Efforts toward European intervention on the eve of the Spanish-American War

Minter Robert Rutherford
The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation
Rutherford, Minter Robert, "Efforts toward European intervention on the eve of the Spanish-American War" (1939). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 2201.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/2201

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.
EFFORTS TOWARD EUROPEAN INTERVENTION
ON THE EVE OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

by

MINTER ROBERT RUTHERFORD, JR.

B.A., MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY, 1936

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master
in the College of Arts.

MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY

1939

Approved:

J. MILLER
Chairman of Board
of Examiners.

W. G. BALMER
Chairman of Committee
on Graduate Study.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I  The Scene</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Briefly the Events Leading to War</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III The Intrigues of Intervention</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Material Interests Found Dominant</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE

In the months directly preceding the Spanish-American War there were recurring proposals that the Great Powers—England, France, Russia, Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary—should join in a concerted action for the purpose of intimidating the United States. It appeared probable that the United States, in order to advance the cause of independence in Cuba, would soon go to the length of inciting war with Spain. There were offered by Spain certain intangible reasons why this possibility should be resisted. It is seen here, however, that there were other more influential considerations tending to restrain the Powers from such intervention. For this step would most certainly have had as its result a diversion of the commerce, and an alienation of the friendship of the United States.

This paper is a study of the manner in which these suggestions for intervention were broached in the various Foreign Offices. More particularly it notes the contrast between the sincere but barren solicitude which the Powers displayed for Spain's cause, and yet the constant efforts to avoid becoming so deeply involved in any scheme that their relations with the United States might be impugned were it to become known.

The material was derived primarily from European sources and incorporates a portion of the contemporary press reports upon this topic. As it is not concerned with the purely domestic
American ramifications nor with the subsequent military events, it is essentially a record of the European reaction to a diplomatic episode which was inherently portentous for the United States of forty years ago, and from which there may be derived observations pertinent to present international affairs.
I.

The revolt for independence which broke out in the eastern provinces of the Spanish island of Cuba in February of 1895 was by no means unique nor unanticipated. There had been numerous such attempts through a period of many years. The most of them had in some manner been associated with partisans in the United States, or had been directed toward obtaining the recognition and support of the United States.

The welfare and political status of Cuba had always been of concern to the United States. Jefferson and several of his immediate successors had expressed succinctly the particular public interest of the United States in the future of Cuba. They stated that Cuba was a natural appendage to the United States, and that it would never be permitted that she should be the possession of any other European state but Spain.¹

The powers of Europe had long displayed an interest in the Spanish control of Cuba. There had been recurring proposals, as through the period of the Carlist Wars, to sell Cuba to France or to England.² At one time then, and later at the middle of the century in the midst of the Lopez filibustering expeditions, conversations were begun attempting to induce the United States to jointly guarantee with France and England the dependent position of Cuba.³ Then came the incidents of the Soule mission, and the Ostend Manifesto which was such a bald and unpoltic statement of American aims as to leave European councils quite nonplussed.⁴ Through the Civil War Cuba was of considerable
domestic significance in connection with the chances of it becoming a slave territory. In Grant's administration, which roughly coincided with the period of the desultory Ten Years War in Cuba, there occurred other events with European ramifications. Secretary of State Fish even requested that the powers of Europe consult with Spain or go the length of intervening in Cuba, to the end that the United States would not be alone in facing the anarchy of that island.\(^5\)

Toward the end of the century the material interests of the United States in Cuba together with implied and assumed responsibilities were of too preponderant a character to be denied. The perfection of the Caribbean policy of the United States with the lately projected isthmian canal made it obligatory that the United States scrutinize the events in any of the West Indian islands—from simply a general strategic care that no threatening element should be introduced.\(^6\) Somewhat in the same spirit it was of concern to the United States that the tranquillity of Cuba—with her population of a million and a half, the majority of them illiterate natives, and one-third of them negro\(^7\)—be not too long nor too violently disturbed. Finally, there were immense financial investments in Cuba, mainly in sugar plantations and railroads. One season of civil conflict with its attendant neglect of crops and pillage and destruction was sufficient to adversely affect the value and security of investments.\(^8\)

Besides these factors which had long been valid indications
of the interest of the United States in Cuba there were at this time transitory and more special points. Important was the fact that now, in the late nineties, the United States seemed to have arrived at a period in her national growth when she was ready to engage in some activity of foreign or imperial connotation. Then there was that chance of circumstance such that two newspaper publishers in New York had an undue influence on public opinion; the violences and tragedies of Cuba were colored and perverted to stimulate the circulation of their respective papers. Also a condition of the period (though far from novel in its general terms) was that of politics. As war became a more and more popular topic and prospect with the people of the United States the two parties vied with each other in claiming its promotion. And at this moment it also seemed opportune to distract attention from a matter which had become moot and politically dangerous, that of currency and finance.

Thus because of its undoubted essential and intrinsic importance to the United States and because of its susceptibilities to the current needs of politics and private interests, the revolt in Cuba received immediate and sustained notice in America. But not so in European circles. The bloody but internal troubles of Cuba together with the policies of Spain were of but minor interest to a Europe which had its own pressing complications. The powers of Europe too had colonies and dependent peoples. There were atrocities to be found nearer at home and scandals right at home.
Great Britain was now in a period when she wished to forget her troubles; she was attempting to devote her full and joyous attention to the significance of the Golden Jubilee. Her soliloquy was being constantly interrupted. The border tribes of India and Afghanistan would not remain pacified. The Jameson fiasco was still hanging fire. There was talk again about reclaiming the Nile. As for France, she was pleased with her Russian Entente and there were state visits of dignitaries every now and then. But she was disturbed by the "Affaire Dreyfus" which would not be dispersed. Germany had a navy now of really imposing proportions; the Kaiser was still making speeches. And if in nothing else the Germans seemed to be absorbed in domestic topics such as agricultural economics. Not much was heard at this time from Italy. In a manner this was proper for the Italians were not recovered from the setback administered them in Ethiopia a year or so previously. Austria alone appeared to have little to depend upon for drama except perhaps the doings of the House Hapsburg. Russia was completely intrigued by the Orient. Indeed that was a fascinating region to all the Powers. The Japanese had but recently displayed the latent opportunities in China.13

China was only one place of mutual interest, and of mutual distrust, to all Europeans. The other was the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey for years had given trouble. Now it was not with the Armenians but rather with the Greeks and the Cretans. The Concert of Europe, appealed to, was making little headway
in disposing the contentions. In fact, the Concert of Europe was giving a most revealing preview of the manner in which it was to act when called upon next season by the Spaniards.

On the whole the preliminary period of the rebellion in Cuba was not looked upon by Europe as being of major significance. When it came, even the news of the discovery of gold in the Yukon was a more brilliant and sustaining topic.

However, as the months passed and the Spanish troops, sent to Cuba in really phenomenal numbers, appeared to be more than usually ineffective and as it began to appear that the United States was taking a sordid interest in the cause of the insurgents which might soon lead her to adopt more than an impartial attitude—then did the powers of Europe begin to realize how a break in the relations of Spain and the United States could affect their own horizons. The loss of a war would obviously affect the political strength of Spain and of her dynasty. It would be of portentous influence upon the financial credits and abilities of one of the already precarious debtors of Europe. Such a war would mark another advance of new-world and democratic institutions. And any alteration of the position of the United States so as to imply her entrance into the affairs of Europe (it being presumed that Cuba, being Spanish, came within this province), would materially disrupt the then stable balance of powers.

Thus the relations of Cuba, the United States and eventually Spain did become a concern of the powers of Europe. But
when all the events relating to the war and the comments elicited in Europe are reviewed, two general observations are apparent. First, that war came to be taken as inevitable by Europe, inasmuch as the United States perforce had to obtain some manner of satisfaction in regard to Cuba, and Spain, politically beset, could offer no other recourse. Secondly, it was perceived at this time that the United States was of greater material value to Europe than was Spain and that the United States had arrived to such an estate as to be above the advices or threats of Europe.
II.

It is pertinent now to follow the European reaction to the conditions and events which culminated in the breaking-off of relations between the United States and Spain in April of 1898. It is found that there existed little general attention for the Cuban situation until the fall of 1897. The earliest comments dealt only with such simple observations as that "the long drawn out war in Cuba is enough to exhaust a richer country than Spain,"¹⁵ and "a very critical moment for Spain is looming in the near future . . . . A further continuance of the present state of affairs is clearly impossible."¹⁶ In fact, in July, 1897, when Ambassador White in Berlin was requested to report as to "the sentiments of the German Government and people regarding the action of the United States in relation of Spanish affairs," he was unable to report a single item of substance.¹⁷

However, there had been several incidents since the outbreak of the insurrection in Cuba early in 1895 which, though inconclusive and unnoticed, may be mentioned here. In April of 1896 Secretary of State Olney had addressed a note to the Spanish Minister in Washington, Dupuy de Lome, commenting upon the lack of progress of the Spanish forces in putting down the insurgents and offering the good offices of the United States.¹⁸ Spain politely demurred with the sentiment that "there is no effectual way to pacify Cuba apart from the actual submission of the armed rebels to the mother country."¹⁹ The matter was
left thus until December of that year when Cleveland made the matter of relations with Cuba the central point in his Message to Congress. Vigorous as his attitude was, yet it was without weight, for it was but three months till the Republicans would be entering office.

McKinley was not at all hasty in altering such policy as had been established by the preceding administration. His first effort was made in June of 1897. At that time Secretary of State Sherman directed to the Spanish Foreign Office a strong protest "in the name of the American people and in the name of common humanity" against the cruelties and violence then rife in Cuba. Spain replied in a manner again calculated to be evasive and unsatisfying that she expected "to persevere in this system" and that the United States could be more helpful by suppressing such insurrectionary and unneutral aids as the filibustering expeditions and juntas. It was then determined to fortify and make more explicit the American position. General Woodford, supplied with comprehensive instructions, was dispatched as Ambassador to Madrid. On the way to his post he was to survey the potentialities of Continental attitudes in regard to the possibilities of active American interference in Cuba.

But before Woodford could act there occurred early in August the assassination of Premier Canovas. Of no absolutely essential influence upon the course of Spanish affairs, yet this event was sufficiently dramatic to suddenly focus European
attention upon Spain and her problems. Thenceforth European accounts of Cuba and Spain did not lack for background mater-
ial nor for an informed reception.

By the middle of September Woodford was able to present his Note to the Conservative Azcarraga Ministry which had pledged itself to "follow in the steps of Senor Canovas." This note, breaking what de Lome in Washington had just termed a "period of great calm, which presages well for the Cuban question," consisted of an "exposition of the losses suffered by the United States from the point of view of its commercial and industrial interests" and "firmly urged the necessity of finishing the war." In case the war were not concluded in a reasonable period (by the end of October being suggested) then "the United States would consider itself justified in taking measures to assure the independence of the island." 27

Quickly perceiving the import of this threat, the reports of English journals are of interest. The London Times said cautiously:

Great reserve is observed in official circles regarding this latest phase of the question, which, besides making a great sensation abroad, will be fraught with serious consequences for Spain. 28

The Spectator had a bit more time for analysis and ventured the conclusion:

It is difficult to see how war can be avoided . . . . Why should not Spain avoid war by making some minor conces-
sions to American opinion? That is possible, no doubt, but we do not believe that it will happen, because we do not believe that any very considerable number of people in Spain will wish to avoid war on these terms. 29
The Saturday Review was more rash in its remarks:

This of course would be the first step towards the annexation of Cuba by the Union. . . . For Europe, its significance lies in the fact that if the policy of foreign adventure is to be continued it will force the United States to become a first class naval power.

But these ruminations were cut short by another event which presaged to entirely change the complexion of the negotiations. The Conservative party fell from power at the end of September. The incoming Liberals, for so long the opposition, were pledged to a policy of conciliation and reform in Cuba. Sagasta, the new Premier, only shortly before had charged that "in his opinion the situation was going from bad to worse. . . . For his own part he was in favor of applying the scheme of autonomy to Cuba forthwith." One of the first announcements of the Liberal Cabinet was that it "had decided to set aside all questions of the past and face the position as it presents itself today." Thus it was felt that a peaceful solution would be quickly arrived at and that the bellicose attitude which the United States had so recently adopted could with impunity be discarded.

The Saturday Review commented in the optimistic vein that

Senor Sagasta, the Liberal leader, seems fully aware that no advantage can accrue to his country by a conflict with the United States, and believes in the concession of autonomy as the sole remedy for Cuba.

And the Times was confident that "the reforms upon the basis of autonomy . . . will be adhered to and carried out as quickly as is practicable."
It appeared momentarily that these hopes were to be realized. General Weyler was immediately recalled and tentative plans were issued as to the liberalization of the Cuban government, encompassing the setting up of a Cuban Cabinet and an application of the same voting regulations as on the peninsula. There was a general sense of relaxation in Europe and in the United States. But the Times was wondering intuitively:

If, on the other hand, the reforms when adopted are deemed inadequate or illusory, or if they are long deferred, the disappointment thus occasioned must almost inevitably tend to bring about a reaction of feeling and to invigorate the American enemies of Spain.

That is exactly what did happen. The Liberals made an encouraging start but could not overcome the Spanish inertia. The new Governor General, Blanco, was sent to Cuba, accompanied by 20,000 troops, despite the statement of the Government that "the ultimate pacification of the island of Cuba must now be looked for in political rather than in military action." At this juncture the Pall Mall Gazette was able to observe that this was the same Spain as of old:

It remained only to adopt some half-way course, such as the present, to promise a comprehensive scheme of autonomy, along with at least a demonstration of the strong hand to mask the retreat. . . . 'Too late,' is written large over the whole thing. . . . So far, the tone of the official world on both sides is thoroughly, even remarkably, correct . . . . There seems to be nothing for it but for Spain to struggle desperately along, trusting vaguely to the chapter of accidents to avert a war.

But it was the reply to the Woodford Note that brought complete disillusionment. Oblivious to proffers of the good offices of the United States and disregarding all protestations of
material loss and of shocked humanitarian susceptibilities, the answer of Foreign Secretary Gullon was merely a counter-complaint "expressing regret that the Cuban insurrection should receive support from frequent American filibustering expeditions, believing that otherwise the rebellion would perhaps not exist." The past month's expectations and hopes had been futile; the situation was as it had been before.

Taken aback by this unsympathetic response, the United States pressed no immediate action. Looking ahead it was seen that the President's Message to Congress early in December would afford a convenient opportunity to properly mark out the next departure. So there was about a month's respite from new developments during which period the European journals adequately dealt out estimations of the resources, and probable motives and attitudes of the parties involved.

Very obvious was the fact that Spain was in a much disabilitated condition due to the demands of years of civil and colonial strife, and that her outlook was bleak:

Spain is sending good pesetas after bad, live men after dead. This is the inevitable penalty of dry rot. Whatever a Spanish Premier may try to do now, he cannot get over the effects of the miserable inanity, tempered by brutalities, of the past. And, while placing the most generous construction upon Spain's attitude now, we must hold her responsible for her own difficulties.

Seldom in the world's history has a nation been confronted by perils so many and so grave as Spain... American intervention in Cuba, national bankruptcy of the most complete and desperate order, and the harrowing possibility—if not probability—of internal dissension in the form of revolution—Carlist or otherwise; such is the triple menace impending over the unhappiest of European countries...
It was generally observed too that for domestic political reasons Spain was really not in a position to safely contemplate peaceful negotiations with the United States in regard to the imminent independence of Cuba.

Now, it seems to be quite certain that, to whatever else they may assent, no Spanish Ministry will assent, or dare to assent, to foreign mediation between Spain and her rebellious subjects. To admit of mediation would be regarded throughout the country as a slight to the national honor, and it probably would provoke an outburst which would prove fatal to the Monarchy as well as to the Ministry. The possibilities of war and of defeat in the alternative are fully realized, but they are boldly faced. Spain prefers to lose Cuba in a war which she foresees will be disastrous to her rather than to surrender what she regards as her just rights in deference to menace. It is a foolish choice but it is the choice of the nation.

The Spaniards are probably about as ill prepared for war with a Great Power as any nation in the world, but it is doubtful if this consideration, had they been able to realize it, would have deterred them from going to war. The difficulties in the way of consenting to American intervention are great—involving, indeed, not only the certainty of ruin to any Ministry proposing it, but grave danger to the dynasty as well as to the social order in Spain. It is not altogether surprising that Spanish statesmen prefer to face even the risks of war, though they can hardly share the careless confidence of the uninformed masses.

The Spectator went even further and imputed that Spain might perhaps be deliberately seeking war with the United States as a solution of her domestic difficulties. These three following excerpts, each of a later date, indicate this trend of thought and no doubt contain much in the way of accurate observation.

The peasants are not able to realize their own weakness and America's strength, and the educated are, as a rule, too proud to admit it. Pride dominates all classes and all things in Spain, and pride will bid Spain to stand up to the United States without the slightest fear of the consequences. Curiously enough, too, war will probably
be considered the best way out of Spain's difficulties by the small number of thoughtful and far-seeing politicians she possesses. They will argue that the drain on the resources of Spain owing to the Cuban revolt is destroying Spain. But it is impossible to propose the abandonment of Cuba in cold blood. If the Queen were to carry out such a plan they would simply be handing the country over to Don Carlos. The only escape from the dilemma which the country will admit is the loss of Cuba after a war with a Great Power. . . . Here then, we have the reasons of high politics as well as national characteristics combining to make Spain meet a war half-way rather than escape from it. 

Victory in war would of course end the Spanish difficulties, while defeat would allow the Government to give up Cuba without affronting the Spanish idea of honour, and so endangering the Monarch itself . . . . We fear, therefore, that they mean to accept war, or possibly to provoke it. . . . It would almost certainly save the throne of Alphonseo II, who would be regarded in defeat as a victim of undeserved misfortune; and to save that throne at any hazard is necessarily and justifiably the one preoccupation of the Queen-Regent. 

The Queen-Regent's Government . . . considers more and more carefully whether war would not be the best way out of an otherwise impenetrable jungle of hostile circumstances. It would certainly save honor; it might save Cuba. . . . That solution is the interest of Spain, which had better lose her colony in war than show herself incompetent to put down forty thousand undrilled insurgents. 

After weighing these various factors it came to be accepted that war was a most likely contingency. In fact it might be said that it appeared certain that "the time for international arrangement of the Cuban war has come at last." By now White had been able to discern in Berlin sufficient expressions of views to arrive at the conclusion "that opinion is steadily tending toward the idea that Spain cannot hold Cuba . . . that some sort of interference by the United States is sooner or later inevitable."
As for the position of the United States there were conflicting reports and a certain amount of antipathy revealed. The summary of the *Times* was conservative and fairly indicative:

The dominant factor in the situation is the recognition in the United States that, whatever may be the result of war, it must cause perturbations in the commercial and the financial world that, at the present crisis, would be extremely damaging to American interests. The annexation of Cuba has never been really popular with the main body of the American people, who have no wish to grapple with the problem of taking over the government of an island inhabited by an alien race of mixed blood and speaking a strange tongue. On the other hand, apart from the grave injury caused by the indefinite prolongation of the Cuban troubles, there are many Americans who are interested in the development of the resources of an island which is by nature one of the richest in the world. An autonomous Government in Cuba, if it had a free hand in finance, would probably be willing to let in American capital on fair terms and to grant large trading concessions. The essence of Spanish colonial policy, however, is to exclude foreign influences and to maintain a privileged position for the mother country.49

The *Spectator* more pointedly said that "The Americans, we take it, though not, perhaps, intent on war, are not indisposed to risk it."50

Finally when the time came for McKinley's Message it was thought doubtful whether he would "see any advantage to be gained in carrying the controversy much further."51 It was anticipated that McKinley would continue a moderate course and make as many allowances as he could in favor of such concessions as had been granted to Cuba by Spain. It was realized that the previous declarations of the United States had been sufficiently forceful and were still valid, to the extent that
the United States could whenever she wished take action based upon them. These expectations were quite fully borne out.

The *Times* account of the Message is comprehensive and constrained:

Although he gives full credit to the present Spanish Cabinet for the change of policy it has announced, and professes a desire neither to hurry its necessarily difficult operations nor to embarrass it by offering suggestions as to the mode of carrying them out, there is yet a tone of patronizing tolerance, together with warnings that tolerance cannot be practiced indefinitely, which must make the Message not wholly agreeable reading either for the Spanish Government or the Spanish people. For the present the President does not intend to intervene in any way, relying as he does, upon the perseverance of the Spanish Cabinet in a policy from which, in his judgment, it cannot retreat without dishonour. At the same time he insists that this forbearance in no way derogates from the right of the United States to intervene at some future time should no effectual remedy be found for the existing disorder. . . . On all grounds, therefore, the President concludes in favour of confining himself for a period not strictly defined to the issue of grave admonitions to the Spanish Government. 58

A report with more of a personal tone of approval was that of the *Pall Mall Gazette*:

Upon Cuba, to which Mr. McKinley devoted nearly half a lengthy message, he may be heartily congratulated. . . . Alike on the score of humanity and of material interests the United States is right in warning Spain and protesting diplomatically. Above all, it is only fair, he admits, to give Senor Sagasta and Marshal Blanco a chance. Their protestations are fair, their beginning in accordance with these; his Message adds the needful reminder that they must go on as they have begun, only more so. He does not assign any definite date for the fulfillment of the protestations, and therein shows himself a man of sense. 53

The *Saturday Review* chose to see the matter in an entirely different light and was most critical in its remarks that, "President McKinley's first message to Congress confirms the opinion
of those who saw in him only a weak and vacillating man . . . .

He tries to face both ways about Cuba."\(^54\)

The next period, through December, January and into February, is difficult to appreciate. Like the interim preceding the Presidential Message it was outwardly calm. But it was not passed in merely waiting; it was a time of tension and of balancing. There were several deliberate though unacclaimed movements on both the part of the United States and of Spain which could have as their essential meaning only that preparations were being made for war. There was a modicum of war talk. There were even more professions of sincerity in the desire that war should not come.

Typical perhaps of the incongruities of this period are the intermittent assurances which reveal the complacency of de Lome, the Spanish Minister. Following his remark in September as to the calm in Washington, he said in November that "The situation continues improving; our cause is making progress in prudent public opinion." In December he thought "the political situation has never been better, nor my mission easier. . . ." and "There is absolute quiet and lack of news. . . . I consider the situation good." In January the same tone prevails: "Our situation is bettering every day by this calm."\(^55\)

Even the Times in its summary of the history of the year 1897 made no more than an indirect mention of the Cuban affair:

As to the internal history of the United States, it may, for practical purposes, be summed up in three things: -- [the Dingley Tariff and Tammany and the New York City
elections being the first two] and the steady growth of a desire for a strong navy. The latter agitation finds its excuse in Cuba and in Hawaii . . . . 56

And at the same time a dispatch from Madrid shows in what manner false impressions gained currency there:

It is announced here that all the American war correspondents in Cuba will leave the island tomorrow on their return to the United States. Their decision, coupled with the change observed in the attitude of the United States as regards Cuba, is taken as showing that the question has lost the importance previously attached to it in America. The general opinion here is that a pacific solution is on the point of being attained, notwithstanding the efforts of the Separatist party. The more moderate and thoughtful section of the public consider that no reason now exists for the continuance of the war.57

Of undoubted significance was the sending of the United States fleet to southern waters in late December, in which region it was to remain until called upon for war duties. Ostensibly this was a normal seasonal fleet movement but it is difficult to know upon what criteria it could be determined whether this was the simple fact or whether the fleet was sent to Florida because it was anticipated that it might be needed there. However, de Lome sent his intelligence without any imputation of guise:

Decision to send the fleet was reached some time ago; it resumes the drill practice which had been suspended during the past two winters, in order not to arouse excited public sentiment; and the purpose is also to demonstrate that the situation has improved and to avoid a demand for one or more boats to go to Cuba.58

Reactions in Madrid differed on receipt of this news. One paper, the Imparcial, became quite aroused:

After a series of insults and calumnies aimed at Spain . . . McKinley is thinking of compensating us by sending a squadron to the Gulf of Mexico. Never was such a measure less
necessary than now... It is because the Yankees are seeking to justify their policy that the insurgents build hopes solely on that friend's intervention. The dispatch of the squadron in question supports those hopes and will lead to a prolongation of the struggle. 59

But according to a semi-official note issued in Madrid:

The dispatch of an American squadron to perform evolutions in the Gulf of Mexico has made no impression in political circles here. The Government, it is said, is aware that in the present season that sea is the only one where a squadron can maneuver, and that these winter maneuvers have not taken place for two years with the very object that the susceptibilities of the Spanish nation should not be wounded. 60

However, in spite of this expression de Lome was directed to officially express how much surprise has been felt by the European press and public on account of the activity and apparent concentration of naval forces of the United States in waters adjacent to Cuba and Spain. 61

De Lome's hope that the need for a ship at Cuba would be obviated was unfortunately not borne out. It has never been known just why the Maine was sent to Havana. Lee, the Consul-General, had for some time been overemphasizing the anti-American sentiments of certain groups there. He had on several occasions suggested the salutary effect which an American naval vessel would have. But when upon no commensurate provocation the Maine was dispatched, Lee became overawed by the immensity of his responsibility and hurriedly informed the Government that the moment was not appropriate and further, that the Maine was too imposing a ship and she definitely was not desired. His protests were futile. 62

It was announced at the time that the visit of the Maine
had been prearranged and was done with the pleasure of the
Spanish Government. The public comments generally followed
this view:

The resumption of the long interrupted visits of American
ships to Cuban waters is an indication of improved rela-
tion and conditions. The moment would seem highly inop-
portune for any hostile movement on the part of the Ameri-
can government, since the state of affairs in Cuba has not
for a long time offered so little excuse for interference
as at present.63

But from the report of de Lome, announcing this news to his Gov-
ernment, it may be assumed that he had not been previously con-
sulted. He said: "Since my conference of this morning with
Day . . . he has told me by telephone . . . that the President
has determined to send the Maine to Habana . . . ."64 It must
have been a shock to the Spanish Government but they responded
in gallant style with the announcement that as a return courtesy
a ship from their fleet would call at New York.65 And so the
Maine, well received by the municipal authorities and by the
populace, anchored in Havana harbor January 25th and without
serving any apparent purpose there remained.

Several weeks went by without any untoward public happen-
ings. Havana and Cuba were quiet; even Congress was not too de-
manding. Then came that petty event which possessed signifi-
cance because of its instantaneous and forceful appeal to those
who wished to disparage Spanish character: the publication of
the de Lome letter. This was a private letter of the Spanish
Minister, written a month or so earlier, containing remarks
which, though apt, were not complimentary to the President.
Really more serious, he cast reflection upon the faith with which certain current commercial negotiations were being maintained by Spain. De Lome telegraphed his resignation immediately. The Spanish Foreign Office accepted it immediately, even before the United States could request this action, thus circumventing any demand on the part of the United States for refutations or apologies. The Spectator very truly characterized the incident when it stated that

It ought to make no difference in the situation. . . .
It is almost certain to make a great deal of difference, and to bring the United States and Spain much nearer to a rupture in regard to Cuba.

This same article indicated that there were those who disparaged the yet continuing bloodshed in Cuba and anticipated that some change must come:

We cannot profess to be sorry to think that the moment may actually be approaching when the United States will intervene to stop the long agony of Cuba. We have no antipathy to Spain, but rather wish her well. But she cannot regain her health as a State as long as she is wasting her blood and treasure on Cuba. . . . The condition of the island is at this moment so terrible, and has been so appallingly miserable for the last three or four years. . . .

In but a few days the harrassed de Lome was in Canada, and quite forgotten. In a few days Cuba and her personal ills were forgotten. For on the 15th of February there occurred that fateful disaster to the Maine. It is strange to consider that its cause has ever remained a complete mystery; it is known only that the explosion was from the exterior of the ship. Considering now the passions and suspicions aroused it is also a strange fact that war did not come for over two months, and that
when it did come the **Maine** was not directly figured as a **causa-belli**. As for expressions of the implications of the affair the **Times** said about all that was possible with the words:

> It is peculiarly unfortunate that an incident of this kind should have occurred in a Cuban harbor at a moment when the relations between the United States and Spain have but lately begun to improve after a period of protracted tension.70

A touch of the prophetic may be added here. A phrase from a Spanish circular dispatch sent out early in February to the several Ambassadors, remarked that "the persistency with which the **Maine** and **Montgomery** remain in the Greater Antilles is causing increasing anxiety, and might, through some mischance, bring about a conflict."71

It has been attributed that from this juncture General **Woodford** was the only person who conscientiously worked for peace.72 Both countries made ready for war almost as though there were no alternative. This trend had its paramount exemplification in the United States in an Appropriation Bill passed early in March, just the day before **Polo Benarbe**, the new Spanish Minister, arrived in Washington. There is little indication as to the responsibility for this measure; seemingly it was not requested by the Executive. Congress spontaneously decided that it was timely to place at the disposal of the President $50,000,000, designated as for 'defence.' The first communication from Polo reveals his concern when he speaks of "the supremeness of this measure."73 The **Times** said: "Such is the
one grave fact in today's situation. It may be regarded as a fact which makes for peace or makes for war."

It was suggested that this move may have been inspired by "rumours . . . that Spain is buying ships of war, and that part of her existing fleet is under orders to sail westward. . . . "

For Spain was not backward in her preparations for war. Her military and naval forces, such as they were, were organized for the contingency. Certain sections of her press had long been clamoring for hostilities. It can hardly be claimed that at any point Spain was astounded by the course of events.

These next few weeks were weeks of suspense—foreboding suspense—awaiting the report of the Maine Committee; awaiting the report of the Consuls; awaiting McKinley's Message; awaiting the resolutions of Congress. The frequent comments of the Times indicate the presentment, and also are proof of the inconsistencies and wavering confusion of the period:

These diplomatic conversations mark time. On both sides active naval movements continue. This Government [the United States] is, in fact, pressing naval and military preparations as if war were inevitable and, at the same time, conducting diplomatic intercourse on the theory that peace may, and probably will, be preserved. . . . The tone of the press is more hopeful than ever.

While peace is still probable and war also probable. . . . the best opinion . . . is not for war. . . . The Spanish Government is playing a relatively passive part in the development of the situation, and the war-like preparations reported from the United States should form a curious contrast with the subdued and, to all appearances, inactive anxiety prevailing here (in Madrid).

Up to Wednesday last (23rd), the general impression seems to have been that a rupture would be averted. . . . On Saturday and yesterday (26th, 27th) most sensible and well informed citizens were distinctly less hopeful of the
maintenance of peace than they had previously been. . . .

Not war, but peace—such is the belief today.

There is no doubt that the Spanish Government takes a favorable view of its relations with the United States and believes that peace is assured.

In the meantime, of course, both nations are preparing for war, but, so far as can be judged, Spain is perhaps more ready for immediate fighting than is the United States. The conjectures of the Spectator also showed the trend and the contradictions:

If we are to judge only by the appearances of the hour, everything seems to be pointing to a peaceful solution of the differences between Spain and the United States.

In spite of optimistic telegrams . . . we remain convinced that, short of that unforeseen event happening which may always, and sometimes does happen in politics, war will speedily break out over Cuba. . . .

We adhere . . . to the belief which we have expressed in these columns for the last six months—namely, that short of a political miracle, war will be the end of the Cuban controversy.

Toward the end of March, more than a month after the Maine disaster, it could be observed that events would soon be culminating. By about March 23rd the Maine Report was in the hands of the President. Woodford presented a memorandum to Spain, calling upon her to arrive at an "immediate and honorable peace" in Cuba, or else this report together with the whole Cuban question would be submitted to Congress. Several days later Woodford presented a note, giving the essence of the Maine Report and suggesting that inasmuch as a certain measure of Spanish responsibility was implied there was owing from Spain "such action as is due where the sovereign rights of one friendly nation
have been assailed within the jurisdiction of another." The next day, March 29th, Woodford presented at a conference a third memorandum, calling for "an immediate armistice, lasting until October 1," and the utilization of the good offices of the United States and "the immediate revocation of the reconcentration order," and permission for the United States to send to Cuba provisions and supplies for the needy.

On March 31st Spain answered collectively these three communications. As to the pacification of Cuba she hedged, attempting to endow the "insular parliament" with a degree of responsibility. As to the Maine, Spain was "ready to submit to an arbitration the differences" but contended that her profuse expressions of sympathy at the time of the disaster obviated any need now for apologies. As to the truce, the Cuban autonomist government again was referred to but it was agreed that if the insurgents were to request an armistice the Governor General was permitted to comply, the length of the period to be by him determined. Finally the reconcentration policy was unqualifiedly revoked and it was granted that the United States could render succor to the suffering of Cuba.

From day to day McKinley's Message was expected. Its postponement seems to have been due to repeated requests from the Consuls, for more time in which to evacuate American citizens. This is substantiated by dispatches in the Times stating that on the 6th and 8th of April two steamers actively engaged in removing Americans from Cienfuegos and Santiago.
Finally on April 9th Spain decided, though ostensibly not at the request of the United States, to make the ultimate concession and hastened to inform the United States:

The Government of His Majesty has resolved to accede to the desires of the Holy Father and of the great Powers, and to instruct the General in Chief of the army in Cuba that he may concede immediately a suspension of hostilities for the period he may deem prudent, in order to arrange and facilitate peace on the island.85

But this was now not enough. If the suspension of hostilities had been made for a definite period it might have influenced the President. As it was, McKinley's Message of the 11th merely mentioned that certain proposals of too insubstantial a character to be relied upon had been called to his attention.86

So the matter was turned over to Congress. Congress, after debating for ten days over the terminology and a statement of motives, voted the resolution calling for war.

Although the European press gave these last developments between Spain and the United States an imposing amount of space yet there were in other quarters major distractions: -- In January Zola had cried, "J'accuse," and another stage of the Dreyfus case was under way; in March Kitchener had started up the Nile to recover the bones of Gordon (and to find Marchand); in March the Germans and the Russians announced their respective leases of Kiaochou and of Port Arthur. It was altogether an interesting period. . . . .
III.

Until almost the day that relations were broken off with the United States, Spain had based her negotiations upon the fundamental premise that she could depend upon intervention from the Powers of Europe to prevent Cuba being taken from her. Spain was sincere in believing that the Concert of Europe would act on her behalf. She felt that the Powers would take strong diplomatic measures against the United States, perhaps apply military measures. And actually there were those European statesmen who did so attempt to help Spain. But they were not successful.

As noted above, England and France had in the past taken an active interest in the continued Spanish domination of Cuba and had gone to certain lengths to assure it. But now in the late nineties when the Spanish rule was again threatened an appeal was not confined to these two States. The Spanish requests were directed to the six Great Powers of Europe. For changes had taken place in the makeup of Europe through the last decades. No longer was any single State preponderant on the Continent. Due to the influence of nationalism there were now several more or less equal States, and these States had certain alignments and groupings to the effect that there was a balance of Power—between the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy, and the Entente Cordiale of France and Russia. England, formerly the balancing factor in European politics, was not entering a period of transition. She was still fearful of Russia and yet,
seeing that she must oppose Germany, somewhat impelled toward France. Disregarding these special inclinations it was obvious that to effectively aid Spain any effort would necessarily have to include all of Great Powers.

There was certain logic in the hope that the Great Powers of Europe could be organized to act together. At this particular time there existed a certain residual tradition for this prospect. The so-called Concert of Europe had been founded on the idea that the European states should cooperate in administering or dismissing problems of mutual interest. Since the occasion of the Congress of Berlin the Powers had felt themselves responsible for Turkey and for the arrangement of the Balkan states, had periodically consulted in this regard. Prior to any interest in Spanish affairs Europe had sought to settle the troubles in Crete. But after prolonged negotiations Germany and Austria had withdrawn from the proceeding and left it for the other four Powers to dispose.86 There had been futile attempts at cooperation in the Orient. Great Britain had sought to procure effective resistance to Japan's war with China, but only the United States had helped her. After the war, however, it was France, Germany, and Russia who banded together to alter the terms of the Treaty of Shimonseki, England refusing participation. The Powers had recently gathered and determined policies by which they bound themselves in development of the Congo region.87 In all there was a sort of atmosphere to the effect that, with the exactly correct combination of circumstances, it would seem possible that the Powers of Europe might all act
together and impose wills in an energetic manner. But even more apparent it was that the interests of Europe were diverse and that any common move would have to be based in the case of each individual power upon motives of personal advantage.

Spain had had an experience some years previously which should have given her an insight into the problems involved in seeking the joint action of the Powers, and knowledge of the attitudes which she would encounter. This had occurred in 1891 when, fearful of a republican uprising on the Peninsula, the Queen had appealed to the Powers for support of her throne. Her pleas had been fruitless. The German Foreign Office at that time directed a note to Spain pointing out facts which were still to be true six and seven years later:—that because of her republican form of government little help should be anticipated from France in a Monarchical project; that probably the most important power to be consulted was Russia, not that her help would be of such intrinsic value but that so many considerations of the other Powers depended upon her; and finally that Spain should not expect Germany and Austria to obtain Russian support for her, but should seek it directly through her representative in St. Petersburg. Spain seems not to have taken these bits of advice to heart.

Prior to September 1897 about when Europe became actively interested in the Cuban affair there had been furtive Spanish attempts to interest the European chancelleries and to organize
them for her future support. Perhaps the first evidence of this movement is a letter from the Queen-Regent to Victoria sent in May of 1896 which, besides its unique personal interest, contains something in the way of exposition:

You can well imagine how, with this war in Cuba, my heart is full of grief and sorrow. We are now in a most critical position, as on the one hand, the war is being protracted, so many men perish there in fighting and of illness, whilst, on the other, in this country bad harvests and dearth of food are to be expected. The attitude of the United States is also very doubtful; whilst their Government promises us neutrality, and friendship, Americans send money, arms, and ammunition to the insurgents, which of course increases the resistance of our enemies. President Cleveland advises Spain to make concessions to the rebels at once, in order to obtain peace; but we cannot make concessions to the Cubans till they lay down their arms.

Mr. Cleveland also offers to act as a mediator between the insurgents and Spain; but this, above all things, would hurt the national feeling of the Spaniards, and I could never accept it, as we know how sedulously they work in America against us in favor of the insurgents. I therefore confidently turn to you, dear aunt, to tell you of my grief and sorrows, and to entreat you to assist me in these trying circumstances, as you always have done, with your good advice and with your powerful friendship.

Salisbury's memorandum to Victoria as to the manner in which she should reply is worthy of notice because of its rather anti-American tone, inspired probably by the current Venezuelan affair. This English attitude was to be greatly modified in a year's time. Still, even here, there is not much indication of any material help for Spain:

Letter from Queen Regent of Spain: Lord Salisbury with his humble duty would suggest that, after expression of deep sympathy, your Majesty should reply that in your judgment little good would come from proclaiming concessions, until the revolt in Cuba is suppressed or at least until a conspicuous victory has been won. Reforms proclaimed, until the rebels had been beaten, would not induce them to lay down their arms. They would only be encouraged
to insist on entire independence. United States will do all the mischief they can without going to war. There is great goodwill in England towards Spain; but of course England cannot join in suppressing insurrection. She would be glad to give any assistance that is possible without breaking her neutrality.

Another statement of the British attitude at about this time toward the Cuban affair is found in a letter from Henry White to Olney, recording an interview of White and Salisbury. It bears out the point that England would not be inclined to intervene in Cuba.

... before leaving Salisbury I turned the conversation to Cuba, and after ascertaining that he is well aware of the deplorable condition of things in that island, I remarked that I had always assumed and stated in the United States that it would be a matter of indifference to Great Britain whether we were to annex the island or not, to which he at once replied, "It's no affair of ours; we are friendly to Spain, and should be sorry to see her humiliated, but we do not consider that we have anything to say in the matter, whatever may be the course the United States may decide to pursue. . . ."92

Later, in August of the same year (1896), there occurred a really strenuous effort on the part of the Spanish Government to organize the Powers for the contingency of war with the United States. Duke de Tetuan, in an account of his public activities, gave the impression that the Government's activities had been intensive and sustained in this regard.

Canova's Ministry, which has been so unjustly and intemperately censured, busied itself, from the time it went into office in 1896, in securing for Spain advance commitments from the Powers for a cooperation which should be neither platonic nor fantastic, but which would defend Spain's rights and her sovereignty over Cuba against all external aggression, in the event of a rupture of relations with the United States.93

And it has been said that
The Spanish ministers were by this time completely convinced that Spain's interests could only be defended by a coalition which should be in existence and prepared to act, when the new American President was inaugurated on March 1, 1897.94

This effort in August seems to have had no antecedent manoeuvres and within a few weeks exhausted itself after attaining no visible results.

However it is of interest to note the reception which this attempt had in Europe. The movement had its first manifestation in the circulation of a Memorandum among the Ambassadors of the Powers at Madrid. This lengthy document prepared by Tetuan presented a full picture of the situation—the course of the revolt in Cuba and the military attempts at suppression; the influence of the United States; and a statement of the reasons why Europe should take a more than passive view of the future of the situation. The Ambassadors were all very encouraging in their comments. They made assurances that the Memorandum would receive favorable consideration were it sent formally to the several European Governments.

When Spain was about to take this further step there occurred a most untoward incident. Taylor, the American Minister, confronted Tetuan with full knowledge of the Memorandum and was in position to demand that it be suppressed. Apparently he had been informed of the matter by Drummond Woolf, the British Ambassador, and his information had been substantiated by the French representative. This led to a lasting distrust for Woolf on the part of the Spaniards.95 More immediately it necessitated
a revision of the Spanish strategy.

Spain now had to gain support through informal conversations—pledges which would not be so definitive nor binding. She set to work to acquaint the Foreign Offices of Europe with the portent of a possible war between the United States and Spain, implying that it would be to their best interests to have the Spanish control of Cuba undisturbed. Except in the case of France the approach was indirect. It was pointed out that, were Spain to lose Cuba, it would most certainly affect the stability of the Spanish dynasty. And the dynasty was dear to Europe; the Queen-Regent was an Arch-duchess of the House of Hapsburg. Further there was the ominous fact that the defeat of Spain might lead the United States to further international interference or aggrandisement. France’s financial interests in Spain would tend to insure her proper attitude. The republicanism of France was reason to avoid mentioning to her anything about the Monarchical principle, but it was perfectly reasonable to point out that French colonies might well be affected in their tranquillity by the liberation of Spanish Cuba.

The original Memorandum had summed these factors up very briefly:

... the Great Powers ... of Europe will understand, that there is inherently in the Cuban question a problem supremely European, affecting not only the development and future of Spain, but also the general interest of Europe, because of very grave international consequences may result from the Cuban insurrection, and the daily more absorbent and expansive Monroe Doctrine.

Tetuan observed that "We offered in exchange the aid of Spain
in connection with certain continental interests." But it may be stated now that the 'aid of Spain' had not a great deal of value for the European Powers; other considerations were more persuasive.

Late in this summer of 1896 when the Spanish Ambassadors came to determine definitively just what reception Spain would find in Europe were she to issue a direct plea for help they discovered that the attitudes were not such as Tetuan had been led to believe by the comments elicited in Madrid. To none of the Powers did the prospects of the situation appear fortuitous.

The report of the Duke de Mandas from Paris was obviously not encouraging:

Your Excellency will doubtless remember that I have repeatedly stated my conviction that we should find in France, as we have found, the support of public opinion and of the stock exchange, but that the help we should expect from the French Government would be very small, because of France's own difficulties with her colonies, her present situation, and the care she must exercise with respect to her numerous and complex relations with various nations, not the least delicate of which are her relations with nations friendly to the United States.

A year later American Ambassador Porter reported what he had heard related of this occasion, saying that:

When Spain made an attempt last year to have the European powers unite in a protest against the contemplated action of the United States in favor of the Cubans, members of the French Government did not favor such action and behaved in a very friendly manner to us.

From Berlin Mendez Vigo reported his conversation with Marschall in the Foreign Office:

I had the satisfaction of hearing the Minister repeat to me the assurances which the Emperor of Germany gave Your
Excellency, with respect to the interest which everything having to do with Spain and to Her Majesty the Queen-Regent, inspires in his Highest the Emperor and in this Government. 101

Surely empty phrases when accompanied by nothing more specific in the way of promises.

In Vienna the situation was no better. Despite the interest which Franz-Joseph and his Government felt in Spain's Queen, the wish to consider the 'incident as ended' prevailed at the Austrian court. 102

And in St. Petersburg the very incapable Spanish Ambassador, Villagonzalo, did not himself have a clear concept of what was taking place and obtained not a particle of satisfaction. In Rome the opinion was that the whole matter was ill advised. In London Salisbury paid not enough attention to the proposal to formulate a reply.

As if by agreement among themselves, the Powers seemed bent on wiping out even the memory of what had happened at Madrid, and thereby forestalling any possible consequences to what they now regarded as a premature and false step. 103

In retrospect the Duke de Tetuan concluded:

In spite of all we could do we were not successful; our proposals could make no headway against the fear which the Powers felt that, by committing themselves, they would endanger the future peace of Europe. 104

* * * * * * *

After these barren efforts of 1896 nothing more was heard of intervention for over a year. It was in the last days of September, 1897, subsequent to the delivery of Woodford's note to the Spanish Government, that the subject definitely reappeared. And it is in connection with the Kaiser and Germany that this renewed effort was mainly revealed.
Although there is no direct evidence of what took place we may surmise that at some time, several weeks earlier even than the date just mentioned, the Kaiser became interested in the Spanish problem. Probably it was through a personal communication from Franz Joseph of Austria. Bulow mentions that he was aware that he would soon have the problem to deal with:

Two questions were to the fore when I returned to Berlin in the early days of September 1897; the menace of a conflict between Spain and the United States, and the aftermath of the war between Greece and Turkey. In both cases William II had acquired a definite opinion. ... In the threatening Spanish-American war his sympathies were all on the side of Spain simply because Spain was a monarchy and America a republic. He came to the conclusion that it was the duty of the European monarchs not to leave the Queen-Regent Christina of Spain, "our gallant colleague," in the lurch. It was, therefore, my business to take care as far as possible that the Kaiser in his visit to Budapest, which was planned for the middle of September, did not express himself too emphatically in an anti-American sense. ... 105

It is readily observed that Bulow's position was to be one of moderation and in opposition to the over-enthusiastic sympathy of the Kaiser. He went on to say: "When I was back in Berlin I gave instructions to observe neutrality and great reserve in the Spanish-American quarrel that was becoming steadily more serious." 106

Indeed it did result that the Kaiser attempted to make evident his inclination. Tower, the American Ambassador in Vienna, reported subsequently that "It is worthy of note, that the manner of the German Emperor during the visit to Hungary ... was apparently not quite friendly." 107 However Tower went on to comment that the Austrian attitude was satisfactory and that the
"treatment received from the Emperor Francis Joseph was exceedingly courteous and friendly." More specifically, Tower wished it known that he considered absolutely false those newspaper articles which might state that:

... the German Emperor seized the opportunity, upon his recent visit to Hungary during the Austro-Hungarian manoeuvres, to establish an agreement with the Emperor Francis Joseph under which Germany and Austria-Hungary, would intervene on behalf of Spain if the United States should take open measures in recognition of the insurgents in Cuba or should adopt a policy intended to lead to the independence of the island.

But in spite of the confidence of the American Ambassador, discussions considering intervention really were getting under way. On the 28th of September

Emperor William in his enthusiasm for the cause of monarchical solidarity ... was impelled ... to recommend, by telegraph to the Foreign Office, intervention by the States of Europe, possibly by the continental States only, in favor of Spain.

This first overt step was apparently taken without the advice of his close adviser and intermediary with the Foreign Office, Count Eulenburg. And it would be suspected that the Kaiser must have dispatched some sort of a message to either Madrid or Vienna because Bulow in a telegram to Eulenburg the next day commented that he had read in the Neue Freie Presse that

the Brussels'Soir expresses expectation that the German Emperor is about to address a note to the United States on Spain's behalf, which will be couched in the same tone as that of his telegram regarding the Transvaal conflict.

Bulow, in this same telegram went on to make several observations, the connotation of which is highly significant and worthy of remark:
England's exports to the United States are ... roughly 170, as against Germany's 94, and France's 66 millions of dollars. America's exports to England amount to 406, as against 97 to Germany and 47 millions to France; moreover, the new American tariff empowers the President of the United States to grant to foreign countries special customs privileges in return for mutual concessions. Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Italian trade and shipping interests stand far lower than those of England, Germany and France.

The crux of the communication was that:

... the action in question must be carefully considered, and at any rate, a binding pledge must be obtained from Russia for France's honest and complete cooperation. If England and France stand out of it, not only would the success of the action become dubious, but it might also place us at a considerable disadvantage, both politically and commercially.

Thus here in this earliest official dispatch which is available two points were made clear. First that Germany was going to be influenced in her decisions by commercial factors; secondly, that the prerequisites for her cooperation were to be strict—that England and France both join in the intervention, and that Russia must guarantee the full participation of France. It was upon the unfavorable aspect of these particular fundamental points that Germany was unwilling to give to Spain the assurances requested, and for comparable reasons that the other powers likewise refused.

The next message seems to have been to Bulow from Eulenberg, now in the company of the Kaiser. He stated that he conferred with the Kaiser, and that they had appreciated the suggestions and qualifications which Bulow had imposed and further that they had come to the conclusion that the only secure method
by which the case might be advanced was through the formal sponsorship of Austria in the negotiations. It was mentioned that Austria, being the most intimate dynastically with Spain, would be looked upon as the natural sponsor and that German leadership would provoke suspicion. The idea was added that France should be approached only through the device of a proposal for a joint European assurance of all colonial possessions.113

To complete this exchange of views: Bulow replied to Eulenburg the same day, the 30th of September, giving his approval to the plans advanced. He commented that the manner in which intervention could best be assured would be for the negotiations to be upon the initiative of France and Russia together, but that of course he realized that this is utterly out of the question. Bulow then closed by urging that Austria be induced to "secure the agreement of England, France, and Russia for joint action on Spain's behalf with the United States." Mention of Italy was omitted, whether because he felt that her adherence was certain or that she was not essential is not known.114

This led a week later to a telegram from Bulow to Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at Vienna, informing him that Germany "on political grounds" could not lead the Powers but that Germany would "consider seriously all proposals reaching us from London or Paris—perhaps after suggestion by Austria."115 Lichnowsky replied a week later that he had conferred with Goluchovsky, Austrian Foreign Minister, and that seemingly Austria was not inclined to take any vigorous action, hoping that Spain herself
would "expressly approach the Cabinets" of the Powers.\textsuperscript{116} It was thus intimated that Spain might after all be forced to do her own promoting.

Here, in the middle of October there is a lapse in the German records of the negotiations. Not until the middle of February, some four months later, did the subject of intervention again actively occupy the Germans.

The phases concerned with France and Russia were initiated a bit later than the German and extended on into November. From documents in the French Archives it is said that "in the early days of October (it was proposed) . . . that France and Russia should make an offer of their good offices to the two parties."\textsuperscript{117} The French Foreign Minister, Hanotaux, consulted with the Russian Government and the latter stated on November 8th that "despite the sympathy felt for Spain, Russia's international relations are such that in this eventuality (war) she would be compelled to take a neutral attitude."\textsuperscript{118} It was added that at the most Russia would be willing then to go only so far as to join in a suggestion of arbitration. This statement appears to have been conclusive for there were no more immediate Spanish appeals to France or Russia.

It is worthwhile to notice now what the American representatives reported in regard to probable attitudes in Europe in the case of more strained relations with Spain. As noted above, White in Germany had early been instructed to observe the temper of public and official opinion. In the only communication of
this period, he stated on October 4th that he had come from
an informal interview with von Rotenhan at the Foreign Office
and that

I took especial pains not to recognize the right, nor in-
deed the possibility, of any interference by any European
power, in any policy which the American Government shall
decide to adopt in regard to a question so purely Ameri-
can.119

He went on to say that as yet nothing had come to his attention
which indicated anything as to the official German views and
that the press was on the whole favorable to the American cause
with only a few conservative journals making disparaging remarks
as to American motives.

Ambassador Porter in Paris was more specific in his state-
ments, giving at least the appearance that he was more discern-
ing. As early as July he had analysed the basic elements in
French opinion:

There are three reasons which make France feel kindly to
Spain. Her people are of the Latin Race. Frenchmen have
purchased Spanish bonds and have a pecuniary interest in
Spanish railways and, having colonies of her own, France
feels a policy of interference with any colonies of Euro-
pean powers. But I think it will be found that these con-
siderations would not induce her to take any hostile steps
towards us as a nation in case we should be obliged to
resort to vigorous action in reference to the deplorable
condition of things in Cuba.120

Later, in August, he noticed:

There have been some persons at work for some time trying
to create a sentimental sympathy for Spain, looking to
some sort of an understanding between the countries which
would strengthen both, but the effort has made no progress,
and will not be revived. . . . I feel . . . that France
would not only not commit any overt act in behalf of Spain
but that she has no disposition in her present temper to
enter any formal protest against such action as the United
States may be compelled to take to put a stop to the dis-
astrous Cuban War.121
Through the remainder of the autumn Porter perceived nothing worthy of communicating to Washington.

There is but a single report, on October 5th, from the Embassy at Vienna, a portion of which has already been noted. Other parts perhaps contribute to an understanding of the atmosphere.

Telegraphic dispatches . . . have appeared in many European newspapers within the last few days in reference to a probable understanding between Germany and Austria-Hungary in matters relating to Spain. . . . I have the honor to report to you . . . that there is nothing in the tone of public opinion in Vienna . . . that would justify this statement as to an understanding with Germany, nor is it justified by the attitude of the newspapers which are usually taken to express the sentiments of the government. However much the people of Austria may sympathize personally with the princess of their own nationality who now governs Spain, there can be no doubt that their interest in the affairs of Cuba is slight, and they express no approval of the methods pursued by the Spanish Government to suppress the insurrections.122

Tower gives a resume of a semi-official press article, stating that it is in a temperate tone which gives no evidence of hostility, especially towards the American Government, nor can we draw from its statements any intimation of the reported intention on the part of the Austrian Empire to assume the championship of Spain in regards to her colonies in the West-Indies. . . . While no thought is given here to the possible armed intervention of European powers in the face of a conceivable assertion of the Monroe Doctrine, more or less remotely implied by the rumored understanding between Germany and Austria-Hungary, the present position of the American Government is calmly considered and its desire to put an end to the strife in the West-Indies is justified. . . . No evidence of hostility to the United States on the part of Austria-Hungary has come to my attention. . . . 123

From such scarce evidence as this it can only be concluded that through this period the American diplomatic representatives in
Europe knew little of the serious negotiations which were taking place with the intent of aligning the Powers against the United States.

According to the account of Ferrara the next development was in 'early December,' when Austria prompted Spain to renewing her efforts at Paris and St. Petersburg:

Feeling certain now of the support of Germany and Italy, the Austrian Chancellery sent instructions to its envoy at Madrid. Thereupon the Spanish Foreign Office once again took up with the French and Russian Ambassadors at Madrid, the question of intervention by the Great Powers.

... To this new sounding the Russian and the French Governments replied that they were disposed to cooperate, but only to the extent, in the event of a crisis, of urging arbitration.

At Paris, the Spanish Ambassador again put direct pressure on Hanotaux. He explained to him that the intervention that was asked was not one of cannons and ships, but of representations and recommendations to the Washington Government. Minister Hanotaux replied, concretely, that France would associate herself in good faith with any action subscribed to unanimously and collectively by the European powers, if such a thing could be brought about, but that he doubted whether such unanimity of agreement could be realized. . . .

Russia, in her attitude, remained always very reserved, declining to associate herself with general actions. Being at the time the natural enemy of England, she did not wish to take a step which might result in England's being drawn closer to the United States.

No reference is found to this December episode in any other source. But inasmuch as it is in harmony with the established trend and character of action, and as nothing was gained for Spain, there is no reason to question the authenticity.

Thus, after the brief display of vigor in September and October of 1897, the Spanish efforts to perfect the organization
of the Concert of Europe and to obtain certain European commit­ments were allowed to lapse. The matter was left unattended except for perhaps the feeble blessings of Austria until Febru­ary and March of 1898. At that time, under the stress of re­asserted warnings and threats from the United States, Spain again became energetic in her search for European support.

All this while there was remarkably little in the public press which indicated that any but the diplomats had knowledge of the pending negotiations. The first real news dispatch dealing with intervention is not discovered until the middle of March. However, some of the journals and periodicals which were not so restrained in the matter of discussion and which needed no substantiation for their assumption did give certain attention to this topic. And though not exactly the same in substance, suggestions of possible lines of sympathy and alleg­iance in Europe were quite profuse.

Inspired not by Cuban anticipations but more likely by the affair in Crete, an article in the July Fortnightly is of inter­est because of an observation which proved apt:

No one who has studied the drift of public opinion in Eng­land during the last month or two can have failed to ob­serve that the policy of non-intervention has made great strides.125

In the Spectator, during September, was a blatant statement of English inclinations:

It is hardly necessary for us to say that if war takes place our sympathies will be with our own flesh and blood, and not merely because they are our own flesh and blood, but because we believe that the rule of Spain in Cuba is
an outrage on humanity. . . . and if America chooses to undertake the work of putting a stop to the hideous cruelties practiced in Cuba, all Englishmen should applaud her, and should refuse to inquire too narrowly into the reasons which have influenced her statesmen in putting pressure on Spain. 

A writer in the December *Fortnightly* expressed this same sentiment graphically:

Because we English are too ignorant or stupid to jump upon the Turk a thousand miles from home, is no cause why we should forbid our American cousins to shut the shambles at their very threshold.

An October *Spectator* touched in generalized terms on the effect war would have upon the alliances and unanimity of Europe:

We are not sure either that in the present position of Europe, which is avoiding war by the sort of strain with which a coalition avoids differences of opinion, the very fact of a war existing may not have a highly disturbing effect, dividing as it will the sympathies of great populations, and rousing the dynastic fears which wake whenever a Republic shows itself strong for actual conflict.

Intervention was finally spoken of realistically by the Illustrated *London News* in the middle of October:

... none of the Great European Powers (are) disposed to aid Spain, by force of arms, in resisting such an (American) intervention.

Several weeks later in the *Spectator* there was a similarly accurate remark as to the true state of affairs:

The Queen-Regent's Government . . . is looking around despairingly for allies, who as yet give only pleasant words. . . . The (United States) Government does not believe that Spain will find allies so long as it refrains from annexation, and knows that 'a war for liberty' will excite . . . enthusiasm. . . .

These above extracts, being about the extent of pertinent references in those periodicals from which they are taken, indicate that information as to the current thought of intervention
was not plentiful and was far from specific.

On the 10th of February the German Ambassador in Madrid, Radowitz, reported to the Foreign Office that Spain was becoming uneasy about the American fleet movements in the Caribbean region. This was no doubt the motivating factor causing Spanish officials to approach with 'special zeal' at this time both the German and French Ambassadors. Simultaneously Vigo made advances in Berlin.

After considering these renewed pleas for several days Bulow telegraphed to Radowitz defining the position of the German Government. He said that although Germany was ever friendly to Spain and her cause yet the only manner in which the Spanish cause might be promoted was under the leadership of France. This communication read in part:

The Ambassador (Spanish) enquired whether the German Government would not be prepared to lead European action in defense of the monarchical principle, against the republican aggressiveness of America.

... we must always be ready to support the monarchical principle wherever it can be done with success, but a suggestion in this sense by Germany would not be a suitable method. For the French Government, without whose cooperation action by Europe is hardly conceivable, would hardly be willing, and in consideration of the state of French public opinion, would hardly be able to follow the lead of monarchical Germany in a great joint action against a sister republic.... If, on the other hand, the French Government, induced by material considerations, decided to carry the conflict of interests, which is known to exist now between her and the United States, into the field of the Cuban question, and if proposals were made from Paris to the other Cabinets for action by Europe—diplomatic, at first—His Majesty would be ready to cooperate. A suggestion of this kind from France would cease to exist as soon as the suspicion was aroused in France that it was in accordance with German wishes and would serve German ends.
Both the friendship which the Spanish Government has shown to the French Government for more than thirteen years, and also France's important money interests in Spain, justify the assumption that the Paris Cabinet would not reject a Spanish appeal for help, unless specially difficult circumstances or—as in the case of German leadership—national feeling, stood in the way at the time.132

After this bit of procedural advice to Spain in February there was nothing heard directly from any of the Powers for the period of a month. Apparently Spain attempted to follow Germany's suggestion and sought to obtain in Paris the requisite active support. On the 11th of March Radowitz reported that as yet he had no information on the progress of the Spanish endeavors, but that it was likely that Hanotaux had merely reexpressed a platitudinous assurance of interest and willingness to cooperate and had, of course, refused to take the initiative when Austria was so obviously the most concerned State.133 A report from the Italian Ambassador in Madrid on the 12th of March is pertinent because although these conversations of Spain with Germany and France were supposedly confidential, he defines the situation with certainty:

The Spanish Government, in which Germany has demonstrated a continuing interest, has made propositions to the Emperor that he do something to show his friendship for Spain, and to weaken, if not to prevent, any action by the Americans in favor of Cuba. The German Emperor has replied that he would willingly assent to the Spanish request if Spain can get France to take the initiative after which he will give his hearty support to any action France might take. The French Government, in its turn, has replied warmly and favorably, but it also does not wish to take the lead in proposing a collective moral action to the Great Powers.134

The next step seems to have come from Austria. Undoubtedly at the insistence of Spain she again assumed the responsibility
for obtaining commitments from the Powers. Bulow reported to Eulenburg on the 15th of March this subsequent approach in Berlin:

Yesterday Herr von Szogyeny handed me the enclosed copy of the verbal note which again suggests that Germany ought to take the lead in action by Europe in the Cuban affair. It declares, as a new fact, that the Spanish Ambassador in Paris had assured his government that France would very gladly join in any representations made in Washington, if the suggestion came from another Power. The French Government could not possibly take the initiative on account of the intimacy existing between Russia and America.

Bulow went on to discuss Germany's possible attitude. He thought the French reservation in regard to Russia made it very dangerous to depend upon French cooperation and he suggested (for the first time apparently) what might be expected from England. As these several factors made the action not worth risking Bulow suggested that perhaps the best way out for Spain would be through mediation by the Pope.

This French utterance is sufficient to indicate at once that, under the circumstances, any French representations in Washington would be merely of an academic character; for it must be taken as out of the question that this or any other French Government would be side by side with Germany in any really energetic action taken against a Power which is intimate with Russia. The French Government has given the measure of what is or is not to be expected from it, and has also indicated Russia's position in the affair.

The tone of political organs in England also make it clear that she looks on the maintenance of good relations with America as much more important than her relations toward Spain. It can be said at once, therefore, that the notion of effective action by Europe cannot be realised, and that a suggestion to this end, made by the Berlin or the Vienna Cabinet, would be without result and merely tend to increase the tension existing between America and Spain.

It was possible to foresee that Spain, whose colonial administration was notoriously behind the demands of the age,
would end by having trouble with her colonies. But our gracious Master, his Majesty the Emperor, is justified in deploving that so remarkable a personality, and one so thoroughly sympathetic to himself as the Queen-Regent, should have to bear the consequences of hundreds of years maladministration. The responsibility which an ignorant and fanatical people is ready to attribute to the Regent, might perhaps be removed from her to a certain extent, if the idea, recently made public, of ending the Cuban conflict by the Pope's arbitration was realised.

The authority of the latter as arbitrator, which is recognized nowhere in the world more unquestionable than in Spain, would then cover the Regent's responsibility and minimise the dangers threatening the Monarchy.

Two days later on the 17th, after having probably gained the approval of the Kaiser on these above views, Bulow communicated to Radowitz in Madrid and enclosed this memorandum. He mentioned the occasion of 1891 when Spain had been advised to search out Russia, stating that that advice still held:

His Majesty's Government has repeatedly on various occasions, both in Vienna and Madrid, returned to the concept that if Spain was hoping for European action in her favor, she must first of all gain closer touch with Russia and look for support there. After some time a reply was made to this suggestion, to the effect that the Spanish Government had taken the step advised by us in St. Petersburg, that it had been received in a friendly manner, and that the Spanish Government was expecting a favorable result. Of this final result no news has come to us. . . . If the Spanish Government's silence regarding the result of the attempt at a rapprochement with St. Petersburg was enough to awaken doubts as to its success, these doubts have been converted into certainty by M. Hanotaux's declaration which does, and at any rate should, indicate that Russia would be more likely to side with America than with Spain. No one will expect France to side with any Power but Russia, whatever the question may be. Thus any uncertainty whether Spain can count on Franco-Russian support against America is settled in the negative, until further notice. It also indicated the only attitude possible for Germany under the circumstances, namely to hold aloof. There is not need to explain in justification, that it is Germany's duty to avoid engaging herself further or earlier than
France in a question which has aroused the passions of the American people more and more. The second Napoleonic Empire's Mexican adventure is sufficient warning for us.

You will reply to the Spanish suggestion, that . . . the Emperor deeply regrets that he cannot cooperate in settling the Spanish American conflict, until France shall have adopted an unmistakable attitude in this question and definitely promised to cooperate, dropping the above mentioned reservation regarding Russia.

This German reply must have been a deep shock to Spain for not only did Germany refuse to give any assurances of her cooperation but she even seemed to be attempting to entirely withdraw from the affair. But Spain continued her attempts in the directions that still seemed open: The Spanish Foreign Minister, Gullon, wrote to Leon y Castillo in Paris to keep up his efforts:

Telegram from Your Excellency received last night gives me extreme satisfaction, since it proves that France maintains, and will augment friendly attitude. On that government, as well as on the intelligence and zeal of Your Excellency, depends in great part whether we shall overcome, or at least moderate, the grave circumstances in which we find ourselves. To that end, it is very necessary that Monsieur Hanotaux put pressure upon the Czar and his cabinet (to whom also we are addressing ourselves), because Germany, as a consequence of I do not know what reservations or distinctions, seems to be looking to St. Petersburg, before giving to our proposal the frank, warm, and immediate adherence which, because of her previous acts, we had every right to expect.

But what the Spanish Ambassador accomplished is not indicated, for the next ten days are devoid of record of any negotiations.

It is opportune now to consider how England figured in all these calculations. It was about this time, in the middle of March, that Spain began to worry about English cooperation. It may be wondered whether through the past months the term
'European,' had really included England. A more correct term might have been 'continental'; it cannot be affirmed that the participation of England in those schemes was considered imperative by Spain. However, it is obvious that Spain had procured from England nothing in the way of promises. Ferrara's description of what had been happening in London is most apt:

From January 1898 onward, the Spanish Government had been anxious to find out what would be England's attitude, but had learned absolutely nothing. The insistence of the Madrid Ministers with Rascon, Spain's new Ambassador to London, reflects the perplexity of the Spaniards. Rascon himself did not know what to think. The words that came from the lips of the English ministers were beyond reproach, but the substance of them pointed towards a policy of strict neutrality in case of war. The ministers at London received the peace hints made to them by Madrid; they deplored any and every threat to peace, they were willing to instruct the British Ambassador at Washington that, if a good opportunity presented itself, he should explain to Washington Spain's wish to conciliation. But they were unwilling to give the Washington Government advice that Washington had not asked for, or to make any commitments as to the course England would take in the future.

The most concrete statement Spain had been able to elicit from the English had been about March 9th. There had appeared in the Times a dispatch from Washington, noting

a visit this morning by the British Ambassador to the President, accompanied by the Secretary of State. The conjecture that he brought a message of good will from England, though made, need not be pressed. . . . America fully believes that she has England's moral support. . . .

And the following day there was this comment on the incident:

The British Ambassador's visit to the President is still much discussed. There is a strong disposition to believe that he offered either moral or material support or both. . . . there is a general readiness to believe that it was a visit of goodwill, and perhaps something more.

Rascon had gone immediately to the Foreign Office and demanded:
explanations, or a disavowal of these conjectures. He was able to report to Madrid that "This the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs denied to me categorically, and also did so in the House of Commons today." At the most though this was only negative assurance and Spain was in need of something positive.

On the 17th of March the Queen Regent wrote to Victoria a letter not so different from that which she had written almost two years previously—probably the first personal communication to Victoria since that earlier occasion:

Full of trust in you I am writing to explain my difficult position, convinced that you will support me with your powerful help and good advice. So far Spain has struggled along against all difficulties. . . . We should long ago have brought the war in Cuba to an end, had America remained neutral, but now, when the insurrection is nearly over, the Americans intend to provoke us and bring about war, and this I would avoid at all costs. . . .

Until now I have now troubled anybody with my affairs, and I only do so now in order to preserve peace. I have applied to the Emperor of Austria, who promised me to approach the other Powers in order that common action may be taken for the preservation of peace; but I wished to address myself to you at the same time to beg you not to deny me your powerful protection. I know how with the greatest kindness you always interest yourself in my poor fatherless son—for his sake I beg you to help me. It would so distress me if England were not at one with the other great Powers in this matter. . . .

Christina had good reason to believe that this letter might be productive, for indeed Victoria's personal sympathies were not with the United States. Spain had long been counting on the fact that the reigning monarchs of Europe would be on her side, and that it was only the circumspectness of the more or less democratic parliamentary
officials that she would have to contend with to achieve her goal. At this time Franz Josef perceived that Spain was not making any perceptible progress, and began a program directed at the heads of the States. Ferrara states:

With great energy, Franz Josef now approached the sovereigns. The Kaiser of Germany, acting separately from his Government, started work with the German Ambassador in Vienna, Madrid, and Washington, with whom he communicated directly.

Even the President of the French Republic was willing to address himself to the Czar personally, and it was believed at Madrid that if he should do so, the Kaiser would do likewise. From Italy came encouraging reports; the Cabinet, despite the objections of several very influential men in the Foreign Service, was disposed to go along with the other Powers.144

Despite their interest, these personages were unavailing in the final disposition of national forces. Characteristic, no doubt, was the case of England. It was not until the 1st of April that Salisbury felt constrained to give to Victoria a memorandum as to the manner in which she should reply to the personal plea from the Queen-Regent. He noted:

The Spanish question is very grave; and Lord Salisbury would not like to advise your Majesty to give any undertaking to assist the Queen of Spain without consulting his colleagues; for any communication from this country to the United States in the way of remonstrances, might arouse their susceptible feelings and produce a condition of some danger, without any corresponding advantage. At the same time Lord Salisbury thinks that your Majesty would not refuse to join in any course taken by all the other great Powers. But he doubts the expediency of action by them. It is more likely to help the war party in the United States than to weaken them.

The position of the Queen Regent of Spain is most lamentable and grievous. It is impossible not to feel the deepest sympathy for her.145
Thus on the 4th of April Victoria was able to record in her Journal: "Wrote a letter to the Queen of Spain, who has appealed to me, poor thing!" This reply could hardly have been of any assistance to Spain, even had it contained anything of substance, for a week or so earlier Spain had begun to feel the pressure of events in the United States and precipitate action had become necessary.

It was on the 26th of March (Woodford was threatening with the Maine report) that Spain finally attempted to bring the matter of intervention to a test. On that day she made a last effort through diplomatic channels to discover what England was going to do. And disregarding English possibilities she put her plea for help into a definite and positive form to the other Powers. Surveying the situation Spain could not perceive that she had a great deal to count upon. Ferrara sums it up:

France was willing to support a discreet action at Washington; the Kaiser, though inclined to be somewhat reserved, was disposed to associate himself in a general action, provided that France also should join; Austria and Italy were in agreement with the Kaiser’s attitude; Russia, while not believing in the practicability of the joint action, nevertheless would not withhold her assent in the event that all the others should concur.

Gullon dispatched instructions to Rascone in a final effort to determine the English position:

I understand that the absence of Salisbury will increase the difficulties of Your Excellency in reference to certain confidential investigations, but I wish nevertheless that Your Excellency should learn if Great Britain actually has made any agreement with the United States in the event of war, or if Britain’s silence is due solely to the wish to keep her hands free, and not to be bound in advance by any commitment, tacit or express, with the government of the
Republic. If at the very earliest possible moment you can inform us with respect to these questions, you will do us a great service. Do not, however, ask anything of Drummond Woolf.148

This reference to Drummond Woolf, the distrusted British Ambassador, was due to the fact that he had for a protracted period been absent from his post in Madrid. This circumstance had only increased the difficulty of handling the question with England. (Perhaps this was the intent of the British.) Apparently Rascone learnt nothing at all for the next telegram to him from Gullon had a definite tone of futility:

The attitude of that Government, and the views of its ministers are, as I have been told in Rome, even stranger and more mystifying than Your Excellency believes. This cannot be the result of their blundering, but must be due to a policy or interest not friendly to us. In the circumstances, it will not do for you to insist overmuch on the questions formulated ... in my ... telegram. It will be enough for you merely to present them, and meanwhile we must be patient, and seek to learn what that government is doing, and what it proposes to do.149

As for the petition to the Powers on that 26th of March, a trustworthy account would seem to be that of Radowitz to his Government:

This afternoon the Minister of State verbally informed the Ambassadors of Austria, France, Russia, Italy, myself, and the British Charge d'Affaires, in identical terms, that in view of the threatening development of affairs with the United States of America, the Spanish Government desired to forward through the representatives here to our Governments the following confidential request: 'That the Powers should advise both Spain and the United States of America to prevent the conflict which may arise out of the questions put by Mr. Woodford in his note of March 23rd by accepting an arbitrator, so that peace be not disturbed.'

... They would be especially grateful here for the greatest possible dispatch of the Powers in sending their answers. All my colleagues have received a similar message.150
About this same time Radowitz sent Bulow further observations upon the Spanish temper of the moment:

The Queen feels that the question of the conflict with America regarding Cuba has now reached an acute state, and that its decision can no longer be delayed. . . . Her Majesty herself no longer believes that the tendencies pointing to complete independence of the colony could be held back permanently. It is her anxiety—and now also that of a continually increasing number of intelligent Spaniards—not so much that Spain should assert her claim to possess Cuba, which is a perpetual danger and a very great burden to her, but rather that the separation of this colony from the Mother country should be completed in a form which should not threaten the continuance of the present monarchy. . . . In the last two years public opinion in Spain has become more familiar than could have before been conceivable with the possibility of losing Cuba, which, on the assumption naturally, that Spain would also be relieved of the Cuban debt, would be more of a strength than a weakness to the Spanish State. 151

So now after these weeks of active preparation and numerous statements that she would never relinquish Cuba nor accept arbitration, finally it is found that Spain is requesting merely that the Powers jointly advise Spain and the United States that mediation should be utilized instead of resorting to war. There was no proposal that the Great Powers forcefully intervene to directly aid Spain!

Here at this first decisive juncture, with such a moderate form of action requested, and after having so many times reiterated her pledge to cooperate in any simple measure of recommending peaceful means, Germany held off. Bulow instructed Radowitz that

For the reasons known to you His Majesty's Government is prevented from taking a lead in the Spanish-American affair: You will, therefore, report at once what is known to you of the replies returned by other Cabinets. 152
Yet Bulow had the cross to write to Radowitz a day or so later, complaining that

The Americans are not likely to be impressed by the attitude of the European powers, which was, indeed, foreseen by His Imperial Majesty's Government; among these, Russia and France, perhaps under the influence of England's silence, refuse all initiative and merely utter platonic words of sympathy.188

'Words of sympathy' must indeed have been all Spain received, for nothing further is recorded of this interlude from any of the Powers.

Spain perhaps did not notice the deflection for she was engrossed in the more recently suggested solution to her problems. This was the scheme for Papal mediation. As noted above there had been mention of this possibility in Bulow's memorandum of March 15th. It is not known when this idea first made its appearance but on the 28th of February there appeared in the Times an item from Madrid:

*The Imparcial published a dispatch * . . . * which purports to give the substance of an interview with Prince Bismarck on the subject of Cuba and the relations of the United States with Spain. The ex-Chancellor is represented to have said that the Cuban question ought to be submitted to the arbitration of the Pope, though he hardly thought that the United States, as a Protestant nation, would accept such arbitration.*

The article then quoted the typically Spanish remarks of Premier Sagasta on the subject of this proposal:

*Arbitration is impossible because no basis can be found for it . . . The Government rejects, and will continue to reject . . . every act, however small, tending to cast the slightest shade on the indisputable sovereignty of the nation or diminish our liberty of action in any territory where floats the Spanish flag . . . To speak of*
arbitration is a waste of words...154

Despite such zealous assertions it had come to be generally felt in Europe that Spain, in her extremity, might submit to the plan. The Pope seemed to be an ideal party for mediator, from the point of view of Spain, as his Catholic authority would be readily accepted by the people. The Chancelleries of Europe gladly pushed the scheme as it seemed to offer them escape from a task for which they had no inclination. On the 26th, 27th, and 29th of March the German Foreign Office dispatched successive telegrams to Rome, helping to define the basis upon which negotiations could be undertaken by the Pope.155 However, upon specific enquiry whether she would consent to give up Cuba to avoid war, Spain replied on the 1st of April in the negative.156 The plan for Papal mediation thus quickly faded, it being known that the United States was not considering anything but outright independence for the island, and that even to obtain this, the chances of her bargaining through the Pope were of the very slightest. However, a week or ten days later, just before McKinley's Message, Spain did call upon the Pope for assistance. At her private request the Pope formally suggested to Spain that a truce be granted in Cuba, and acting upon this Spain with dignity was able to inform the United States an armistice would be arranged. As Ferrara says:

Thus the efforts of the Pope in the whole dispute...amounted to no more than a request to Spain to end hostilities in Cuba. At no time did the head of the Catholic Church assume the character of arbitrator.157
An altogether new phase of the negotiations was initiated in the first days of April, motivated largely by the Ambassadors of the Powers in Washington. Thus there are not many traces found as to the references and personalities involved. Important was a communication on the 4th of April from Bulow to Holleben, the German Ambassador in Washington:

The Austro-Hungarian representative in Washington is inclined to take, together with the representatives of the other five Great Powers, some step with the American government for the maintenance of peace. And insofar as the other five representatives will cooperate, you are empowered to join in that step in the manner which the Vienna cabinet desires.

On the other hand, as it is telegraphed from Madrid that a Papal movement for the bringing about of peace is imminent which may very well be more welcome to the American sensibilities than a comparable step by the Powers and, as you may feel upon consideration that a strong impression by the latter is out of the question inasmuch as its academic character would be apparent because of the well-known prior position of England, France, and Russia, so it may commend itself perhaps that Austria, being the most interested representative in the Spanish question, should be made to see that a platonic and really hopeless step by the powers might compromise a more powerful peace action coming from the other source.158

This significant dispatch is one of three from Die Grosse Politik left untranslated by Dugdale.159 It is most clear on the point that the German Foreign Office advised against the representations in Washington, rather than that being the instigator as is a generally accepted impression. Other items bear out this position of Germany. On the next day, the 5th of April, Bulow records that he told Vigo:

I added that I should be acting disloyally if I allowed the Ambassador to believe that there was any real prospect of active intervention in Spain's favor by the World Powers, who were just now occupied with the Far East.160
And on the 7th Bulow wrote to the Kaiser:

I thoroughly agree with the view that in dealing with the Spanish-American conflict, we must avoid all appearances of unnecessary partisanship, especially against America, and must join only in as far as is unavoidable, in order not to arouse distrust among the other Powers and even in America itself. 161

Bulow intimated at the beginning of that dispatch to Holleben that it was Austria that had organized the scheme for action in Washington and what little other evidence there is supports this theory. Ferrara says:

In St. Petersburg things never at any time took definite shape. . . . On April 2nd, Count Mouravieff, Secretary of State, told (Villagonzalo) that before a decision could be reached, it was requisite that the Austrian Chancellor should state in precise terms to the governments of the European Powers, the kind of action he contemplated taking with respect to the projected joint diplomatic action at Washington. After some delay Austria made the statement asked for, but still Mouravieff refused to commit himself. 162

On the 3rd, Goluchowsky in Vienna is reported to have stated to Hoyos, the Spanish Ambassador:

Russia and Italy favor a joint effort, and there is no doubt about Germany and France. England will also join, but on condition that her Ambassador in Washington shall first discuss the matter of friendly mediation by the Powers with the American State Department. 163

As to England's part in the representation there are numerous statements substantiating the view that she was reluctant to take any part in the representations but that it would have been difficult to have remained aloof. A report by Ambassador Hay on the 6th of April of a conversation with Salisbury is conclusive:

He told me that the Government of Great Britain had formally instructed Sir Julian Pauncefote to be guided by the wishes of the President, in any action he might take or
not take in the direction of any collective representation of the Diplomatic body in Washington. He then read me part of a dispatch from Sir Julian Pauncefote, indicating that some such representation would be made today, with the assent of the President and the State Department. This was somewhat unexpected news to him, for he repeated his assurance that neither here nor in Washington did the British Government propose to take any steps which would not be acceptable to the Government of the United States. 164

It seems uncontroverted that the Austrian Ambassador took the responsibility of calling the representatives together and of obtaining their consent for the note to be presented to the President. Hollseben reported that "after long consideration, we decided to go no deeper into questions still unsettled" and so when, on the 7th of April, the Powers presented their view of the impending Spanish-American crisis it amounted to no more than an expression of hope 'for the sake of humanity' that peace would not be disturbed. McKinley replied with composure that it was only by 'humanity' that the United States intended to be guided in her actions.

Two days later on the 9th of April the representatives of the Powers took a similar step in Madrid. They could afford there to be more blunt. They recommended that the suggestion of the Pope for an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities in Cuba be acted upon. And within a few hours Spain did so act. But this gesture served no purpose; the United States went ahead in her war preparations.

* * * * * * * * *

On the 11th, the day of McKinley's long delayed Message to Congress, "The Austrian Government . . . proposed once again to
the Powers that action be taken in Washington in Spain's behalf. Because of the success of the Powers in at least finally speaking collectively, it was felt they might now join in some stronger action at Washington. The Italian Government replied that it was willing to cooperate in this further step if all the Powers participate, and that, in addition, before the project is put in effect, the American Government must be sounded out to determine whether the United States will adopt an attitude embarrassing to Europe.

This was simply a restatement of the British condition and hardly could it be hoped to obtain effective action against the United States if she were going to be consulted beforehand. This tentative proposal bringing no results, Austria in her usual habit of attempting to shift the initiative to one of the other Powers mentioned momentarily that maybe Hanotaux would prepare a Note which all of the Powers would sign and jointly forward to Washington, but of course such an ill conceived project received absolutely no response.

The days were slipping by and nothing valuable was being accomplished on the continent. It was seen that any further steps would have to originate with the representatives in Washington. And in fact, the Ambassadors did attempt to come together again. There is one indirect reference to some manner of projected action duplicating that taken on the 7th. Holleben in a dispatch on the 22nd of April states that "Shortly afterwards it was Sir Julian Pauncefote who rejected the further
steps which were advised here for common action by the Powers. No other particulars or circumstances are known.

However, on the 14th of April the Ambassadors gathered in a meeting which, in its subsequent recounts, was to cause considerable discussion. The Ambassadors on this occasion decided that they should send to their respective Foreign Offices identical notes, with the suggestion that the six Governments each give its approval to the sentiment expressed and then present it to the United States. The later dissension was as to which representative was responsible for calling the meeting and especially as to which was responsible for the terminology and phrasing of the note which would have been highly offensive had it come to the attention of the United States. When Holleben dispatched his copy of the note to Berlin he commented by way of introduction:

It is very remarkable that the British Ambassador today took the initiative in a fresh step by the representatives of the Great Powers. We imagine that the Queen-Regent applied to the Queen of England in this sense. Many writers have come to the defense of Pauncefote by citing extenuating circumstances and intimating that Germany was to blame for the whole thing. However from the total evidence it would seem that the facts briefly were: The representatives gathered on that 14th of April at the British Embassy on the instigation of the Austrian Ambassador. They were there presented by Pauncefote with a draft note in English. In the course of the ensuing discussion the French Ambassador translated this
note into French, making such amendments as seemed agreed upon. Then, without an intensive rereading of the note, the Ambassadors dispersed and the revised and translated not as it then stood was dispatched to their respective Governments.

This note in question, as it was contained in the communication of Holleben to Berlin, read as follows:

In view of the attitude of Congress no further hope of peace can be entertained, and general opinion appears to imagine that the Powers also object to war. The Spanish Minister's note of April 10th seems to offer a good basis for fresh negotiations. If the Governments share this view, it would appear advisable to dissipate the misconception that armed intervention in Cuba is approved by the civilized world. (The President, in his December message, said that he only desired intervention if this were the case.) Under these circumstances, the representatives here believe that the Great Powers might call the attention of this Government to the Spanish Note of April 10th, and declare that armed intervention does not appear to them justified. This declaration might take the form of a collective note from the Powers to the representatives of the United States of America. This would make a greater impression and not make it appear as though the representatives merely desired to repeat their first step, which the President did not even deign to mention in his most recent message. If an identic note were decided upon, it would be advisable to publish it immediately, in order to relieve the civilized world of the reproach of having condoned this aggression, for which their authority is being quoted.172

In spite of the contention as to whether the British Ambassador was or was not mainly responsible for initiating this second action in Washington it is most clear that the British Foreign Office summarily rejected it. Several years later it was related by a Foreign Office official in answer to a query from the House of Commons that:

On the receipt of this message Her Majesty's Government at once replied objecting to the terms of the proposed
communication as injudicious. Two days later Lord Pauncefote was informed that Her Majesty's Government had resolved to take no action. We had at that time no information of the attitude of the German Government. 173

From all accounts France followed the lead of England in this matter, giving the note no more consideration after learning that the British were to let it lapse. The Spanish Ambassador in Paris was told that all of the Powers "except Austria believe it contraproductive at this time to unite in a joint note, believing that if they did so, the effect would be to excite the passions of the American people." 174

As independent and immediate as the English was the Russian decision on this new development. Russia had long disparaged the efficacy of any move whatsoever to influence the United States. The Italian Ambassador recorded Foreign Secretary Mouravieff as saying on April 16th with regard to the proposed collective note that it

... would not dissipate the threat of war, and might have the effect of establishing a dangerous precedent; if the Great Powers were to approve it, it was probable that Russia would do the same, but he believed it would be far better for the Powers to limit themselves to instructing their representatives at Washington to take, each independently of the other, such action as his Government believed most opportune. With a dignified protest such as this, the Powers could disavow all responsibility in this dispute in which effective intervention now seems impossible. 175

Radolin, the German Ambassador, also reported a conversation with Mouravieff, which must have taken place on the same day:

Count Mouravieff will receive the Emperor's commands tomorrow, as to whether it is considered right for Russia to join in an identical or a collective note. Personally
he considered . . . that both steps would be pointless, for America would certainly not accept them, and they would only damage the Powers' credit with America. . . . Count Mouravieff fears that the whole proposal, which comes from England, is intended to disunite us monarchic Powers from America. If once annoyance took root, it would be hard for us to draw near to America again, and this might be necessary under certain circumstances. It would not be so difficult for purely parliamentary Powers as for monarchic Powers, such as Russia and Germany, to draw near again. Count Mouravieff is strengthened in the belief that this is the English calculation, as England's game at first was not clear, in as much as she proposed mediation in America, and then, when she was unsuccessful in this, sheltered herself behind the Powers so as to take common action. The fact that the President did not give a single word of mention to the first Note of the Ambassadors, shows that America does not desire the unanimity of the Powers.

Count Mouravieff summed up his exposition by saying that in his personal opinion there could be no promise of success for either an identical or a collective note; he thinks non-intervention to be the best policy. 176

It was upon this personal expression of probable Russian policy that Germany based her attitude and decision in regard to the proposal from Washington. Evidently without prior knowledge of what steps England and France were taking Bulow communicated to the Emperor:

I will at once reply to Count Mouravieff that Your Majesty considers that an empty protest would merely do harm to the dignity of the powers, and I will telegraph to Vienna and London that a fresh suggestion has been made by England for a new collective step in Washington in the interests of peace. From what is known here of the Russian Government's views, its participation is more than doubtful; Your Majesty's Government, however, considers that a fresh platonic step—and to anything more the combined Powers would never agree—would do no good to Spain, but merely injure the dignity of the Powers. Finally I will communicate Prince Radowitz's telegram to Herr von Radowitz for his private information. 177

This left Italy uncommitted and Austria the only Power
anxious to proceed. On the 19th of April both Germany and England made it a point to officially declare their positions and it was then immediately obvious that this second attempted movement for intervention was not to culminate. War began almost immediately.

There is yet remaining one paltry mention of something like intervention. On June 5th Holleben asked the Foreign Office about the possibility of a peace proposal being issued by the Continental Powers. The Kaiser is said to have remarked that "he would not fall into that trap again; mediation was nonsense, until one or the other of the belligerents was completely defeated." On July 16th, after a communication from Radowitz at Madrid, the German Foreign Office declared that "mediation by the Continental Powers was impossible; the right course (to secure peace terms) was for Spain to appeal to the combined Continental Powers to join England for the purpose of mediation." But by this time even Spain was weary of attempting to get the Powers together and in her suit for peace she employed the good offices of France alone.

This final phase of the attempted intervention, culminating in the representations at Washington on the 7th of April and which had an anti-climax in the meeting at the British Embassy on the 14th, seemed to have dated from about the middle of February. Yet there was nothing in the nature of reliable press knowledge of these events until along in the middle of
March. The press had had little or no inkling of the September negotiations, and of course through the intervening months there had been nothing to report. However, through the entire period there were frequent references to 'national sympathies'—comments as to the inclination of public opinion in the several countries. But this was not the same as anticipating whether or not the Powers were enough interested in the future of Cuba and Spain to go the length of publicly and collectively asserting themselves. Thus the people in Europe were tardily informed of the fact that important negotiations were underway. Following through the Times from day to day, there may be observed beginning in March the gradual and growing certainty that some manner of intervention had been proposed but that it was indeed insecure in its prospects.

On March 11th from the correspondent in New York there came a rumor about American investigation of European sentiments:

The accounts of communications between this Government and other European Powers than England may or may not be well founded. There is a concurrence of testimony from several quarters that they have all been sounded and that all but Germany and Austria responded in a friendly spirit.181

On the 13th from the Paris Temps came this following accurate observation:

Spain does not deceive herself when she counts upon the sympathies, at least latent, of the European Governments. But she would be as mistaken to rely upon any effectual support from Great Britain as to attach any serious meaning to the alleged willingness of the Triple Alliance to uphold her cause and fight her battles. Spain must before all rely on herself.182
Again from New York a comment on the 13th noted the American realization that European attitudes were perhaps worthy of analysis:

Amid all this confusion American eyes are turned often to Europe. Thence come certain anxieties for the Government, especially with reference to Germany and Austria, for reasons well understood on both sides. London dispatches, however, all bring assurances of English good will.

Finally on the 14th of March assertions became more specific, indicating perhaps some confidential source of news. The Paris correspondent telegraphed:

The Emperor Francis Josef, according to information from good sources, is making great efforts to induce the European Powers to represent to the United States the danger to Europe of their carrying any further their interference in Cuban affairs—affairs which are regarded as European rather than American. It is not surprising to learn that the efforts of the Emperor Francis Josef are being warmly seconded by the Emperor William. The American Government is stated to be aware of this situation.

The same day there was a dispatch from Vienna giving the substance of an article in one of the papers there. It was said to assert that

... the United States are well aware that in declaring war on Spain they could not count upon the approval of any of the European Powers. All of them would side with Spain, if not actively, at all events by means of a categorical protest against Mr. McKinley's conduct. This is also well known in Madrid.

On the 16th of March the New York correspondent, after perusing such dispatches as were available, was able to dismiss the most serious threat as being yet inconsequential:

Austria, for dynastic reasons, and Germany, for reasons partly of Tariff disputes and partly of Imperial feeling...
towards the United States, are using their moral weight in diplomacy on the side of Spain. It is not believed that any opposition has declared itself on the part of either Power of which this Government is obliged to take notice. 186

From Berlin on the 21st came a summary of feeling there definitely moderate in tone:

In no quarter can I find any trace of an inclination on the part of Germany to intervene in any shape or form in the Cuban question. ... Germany's extensive and complex commercial interests, as well as a regard for Germans in America, absolutely forbid her to have anything to do with the matter. Lively sympathies are entertained here for the Queen Regent of Spain, but they afford no ground for abandoning the reserved and strictly neutral attitude which has been maintained from the beginning of the Cuban troubles. 187

A Vienna dispatch of a week later was equally discouraging as to prospects for Spain:

If it were hoped that the difficulty between the two countries was capable of being settled by the friendly intervention of any of the Powers, it would, perhaps, have been well to abstain from admonishing exclusively the United States as if there were no wrongs on the other side. The Austrian semi-official press has wisely refrained from committing itself to any very strong opinion either way.

This same correspondent transmitted an extract from the Russian paper Novosti which was most blunt in its statement that Europe would not act:

Unfortunately, it is evident that Spain is doomed to carry on this struggle with the United States alone, as the European Powers will not wish to interfere in this matter in which they have no immediate interest. 188

But in Spain the possibilities of diplomatic action or even of military action for her benefit were not considered so remote. On the 31st of March the Madrid correspondent reported on the currents of public spirit there:

Either Spanish diplomacy has been working busily and with
solid results in various Courts of Europe, or else public opinion is once again incapable of discriminating between material alliances and courteous phrases of a more or less platonic character... The obviously guarded words spoken by M. Hanotaux in the French Chamber are distorted in an astonishing manner by the Madrid Press. The most extravagant interpretations are put upon them... M. Georges Thiebaud's article in the Journal is reproduced with as much enthusiasm as though it were directly inspired by some Government, and a call by the French or Russian Ambassador at the Palace gives rise to infinite speculations... Austria, it is whispered, is particularly anxious that no rupture should occur, and Russia and France, or France and England—for the combination varies from moment to moment—are rumoured to be practically cooperating to the same pacific end.

The Heraldo alone among Madrid newspapers loudly protests against Spain's predisposition to throw the burden of her concerns on foreign soldiers. A leading article in that journal says: 'That the Madrid Government has made diplomatic soundings is an open secret, but, although we do not pretend to be initiated in certain mysteries, we venture to affirm that in Vienna, and Berlin, and Paris, we have reaped fair words and the offer, at most, of a moral support appropriate to the circumstances of the conflict, should conflict present itself. Nothing more. No promise of effective intervention has been made...'

The same day there was notice of an even more extravagant article in one of the Madrid papers:

The Ministerial journal El Globo will publish a leading article tomorrow confirming the statement that the foreign Powers are using every effort to mediate between the United States and Spain and that peace is likely to result. The Globe will say: 'Spain, seeing that the sympathy of the Powers is openly for her, will come forward, not only in defense of her own rights, but as the champion of Europe against the aggressive action of the United States.'

But the papers of Paris at the same moment were realistic—-even pessimistic—about the cause of Spain:

The Debats and the Temps comment on the prospect of war between Spain and America. The former, while declaring that France unanimously sides with Spain, acknowledges that her diplomacy can do little without injuring the disputants and herself. The Temps admits that the first
effort of diplomacy has not been very successful. 191

It was not until the 5th of April that the Times saw fit to recognize editorially the possibilities of intervention:

It is said, indeed, that notes are being exchanged between European Cabinets with a view to representations at Washington. But that sort of European concert, even if it can be effected, is a harmless enough affair, especially as we cannot for a moment suppose that it would include Great Britain. . . . 192

After the appeal by the Powers on the 7th of April there was of course almost immediate realization and admission that the representations had accomplished nothing. Thoughts next turned to the question of whether, with this move back of them, the Powers could come to agree now on some action more vigorous and certain of modifying the course of the United States. On the 8th it was reported from Washington to the Times:

Inquiries at the various Embassy and Legations today made it plain that yesterday's action constituted all that the Powers would do, and that they have no intention at present of following up their Note with any suggestion, negotiations, or intervention. Influential members of the Diplomatic Body say that the Note contained nothing between the lines which could be taken to indicate that the Powers intended to take further steps. . . . It is said . . . that Sir Julian Pauncefote, reflecting the views of Great Britain, used a repressive influence in keeping the Note to a mild and polite expression of the desire of the Powers for peace, and that had the influence of the French and Austrian representatives prevailed the Note would have been more emphatically worded. Up to the present time Russia and Italy have taken the least interest in the action of the Powers, although they joined in it as a result of influences from foreign capitals. Germany also has shown no ardent interest in the joint action. 193

And a week later on the very day the Ambassadors gathered at the British Embassy there was this comment as to future possibilities:
There is renewed talk in diplomatic circles today of European intervention on more definite lines than hitherto.

It is reported, however, that if anything is done, it will probably be only a further appeal by Spain to the Powers showing that the armistice has been granted, with a request that, as the Powers have secured this action, they should unite to see that time is allowed to try the efficacy of the concession. Many diplomatists believe that Spain will make such an appeal and that she will meet with a favorable response, but the general opinion at the different Embassies and Legations is that war is inevitable.

At this same time dispatches from the various capitals of Europe indicated the conflicting reactions to the thought that effective results might be obtained:

(Madrid) In diplomatic circles, says the Liberal, it is admitted that American bad faith puts Spain in a favorable position in the eyes of Europe, but it is considered doubtful whether the Powers will intervene, owing to Great Britain's ambiguous attitude.

(Paris) The Temps seems to dread the growth of an undue sympathy in official circles—it is not quite clear where—for Spain. Its warning is, perhaps, meant for Austria and a little for France. At all events, it says, 'any nation which should assume by itself the responsibility of backing Spain and of making itself an enemy of the United States would injure, in the most serious way, its most essential interests.'

(St. Petersburg) . . . the members of the Diplomatic Body here, strongly desire that a last effort should be made to prevent war. The foreign diplomatists are now considering among themselves and with Russian statesmen the desirability of the Great Powers making for a second time joint friendly representations to the United States Government in favor of the maintenance of peace. It is believed here that a step of this nature is about to be taken.

(Vienna) . . . there has been and can be no question of intervention. It is mediation in the least obtrusive form which the Powers have attempted. . . . Between action of this description and actual intervention there is little in common . . . . The effacement of the United States as a factor in the transoceanic schemes of some of the Great Powers and the paralysing of its export trade, even if only for a time, might tempt some of the more enterprising European States ultimately to promote intervention in the
campaign which now seems almost inevitable. 198

Finally on the 19th of April there came from Washington a dispatch which was conclusive and marked the end of any discussion as to intervention:

The Diplomatic Body in Washington is doing nothing as a body. In the presence of the decision of England to observe strict neutrality no concerted action is possible. No other is of much value. France and Austria seems to be still unconvinced that the voice of Continental Europe may not be heeded in Washington. They continue their efforts in certain directions, but they are certain beforehand to fail. . . . 199

As was true during the fall months, so now in February and March the periodicals with their greater liberty of discussion were able to perceive and to adduce more comprehensively the progress of the intervention idea. In this field the Spectator was outstanding, colorful and yet seemingly accurate. The following extracts taken from different issues typify its range of speculations:

On February 19th: Whether France has actually come to the pecuniary aid of Spain, directly or indirectly, is a very difficult question. . . . But even if France has not given financial encouragement to Spain, it is by no means improbable that diplomatic encouragement and support have been rendered her . . . privately and unostentatiously. . . . It is by no means unlikely that she let is be understood indirectly that considerations of the utmost importance to her as a nation would not allow her to see Spain treated in an unfriendly spirit by any Power, and that a Spanish appeal made to France must cause in the end the intervention of France. . . . In any case . . . France cannot possibly afford to neglect Spain. 200

On March 19th: We have always held that the possible action of the Continental Powers must be taken into consideration when weighing the Cuban problem, and this view has lately been supported by news from various sources. . . . The Americans would not be likely to alter their course because of a veiled Continental menace; . . . the
American people have instinctively understood that their Spanish quarrel may bring them face to face with a Continental coalition...

On April 6th: Suppose that such a coalition exists, or looks like coming into existence—a coalition formed of France, and Russia, Germany and Austria—the President might well feel cause for hesitation and delay. ... As a matter of fact, if America were really attacked by a great Continental coalition, England would be at her side in twenty-four hours.

On April 16th: The attitude of the Continent in regard to the struggle is very curious. When England and the United States are squabbling the European Press always profess an intense cordiality for America, but in reality the Continental peoples do not love the Republic. Now they are in full cry, especially in Paris, against the insulting and arrogant Power which dares to act without considering the feelings of the Concert of Europe. Fortunately public opinion here is ... with America.

In the same issue: Germany, Austria, and Russia all sympathize with the Monarchical principle, all dislike the great Republic, as by its very prosperity inimical to Monarchy, and all have grounds for quarrel, more or less acute and of long standing. France, too, though not Monarchical, is very friendly to Spain, hankers always for an alliance with her in the Mediterranean, and would greatly like to possess Morocco with Spanish consent. Moreover, the Continent thirsts for the power of entering Spanish America, the feeling being particularly strong in France and Germany—in France because General Grant hustled her out of Mexico, in Germany owing to her economic situation.
IV.

It is not known exactly what form of assistance was expected by Spain out of her appeal to the Powers on the eve of the War. Mere diplomatic representations seem to have been taken for granted by most of the parties involved. It was felt that they were pointing toward some kind of a collective Note; the United States was to be informed that she had no legitimate right to interfere in Cuba and that any such course would be strongly resented by Europe. The efficacy of a communication of this type depended upon the likelihood of its being supplemented by actual military force. From the many delays and the multiple evasions of initiative displayed by the European Powers it is obvious that the responsibility for this ultimate issue of intervention was truly not sought. Ferrara is most accurate when he terms as 'extraordinary' a sly request of Gullon on April 16th that the Pope suggest "to the Great Powers that one of the best ways of preventing war would be for them to make a naval demonstration." In this connection too it may be noted that when a proposal of Admiral Tirpitz that "we must . . . send out some ships in order to show that we too have something to say over there" was transmitted to Bülow it was received with extreme diffidence. Although the idea was repeatedly expressed that "platonic steps with empty protests can have no utility for Spain, but can have only injurious results for the reputation of the Powers," yet at
no time was it seriously projected to take any really vigorous action. Spain should have early resigned herself to the prospect of obtaining at the most only a mild statement to the United States that Europe hoped always for the maintenance of peace.

Spanish statesmen apparently did not comprehend the increasing importance of the United States in world affairs. They misjudged the comparative estimation of Spain, and thought themselves still an essential element on the Continent. The Spanish appeal was based upon an abstract sentiment—support of the dynasty. But it was not adequately proved to the Powers in what manner this principle was of material concern to them. Profuse sympathy was indeed extended to Spain and her monarch, but the decision of Europe was based rather upon factors relating to the United States. A recognition of the coming preponderant place of the United States in the economic balance and an appreciation of the uniquely unassailable status of the United States in the scheme of international strategy, were the criteria by which the Powers very shortly perceived that it was not to their advantage to endanger their relations with the United States for the sake of the Spanish Queen-Regent.

The commercial statistics noted in that first dispatch from Bulow to the Kaiser in September of 1897 are worthy of brief expansion. At this period the value in millions of dollars of the trade of each of the Powers with the United States and with Spain was roughly: 207
The financial loss which would attend the adoption of a position calculated to resist the United States was most real; the benefits which would accrue from the continued presence of the Spanish throne were vague. It may be observed that Austria, who was the chief proponent of Spain's cause, risked as Bulow said "practically nothing, in regard to trade and commerce." Also on this point it was mentioned that "Austria did not have a powerful fleet. Her coast line was small. In the event of a war, Austria's contribution would be less than that of any other of the Great Powers." So she alone could afford to institute moves hostile to the United States in order to demonstrate her friendship for Spain.

Other reasons for the unresponsiveness of the Great Powers were in connection with fundamental concepts of international politics—the world rivalry of the Powers.

One aspect of this was the view that the Cuban question was not worth causing dissension within the Concert of Europe. The attempted execution of a vital intervention policy would quickly disrupt the ostensible harmony then prevalent in Europe. "... no door should be left open, through which an American question might penetrate to Europe. Equilibrium had been reached in
Europe, despite grave difficulties, and at the cost of much effort. No chance must be taken of disturbing this equilibrium, by any action in the interest of a Power which had long been indifferent (to them).\(^\text{210}\)

It was felt in some quarters that to interfere in this problem, admittedly largely American, might induce the United States "to interfere in European affairs at some future date, and this could not be permitted."\(^\text{211}\) Perhaps by leaving the United States unmolested now she would continue the naive course of isolation. The Powers wished to pursue, without the addition of another claimant, the exploitation of Africa and the Orient. In Bulow's Memoirs there is related how the Kaiser's dreams of expansion were so shattered by the emergence of the United States.

The Kaiser thought . . . that the Spaniards would be unable to quell the insurrection in the Philippines; but he also thought that the American fleet would be beaten by the Spanish. Then, he supposed, Manila would drop like a ripe fruit into our lap. The Spaniards, perhaps, might even ask us to restore order in the Philippines and then offer us Manila as our reward. A clean sweep was made of all such fantasies by the disastrous defeat of the Spaniards at Cavite.\(^\text{212}\)

The converse phase of this point was even more apt. Although the Powers did not wish the United States to enter international councils, yet at the same time they had definite intentions of not estranging the United States. More positively they each hoped to improve her friendship. Through these months the prospect was constantly in mind that some portion of the negotiations would be revealed to the United States and that the prestige and intimacy of some one of the Powers might be advanced
to the detriment of the others. Bulow early made it his task to "prevent England and France from exploiting any German action in Spain's favour in order to embroil (Germany) with America." And Mouravieff contended that the whole proposal came from England and was "intended to disunite (the) monarchical Powers from America." By all it was known that the new Power arising on the other side of the Atlantic could be more useful to them than Spain. . . . One day Asia and Europe would call on the power of the United States to aid in the settlement of difficult problems.
NOTES

1. Jefferson said: "I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States." Paul L. Ford, Writings of Thomas Jefferson, New York, 1899, Vol. X, p. 261. John Quincy Adams said: "These islands ... are natural appendages to the North American continent; and ... Cuba ... from a multitude of considerations has become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests of our Union." W. C. Ford, Writings of John Q. Adams, New York, 1917, Vol. VII, p. 372. Clay wrote: "(We) could not consent to the occupation of these islands by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatsoever." Also there are similar remarks by Madison, and of course the implications of Monroe's Message. All these are cited in Harry F. Guggenheim, The United States and Cuba, New York, 1934, pp. 2-5.

2. In 1819 there were reports that England was buying Cuba, and in 1836 Spain actually began negotiations with France. Ibid., p. 5.

3. In 1823, and 1825, Great Britain proposed that some sort of joint international policies be arranged in regard to Cuba. In 1852 there was correspondence to the same end. In each case the United States refused to cooperate. Ibid., pp. 6, 12-13. In April and July 1853 "Britain and France presented identical notes to the United States in regard to filibustering in Cuba. Webster and Everett dismissed this attempt with directness." French Ensign Chadwick, The Relations of the United States and Spain: Diplomacy, New York, 1909, p. 241-2.

4. Soule, Minister to Spain under Pierce, was most obvious in his efforts to effect the transfer of Cuba to the United States. The Ostend Manifesto, of which he was one of the authors along with Buchanan and Mason (Ministers to England and France), in 1854 stated that Cuba must belong to the United States. Ibid., p. 15, ff. At the time it was said that American diplomacy was: "certainly a very singular profession, which combines with the utmost publicity the habitual pursuit of dishonorable objects by clandestine means." A. A. Ettinger, The Mission to Spain of Pierre Soule, New Haven, 1932, p. 174. Cited by Guggenheim, op. cit., p. 19.

5. Ibid., p. 28-29. However at this particular time (1873) Europe was not interested in the problem of Cuba.

6. In connection with this phase there is a comprehensive statement in Bemis: "... a little group of young Republicans took advantage of the situation to further their
'large' policy: to acquire for the United States strategi­
cal command of the Caribbean and the approaches from both
oceans to the future isthmian canal, the necessity for
which was becoming daily more prominent. The control of
Cuba was the keystone to this policy. The leaders of this
group were Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, and
Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Their
philosophical mentor was Captain A. T. Mahan, the eminent
historical expositor of the significance of sea power in
history, who since 1890 had been stressing in periodical
articles the importance of Samoa, the Hawaiian Islands, and
the Caribbean for the protection of a naval communication
by the isthmian canal, which would one day be vital to the
defenses of the two American coasts and the domination of
the Pacific Ocean. Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History

7. Guggenheim, op. cit., p. 50. These figures are said to be
from a census taken in period of American occupation.

8. It has been generally accepted that the 'big business' and
the sugar interests welcomed the war with Spain. Bemis
states the case otherwise: "Far from pushing the United
States to interfere in Cuba to protect plantations in the
events of 1895-1898—American capital interested in Cuban
sugar was powerless to prevent Congress from threatening
its ruin by the termination of reciprocity; moreover it
preferred Spanish to Cuban rule. Actually business inter­
ests in the United States were to the last opposed to any
war with Spain." Bemis, op. cit., p. 437. Bemis refers to
an article entitled: American Business and the Spanish­
American War, by Julius W. Pratt, Hispanic American Histori­
cal Review, May 1934, Vol. XIV, p. 163-201. Of course this
does not imply that the disruption of the Cuban economy by
the insurrection was not disparaged in the United States.

9. Bemis very aptly defines the atmosphere of the period:
"The Cuban question became critical at the close of the
nineteenth century, at the end of an unique epoch of Ameri­
can history. It coincided with the completed settlement of
a continent, with the disappearance of the American fron­
tier, with the turning of national imagination to other
fields of interest. It came to a climax when the people
had suddenly been made conscious of their adolescent world
power, of their approaching maturity. President Cleveland's
bugle call for the support of the Monroe Doctrine in 1895
had awakened them to this new feeling. The railways were
built, the continent settled, the frontier gone, the home
market seemed approaching satiation, the new populous Paci­
fic Coast was indicated for future naval protection and com­
munications. The need of an isthmian canal faced the

11. Roughly speaking, while the Democrats were in power the Republicans were the most vociferous against Spain. With the change of Administration, the Republicans became the more moderate. However, in spite of this generalization, it is also true that it was taken for granted by the Republicans that if war were to develop, their influence and hold on the country would be materially strengthened. It was awkward for an Administration, whether Democratic or Republican, to lead the country into war, but once that condition came about, its appeal was reinforced.

12. For many Americans, especially in the West, the Election of 1896 had been decided upon the question of currency reform--Bryan and bimetallism. Upon investigation abroad McKinley soon found that he could hope for no international cooperation in any financial schemes. As a purely domestic problem it had to be avoided--Mark Hanna and 'big business' were strictly for the gold standard. Thus: "... the Republican party was badly in need of a new issue to divert popular attention. Spain furnished the diversion." S. E. Morison, The Oxford History of the United States, London, 1927, p. 409.

13. This whole picture is of material such as could be gathered in any general text. Dependence in this present case, however, has been placed upon the Introductory Notes to the Chapters of The Letters of Queen Victoria, Third Series, London, 1932, Vol. II, p. 1-4, 111-114, and 219-222. And further it is the result of later impressions from perusing the pages of the contemporary journals.

14. See the extract, given on page 33 below, from the Spanish Memorandum of 1896.

15. Editorial, London Times, August 11, 1897, p. 7. (The London Times will be cited hereafter as Times.)

16. Times, September 15, p. 5.

17. State Department Diplomatic Dispatches, Germany, Vol. 63, #57, White to Sherman, July 20, 1897.

18. Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, Washington, 1905, p. 3, De Lome to Tetuan, April 10, 1896. (This work to be cited hereafter as Spanish D. C. & D.)

20. James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presi-
1896. Cleveland said in part: "... it cannot be 
reasonably assumed that the hitherto expectant attitude 
of the United States will be indefinitely maintained."

1897. The note concluded: "Against these phases of the 
conflict, against this deliberate infliction of suffer-
ing on innocent noncombatants, against such resort to 
instrumentalities condemned by the voice of humane civil-
zation, against the cruel employment of fire and famine to 
accomplish by uncertain indirection what the military arms 
seem powerless to directly accomplish, the President is 
constrained to protest, in the name of the American people 
and in the name of common humanity."

22. Spanish D. C., & D., p. 35. Tetuan to de Lome, August 4, 
1897. De Lome delivered a note in accordance with these 
directions to the State Department on August 30th.

23. State Department Diplomatic Dispatches, France, Vol. 114,
474, Porter to Sherman, August 19, 1897. Porter stated: 
"General Woodford has spent about a week here and Ambassa-
dor White several days and we have conferred at length and 
discussed thoroughly the Cuban question in the light of 
the latest information from Spain and other European coun-
tries."

24. Premier Canovas was assassinated August 8th by an anarch-
ist. As to the significance of this event Sherman, for 
instance, said in substance, "The death of one man, how-
ever, would not change the sentiment of the country. ... ."
Times, August 10, 1897, p. 3.

25. Times, August 22, 1897, p. 3. Azcarraga had said more 
specifically that the Government "had confidence in Gen-
eral Weyler, whose conduct of affairs, both military and 
political, (was) highly praised."

26. Spanish D. C., & D., p. 36. De Lome to Tetuan, September 16, 
1897.

27. As reported in the Times, September 21, 1897, p. 3, this 
purports to be an account of an interview between Tetuan 
and Woodford at San Sebastian, and thus a few days prior 
to delivery of the formal note.

28. Ibid., loc. cit.
The new Liberal Government in Spain this time made good its professions for reform by proclamations of the Queen-Regent (November 25, 1897) extending to the Antilles all rights enjoyed by the peninsular Spaniards, by establishing in Cuba the electoral laws of Spain, and by launching (subject always to ratification by the Cortes) a series of measures going far toward autonomy if the Cubans would cease fighting and accept them. There is no doubt of the good intentions of the Sagasta Government to set up in Cuba home rule like that of Canada, but its measures were opposed in Cuba by both the Spanish elements in and about Havana, who would have been swamped by autonomy, and by the Cuban revolutionists, who would accept nothing now but independence." Bemis, op. cit., p. 441.
47. Fortnightly Review, loc. cit. Note #41, ante.
48. State Department Diplomatic Dispatches, Germany, Vol. 64, #114, White to Sherman, October 2, 1897. Of his conclusions White added: "This is the trend of public opinion as gathered from the mass of cuttings from leading journals in all parts of the Empire laid on my table every morning and they seem to indicate what the feeling behind the Imperial Parliament will be when it shall assemble."
49. Editorial, Times, November 18, 1897, p. 9.
50. Spectator, loc. cit. Note #45, ante.
51. Times, loc. cit. Note #49, ante.
52. Editorial, Times, December 7, 1897, p. 9.
55. De Lome's remarks as to calm prevailing are found in:
   Spanish D. C. & D., p. 40, de Lome to Gullon, November 25, 1897; Ibid., p. 43, December 2, 1897; Ibid., p. 52, December 16, 1897; and Ibid., p. 62, January 5, 1898.
57. Times, January 1, 1898, p. 6.
58. Spanish D. C. & D., p. 52, de Lome to Gullon, December 16, 1897.
59. Times, December 20, 1897, p. 5.
60. Ibid., loc. cit.
61. Spanish D. C. & D., p. 79, Gullon to de Lome (date missing; circa February 5, 1898). Also indicating his concern, Gullon added: "I request your Excellency to communicate anything touching the movement of vessels, charging yourself to obtain on this subject data and full information, having recourse not only to your official position, but also to any personal means."
64. Because the exact language is important on this point, and because the communication contains other items of interest, the more complete dispatch is given here: "Since my conference of this morning with Day, the latter went to see the President, and by telephone appointed 3 o'clock p.m. for me to call. I have just seen him, and he told me that the result of our conference and the reports concerning the commercial negotiations confirmed by Woodford have been so satisfactory that the President has determined to send the Maine to Havana as a mark of friendship, and the Secretary of the Navy would so state to the press. Day has also given a similar statement to the papers. Lee will do the same in Havana, and the representative of the United States at Madrid. Speaking of the matter, Day said that if Lee had requested a vessel for the protection of the lives and property of Americans in Havana, naturally one would have been sent; but, the occasion for that having passed, the sending of the vessel simply as a visit must be taken as an act of friendly courtesy and not looked upon in any other aspect; that the President believes it has been a mistake not to have had an American war vessel visit Cuba in the past three years, because now what is a fresh proof of international courtesy is looked upon as a hostile act. . . ." Spanish D. C. & D., p. 68, de Lome to Gullon, January 24, 1898.

65. Ibid., p. 69, Gullon to de Lome, January 25, 1898.

66. In a letter to Mrs. Cleveland on February 19, 1898, Richard Olney wrote: "Poor Dupuy must realize how much worse a blunder can be than a crime. Here is his country practically unrepresented at Washington at a time when its interests demand a persona grata at our capital more imperatively than ever before. I had much confidence in the man and thought him able, sincere, and patriotic. I confess some expressions of his letter stagger me, and, if they bear the interpretation the President has put on them, and mean that Spain has been tricking us as regards autonomy and other matters incidental to it, I should have wanted the privileges of sending him his passports before he had any chance to be recalled or resign." Henry James, Richard Olney and His Public Service, Cambridge, 1923, p. 307-308.

67. De Lome's telegrams apropos the publication of his letter were: "The Journal will state tomorrow that it has a letter which I wrote to Senor Canalejas a few days after the message of McKinley, in which, in stating my opinion, I used expressions humiliating to the President of the Republic. The Journal claims that this letter was lost
by Senor Canalejas and got into the possession of the junta. I believe he never received it, and that it was gotten hold of in Habana. At all events, although I do not remember the terms, it may be true, and my position here would be untenable. I notify your Excellency in order that you may decide upon the course best for the Queen and Spain, without considering me in any way," Spanish D. C. & D., p. 80, de Lome to Gullon, February 8, 1898. February 9th: "The letter published in the Journal. The Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Day, has been to see me to ask if the letter was mine. I have replied that it was, and that, as Minister from Spain, I could say nothing, but claiming right to express my opinion privately, as, with such frequency and less the discretion, the American agents have done. My position, you will see, can not be what it was before; I do not believe I can continue here. The Department of State has given out a statement to the press that Woodford will communicate with the Government of His Majesty."

Ibid., p. 81.

68. Spectator, February 12, 1898, Vol. 80, p. 228.
69. Ibid., loc. cit.
70. Editorial, Times, February 17, 1898, p. 9.
71. Spanish D. C. & D., p. 80, Gullon to the Ambassadors at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, Rome, and St. Petersburg. The dispatch in full: "The official situation with the United States is almost the same as it was ten days ago, but the display and concentration of naval forces near Habana and in the waters near the Peninsula and the persistency with which the Maine and the Montgomery remain in the Greater Antilles, are causing increasing anxiety, and might, through some mischance, bring about a conflict. We are trying to avoid it at any cost, making heroic efforts to maintain ourselves in the severest rectitude.

72. One tribute to Woodford in this regard was: "General Woodford, our recent Minister at Madrid, undoubtedly delayed our war with Spain for several months, and skillful diplomatic intervention brought that war to a speedy close just as soon as our military and naval successes made it possible." Andrew Dickson White, Autobiography. New York, 1905, Vol. II, p. 367. From another source there are these comments: "McKinley, during this period, opposed intervention, but the war party, supported by the Hearst Papers, was growing rapidly. Our able minister in Spain, General Woodford, was also opposed to our intervention. Congress, however, held the opposite attitude. . . . Through the efforts of Minister Woodford, at Madrid, and others, a diplomatic victory had been won only to be thrown away by McKinley and Congress." C. H. Hamlin, The War Myth in United States History, New York, 1927, pp. 70, 72.
In full this dispatch read: "I have just arrived and taken charge of my post. Tomorrow, at the earliest moment, I shall see the Secretary of State. Yesterday the Congress voted unanimously an appropriation of $50,000,000 for armament. In spite of the supremeness of the measure, the situation at the moment appears more tranquil, while still of undeniable gravity. The impressions I have received cause me to fear, nevertheless, that the report of the Maine and the reports of the consuls may stir up dangerous incidents."

Times, March 8, 1898, p. 5.
Editorial, ibid., p. 10.

Frequently quoted is an account of the Spanish reaction to news of the passage of this $50,000,000 Appropriation Bill. It was said that it 'stunned them.' But the Spanish were stunned, not by the war-like implication, but rather by the fact that such a sum was already on hand in the treasury, in cash credits, and that no new taxes were levied.

Times, March 17, 1898, p. 5; March 28, p. 7; Editorial, March 28, p. 11; March 29, p. 5; April 2, p. 7; Editorial, April 5, p. 11.


Spanish D. C. & D., p. 95. Gullon to the Representatives Abroad, March 24, 1898. More complete the dispatch reads: "At a conference yesterday between the Minister of the United States and the Minister of the Colonies and myself, Mr. Woodford handed to me a memorandum, unsigned, which sets forth that the report of the American commission concerning the explosion on the Maine is now in the hands of the President. It further states that if within a few days a conclusion is not reached which will assure immediate and honorable peace for Cuba the President must submit to the American Congress not only the report of the Maine, but also the whole question of the relations between the United States and Spain. . . . It is advisable that your Excellency may thus understand the character and extent of the demands and requirements before us . . . in order that your Excellency may be able to let the Government to which you are accredited clearly understand the attitude of the two Cabinets, and the character which will invest any events the future may have in store for us."
Ibid., p. 105-6, Note delivered to Gullon by the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States, March 28, 1898. After quoting from the Maine report, Woodford continued: "Upon the facts as thus disclosed a grave responsibility appears to rest upon the Spanish Government. The Maine, on a peace errand and with the knowledge and consent of that Government, entered the harbor of Habana, relying upon the security and protection of a friendly port. Confessedly she remained, as to what took place on board, under the jurisdiction of her own government. Yet the control of the harbor remained in the jurisdiction of the Spanish Government, which, as the sovereign of the place, was bound to render protection to persons and property there and especially to the public ship and to the sailors of a friendly nation."

Ibid., p. 106-7, Memorandum handed by the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to the President of the Council of Ministers, March 29, 1898.

Ibid., p. 107-8, Reply agreed upon by the Council of Ministers, March 31, 1898.

This is the generally accepted view. It is noted, for example, by Orestes Ferrara, The Last Spanish War, New York, 1937, p. 133. At the time, however, it was currently thought that the delay of the message was due to the Diplomatic representations. That, for instance, is the version given by Chadwick. "The sending of the presidential message was, however, postponed through the presentation that day to the President of a collective note by the representatives of (the Powers)...." Chadwick, op. cit., Diplomacy, p. 573.

Times, April 7, 1898, p. 3. "The Boston Fruit Company's steamers Beverly and Brookline have cancelled their passenger lists and sailed from Port Antonio today under arrangements with the United States Government to convey American residents from Cuba to Key West. The Beverly goes to Cienfuegos and the Brookline to Santiago de Cuba." Ibid., April 9, p. 3. "The Brookline returned to Port Antonio this morning from Santiago with the American Consul and 30 American subjects on board. .... A telegram received here states that the Beverly left Cienfuegos this morning for Key West."

Spanish D. G. & D., p. 116, Gullon to Polo, April 9, 1898.

It is stated that "The Spanish minister in Washington was notified that the President in his message to Congress on April 11, would explain the concession made by Spain, but this was not done—a reference only was made to it in his war message. Hamlin, loc. cit. Note #72, ante. As to
this lack of consideration for the Spanish concessions the
Times said: "It will probably be reserved for the historian
to explain why the President relinquished his labours
in the cause of humanity just when they were becoming
fruitful. . . ." Editorial, Times, April 14, 1898, p. 3.

86. "Germany and Austria . . . clogged the wheels of the Euro-
pean Concert in 1897 . . . withdrew . . . leaving England,
Russia, France, and Italy to deal with the problem. . . .
The four powers by an ultimatum forced the Sultan to with-
draw the Turkish troops, and then, on Russia's motion,
appointed Prince George of Greece High Commissioner of
Crete." The Letters of Queen Victoria, Third Series, Vol.
III, p. 220, Introductory Note to Chapter XIV (1898).
Bulow says: "When I was back in Berlin (September 1897),
I gave instructions to . . . show indifference in what was
left over of the Greco-Turkish war, namely, the Cretan
question. . . ." Memoirs of Prince von Bulow, Boston, 1931,
p. 172-3.

87. Joseph Ward Swain, Beginning the Twentieth Century, New
York, 1933, pp. 208-228.

501-2. Bulow to Radowitz, March 17, 1898. Bulow relates:
"On February 23, 1891, the Foreign Office addressed the
first dispatch to Prince Reuss, who remarked on it that
France could hardly be interested in maintaining the Mon-
archy in Spain, for France, as the leading Power in a
Latin-republican Alliance, would be more independent in
all directions—even against Russia—than now, when the
French Republic must feel more isolated in monarchical
Europe; that, on the other hand, however, Russia for a
similar reason, could have no inducement for favouring an
extension of the republican system in Europe; that the
Queen of Spain, therefore, who then feared a republican
armed rising in the Iberian Peninsula, as a consequence
of the troubles in Portugal, would do best to apply direct
to the Emperor of Russia for eventual support, if needed,
without the mediation of Vienna or Berlin. Since this
first mention, His Majesty's Government has repeatedly on
various occasions, both in Vienna and Madrid, returned to
the conception that if Spain was hoping for European ac-
tion in her favour, she must first of all gain closer touch
with Russia and look for support there."


90. Ibid., p. 45, May 25, 1898.

91. Letters of Queen Victoria, loc. cit. Note #89, ante.

92. Henry James, Richard Olney and His Public Service, Cam-
bridge, 1923, p. 244. Letter of Henry White to Olney,

94. Ferrara, op. cit., p. 66.

95. Ibid., p. 40, ff. The whole incident involving Drummond Woolf and Taylor is given with much detail here.

96. Bulow happens to state that "The Queen Regent of Spain, besides being an excellent wife and an able regent, was the daughter of the Archduke Charles Ferdinand of Austria, niece of Archduke Albert, the victor of Custozza, and a sister of the Archdukes Charles Stephen and Eugene, who of all the Austrian archdukes were most liked by the Kaiser." Memoirs of Prince von Bulow, Boston, 1931, Vol. I, p. 171.


98. Ibid., p. 75.


100. State Department Diplomatic Dispatches, France, Vol. 114, #74, Porter to Sherman, August 19, 1897.


102. Ibid., p. 70.

103. Ibid., p. 71.

104. Ibid., p. 75.

105. Bulow's Memoirs, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 170-71. Bulow's further characterizations of the Kaiser are of interest. At this same juncture he said: "Events which seemed to herald armed conflicts between foreign states worked with especial force on his lively and fantastic imagination. . . . Kaiser William II followed the wars of other people with all the excitement of the playgoer before whose eyes there is performed a piece which holds his liveliest interest but in which he has himself no part. He reserved only the right of the critic and, as Kaiser, the privilege to award the palm to one side or the other in accordance with his verdict. When foreign war threatened, he could hardly wait for the curtain to go up." (P. 170.) And:

"... the sympathies of William II--and it was his nature to be a hot partisan in every issue that arose anywhere--
lay entirely on the side of Spain, partly through dislike of the republican form of the State in America, and partly out of personal friendship for the Austrian brothers of the Queen Regent of Spain."

(Pp. 254-55.) Yet, an earlier period and for a different audience, Bulow had written: "More than anyone else the Emperor William II manifested this understanding of the United States. It was he who first paved the way for our friendly and sound relations. He won over the Americans by his consistently friendly and sympathetic attitude . . ." Prince von Bulow, Imperial Germany, New York, 1917, p. 45.


107. State Department Diplomatic Dispatches, Austria, Vol. 42, #17, Tower to Sherman, October 5, 1897.

108. Ibid., loc. cit.

109. Ibid., loc. cit.

110. German Diplomatic Documents, Vol. II, pp. 495-96. A Note by the German editors.

111. Ibid., p. 496. Rotenhan to Eulenburg, September 29, 1897. The telegram begins: "Herr von Bulow telegraphs . . .," thus it is really Bulow's sentiments that are being expressed.

112. Ibid., loc. cit.

113. Ibid., p. 497. Eulenburg to German Foreign Office, September 30, 1897. As to the point about France he said specifically: "As regards my doubts concerning France, i.e., the difficulty of winning a republic over for an action with a dynastic object, the Continental Powers might be united on a basis of joint protection of the colonial possessions of the European Powers against overseas aggression."

114. Ibid., pp. 497-8. Bulow to Foreign Office (for forwarding to Eulenburg), September 30, 1897.

115. Ibid., p. 498, Bulow to Lichnovsky, October 7, 1897.

116. Ibid., p. 498, Lichnovsky to German Foreign Office, October 15, 1897.

117. Ferrara, op. cit., p. 83. Cited as being "from a resume . . . of the French documents." No other particulars given as this source of information.
118. Ibid., loc. cit. This purports to be a direct quotation from the French documents.

119. State Department Diplomatic Dispatches, Germany, Vol. 64, #118, White to Sherman, October 4, 1897.


121. Ibid., Vol. 114, #74, Porter to Sherman, August 19, 1897.

122. Ibid., Austria, Vol. 42, #17, Tower to Sherman, October 5, 1897.

123. Ibid., loc. cit.


131. Ferrara, op. cit., p. 93. The dispatch in the German Diplomatic Documents reads: "Senor Mendez Vigo corroborates the indications in the two last sentences in your report of February 10th, and declares here that the movements of North American war-ships in Cuban waters and elsewhere are causing the Spanish Government serious anxiety regarding the intentions of the Washington Cabinet. The Ambassador enquired whether, in view of this, the German Government would not be prepared to lead European action in defence of the monarchical principle, against the republican aggressiveness of America." German Diplomatic Documents, Vol. II, p. 498, Bulow to Radowitz, February 15, 1898. As for the approach to France there is this account: "On February 4th, 1898, M. Hanotaux telegraphed to M. Patenotre, the French Ambassador at Madrid, that M. Leon y Castillo, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, in the course of his last call at the Quai d'Orsay, had asked for the support of France in the difficulties expected between his country and the United States." Genevieve Tabouis, The Life of Jules Cambon, London, 1938, p. 91.

133. Ibid., Vol. II. Note of German editors, p. 500.

134. Ferrara, op. cit., p. 95. (In the Spanish the source cited for this quotation is: 'Documentacion italiana. Informe del Embajador de Italia en Madrid del 12 Marzo de 1898.')


139. Times, March 9, 1898, p. 5.

140. Ibid., March 10, p. 5.

141. Spanish D. C. & D., p. 90, Rascon to Gullon, March 10, 1898.


143. For instance, later on Victoria noted in her Journal: "War seems hopelessly declared, and the respective Spanish and United States Ministers have left their posts; it is monstrous of America." Ibid., Vol. III, p. 244. (21st April.)


145. Letters of Queen Victoria, Vol. III, p. 239.

146. Ibid., p. 244.

147. Ferrara, op. cit., p. 103.

148. Ibid., pp. 107-8 (telegram of March 26th).

149. Ibid., p. 108 (no reference as to source; said to be of April 1st).
3CVl

ISO.

Qmrmai»

diplom atie B o e w sty  Vol.

I I ,
p. 504, Hadowit*

to eerwm Foreign O ffice, l^rch  26, 1898.

3»S 1. Vol. 1% , p . 50^5-»4, Billow to Otto von Bulow,

^  Hareli^27

1898, conveying to him the essentials of a re­

po rt "which arrived today from the Imperial Ambassador

in Madrid."


Otto von Bulow, March 26, 1898: In full this dispatch

read: "You will inform Cardinal Kopp for use in confi­
dence, that about a fortnight ago, when matters between
Spain and America were coming to a head, the idea of Papal
arbitration was suggested by us in Berlin in various quar­
ters, and recommended as a solution which would best cover
the responsibility of the Spanish Crown. The advantage
of arbitration by this method would, in our opinion, lie
not in its substance, but in the personality of the arbi­
trator, whose decision no one in Spain would question,
apart perhaps from the Socialists. It is certainly doubt­
ful whether America would accept the arbitrator; the Ameri­
can bishops would have to cooperate, and the Catholic ele­
ment is very strong in the American Congress. It might be
possible for the American bishops to create a feeling be­
tween Rome and Washington regarding the substance of the
decision, before the Pope was finally accepted as arbitrat­
or." Also, p. 503-4, Bulow to Otto von Bulow, March 27,
1898: "... I can imagine that the Pope will first have
an enquiry made in Madrid, as to whether the Queen and her
advisors consider that it would benefit Spain, supposing
that he arbitrated in favour of relieving the Mother
Country of Cuba and the debt contracted for Cuba. ... If
yes, then the American Government might appeal for the
Pope's arbitration. America would thus have obtained
Cuba's freedom without bloodshed and cheaper than by a
war—even if she consented to be responsible for a share
of the Cuban debt in some form."

156. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 506, Bulow to Emperor William, April 1,
1898. "Our Majesty's Minister at the Vatican telegraphs:
Cardinal Secretary of State tells me that the Nuncio in
Madrid reports that, in answer to his enquiry, the Span­
ish Government declares it to be impossible to accept
arbitration on the basis of the cession of Cuba."
William in this instance added the interesting marginal note to the telegram: "Then there is no way of helping them; they will lose Cuba all the same."

157. Ferrara, op. cit., p. 123. Ferrara's account of this last subterfuge seems quite complete. He gives two documents from 'The Spanish Archives, Docket 37', which tell the story. On April 9th the Spanish Ambassador at the Holy See telegraphed to Madrid: "Both his Eminence (Rampolla, Cardinal Secretary of State) and the Pope are greatly disturbed over the gravity of the situation, but can suggest no other means to preserve the peace than by the suspension of hostilities in Cuba... The Great Powers, Cardinal Rampolla says, are making efforts to prevent war, and so far they have shown sympathy for Spain. The Pope begs the Government of Her Majesty to consider the grave consequences which war might have for many interests, and says that if war is avoided, everything else can be arranged. The urgent need is that an armistice be declared; other questions can be dealt with later." The same day the Minister of State at Madrid telegraphed to the Spanish Ambassador at the Vatican to advise: "That Spain had assented to the 'earnest, noble, and disinterested petition of the Holy Father', to suspend hostilities, and the order to this effect had been sent to the Marshal of the Spanish armies in Cuba... requesting that His Holiness be informed that the Spanish Government had confidence that he 'would be vigilant in seeing that our just demands for compensation are satisfied, and that the prestige of this Catholic nation be not impaired.'"

In connection with the Papal efforts, it is worthy of note here that Ferrara on pages 119-20 gives the only rational explanation of that incident which was of some importance in determining the tenor of the American people. This is in reference to the statement given out in Spain that the United States had requested the arbitration of the Pope. Ferrara says that this came up in such a manner because McKinley was attributed as saying that he needed 'help' in his efforts to avoid war, meaning the cooperation of Spain. But in Europe it was assumed that by 'help' he meant diplomatic aid from the Pope. This was deeply resented in the United States, and has been classed with the de Lome letter and the sinking of the Maine as a significant event leading to war. (Elbert J. Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish American War, Baltimore, 1908, cites from a paper read by Mr. Woodford in 1904, 'Mr. McKinley and the Spanish American War', as saying that this "suggestion by the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs that the request of the Pope for an armistice was at the instance of the American President..."
compelled delay in the announcement of the armistice, which then came too late to arrest the demands of the American people for immediate action."


159. From the section in *Die Grosse Politik* on the 'American Spanish War, Arbitration and Intervention,' Dugdale omits translating three documents. Besides the one given here there were #4124, Bulenbg to Hohenlohe, February 23, 1898, and #4142, Bulow to Radolin, April 16, 1898.

160. German Diplomatic Documents, Vol. II, p. 506-7, Memorandum by Bulow, April 5, 1898. Ferrara, from his sources, has the Spanish report of this conversation between Vigo and Bulow. "Bulow told him, Mendez Vigo said: 'You are isolated, because everybody wants to be pleasant to the United States, or, at any rate, nobody wants to arouse America's anger; The United States is a rich country, against which you simply cannot sustain a war; I admire the courage Spain has shown, but I would admire more a display of practical common sense.'" Ferrara, *op. cit.*., p. 127.

In regard to the question of Germany being responsible for the efforts toward intervention there may be noted here an example of manner in which these imputations have been given currency. A reputable author says: "During the Spanish-American War the feelings of the German people seemed to have been a real hatred of the United States. . . . The design of the Emperor to make a sort of continental diplomatic bloc against the United States made some progress in Europe, and to some small extent in the Embassies at Washington. Robert Balmain Mowat, *The Life of Lord Pauncefote*, London, 1929, p. 212.


165. German Diplomatic Documents, Vol. II, p. 507-8, Holleben to German Foreign Office, April 7, 1898.

166. Ferrara, *op. cit.*, p. 139.
Ibid., loc. cit. ('Italian Archives.')

Ibid., p. 139-40. (From telegrams, dated April 16th and 18th respectively, of the Spanish Ambassadors at Paris and St. Petersburg, in 'Spanish Archives, Docket 37.')

German Diplomatic Documents, Vol. II, p. 413, Holleben to Hohenlohe, April 22, 1898. More fully be reported: "At the beginning of the Cuban conflict, England showed the United States some platonic favour, as I still fully believe, with special reference to the Far East; but this did not in the least prevent her from joining in the collective step of the Powers on April 7th. Shortly afterwards it was Sir Julian Pauncefote who rejected the further steps which were advised here for common action by the Powers and which found expression in the identical proposals of the six representatives here to their Governments, on the 18th. But I understand from my French colleague that nothing more came of this, owing to England's lukewarm attitude, a matter which, as Your Highness knows, I do not especially regret."

Ibid., Vol. II, p. 508-9, Bulow to Emperor William, transmitting telegram from Holleben, April 15, 1898.

Mowat says: "Holleben's story that Pauncefote called the Americans brigands further discredits all the rest of his account. . . . Although it was afterwards denied, it is not impossible that the Austrian Ambassador (perhaps influenced by Holleben) was actually the original proposer of the meeting, for Count Bulow had previously urged the Austrian Government to take the initiative in intervention, saying that in such a case Germany would follow." Mowat, op. cit., pp. 218-9. Another version is given by George W. Smalley, Anglo-American Memories, Second Series, London 1912, p. 180: "It is no secret that when we went to war with Spain in 1898 the sympathies of Continental Europe were on the side of Spain and not of the United States. It is no secret that some of the skilled diplomats who represented those powers in Washington conceived a scheme whereby effect might be given to those sympathies. The leading mind among them—whether the leading spirit I cannot say, though I am inclined to think not—was the French Ambassador, M. Jules Cambon. . . . Among them, at any rate, they agreed that each should send to his own Government a proposal for a remonstrance to be addressed by all their Governments to the United States against the war. They were five in all. The five met by themselves and agreed to ask the British Ambassador to join them; and not only to join them but to draft the dispatch he and the five were to send to their Governments separately."
This incident in all its different versions is one of the most popular phases of the whole Spanish American War, being mentioned in some manner by almost all writers on this period.


173. "Parliamentary Debates, Fourth Series, Vol. CIII, p. 105, February 14, 1902, Lord Cranborne. Also there is record of Lord Cranborne stating to the House of Commons in January 20, 1902: "Her Majesty's Government declined however to associate themselves with other subsequent proposals which seemed to them open to objection as having the appearance of putting pressure on the Government of the United States and offering an opinion as to their attitude." Parliamentary Debates, Fourth Series, Vol. CI, p. 311.

174. Ferrara, op. cit., p. 148. ('Docket 37,' April 18th.)

175. Ibid., loc. cit. ('Italian documents, telegram from St. Petersburg, April 16, 1898.')

176. "German Diplomatic Documents, Vol. II, p. 511-12, Bulow to Emperor William, April 16, 1898, transmitting communication of Radolin. A further section of this communication is of interest as being in agreement with the possibility noted that Spain would welcome war: "As regards Spain, Count Muraviéff thinks that the interests of the dynasty must be considered before everything else. In his opinion the only chance of saving it will be for the Queen to place herself at the head of the movement, and to make war whatever the cost may be, even though there may be no chance of success. Only thus can the dynasty maintain and strengthen itself. If this is not done, the Queen would undoubtedly have to give way before a revolution. To use Count Muraviéff's words: 'Si la Reine est sage, modérée et vraiment patriotique, elle succombera et sera renvoyée. Si, par conséquent, elle se met à la tête du mouvement et n'est ni sage ni patriotique, elle peut sauver sa couronne; c'est cynique, mais c'est ainsi.'"

177. Ibid., loc. cit.

178. Ferrara, op. cit., p. 150.

179. "German Diplomatic Documents, Vol. II, p. 512. A note by the German editors. Salisbury expressed a similar sentiment. "Lord Salisbury with his humble duty respectfully submits that he believes the Powers are sorrowfully agreed that at this stage nothing further can be done to arrest the war. Even the very temperate and guarded note which
was addressed by the Powers to the U. S. (sic) Government
was very much resented by a large portion of the community
as an undue interference, and had no other effect than
to harden the war feeling." Letters of Queen Victoria,  
Third Series, Vol. III, p. 244, Memorandum, April 22,  
1898,


181. Times, March 11, 1898, p. 5.
182. Ibid., March 14, 1898, p. 5.
183. Ibid., loc. cit.
184. Ibid., March 15, 1898, p. 5.
185. Ibid., loc. cit.
186. Ibid., March 16, 1898, p. 5.
187. Ibid., March 21, 1898, p. 7.
188. Ibid., March 26, 1898, p. 7.
189. Ibid., March 31, 1898, p. 5.
190. Ibid., April 4, 1898, p. 7.
191. Ibid., loc. cit.
192. Editorial, Ibid., April 5, 1898, p. 11.
193. Ibid., April 9, 1898, p. 3.
194. Ibid., April 15, 1898, p. 3.
195. Ibid., loc. cit.
196. Ibid., April 16, 1898, p. 7.
197. Ibid., April 18, 1898, p. 5.
198. Ibid., April 19, 1898, p. 5.
199. Ibid., April 19, 1898, p. 7.
201. Ibid., March 19, p. 397.
202. Ibid., April 9, p. 501.
203. Ibid., April 16, p. 530, and p. 533.


206. Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XV, p. 27. Bulow to Radolin, April 16, 1898. This is from one of the dispatches omitted by Dugdale.

207. Statesman's Yearbook, 1898.


209. Ferrara, *op. cit.*, p. 88

210. Ibid., p. 95.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sources.


This is a collection of the Diplomatic Correspondence of the German Foreign Office, in some fifty volumes. It contains frequent historical notes by the editors and retains the marginal comments of the Kaiser. It is supposed to be exhaustive, and although certain few documents of interest are referred to which are not given or were not found in the official files. This is an incomparable source.


These four volumes are a compilation of Die Grosse Politik, together with additional notes. Of the section from Die Grosse Politik entitled 'American-Spanish War, Mediation and Intervention' only three documents are not translated by Dugdale. The editor appears to have done his work in an impartial spirit.

Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 1896-1900. Washington, 1908.

It is stated only, that this was material presented to the Cortes by the Spanish Minister of State. There is no indication of the motive of the United States Government Printing Office in publishing this compilation. Any omissions or alterations are not noted, and the original file numbers and dates are not complete. In spite of this absence of any critical introduction or comment this is excellent material upon the direct relations of Spain and the United States.

Parliamentary Debates, Fourth Series. 1899-1902.


State Department Diplomatic Dispatches. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Secondary


There is nothing here of direct reference to the intervention episode. Benton devotes himself to topics as
neutrality, filibustering, and the suit for peace.


This is an exhaustive treatment of all the relations since the 1700's, but there is nothing on the topic of European intervention in 1898.

This is the standard account of the military operations.


Ferrara, Orestes. Tentativas de Intervencion Europea en America, 1896-1898. La Habana, 1933.
Ferrara, a former Cuban Ambassador to the United States, claims to have had access to the French and Italian, as well as the Spanish and American archives. This is the only work encountered devoted to the specific topic of intervention in the Spanish-American War, but its value is unfortunately impaired by mechanical and critical deficiencies. The documentation is inadequate, not giving complete reference number, dates, or identities of correspondents for material cited. Further the author has depended in large part upon the German Diplomatic Documents for his framework and in places paraphrasing is too evident.

This is a straight translation of Ferrara's work and there has been absolutely no attempt at criticism nor any verification of sources.


The account of the intervention incident here is the only
other domestic one besides that of Dennis which is at all intensive and discerning.


Newspapers and Periodicals

Fortnightly Review. July 1897-June 1898. This monthly publication depended upon contributed signed articles, and thus at times was tardy and ill-informed.

London Times. July 1897-April 1898. The reliability of the news and the semi-official character of the editorials of this paper are well known. It was quite definitely pro-American in sympathy.

Pall Mall Gazette. October 1897-May 1898. This London daily was also inclined toward the United States, but of course lacked the influence of the Times.

Saturday Review. July 1897-July 1898. In contrast to the others this weekly journal was strongly critical of the United States.

Spectator. July 1897-June 1898. In tone this weekly was warmly sympathetic, almost overconsiderate, for the United States.