Civilian Conservation Corps in Virginia, 1933-1942

John P. Byrne

The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976

This is an unpublished manuscript in which copyright subsists. Any further reprinting of its contents must be approved by the author.

Mansfield Library
University of Montana
Date: 1982
THE CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS
IN VIRGINIA 1933-1942

By
John P. Byrne
B.A., College of William and Mary, 1977

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Science
University of Montana
1982

Approved by:
Chair, Board of Examiners

Dean, Graduate School

Date
The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) is generally considered to have been one of the most popular and successful of all the New Deal ventures. In a democratic government, these two criteria—popularity and success—are the appropriate ones for assessing government programs. By investigating the activities of the CCC in one state, the Commonwealth of Virginia, a close analysis of this nine year experiment undertaken by the federal government in the conservation of human and natural resources proved possible.

The popularity of the Virginia CCC was determined through perusing selected Virginia newspapers and through inspecting the public and the private statements of the Virginia congressional delegation. The records of the Civilian Conservation Corps, stored in the National Archives in Washington, supplied the bulk of the evidence with which to analyze the success of the Virginia CCC in the conservation of human and natural resources.

In 1933 the CCC was welcomed by the Virginia press and tolerated by the most powerful members of the Virginia congressional delegation, Senator Carter T. Glass and Senator Harry F. Byrd. By the end of the CCC in 1942, these two senators, along with other influential Virginians in the House of Representatives, had successfully opposed the continuation of the CCC. In the CCC obituaries of the Virginia press editors did not mourn the loss of the CCC. Despite the CCC's fall from popularity, the nine year record of the CCC reveals considerable success in the conservation of human and natural resources in the state of Virginia.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ........................................... 1

Chapter
I. THE RECEPTION OF THE CCC IN VIRGINIA ........ 7
   The Virginia Press Welcomes the CCC .........
   The CCC in the Context of Virginia
   Politics ............................................

II. THE NINE YEAR RECORD ............................ 22
   Conservation of Human Resources
   in Virginia ........................................

III. THE NINE YEAR RECORD ............................ 40
   Conservation of Natural Resources
   in Virginia ........................................
   Works Projects of the Department
   of Agriculture .................................
   Work Projects of the Department of the
   Interior ..........................................  
   The Virginia CCC as a Part of New Deal
   Conservation ....................................

IV. THE NEW DEAL IN VIRGINIA: FROM TOLERATION
   TO DERISION .................................... 65
   The End Draws Near ............................
   Obituaries in the Virginia Press ..............

CONCLUSION: THE VIRGINIA CCC IN
RETROSPECT .................................. 84

APPENDIX .......................................... 94

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................... 96
INTRODUCTION

Born amidst the chaos of the Great Depression and implemented with the haste of the "hundred days" legislation, the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) was a nine year experiment by the federal government in the conservation of human and natural resources. During the life of the CCC, 1933-1942, five percent of the total male population worked for the CCC in the forests and the parks of the nation. Designed to "save" both men and land, the consensus is that the CCC was among the most popular and successful of all the New Deal programs.

In a democratic nation, popularity and success are the crucial tests of any government program. I have chosen to investigate the CCC in the Commonwealth of Virginia to determine if the CCC was indeed popular and successful. I make no claim that the Virginia CCC necessarily represents the entire CCC program, but the close analysis made possible by considering the activities of the CCC in a single state provided an opportunity to scrutinize the general assertion that the CCC won popular support and effectively conserved the potential of the
American people and the resources of the American landscape. Despite the initial popularity of the CCC, and the success for which it is acclaimed, one fact looms large in any discussion of the CCC: Congress chose to end the CCC in June of 1942, thereby denying its popularity and making its future success impossible. This thesis attempts to not only investigate the popularity and success of the CCC in Virginia, but also to chronicle the part that leading Virginians played in dismantling the CCC.

The concept of an army of youths enlisted in conservation work had precedents both abroad and at home but the credit for establishing a vast program of work relief designed to benefit the public lands of America properly belongs to Franklin D. Roosevelt. FDR promised such a program in his presidential campaign and, once installed in office, he sketched his ideas for such an organization on a piece of paper, asked his cabinet to cooperate, and then left the details of administration to his subordinates. 2

The Director of the CCC had only a small staff in Washington. The cooperation of federal agencies was needed to make the program work. In conjunction with the states, the United States Department of Labor recruited the men. Because of its considerable experience in the logistics of managing large groups of men, the United
States Army was called upon to condition, feed, shelter, and oversee the conduct of enrollees. During the work-day the men were directed by personnel of the United States Department of Agriculture or the United States Department of the Interior. Most commonly this meant that the men were responsible to either the United States Forest Service or the National Park Service, but numerous other agencies were involved as well.³

Initially the recruitment of enrollees was restricted to young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five who were on the relief rolls. Roosevelt's pragmatic and political concerns allowed the "mainstream" youth program to be expanded to include various special interests. In 1933 special quotas were established for blacks, war veterans, Indians, and older unemployed men with experience working in the woods. Red, white, or black, a veteran of a war or a veteran of the woods, enrollees rushed to sign up for six months of conservation work in the CCC.

Enrollees lived in two hundred-man camps in the states and territories of America. For their efforts they received one dollar a day, room and board, and a chance to improve their educations through the "school in the camps." In return the enrollees were expected to work hard, to send the major portion of their paycheck to their dependents,
and to attend classes. By the end of the CCC almost three million men had served in 4,500 camps. According to J. J. McEntee, the second Director of the CCC, the greatest contribution of the program was in the conservation of human resources.  

McEntee also claimed that the greatest works of the CCC in natural resource conservation were achieved in forest fire prevention and control. But enrollees also planted so many trees that they earned the CCC the sobriquet of FDR's "tree army." Recreational development, especially the construction of trails and campgrounds, was another major accomplishment of the CCC. The variety of work was so great as to defy easy description—the CCC did everything from building administrative facilities for wildlife refuges on the Atlantic coast to resurrecting the totem pole culture of the Haida and Tlingit tribes on the Pacific coast. In March of 1942 the United States Department of Agriculture and the United States Department of the Interior estimated that it would take one million men almost a quarter of a century to complete the "backlog" of conservation work identified by the CCC.  

Camp Roosevelt in the Massanutten Mountains of the Great Valley of Virginia, established on April 17, 1933, became the first CCC camp—or C camp as they came to be called—in the nation. Virginia had one more first in a
long line of "firsts" beginning with Jamestown. Virginia was also one of the first states to break with the policies of the New Deal. Eventually that opposition to the New Deal also grew to include the CCC. The CCC died in Congress in 1942 for a variety of reasons—not least of which was the hostility to the CCC voiced by the Virginia congressional delegation. Congress had voted not to make the CCC a permanent organization in 1937; now Congress voted to abandon the CCC altogether. The once popular CCC was popular no longer and the success of the CCC had to be evaluated in terms of its nine year record rather than its continuing record. What had happened?
Notes for Introduction


2 Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York: Da Capo Press, 1939) p. 192.

3 Among the other federal bodies involved were the Department of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, the Veterans Administration and the Tennessee Valley Authority.


5 Ibid, p. 86.

6 Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 16 and 18.
CHAPTER I

THE RECEPTION OF THE CCC IN VIRGINIA

The Virginia Press Welcomes the CCC

As winter changed to spring in 1933, Virginia newspaper editors welcomed the budding CCC. The Lynchburg News patiently explained to its readers that contrary to the testimony of organized labor, the CCC would not depress wages in Virginia. The dollar a day earned by enrollees would simply mean that otherwise unemployed men would receive a living wage. While not openly enthusiastic about FDR's "tree army," the News expressed guarded optimism for the idea of a reforestation army.¹ The Winchester Evening-Star made no diagnosis in March and April of 1933. Later on it would praise the CCC for not being costly.² Neither the News nor the Evening-Star accepted the early New Deal uncritically. The idea of economic recovery through increased government spending and the existence of that influential coterie of professional advisors to FDR known as the "brains trust," both provoked ridicule.³ But the CCC did not. This may have been due to vestiges of
Democratic party loyalty combined with a recognition that in the chaos of the Depression something ought to be done by somebody to alleviate distress.

The Richmond Times-Dispatch, the paper of record in Virginia, agreed that a conservation corps might lower the prevailing wage. But the editors went on to defend the CCC on the basis of the much needed relief it provided. And besides, the editors predicted, the CCC promised to be "healthy" for the enrollees.  

Another Richmond newspaper, the News-Leader, observed that the President's relief program did not yet form a "logical whole" but approved of the CCC, calling it "one of the most constructive public works projects ever undertaken in America." Surely this analysis was premature because to claim, as the News-Leader did, that the CCC marked the turning point in American forestry before the CCC actually completed any work is like congratulating a redwood sapling on being one of the tallest trees in the world. According to the News-Leader, "the net result may be to turn the minds of thousands of farmers from unprofitable field crops to renumerative forest crops." Such misdirected hopes reveal more about the whims of the editors of the News-Leader than they do the subsequent history of the Virginia CCC.

The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot offered the most sober analysis. Dispensing entirely with the matter of the
objections of organized labor, the editors intelligently pointed out:

The real doubts are of other kinds. They relate to such matters as the cost of this experiment, the difficulties of administration, the uncertainty as to whether transporting unemployed men about the country to work camps will prove better than giving employment nearer home, and the numerous details of an enterprise for which no precedent exists.

Additionally, the Virginian-Pilot cautioned that the CCC could not resolve the larger problem of twelve million unemployed American men. And because America had never given anything but lip service to conservation, the editors were wary of the sincerity of that commitment. The benefits of the CCC should be so great as to prevent "rank failure," but the editors concluded "a great deal depends upon the manner in which it is administered." 6

To my knowledge, no Virginia editor flatly opposed the establishment of the CCC. Both the Roanoke World-News and the Alexandria Gazette liked the practicality of the CCC proposal. The World-News particularly welcomed the place occupied by the CCC in the President's three-handled relief package while the Gazette noted the opportunity for disaster relief that such a reservoir of labor represented. 7

The CCC continued to ride a wave of popularity in the press; by the end of 1934 the University of Virginia Newsletter stated:
No matter what he may think about the New Deal as a whole, or about some of its specific phases, any person must go far afield to criticize unfavorably the civilian conservation camps.8

Virginia newspaper editors voiced no opposition to the creation of the CCC; the only opposition to the CCC found in the newspapers of 1933 were voiced by one extremist group and one eccentric individual. The Virginia state committee of the Socialist party spoke against the CCC bill because it was a measure that sought not only the reduction of wages but also "to stabilize unemployment, making unemployment an occupation, or a crime punishable by forced labor."9 G. C. Eggleston of Amelia, Virginia wrote a letter to the editor of the Times-Dispatch questioning the necessity of CCC reforestation:

I have never been anywhere and don't know anything except that hundreds of white men and colored men with axes, crosscut saws, saw mills, and fire for more than 200 years have been trying to deforest Amelia County without success.

Instead of reforestation, Mr. Eggleston preferred that the money Congress contemplated spending on the CCC be diverted to the strengthening of the United States Navy.10 Despite Mr. Eggleston's disclaimer of omniscience, he might have known that the peak year for timber harvest in Virginia was 1909 and the worst year on record was the previous year, 1932. Forest production statistics clearly indicated the severity of the problem.11 Needless to say, neither the
doctrinaire opposition of the Socialist party nor the imaginative analysis of G. C. Eggleston carried much clout in Virginia.

Throughout most of its history, the CCC enjoyed favorable newspaper publicity in Virginia. Its popularity stemmed not only from its reputation as a practical form of conservation, a healthy form of employment and an appropriate form of relief, but just as the Gazette had prophesied, the CCC provided a useful source of disaster relief when called upon. When the James River and the Potomac River overflowed their banks in March of 1936, the CCC became a ready source of labor to contain the raging waters. For this the Virginia CCC received Richmond's "heartfelt thanks" and favorable publicity as well.12 Always publicity-conscious, the CCC also regularly presented to the Richmond Times-Dispatch impressive lists of work accomplishments.13

THE CCC IN THE CONTEXT OF VIRGINIA POLITICS

By the time FDR signed the CCC bill on March 31, 1933, virtually all of the initial objections of Virginia bureaucrats were overcome. Federal officials had already managed to convince unspecified "high level officials" in Virginia that their fear of two hundred-man camps being susceptible to agitation from within was illusory and,
furthermore, the number of unemployed men justified the large size of the camps. Even more enticing to Virginia officials, selection of the enrollees would not be purely a federal matter. In accordance with guidelines established by the United States Department of Labor, individual states were charged with the task of recruitment. Virginia was promised "many camps" and guaranteed 5,000 positions in the initial national recruitment quota of 250,000 men. In Virginia, 124 county and city agencies compiled eligibility lists. Although the work would be financed with federal funds, work projects would not be confined to federal lands. The CCC would also work on state and private lands within Virginia. The CCC would cost Virginia almost nothing. The only continuing expense Virginia would have to bear was the operating cost of the state selection agency. Able politician that he was, FDR not only made sure that there was plenty in the CCC to interest the states, but he also involved the governors in the planning process. By the nineteenth of April, 1933, the Virginia CCC was "besieged with applicants," whom state and local officials were busily processing.\textsuperscript{14}

Unfortunately for the future of the CCC in Virginia, Virginia's Senators were not committed to the principles behind FDR's "tree army." Together, Senator Carter T. Glass of Lynchburg and Senator Harry F. Byrd of Winchester
controlled the politics of the state. Glass, the elder politician, presided over what Virginians called the Organization. Byrd, appointed to the Senate in 1933, may have been a young man but he was the guiding force behind the Organization (or as some more forthrightly labeled it, the Byrd Machine). Without their active support the CCC was destined to encounter difficulties.

The Virginia CCC could not depend for its survival on the popularity it enjoyed among the citizens of Virginia. "In a word," observes V. O. Key in his classic, Southern Politics in State and Nation, "politics in Virginia is reserved for those who can qualify as gentlemen." During the New Deal, Virginia posed as no model for participatory democracy. The Byrd Machine thrived under the influence of a small electorate and as few elections as possible. According to Key's analysis, in Virginia, an overwhelmingly Democratic state, only eleven to twelve percent of those eligible to vote in the Democratic primary did so. An organization of 1,000 or so individuals actually ran the state. As late as 1949, Key argued that "The Commonwealth possesses characteristics more akin to England at about the time of the Reform Bill of 1832 than to those of any other state of the present day South." With a rhetorical flourish, Key adds, "It is a political museum piece."
The Byrd Machine controlled public office, dispensed patronage, and of course, influenced the editorial pages of Virginia newspapers. It was the single most potent force within the state. Any discussion of the popularity of the CCC must reckon with the attitudes of Virginia's foremost politicians toward the program.

When the first CCC camp was pitched by "green" enrollees on April 17, 1933, Carter Glass was already three-quarters of a century old. He called himself a "Jeffersonian Democrat." Born before the Civil War, Glass never strayed from the importance of states-rights or from the obligation of government to avoid debt whenever possible. Like Miniver Cheevy, Glass felt ill at ease in a modernizing world. One of his familiar refrains was "I have lived too long." Glass displayed nothing but contempt for FDR's New Deal. Small of frame and often ill, Glass was frequently described as "fiery" or "peppery," and was not averse to taking on the combined forces of the New Deal. His greatest battles with the policies of Franklin Roosevelt were over the passage of the National Recovery Act (NRA) in 1933, the "packing" of the Supreme Court in 1937, the "purge" of Virginia in 1938, and the unprecedented decision by Roosevelt to run for a third term in 1940.
As a reward for his part in the passage of the Federal Reserve Act, President Woodrow Wilson appointed Glass Secretary of the Treasury in 1919. Later, Glass would take especial delight in the fact that he rejected the same position when tendered to him by Franklin Roosevelt; Glass never personally supported massive relief expenditures by the federal government, and deficit spending was always abhorrent to him. When asked to attend a meeting on the subject of relief by Governor John Pollard of Virginia in 1933, Glass hotly retorted:

I am sure I shall not be able to attend the conference which you have arranged for October 13th at noon, to discuss 'matters of relief' under the chimerical plans of the various bureaus here in Washington. I shall be more interested later on to know who will come to the 'relief' of the taxpayers of the country when these enormous and fanciful expenditures are compelled to be met or repudiated.18

Glass never seems to have forgotten that in 1900 Virginia had the largest debt of any state in the nation.19

A man of remarkable consistency, the beliefs of Carter Glass were "shatterproof." His attitude toward relief explained his attitude toward the CCC. Not only was the CCC a waste of money, it was also a usurpation by the federal government of Virginia's prerogative to manage its own affairs. For whatever reasons, Glass chose not to speak out against the CCC in the beginning years. Even the man of principle sometimes holds his tongue.
Harry F. Byrd was Carter Glass's colleague in the Senate. Appointed to the Senate in 1933 to fill the vacancy left by Senator Claude Swanson when the latter accepted a cabinet position in the Roosevelt administration, Byrd was no newcomer to politics. Byrd had served one term as Governor of Virginia from 1926-1930, during which time "his genius was in establishing reins of control which he and his lieutenants held long after he left the governor's chair in 1930." 20

If Glass can be considered a product of Civil War and Reconstruction, Byrd can be viewed as the quintessential man of the New South. As a young man Byrd salvaged a newspaper business and then founded an apple-growing, apple-packing, and apple-processing empire—the largest singly-owned operation of its kind in the world. Having worked his way out of debt and built an industry, Byrd accomplished in his own lifetime what the New South hoped to make of its future. As Governor of Virginia, Byrd converted the state's million dollar deficit into a surplus, and with his "Program of Progress" the highway system of Virginia was funded through a "pay-as-you-go" system with revenues drawn exclusively from gasoline taxes and motor vehicle licenses.

Byrd voted for some of the hundred days legislation, but, as one student remarks, after the passage of
the Economy Act Byrd was ready to go home. His first schism with the Roosevelt administration was precipitated by the proposed appointment of Rexford Tugwell, a liberal intellectual, as an assistant to Henry Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture under FDR. This schism widened when the Administration recommended that Congress approve an amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act that would restrict Virginia exports. Byrd spoke against the need for social security legislation in 1935 and later resented the stand of the Administration on public housing. Aside from a business-like efficiency, economy in government was his chief concern.

Byrd's experience with the federal government as head of the Virginia Drought Relief Commission in 1930 taught him that the federal government could be relied upon for emergency relief of distressed citizens. As newspaperman Virginius Dabney recalls Byrd's service on that commission, Byrd "did not suggest that the state of Virginia provide funds for her own sufferers." Nor would Byrd ever suggest that relief funds be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia.

Byrd tolerated the CCC in the first few years of the Depression because conditions indicated that the Depression was real and citizens in distress required temporary relief. Whatever his theoretical objections to massive relief expenditures by the federal government,
Byrd believed that if the federal government was intending to squander the money of the taxpayer then surely Virginia should get her share. Accordingly, in August of 1933 Byrd wrote to Robert Fechner, newly appointed Director of Emergency Conservation Work, asking that when the CCC camps relocated to the Southern states for the first winter's work, would he please remember that Virginia deserved her share? His request was matter-of-fact, as if additional CCC camps should flock to Virginia as surely as birds migrate south for the winter.

Although welcomed in the press and supported by state officials, the CCC was not so well favored with the leaders of the Organization. At best, Glass showed an absence of malice while Byrd supported the CCC temporarily—until Virginia got her share. Their future acceptance of the CCC was by no means certain.
Notes for Chapter I

1Lynchburg News, March 26, 1933.

2Winchester Evening-Star, September 11, 1934.


4Times-Dispatch, March 29, 1933.

5Richmond News-Leader, April 6, 1933.

6Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, April 2, 1933.

7The CCC was only one of three relief measures FDR promised the states. He also promised direct grants and a system of public works projects; Roanoke World-News, March 24, 1933; Alexandria Gazette, March 27, 1933.


9Times-Dispatch, April 4, 1933.

10Times-Dispatch, April 20, 1933.

11F.C. Pederson, "Virginia's Forest Resources, Problems, and Requirements," University of Virginia Newsletter, November 15, 1939.

12Times-Dispatch, March 20, 1936.

13Times-Dispatch, September 23, 1935; Times-Dispatch, February 16, 1941.

14Times-Dispatch, April 19 and 21, 1933.
As an indication of the tenacious hold Byrd exercised over public office, he later admitted that he "hand-picked" 8 out of the 9 governors succeeding him, as reported in Allen W. Moger, *Virginia Bourbonism to Byrd, 1870-1925* (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1968) p. 360; the patronage in Virginia was channeled through the courthouse clerks, as reported in J. Harvie Wilkinson, *Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics, 1945-1966* (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1968) p. 17.

Glass criticized FDR's plan to gain a majority in the Supreme Court as "a proposition which appears to me utterly destitute of moral sensibility and without parallel since the foundation of the Republic," *New York Times*, March 30, 1937 quoted in Robert Thomas Cochran, *Virginia's Opposition to the New Deal, 1933-1940* (M.A. thesis, Georgetown University, 1950), p. 52; Roosevelt tried unsuccessfully to purge Virginia in 1938 by bypassing the tradition of Senatorial courtesy in judicial nominations. For the affront to Glass caused by the nomination of Floyd Roberts to a newly created seat on the federal district court for western Virginia, see Carter Glass to Harry F. Byrd, May 31, 1938, Box 345, Carter Glass Papers, University of Virginia Alderman Library, Charlottesville. For the opposition of Glass to a third term for FDR see Cochran, *Virginia's Opposition to the New Deal,* p. 146.


Edwin E. Holm Jr., "Virginia's Indebtedness," University of Virginia Newsletter, March 1, 1940.


Harry F. Byrd to Robert Fechner, August 31, 1933, File "Virginia," General Correspondence 300, RG-35, N.A.
CHAPTER II

THE NINE YEAR RECORD

Conservation of Human Resources
In Virginia

Historians, former administrators, and former enrollees comment favorably on the success of the CCC in the conservation of human resources.\footnote{1} Certainly the determination of success is a difficult one because there exists no agreed upon yardstick with which to measure success in human conservation. The impersonality of official records and the subjective character of individual memories guarantee that a definitive evaluation of the achievement of the CCC in the life of the average enrollee is forever beyond us. The problem is further complicated by the CCC having undergone changes in its identity throughout its nine year history. Initially it was a relief agency, then it became a training agency, and finally it evolved into a defense agency.\footnote{2} The available evidence indicates that as a relief agency and as a training agency, the Virginia CCC reflected the general success of the national program.

During the hard times of the Depression the Virginia CCC provided ten of thousands of jobs to the
unemployed. Between 1933 and 1942 the Virginia CCC employed over 75,000 men; 64,762 enrollees and 10,435 non-enrollees served at least one enrollment period with the CCC. Due to the availability of re-enlistment, many of these men served for a year in the CCC. As an indication of the vital role in employment occupied by the CCC, the Virginia Department of Public Welfare determined that between July of 1936 and January of 1938, twenty percent of the enrollees they polled had never had a job before. An additional thirty percent of these same enrollees had been unemployed from two to six months prior to their enrollment in the CCC. The CCC camps stimulated the Virginia economy by spending approximately $315,000 every month in Virginia. The $16 million that enrollees allotted to their dependents from their monthly paychecks helped thousands of families trying to "make ends meet." In view of these statistics and the observation that Virginia proved especially reluctant to provide direct relief to its citizens, the jobs made available by the CCC were especially helpful in blunting the sharp edge of Depression.³

Consider, for example, the situation of the mountain folk sequestered in the hollows of the Blue Ridge Mountains of Virginia: game was scarce, farming was marginal, and local industry was virtually nonexistent. Moreover, the federal government was in the process of relocating these
people because many of the hollows they inhabited had become a part of Shenandoah National Park, authorized in 1926. Through the activities of the Resettlement Administration, and even more significantly, through the opportunities provided by the CCC, the New Deal offered some measure of hope to these people. One CCC official in Shenandoah Park recalled that in the first days of the CCC his tent was fired upon by hollow folk toting Revolutionary War guns. These same individuals started fires in the new national park, angered that the CCC was depriving them of their customary role as local firefighters. But this official also noted that after the first six months of the CCC in Shenandoah, during which time he personally delivered one baby of a mountaineer, the local residents began to appreciate the CCC. In time, some of these mountaineers grew to depend upon the CCC because camp cooks provided garbage to feed their hogs or, even more importantly, because enrollment led to a paycheck with which they could buy food for their children. One Blue Ridge entrepreneur, the owner of a local resort, believed that the CCC was the one thing above all others that made "good men" out of the boys of Eliot Jenkins, a mountaineer. Just as some
Virginia citizens found their way as far West as Utah, so too, the Virginia CCC offered opportunities to out-of-state enrollees. Many of these individuals were recruited from Pennsylvania, a state that lay within the same Army Corps Area as Virginia and was thus included within the selection process for the Virginia CCC. Oral history interviews conducted with three former enrollees of the Virginia CCC, all from Pennsylvania, demonstrates the fondness with which many still regard the CCC. One respondent recalled that the CCC provided him with his first job and a ray of hope. Another respondent grew to appreciate the Blue Ridge so much during the enlistment period of 1933 that he has now moved back to Virginia, under the shadow of the Blue Ridge, to spend the remainder of his life. An interview with a third respondent uncovered the startling fact that to some, a dollar a day and room and board represented an increase in pay. This gentleman, raised in the anthracite coal region of Pennsylvania, welcomed a chance to escape the mines and the ten cent an hour wage he earned there, to accept a job in the CCC at Fort Hunt Park, south of Alexandria, Virginia. Eventually he rose in the hierarchy of the CCC to become a purchasing agent for the Army Third Corps Area—a geographic region encompassing Virginia, Washington D.C., Maryland, and Pennsylvania.5
By almost any standard, ranging from the objective one based upon the sheer number of enrollees who served in the CCC to more subjective criteria, based upon the impressions made by the CCC on the memories of former enrollees, the CCC provided an impressive amount of relief to young men needing it badly. The Virginia CCC especially helped two minorities during the Depression—war veterans and black Americans. War veterans, because of their age, were given separate camps; blacks because of the segregation that prevailed in the South, also occupied distinct camps (with only a few exceptions). The situation of both of these groups was especially desperate in a generally desperate decade.

War veterans marched on Washington after the inauguration of Franklin Roosevelt—a President who they thought had promised Americans a new deal. But concomitant with this promise, FDR had also vowed to balance the budget. Once installed in office, the new president first probed for soft spots in the budget, then he announced that the benefits of veterans would be reduced. In May of 1933 the veterans, or "bonus-marchers," assembled in Washington to protest FDR's plan to slash their benefits in half. Instead of driving the veterans away as his predecessor in the White House had done, Roosevelt gave the veterans shelter, offered them coffee, and sent his wife Eleanor,
his "eyes and ears," to hear their complaints. Eleanor motored to Fort Hunt Park, between Alexandria and Mt. Vernon, to visit:

As she quietly mingled with the orderly mess lines and trooped into the hall to talk with the old veterans while they ate, she was accepted, respected, and welcomed with unconcealed surprise and with dignity. The moment was nostalgic. She talked of France in 1919; they sang the old war songs. She visited the hospital, poked into some of the other buildings. Later someone said, 'Hoover sent the Army. Roosevelt sent his wife.'

Even more important than this symbolic gesture, FDR presented the veterans with an invitation to join the CCC. Some of the bonus-marchers scowled, but most of the bonus-marchers joined. On May 23, 1933, FDR issued an Executive Order allowing the CCC to enroll 25,000 veterans. With the exception of ten percent, the "diehard" contingent, the majority entered the CCC. Fort Hunt Park became the first veterans CCC camp. Veterans continued to return to Washington until 1936. Each time, the "bonus-marchers" were invited to join the CCC.

These veterans were primarily World War I survivors although some served in the Spanish American War and a few in limited military actions undertaken by the U.S. government. One individual who visited the veterans camps of Virginia described the enrollees thus:
All are past the age of thirty-five, and some are in the fifties and sixties. A number were formerly inmates of psychopathic hospitals, some have been ne'er-do-wells and adventurers, others have been addicted to drink. There were skilled workmen out of employment, foreign born with factory backgrounds who are bewildered by the breakdown of the little machine hives which were all they knew of America, and professional men whose professions have sunk into the depression and disappeared. Many of these individuals needed continuing help. In recognition of this need the CCC allowed veterans to re-enroll as often as they wished. In a limited way, the CCC offered the veteran opportunities to find employment, to receive training, and perhaps most importantly, to escape the dreariness of the Soldier's Homes—a life to which many had been resigned. Generally unable to perform strenuous manual labor, the CCC assigned these men whenever possible to less arduous tasks. The CCC camp at Fort Hunt Park, for example, became an exhibit center for the National Park Service. Here enrollees built dioramas, drew maps, and painted signs for display in units of the National Park Service throughout the Eastern United States. In an age when the problems of veterans were only a small part of the catastrophe that descended upon Washington in the thirties, the CCC acted as a salve to veterans wounded by a fickle economy and a complicated age.

Another group that benefited from the Virginia CCC were blacks, frequently categorized during the Depression
as "last-hired", first-fired." Inclusion of blacks in the CCC developed as an amendment to the CCC bill in 1933 when the only black Congressman, Representative Oscar De Priest of Illinois, proposed that "no discrimination shall be made on account of race, color, or creed . . . under the provisions of this Act." Accordingly, ten percent of the CCC enrollment was opened to blacks. Some states, notably the state of Georgia under Governor Eugene Talmadge, ignored this provision, but Virginia did not. Black camps dotted the eastern portion of Virginia. Black enrollees labored primarily in the CCC camps operated by the Soil Conservation Service. Some communities initially resisted the locating of black camps within their neighborhoods, but the promise of money spent locally by the camps stilled the outrage of many. The incorporation of blacks into the CCC represented one way in which blacks could claim to have received favorable attention from the policies of FDR. The federal government even endorsed integration policy on occasion. Such was the case in Virginia in 1933 when a woman complained that in Amherst County, white enrollees were compelled to live in the midst of 180 blacks with no provisions for segregation. The captain of this camp responded to the woman's outrage by stating that "The Federal Government thinks as much of a Negro as it does of a white man." The captain's decision
was final.  

White, "junior" enrollees, war veterans, and blacks all benefited from the Virginia CCC. Indeed the relief afforded Virginia by the CCC was more extensive than the state of Virginia had any right to expect. Senator Byrd was aware of this when he reported in 1933 that Virginia had "more than our quota of federal positions, and more than any other state due to our proximity to Washington."  

From an early date, Virginia received a disproportionately large share of CCC camps. Final statistics confirm this impression of favoritism: ranking thirty-sixth among the states in area, Virginia ranked fourth in the total number of camps established in any state; ranking nineteenth among the states in population, Virginia ranked sixteenth in the total number of enrollees serving in any state; and although Virginia escaped the worst ravages of the Depression, Virginia ranked nineteenth among the states in the total amount of money allotted by CCC enrollees to their dependents.  

The generosity shown by Washington toward the Virginia CCC may have been motivated more out of respect for the clout of the Virginia congressional delegation than it was motivated by an appreciation for the hardships imposed by the Depression in Virginia. Both Eleanor Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's "minister of
"relief," were aware that Virginia weathered the Depression relatively well. Lorena Hickok, confidante of Eleanor and employee of Hopkins, traveled across America during the Depression, seeking out the poorest and the most forlorn cities and states. Her reports to her friend and superior show that although she did travel through the South, she did not even bother to stop in Virginia. In comparison to states like South Dakota, the plight of Virginia was simply not that bad. Yet Virginia continued to receive a generous share of federal monies, in spite of its relative prosperity and its reluctance to contribute its fair share to federal relief programs.

Although Virginia was better off than many other states during the Depression, this can by no means be construed to suggest that Virginians were strangers to poverty. In July of 1942, a few days after Congress terminated the CCC, a rural sociologist at the Virginia Agricultural Experiment Station in Blacksburg, Virginia noted that many Virginians still lived on a bare subsistence level. According to his calculations, 100,000 whites and 65,000 blacks lived in families where the average wage was less than $250 a year. The problem was one of erosion:

If Jefferson could revisit Virginia today he undoubtedly would be greatly shocked to see how much of his beloved Virginia soil has become eroded, and how human erosion is inevitable for many of those who work it.
As Virginia recovered from the Depression, the CCC became less and less essential as a relief agency. And yet, despite declining enrollments in 1942, the potential for human conservation in Virginia had not been exhausted by the CCC. Virginians might still have benefited from a continuation of the program.

The most spectacular success of the CCC in human conservation was in the administration of relief. A valuable, but lesser success of the Virginia CCC resulted from its training function. The apparent modesty of this success is perhaps in part the consequence of the record-keeping of the Virginia CCC. A curious reluctance to maintain a complete file labeled "success stories," a standard way through which the CCC monitored the progress of the most promising enrollees after they left the CCC, might suggest that the Virginia program failed to train its enrollees for employment. Only one success story appears in the Virginia file and this is the story of an enrollee becoming an airplane mechanic. Upon further consideration, this dearth of documentary evidence does not seem to be especially damning, however, for all CCC success stories actually demonstrate is the fact that certain enrollees found employment after leaving the CCC. We can safely assume that most enrollees managed to find jobs after they left the CCC.
A more telling investigation of the success of the Virginia CCC in training enrollees includes an analysis of the educational program. The CCC stressed both literacy education and vocational education. Nationally, the CCC claimed to have taught over 35,000 enrollees to read and write. Part of this literacy training took place in Virginia and represented a substantial improvement in the literacy rate of a state well-known for its lack of emphasis upon education during the Depression. Most of the Virginia camps maintained a library of approximately eight hundred books. Without a doubt, this was an eye-opening experience for some enrollees; possibly it was an enlightening experience for others.

The vocational education made possible through the CCC was particularly important to Virginia, which as a part of the South, was handicapped by a shortage of skilled labor. The courses offered in Virginia camps included instruction in such practical subjects as typing, auto mechanics, blueprint reading, carpentry, and even the construction of parking lots. Frequently, vocational classes and work projects complemented each other well. One former enrollee even attributed much of his later success in life to the vocational experience he gained while in the Virginia CCC.
On January 1, 1942, the CCC became primarily a defense agency, officially abandoning its previous identities as a relief agency and as a training agency. By trying to assume the uniform of the soldier, the CCC donned one identity to which it was not "well-suited." In its short life as a defense agency the CCC assumed its least successful identity. It neither won the war nor consciously strove to conserve human resources.

The 162 Camp Inspection Reports of the Virginia CCC testify to the multiplicity of minor problems that afflicted the camps throughout their nine year history. The problems were those one might expect in any similar venture when large groups of men are expected to live, to work, and to study together. As men are prone to do in all male settings, Pennsylvanians and Virginians fought among themselves. The recruitment of men from both sides of the Mason-Dixon line probably was foolish. Drunkenness posed another problem, particularly among veterans, perhaps the least well-adapted group in the CCC. The desertion rate in Virginia camps paralleled the overall national desertion rate of eighteen to twenty percent. Mass desertions plagued the Virginia camps. The educational program of the Virginia CCC suffered from some of the same shortcomings evident in the national program. Among these shortcomings were inexperienced teachers, apathetic
students, and an atmosphere more conducive to work than to education. Because the Camp Inspection Reports are internal documents written by inspectors whose job it was to look for problems in administration, a sustained reading might cause one to overemphasize the problems in the Virginia camps. In retrospect these were minor rather than major problems and in no way did the inevitable problems in the camps invalidate the success of the Virginia CCC in the conservation of human resources.

In the final report of the CCC the Director argued that the greatest achievement of the CCC occurred in the conservation of human resources. A close look at the Virginia CCC confirms this observation. A job, "three squares," and money for home in a time when all were in short supply constituted the transcendent achievement. The Virginia CCC offered meaningful aid to white youths, black youths, and war veterans. One could, of course, argue that the CCC failed to measure up to its potential, but such an argument would be churlish. The success of the Virginia CCC is immediately apparent when one pauses to seriously consider what would have been the achievement in human conservation if there had been no CCC in Virginia.
Notes for Chapter II


5 Personal interview with John V. Coxe and James Heeter, Summer, 1982, Shenandoah National Park; Personal interview with Ray Evans, Summer, 1982, Arlington, Virginia.

All but 300 or 400 hundred veterans out of 3000 protesters joined the CCC, New York Times, May 21 and 22, 1933; Saalberg, "Roosevelt, Fechner and the Civilian Conservation Corps," p. 62.


Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942, p. 23.


Evening-Star, March 22, 1933.


W. E. Garnett, letter to the editor, Times-Dispatch, July 6, 1942.

Success Story of Henry C. Helbig Jr., Success Stories 1936-1941 (VA), RG-35, N.A.

Heinemann, "Depression and New Deal in Virginia," p. 277, goes so far as to argue that Virginia chose roads over schools; the camp educational reports usually mention eight hundred books, Camp Inspection Reports (VA), RG-35, N.A.

Bill Van Oot, "The South's Need for Vocational Education," November 1, 1939, University of Virginia Newsletter; Camp Educational Reports, Camp Inspection Reports (VA), RG-35, N.A.; Personal interview with Ray Evans, summer 1981.
One enrollee even complained to the Washington office about the situation in Douthat State Park in western Virginia by arguing, "It is the age old question of the north and the south." The complaint was signed "95 Mistreated but Powerful Pennyslvanians to the Director of the CCC, (undated), File SP-4 (Clifton-Forge)." Camp Inspection Reports (VA), RG-35, N.A.; another documented case of sectional conflict broke out in Luray, Virginia in 1940 when "local experienced men" apparently beat up ten Pennsylvania enrollees, Gus J. Calno to Fechner, File "NP-10 (Luray)" Camp Inspection Reports (VA), RG-35, N.A.

One enrollee observed "It is a matter of common knowledge that the drunken element predominates in the Veteran's Camps." Enrollee to Fechner, File "SP-20 (Chester)." Camp Inspection Reports (VA), RG-35, N.A.; for additional evidence of the problem of the drunkenness in veteran's camps as revealed in Camp Inspection Reports for Virginia see: Captain Riley E. McGarraugh to Commanding General of 3rd Corps Area, November 15, 1939, File P-76 (Bedford)," File "F-13 (Greenlee), and Patrick King, Special Investigator to Fechner, January 27, 1939, File NP-7 (Petersburg)."

Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942, quoting Minutes of the Advisory Council to the Director of the CCC, April 20, 1937 and March 28, 1939; the most publicized desertions in the Virginia Camps occurred in November of 1937 among Pennsylvanians stationed in Shenandoah National Park. One hundred enrollees, unhappy with the weather, the food, and "punk" towns like Luray, refused to work. By refusing to work these enrollees from the mining district of Pennsylvania were probably enacting the accepted procedure for protesting in a coal mine, but in Virginia such actions were viewed as a "Mutiny in the Camps." The Army investigation of this episode is reported in Report of Investigations of Mutinous Conduct in the CCC, File "Mutiny in Camps," General Correspondence 300 (VA), RG-35, N.A. Mass desertions in Virginia were the subject of discussion in the Advisory Council, see Minutes, November 22, 1935, p. 8, and April 20, 1937, p. 6. By 1939 a fifty-eight percent desertion rate, in the camps again attracted attention from the Washington office, see File "Virginia, 1939" Correspondence with State Selection Agencies, 1933-1942 (VA), RG-35, N.A. The severity of the desertion problem in Virginia can probably be explained by
the cultural differences between Pennsylvanians and Virginians and the observation that, because economic conditions were better in Virginia than most states, the Virginia attracted underage or undermotivated enrollees in great proportion.

This is the conclusion I have reached from reading the Camp Educational Reports filed in the Camp Inspection Reports (VA), RG-35, N.A.
CHAPTER III

THE NINE YEAR RECORD

Conservation of Natural Resources in Virginia

With the aid of a jalopy, a state highway map, and a few hints, the resourceful traveler can still see the legacy of the CCC in the conservation of natural resources in Virginia. The national forests, national parks, and private lands of Virginia still bear the mark of the CCC. Never before had the public and private lands of Virginia had such attention lavished upon them. Working within the various meanings of conservation used by the CCC, the enrollees in the Virginia program demonstrated both the limits and the achievements of New Deal conservation.

The work of the Virginia camps was performed under the supervision of the United States Department of Agriculture and the United States Department of the Interior. Within the Department of Agriculture, the United States Forest Service and the Soil Conservation Service directed the work projects. Within the Department of the Interior, the National Park Service and the Bureau of the Biological Survey directed the work projects.
Trying to put the accomplishments of an average of sixty-three camps over a nine year period into simple English is as difficult today as it was during the New Deal.\(^1\) Any discussion of the contribution of the CCC to American conservation invites a statistical response. The CCC itself viewed its contribution in this way—the Washington office kept careful records in its statistical division of the progress of the CCC in man-days, miles, acres, linear feet, cubic yards, and anything even remotely measurable. Such record keeping helped to provide an arsenal of facts and figures to proselytize or to defend the CCC, and it also seemed to make sense of three million men in 4,500 camps across the nation. And yet, a purely statistical analysis yields only quantities. A modern day analysis of the work of the CCC in one state ought to consider the quality of the work done by making some judgments on the benefits the CCC wrought in that state.

WORKS PROJECTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

In 1933, the forests of Virginia were badly in need of attention. Unprotected from fire, overcut, and beginning to be reseeded by inferior species, the forests of the tidewater, piedmont, and mountainous portions of Virginia were strangers to the practice of conservation.\(^2\)
Unlike the American West, where large percentages of federal lands had already been set aside, the overwhelming percentage of forested land in Virginia was owned privately. A dozen of the Virginia CCC camps engaged in forestry cared for these private lands. Obviously the federal government could not be expected to make substantial improvements on these lands at no cost to the landholder so the work of the CCC was confined to fire prevention and control—a resultant public good. To this end, CCC enrollees built fire lookout towers and laid telephone lines, constructed fire lanes and erected bridges, "piled slash," and, of course, fought forest fires directly. Another dozen camps worked in the national forests of Virginia on these same tasks and in tree planting and recreational development: jobs designed to extend the care of, and improve the access to, public lands.\(^3\)

The fire protection work done on private, state (only one camp worked on the state forest), and national forests was substantial. Over 85,000 man-days were spent "digging fire line." More than 4,100 miles of fire roads, over 700 vehicle bridges, over 1,200 miles of telephone lines and 122 lookout towers and houses were built by the CCC in an effort to decrease the response time to fires and to improve fire detection techniques. Enrollees also reduced the fire hazard by brush piling over more than
100,000 acres. In the national forests of Virginia enrollees spent over 11,100 man-days gathering hardwood seeds and pine cones for reforestation efforts in forest tree nurseries. FDR's "tree army" planted over 1.6 million trees in Virginia forests and carried out thinning operations on over 71,500 acres.

Recreational efforts of the CCC included the development of recreation areas in the Jefferson National Forest and in the George Washington National Forest. In keeping with the segregationist policies of the South, enrollees erected separate white and black recreation areas in Jefferson National Forest. CCC funds were also used for purchases of land for the purposes of conservation and a scenic tract, the Peaks of Otter—a 673 acre parcel near Lynchburg, Virginia—was added to Jefferson National Forest in 1936 by Executive Order. In the George Washington National Forest, enrollees created the Sherando Lake Forest Camp, and stocked the artificial lake with 3.5 million fish. In other areas of the state, enrollees developed 170 acres of public campgrounds by putting in water lines, building picnic tables and erecting shelters.

The United States Forest Service also administered, for the Tennessee Valley Authority, several CCC camps in the southwestern portion of Virginia. These camps,
extensions of the Tennessee Valley Authority, concentrated on fire protection and suppression activities. 7

Three centuries of farming in Virginia left the state with a serious erosion problem. While it is true that the dust did not blow with the fierceness that it blew in the Western United States, shoestring erosion—the gullying of the earth—characterized the Virginia landscape. More difficult to spot was the phenomenon of sheet erosion, the uniform skinning off of the topsoil. With the establishment of the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) CCC camps under the supervision of that agency began to demonstrate to farmers techniques of erosion control.

Virginia farmers treated their land carelessly. Partly this was because roughly half of Virginia's farmers were tenant farmers and thus did not have as great a stake in the health of the land as resident owners. Partly this was because Southern farms were so small that farmers overworked them. Fields were not allowed to lie fallow, cover crops were rarely planted, and many times farmers planted up and down slopes instead of across their hills. For this they paid their price in lost soil. 8

Hugh Bernet, the founder of the SCS, realized a dream when he convinced Congress to create an agency devoted to soil conservation. Bennet's first encounter with sheet erosion, if we are to believe him, took place
in Louisa County, Virginia in 1908. Bennet and a companion noticed that hilly land that lay side by side which should have been identical, was not identical. One side was typified by soil that was "mellow, loamy, and moist," while the other side was typified by soil that was "clay, hard, and almost like rock." The lands had the same parent rock, the same slope, and the same origin of formation. The only difference was that one side had been "cropped" and the other side was still in woods primeval. Erosion was the cause for the difference concluded Bennet. After this revelation he became convinced that the loss of topsoil through sheet erosion was a pervasive and grievous national problem. With the establishment of the SCS in 1935, Bennet had an agency to combat both sheet and shoe-string erosion.9

With the labor force of the CCC, by 1935 Bennet had, as one CCC pamphlet phrased it, "hands to save the soil." Through demonstration of proper land practices on selected farms he hoped that the CCC could lead by example. The customary procedure for a CCC camp under SCS supervision was to survey, upon request, a farmer's land. The enrollees noted the slope, the soil type, the extent of erosion and the uses to which the land was being put. Then the CCC drew up a unified plan for erosion control and the farmer signed the plan with the agreement that he would
receive free labor in return for the cost of the materials. Under the supervision of soil engineers, enrollees went to work. They built check dams, sloped banks to an even grade, constructed diversion ditches and then planted the gullies with grasses, brushes, and trees.

The CCC camps devoted to soil conservation were located in the southeastern portion of Virginia. An average of thirteen Virginia camps accomplished the following in erosion control:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stream and lake bank protection</td>
<td>51,132 sq. yds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment of gullies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank sloping</td>
<td>3,872,556 sq. yds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. check dams, permanent</td>
<td>8,801 sq. yds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. check dams, temporary</td>
<td>166,682 sq. yds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeding and sodding</td>
<td>16,354,963 sq. yds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tree planting, gully</td>
<td>3,491,603 sq. yds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditches, diversion</td>
<td>1,168,045 lin. ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terracing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrace outletting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channel construction</td>
<td>806,884 lin. ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlet structures</td>
<td>13,682 lin. ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planting, seed or sod</td>
<td>2,742,648 sq. yds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheet erosion planting</td>
<td>407 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limestone crushed (for liming soil)</td>
<td>277 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limestone hauled</td>
<td>818 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contour furrows and rides</td>
<td>316 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation for strip cropping</td>
<td>731 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road erosion control demonstration</td>
<td>16 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous erosion control</td>
<td>4,910 man-days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In retrospect, the CCC work performed under the supervision of the United States Forest Service and the Soil Conservation Service was not entirely successful. The Forest Service was constrained in its activities on
forested land because over ninety percent of the forested land in Virginia was in private ownership. With so little land of its own, the National Forest Service was unable to introduce the full range of forest improvements to Virginia. By 1939, fully three million acres of forested land received no fire protection at all and only a scant three percent of privately owned land was managed according to the principle of sustained-yield.\textsuperscript{12}

Modern officials of the Soil Conservation Service admit that the demonstration techniques practiced by the CCC were at best a partial success. Despite the claim made by the CCC in its annual report that CCC soil conservation worked especially well in Virginia, the precedent set by the CCC was not practical. The demonstration techniques practiced by the CCC required a huge amount of man power and only solved a small part of a larger problem. Moreover, these CCC camps relied heavily upon federal expenditures and unwisely bypassed state and local governments. Perhaps most important:

It was not an approach calculated to build an enduring program. It required a minimum of investment of money and effort on the part of the landowner or operator and might not, therefore, permanently capture his interest and enthusiasm.\textsuperscript{13}

Beginning in 1937 the SCS began to phase out its demonstration projects and to institute a more permanent arrangement through which farmers could cooperate with the SCS via soil
conservation districts. By 1944, two years after the end of the CCC, all demonstration projects under the direction of the SCS were terminated.

WORK PROJECTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Virginia had, on the average, more CCC camps in national parks than did any other state. Enrollees performed a major role in the development of Colonial National Historical Park and Shenandoah National Park. During the New Deal, the National Park Service (NPS) concentrated on parkway construction, assumed the supervision and interpretation of Civil War battlefields, and devoted increasing attention to historic site administration. The NPS also continued to occupy its traditional role as guardian of the nation's most treasured parklands.

As a state that is both rich in history and ample in beauty, Virginia featured two parks during the thirties that highlighted this dual heritage. Colonial National Park, located in the historic triangle of Virginia, encapsulates early American history. From the first permanent settlement in Jamestown, to the colonial capital in Williamsburg, to the battlefield in Yorktown, Colonial Americans established a new home in a strange land, began to govern themselves according to their own notions, and
finally won independence. Shenandoah National Park held the delights of the Blue Ridge and became, during the thirties, the most visited unit of the national park system.

Enrollees in the camps of Colonial National Historical Park added a new connotation to the word conservation. Conservation also became associated with the conserving of history. In Jamestown, enrollees literally unearthed the nation's past by digging for artifacts. Archaelogical digs in Jamestown—at this time only bare, abandoned swampland—yielded a half million artifacts. Enrollees washed, sorted, and repaired these artifacts in a laboratory and then built a museum in which to display them. Then, to finish off the task, enrollees landscaped the museum grounds and built picnic grounds and parking areas.15

The majority of the restoration work done in Williamsburg was funded by John D. Rockefeller Jr., but the CCC camps did build replicas of colonial furniture for display in Williamsburg.16

In Yorktown, enrollees first identified and then reconstructed the trenches and earthworks of the battlefield of 1781. They also restored old buildings and developed the area for visitation. The thoroughness with which they tried to dredge up America's past is nowhere
better illustrated than by the presentation to FDR of old English rum bottles found with grappling hooks off the shores of Yorktown. Such an award to the President bore testimony to the diligence and not to the dereliction of the enrollees. The President, for his part, twice used CCC funds to expand the size of Colonial National Historical Monument.17

In Virginia, the development of national parks and the rise of an automobile culture developed in tandem during the New Deal. Parkways offered to those seeking a pleasurable drive through or between units of the NPS an opportunity to make the ride itself a part of the national park experience. The Colonial Parkway—connecting Jamestown to Williamsburg to Yorktown—was both landscaped and groomed by the CCC. Transplanting trees is brute work, but the creation of the Colonial Parkway was an artistic endeavor.

In Shenandoah Park, enrollees worked on another parkway, the Skyline Drive. Although the CCC did not actually build the Skyline Drive, they did landscape it, helping to transform a lonely ridge into a motoring delight. The CCC placed a premium on scenery. Enrollees cleared the woods to provide the best possible vistas and then constructed the many overlooks that still causes traffic to linger as it travels through the Shenandoah
Park. Even the barrier guard—in this case the stone wall that still graces the Skyline Drive—was constructed with respect for the most scenic alternative.18

Other jobs completed in Shenandoah Park included the rerouting of the Appalachian trail so that the Skyline Drive and the preexisting foot trail did not compete any more than was necessary on top of the narrow ridge that is Shenandoah National Park. The CCC built shelters along the Appalachian trail for those wishing to camp and constructed auxiliary trails, such as the one up to Mary's rock, for those who wished to see the mountains close up. The CCC also built a major picnic ground and tent and trailer campground in Big Meadows. CCC camps worked in Shenandoah National Park from the time the land was accepted by the Secretary of the Interior in 1933 (at which time the President also authorized the purchase of additional lands with CCC funds) until just before the closing of the camps in 1942.19 A large proportion of the public facility development that must be undertaken before a national park can be considered accessible was performed by the many CCC camps that worked in Shenandoah Park.

When the NPS assumed jurisdiction over the Civil War battlefields from the Department of War in 1933, it proceeded to use the CCC to embark on an ambitious program of restoration and development. Civil War battlefields in
Fredericksburg, Petersburg, and Richmond were now fit subjects for conservation—in this case taken to mean conserving the memory of war. The trenches from which battles were pitched were not only located and resurrected, they were also planted to protect them from erosion. Enrollees protected battlefields from fire. After marking points of interest, enrollees led public tours through newly constructed foot and bridle trails in an attempt to make the memory of war even more vivid. As he had done elsewhere, the President authorized the use of CCC funds to acquire more lands in Civil War battlefields.20

In Fort Hunt Park, enrollees engaged in more than recreational development. Here enrollees built exhibits for the NPS. An exhibit center, which included maps and dioramas, provided units of the NPS in the Eastern United States with a multitude of materials for display.21

In Chopawamsic and Swift Creek Recreational Demonstration Areas the CCC developed facilities for low income and organized camping groups from nearby urban areas.22

One of the most successful of the NPS programs undertaken by the CCC, at least in Virginia, was the state park program. This program was a cooperative effort between federal and state officials. As early as 1929, the Governor of Virginia had been presented with a resolution
passed in the General Assembly, which expressed an intention to establish a state park system. By 1932, intention had not been converted to action because the only step toward the establishment of such a system was the acceptance by the state of a parcel of land that was a part of Richmond Battlefield. As it turned out, this same land was then given by the state to the federal government because it did not feel it could afford to develop the battlefield properly.  

The real impetus given the state park system of Virginia came in 1933 when FDR, given considerable latitude in the legislation establishing the CCC, decided that a state park program developed by the CCC might be a good idea. This use of the CCC not only increased the popularity of the CCC in Virginia, it also saved the federal government the expense of having to transport enrollees in the Eastern United States to worksites in the Western United States.

With an initial appropriation by the Virginia legislature of $50,000, Virginia acquired lands to be developed as part of a state park program. A few states already had well-developed state park systems but Virginia, in keeping with the tenets of fiscal conservatism, was one of five states without any state park lands. This was soon remedied.
Lands purchased by Virginia for parks to be developed by the CCC were scattered throughout the state. In the mountainous portion of Virginia, the state purchased Douthat State Park, Hungry Mother State Park and Fairy Stone State Park. In the piedmont the state purchased Staunton River State Park and in the tidewater, the state purchased Westmoreland on the Potomac, and Seashore State Park near Cape Henry. In fact, if Shenandoah National Park and Swift Creek Recreational Area were included in the calculations, circles with a radius of fifty miles could be drawn around each of these parks and, with the exception of a select few in two counties, everybody in Virginia would be within fifty miles of a park.

In the Virginia state parks the CCC assigned enrollees to 15,000 man-days of educational guiding and public contact work, 10,000 man-days of emergency work, and 5,000 man-days of tree preservation work. The major effort in these parks was the development of public facilities: picnic grounds, bathhouses, foot and horse trails, and fishing waters. For the enjoyment of these facilities the enrollees built everything from artificial lakes in all the mountain parks to doorknobs on vacation cottages in the beach parks. By 1936 these parks were, to the delight of Virginians, revenue-producing and attracting over 100,000 visitors annually. By 1942 the state park
system in Virginia comprised over 20,000 acres and eleven parks (five were relatively minor developments).\textsuperscript{25}

The Bureau of the Biological Survey in the Department of the Interior supervised one CCC camp near Pungo, Virginia. In this camp, enrollees developed the Back Bay Migratory Wildfowl Refuge. It was designed especially for the benefit of geese. Besides the construction of a headquarters and service facilities, enrollees erected over 5,000 rods of a specially constructed fence meant to solve the problem of saltwater encroachment on freshwater waterfowl habitat.\textsuperscript{26}

In reflecting over the work done by the Virginia CCC, the National Park Service may have used CCC labor to further public enjoyment of the parks to the detriment of the preservation of the parks. The enabling legislation of the NPS cites preservation and public enjoyment of the parks as purposes for the creation of the NPS but these requirements can tug policy in different directions. The CCC could be utilized to expand the facilities for public enjoyment, but it was vastly more difficult for the CCC to actively preserve the national parks. A parkway in the historic triangle obviously served a useful purpose, but what of a parkway in a narrow wilderness park like Shenandoah? In 1933 the new Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, remarked that "If I had my way about national
parks I would create one without a road in it. I would have it impenetrable forever to automobiles, a place where man would not try to improve upon God." Ickes' opinion obviously did not prevail and the Bureau of Public Roads constructed the Skyline Drive and the CCC "improved" it. Neither Harry Byrd nor Franklin Roosevelt expressed anything but approval for the project, but the necessity of the NPS building a road that straddles the top of the park was not clear in 1933 and is not clear by today's standards. All too often the CCC represented a labor force that, at least in the case of national parks, increased public enjoyment of the national parks at the expense of the wilderness quality of these parks.

In the view of one NPS official, many of the work projects proposed by the states in their state programs were too ambitious. Conrad Wirth, the NPS official in charge of the state park program in the thirties, recalls in his memoirs that states often suggested schemes for the development of parks that conflicted with the preference of the NPS for inexpensive, minimal facilities. A visit to Seashore State Park today to see one of the vacation cottages built by the CCC indicates that perhaps here the CCC was too zealous in the development of Seashore. In its effort to win acceptance from the states, the NPS may have allowed more development than it ought to have allowed
in the state park work done by the CCC.

THE VIRGINIA CCC AS A PART OF NEW DEAL CONSERVATION

Shortcomings in the natural resource conservation of the CCC were, of course, not peculiar to Virginia. From the beginning of the CCC, the perceptive critic noticed problems posed by the conception of the CCC. There was an inherent tension created by the recruitment of men to save the land because in the process of trying to beautify and harmonize nature, enrollees might actually mar and disrupt nature's workings. So spoke J. Gresham Macon when he objected to the establishment of the CCC in 1933: "putting gangs of helots to work" in the woods amounted to a situation where the "resources of the federal government will be devoted on a gigantic scale to the artificializing of what natural beauty this country has." So spoke Bob Marshall, an employee of the United States Forest Service and the founder of the Wilderness Society, when he cautioned his boss in 1935 that "unless you act very soon on the seven primitive area projects I presented to you a month ago, eager CCC boys will have demolished the greatest wildernesses which remain in the United States." There is a certain arrogance in the efforts of man to improve upon nature; sometimes nature works best when left alone.
The CCC not only posed a threat to those of the preservationist persuasion, but the haste with which the CCC was implemented and the various purposes that the CCC was required to serve meant that some of the work projects were either ill-conceived or "make-work." The Director of the CCC even admitted that the CCC "was handicapped from the beginning by the fact that no master conservation plan was available." In the haste of the Depression there was not much time for planning. As a result, the CCC sometimes found itself in embarrassing or indefensible predicaments: in its zeal to eradicate an infestation of Mormon Black Armored Crickets, the CCC accidentally killed six hundred sheep belonging to a private citizen in Utah; in a North Dakota CCC camp under the supervision of the General Land Office, the CCC labored for a solid six months to extinguish an underground coal fire but, according to Conrad Wirth, "no dent was made in putting out the fire."

New Deal conservation remained a collection of disparate ventures because no individual bound this bundle of sticks into a single instrument of policy. The appointment of two labor leaders as successive directors of the CCC did not help matters because as a result the CCC proved more interested in putting men to work than in pursuing far-sighted conservation policy.

FDR shares part of the blame for the failure of
New Deal conservation. In the formulation of national conservation policy Roosevelt demonstrated good, but not great leadership. In the words of one of his most insightful biographers, FDR lacked "that burning and almost fanatic conviction that great leadership demands." Roosevelt was too fully the politician to be irrevocably committed to any one cause, including conservation. Nor did the President demonstrate a sensitivity toward the blooming preservationist instinct of his time represented by nontraditional thinkers in the United States Forest Service like Bob Marshall and Aldo Leopold. For example, FDR found nothing objectionable about putting a road through a wild woods or with placing a mine in a wilderness. Perhaps he lacked the requisite misanthropy to be committed preservationist; perhaps his infirmity prevented him from embracing untrammeled nature. In any event, FDR's utilitarian version of conservation, divorced from the tradition of esthetic conservation, meant that his pet project, the CCC, would also have difficulty in embracing this conception of conservation as part preservation.

Viewed within the limits of New Deal conservation, the sometimes inadequate efforts of the Virginia CCC are understandable. In the Department of Agriculture the CCC was unable to convert Virginia's forests to a sustained-
yield management basis because of the entrenched suspicion of private landholders to this form of forestry. The SCS demonstration camps manned by the CCC enrollees did not manage to convince all of the Virginia farmers of the wisdom of the SCS. In the national parks the CCC may have been permitted to "overdevelop" while in the state parks the CCC developed the parks to a degree that even bothered the NPS.

The blame can be distributed but one consideration towers above all others. Suppose the CCC had never come to Virginia, what would Virginia have done by itself to introduce the philosophy of conservation? A conservation mentality builds up almost as slowly as rock degrades to red clay. The Virginia CCC allowed Virginians to begin to think more deeply about the consequences of cutting too many trees or letting too much soil wash off the land. The Virginia CCC made the Virginia parks more accessible and more enjoyable.

If the Virginia CCC is representative of the larger problems associated with New Deal conservation, then it must also be taken as a good reflection of the achievements of New Deal conservation. The statistical accomplishments have the special kind of force that only numbers can convey. The attitudinal transformation inspired by the CCC is less quantifiable, but surely it was no less real. Within the
constraints of federal conservation policy and the modest hopes that one could expect from progressive policies in a conservative state, the Virginia CCC was successful in its effort to bring natural resource conservation to Virginia.
Notes for Chapter III

1 This average of 63 camps over a nine year period was computed by CCC statisticians in the Final Report of the Federal Security Agency, p. 111, RG-35, N.A.

2 Pederson, "Virginia's Forest Resources, Problems and Requirements."

3 Civilian Conservation Corps Activities in Virginia under Department of Agriculture since April, 1933 (unpaged), File "Virginia," Publicity Materials, 1933-1942, RG-35, N.A.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.


7 Civilian Conservation Corps Activities in Virginia under Department of Agriculture since April, 1933, File "Virginia," Publicity Materials, 1933-1942, RG-35, N.A.


10 Hands to Save the Soil (Washington: GPO, 1939).

11 Civilian Conservation Corps Activities in Virginia under Department of Agriculture since April, 1933, File "Virginia" Publicity Materials, 1933-1942, RG-35, N.A.

12 Pederson, "Virginia's Forest Resources, Problems and Requirements."
For verification of the large number of NPS camps in Virginia relative to other states see the appendices in the Annual, Special, and Final Reports, RG-35, N.A.; for NPS policy, Donald C. Swain, "The National Park Service and the New Deal, 1933-1940," Pacific Historical Review, vol. XLI (1972), p. 332.


Publicity Remarks of McEntee, May 6, 1940, RG-35, N.A.


Federal Park Areas Where the Civilian Conservation Corps Has Worked in Virginia, RG-35, N.A.

Executive Order 6542.


Federal Park Areas Where the Civilian Conservation Corps Has Worked in Virginia, RG-35, N.A.

Ibid.

Wilbur C. Hall, "Virginia's State Parks," University of Virginia Newsletter, April 15, 1937.


Hall, "Virginia's State Parks."
28. Wirth, Parks, Politics and the People, p. 113.
CHAPTER IV

THE NEW DEAL IN VIRGINIA: FROM TOLERATION TO DERISION

Virginia experienced soil erosion, but it did not have a Dust Bowl; Virginia underwent a depression, but it did not have a Wall Street. For a variety of reasons, the Depression was less severe in Virginia than in other parts of the country. Most of these reasons were economic: during the thirties the Virginia economy was well-diversified and none of the major sources of revenue—agriculture, manufacturing and trade—contributed to more than twenty percent of the state's total revenue. Perhaps even more important, some of the goods produced in Virginia tended to be "Depression-proof." Even in the worst of times, Americans still smoked Virginia tobacco. Additionally, the closeness of Virginia to the nation's capital gave it a geographic advantage over other states. Northern Virginians, lured by the rise of big government, still commuted to Washington in droves. A liberal sprinkling of military installations—including a major port in Norfolk—provided a steady injection of revenue into the state.¹

65
During the thirties the state of Virginia maintained her good credit and kept her finances solvent. Some were poor but the Virginia poor had not cultivated the habit of looking to the government for solutions. Poverty for the few seemed to be one of the ineluctable facts of existence.² Blessed with a well-diversified economy, bolstered by a decades old habit of spending state monies charily, and habituated to depending on themselves for economic survival, Virginia appeared relatively prosperous during the Depression. If the Depression had disrupted the Virginia economy more severely then perhaps Virginians might have come to rely heavily upon federal aid programs. As it was, Virginians did not desire or expect much from the federal government. Massive federal aid programs were a vision that Virginians never shared.

The most influential persons in the state of Virginia never accepted the premises of the early New Deal. Not only did the Organization question the wisdom of continued deficit spending, but never for a moment did the Organization promote the idea of an energetic government. Virginia government may have been honest and efficient but it did not do very much. Senators Glass and Byrd did not believe, as Roosevelt did, that government should "advocate the continuous responsibility of government for human welfare."³ As a result, Roosevelt's programs never
received strong support from the Organization. According to the analysis of James T. Patterson in *Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal*, only five Democratic Senators consistently opposed FDR in 1933-1934. Two of these were Virginia's own. On the basis of key votes, Patterson claims Carter Glass had the most anti-administration vote in the Senate and Harry Byrd, growing into his disaffection, was the Senator with the fifth most anti-administration voting record. Assured of their re-election, Glass and Byrd could afford to speak out against the New Deal with impunity.

When the blue eagle of the National Recovery Administration (NRA) began to circle in Lynchburg, Glass swore round and round that the "black buzzard" would not fly above the door of his newspaper. Although Harry Byrd helped to vote the Agricultural Adjustment Administration into existence in 1933, by the spring of 1934 he was denouncing proposed changes in the AAA that would extend the licensing power of the Secretary of Agriculture and would permit stricter production controls. In Byrd's view, such an amendment would create a "Hitler of American agriculture" (as well as probably restrict the tobacco export business in Virginia).

Led by Glass and Byrd, the Virginia government also resisted New Deal programs. Virginia righteously refused
to provide direct relief to citizens on the grounds that nobody was entitled to something for nothing. Despite the fact that Virginia was the richest state in the South and clearly could afford to contribute its fair share to federal relief programs, by the end of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) in December of 1935, Virginia, with two percent of the nation's population, contributed less than six tenths of one percent to the cost of FERA. In theory, a state was expected to contribute to relief in accordance with its ability to pay but Harry Hopkins, head of FERA, had failed to enforce this requirement in the case of Virginia and he knew it. One federal official stationed in Virginia gave his estimation of the situation to his superiors in Washington:

Its public officials have no particular interest in them (their relief clients) and, in spite of rather ample resources and an excellent financial condition, the leaders in the public life of Virginia have no conviction that the State should bestir itself to help them.⁶

The Virginia General Assembly did its part to defeat legislation inspired by the New Deal. For example, in the 1936 session:

Not one social security or labor bill of importance was passed, and the trash cans were stuffed with defeated bills for unemployment insurance, old-age pensions, old-age assistance, an eight-hour bill for women, a stricter mine safety law, an improved workman's compensation law and a minimum wage law for women and minors.⁷
Virginia gained further notoriety for its "foot-dragging" when it became the last state in the Union to adopt social security legislation.8

Such hostility to the New Deal began to affect the future of the CCC. The first challenge to the survival of the CCC in Virginia was indirect, involving CCC appropriations buried in a $4.88 billion relief bill. In January of 1935 the President asked Congress to pass a $4.88 billion bill to phase out the activities of FERA and to create a new, more ambitious relief program, the Works Progress Administration (WPA). Included in that appropriation were funds necessary for the continued survival of the CCC. The bill passed the House, for economy sentiment in that body did not approach economy sentiment in the Senate until at least 1937, but the relief bill passed over the objections of ten Democratic Representatives—three of them representing the state of Virginia. Congressman Colgate Darden of Norfolk, Congressman Willis Robertson of Lexington, and Congressman Howard Smith of Alexandria all opposed the bill. Their public explanations were straightforward. Darden stated that "Emergencies do not last forever," Robertson pointed out that "My campaign pledge was to work and vote for economy," and Smith added that "The provisions of this bill are an abdication by Congress and delegation to the
None of the Virginia Representatives had singled out the CCC as a target, but all had begun to question the continued deficit spending contemplated by the Administration and FDR's rather "high-handed" approach to fiscal policy. If the rest of the House had voted as these three did, the CCC would have been left without money for continuance.

In the Senate, Carter Glass had more than a little to say about Roosevelt's request for money that failed to specify to the Congress exactly how it was to be spent. As chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Glass felt that to " earmark" appropriations was a sacred duty of the legislature. He announced that the President's bill would be modified.10 Byrd led an attack on the very idea of a relief bill. Reversing an earlier stand on the merit of work relief, Byrd now advocated a dole. A straight dole would eliminate $3 billion from the relief bill, prohibit the creation of the WPA, and endanger the survival of the CCC. Byrd explained his action on the floor of the Senate on February 20, 1935:

Mr. President, we are entering the second phase of our recovery. We are now beginning the sixth year of our war against the depression. The time has come when temporary and emergency legislation should yield to sound principles of gradual reduction in public spending, increasing our markets abroad, and giving confidence to private enterprise to go forward. Mr. President, there is a limit to the credit of even the richest nation in the world. . . .
The defeat of this proposal to expend five billions of dollars on unknown projects, many of no immediate necessity and of doubtful permanent value will do much to restore confidence to those business men anxious to go forward.

Over the objections of three Representatives and both of the Senators from Virginia, the President got his $4.88 billion. The CCC now had money for continuance.\textsuperscript{11} The CCC had not been singled out yet for budgetary cuts, but the future of any federal relief program in Virginia was uncertain after 1935.

Another blow to the acceptance of the CCC in Virginia came in May of 1937 when Representative Clifton Woodrum of Roanoke broke with the Administration. Woodrum gathered a reputation during the New Deal as one of Roosevelt's "first dozen," and a man "perhaps closer to the Administration than any other Virginian in public life."\textsuperscript{12} As a recognized expert on fiscal policy and Democratic ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee, Woodrum wielded considerable power. But Woodrum, while sympathetic to the early New Deal, was not willing to indefinitely straddle Virginia politics and Administration policies. He recommended slashing the Administration's relief budget from $1.5 billion to $1 billion and urged thirty-two agencies to trim ten percent from their 1938 budgets.\textsuperscript{13} After this action, one can say that FDR did not have one powerful friend left in the influential Virginia congressional delegation. The drive for economy in
government, which Woodrum had now joined, could not help but affect the future of the CCC.

In the spring of 1937, FDR asked Congress to make the CCC a permanent institution. In the House of Representatives the CCC failed to win the necessary votes for permanence; but the Senate approved a permanent status for the CCC. In joint conference the houses compromised their differences by agreeing on a three year extension for the CCC. There were some, like Harry Byrd, who would have preferred in 1937 that the CCC be limited to two more years. When Byrd introduced such legislation in 1937 it was defeated, but he did succeed in "freezing" the pay of enrollees for the future at 1937 levels. Byrd's desire for a self-liquidating and inexpensive form of relief was clear.

The year 1937 was a critical year for the CCC because Congress refused to make the CCC a permanent part of government. In Virginia there were still a few like Governor George Peery of Virginia who favored a permanent CCC. But already Woodrum had broken with the New Deal and Byrd had directly attacked the permanence of the CCC.

THE END DRAWS NEAR

If 1937 was a critical year, 1941 was a fatal year for the CCC. The committee that Byrd chaired, the Joint
Committee for the Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, released a report that reflected the increasing prevalence of economy sentiment and wartime fever. The report recommended that because "there is no room for nonessentials in a government stripped for action," such superfluous government operations as the CCC ought to be abolished by July 1, 1942.16

Even though the CCC intended to devote itself entirely to defense-related activities by January 1, 1942, the report of the joint committee maintained that whatever training the CCC provided that was germane to defense could be done better in some other agency. Critics of the CCC charged that its mission was peripheral to the cause of national defense.17

The role of Virginians in the dismantling of the CCC was crucial. Byrd, as Chairman of the Joint Committee, orchestrated the investigation. Also signing the report of the Byrd committee were Carter Glass, chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations and Clifton Woodrum, Democratic ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee. The rest were non-Virginians: Robert L. Doughton, chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means; Walter F. George, chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance; Kenneth McKellar, Democratic ranking member of the Senate Appropriations Committee; Thomas H. Cullen,
Democratic ranking member of the House Ways and Means Committee; and Gerald P. Nye, Republican ranking member of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. Senator George and Senator Nye signed the report with reservations. Representative Robert La Follette Jr., Republican ranking member of the Senate Committee on Finance, filed the only dissent.

In his dissent La Follette objected to the substance of the entire report. Besides recommending termination of the CCC, the report of the joint committee also proposed abolition of the Farm Security Administration (FSA) the farm-tenant program, and the peacetime activities of the National Youth Administration (NYA). Stressing the persistence of both poverty and underprivilege, La Follette urged the government to continue to address these problems and concluded that "the various social programs which the majority of the committee would eliminate are vital to the successful conduct of total war."18

In the Virginia press, the Report of the Joint Committee on Nonessential Federal Expenditures, was not remarked upon at length. Byrd's newspaper, the Winchester Evening-Star, praised the committee for a hearings process "based upon a great deal of factual information, testimony and other documentary evidence." In view of the fact that the conclusions of the joint committee occupied a scant ten
hours, it is understandable why the Evening-Star was not specific on these sources. In Richmond, the Times-Dispatch expressed appreciation for the forthrightness of the joint report issued by the Byrd committee but mused that perhaps it would make more sense to curtail than to abolish the CCC because:

We can't wreck agencies which are capable of doing extremely important work during the war, and strengthening us for the ordeals of peace, without inviting the accusation that we are indulging in a false economy.19

The national press was more suspicious of the motivations underlying the report of the Byrd committee. Newsweek simply repeated the claim that "Byrd, himself a gentleman farmer, was accused of using the war to kill New Deal legislation he previously had been unable to touch." The less circumspect New Republic lambasted the report, "the animating motive is burning hatred of the New Deal and the administration in general." The New Republic failed to understand why the funding of agencies like the FSA, which helped small farmers grow wheat for the war effort, and the TVA, a manufacturer of seventy-five percent of the aluminum used in the production of airplanes, should be eliminated or reduced in the presumed interests of national defense. The New Republic also could not understand why the NYA and the CCC should not continue to provide the valuable educational training they had been contributing to the war
A few days after the release of the Byrd report, the Brookings Institution also released a report advocating the termination of the CCC. Opponents of the CCC had won the day. Byrd appeared as a key witness at the hearings on the termination of the CCC. Reporting to the Senate Committee on Education and Labor as chairman of the Joint Committee on the Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, Byrd attacked the CCC as a waste of money and as an assumption by the federal government of a responsibility which was properly a local responsibility. Byrd also maintained that the CCC contributed to the problem of labor shortages on American farms.

While Byrd was the most visible player, Glass also ardently desired the end of the CCC. Unlike Byrd, Glass never admitted that the CCC had performed a useful function. When the Secretary of the Senate routinely informed the Senator in the fall of 1938 of the accomplishments of the CCC and other relief, public works, and recovery agencies, Glass responded sarcastically:

Thank you for sending me the summary of the great things the federal government has done for the State of Virginia. Nevertheless, I am not unconscious of the fact that what has been done has been done at the expense of the tax-payer of the State and should not have been done except by the definite sanction of those taxpayers and by State rather than federal officials.
Due to illness, Glass could not play as active a part as he might have liked in the move to abolish the CCC.

In the House of Representatives the CCC had also lost its popularity. Of the nine Virginia Representatives, no more than two had ever been counted as enthusiastic New Dealers. Representative Willis Robertson of the House Ways and Means Committee from Lexington, Virginia, explained in 1941 to the press that in the face of an Administration request to cut taxes by $2 billion, the CCC was a logical target for budget-cutting. Clifton Woodrum, at one time the most reliable of Virginia New Dealers, had not only signed the report of the Byrd committee, but in July of 1942 he reminded his colleagues on the floor of the House that "Six months ago it would have been utterly foolish to propose a vote to abolish the Civilian Conservation Corps," but such was not the case in the current emergency. Always economy-minded, Woodrum felt the CCC to be expendable under the added burden of a crisis in American defense.

To the gratification of the Virginia congressional delegation, Congress chose to end the CCC by June 30, 1942. The CCC liquidated itself quicker than the deadline given to it by Congress. Perhaps Carter Glass epitomized the thinking of the Virginia congressional delegation when he wrote to
Senator Kenneth McKeller upon hearing the news:

I am glad to have noted that you have attended to
details in quite a satisfactory way and just as I would
have attended to them had I been there. I am glad that
the Senate concluded to be rid of (the) CCC. It also
should have gotten rid of the Youth Administration.
Both are simply wastes of the taxpayers' funds. 25

OBITUARIES IN THE VIRGINIA PRESS

The obituaries for the CCC in Virginia newspapers
approved of the termination of the CCC. The paper of
Carter Glass, the Lynchburg News, rejoiced that "happily"
the CCC "is no more." 26 The Richmond Times-Dispatch
praised the CCC for its past usefulness and its exemplary
administration but accepted the premise that World War II
had ended the need for the CCC. Perhaps in the postwar
years, in other states, the CCC might be revived—but in
Virginia there was no need because she now had all the
necessary youth programs. During its existence the CCC had
been "one of the most popular of the depression-born
agencies." 27 Another Richmond paper, the News-Leader, had
such high hopes initially for the CCC that it is not
surprising that ultimately it judged the CCC harshly.
The News-Leader bid "au-revoir" to the CCC noting that in
July of 1942, "Sixty thousand youths incredibly remained in
the CCC through all the changes of recent months."
According to the newspaper, the CCC had been nothing more
than a "make-work" agency. The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot viewed the death of the CCC as a wise decision by Congress for "there are better ways to condition America's youth for the duties of the hour than to organize them into reclamation, reforestation and park conservation battalions." The Virginian-Pilot did envision the reappearance of the CCC at some later date by predicting, "Americans may yet have the opportunity of welcoming it back once more, and perhaps as a permanent American institution." The Roanoke World-News agreed that the CCC had been popular and useful, but alas, it had been too expensive, "It has frequently been pointed out that it cost the government more to keep a boy in a CCC camp than it did a Roanoke father to send his son to college." The Alexandria Gazette conceded that the CCC no longer performed the useful function of keeping boys off the street but that it had performed a useful function at the time of its abolition: for both the Army and the Forest Service a skeleton version of the CCC would have continued to be a good thing. The opinion of the Gazette contrasted sharply with the opinion of the CCC shared by the Virginia congressional delegation and the rest of the Virginia press.
Notes for Chapter IV

1 These are the major conclusions in Heineman, "Depression and New Deal in Virginia," pp. 1-14 passim.


4 Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, p. 348. The other three anti-New Deal Senators were Millard E. Tyding of Maryland, Edward R. Burke of Nebraska, and Peter G. Gerry of Rhode Island.

5 Glass to Lippman, August 10, 1933, Carter Glass Papers, Box 4, University of Virginia Alderman Library, quoted in Heinemann, "Depression and New Deal in Virginia," p. 62; Times-Dispatch, May 23, 1934.


9 Times-Dispatch, January 27, 1935.

10 "No one has told us the projects that are to be undertaken. I do not know what kinds of setup the President intends to have. I don't think anybody knows or can tell how the money is to be expended," complained Glass, Times-Dispatch, February 1, 1935. See also Times-Dispatch, February 5 and 6, 1935.
11 Times-Dispatch, February 21, 1935.
13 Times-Dispatch, May 3 and 6, 1937.
15 Peery to Fechner, March 2, 1937, File "Virginia," Correspondence with Governors, 1933-1937, RG-35, N.A.
17 Such was the criticism of the Brookings Institution, New York Times, December 29, 1941. The New York Times also reported, April 18, 1942, that a Gallup Poll indicated the "man on the street" leaned toward curtailment or abolition of the CCC. In response to the question, "Should the CCC in its present form be done away with until the end of the war?" fifty-four percent responded "yes," thirty-seven percent responded "no," and nine percent were "undecided."
19 Evening-Star, March 26, 1941; Times-Dispatch, December 26, 1941.

23. Besides Woodrum, John Flannagan from the mining district of southwestern Virginia also became known as a New Deal advocate.


25. Glass to McKellar, April 8, 1942, Correspondence, 1937-1942, Box 423, Carter Glass Papers, University of Virginia Alderman Library.


27. Times-Dispatch, July 3, 1942.


29. Virginia-Pilot, July 2, 1942.


CONCLUSION

THE VIRGINIA CCC IN RETROSPECT

If popularity and success are indeed valid tests of any democratic government program, then the CCC may be judged on that basis. The CCC has been characterized by former New Dealer Rexford Tugwell as "too popular for criticism," and by scholar John Salmond as "one of the most popular of all the New Deal measures." Researchers at the regional and state levels have corroborated its popularity. In the Northern Rockies it is called "perhaps one of the most popular of the New Deal programs," while in both Utah and New York it emerges as "the most popular" of the New Deal agencies. Almost without exception the various treatments of the CCC exhibit the "glowing approval" that historian Paul Conkin indicates is symptomatic of New Deal scholarship.¹

One single fact ought to dominate all discussion of the popularity of the CCC—no matter how popular it may have been, the CCC was the first major Depression agency to be abolished by Congress. Despite impassioned arguments for the continuation of a skeletal version of the CCC
during World War II as a means to protect Western forests from Japanese incendiary attack and as a means to provide a labor force on military reservations, Congress chose to end this experiment in conservation in 1942. What had happened?

Using Virginia as a focus, I researched this question by looking at editorial reactions toward the CCC in the major Virginia newspapers. As a barometer of popularity, newspapers provide some indication of the general thinking about an issue. They are less insightful when it comes to analyzing the reasons people believe as they do because with their penchant for timeliness they become mired in the thinking of the moment. For an understanding of the motivations of the Byrd Machine, other sources had to be plumbed—notably the public and private statements of Virginia's two most powerful individuals during the New Deal, Senator Glass and Senator Byrd.

The Virginia press extended a generally warm welcome to the CCC in the spring of 1933. Without overt hostility from the Byrd Machine, Virginia editors felt free to praise the CCC as a practical form of conservation, a healthy form of employment, and an appropriate form of relief. Within Virginia government, the CCC won support because it provided jobs to Virginians at little cost to the state, brought money into the state, respected the
prerogatives of the state in matters of selection, benefited private landholders and state lands along with the federal domain, and, in comparison to other states, offered Virginia a generous share in the program. The CCC did not, however, convince the two most powerful men in Virginia of its intrinsic merit. In 1933, Senator Glass can barely be said to have tolerated the CCC while Senator Byrd tolerated the CCC only as long as he felt Virginia was getting her share.

The nine year record of the CCC in Virginia can be evaluated in terms of its accomplishments in the conservation of human and natural resources. These accomplishments included putting 75,000 individuals to work at a time when jobs were scarcer than at any other time in Virginia history. The Virginia CCC succeeded in injecting cash into poor Virginia towns and enabled enrollees to send money to dependents at home. For those who chose to sign up, the CCC offered "three squares," firmer muscles, and an exposure to educational opportunities.

Compared to other states, the Virginia CCC was probably administered as well as most. There were some special problems in Virginia camps such as a high desertion rate and a high incidence of sectional fighting, but other states had problems as well. Farther to the South, Georgia
was particularly lax in the enrollment of blacks. Farther to the West, if South Dakota is any indication, the CCC camps had difficulties keeping enrollees at work through the winter.³

FDR did not question the success of the Virginia camps. Traveling to five Virginia camps in August of 1933 the President remarked, "All you have to do is to look at the boys themselves to see that the camps themselves are a success." Looking at these "boys" almost fifty years later, one cannot help but be struck by the observation that if the Virginia CCC was not a success then why do so many of these former enrollees make annual pilgrimages to celebrate failure?⁴

As practiced by the Virginia CCC, natural resource conservation posed some problems. These problems were the result of the failure of a nationwide program to be tailored to a particular state and the result of larger, more fundamental problems connected with the way in which conservation was realized through the CCC and even the way in which conservation was understood during the New Deal. The gains made by the Virginia CCC in forest fire protection, tree-planting, and recreational development were substantial. The CCC helped to introduce soil conservation techniques to a state badly in need of better land practices. With more C camps in units of the National Park Service than in any other state, the CCC rendered these
units vastly more accessible to the public. The CCC also played a formative role in the launching of the historic preservation efforts of the NPS. Finally, the land purchased in Virginia by both the federal government and the state led to the consolidation of federal lands and the establishment of a state park system.

Salmond's explanation for the failure of the CCC to win continuance in Congress centers around the seeming irrelevance of the CCC in the wake of economic recovery and the imperatives of a world war. These are surely a large part of the explanation. A close look at Virginia suggests an additional explanation. The opposition to the New Deal so forcefully felt by Virginia politicians caused them to not only "sour" on the New Deal but impelled them as well to try to "roll-back" the New Deal when conditions were opportune. The first success was the abolition of the CCC. The committee that Byrd chaired, the Joint Committee for the Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, made little attempt to conceal its intent in its supplemental report:

The committee notes especially the abolition by the Congress of the Civilian Conservation Corps. This was recommended by the committee, and it marks the first complete dismantling of a major depression agency. The Civilian Conservation Corps had spent $2,278,000,000 in eight and one-half years.

The Byrd Machine broke with the New Deal because
the New Deal emphasized Presidential power at the expense of state's rights and increased the indebtedness of government without apparently improving its workings. But most of all, the Byrd Machine rejected the New Deal because it embodied a philosophy of government that conflicted with its own. Roosevelt, according to one of his Cabinet officials, "did not like to make a recommendation not to do something. He liked to recommend things to be done." His public justification was, "Better the occasional faults of a Government that lives in a spirit of charity than the consistent omissions of a Government frozen in the ice of its own indifference." While undoubtably FDR relished his role as both broker and brandisher of power, without question he also believed in a positive federal state.

Quite simply, the Byrd Machine did not advocate a positive federal state: the federal government ought to be limited. The Byrd Machine was more interested in the occasional faults of the government than in its spirit of charity. Understandably, the Byrd Machine also worried about the effect of the intrusion of the federal government on the hegemony of the Organization. One contemporary maintained that the Organization looked upon federal relief as "a night stick to beat the states with."

For reasons of both principle and self-interest,
the Byrd Machine tried to subvert the New Deal. The success of Harry Byrd in orchestrating the demise of the CCC in 1942 was his first success in an assault upon New Deal programs. Others in Congress shared his views but the particular success of the committee investigation chaired by Byrd has to be explained not only by reference to returning prosperity and an impending war, but also by reference to the persistent efforts of Harry F. Byrd to undo the New Deal. The effectiveness of Byrd's opposition is perhaps best explained by what one historian has called the "genius of negative statecraft," a Southerner's forte:

Who can deny that the real genius of the Southern politician, both in Congress and elsewhere, is a genius of negative statecraft—of parliamentary skill and legislative mastery used to delay, to enact, to build—and that this more often than not is the very embodiment of conservative hopes.9

Byrd, along with the rest of the Virginia congressional delegation, got what they wanted with the abolition of the CCC. And if the press is any indication, Virginians did not mourn the loss. Indeed, requisitions for enrollees were becoming hard to fill in the spring of 1942.10

The CCC lies dead but not forgotten in Virginia. Former enrollees still remember it with fondness; a highway map still attests to the multiplicity of work projects. While the fact of its death does not detract from the
considerable success the CCC had in the conservation of human and natural resources within Virginia certainly the end of the CCC stands as an indication of the effectiveness of the anti-New Deal fervor present among the Virginia elite. Through its successor agencies—the Job Corps, The Youth Conservation Corps, and the Young Adult Corps—the concept behind the CCC is still alive. Currently there is even a bill in Congress to revive the CCC.
Notes for Chapter V


2Termination of the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Youth Administration, Hearings Before the Committee on Education and Labor, United States Senate, 77th Congress, Second Session, on S. 2295. A Bill to Provide for the Termination of the National Youth Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps, March 23 to April 17, 1942 (Washington: GPO, 1942) pp. 253-301; Salmond. The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942, p. 213.

3For a discussion of discrimination in Georgia see Michael S. Holmes, "The New Deal and Georgia's Black Youth, Journal of Southern History, XXXVii (August 1972), pp. 433-460 and Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps, pp. 88-90; for a mention of what the Director of the CCC labeled "Camp Crook" in South Dakota because no work was required of enrollees for four months in the winter of 1935, see Minutes, September 8, 1936, p. 19, RG-35, N.A.

4New York Times, August 13, 1933; for example, the annual reunions at Big Meadows in Shenandoah are the oldest continuously meeting CCC in America.


10. A call in April of 1942 for 818 white and 450 black enrollees could not possibly be filled, wired the Virginia supervisor of CCC selection to the U.S. Department of Labor. It would probably be more reasonable to expect 100 white and 75 black enrollees. E. R. McKesson to Frank Persons, April 1, 1942, File "Enrollment, August 1941-end," Correspondence with State Selection Agencies, 1933-1942 (VA), RG-35, N.A.
Important Dates in the CCC

March 9, 1933----FDR outlines CCC plan to Cabinet.

March 21, 1933----FDR proposes CCC legislation to Congress.

March 31, 1933----FDR signs CCC bill. Receives "blanket authority."

April 5, 1933-----Robert Fechner, a vice-president of the AF of L, is appointed Director of the CCC.

April 7, 1933-----Selection of enrollees begun.

April 17, 1933-----Camp Roosevelt in George Washington National Forest, Virginia becomes the first C camp in nation.

April 22, 1933-----"Local experienced men" (LEM) are employed as technical assistants.

May 11, 1933-----FDR issues Executive Order No. 6129 authorizing the enrollment of 25,000 war veterans.

July 15, 1933-----CCC reaches its quota of 300,000 enrollees.

August 13, 1933----Virginia has forty-nine camps.

April 8, 1935-----FDR signs $4.88 billion relief bill. Despite opposition by the Virginia congressional delegation, the CCC has money for continuance.

August 31, 1935----Nationally, CCC enrollment reaches an all-time high of 520,000 men.

May 28, 1937-----House and Senate conferees agree to a three year extension of the CCC.
July 1, 1939------Congress makes the CCC a part of the Federal Security Agency, thereby giving official recognition of the CCC as primarily a training agency. CCC is continued until June 30, 1943.

December 24, 1941--Byrd committee recommends abolition of the CCC.

January 1, 1942------CCC commits itself to an "all-out" defense program.

May 4, 1942--------FDR asks for one year extension of CCC.

June 10, 1942------Virginia has only nineteen C camps—the majority located on military reservations.

June 30, 1942------Congress ends the CCC.
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Records in the National Archives, Washington

The records of the Civilian Conservation Corps, Record Group 35, are located in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. The most recent guide to these holdings is Douglas Helms, Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Civilian Conservation Corps (Washington: National Archives and Records Service, 1980).

A state study of the CCC properly begins with the Camp Inspection Reports, 1933-1942. In the boxes marked "Virginia" are the periodic and the special reports made by CCC inspectors, investigations of the C camps by the Army, and the statements of camp educational advisors. There are 162 files for Virginia camps. An especially valuable source is Copies of Illustrated Narrative Reports of National Park Service Camps, 1933-1935. Contained within this collection is a colorful account of the activities of the C camps in Colonial National Historical Monument in its beginning years; unfortunately, no such account exists for Shenandoah National Park. A geographical perspective on Virginia camps is available in Camp Directories, 1933-1940; and Camp Location Maps for the Third Corps Area, 1939-1940. A short film, "A Day in Virginia Camps," is one of two films made for the CCC in Informational Motion Pictures, 1934.

Local data on the Virginia CCC is present in Letters of Instruction to Local Selecting Agents, 1938-1942; and Local Procedural Records, 1936-1940. The involvement of the Commonwealth of Virginia in the CCC can be examined in the Virginia portions of General Correspondence, 1933-1942 (300); Correspondence with Governors, 1933-1937; Correspondence with State Selecting Agencies, 1933-1942; State Procedural Records, 1933-1942; State Procedural Manuals, 1935-1942; and State's Plan of Operation for CCC Selection, 1937-1942.

Success in the conversation of human and natural resources is addressed in the Virginia files of Benefit
Letters, 1934-1942; Success Stories, 1936-1941; Success Stories, 1939; and Publicity Materials 1933-1942. Other Virginia data can be found in Personal Correspondence of the Director, 1933-1939; and Reports of Field Trips, 1935-1941.

A handy guide to both the chronology of the CCC and the CCC documents themselves is the Index to Reference File. Invaluable for an understanding of the day-to-day operations of the CCC are the Minutes of the Advisory Council to the Director, 1933-1942. The achievement of the CCC is enumerated in the Annual, Special, and Final Reports. The conservation philosophy of the various agencies participating in the CCC is revealed in Publications, 1933-1942.

Records in the Manuscript Room of the University of Virginia Alderman Library, Charlottesville

For isolating the opinion of Carter Glass toward the CCC, his papers are the best source. I could find no public statement made by Glass critical of the CCC. At the University of Virginia I found the most useful boxes in the Carter Glass Papers to be Box 345, Box 383, and Box 423. There is no particular logic to these boxes, although there is an updated inventory by Kincaid available in the Manuscript room. The papers of Harry F. Byrd, also available at the University of Virginia Library, and also well-indexed, were not consulted for the reason that Byrd made many public statements which revealed his attitude toward the CCC.

Records in the Virginia State Library and the Virginia State Archives, Richmond

The Executive Papers of the three Governors of Virginia during the tenure of the CCC are of declining usefulness. The Executive Papers of Governor Pollard, 1930-1934, Box 33, Federal Affairs, contain five files on the CCC. The Executive Papers of Governor Peery (1934-1938), Box 17, Conservation and Development, contain a single file on the CCC, Box 154, Federal Affairs, in which problems of the Virginia CCC are discussed. The least useful of all these papers were the Executive Papers of Governor Price—only one mention of the CCC could be found here, and it was insignificant.
The collection of Virginia newspapers, 1933-1942, in the Virginia State Library is the best collection in the state (and better than the collection in the periodicals room of the Library of Congress). Available in microfilm are the Alexandria Gazette, the Lynchburg News, the Norfolk-Virginian Pilot, the Richmond News-Leader, the Richmond Times-Dispatch, the Roanoke World-News, and the Winchester Evening-Star.

Oral History: Personal interviews and the Shenandoah Oral History Project

I tape-recorded two interviews with former enrollees of Virginia camps in the fall of 1981. The first interview was with Ray Evans, an alumni of the CCC camp at Fort Hunt, Virginia; the second interview was a joint interview with John V. Coxe and James Heeter, alumni of the CCC camps of Shenandoah National Park. The tapes are in my possession. In the process of being transcribed are the five interviews about the CCC in the Shenandoah Oral History Project, available at the Harry F. Byrd Visitor Center, Shenandoah National Park. To date, three interviews have been transcribed: James Heeter, Colonel Joseph W. Koch, and a joint interview with Edward Scott and Russell Barlow. These interviews are conducted by the interviewer to prove a point, namely that the inhabitants of the Blue Ridge were not a backward people. Because of this the interviews are lacking in objectivity. In addition to this, I also talked with Wally Reynolds, Executive Director of the National Association of Civilian Conservation Corps Alumni, in Manassas, Virginia, about his recollections as an assistant educational advisor and about the CCC alumni organization. I received letters from numerous former enrollees wanting to share their memories of the CCC. I also attended the annual reunion of the CCC camps of Shenandoah in the fall of 1981. Almost without exception, former enrollees everywhere tended to speak well of the CCC.

Published Documents

For copies of the Executive Orders adding lands to the federal domain through the appropriation of CCC funds, before 1936, the vault of the Federal Register in Washington is one place to go. For copies of Executive Orders dated 1936 to 1938, see the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 3: The President, 1936-1938 Compilation (Washington: GPO, 1968). No lands were added after 1938. The Congressional Record, 1933-1942, is a useful source for
finding the Virginia congressional delegation on record, but it must be used with caution in researching the CCC since so many of the important votes on matters affecting the CCC were not roll call votes.

Three of the most important hearings affecting the CCC were: Unemployment Relief: Joint Hearings Before the Committee on Education and Labor, United States Senate, and the Committee on Labor, House of Representatives, 73rd Congress, First Session, on S. 598, March 23 and 24, 1933 (Washington: GPO, 1933); To Make the Civilian Conservation Corps a Permanent Agency: Hearings Before the Committee on Labor, House of Representatives, 76th Congress, First Session, on H.R. 2990, February 9, 23, and 24, 1939 (Washington: GPO, 1941); and Termination of the of the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Youth Administration, Hearings Before the Committee on Education and Labor, United States Senate, 77th Congress, Second Session, on S. 2295: A Bill to Provide for the Termination of the National Youth Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps, March 23 to April 17, 1942 (Washington: GPO, 1942). Important not only because of the membership of three Virginians on the committee, but also because of the influence the committee wielded in Congress, are the findings of the Byrd committee: Preliminary Report of the Joint Committee on the Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, Congress of the United States, 77th Congress, First Session, Document 152 (Washington: GPO, 1941); Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, Congress of the United States, 77th Congress, First Session, Pursuant to Section 601 of the Revenue Act of 1941, Parts 1 to 4, November 28, December 1, 2, and 4, 1941 (Washington: GPO, 1942); and the report apparently overlooked by Salmond in his study of the CCC, Supplemental Report of the Joint Committee on the Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, Congress of the United States, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document No. 152, Pursuant to Section 601 of the Revenue Act of 1941, Part 2 (Washington: GPO, 1942).

Secondary Sources

The best general introduction to the CCC is John A. Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942: A New Deal Case Study (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1967). Salmond's research is thorough,
his synthesis is good, and his conclusions are reasonable. The title of his study is, however, a misnomer. Salmond does not compare the CCC to other New Deal agencies as his title might suggest, but rather bases his study upon a close examination of the CCC records in the National Archives. Much of the information used by Salmond is also present in two earlier, unpublished works: James Russell Woods, "The Legend and the Legacy of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC)" (Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1964); and John J. Saalberg, "Roosevelt, Fechner and the Civilian Conservation Corps: A Study in Executive Leadership" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1962). These two studies proceed on rather different assumptions. Woods attempts to analyze the role of FDR in the CCC, or as he phrases it in his introduction, "the story of its rise, run, and fall in relation to its creator," while Saalberg argues that FDR was more important in establishing the CCC than in administering the CCC (p. 208).


Conflicting interpretations of the role of the Army in the CCC can be found in Charles W. Johnson, "The Civilian Conservation Corps: The Role of the Army" (Ph.D dissertation, University of Michigan, 1968); and George P. Rawick, "The New Deal and Youth: The Civilian Conservation Corps, the National Youth Administration and the American Youth Congress" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1957). Johnson defends the participation of the Army by flatly asserting that the Army "did not abuse its power" (abstract), while Rawick makes the claim that the Army entered the CCC through "mindlessness" and monopolized the CCC organization, even transferring their racist and fascist tendencies to it (pp. 382-384). According to
Rawick, the National Youth Administration (NYA), free from Army involvement, represented the liberal impulses of the New Deal. Michael S. Holmes, "The New Deal and Georgia’s Black Youth," Journal of Southern History, XXXVIII (August, 1972), also judges the success of the CCC by comparing it to the NYA. Holmes finds the NYA to be less discriminatory to blacks than the CCC in Georgia. The only other recent critical judgment by a scholar on the success of the CCC that I found is Robert W. Dubay, "The Civilian Conservation Corps: A Study of Opposition, 1933-1935," Southern Quarterly, 6 (April, 1968). Dubay is critical of the success of the CCC because of its high desertion rate. The story of opposition could profitably be researched past 1935.

There is currently no adequate discussion of the participation and accomplishments of either the Department of Agriculture or the Department of the Interior in the CCC. Nor is there a study of the veterans in the CCC. Blacks in the CCC are the subject of John A. Salmond, "The Civilian Conservation Corps and the Negro," Journal of American History, LII (June, 1965); and Charles W. Johnson, "The Army, the Negro and the Civilian Conservation Corps: 1933-1942," Military Affairs, 36 (October, 1972). Both of these articles present findings contained in their larger studies already cited. Donald Lee Parman, "The Indian Civilian Conservation Corps" (Ph.D dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1967), is a study of a neglected area of research. Parman shatters the justification of the CCC on the basis of its orientation to the outdoors life when he claims that "The former enrollees who have really prospered now work in factories in Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Wichita, Kansas City or urban centers on the West Coast" (p. 244). Elmo Richardson concludes in "Was There Politics in the Civilian Conservation Corps?", Journal of Forest History, LII (June, 1965), that partisan politics played very little part in the CCC. His article is mislabeled; obviously there was politics in the CCC. What he really concentrates on is patronage. But even on this basis Richard’s analysis is questionable because not only did the CCC vary enough from state to state that he would have had to examine the workings of the CCC in all the states to come to such a conclusion, but there are clear indications that partisan politics and patronage were involved. In Johnson’s study of the Army and the CCC he mentions that Julian N. Friant, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture, "cleared the names of personnel to be appointed to the CCC camps with the Democratic Congressmen from that area" (p. 205).
Education in the CCC has a large bibliography. Many of the CCC educational advisors chose the CCC as the subject of their graduate theses and dissertations. A relatively recent article is Calvin W. Gower, "The Civilian Conservation Corps and American Education: Threat to Local Control?", History of Education Quarterly, 7 (Spring, 1967). Perhaps the most authoritative study is Frank Ernest Hill. The School in the Camps: The Educational Program of the Civilian Conservation Corps (New York: American Association for Adult Education, 1935). Hill visited CCC camps around the nation and reported directly to the CCC Advisory Council. Although Hill tries to objectively discuss problems in individual camps, he is not himself free from prejudice when he argues against the use of classroom teachers in the CCC because he "is more likely to carry the habits of formal education soul deep and if he does he will be a misfit in the CCC" (p. 19).

A partisan account of the CCC from the second Director of the CCC is James J. McEntee, Now They Are Men: The Story of the CCC (Washington: National Home Library Foundation, 1940). Alfred Cockman Oliver and Harold Dudley, This New America: The Story of the CCC (New York: Longman, 1937) is premature. Intended for public consumption is Ray Hoyt, We Can Take It!: A Short Story of the CCC (New York: American Book Company, 1935). Helen M. Walker, CCC Through the Eyes of 272 Boys: A Summary of a Group Study of the Reactions of 272 Cleveland Boys to Their Experiences in the Civilian Conservation Corps (Cleveland: Western Reserve University Press, 1938), is based on honest information. The summary presents the results of the work of ten graduate students in the School of Applied Social Sciences at Western Reserve University who interviewed at their homes a group of enrollees discharged from the CCC between March and October of 1936. A dissertation expanded into a book is Charles P. Harper, The Administration of the Civilian Conservation Corps (Clarksburg, West Virginia: Clarksburg Publishers, 1939). As the title suggests, Harper's is an administrative analysis, but it was written well before the date of publication. A study that was strongly influenced by the guidance movement which critically analyzes the CCC but concludes with praise is Kenneth Holland and Frank Ernest Hill, Youth and the CCC (Washington: American Council on Education, 1942).

Studies of the CCC in particular states are increasingly in vogue. At the dissertation level are James Hansen "The Civilian Conservation Corps in the Northern Rocky Mountains" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wyoming, 1973); Kenneth W. Baldridge, "Nine Years of Achievement: The Civilian Conservation Corps in Utah" (Ph.D. dissertation, Utah State, 1971); George Barrett Potter, "The Civilian Conservation Corps in New York State: Its Social and Political Impact (1933-1942)" (Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1973). Hanson's study is the least useful of the three because he is too defensive of the program. Baldridge concludes in his study that the most important contribution of the CCC was not "the developing of resources or ... monuments to conservation and recreation," but the making of men (p. 362). This assertion is difficult to prove and Baldridge has not managed to make a convincing case. The best study of the three is Potter's study of the CCC because Potter discusses the successes of the CCC in the light of its failures in New York. Potter admits, for example, that the flood control work done by the CCC on the Waskill River was a fiasco and discusses the charge made by the Association for the Protection of the Adirondacks that the CCC was destroying the "forever wild" character of Adirondack State Park.
Potter also discusses the reasons that Representative Snell and Representative Taber opposed the CCC. In sum, these three studies help to fill in a gap in the history of the CCC—too often approached from the national perspective to the exclusion of the view from the states. An excellent study of the work done by the CCC in Maine is available in Harvey Paul McGuire, "The Civilian Conservation Corps in Maine" (M.A. thesis, University of Maine, 1966). McGuire's thesis deals almost exclusively with work projects and thus is a narrower study than the dissertations mentioned.

State studies of the CCC published as magazine articles include Hubert Humphrey's, "In a Sense Experimental: The Civilian Conservation Corps in Louisiana," Louisiana History, 5 and 6 (Fall, 1964 and Winter 1965); Kenneth E. Hendrickson Jr., "The Civilian Conservation Corps in Pennsylvania: A Case Study of a New Deal Relief Agency in Operation," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, C (January, 1976); and Reid Holland, "Life in Oklahoma's Civilian Conservation Corps," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 48 (Summer, 1970). The Louisiana study is the most comprehensive because Humphrey deals with both the conservation of human and natural resources. He is most helpful in his discussion of natural resource conservation, concluding that "From approximately nine years of CCC operation, Louisiana emerged with a new forest condition, a comprehensive erosion control program on a permanent basis, significant rehabilitation work on independent drainage systems affecting agricultural lands and an improved system of levee roads to facilitate flood control" (pp. 366-367). The Pennsylvania analysis concludes that the CCC was an effective work relief program but deals insightfully with the problems of administration—particularly those occasioned by the involvement of the Army. The Oklahoma discussion is limited because the author bases his conclusions almost exclusively on Camp Inspection Reports. A brief treatment of the CCC in Alaska, discussing the work of the CCC in the revival of the totem pole culture of the Haida and Tlingit tribes, is Virgil Heath and John Clark Hunt, "Alaska CCC Days," Alaska Journal, 3 (Spring, 1972). Donald Tanascora, "Six Months in Garden Valley," ed. Elmo Richardson, Idaho Yesterdays, II (Summer, 1967), is a reminiscence by a former enrollee from New York City stationed in the wilds of Idaho in the fall of 1939. Elmo Richardson writes about the limited success of the state park system developed by the CCC in New Mexico in, "The Civilian
Conservation Corps and the Origins of the New Mexico State Park System," *Natural Resources Journal*, 6 (April, 1966). Localized studies include Reid Holland, "The Civilian Conservation Corp in the City: Tulsa and Oklahoma City in the 1930's," *Chronicles of Oklahoma*, 43 (Fall, 1975); Michael J. Ober, "The CCC Experience in Glacier National Park," *Montana, The Magazine of Western History* (July, 1976). Most of these entries can be found in Ronald J. Fahl, *North American Forest and Conservation History: A Bibliography* (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio Press, 1977). As is inevitable with bibliographies, Fahl's is growing out of date. In a few instances, this usually reliable bibliography is incorrect or leads the reader astray. For example, Harold T. Pinkett's description of CCC records in "Records in the National Archives Relating to the Civilian Conservation Corps," is incorrectly listed as having appeared in the *Social Science Review* instead of the *Social Service Review* (there is no such periodical as the *Social Science Review*). An example of a "dead-end" article not really related to the CCC, although it was listed as such, is Fern Berry, "Unchanging Land: The Jack-Pine Plains of Michigan."


An understanding of Virginia during the New Deal can be pieced together from three ideologically distinct works. Robert Thomas Cochran "Virginia's Opposition to the New Deal, 1933-1940" (M.A. thesis, Georgetown University, 1950), is a defense of the Byrd Machine: "The present Organization is in no way similar to an ordinary political machine. Essentially it is the vehicle for class rule in Virginia, and the benefits of class rule in this instance far outweigh its negative tendencies" (p. ii). Despite the bias, the thesis is worthwhile. In volume 2 of John Braeman ed., *the New Deal* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1975), appears a chapter by Robert Hunter, "Virginia and the New Deal," it has the advantage of being published. A comprehensive treatment of the New Deal in Virginia is Ronald L. Heinemann, "Depression and the New Deal in Virginia" (Ed.D. dissertation, University of
Virginia, 1968). Heinemann attempted to answer the question, "To what extent did the depression and/or the New Deal change the face of Virginia, her people, her economy, her politics?" (Introduction). His answer to that question is "very little." Heinemann concludes that Virginia was more affected by the Civil War and even World War II than the New Deal. He argues that the Virginia of 1939 was similar to the Virginia of 1929 and that "liberalism did not replace phlegmatic conservatism, Keynesianism did not replace the balanced budget, and rugged individualism remained the dominant social philosophy. It was if the intervening years had disappeared from view, a decade misplaced in memory" (pp. 267-268).


A good introduction to the life of Carter Glass appears in Current Biography, 1941 ed., s.v. "Glass, Carter T." Contemporaries of Glass wrote two biographies: James E. Palmer, Carter Glass Unreconstructed Rebel (Roanoke: The Institute for American Biography, 1938); Rixey Smith and Norman Beasley, Carter Glass: A Biography (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1939). Neither study is definitive as Glass himself was aware when he called Palmer's book "amateurish," and when he expressed amazement that Rixey Smith, his aid, had been supposedly writing a biography for five years but "has never asked me a question about myself" (Glass to Jesse H. Jones, October 13, 1938, Box 383, Carter Glass Papers, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville). Perhaps the dearth of competent political biography has been remedied by a recent dissertation, Alfred Cash Koeniger, "Unreconstructed Rebel: The Political Thought and Senate Career of Carter Glass," 1929-1936 (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1980).


The role of Virginians as conservatives opposed to the New Deal is an integral part of the story in James-T. Patterson, *Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress,*


A fascinating study of poverty and seclusion in the Blue Ridge is a report by a research team from the University of Chicago, Thomas R. Henry and Sherman Mandel, *Hollow Folk* (Berryville, Virginia: Virginia Book Company, 1933). An account of a resort that is closely connected with the history of Shenandoah Park and to a lesser extent with the CCC is George Freeman Pollock, *Skyland: The Heart of the Shenandoah National Park*, ed. Stuart E. Brown Jr., (U.S.A.: Chesapeake Book Company, 1960). On the
work of the CCC on the Skyline Drive see Henry Heatwole, Guide to the Skyline Drive (Luray, Virginia: Shenandoah Natural History Association, 1978).


Mountain; Aldo Leopold and the Evolution of an Ecological Attitude Toward Deer, Wolves, and Forests (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1974), is useful but long-winded.

