
treasure fleet might select an alternate route. Inasmuch as the Span-
ish fleet normally stopped at the Azores each year on its way to Spain,
it would have made much more sense to the English fleet to have seized,
or at least to have lain close to the Azores to wait. Considering
only a position close to Spain to wait for the fleet, it would have
been much better to have lain in wait south of Cape St. Vincent rather
than west of it. The patrol distance would have been much shorter,
affording a better chance to locate the flota.

It is interesting to compare the actions of the English fleet
of 1625 with modern British principles of war. The principles included
in the following discussion, although applicable to any period in his-
tory in retrospect, would not, of course, have been recognized in
their entirety by the 17th century military personnel concerned. That
most of these principles were violated in the Cadiz expedition is
demonstrable. An objective was selected, but the project was not
carried through, finally being abandoned. The same might be said of
offensive action. An offensive action was begun, but a second plan
was allowed to take precedence. Administration was one of the chief
items missing in this operation. It was poorly planned and executed
from a tactical viewpoint and even more so in its logistical aspects.
A solid example of administrative failure was the soldier's going
ashore and marching off with empty knapsacks. Cooperation was defi-

ектly lacking between the leaders and the merchant captains, allowing

---

1 Subcourse 1/62, The Role of the Army and Fundamentals of Com-
bat, Lesson 4, The Principles of War, U. S. Army Command & General
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
dissention to creep in, ending in severe accusations at the conclusion of the venture. Concentration of force was achieved in the massing of the fleet in one attack upon Cadiz, but was not followed up as only a small part of the force was involved in the attack, other elements anchored nearby, did nothing. Economy of effort, or using just enough to accomplish certain missions was not followed. While the attack on Puntal was going on, other parts of the fleet should have had other missions instead of merely watching and waiting. Flexibility was lacking in that the force could not do more than one thing at a time, although a degree of flexibility was achieved when the action at Cadiz was broken off and a new venture began. However, it was not a spontaneous or even pre-planned flexibility, but was arrived at only after discussion. Surprise was achieved in the sudden attack on Cadiz, but the advantage of this principle was lost through the must-have-a-council-meeting-first attitude of the commander. The principle of security was violated by not posting a squadron, or part of a squadron, outside the Bay of Cadiz to prevent the fleet being surprised or to prevent Cadiz from being reinforced. Neglect of this latter point allowed thousands of Spanish soldiers to garrison Cadiz, and was the chief reason why a land-based attack was not launched against the well-bastioned, walled city. Maintenance of morale was one factor never considered, although a point might be stretched in considering Cecil’s issuance of wine to his tired and hungry soldiers as being in this category. The well-being of the soldiers and sailors was never considered either before or during this mismanaged venture. Efforts to feed and clothe the men were made after the return to England, when
the soldiers and sailors were once more billeted upon the reluctant citizens of the southern coastal counties, but this took almost two months to resolve, doing little in the meantime to maintain morale. To have established morale during this venture would have required a miracle inasmuch as all of the personnel concerned were there against their will. Little wonder that the expedition failed.

The Cadiz expedition, in the completeness of its failure, must be considered as the absolute nadir of the art of English seamanship. There were other failures which followed, as at the Isle of Rhe in 1627; there were defeats by the Dutch in the 1590's, but never again was there an expedition which failed of itself. The Cadiz expedition defeated itself in 1625 through the inadequacy of its preparation and planning, and through the ineptness of its leaders. Zuane Pesaro, Venetian Ambassador to England, summed it all up in a letter to his government, written on 2 January 1626:

... they say that the king ordered the return upon information from Essex, but the ministers are sure that it was the individual decision of Marshal Cecil. The reasons for this unexpected event are bad management, division between the leaders and shortness of provisions combined with a fear of utter loss at this bad season and that they would never return.²

No mention was made by Pesaro of a defeat by an enemy. It thus may be said that the enemy which defeated the Cadiz expedition came from within.

Who was the enemy within? How can he or it be singled out and blamed? Could it be Parliament for not supporting Charles and Buckingham in their grandiose plans? No! Parliament could not be blamed

²Cal. St. P., Venetian, 1625-1626, p. 269.
in any way. Inasmuch as the House of Commons controlled the purse strings, the Parliament had a right to know how and where the nation's assets were to be expended. Charles would not take them into his confidence and tell them of his plans for war. Naturally, the Parliament resented this and fought back with the only weapon they had, refusal to grant supply. The Parliament had nothing to do with the war plans or the expedition for the simple reason that Charles refused to tell them anything about it.

Charles must be held responsible for his stubbornness in not informing the Parliament of his military and naval plans. Had he done so he would undoubtedly have received their support. Perhaps the support might not have been of the magnitude which he and the Duke wished, but it would have been better than sending out an expedition inadequately equipped. Considering the mood and feelings of the English people toward Spain, it would appear that Charles might have had his way had he placed his confidence in his Parliament rather than in himself and Buckingham. Charles and his ideas of Kingship were, therefore, directly responsible for the Parliament not granting him supply with which he could have adequately equipped the Cadiz expedition.

The departed James must not be overlooked when it comes to determining responsibility. Through his slipshod policies, the military and naval forces had been allowed to decay for over twenty years. Charles was but the recipient of the neglect of James. However, while Charles cannot be blamed for the condition of the armed forces, he must bear the moral responsibility for allowing himself to be influenced by Buckingham and for not taking his Parliament into his confidence.
The Privy Council knew of the war plans as did the King's Council of War. Orders pertaining to the preparations and the expedition itself were issued by both bodies. Inasmuch as Buckingham was the dominant member of the Privy Council and most of the Council of War bore some form of allegiance to him, it is not difficult to comprehend that the Duke influenced both groups. The Privy Council, although aware of the aim of the expedition, should not be held to account for its preparation or actions because the Council of War had been appointed to advise the monarch in matters of war.

One member of the Council of War should be singled out for particular censure. Sir George Carew, later the Earl of Totness, was Master of the Ordnance. The Royal Ordnance Office had charge of the ordering, purchase, storage, care and maintenance, issue and recovery of all munitions of war both by land and sea. When faulty muskets were provided, something must have been amiss. Many of the muskets furnished did not have touch holes to ignite powder in the firing chamber, and ammunition provided did not fit the weapons. The Royal Ordnance Office came directly under the Crown, Buckingham, and the Privy Council. No attempt was made immediately, however, to find fault with the Ordnance Office. Thus, Sir George Carew not only escaped criticism for his part in providing faulty ordnance for the expedition, but he was raised to an earldom in 1626.³

The Council of War as a body probably had little influence on either Charles or the Duke. Theirs was an advisory capacity, and the

³G. E. Aylmer, "Attempts at Administrative Reform," The English Historical Review, LXXII (April, 1957), 240-44.
only member known to have opposed Buckingham was Sir Robert Mansell, the single naval member of the Council. There is little doubt that had Mansell not resisted the Duke before Parliament, that he, and not Cecil, would have commanded the Cadiz expedition. There is no evidence, either, that the Council of War would have been successful in opposing Buckingham's plans. Most members were appointed through ducal patronage—who cares to oppose one's patron?

The trail of guilt now leads to the Lord Admiral himself. Was the Duke of Buckingham responsible in any way for the failure of the Cadiz armada? Yes, he was. The Duke, although not with the expedition, had retained for himself the pompous title of "Generalissimo," with Cecil as his deputy. Buckingham passed on to Cecil the instructions which he had received from the King. The provisioners of the fleet were responsible to Buckingham and reported directly to him. Thus, the Duke should have been acutely aware of the logistical preparations made between May and October 1625. Buckingham as Lord Admiral since 1618, must have known something of the condition of the dilapidated ships in which the expedition sailed. Buckingham had, through patronage, been responsible for the appointment of the senior commanders of the fleet. The selection of these leaders was one of the real tragedies of the expedition. The commander, the squadron commanders, and the squadron seconds-in-command, were either military men or had no experience. Soldiers and sailors look to experienced commanders with respect, as men who know their jobs, and upon whom they can rely. There were no commanders who had any experience in the sort of task which lay before them. For the selection of these leaders Buckingham
must be declared guilty.

The abrupt change of command from the Duke to Sir Edward Cecil must be considered as one of the basic reasons for the expedition's failure. By removing himself, the Lord Admiral took away the one strong, dominant personality in the organization. Had Buckingham sailed with the fleet, it would have had a powerful, forceful leader used to being obeyed. The Duke was well aware of how to effectively use his rank and station. Instead, a man new to the middle nobility was substituted. Cecil was outranked by several members of the venture, notably the Earls of Essex and Denbigh. In addition, Lords Valentia and Cromwell were viscounts, as was Cecil, but they had years of seniority. These gentlemen would not have dared to oppose Buckingham, and the Lord Admiral, through his overriding authority, would have given the fleet a definite purpose or goal. There is little doubt, also, that had Buckingham been in command, the restrictive shipboard Council of War would not have existed. The Duke planned the expedition, his men provisioned it, his men executed the plan, he retained the overall command, and so he must bear the responsibility for its dismal failure. Had the expedition succeeded, the Lord Admiral would have been a national hero for devising such a plan. Inasmuch as it failed, it seems justifiable that he be judged as responsible.

Can Sir Edward Cecil be blamed for the failure at Cadiz? No, not directly, because his actions were controlled by the expedition's Council of War. Cecil might be the easiest to blame, but not when he had to abide by the decisions of this board. Could this Council of War be held responsible? As a body, yes, but as individuals, no. This was the shipboard group which made the decisions; as such, they
should shoulder the blame for their operations. It is difficult to pinpoint responsibility here, because all members of this Council were not always present due to weather and separation of ships. Some were present for some decisions, but not for others. Even though Cecil had been hampered by the actions of this Council of War, he had insisted that a clause be inserted in his instructions whereby he was bound by their decisions, and it had been a fortunate move by him. He could not be held liable for decisions made for him, so it must be the Council of War that receives the blame for decisions made and results therefrom after the fleet sailed from Plymouth.

The Dutch commanders and their squadron do not come in for any sort of censure on this voyage inasmuch as they performed more than adequately at all times. They were outnumbered as far as decisions made were concerned and did their best under all circumstances.

The Captains of the merchant ships which made up most of the fleet must come in for particular criticism for their part in the expedition. When a Council of War was held to make a decision, the merchant captains held the balance of power because of their numbers; this, along with their efforts to enhance the liabilities of some of the projected objectives could sway the vote of the Council. San Lucer was not attacked because of the objections of the merchant captains to maritime hazards; they were also able to do the same with regard to St. Mary Port, Gibraltar, Malaga, and the Madeiras. As soon as one of these was brought up, this group had many excuses as to why they could not go there. Thus, the merchant captains controlled many of the actions of the expedition. Their lack of cooperation and
cowardice at Cadiz is a matter of record. Drake or Hawkins would have solved this by a rope from a yardarm, but Cecil probably would have asked the Council of War to decide the matter, and he would have been outvoted.

As an immediate consequence of this debacle at Cadiz, King Charles, Buckingham, and the royal administration came under open attack by the House of Commons. Buckingham bore the major part of this criticism and personal censure. Charles had only succeeded in beginning his reign with a catastrophic failure. The reign began on the wrong foot; it remained so until Charles' demise in 1629. The defeat and disgrace in 1625 saw the Royal Navy at its nadir. Charles was interested in the Royal Navy, unlike his father, and although he had an extremely unfriendly Parliament, he attempted to rectify the condition of his fleet. This eventually led to changed in naval policy.

Another immediate consequence was the impeachment of the Duke of Buckingham by the House of Commons. The Commons recognized the Lord Admiral as the source of their recent national disgraces and tried to have him removed from office. Only the King's direct action of proroguing parliament saved his favorite. Although the attacks by the Commons resulted in at least two members being sent to the Tower, the lower house had learned something. They had discovered their real power lay in controlling the King's purse, and that they were gaining strength and privileges. They were now in a much better position to face up to absolute power and were becoming mentally adjusted to attempt resistance to royal decrees. Charles realised this also and later was to attempt to retaliate by not calling Parliament for eleven years.
Mention has been made of the billeting of soldiers and sailors on the civilian populace. The citizens were reimbursed by the government for housing and feeding the soldiery, but this in no way made up for the inconvenience and mischief caused by these rough characters. No consideration was shown as to whether the citizen wanted these soldiers or could afford to provide for them while awaiting Crown payments, which often never came. Soldiers pressed for the Cadiz expedition had been billeted upon the citizenry from June into October, to the utter misery and despair of these people. Upon the fleet's return, the same procedure was followed and also in succeeding expeditions.

The third Parliament of Charles' reign met in March 1623. In April, Sir John Eliot described conditions around Plymouth and the abuses by soldiers of the rights of private citizens. Sir Walter Erle of Dorsetshire spoke of the soldiers stealing sheep, disturbing markets, ravishing women, burglary, highway robbery, and ransom, as some of the crimes committed by these men in his county. Sir John Eliot brought in the question of martial law concerning the punishment of soldiers for offenses against civilians. Eliot believed that when a soldier committed an offense against a civilian, that the latter should have recourse to ordinary processes of law and not be dependent upon the soldier being punished by his officers. The question was, according to Sir John, were soldiers a law to themselves, or were they subject to the laws of the realm? After continued debate, they finally

---

2Ibid., p. 227.
declared that the exercise of martial law in time of peace was absolutely illegal. Sir Edward Coke proposed that the King be petitioned against these abuses, but Sir Thomas Wentworth argued that a bill should be drawn up instead, which would regulate how soldiers would be quartered in the future. Sir Nathaniel Rich proposed that a petition be used for it required an immediate answer, whereas a bill would be sent up at the end of the session. The King might reject it then while having accepted supply in the meantime.

Finally, after more than a month of debate, the Petition of Right was presented to the King, containing provisions against forced loans, arbitrary imprisonment, martial law, and compulsory billeting. In early June 1628 as shouts of applause rocked Parliament, the Clerk spoke the words of the King's approval, "Soit droit fait comme est desire." Those portions of the great Petition of Right of 1623 which pertain to the quartering of soldiers and sailors upon the citizenry and establishing of martial law in peacetime, can be traced directly to the circumstances surrounding the preparations for the Cadiz expedition of 1625. King Charles had now promised to refrain from these practices in the future. At last some good had come out of the events surrounding this ill-starred venture. The Petition of Right of 1628 became a definite part of English life; it is an outstanding example of a king bowing before grievances of his people and his parliament.

Eventually, more good appeared out of the shadows around the defeats, disgraces, and failures involving the Cadiz expedition and

---

its bitter aftermath. The Royal Navy was investigated in 1626-27 by an official commission, and while this body accomplished little in the way of recommendations, it was a step in the right direction. In 1626, 1629, and 1630-31, the Royal Ordnance Office was investigated by a commission which had Cecil and Coke as two of its members, as this office's shortcomings during 1625-29 were well known. While this investigation accomplished little, it did recognize that something was wrong with the system. These investigations were but the first harbingers of later reforms, but these were the beginnings, the recognition that changes must be made. The understanding that something needs adjustment is a large step towards its eventual correction.

After viewing the results of the first major sea campaign since 1607, Charles, Buckingham, and England realized the state into which their armed forces had deteriorated. It was something, unfortunately, which could not be corrected overnight, but only through a carefully administered program over a period of years. It would take this long to replace the shattered morale, the ancient, weary ships, and to adequately train personnel in leadership, better weapons, and equipment. This program was begun under Charles' direction. He had a major problem; the Crown was poor and in debt, so Charles had to resort to "ship money" to secure the desired revenue. During the reign of Charles, 1625-49, forty-six ships were added to the fleet, twenty-four of which were newly built, nineteen were prizes, and only three of the old

---

8 Ibid., pp. 244-45.
ships were rebuilt. It thus may be seen that the emphasis was on adding new ships, or those already built and in good condition.

Had Charles and the House of Commons, his chief source of revenue, not been estranged during most of his reign, there is little doubt that even more ships would have been added to the growing fleet. As late as 1641, sixteen years after the failure at Cadiz, this event was remembered with great bitterness. It was referred to in the Grand Remonstrance of 1641, a grievance petition to the King, as "the discreditable attempt on Cadiz." The Commons clearly recognized that England needed a powerful navy, but with the monarch and his source of his revenue at odds, little could be accomplished. Under Charles, the launching of one, or at the most two, warships in a year was cause for congratulation, pride, and excitement. After Charles had been put to death in 1649 and Parliament ruled, twenty-two new ships were launched in a single year, 1654. In the ten-year period between 1649 and 1659, the staggering number of two hundred and seven ships were added to the Royal Navy, of which ninety-eight were newly built, and one hundred and nine were prizes. Thus, it may easily be seen that Parliament recognized that England's strength lay in having an immense navy to protect her shores and carry out her continental foreign policy. England had come a long way since the

9Oppenheim, Administration of the Navy, pp. 254-55.


11Oppenheim, Administration of the Navy, pp. 330-37.
the days of James, the appeaser, and the beginnings of national pride in the Royal Navy were evident during the tenure of the Commonwealth. The English had faced the hard fact that they needed a strong navy, although it was only after the struggle between Crown and Commons had ended that she was able to realize this goal. It is furthermore readily apparent that through the failures in years past, pointed up mostly by the failure at Cadiz, that a different form of organization was necessary when assembling battle fleets. The past had seen armed merchant vessels called to service to meet a crisis, and these had always made up the bulk of the English battle fleets. In the future, this would not be so. From the time of the Commonwealth, the English Royal Navy was always a large and powerful force, ready to do battle on its own.

The raid on Cadiz was actually of small consequence. The Spanish had offered practically no resistance and their losses were slight, other than the damage to Fort Puntal. The city was not captured, no treasure was taken. The Spanish navy was not destroyed or even damaged. Spain was not crippled financially, the treasure fleets continued to arrive, and her wars continued. Being preoccupied in the New World, in the Netherlands, in the Palatinate, and in the Mediterranean, Spain chose not to pick up the well-worn gauntlet which England had flung down. As far as she was concerned, this ludicrous episode at Cadiz meant nothing other than to indicate that Spain had little to fear from England. A state of war existed, but not in actual combat between the two powers. So, for England, was it all a bitter failure?

Out of the events circumjacent to the Cadiz expedition of 1625
there came many unforeseeable changes, although not at the time nor in the area of military or naval victories. Some of the eventualities were open criticism by the Parliament of the sovereign, his ministers, and the royal administration; investigations into the conduct of governmental agencies leading to reforms; reorganization and enlargement of the Royal Navy with less dependence upon merchant vessels; an efficient and well-trained body of regular naval personnel to man these ships; the prohibition of martial law in peacetime, and a ban on compulsory billeting of soldiers on the citizenry. Thus, without the English people being aware of it, many worthwhile reforms were generated out of the ashes of this catastrophe at Cadiz in 1625.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

BIOGRAPHIES AND SQUADRON ORGANIZATION

SIR EDWARD CECIL, VISCOUNT WIMBLEDON

"CECIL, Sir Edward, Viscount Wimborne (1572-1638), naval and military commander, was the third son of Sir Thomas Cecil, second lord Burghley and first earl of Exeter, grandson of Sir William Cecil, first lord Burghley and nephew of Sir Robert Celyll, first earl of Salisbury, whose deviation from the paternal spelling of the name he systematically adopted. He was born on 29 February 1571-2, and entered the military service of a company of English foot-soldiers, and in May 1600 was appointed to a troop of cavalry, which he commanded at the battle of Nieuport. In 1601 he commanded a body of one thousand men raised in London for the relief of Ostend, then besieged by the Spaniards, and on his return in September was knighted by Queen Elizabeth. In the spring of 1602 he was colonel of a regiment of English horse under Prince Maurice, and served in the expedition into Brabant and at the siege of Grave. He continued actively serving during the years immediately following, and achieved a high reputation for valour and conduct. In 1610 he commanded the contingent of four thousand men under Prince Christian of Anhalt, at the siege of Juliers, 7-17 July to 12-22 August. He was M. P. for Aldeburgh 1601, for Stamford 1609, for Chichester 1620, and for Dover 1621.

"During all these years Cecil was markedly supported by the Duke of Buckingham; and in 1625, when the expedition against the coast of Spain was determined on, Buckingham, though nominating himself to the supreme command, as generalissimo, appointed Cecil as his deputy, with the title of lord marshal and general of the sea and land forces, "the greatest command," it was said, "that any subject hath had these hundred years" (Court and Times of Charles I, i. 53). Buckingham offered indeed to procure him an appointment from the king; but Cecil, "not to lessen the duke's honour, took it from himself" (Cal. State Papers, Dom. 16 March 1629-30). Notwithstanding these high-sounding titles the preparations were wretched in the extreme. The men were raw levies, and the officers, for the most part, no better; the fleet was mainly composed of merchant ships, hastily pressed into service, and commanded by men ignorant of war and discontented at the part they were compelled to undertake. Even the general had never yet held any independent command, and was totally ignorant of naval affairs. Nevertheless Buckingham anticipated an easy success. The

knight came down to Plymouth to review the troops and the fleet, and it was officially announced that Cecil was to be raised to the peerage as Viscount Pembroke.

"The failure of this costly expedition gave rise to much popular indignation, the weight of which fell, not undeservedly, on Buckingham. But no censure of Buckingham can absolve Cecil from the blame which must attach to the gross incapacity which he displayed under circumstances of no peculiar difficulty. To his incompetence the Spaniards owed it that every ship in the harbor was not taken or burnt, that Cadiz was not sacked, and that the treasure ships were not captured. The superior officers of the expedition, especially the Earl of Essex, did not hesitate to prefer a formal charge of misconduct against the general. It appears to have been cursory examined by the King in council, but no evidence was taken; the favour of the Duke of Buckingham and Cecil's denial of every point were held to be sufficient to warrant a full acquittal; and thus, far from receiving every censure, his credit at court rose and continued to rise till, a few years later and after the more disastrous failure at the Isle of Re, even the people began to consider him as an heroic leader of armies." Cecil's squadron organization follows:

THE ADMIRAL'S SQUADRON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Commanders</th>
<th>Tonnes</th>
<th>Seamen</th>
<th>Landmen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ann Royall</td>
<td>Lord Marshall</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St George</td>
<td>Lord Delaware</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convective</td>
<td>Sr Michael Gayre</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assurance</td>
<td>Capt. Osborne</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudence</td>
<td>Capt. Vaughan</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anne</td>
<td>Capt. Wollaston</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royall Defence</td>
<td>Capt. Ellys</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesser Saphire</td>
<td>Capt. Bond</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assurance of Dover</td>
<td>Capt. Barsey</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonathan</td>
<td>Capt. Boteler</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amitie</td>
<td>Capt. Malyn</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob</td>
<td>Capt. Gosse</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthonie</td>
<td>Capt. Blaque</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hermyt</td>
<td>Capt. Turner</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopewell of New Castell</td>
<td>Capt. - - -</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abraham</td>
<td>Capt. Dowses</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbara Constant</td>
<td>Capt. Hatch</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camelyon</td>
<td>Capt. Seamour</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Venture</td>
<td>Capt. Knivett</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Glanville, Voyage to Cadiz, p. 125.
2King's ship.
Sir Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex

"Devereux, Robert, third Earl of Essex (1591-1646), parliamentary general, was son of Robert, second earl of Essex and Frances, daughter of Sir Francis Walsingham, and widow of Sir Philip Sidney. His father having been attainted in 1601, he was restored in blood and honour by act of parliament in 1604.

"In 1620 Essex commanded a company in the regiment of English volunteers which set forth under Sir Horace Vere to defend the Palatinate. He saw scarcely any service, as he returned speedily to England to attend to his parliamentary duties, and on 13 Jan. 1621 he became a member of the council of war, appointed to consider the measures to be taken for the defence of the Palatinate if, as was the expected, James should interfere in person. During the summer of that year he visited the Netherlands, and accompanied the Prince of Orange to the field, but he again returned to be present at the winter sitting of parliament. In 1625 Essex was vice-admiral in the Cadiz expedition."

His squadron was as follows:

THE VICE ADMIRAL'S SQUADRON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shipps</th>
<th>Commanders</th>
<th>Tonnes</th>
<th>Seamen</th>
<th>Landmen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Swiftsure</td>
<td>Earl of Essex</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Provision ship.
2. DNB, V, 890.
4. King's ship.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shippes</th>
<th>Commanders</th>
<th>Tonnes</th>
<th>Seamen</th>
<th>Landmen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reformation^1</td>
<td>Lo. Viscount Valencia</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capt. Gilbert</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rainebowe^1</td>
<td>Sr John Chudley, knt</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zouch Phenix</td>
<td>Capt. Phillpott</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martha</td>
<td>Capt. Barber</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea flower</td>
<td>Capt. Sidenham</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary Anne</td>
<td>Capt. Harman</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carnation</td>
<td>Capt. Walsingham</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>Capt. Gurling</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True Love</td>
<td>Sr Jo. Hamden, knt</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ffreindship</td>
<td>Capt. John Harvey</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary Constant</td>
<td>Capt. Hermin Burley</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyger</td>
<td>Capt. Welden</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retorne</td>
<td>Capt. Hagthorp</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary Magdalen</td>
<td>Capt. Whiddon</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timothy</td>
<td>Capt. Pawlett</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venture</td>
<td>Capt. Mohun</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Exchange</td>
<td>Capt. Edw. Harvy</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esperance</td>
<td>Capt. Wm Reskymer</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patient Adventure</td>
<td>Capt. Bargrave</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amitie</td>
<td>Capt. Shipwith</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barking</td>
<td>Capt. ffittton</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyon of Ipswich</td>
<td>Capt. Rockwood</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuell</td>
<td>Capt. Walters</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Bonaventure^2</td>
<td>Capt. Johnson</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sara Bonaynture^2</td>
<td>Capt. Carew</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian^2</td>
<td>Capt. Sharey</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chestnutt^3</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ffortune^3</td>
<td></td>
<td>400</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William &amp; John^4</td>
<td>Tho. Tentes, Mr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Wills^4</td>
<td>Wm Sneddall, Mr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**William Feilding, Earl of Denbigh^5**

"Feilding, William, first Earl of Denbigh (d. 1613), was the son of Basil Feilding of Newnham Paddox in Warwickshire. He was born

---

1 King's ship.
2 Munition ship.
3 Horse ship.
4 Catches (Ketches).
5 DNB, vol. 1, 1154.
before 1582, educated at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, and knighted, according to Collins on 23 April 1603, according to Doyle on 6 March 1607 (Collins, Peerage, ed. Brydges; Doyle, Official Baronage). He married Susan Villiers, daughter of Sir George Villiers of Brookesby, Leicestershire. "The plain country gentlemen who had the good luck to marry Buckingham's sister in the days of her poverty" found that the match had made his fortune (Gardiner, History of England, iv. 276). He became first deputy-master, and then master of the great wardrobe (23 Jan. 1619, 11 Jan. 1622). He was created successively Baron Feilding (13 Dec. 1620) and Earl of Denbigh (14 Sept. 1622, Doyle). He was charged to follow the Duke of Buckingham and the Prince of Wales to Spain, and selected for the honour of bringing word to England when the contract was passed (Court and Times of James I, ii, 402, 415). Without any experience either of military or naval affairs, he was appointed to important commands. In the expedition to Cadiz in 1625 he acted as rear-admiral, and when Cecil landed, as admiral (The Voyage to Cadiz, Camden Society, pp. 50-83)." His squadron was organized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shippe</th>
<th>Commanders</th>
<th>Tonnes</th>
<th>Seamen</th>
<th>Landmen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St Andrews</td>
<td>Earl of Denbigh</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John Watts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonaventure</td>
<td>Lo. Cromwell</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capt. Collins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dreadnough</td>
<td>Sr Beverley Newcome</td>
<td>1,58</td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capt. Povie</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abigail</td>
<td>Capt. Stradling</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tryall</td>
<td>Capt. Rous</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane Bonaventure</td>
<td>Capt. Duppa</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppilie</td>
<td>Capt. Jo. Reskymer</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew</td>
<td>Capt. Barna. Burley</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convert</td>
<td>Capt. Jones</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centaure</td>
<td>Capt. Oxenbridge</td>
<td>1,53</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragon</td>
<td>Capt. Marbery</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopewell</td>
<td>Capt. Browne</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adventure</td>
<td>Capt. Sacheverill</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susan</td>
<td>Capt. Powell</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rose</td>
<td>Capt. Plumleigh</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wa &amp; Thomasin</td>
<td>Capt. Cheke</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuell</td>
<td>Capt. Hake</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alyan</td>
<td>Capt. Kettelby</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blessing</td>
<td>Capt. Dunne</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence</td>
<td>Capt. Morgan</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Glanville, Voyage to Cadiz, p. 127.
2King's ship.
3Munition ship.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shipps</th>
<th>Commanders</th>
<th>Tonnes</th>
<th>Seamen</th>
<th>Landmen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isaacke</td>
<td>Capt. Peywell</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lion</td>
<td>Capt. Squibbe</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susan &amp; Hellen1</td>
<td>Capt. Levitt</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William of London1</td>
<td>Capt. Amadas</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hope1</td>
<td>Sr Tho. Pigott</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ffoxes2</td>
<td>Roger Barton, Jr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truelove2</td>
<td>Austin Carpenter, Jr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperous3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isaackson3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shipps</th>
<th>28</th>
<th>Tonnes</th>
<th>8242</th>
<th>25507</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catches</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Seamen</td>
<td>1583</td>
<td>5844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Landmen</td>
<td>2949</td>
<td>9983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Munion ship.
2 Horse ship.
3 Catches.
APPENDIX B

ROSTER OF REGIMENTS, COMMANDERS, AND OFFICERS OF THE
MILITARY FORCES ACCOMPANYING THE FLEET, 1625


APPENDIX C

LORD WIMBLEDON'S FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS, NO. 1

A copy of those instructions which were sent unto the Earl of Essex and given by Sir Edward Cecil, Knight, admiral of the fleet, lieutenant-general and marshal of his majesty's land force now at sea, to be duly performed by all commanders, and their captains and masters, and other inferior officers, both by sea and land, for the better government of his majesty's fleet. Dated in the Sound of Plymouth, aboard his majesty's good ship the Anne Royal, the third of October, 1625.

1. First above all things you shall provide that God be duly served twice every day by all the land and sea companies in your ship, according to the usual prayers and liturgy of the Church of England, and shall set and discharge every watch with the singing of a psalm and prayer usual at sea.

2. You shall keep the company from swearing, blaspheming, drunkenness, dicing, carding, cheating, picking and stealing, and the like disorders.

3. You shall take care to have all your company live orderly and peaceable, and shall charge your officers faithfully to perform their office and duty of his and their places. And if any seaman or soldier shall raise tumult, mutiny or conspiracy, or commit murder, quarrel, fight or draw weapon to that end, or be a sleeper at his watch, or make noise, or not betake himself to his place of rest after his watch is out, or shall not keep his cabin cleanly, or be discontented with the proportion of victuals assigned unto him, or shall spoil or waste them or any other necessary provisions in the ships, or shall not keep clean his arms, or shall go ashore without leave, or shall be found guilty of any other crime or offence, you shall use due severity in the punishment or reformation thereof according to the known orders of the sea.

4. For any capital or heinous offence that shall be committed in your ship by the land or sea men, the land and sea commanders shall join together to take a due examination thereof in writing, and shall acquaint me therewith, to the end that I may proceed in judgment according to the quality of the offence.

¹Corbett, Fighting Instructions, pp. 52-61.
5. No sea captain shall meddle with the punishing of any land soldiers, but shall leave them to their commanders; neither shall the land commanders meddle with the punishing of the seamen.

6. You shall with the master take a particular account of the stores of the boatswain and carpenters of the ship, examining their receipts, expenses and remains, not suffering any unnecessary waste to be made of their provisions, or any work to be done which shall not be needful for the service.

7. You shall every week take the like account of the purser and steward of the quantity and quality of victuals that are spent, and provide for the preservation thereof without any superfluous expense. And if any person be in that office suspected for the wasting and consuming of victuals, you shall remove him and acquaint me thereof, and shall give me a particular account from time to time of the expense, goodness, quantity and quality of your victuals.

8. You shall likewise take a particular account of the master gunner for the shot, powder, munition and all other manner of stores contained in his indenture, and shall not suffer any part thereof to be sold, embezzled or wasted, nor any piece of ordnance to be shot off without directions, keeping also an account of every several piece shot off in your ship, to the end I may know how the powder is spent.

9. You shall suffer no boat to go from your ship without special leave and upon necessary causes, to fetch water or some other needful thing, and then you shall send some of your officers or men of trust, for whose good carriage and speedy return you will answer.

10. You shall have a special care to prevent the dreadful accident of fire, and let no candles be used without lanterns, nor any at all in or about the powder room. Let no tobacco be taken between the decks, or in the cabins or in any part of the ship, but upon the forecastle or upper deck, where shall stand tubs of water for them to throw their ashes into and empty their pipes.

11. Let no man give offence to his officer, or strike his equal or inferior on board, and let mutinous persons be punished in most severe manner.

12. Let no man depart out of his ship in which he is first entered without leave of his commander, and let no captain give him entertainment after he is listed, upon pain of severity of the law in that case.

13. If any fire should happen in your ship, notwithstanding your care (which God forbid!), then you shall shoot off two pieces of ordnance, one presently after the other, and if it be in the night you shall hang out four lanterns with lights upon the yards, that the next ships to you may speed to succour you.
11. If the ship should happen to spend a mast, or spring a leak, which by increasing upon you may grow to present danger, then you shall shoot off two pieces of ordnance, the one a good while after the other, and hang out two lights on the main shrouds, the one a man's height over the other, so as they may be discernible.

15. If the ship should happen to run on ground upon any danger (which God forbid!) then you shall shoot off four pieces of ordnance distinctly, one after the other; if in the night, hang out as many lights as you can, to the end the fleet may take notice thereof.

16. You shall favour your topmasts and the head of your mainmast by bearing indifferent sail, especially in foul weather and in a head sea and when your ship goeth by the wind; lest, by the loss of a mast upon a needless adventure, the service is deprived of your help when there is greatest cause to use it.

17. The whole fleet is to be divided into three squadrons: the admiral's squadron to wear red flags and red pennants on the main-topmast-head; the vice-admiral's squadron to wear blue flags and blue pennants on the fore topmast-heads; the rear-admiral's squadron to wear white flags and white pennants on the mizen topmast-heads.

18. The admirals and officers are to speak with me twice a day, morning and evening, to receive my directions and commands, which the rest of the ships are duly to perform. If I be ahead I will stay for them, if to leeward I will bear up to them. If foul weather should happen, you are not to come to near me or any other ship to hazard any danger at all. And when I have hailed you, you are to fall astern, that the rest of the ships in like manner may come up to receive my commands.

19. You shall make in every ship two captains of the watch, or more (if need be), who shall make choice of soldiers or seamen to them to search every watch in the night between the decks, that no fire or candle be carried about the ship after the watch is set, nor that no candle be burning in any cabin without a lantern, nor that neither but whilst they are making themselves ready, and to see the fire put out in the cook's room, for there is no danger so inevitable as the ship's firing.

20. You shall cause the landmen to learn the names and places of the ropes that they may assist the sailors in their labours upon the decks, though they cannot go up to the tops and yards.

21. You shall train and instruct such sailors and mariners as shall be found fit to the use of the musket, as you do your landmen, and register their names in a list by themselves, making no difference for matter of discipline between the sailors and soldiers aboard you.

22. You shall not give chase nor send aboard any ship but by order from me, or my vice-admiral or rear-admiral; and if you come near
any ship in your course belonging to any prince or state you shall make
stay of her, and bring her to me or the next officer, without taking
anything from them or their companies by force, but shall charge all
your company from pillaging between decks or breaking up any hold, or
embezzling any goods so seized and taken, upon pain of severity of the
law in that case.

23. You shall fall astern of me and the admirals of your sev-
eral squadrons unto the places assigned unto you, and follow their
lights as aforesaid, receiving such instructions from me or them in
the morning what course to hold. And if you shall at any time be
separated from the fleet by foul weather, chase or otherwise, you shall
shape your course for the southward cape upon the coast of Spain in
the latitude of 37, one of the places of rendezvous; if you miss me
there, then sail directly for the Bay of Cales or St. Lucar, which is
the other place assigned for rendezvous.

24. You must have a special care in times of calms and foggy
weather to give such a berth one unto the other as to keep your ships
clear, and not come foul one of another. Especially in fogs and mists
you shall sound with drum or trumpet, or make a noise with your men,
or shoot off muskets, to give warning to other ships to avoid the
danger of boarding or coming foul one of another.

25. If you or any other two or three of the fleet discover
any sail at sea to the windward or leeward of the admiral, which the
admiral cannot discern, if she be a great ship you shall signify the
same by striking or hoisting of your main topsail so often as you con-
ceive the ship to be hundred tons of burthen; and if you discover a
small ship you shall give the like signs by striking your fore topsail;
but if you discover many ships you shall strike your main topsail often
and put out your ensign in the main top; and if such ship or fleet go
large before the wind, you shall after your sign given do the like,
till you perceive that the admiral and the rest of the squadrons have
seen your sign and your so standing; and if you went large at the time
of discovery of such ship or fleet, you shall for a little time hale
aft your sheets and then go large again, that the rest of the fleet
and squadrons may know that you go large to show that the ship or
fleet discovered keeps that course.

26. If the ship or fleet discovered have their tacks aboard
and stand upon a wind, then if you had your tack aboard at the time of
the discovery you shall bear up for a little time, and after hale after
your sheets again to show us what course the ship or fleet holdeth.

27. If you discover any ship or fleet by night, and they be
(to) windward of you, the general or admirals, you shall presently bear
up to give us knowledge if you can speak with her; if not, you may
keep your luff and shoot off a piece of ordnance by which we shall
know you give chase, to the end that the rest may follow accordingly.

28. For a general rule let no man presume to shoot off any
pieces of ordnance but in discovery of ships or fleet by night, or
being in danger of the enemy, or of fire, or of sinking, that it may
be unto us a most certain intelligence of some matter of importance.

29. If any man shall steal any victuals by breaking into the
hold or otherwise, he shall receive the punishment of a thief and
murderer of his fellows.

30. No man shall keep any feasting or drinking between meals,
or drink any health upon the ship's provisions; neither shall the stew-
ard deliver any candle to any private man or for any private use.

31. In foul weather every man shall set his sail to keep com-
pany with the rest of the fleet, and not run too far ahead by day but
that he may fall astern the admiral before night.

32. In case the fleet or any part of us should be set upon,
the sea-captain shall appoint sufficient company to assist the gunners,
after which (if the fight require it) the cabins between the decks
shall be taken down, (and) all beds and sacks employed for bulwarks.
The musketeers of every ship shall be divided under captains or other
officers, some for the forecastle, some for the waist, and others for
the poop, where they shall abide if they be not otherwise directed.

33. An officer or two shall be appointed to take care that no
loose powder be carried between (the decks) nor near any linstock or
match in hand. You shall saw divers hogsheads in two parts, and,
filling them with water, set them aloft the decks. You shall divide
your carpenters, some in hold, if any shot come between wind and water,
and the rest between the decks, with plates of lead, plugs and all
things necessary laid by them. You shall also lay by your tubs of
water certain wet blankets, to cast upon and cloak any fire.

34. The master and boatswain shall appoint a convenient number
of sailors to every sail, and to every such company a master's mate
or a quartermaster, so as when every man knows his charge and his
place, things may be done without noise or confusion; and no man (is)
to speak but the officers.

35. No man shall board any enemy's ship, especially such as
command the king's ships, without special order from me. The loss of
one of our ships will be an encouragement to the enemy, and by that
means our fleet may be engaged, it being a great dishonour to lose
the least of our fleet. If we be under the lee of an enemy, every
squadron and ship shall labour to recover the wind (if the admiral
endeavour it). But if we find an enemy to leeward of us the whole
fleet shall follow in their several places, the admirals with the head
of the enemy, the vice-admirals with the body, and the rear-admirals
with the sternmost ships of the chase, (or other leading ships which
shall be appointed) within musket-shot of the enemy, giving so much
liberty to the leading ship as after her broadside delivered she may
stay and trim her sails; then is the second ship to give her side,
and the third and fourth, with the rest of that division; which done they shall all tack as the first ship and give their other sides, keeping the enemy under perpetual volley. This you must do upon the windermost ship or ships of an enemy, which you shall either batter in pieces, or force him or them to bear up, and so entangle them or drive them foul one of another to their utter confusion.

35. Your musketeers, divided into quarters of the ship, shall not discharge their shot but at such a distance as their commanders shall direct them.

37. If the admiral or admirals give chase, and be the headmost man, the next ship shall take up his boat if other order be not given, or if any other ship be appointed to give chase, the next ship (if the chasing ship have a boat at her stern) shall take it.

38. Whosoever shall show himself a coward upon any landing or otherwise, he shall be disarmed and made a labourer or carrier of victuals for the army.

39. No man shall land anywhere in any foreign parts without order from me, or by the sergeant major or other officer upon pain of death.

40. Wheresoever we shall land no man shall force any woman upon pain of death.

41. You shall avoid sleeping upon the ground and the drinking of new wines, and eating new fruits, and fresh fish until it has been salted three hours, and also forbear sleeping upon the deck in the night time, for fear of the serene that falls, all which will breed dangerous fluxes and diseases.

42. When the admiral shall hang out the arms of England in the mizen shrouds, then shall the council of war come aboard; and when that shall be taken in and the St. George hung in the main shrouds, that is for a general council.

For any orders upon the land (if God send us thither) we shall establish them. For matter of sailing or discipline at sea if there be cause you shall receive other directions, to which I refer you.

Likewise it is ordered between the seamen and the landmen that after the captain of the ship is cabined, he shall if possible lodge the captain of the foot in the same cabin, after the master of the ship is cabined the lieutenant, and after the master's mates the ensign.
APPENDIX D

LORD WIMBLEDON'S FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS, NO. 2

Instructions when we come to fight with an enemy, sent by the Lieutenant-General unto the Earl of Essex, at sea, 11 October 1625.

1. That you shall see the admiral make way to the admiral enemy, so likewise the vice-admiral and the rear-admiral, and then every ship (is) to set upon the next according to his order, yet to have such a care that those that come after may be ready to second one another after the manner here following.

2. If we happen to be encountered by an enemy at sea, you shall then appoint a sufficient company to assist the gunners. You shall pull down all the cabins betwixt the decks and use the beds and sacks for bulwarks, and shall appoint your muskets to several officers, some to make good the forecastle, some the waist, and others abaft the mast, from whence they shall not stir till they be otherwise directed, neither shall they or the gunners shoot a shot till they be commanded by the captain.

3. You shall appoint a certain number of mariners to stand by sails and maintops, that every of them knowing his place and duty there be no confusion or disorder in the command; and shall divide carpenters some in hold, some betwixt the decks, with plates of lead, plugs, and other things necessary for stopping up breaches made with great shot; and saw divers hogsheads in halves and set them upon the deck full of water, with wet blankets by them to cloak and quench any fire that shall happen in the fight.

4. No man shall board any enemy's ships without special order, but every ship if we be to leeward shall labour to recover the wind. If we be to windward of them, then shall the whole fleet, or so many of them as shall be appointed, follow the leading ship within musket-shot of the enemy, and give them first the chase pieces, then the broadside, afterwards a volley of small shot; and when the headmost ship hath done, the next ship shall observe the same course, and so every ship in order, that the headmost may be ready to renew the fight against such time as the sternmost hath made an end; by that means keeping the weather of the enemy and in continual fight till they be sunk in the sea, or forced by bearing up to entangle themselves, and to come (foul) one of another to their utter confusion.

---

1Corbett, Fighting Instructions, pp. 61-62.
APPENDIX E

LORD WIMELEDON'S FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS, NO. 3

At a Council of War holden aboard the Anne Royal, Tuesday, the 11th of October, 1625.

The Council, being assembled, entered into consultation touching the form of a sea-fight performed against any fleet or ships of the King of Spain or other enemy, and touching some directions to be observed for better preparation to be made for such a fight and the better managing thereof when we should come to action.

The particulars for this purpose considerable were many; insomuch that no pertinent consultation could well be had concerning the same without some principles in writing, whereby to direct and bound the discourse. And therefore, by the special command of my lord lieutenant-general, a form of articles for this service (drawn originally by Sir Thomas Love, Kt., treasurer for this action, captain of the Anne Royal and one of the council of war) was presented to the assembly, and several times read over to them.

After the reading, all the parts thereof were well weighed and examined, whereby it was observed that it intended to enjoin our fleet to advance and fight at sea, much after the manner of an army at land, assigning every ship to a particular division, rank, file, and station; which order and regularity was not only improbably but almost impossible to be observed by so great a fleet in so uncertain a place as the sea. Hereupon some little doubt arose whether or not this form of articles should be confirmed; but then it was alleged that the same articles had in them many other points of direction, preparation, and caution for a sea-fight, which were agreed by all men to be most reasonable and necessary. And if so strict a form of proceeding to fight were not or could not be punctually observed, yet might these articles beget in our commanders and officers a right understanding of the conception and intent thereof; which with an endeavour to come as near as could be to perform, the particulars might be of great use to keep up from confusion in the general. Neither could the limiting of every several ship to such a rank or file (and) to such certain place in the same, bring upon the fleet intricacy and difficulty of proceeding, so (long) as (if the proper ships were absent or not ready) those in the next place were left at liberty, or rather commanded, to supply their rooms and maintain the instructions, if not absolutely, yet as near as they could. In conclusion therefore the form of articles which was so

1Corbett, Fighting Instructions, pp. 63-72.
presented, read and considered of, was with some few alterations and additions ratified by my lord lieutenant-general and by the whole council as act of theirs passed and confirmed, and to be duly observed and put in execution by all captains, mariners, gunners, and officers in every ship, and all others to whom it might appertain, at their perils, leaving only to my lord lieutenant the naming and ranking of the ships of every division in order as they should proceed for the execution of the same articles; which in conclusion were these, touching the whole fleet in general and the admiral's squadron in particular, namely:

1. That when the fleet or ships of the enemy should be discovered the admiral of our fleet with the ships of his squadron should put themselves into the form undermentioned and described, namely that the same squadron should be separated into three divisions of nine ships in a division, and so should advance, set forward, and charge upon the enemy as hereafter more particularly is directed.

That these nine ships should discharge and fall off three and three, as they are filed in this list.

Anne Royal . . . . . . Admiral
Prudence . . . . . . Captain Vaughan
Royal Defence . . . . . . Captain Ellis

Barbara Constance . . . . . . Captain Hatch
Talbot . . . . . . Captain Burdon
Abraham . . . . . . Captain Downes

Golden Cock . . . . . . Captain Beaumont
Amity . . . . . . Captain Malyn
Anthony . . . . . . Captain Blake

That these nine ships should second the admiral of this squadron three and three, as they are filed in this list.

St. George . . . . . . Vice-admiral
Lesser Sapphire . . . . . . Captain Bond
Sea Venture . . . . . . Captain Knevet

Assurance . . . . . . Captain Osborne
Camelion . . . . . . Captain Seymour
Return . . . . . . Captain Bonithon

Jonathan . . . . . . Captain Butler
William . . . . . . Captain White
Hopewell . . . . . . Capt — — —

That these nine ships should second the vice-admiral of this squadron three and three, as they are filed in this list.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convertine</td>
<td>Rear-admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>Captain Stokes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assurance of Dover</td>
<td>Captain Bargey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Sapphire</td>
<td>Captain Raymond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anne</td>
<td>Captain Wollaston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob</td>
<td>Captain Gosse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George</td>
<td>Captain Stevens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hermit</td>
<td>Captain Turner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary Magdalen</td>
<td>Captain Cooper</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These three ships should fall into the rear of the three former divisions, to charge where and when there should be occasion, or to help the engaged, or supply the place of any that should be unserviceable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hellen</td>
<td>Captain Mason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amity of Hull</td>
<td>Captain Frisby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anne Speedwell</td>
<td>Captain Polkenhorne</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. That the admiral of the Dutch and his squadron should take place on the starboard side of our admiral, and observe their own order and method of fighting.

3. That the vice-admiral of our fleet and his squadron should make the like division, and observe the same order and form as the admiral's squadron was to observe, and so should keep themselves in their several divisions on the larboard side of the admiral, and there advance and charge if occasion were when the admiral did.

4. That the rear-admiral of the fleet and his squadron should also put themselves into the like order of the admiral's squadron as near as it might be, and in that form should attend for a reserve or supply. And if any squadron, ship or ships of ours should happen to be engaged by over-charge of the enemies, loss of masts or yards, or other main distress needing special succour, that then the rear-admiral with all his force, or one of his divisions proportionable to the occasion, should come to their rescue; which being accomplished they should return to their first order and place assigned.

5. That the distance between ship and ship in every squadron should be such as none might hinder one another in advancing or falling off.

6. That the distance between squadron and squadron should be more or less as the order of the enemy's fleet or ships should require, whereof the captains and commanders of our fleet were to be very considerate.

7. That if the enemy's approach happened to be in such sort as the admiral of the Dutch and his squadron might have opportunity to begin the fight, it should be lawful for them to do so until the admiral
could come up, using the form, method, and care prescribed.

8. That if the enemy should be forced to bear up, or to be entangled among themselves, whereby an advantage might be had, then our rear-admiral and his squadron with all his divisions should lay hold thereof and prosecute it to effect.

9. That the rear-admiral's squadron should keep most strict and special watch to see what squadrons or ships distresses of our fleet should need extraordinary relief, and what advantage might be taken upon the enemy, that a speedy and present course might be taken to perform the service enjoined.

10. That if any ship or ships of the enemy should break out or fly, the admiral of any squadron which should happen to be in the next and most convenient place for that purpose should send out a competent number of the fittest ships of his squadron to chase, assault, or take such ship or ships so breaking out; but no ship should undertake such a chase without the command of the admiral, or at leastwise the admiral of his squadron.

11. That no man should shoot any small or great shot at the enemy till he came at the distance of caliber or pistol shot, whereby no shot might be made fruitless or in vain; whereof the captains and officers in every ship should have an especial care.

12. That no man should presume or attempt to board any ship of the enemy without special order and direction from the admiral, or at leastwise the admiral of his squadron.

13. That if any of our fleet happened to be (to) leeward of the enemy, every of our ships should labour and endeavour what they might to take all opportunity to get to windward of them, and to hold that advantage having once obtained it.

14. That the captains and officers of every ship should have an especial care as much as in them lay to keep the enemies in continual flight without any respite or intermission to be offered them; which, with the advantage of the wind if it might be had, was thought the likeliest way to enforce them to bear up and entangle themselves, or fall foul of another in disorder and confusion.

15. That an especial care should be had in every ship that the gunners should load some of their pieces with case shot, hand-spikes, nails, bars of iron, or with what else might do most mischief to the enemy's men, upon every fit opportunity, and to come near and lay the ordnance well to pass for that purpose, which would be apt to do great spoil to the enemy.

16. That the cabins in every ship should be broken down so far as was requisite to clear the way of the ordnance.
17. That all beds and sacks in every ship should be disposed and used as bulwarks for defence against the shot of the enemy.

18. That there should be ten, eight, six, or four men to attend every piece of ordnance as the master gunner should choose out and assign them to their several places of service, that every one of them might know what belonged properly to him to do. And that this choice and assignment should be made with speed so as we might not be taken unprovided.

19. That there should be one, two, or three men of good understanding and diligence, according to the burden of every ship, forthwith appointed to fill cartouches of powder, and to carry them in cases or barrels covered to their places assigned.

20. That the hold in every ship should be rummaged and made dry, especially by the ship's sides, and a carpenter with some man of trust appointed to go fore and after in hold to seek for shot that may come in under water; and that there should be provided in readiness plugs, pieces of sheet lead, and pieces of elm board to stop all leaks that might be found within board or without.

21. That in every ship where any soldiers were aboard the men should be divided into two or three parts, whereof only one part should fight at once and the rest should be in hold, to be drawn up upon occasion to relieve and rescue the former.

22. That the men in every ship should be kept as close as reasonably might be till the enemy's first volley of small shot should be past.

23. That the mariners in every ship should be divided and separated into three or four parts or divisions, so as every one might know the place where he was to perform his duty for the avoiding of confusion.

24. That the master or boatswain of every ship, by command of the captain, should appoint a sufficient and select number of seamen to stand by and attend the sails.

25. That more especially they should by like command appoint sufficient helmsmen to steer the ship.

26. That the sailors and helmsmen should in no sort presume to depart or stir from their charge.

27. That the mainyard, foreyard, and topsail sheets in every ship should be hung, and the topsail yards if the wind were not too high; hereby to avoid the shooting down of sails.

28. That there should be butts or hogsheads sawn into two parts filled with salt water, set upon the upper and lower decks in several
places convenient in every ship, with buckets, gowns, and blankets to quench and put out wild-fire or other fire if need be.

29. That if a fight began by day and continued till night, every ship should be careful to observe the admiral of her squadron; that if the admiral fell off and forbore the fight for the present every other ship might do the like, repairing under her own squadron to amend anything amiss, and be ready to charge again when the admiral should begin.

30. That if any of the ships belonging to any squadron or division happened to be absent or not ready in convenient time and place to keep and make good the order herein prescribed, then every squadron and division should maintain those directions as near as they could, although the number of ships in every division were the less, without attending the coming in of all the ships of every division.

31. And that these ten ships, in regard of the munition and materials for the army and the horses which were carried in them, should attend the rear-admiral and not engage themselves without order, but should remain and expect such directions as might come from our admiral or rear-admiral.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peter Bonaventure</th>
<th>Captain Johnson</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sarah Bonaventure</td>
<td>Captain Carew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Captain Wharey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susan and Ellen</td>
<td>Captain Levett</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William of London</td>
<td>Captain Amadas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hope</td>
<td>Sir Thomas Pigott, Knt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chestnut</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortune</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fox</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truelove</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was no difference between the articles for the admiral's squadron and those for the vice-admiral's and rear-admiral's, save in the names of the ships of every division, and that their squadrons had not any particular reserve, nor above five or six ships apiece in the third division, for want of ships to make up the number of nine; the munition and horse ships which belonged to their squadrons being unapt to fight, and therefore disposed into a special division of ten ships by themselves to attend the general reserve.

At the rising of the council a motion was made to have some of the best sailors of our fleet chosen out and assigned to lie off from the main body of the fleet, some to sea and some to shoreward, the better to discover, chase, and take some ships or boats of the enemy's; which might give us intelligence touching the Plate Fleet, whether it were come home or no, or when it would be expected and in what place, and touching such other matters whereof we might make out best advantage. But nothing herein was now resolved, it being conceived, as it seemed, that we might soon enough and more opportunely consider of this proposition and settle an order therein when we came nearer to the enemy's coasts; so the council was dissolved.
APPENDIX F

COUNCIL OF WAR MEMBERS

20 October 1625

Sir Edward Cecil, Viscount Wimbledon, Lord Lieutenant General
Mr. William de Nassau, Admiral of the Hollanders
Sir Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, Vice Admiral
Mr. Laur. Revell, Vice Admiral of the Hollanders
Sir William Feilding, Earl of Denbigh, Rear Admiral
Sir Henry Power, Viscount Valenta, Master of Ordnance
Sir Thomas Cromwell, Viscount Lecale
Sir Henry West, Lord Delaware
Sir William St. Leger, Sergeant Major General
Captain Sir Thomas Love
Colonel Sir Charles Riche
Colonel Sir Edward Conway
Colonel Sir Edward Harwood
Colonel Sir John Burgh
Colonel Sir Henry Bruce
Colonel Sir John Proude
Sir George Blundell, Quartermaster General
Captain Sir Samuel Argall
Captain Sir Beverley Newcombe
Captain Sir John Watte
Captain Sir John Chudley (Chudleigh)
Captain Sir Michael Gayer
Captain Raleigh Gilbert
Captain Thomas Porter
John Glanville, Secretary

---

1Glanville, Voyage to Cadiz, pp. 36-37.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES


II. PRIMARY MATERIALS

A. Manuscripts


Letter, Sir Michael Geere to his son, William, 11 December 1625. On microfilm, P. R. O. 698, S. P. 16/11.

Letter, Sir Benjamin Rudyerd to Sir Francis Nethersole, 7 December 1625. On microfilm, P. R. O. 698, S. P. 16/11.


B. Published Works


Sanderson, William. A Compleat History of the Life and Raigne of King Charles from His Cradle to his Grave. London, 1655.

Whitelocke, Bulstrode. Memorials of the English Affairs; or, an Historical Account of What Passed from the Beginning of the Reign of King CHARLES the First, to King CHARLES the Second His Happy Restauration. London, 1692.

Williams, Robert F. The Court and Times of Charles the First; Illustrated by Authentic and Confidential Letters, from Various Public and Private Collections; Including Memoirs of the Mission in
III. SECONDARY MATERIALS

A. Articles


B. Books


----------. War and Society in the Seventeenth Century. Cambridge, 1958.


The Herleian Miscellany; or a Collection of Scarce, Curious and Entertaining Pamphlets and Tracts, as well in manuscript as in print, found in the late Earl of Oxford's Library. Vol. VI, London, 1810.


Nicholas, Donald. *Mr. Secretary Nicholas (1593-1662)* His Life and Letters. London, 1955.


C. Reference Works:


*The Complete Peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain, and*