Rhetorical qualities in the speeches of Carl Schurz

James Lee Roberts

The University of Montana
RHETORICAL QUALITIES IN THE SPEECHES OF
CARL SCHURZ

by

JAMES L. ROBERTS

B. A. Montana State University, 1956

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts

MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY
1956

Approved by:

[Signatures and dates]

Chairman, Board of Examiners

Dean, Graduate School

Date
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Ralph Y. McGinnis, Chairman of the Montana State University Speech Department, whose constant encouragement, unflagging enthusiasm, incessant optimism, copious generosity, human understanding, and sterling character was a source of continual inspiration to this student.

I would like also to denote my appreciation to the many members of the alumni, student body, faculty and administration who have helped to make my stay at M. S. U. a thoroughly enjoyable and enriching experience.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITION OF TERMS USED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Problem</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of the Study</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations of the Study</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions of Terms Used</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of the Rest of the Study</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. SURVEY OF LITERATURE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biographical Background</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Material on Speeches</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. METHOD OF PROCEDURE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Eight Speeches Selected</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True Americanism</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas and Popular Sovereignty</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Amnesty</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Aims of the Liberal-Republican Movement</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election of Senator Caldwell</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Venezuelan Question</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The German Mothertongue</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The '48ers</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Form Used for Analysis and Why This Particular Form Was Chosen</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invention</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER PAGE

Arrangement ........................................ 20
Style .................................................. 21

IV. RESULTS OF STUDY

True Americanism .................................. 36
Douglas and Popular Sovereignty .............. 57
General Amnesty ................................. 76
The Aims of the Liberal-Republican Movement .. 100
Election of Senator Caldwell .................... 114
The Venezuelan Question ......................... 132
The German Mothertongue ....................... 146
The '48ers ........................................... 157

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary:
Invention ........................................... 170
Arrangement ........................................ 173
Style .................................................. 174
General Summary .................................. 177
Recommendations for Further Study ........... 178

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................... 180
APPENDIX ............................................ 181

True Americanism ................................ 181
Douglas and Popular Sovereignty ............. 198
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Amnesty</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Aims of the Liberal-Republican Movement</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election of Senator Caldwell</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Venezuelan Question</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The German Mothertongue</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The '48ers</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED

I. INTRODUCTION

Carl Schurz was born in Prussia March 2, 1829. He lived in several European countries and finally emigrated to the United States of America in 1852 after becoming a persona non grata in Germany as a result of instigating an unsuccessful insurrection at Bonn in 1848 where he was studying at the University. After spending a couple of years in Pennsylvania he migrated to Wisconsin in 1855 where he identified himself with the Republican party and by his speeches made himself an important factor in determining the vote of the German element of that state against slavery. He entered legal practice at Watertown and ran for Lieutenant Governor of Wisconsin in 1857 but lost by a narrow margin. He was a member of the National Republican convention of 1860 and assisted largely in the framing of its platform. During the ensuing campaign he spoke both in English and German, and was instrumental in obtaining Lincoln's election. He was appointed Minister to Spain by Lincoln, but in December 1861 he resigned to enter the army and received a commission of brigadier-general of volunteers. He had a very enviable re-
cord throughout the rest of the war and was promoted to major-general in 1863. After the war he returned to professional practice and was Washington correspondent of the New York Tribune and editor of the Detroit Post and the St. Louis Westliche Post. From 1869 to 1875 Schurz was U. S. Senator from Missouri. In 1872 he helped organize the "Liberal" party and presided over the Cincinnati convention which nominated Greeley, but in 1876 supported Hayes by whom he was made Secretary of the Interior. In that position he conducted many reforms. He served for four years as editor of the New York Evening Post after leaving the cabinet. All of his life in America was spent in an untiring humanitarian effort to provide better living conditions for his fellow citizens. After a very active life he died in New York City at the age of 77.  

II. THE PROBLEM

Statement of the problem. It was the purpose of this study to discover the rhetorical qualities in the speeches of Carl Schurz as shown by an analysis of eight representative speeches between 1859-1898.

Importance of the study. The intrinsic worth of such

a problem and study lay, primarily, in the importance of the man being studied and the era in which he lived. As the spokesman for the large German immigrant element in this country, Schurz's influence became both significant and recognized at a critical stage in American history. The importance of the study rested on the importance of the speeches chosen and their value as a section of the more extensive field of public address—past, present and future. Undoubtedly Schurz held a high position in the galaxy of mankind's orators and this study might have helped to make his place more nearly evident.

**Limitations of the study.** The analysis of the speeches in this study has been restricted to the areas of Invention, Arrangement and Style. Examples of these three divisions and of the use to which they were put have been reported and recorded as parts of this study; however, the areas of Memory, Delivery, Psychology and the rest of the aspects of Schurz's public addresses have not been included and were not mentioned in this analysis due to the difficulty of obtaining unbiased, empirical data on these phases. The study was built upon these limitations, but it tried to consider as thoroughly as possible those general areas which were included.
III. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED

The terms requiring definition were explained in the examination of the criteria for evaluation. However, the general term "Rhetoric" needed to be delved into further in order to make the meaning of the field denotative and to allow the analysis to be more clearly comprehensible.

Rhetoric. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defined the term as: "The art of expressive speech or of discourse, especially of literary composition; especially, the art of writing well in prose."\(^2\) This appeared to be an adequate definition but it was desirable and interesting to see how some of the leading rhetoricians in history have defined the term in their time. John Ward in his book *A System of Oratory* defined rhetoric as being synonymous with oratory or "the art of speaking and writing."\(^3\) Most of modern rhetoric is based upon the foundation of principles as they were laid down by Aristotle but he gave an inadequate definition when he said that rhetoric was "the faculty (power) of discovering in the

---


particular case what are the available means of persuasion."^4
This definition is inadequate because it includes only one
part of the art—-invention, while it omits disposition and
elocution. Cicero's definition "the art of persuasion" is
inadequate, because (as Cicero himself admitted later):^5

1. It makes success the only criterion of eloquence.
2. It ignores the will, temper and disposition of
hearers.
3. Persuasion includes all the passions and motives
for influencing the human mind.
4. It omits the soundness of the arguments and the
character of the speaker.

Quintilian's definition "the science of speaking well"^6 in-
cludes all the phases of Aristotle and Cicero's definitions.
After holding this investigation into the various definitions
that have been expounded by the rhetoricians, the conclusion
was drawn that the best working definition in the aggregate
would be "the art or the study of effective communication in
both the oral and written forms."

IV. ORGANIZATION OF THE REST OF THE STUDY

Chapter II. The second chapter of the analysis in-

^4Lane Cooper (trans.), Aristotle: Rhetoric (New York:

^5Ralph Y. McGinnis, "An Outline of Lectures on Rhetoric
by John Quincy Adams" (Missoula, Montana), p. 1.
(Mimeographed.)

^6H. E. Butler (trans.), The Institutio Oratoria of
cluded a survey of the literature employed and available, on both Schurz' speeches and his life. This survey on literature also listed some of the historical background material which was obtained on the period of American history covering the last half of the nineteenth century. An analysis and consideration was made of the other studies done on the speeches of Schurz and the relative merits and limitations of these studies.

Chapter III. Chapter three contained the method of procedure which was followed in analyzing the speeches which were selected for this study. The first section of this chapter was devoted to the justification of the speeches selected for analysis. In the second section of this chapter the criteria used in this study was dealt with.

Chapter IV. This chapter contained the results of the study as the speeches were broken down according to the criteria which was previously decided upon.

Chapter V. This chapter presented a summary of the study on the eight speeches and the conclusions drawn therefrom. Also, it contained recommendations for further study upon Schurz both as a speaker and as a personality.

Bibliography. The bibliography of material cited throughout the thesis was listed following the thesis. The
more specific details on the references mentioned in the footnotes and in the context of the paper were listed therein.

Appendix. The manuscripts for all the eight speeches analyzed were placed in an appendix at the end of the study in order to expidite references to the content of the speeches.
CHAPTER II

SURVEY OF LITERATURE

Biographical background. There were only three books in this area available and the only one that dealt exclusively with Carl Schurz was the one by Joseph Schafer, Carl Schurz—Militant Liberal, with the other two dealing with Schurz as one of a group.

In Our Foreign Born Citizens by Annie E. S. Beard, Schurz was just one of thirty-four foreign-born citizens who were covered and only six pages were devoted to him with nothing about his speeches as such but three selections about him as a man were thought worthy of quotation.

He rendered great service by exposing public abuses and simultaneously imbuing the people with national ideals of a high order; he put a corrupt civil service upon a more elevated plane of operation. He aided in destroying the bossism of the political machine, and always strove to inspire others with his own principle of country above party, bettering Stephen Decatur's axiom by his own: 'My Country, right or wrong. If right, to be kept right; if wrong, to be put right.'

7Schafer, loc. cit.
9Ibid., pp. 238, 239. 10Ibid., p. 239.
'Schurz's character had the simplicity which mates with true greatness. His was a tender, affectionate nature, though never a weak one. You knew where to find him always, and that was the right place. This fighter for freedom in two worlds, this just advocate, this honest politician, this conscientious journalist, this wise statesman lived with all the honor that a man could wish.'\(^{11}\)

In *Americans by Adoption*\(^{12}\) by Joseph Husband, Schurz was one of the nine people covered in this book with some seventeen pages being devoted to him. This article did not deal with any of his speeches or speechmaking and was primarily concerned with other aspects of his life.

**Critical material on speeches.** A thorough check was made to try to find material in this area but it resulted in only one source being found. This was reported in *Speech Monographs*\(^{13}\) and was a Ph.D. thesis done at Northwestern University by Joseph Harr Mahaffey and was entitled "The Speaking and Speeches of Carl Schurz." This study was not available to this writer at Montana State University. In addition to *Speech Monographs*, the Index to the Quarterly Journal of Speech\(^{14}\) and the University library was thoroughly investigated for additional material but none could be found.

\(^{11}\)Ibid., p. 240.


\(^{13}\)Speech Monographs, XIX (August, 1952), No. 3, p. 219.

\(^{14}\)Index to the Quarterly Journal of Speech, I-XL (1915-1954).
CHAPTER III

METHOD OF PROCEDURE

I. THE EIGHT SPEECHES SELECTED

Due to the large number of speeches and public addresses that Schurz made, a selective sampling of them had to be made in order to fit them into the scope of this study. When the speeches were chosen a special effort was made to cover the whole range of Mr. Schurz's public speaking experiences both from the subject matter and from the time period involved. The eight speeches selected were listed in the chronological order in which they were given by Schurz and the title of each speech was followed by a short commentary concerning that specific speech, given by the editor of Schurz's speeches, correspondence and political papers, Mr. Frederic Bancroft.

1. 'True Americanism'

Speech delivered in Faneuil Hall, Boston, April 18, 1859. The legislature of Massachusetts had adopted an amendment to the constitution of the State, by which foreigners should not be permitted to vote until two years after they had become citizens of the United States. This amendment, generally known as the 'two years' amendment,' was soon to be voted upon by the people. It was one of the measures brought forth by the so-called 'Know-Nothing' or 'American' movement, which had met with surprising successes in many parts of the United States. It was against this spirit of proscription on account of birth, creed, or opinion, styling itself 'Americanism,' that the speaker directed
his arguments.—From Mr. Schurz's introductory note, Speeches (1865), p. 51.  

2. 'Douglas and Popular Sovereignty'

Speech delivered in Springfield, Massachusetts, January 4, 1860.

3. 'General Amnesty'

Speech in the U. S. Senate January 30, 1872. The Senate had resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. No. 1050) for the removal of legal and political disabilities imposed by the third section of the fourteenth article of amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

4. 'The Aims of the Liberal-Republican Movement'

Speech on taking the chair as permanent president of the Liberal-Republican Convention, Cincinnati, May 2, 1872.

5. 'Election of Senator Caldwell'

Speech in the U. S. Senate, March 14, 1873, on the resolution declaring that Alexander Caldwell was not duly and legally elected a Senator from the State of Kansas.

6. 'The Venezuelan Question'

Speech before the New York Chamber of Commerce, January 2, 1896.

7. 'The German Mother Tongue'

A response to a toast at a banquet in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of a choral society, the Deutscher Liederkranz, of New York City, January 9, 1897. Translated by Miss Schurz.

16Ibid., p. 79.
17Ibid., II, p. 320.
18Ibid., p. 354.
19Ibid., p. 450.
20Ibid., p. 249.
21Ibid., p. 334.
II. THE FORM USED FOR ANALYSIS AND WHY THIS PARTICULAR FORM WAS CHOSEN

In selecting the criteria to be used in the study for analyzing the speeches, a composite form was made from the writings of four outstanding rhetoricians of history. These four were: Aristotle, from the ancient Greecian period, who was the father of rhetoric as we know it today; Richard Whately who was the outstanding British rhetorician of all time; and two contemporary Americans who are the leading authorities in the field of rhetoric today, Glen E. Mills and William Norwood Brigance.

In order to obtain a distinct and lucid evaluation of the divisions of Invention, Arrangement, and Style, each division was broken down into its component parts as they were given by the rhetoricians referred to in this study.

**Invention.**

Invention was the first division examined and was analyzed under the three major areas of *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos*, with each of these areas further divided. Aristotle

---

reported on this breakdown as follows:

Of the means of persuasion supplied by the speech itself there are three kinds. The first kind reside in the character (ethical) of the speaker; the second consist in producing a certain (the right) attitude (pathos) in the hearer; the third appertain to the argument proper (logos), insofar as it actually or seemingly demonstrates.  

Whately was fully in accord with Aristotle's viewpoint.

It (rhetoric) is one, on the contrary, to which more attention appears to have been paid, and in which greater proficiency is supposed to have been made, in the earliest days of Science and Literature, than at any subsequent period. Among the ancients, Aristotle, who was the earliest, may safely be pronounced to be also the best, of the systematic writers on Rhetoric.  

Brigance tended to give essential emphasis to pathos but did not minimize the importance of the other two:

It is not sufficient just to 'know the subject,' or to 'give the facts,' or even to 'prove the case,' supremely important as are knowledge, facts, and proof. Human nature does not respond, or at least very seldom responds, to purely logical or 'rational' motives, for down within us all, below the surface, is a maze of subconscious motives that buffet our powers of reason to and fro like a wave-tossed ship.  

Logos. Aristotle divided logos into "artistic" and "non-artistic" proofs and specified the composition of each.

Proofs are of two kinds, artistic and non-artistic. . . . By 'non-artistic' proofs are meant all such as are not supplied by our own efforts, but existed beforehand,

---

such as witnesses, admissions under torture, written contracts, and the like. By 'artistic' proofs . . . are meant those that may be furnished by the method of Rhetoric through our own efforts. The first sort have only to be used; the second have to be found. 26

Of the subject thus far mentioned, we must take next a cursory view of the means of persuasion called 'non-artistic,' as these belong especially to the forensic branch of Rhetoric. They are of five sorts: laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, the oath. 27

As for real or apparent demonstration, there are in Rhetoric two modes . . . As in Dialectic we have, on the one hand, induction, and, on the other, the syllogism and apparent syllogism. 28

Mills was again in essential agreement with Aristotle on the breakdown of logos, but he used current terminology and classification. He also eliminated the introduction of evidence obtained by the means of torture due to the current legal inadmissibility of such. He constructed his breakdown as follows:

1. Exposition
2. Description
4. Reasoning.
   a. Generalizing.
   b. Making analogies.
   c. Alleging causal relations.
   d. Discerning sign relations. 29

Mills gave this additional view of logos:

This book is predicated upon the premise that ideas should come first in the hierarchy of importance. One should not conclude from this that all other matters

26 Aristotle, loc. cit. 27 Ibid., p. 80. 28 Ibid., p. 10.
are trivial. The point is that a speech of any consequence must develop an idea which can make a difference in personal or public affairs. Whatly also agreed with Aristotle but thought him not clear enough in his distinction between the types of proof, and thus he attempted to make this distinction clearer. Brigance said: "Logical Order. This order is inherent in the laws of reasoning." Brigance added further:

Reason, in other words, is the instrument for solving our problems, for satisfying our desires, for climbing upward toward the higher values of life. Argument (which is simply reason set forth in print or speech), then, has a fundamental place in this scheme of things.

Ethos. Aristotle spent a great amount of time on ethos and kept reiterating its importance.

It is not true, as some writers on the art maintain, that the probity of the speaker contributes nothing to his persuasiveness; on the contrary, we might almost affirm that his character (ethos) is the most potent of all the means to persuasion.

As for the speakers themselves, the sources of our trust in them are three, for apart from the arguments (in a speech) there are three things that gain our belief, namely, intelligence, character, and good will.

Whatly repeatedly referred to Aristotle in his discussion, using him as his main reference.

---

30 Ibid., p. 164. 31 Whately, op. cit., p. 16.
32 Brigance, op. cit., p. 94. 33 Ibid., p. 140.
He (Aristotle) remarks, justly, that the Character to be established is that of, 1st, Good Principle, 2ndly, Good Sense, and 3rdly, Goodwill and friendly disposition toward the audience addressed; and that if the Orator can completely succeed in this, he will persuade more powerfully than by the strongest Arguments. He might have added (as indeed he does slightly hint at the conclusion of his Treatise), that, where there is an opponent, a like result is produced by exciting the contrary feelings respecting him; viz., holding him up to contempt, or representing him as an object of reproabon or suspicion. 36

Mills used exactly the same major breakdown of ethos when he said:

The speaker's ethos, aside from any matters of antecedent reputation, is ultimately determined by the choices he makes—by the subject he chooses, by the materials he uses, by his attitudes, by his emotional reactions, by his language—indeed, by all the elements in a speech situation, all the cues or signs available to the listener for interpretation. He is likely to succeed in the degree that his public interprets these choices to mean that he is a person of intelligence, character, and good will. 37

Mills quoted from Aristotle to support his own stand on the importance of ethos and then proceeded to add his interpretation of the present concept of the word ethos.

In its original sense, ethos meant the impressions of character, intelligence, and good will which the listeners received during the speaker's performance. Accordance to this view, an orator was defined as 'a good man skilled in speaking.' Nowadays the concept includes not only what the speaker does in the presence of the audience but also what the listeners have heard about him before the occasion. In other words, the speaker's reputation and position in society influence the listeners' judgments. . . .

There can be no serious doubt that the impressions which listeners get of a speaker constitute a major factor in his effectiveness. Our own observations and the find-

36 Whately, op. cit., p. 49. 37 Mills, op. cit., p. 316.
ings of an experimental study support Aristotle's assertion that the speaker's ethos is the most potent of all the means to persuasion. Thus it behooves a student speaker to cultivate his intrinsic worth as a person as well as his skill in oral communication. 38

Brigance hesitated to break down ethos except in a general way.

Now I am keenly aware that to analyze these qualities and to explain how the bad ones can be scrapped and the good ones taken on is beyond the powers of man. All of us can instantly feel the difference, but none can analyze it except in a general way. And as for teaching others to acquire a great personality, 'the world will make a beaten path to his door.' In a general way only, then, can we touch upon this subject here. 39

A. It is almost needless to say that a successful speaker must have a strong moral character. . . 40

B. A speaker must also have self-control. . . 41

C. Sincerity and earnestness are likewise basic qualities that influence every speaker's powers of persuasion. 42

Pathos. Aristotle stated three considerations that must be known about every emotion if it is to be used effectively.

With respect to each emotion the points to be determined are three. With respect to this we must note (1) what the mental state of angry persons is, (2) with whom they are wont to be angry, and (3) what are the things that commonly make them so; for a knowledge of one, or of two, of these points, without a knowledge of the third, will not enable the speaker to excite anger;

38 Ibid., p. 313. 39 Brigance, op. cit., pp. 140-41.
40 Ibid., p. 141. 41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., p. 142.
and similarly with respect to the other emotions.\(^{43}\)

He then divided pathos into the various emotions as they were defined by him:

1. Anger
2. Mildness
3. Love (or friendship)
4. Hatred
5. Fear
6. Confidence
7. Shame
8. Shamelessness.
10. Pity
11. Indignation
12. Envy
13. Emulation

Whately agreed with Aristotle in the over-all aspect of pathos but declined to go into individual emotions as such.

To treat fully of all the different emotions and springs of action which an Orator may at any time find it necessary to call into play, or to contend against, would be to enter on an almost boundless field of metaphysical inquiry, . . . and on the other hand, a brief definition of each passion, . . . could hardly fail to be trite and uninteresting.\(^{45}\)

Regarding pathos, Mills divided it into the analysis of Subject, Audience, and Occasion, and stated his position as follows:

Analysis of the subject:

Anyone who regards speechmaking as a significant intellectual activity, rather than an exercise in sophis-

---

\(^{43}\) Aristotle, op. cit., p. 92.  
\(^{44}\) Ibid., pp. 93-129.  
\(^{45}\) Whately, loc. cit.
try, must regard the analysis of a subject as one of the most important processes. Only through analysis can a speaker determine which ideas are relevant and important to his subject.46

Analysis of the audience:

The importance of audience analysis becomes obvious when we realize that communication is a form of adjustment to a social situation. In public speaking, the degree of social adjustment is uniquely intimate, being excelled only by private conversation. The public speaker, therefore, must establish more direct contact with his immediate audience than an oral interpreter or an actor does. His effectiveness may depend upon his correctly understanding the desires, biases, moods, and values of the group.47

Analysis of the occasion: He subdivides this into four parts:

1. Kind of occasion.
2. Context of program.
3. Physical surroundings.
4. Its history and customs.48

Mills also failed to list the emotions but instead pointed out their importance in rhetoric.

A really competent speaker must be emotionally responsive, that is, he must be a person of wide sympathies and keen sensibilities. This need for "personal magnetism" implies that a speaker ought to learn all he can about human nature. A knowledge of one's fellow men broadens the sympathies, supplements the academic attainments, and enables one to adapt his speeches to his listeners.49

Brigance placed great emphasis upon pathos but did not list the emotions individually.

46 Mills, op. cit., p. 98. 47 Ibid., p. 103.
48 Ibid., pp. 111, 112. 49 Brigance, op. cit., p. 113.
We may talk all we please about people being moved by logic only—but it will all be just talk, for people are not moved by cold reasoning alone. I do not mean to say that people are not influenced by reason, but rather that they are not influenced by reason alone—that we are also influenced by our likes and our dislikes, our loves and our fears, our pocket-books and our pride—and that our actions are a result of the interaction of our emotions and our reasoning (if these can ever be separate) with our emotions predominating.\textsuperscript{50}

\textbf{Arrangement.}

Arrangement or organization in the composition of the speech was the second quality examined in rhetoric.

Aristotle divided a speech into a maximum of four parts:

\textit{.. the indispensable constituents are simply the Statement and the ensuing Argument. These are the essential elements of a speech; at most, the parts cannot exceed four—Proem (or Introduction), Statement, Argument, and Epilogue. 'Refutation' of the opponent falls under the head of the arguments; and since a 'Comparison' of both sides is an enlargement of your own case, it too appertains to this head.}\textsuperscript{51}

Brigance used a three-division method in his speech arrangement and gave the following statement to support his stand:

The modern introduction includes within it all that these writers meant by 'exordium,' 'statement,' and 'proposition.' Likewise does the modern discussion include all that was meant by 'proof' and 'refutation,' while the modern conclusion covers almost identically what the ancients called 'peroration.' The modern version of this speech division is firmly fixed in the popular mind, and it is partly for this reason that I have chosen

\textsuperscript{50}Brigance, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 113.  \textsuperscript{51}Aristotle, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 220.
Mills was in exact agreement with Brigance except that Mills used the term "body" in place of "discussion." Whately appeared to accept the Introduction and Conclusion divisions but would classify the rest of the speech according to the type of speech it is and the type of arguments which may be introduced although he did not make his stand as distinct as possible.

Style.

Style was the third division examined and was broken down into the four major areas of: 1) Level of style, 2) Diction or Word Choice, 3) Sentence structure, and 4) Rhetorical Devices or Figurative language. Mills said of style:

In the literature of rhetoric there are many definitions of style, but most of them are essentially alike. They indicate that style, as a constituent of rhetoric, embraces the choice of words (for precision, imagery, and so forth) and sentence movement (for force, charm, and so forth).

All of the rhetoricians indicated that the level of the speech should be appropriate for the occasion, subject, and audience, but John Ward gave the clearest and most concise definition:

---

Style involves the artistic use of tropes and figures to fit the subject and occasion. It differs among various languages because of the nature of the languages. (Greek language--inflections) The three kinds of style include:

1. **The Low Style**, which is characterized by plain thoughts and a simple form of expression, . . .

2. **The Middle Style**, which is characterized by gravity and dignity, . . .

3. **The Sublime Style**, which is used to express the most lofty and sublime thoughts, . . .

Mills, who went into a great deal of detail on grammar and diction, said:

In brief, we are often judged by the words (as well as the company) we keep.

Appropriateness to the subject and the occasion is a second determinant of usage. . . .

A third determinant of usage is the general purpose of the speech. . . .

Finally, appropriateness to the speaker himself should be a criterion of usage.57

Brigance also considered Diction of the utmost importance:

Neither Conrad nor Kipling was expressing a new discovery. Julius Caesar, man of action as well as master of words, had anticipated them by two thousand years. "The choice of words," said he, "is the source of eloquence," and eloquence he regarded as the most potent instrument of power.

In turning our attention to the use of words in speechmaking, we note first that man thinks in images, or rather in a succession of images. Not only do words determine the form which these images take in the mind, but they also have clangs, nuances, and echoes which determine the harmony with which they are received.58

---

The raw materials with which a speaker must pattern his thoughts are words. Therefore, the choice of words goes very far toward determining the ultimate vividness of style. So important is this element that we shall consider it in some detail.\textsuperscript{59}

Whately stressed the importance of using short, specific, and commonly understood words.

Inexperienced Preachers frequently err in this way, by dwelling on Virtue and Vice, Piety and Irreligion, in the abstract, without particularizing; forgetting that while they include much, they impress little or nothing.\textsuperscript{60}

Aristotle went into the Diction phase of style in detail and used Euripides as an authority when he said:

\dots a good style is, first of all, clear. The proof is that language which does not convey a clear meaning fails to perform the very function of language. The style, again, should be neither mean nor above the dignity of the subject, but appropriate \dots

In style, the illusion is successful if we take our individual words from the current stock, and put them together (with skill) \dots

Language is composed of name-words (nouns and adjectives) and verbs \dots of these, the speaker should use rare words, compound words, and coined words, but sparingly and seldom.\textsuperscript{61}

Mills considered Sentence Structure as one of the prime means of obtaining variety and preventing monotony in rhetoric.

In order to achieve that variety in style which has been considered previously, the sentences in a discourse should be built in several ways \dots Variety in sentence structure can be achieved in terms of length, position of modifiers, inversion, interrupted movement, periodic and loose structure, parallel and balanced clauses, and the four kinds of sentences.

\textsuperscript{59}Ibid., p. 220. \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{60}Whately, op. cit., p. 78.

\textsuperscript{61}Aristotle, op. cit., pp. 185-186.
Sentences in speech vary between two words and hundreds in length. Extremely short ones are forceful, while long ones build up cumulated effects. The extended use of either type produces monotony.

Whately made perspicuity or clearness his main concern in the sentence structure phase of Style.

In respect to the Construction of sentences, it is an obvious caution to abstain from such as are too long; but it is a mistake to suppose that the obscurity of many long sentences depends on their length alone; a well constructed sentence of very considerable length may be more readily understood, than a shorter one which is more awkwardly framed. . . . The caution just given is the more necessary to be insisted on, because an author is apt to be misled by reading over a sentence to himself, and being satisfied on finding it perfectly intelligible, forgetting that he himself has the advantage, which a hearer has not, of knowing at the beginning of the sentence what is coming in the close.

. . . it is a matter of some difficulty to keep in mind the necessity of carefully and copiously explaining principles which by long habit have come to assume in our minds the appearance of self-evident truths.

Brigance thought it was lamentable that he had to go into the principles of sentence structure but faced the fact that it must be done.

But it needs desperately to be said somewhere, for as Disraeli reminds us it is 'with words we govern men.' Let us now get down to earth and look at the weakest link in the mine-run management of words—sentence structure.

The verb is a motor. It propels the sentence. If you want the sentence to have power, work the verb hard.
Before setting up a standard for determining which modifiers to omit and which to use, remember that there are two kinds.

First, there are defining modifiers: wet street, hot stove, old man. They are necessary, for they tell you something essential.

Second, there are commenting modifiers. Actually, these should be named 'cluttering!' modifiers, for in operating practice most commenting adjectives do clutter: . . .

There are two kinds of words, full words and empty words. Full words include verbs, nouns, and defining adjectives. Empty words include prepositions, conjunctions, adverbs, and relative pronouns. . . . empty words cause trouble. Obviously you must use some of them, but don't use three where you might use two. 66

There is no rule. But after the manner of this statistically minded age, sentence length has been measured and tested. The testers know what sentence length is easiest for an audience with a given listening skill. When any sentence gets over twenty words it starts to be 'fairly difficult,' when it gets over twenty-five words it becomes 'difficult,' and when it goes beyond thirty words it becomes 'very difficult.' This much has been discovered by research. Knowing it, you are on your own.

Mills went into figurative language and related devices quite thoroughly and gave examples of each.

Expressions which convey meanings beyond their literal interpretations are figures of speech. They are used to stimulate and hold attention and interest through the arousal of sensory imagery, the satisfaction of the desire for variety, the addition of greater clearness, and the recalling or imagining of associated ideas. Intemperate indulgence in these devices will, of course, defeat their intended purpose. 69

---

66 Ibid., p. 235.
67 Ibid., p. 236.
68 Ibid., p. 239.
69 Mills, op. cit., p. 294.
Brigance gave almost exactly the same definition as Mills when he said:

Figures of speech may be defined as words used in a sense different from their literal meaning. Our language abounds in figures many of which have become so commonplace as to be accepted as literal. Thus we speak of 'a colorless voice,' 'a sweet disposition,' 'a sharp tongue.' Figures promote clearness, for they can often be used when the literal meaning of words is inadequate to communicate an idea; they promote force, for they communicate by images rather than by abstraction and so 'give thought a shape'; and they promote beauty, for they add grace and charm to the style.\(^{70}\)

Aristotle dealt with some of the major rhetorical devices but did not give as thorough an analysis on this section as was desired in this study. He reported:

... and must take up the question how to devise lively and popular sayings. Of course, the actual invention of these is a matter of natural talent or long practice; ...\(^{71}\)

Whately considered rhetorical devices as one of the chief means of obtaining the qualities of perspicuity and energy or vivacity in style and defined them as follows:

... the latter class including all others;—all that are in any way removed from common use; whether uncommon terms, or ordinary terms, either transferred to a different meaning from that which strictly belongs to them, or employed in a different manner from that of common discourse. All the Tropes and Figures, enumerated by Grammatical and Rhetorical Writers, will of course fall under this head.\(^{72}\)

\(^{70}\)Brigance, op. cit., p. 252. \(^{71}\)Aristotle, op. cit., p. 206.
\(^{72}\)Whately, op. cit., p. 77.
Not all of the rhetoricians were in agreement as to the exact division of the rhetorical devices and figurative language. Some of them went into the minutest detail and others just listed broad classifications. However, there was enough fundamental agreement as to the classification and definition of the major ones listed here with the main differences along the fringe areas and in the lesser figures.

Analogy. The dictionary gave perhaps the most concise definition available when it said:

A relation of likeness, between two things or of one thing to or with another, consisting in the resemblance not of the things themselves but of two or more attributes, circumstances, or effect.73

Brigance considered analogy as one of the superior methods of obtaining vividness.

Analogy and antithesis, or as they are sometimes called, comparison and contrast, have no superior among the objective elements of vividness. They place black against white, good against bad, and the measure of difference is heightened by the comparison. Every speaker comes to the place where he wants to measure some intangible idea and finds himself without a yardstick. The eulogist desires to measure the greatness of his subject, his genius as a leader, his foresight as a statesman, his influence upon the age. There is no measure save comparison and contrast with other statesmen and other ages.74

Genung also testified to the importance of analogy along with the other leading rhetoricians.

Analogy, by which is meant similarity of relation in diverse subjects, is a much-valued means of making clear the relations between ideas. Taking obscure and remote principles of things, it makes them familiar

---

73Webster's Dictionary, op. cit., p. 38.
74Brigance, op. cit., p. 77.
by identifying them with principles that we see all around us; and thus the abstruse becomes simple.\(^75\)

**Epigram.** Genung who delved into the epigram device and cleared up the definition, thought that it had been used too vaguely in the past by certain writers.

To be truly epigrammatic, a saying must give some unexpected turn to the idea; it is in some form the antithesis between what the reader looks for and what he gets. Its essential feature, thus, is the element of surprise.\(^76\)

Brigance said substantially the same thing:

The epigram is a powerful attention-catcher. It mints an old idea into a new form. It is novel. It is interesting. And, since it must perforce be terse, it is easy to remember. . . . The epigram arises from a play on words, from apparent contradictions, or from a sudden turn in the spirit of thought.\(^77\)

**Epithet.** Whately defined this device in the following vein.

Epithets, in the Rhetorical sense, denote, not every adjective, but those only which do not add to the sense, but signify something already implied in the noun itself; as if one says, 'the glorious sun'; on the other hand, to speak of the 'rising' or 'meridian sun,' would not be considered as, in this sense, employing an Epithet.\(^78\)

Whately thought that epithets should be very sparingly and carefully used or they would backfire on the user.


\(^{76}\)Ibid., pp. 273-274. \(^{77}\)Brigance, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

\(^{78}\)Whately, *op. cit.*, p. 84.
It is a common practice with some writers to en-
deavour to add force to their expressions by accumulat-
ing high-sounding qualities of the thing spoken of; but
the effect is generally the reverse of what is intended.
Most readers, except those of a very vulgar or puerile
taste, are disgusted at studied efforts to point out and
force upon their attention whatever is remarkable; and
this, even when the ideas conveyed are themselves strik-
ing.79

Aristotle held virtually the same viewpoint.

There is, of course, some need of epithets; they
diversify the usual idiom, and give our language an air
of distinction. But we must aim ever at the golden mean,
for using too many epithets works more harm than does
sheer carelessness about them; neglect does no good, but
excess brings a positive evil.80

Genung pointed out the usefulness of the epithet:

Epithet, with its point and its pervading vigor
of trope, is perhaps the most common and serviceable means
of condensing a whole picture, or scene, or spiritual
trait, into a word. It is better than pages of inventory
description in cases where vividness of conception is
needed.81

Humor. Mills was quite impressed with the value of
this device and said of it:

It (humor) may appear in a wide variety of forms
like puns, jokes, true stories, satire, irony, and so
on. The test of humor is audience reaction. If the
listeners are not amused by a bit of material, it is not
humor at that time. Incidental humor is used to ease
tension, rest the audience, renew interest, and suggest
good will.82

79Ibid.  80Aristotle, op. cit., pp. 190-91.
81Genung, op. cit., p. 497.
82Mills, op. cit., p. 298.
Whately was also well aware of the possibilities of humor but warned against its overuse.

... humor can be found in the greatest of speeches—not much of it, but some of it, enough of it to overthrow any argument against its moderate use. ... The best humor arises from the clever turn of a phrase, a witty comparison, a comic narration, or the incongruous application of a quotation or well-known maxim. 83

Rhetorical Question. Brigance held this device in high esteem and explained why:

... the rhetorical question, a question the answer to which is not directly given but is unmistakably implied in the form of the question. There are few more telling methods of emphasis than the rhetorical question; it is vivid, terse, sharp; it arouses the attention because it compels the hearer to answer for himself. 84

Mills also was well aware of the effectiveness of this device.

This device involves the use of at least one question the answer to which the speaker leaves for the listeners to supply in their own minds. Some auditors have been known to respond aloud. 85

Interrogation. Genung effectively stated the common stand on this device.

... asking of questions for the purpose of rousing interest, and then answering them, is just as legitimate and natural as oratorical interrogation; it is a means of taking the hearer into partnership with the speaker, as it were, in conducting an investigation. 86

83 Whately, op. cit., pp. 127-128.
84 Brigance, op. cit., p. 215.
85 Mills, op. cit., p. 296.
86 Genung, op. cit., p. 97.
Contrast. The rhetoricians considered this as a fundamental element of style, and Genung adequately summarized their views when he said:

The element of contrast. It is a natural impulse to make calm scenes alternate with stormy or exciting ones, to set people of contrasted character or appearance over against each other, to give opposite moods of the same person in dramatic succession. Life as well as literature is full of such antitheses, occurring in every variety of shading and impressiveness. Whately also clearly showed the importance of this device.

There can be no doubt that this figure is calculated to add greatly to Energy. Every thing is rendered more striking by contrast; and almost every kind of subject-matter affords materials for contrasted expressions. Truth is opposed to error; wise conduct to foolish; . . . .

Repetition. Genung said that it was imperative to use this element.

The same idea, the same forms of expression, must recur again and again, in order rightly to be impressed or made clear; and the constant problem is how to effect this repetition with skill and grace.

Allusion and reference. Mills gave a standard definition when he said:

A casual or passing reference to literature, history, the Bible, and so forth, without necessarily quoting it or identifying the source, is an allusion.

Climax. Mills defined this device quite adequately.

---

This figure of amplification accumulates several steps or details in a series of phrases or clauses for the purpose of making a climax concerning a point.\(^9\)

Example. Mills again listed a very clear and distinct definition of this device.

Examples may appear as specific instances or as detailed illustrations. They may be real or fictitious, verbal or pictorial. When used to clarify ideas, which is possibly their principal function, they should be (a) closely related to the idea, (b) related to the listeners' experiences, (c) presented with a minimum of detail, (d) composed in a natural order, (e) appropriate or fitting, and (f) factually valid unless frankly hypothetical.\(^9\)

Figures of speech. Four of the outstanding figures—Simile, Metaphor, Personification, and Alliteration—were considered in this study.

Simile. Genung defined this device in this way:

When the thing to be illustrated and the associated object are named together, with a particle or phrase of comparison expressed or implied, and when these compared objects are of different classes, the figure thus arising is called Simile. . . . \(^9\)

Metaphor. Aristotle thought very highly of this device and said of it:

It is metaphor above all else, that gives clearness, charm, and distinction to the style; . . . \(^9\)

Genung defined metaphor as follows:

---

\(^9\)Ibid., p. 304. \(^9\)Ibid., p. 132.

\(^9\)Genung, op. cit., p. 77.

A closer association of objects than by simile is made when, instead of comparing one thing with another, we identify the two, by taking the name or assuming the attributes of the one for the other.\textsuperscript{95}

\textbf{Personification.} Genung thought that the English language was well adapted to the use of personification, but, like the rest of the rhetoricians, he warned that it must be used with care. He defined it in the following manner:

This figure endows inanimate things, or abstract ideas, with attributes of life and personality.\textsuperscript{96}

\textbf{Alliteration.} Mills made the following definition of this device.

The use of the same letter or sound at the beginning of a series of words or stressed syllables within words is called alliteration. It is acceptable in oratorical prose if used sparingly.\textsuperscript{97}

\* \* \*

The following form was derived for the purpose of reporting on the criticism of the speeches of Carl Schurz:

I. Invention in the composition of the speech.
   A. Logical Proof (\textit{logos}).
      1. "Non-Artistic Proof" including:
         a. Evidence.
         b. Authority.
         c. Sign.
         d. Assumptions.

\textsuperscript{95}Genung, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 80.  \textsuperscript{96}Ibid., p. 84.
\textsuperscript{97}Mills, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 300.
2. "Artistic Proof" or reasoning, including:
   a. Inductive reasoning, including:
      1) Argument from Generalization.
      2) Argument from Causation.
      3) Argument from Analogy.
   b. Deductive reasoning, including:
      1) Argument by Syllogism.
      2) Argument by Enthymeme.

B. Ethical Proof (ethos).
   1. Intelligence.
   2. Character.
   3. Good will.

C. Emotional Proof (pathos).
   1. Anger.
   2. Love.
   3. Fear.
   4. Confidence.
   5. Shame.
   6. Pity.
   7. Envy.
   8. Emulation.

II. Arrangement (organization) in the composition of the speech.
   A. Introduction.
   B. Discussion.
   C. Conclusion.

III. Style in the composition of the speech.
   A. Level of style:
      1. Low.
      2. Middle.
      3. High, elevated, or sublime.
   B. Diction or Word Choice.
      1. Mono-syllabic or Poly-syllabic.
      2. Generally abstract or concrete.
   C. Sentence structure (according to Mills)
      1. Simple.
      2. Compound.
      3. Complex.
   D. Rhetorical Devices and Figurative Language.
      1. Analogy.
      2. Epigram.
      3. Epithet.
      4. Humor.
      5. Rhetorical Question.
      6. Interrogation.

---

Ibid., p. 307.
7. Contrast.
8. Repetition.
10. Climax.
11. Example.
12. Figures of speech.
   a. Simile.
   b. Metaphor.
   c. Personification.
   d. Alliteration.
CHAPTER IV

RESULTS OF STUDY

"TRUE AMERICANISM"

I. INVENTION

Logical proof (logos)—"non-artistic proof."

Evidence. Schurz used very little direct evidence in this speech but it gave him a change of pace when it was used and it added to the over-all vividness of the speech.

There was Bunker Hill; there Charleston, Lexington and Dorchester Heights not far off; there the harbor into which the British tea was sunk; there the place where the old liberty-tree stood; there John Hancock’s house; there Benjamin Franklin’s birthplace; . . . 99

While the Anglo-Saxon takes possession of New England, Virginia and Pennsylvania, the Frenchman plants his colonies on the soil of French Florida and the interior of the continent; the Hollander locates New Netherlands on the banks of the Hudson; the Swede, led there by the great mind of Oxenstiern, occupies the banks of the Delaware; the Spaniard maintains himself in peninsular Florida, and a numerous immigration of Germans, who follow the call of religious freedom, and of Irishmen, gradually flowing in, scatters itself all over this vast extent of country. 100

Authority. In this speech Schurz used many outstanding American patriots, including what they had said and done, in order to show what "True Americanism" really meant.

It will recognize as supremely inviolable, what Roger Williams, one of the most luminous stars of the

99 Schurz, I, p. 48. 100 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
American sky, called the sanctity of conscience.\footnote{Ibid., p. 62.}

It is one of Jefferson's wisest words that 'he would much rather be exposed to the inconveniences arising from too much liberty than to those arising from too small a degree of it.'\footnote{Ibid., p. 65.}

On the evening of the 2nd day of November, 1855, there stood on this very platform a man, known and loved by every true son of Massachusetts, who, unmoved by the whirlwind of proscriptive movement howling around him, spoke the following words: \ldots The man who said so was Charles Sumner.\footnote{Ibid., p. 68.}

Sign. Schurz used this proof very sparingly as he usually chose to delve more deeply into any stand he took. One example though stands out:

With this banner we stand before the world.\footnote{Ibid., p. 71.}

Assumptions. Schurz used many assumptions in this speech. A good example is when he made the assumption that the slaveholders themselves were being held in a state of serfdom.

There is a class of men who are deprived of their natural rights. But this is not the only deplorable feature of that peculiar organization of society. Equally deplorable is it, that there is another class of men who keep the former in subjection. That there are slaves is bad; but almost worse is it, that there are masters. Are not the masters freemen? No Sir!\footnote{Ibid., p. 59.}

The system of slavery has enslaved them all, master as well as slave. \ldots It is that you cannot deny one class of society the full measure of their natural rights without imposing restraints upon your own liberty. If you want to be free, there is but one way: it is to
guarantee an equally full measure of liberty to all your neighbors. There is no other.\textsuperscript{106}

He made frequent assumptions as to the attitudes and beliefs of the members of his audience:

You hate kingcraft, and you would sacrifice your fortunes and your lives in order to prevent its establishment on the soil of this Republic. But let me tell you that the rule of political parties which sacrifice principle to expedience is no less dangerous, no less disastrous, no less aggressive, of no less despotic a nature, than the rule of monarchs.\textsuperscript{107}

"Artistic Proof."

Inductive reasoning—argument from generalization.

Schurz used generalizations a great deal. A prominent example he gave was when he drew a generalization about the United States because a few events had taken place in this country which were similar to those which took place in Germany four or five centuries previously when an obscure monk discovered black powder, when Gutenberg invented the printing-press, and when Luther started his break with the Roman Catholic Church.

He who reviews the past of this country in connection with the history of the world besides, cannot fail to discover a wonderful coincidence of great events and fortunate circumstances, which were destined to produce everlasting results, unless recklessly thrown away by imbecile generations.\textsuperscript{108}

Another illustration of him using this type of argument was when he generalized about the settlement of the issues of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p. 60. \textsuperscript{107} Ibid., p. 66. \textsuperscript{108} Ibid., pp. 51-52.}
the day because this country was maintaining the basic principles of democracy.

Our present issues will pass away. The slavery question will be settled, liberty will be triumphant and other matters of difference will divide the political parties of this country.\textsuperscript{109}

\textbf{Argument from causation.} Schurz used causal relationships both cause to effect and effect to cause throughout this speech. One of his cause-to-effect arguments was when he gave the nationality elements which went together to form the United States of America.

. . . we see the vigorous elements of all nations, we see the Anglo Saxon, . . . the German, . . . the Celt, . . . the Frenchman, the Scandinavian, the Scot, the Hollander, the Spaniard, and the Italian— all these peaceably congregating and mingling together on virgin soil, where the backwoodsman's hatchet is the only battle-axe of civilization; led together by the irresistible attraction of free and broad principles; undertaking to commence a new era in the history of the world, without first destroying the results of the progress of past periods; undertaking to found a new cosmopolitan nation without marching over the dead bodies of slain millions. Thus was founded the great colony of free humanity, which has not old England alone, but the world, for its mother-country.\textsuperscript{110}

His effect-to-cause reasoning was readily apparent when he pointed out the reasons for the Anglo-Saxon to have pride in the growth and development of this country.

The Anglo-Saxon may justly be proud of the growth and development of this country, and if he ascribes most of it to the undaunted spirit of his race, we may not ac-

\textsuperscript{109}Ibid., p. 67. \textsuperscript{110}Ibid., pp. 55-56.
cuse him of overweening self-glorification. He possesses in an eminent degree the enviable talent of acting when others only think; of promptly executing his own ideas, and of appropriating the ideals of other people to his own use. There is, perhaps, no other race that, at so early a day, would have founded the stern democracy of the Plymouth settlement; no other race that would have defied the trials and hardships of the original settler's life so victoriously. No other race, perhaps, possesses in so high a degree not only the daring spirit of independent enterprise, but at the same time the stubborn steadfastness necessary to the final execution of great designs.\textsuperscript{111}

\textit{Argument from analogy.} Schurz used analogies quite effectively to illustrate points he was trying to put across.

I answer, ideals are like stars; you will not succeed in touching them with your hands. But like the seafaring man on the desert of waters, you choose them as your guides, and following them you will reach your destiny.\textsuperscript{112}

Liberty, sir, is like a spirited housewife; she will have her whims, she will be somewhat unruly sometimes, and, like so many husbands, you cannot always have it all your own way. She may spoil your favorite dish sometimes; but will you, therefore, at once smash her china, break her kettles and shut her out from the kitchen? Let her practice, let her try again and again, and even when she makes a mistake, encourage her with a benignant smile, and your broth will be right after a while. But meddle with her concerns, tease her, bore her, and your little squabbles, spirited as she is, will ultimately result in a divorce.\textsuperscript{113}

\textit{Deductive reasoning--argument by syllogism.} Whenever Schurz used this type of argument, he kept it well concealed within the general framework of the speech and went into detail

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{111}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 56.
  \item \textsuperscript{112}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 51.
  \item \textsuperscript{113}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 65.
\end{itemize}
concerning both the major and minor premises and also the conclusion.

. . . when new periods of civilization break upon humanity, the people of the earth cannot maintain their national relations.

Then the time of a new migration was at hand, and that migration rolled its waves toward America.

Thus was founded the great colony of free humanity, which has not old England alone, but the world, for its mother-country.114

Argument by enthymeme. This type of argument can be found throughout this speech and is used with potent force to bring out the concise meaning of an idea.

. . . the destinies of men are often greater than men themselves, and that a good many are swerving from the path of glory by not obeying the true instincts of their nature, and by sacrificing their mission to one-sided pride.115

There is a thing which stands above the command of the most ingenious of politicians: it is the logic of things and events. It cannot be turned and twisted by artificial arrangements and delusive settlements; it will go its own way with the steady step of fate. It will force you, with uncompromising severity, to choose between two social organizations, one of which is founded upon privilege, and the other upon the doctrine of equal rights.116

Ethical proof (ethos).

Intelligence. From the introduction to the conclusion of this speech, Schurz demonstrated his infinite intelligence and knowledge. Although he was an immigrant to this country,
he knew American history and its foundations in minute detail. He knew the issues of his day and the philosophy of the people. It would be ridiculous on the part of this writer to have pointed out specific examples as the entire speech teemed with the width and breadth of Schurz’s intelligence.

**Character.** Perhaps the greatest attribute of Schurz’s character was that he took a clearcut stand as to what he thought and in what he believed. After taking this stand he did not equivocate or vacillate from it. His honesty and integrity was unquestionable and his character was unimpeachable. Schurz demonstrated in this speech that his character was quite comparable to that of his friend and colleague, Abraham Lincoln, who is commonly regarded as the epitome of desirable character.

**Good will.** Schurz early in the speech identified himself with his audience and put across the point that they were all interested in whatever was best for America.

A few days ago I stood on the cupola of your statehouse, and overlooked for the first time this venerable city and the country surrounding it. Then the streets, and hills, and waters around me began to teem with the life of historical recollections, recollections dear to all mankind, and a feeling of pride arose in my heart, and I said to myself, I, too, am an American citizen. 117

Yes, for to me the word Americanism, true Americanism, comprehends the noblest ideas which ever swelled a human heart with noble pride. 118

---

Emotional proof (pathos).

Anger. In this speech Schurz showed his anger against despots, tyrants, and especially the dictatorial slaveholders.

It is an old dodge of the advocates of despotism throughout the world, that the people who are not experienced in self-government are not fit for the exercise of self-government, and must first be educated under the rule of a superior authority.\textsuperscript{119}

I have already called your attention to the despotic tendency of the slaveholding system. I need not enlarge upon it; I need not describe how the existence of slavery in the South affected and demoralized even the political life of the free States; how they attempted to press us, you and me, into the posse of the slave-catcher by that abominable act which, worse than the 'alien and sedition laws,' still disgraces our statute-book; how the ruling party, which has devoted itself to the service of that despotic interest, shrinks from no violation of good faith, from no adulteration of the constitutional compact, from no encroachment upon natural right, from no treacherous abandonment of fundamental principles.\textsuperscript{120}

Love. Schurz left no doubt about his love for 'liberty' and for America where this liberty flourished.

... and now I stand in this grand old hall, which so often resounded with the noblest appeals that ever thrilled American hearts, and where I am almost afraid to hear the echo of my own feeble voice;--oh, sir, no man that loves liberty, wherever he may have first seen the light of day, can fail on this sacred spot to pay his tribute to Americanism.\textsuperscript{121}

... liberty is the best school for liberty, and that self-government cannot be learned but by practicing it. This, sir, is a truly American idea; but it is true Americanism, and to this I pay the tribute of my devotion.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{119}Ibid., p. 61. \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{120}Ibid., p. 63.
\textsuperscript{121}Ibid., pp. 48-49. \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{122}Ibid., p. 61.
Fear. His greatest fear was that this republic would be destroyed if slavery was allowed to continue. He also was afraid of people who acted for expediency instead of seeking a solution which would be successful in the long run.

I do not hesitate to prophesy that, if the theories engendered by the institution of slavery be suffered to outgrow the equalizing tendency of true democracy, the American Republic will, at no distant day, crumble down under the burden of the laws and measures which the ruling interest will demand for its protection, and its name will be added to the sad catalogue of the broken hopes of humanity.123

Another danger for the safety of our institutions, and perhaps the most formidable one, arises from the general propensity of political parties and public men to act on a policy of mere expediency, and to sacrifice principle to local and temporary success.124

Confidence. Schurz had undaunted faith and confidence in America and that we were destined to lead the people of the world to the realization that they have the ability to govern themselves and be free from despotism.

And thus, sir, we mean to realize the great cosmopolitan idea, upon which the existence of the American nation rests. Thus we mean to fulfill the great mission of true Americanism—thus we mean to answer the anxious question of down-trodden humanity—'Has man the faculty to be free and to govern himself?' The answer is a triumphant 'Aye,' thundering into the ears of the despots of the old world that 'a man is a man for all that'; proclaiming to the oppressed that they are held in subjection on false pretences; cheering the hearts of the despondent friends of man with consolation and renewed confidence.125

123 Ibid., p. 64. 124 Ibid., p. 65. 125 Ibid., pp. 71-72.
Shame. Schurz thought it a shame that slavery was allowed to exist because democracy cannot function along side of slavery.

They speak of a republican form of government—they speak of democracy, but the despotic spirit of slavery and mastership combined pervades their whole political life like a liquid poison. They do not dare to be free, lest the spirit of liberty become contagious. The system of slavery has enslaved them all, master as well as slave.\(^{126}\)

Pity. Schurz pitied those who tried to establish liberty by means of despotism because they lost their freedom in the process.

I will not discuss here what might have been done, and what not, in those times of a fearful crisis; but I will say that they tried to establish liberty by means of despotism, and that in her gigantic struggle against the united monarchs of Europe, revolutionary France won the victory, but lost her liberty.\(^{127}\)

Envy. Schurz pointed out how the people in other parts of the world were envious of those fortunate enough to be able to come to this country.

At last the train started into motion, they gave three cheers for America, and then in the first gray dawn of the morning I saw them wending their way over the hill until they disappeared in the shadow of the forest. And I heard many a man say, how happy he would be if he could go with them to that great and free country, where a man could be himself.\(^{128}\)

Emulation. Schurz used this emotion a great deal in this speech especially concerning emulating those who founded

\(^{126}\)Ibid., pp. 59-60.  \(^{127}\)Ibid., p. 66.  
\(^{128}\)Ibid., p. 49.
this country and those who have helped to preserve its liberty and freedom.

Sir, I wish the words of the Declaration of Independence 'that all men are created free and equal, and are endowed with certain inalienable rights,' were inscribed upon every gate-post within the limits of this Republic. From this principle the Revolutionary Fathers derived their claim to independence; upon this they founded the institutions of this country, and the whole structure was to be the living incarnation of this idea. The principle contains the programme of our political existence. It is the most progressive, and at the same time the most conservative one. . . . 129

He also made use of this emotion to show his audience that the rest of the country would emulate whatever the state of Massachusetts might do.

It ought never to be forgotten that this old Commonwealth occupies a representative position. Her history is familiar to the nation; even South Carolina knows it. The nation is so accustomed to admire her glorious deed for freedom, that with this expectation their eyes are turned upon her. Massachusetts can do nothing in secret; Massachusetts can do nothing for herself alone; every one of her acts involves a hundred-fold responsibility. What Massachusetts does is felt from the Atlantic to the Pacific. 130

II. ARRANGEMENT

"True Americanism" followed the three-divisional method of organization in the composition of the speech. In the Introduction, Schurz established a common ground with his audience by stating how much America meant to him and to the other people throughout the world who were not fortunate enough

129Ibid., p. 58. 130Ibid., p. 70.
to be born in this country.

In the Discussion division, Schurz told what "True Americanism" really meant and the privileges and responsibilities of the people who live under this system. He went into the heritage that the American people enjoy, the main problems that they were faced with at that time, and what they had to look forward to in the future.

In the Conclusion, he summarized his speech and stated that man did have the faculty to be free and to govern himself; that America stood as a symbol of hope and aspiration to the oppressed, downtrodden masses of people throughout the world; and that if we maintained this banner of "True Americanism," the rest of the world would rally and follow our example.

III. STYLE

Level. The style level was sublime. Schurz was talking upon a subject which he dearly loved and he pulled out all the stops in order to put his ideas across to his audience. He painted such a clear picture with his words that it would be almost impossible for an auditor to fail to comprehend Schurz's concepts. Diction or word choice. Schurz's diction in this speech was extraordinary. He always seemed to have used the right word to convey the right meaning. He did not depend on either monosyllabic or poly-syllabic words primarily but used them with a
deft touch to put his meaning across and to give emphasis to what he was saying. His words were mostly concrete but were full of imagery.

**Sentence structure.** Schurz's sentence structure ranged from the very "Simple" to the "Compound-complex" type. He varied his sentence structure according to the meaning and emphasis he wanted to give an idea. Observe the following typical extremes.

That is America.131

The Anglo-Saxon spirit has been the locomotive of progress; but do not forget, that this locomotive would be of little use to the world if it refused to draw its train over the iron highway and carry its valuable freight towards its destination; that train consists of the vigorous elements of all nations; that freight is the vital ideas of our age; that destination is universal freedom and the ideal development of man.132

**Rhetorical devices and figurative language.**

**Analogy.** This speech is filled with analogies which illustrated his ideas and enlightened the audience.

I answer, ideals are like stars; you will not succeed in touching them with your hands. But like the seafaring man on the desert of waters, you choose them as your guides, and following them you will reach your destiny. I invite you to ascend with me the watchtower of human affairs, in which the American Republic stands in so bold and prominent relief.133

Liberty, sir, is like a spirited housewife; she will have her whims, she will be somewhat unruly some-

---

times, and, like so many husbands, you cannot always have it all your own way. She may spoil your favorite dish sometimes; but will you, therefore, at once smash her china, break her kettles and shut her out from the kitchen? Let her practice, let her try again and again, and even when she makes a mistake, encourage her with a benignant smile, and your broth will be right after a while. But meddle with her concerns, tease her, bore her, and your little squabbles, spirited as she is, will ultimately result in a divorce.\textsuperscript{134}

Those who lead us into this channel will be like the sorcerer who knew the art of making a giant snake. And when he had made it, he forgot the charmword that would destroy it again. And the giant snake threw its horrid coils around him, and the unfortunate man was choked by the monster of his own creation.\textsuperscript{135}

\textbf{Epigram.} No use of this device was found in this speech.

\textbf{Epithet.} Frequent use was made of lively epithets in this speech.

While the coast of Virginia is settled by a motley immigration, led and ruled by men of ideas and enterprise, the sturdiest champions of principle descend upon the stony shores of New England. While the Southern colonies are settled under the auspices of lordly merchants and proprietaries...\textsuperscript{136}

... there is none more horrible than the hideous monster, whose name is 'Proscription for opinion's sake.'\textsuperscript{137}

He is a true American! Aye, Charles Sumner is a true American; he is a representative of the truest Americanism, and to him I pay the tribute of my enthusiastic admiration.\textsuperscript{138}

\textbf{Humor.} No use of this device was found in this speech.

\textsuperscript{134}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 65. \textsuperscript{135}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 68. \textsuperscript{136}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 53. \textsuperscript{137}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 67. \textsuperscript{138}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 69.
Rhetorical question. This device was constantly used throughout the speech. Sometimes there would be as many as five rhetorical questions in a row. Other times there would be only one.

Which of the two Republics is the greater—the Republic of the Roman, or the Republic of man?139

Where is their liberty of the press? Where is their liberty of speech? Where is the man among them who dares to advocate openly principles not in strict accordance with the ruling system?140

Aye, where is the faith that led the Fathers of this Republic to invite the weary and burdened of all nations to the enjoyment of equal rights? Where is that broad and generous confidence in the efficiency of true democratic institutions? Has the present generation forgotten that true democracy bears in itself the remedy for all the difficulties that may grow out of it?141

You object that people are misled by their religious prejudices, and by the intrigues of the Roman hierarchy? Since when have the enlightened citizens of this Republic lost their faith in the final invincibility of truth? Since when have they forgotten that if the Roman or any other church plants the seeds of superstition, liberty sows broadcast the seed of enlightenment? Do they no longer believe in the invincible spirit of inquiry, which characterizes the reformatory age? If the struggle be fair, can the victory be doubtful?142

Is it not wonderful how nations who have won their liberty by the severest struggles become so easily impatient of the small inconveniences and passing difficulties which are almost inseparably connected with the practical working of general self-government?143

\[139\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 58.} \quad 140\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 59.} \quad 141\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 60-61.} \quad 144\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 61-62.} \quad 143\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 64.}\]
What if we, in our struggle against slavery, had removed the solid basis of equal rights, on which such new matters of difference may be peaceably settled? What if we had based the institutions of this country upon a difference of rights between different classes of people? What if, in destroying the generality of natural rights, we had solved them into privileges?^\textsuperscript{144}

Ah, sir, is there a man in Massachusetts, except he be a servant of the slave-power, who cannot hear me advocate the equal rights of man, without feeling serious pangs of conscience? Is there a son of this glorious old Commonwealth who cannot hear me draw logical conclusions from the Declaration of Independence—who cannot hear me speak of the natural right of man to the exercise of self-government, without feeling a blush fluttering upon his cheeks?^\textsuperscript{145}

\textit{Interrogation.} Schurz used this device several times in this speech as a lead-in to a topic which he wanted to develop further. He also used it as a means of emphasis for important points.

Are not the masters freemen? No, sir!^\textsuperscript{146}

Shall I point out to you the consequences of a deviation from this principle? Look at the slave States.\textsuperscript{147}

What is the cause of all this? It is that you cannot deny one class of society the full measure of their natural rights without imposing restraints upon your own liberty.\textsuperscript{148}

You tell me, that for my opinion they would mob me in South Carolina? Sir, there is the difference between South Carolina and Massachusetts.\textsuperscript{149}

\textit{Contrast.} The entire speech was in effect a contrast

\begin{footnotes}
144 & \textit{Ibid.}, p. 67. \\
145 & \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 69-70. \\
146 & \textit{Ibid.}, p. 59. \\
147 & \textit{Ibid.}. \\
148 & \textit{Ibid.}, p. 60. \\
149 & \textit{Ibid.}, p. 67.
\end{footnotes}
between the ideal America and the rest of the world, between the North and the South, between slavery and freedom, et cetera. Several specific examples will point out the effective use that Schurz made of this device.

The greatness of thy Roman Republic consisted in its despotic rule over the world; the greatness of the American Republic consists in the secured right of man to govern himself. The dignity of the Roman citizen consisted in his exclusive privileges; the dignity of the American citizen consists in his holding the natural rights of his neighbor just as sacred as his own.  

Sir, there is the difference between South Carolina and Massachusetts. There is the difference between an anti-slavery man, who is a freeman, and a slaveholder, who is himself a slave.  

Repetition. Schurz made frequent use of this device. In the following passage, the repetition of "great" and "I speak" is readily apparent.

As its advocate I speak to you. I will speak of Americanism as the great representative of the reformatory age, as the great champion of the dignity of human nature, as the great repository of the last hopes of suffering mankind. I will speak of the ideal mission of this country and of this people.

In the following example he used repetition to enforce a certain idea he was trying to put across.

My friends, if I had a thousand tongues, and a voice strong as the thunder of heaven, they would not be sufficient to impress upon your minds forcibly enough the greatness of this idea, the overshadowing glory of this result. This was the dream of the truest friends of

---

150 Ibid., p. 58.  151 Ibid., p. 67.  152 Ibid., p. 51.
man from the beginning; for this the noblest blood of martyrs has been shed; for this has mankind waded through seas of blood and tears. There it is now; there it stands, the noble fabric in all the splendor of reality.\textsuperscript{153}

In the following specimen, he not only used repetition of Interrogation and answer but also of a phrase in each of the questions and another phrase in each of the answers.

You object that some people do not understand their own interests? There is nothing that, in the course of time, will make a man better understand his interests than the independent management of his own affairs on his own responsibility. You object that people are ignorant? There is no better schoolmaster in the world than self-government, independently exercised. You object that people have no just idea of their duties as citizens? There is no other source from which they can derive a just notion of their duties than the enjoyment of the rights from which they arise.\textsuperscript{154}

Schurz used the phrase "thus we mean" to drive home his point in the following selection.

And thus, sir, we mean to realize the great cosmopolitan idea, upon which the existence of the American nation rests. Thus we mean to fulfill the great mission of true Americanism—thus we mean to answer the anxious question of down-trodden humanity. . . .\textsuperscript{155}

Allusion and reference. Schurz only made occasional use of this device in this speech.

Remember the shout of indignation that went all over the Northern States when we heard that the border ruffians of Kansas had crowded the free-State men away from the polls and had not allowed them to vote.\textsuperscript{156}

And now I tell you, when he lay on the lounge of the ante-chamber, his anxious friends busy around him, and his cowardly murderers slinking away like Cain, . . .\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{153}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 57. \textsuperscript{154}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 61. \textsuperscript{155}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 71-72. \textsuperscript{156}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 66. \textsuperscript{157}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 69.
Climax. Schurz built up a series of climaxes throughout the speech with each succeeding climax a little higher and a little more forceful than the one before. A typical one was when he defended the stand he had taken in the speech—that of coming into Massachusetts and advocating the equal rights of man.

Strenuous advocate of individual rights and of local self-government as I am, if you ever hear of any movement in the West against the integrity of the fundamental principles underlying our system of government, I invite you, I entreat you, I conjure you, come one and all, and make our prairies resound and our forests shake, and our ears ring and tingle, with your appeals for the equal rights of man.  

Schurz's peroration could scarcely be more graphic and vivid.

"Has man the faculty to be free and to govern himself?" The answer is a triumphant 'Aye,' thundering into the ears of the despots of the old world that 'a man is a man for all that'; proclaiming to the oppressed that they are held in subjection on false pretences; cheering the hearts of the despondent friends of man with consolation and renewed confidence.

This is true Americanism, clasping mankind to its great heart. Under its banner we march; let the world follow.

Example. Schurz used this device with telling effect numerous times in this speech.

That night our neighbors were pressing around a few wagons covered with linen sheets and loaded with household utensils and boxes and trunks to their utmost capacity. One of our neighboring families was moving far away across a great water, and it was said that they would never again return. And I saw silent tears trickling

\[158\]Ibid., p. 70-71.  \[159\]Ibid., p. 72.
down weather-beaten cheeks, and the hands of rough peasants firmly pressing each other, and some of the man and women hardly able to speak when they nodded to one another a last farewell. 160

A contrary policy is not only pusillanimous and small, but it is senseless. It reminds me of the soldier who, for fear of being shot in battle, committed suicide on the march; or of the man who would cut off his foot because he had a corn on his toe. It is that ridiculous policy of premature despair, which commences to throw the freight overboard when there is a suspicious cloud in the sky. 161

Figures of speech. Simile. Schurz used simile quite sparingly but made good use of it when he did use it.

Liberty, sir, is like a spirited housewife... 162 and his cowardly murderers slinking away like Cain. 163

Metaphor. The only example found of metaphor was more or less a negative example.

Was it but a wild delusion when we thought that a man has the faculty to be free and to govern himself? Have we been fighting, were we ready to die, for a mere phantom, for a mere product of a morbid imagination? 164

Personification. Schurz's use of personification in this speech was negligible.

While the heart of Europe was ravaged by a series of religious wars... 165

Alliteration. Any alliteration that Schurz used in this speech was purely unintentional and due to chance.

. . . the steady step of fate. 166
. . . answer the anxious question. . . 169

166 Ibid., p. 67. 167 Ibid., p. 72.
"DOUGLAS AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY"

I. INVENTION

Logical proof (logos)—"non-artistic proof."

Evidence. Schurz used a lot of direct evidence in this speech. He referred throughout this speech to an article on popular sovereignty which Mr. Douglas had written in Harper's Magazine and made three direct quotations from it.\(^{168}\) He made many other direct quotations such as the following one which he quoted from a decision by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

\[ \text{'The right to hold a slave exists only by positive law of a municipal character and has no foundation in the law of nature or the unwritten and common law.'}^{169} \]

Authority. In this speech Schurz pointed out the deeds and actions of many outstanding Americans and contrasted them with the position that Douglas had taken.

Thus he did not blush to slander Jefferson, who, when speaking of the country, meant the world, and, when speaking of his fellow citizens, meant mankind; and Franklin, in whose clear head theory and practice were the same, and who, having declared 'all men to be created free and equal,' became the first president of the first great abolition society; and John Adams, the representative of that State which abolished slavery within its limits with one great stroke of legislation; and Washington, who declared it to be 'his fondest wish to see slavery abolished by law,' and affixed to the Declaration of Independence the broad signature of his heroic sword; and Madison, who deemed it 'absurd to admit the idea of property in man'. . . .\(^{170}\)

\(^{168}\)\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 82, 83, 94, 95.

\(^{169}\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 83.

\(^{170}\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 96.
First, Thomas Jefferson, whose philosophical spirit grasps the generality of things and events; then Benjamin Franklin, the great apostle of common sense, the clear wisdom of real life beaming in his serene eye; then the undaunted John Adams. . . . 'No recognition of the right of property in man!' says Madison. 'Let slavery be abolished by law!' says Washington. \(^{171}\)

He also referred to one of his colleagues:

. . . and is it indeed true what Judge Black intimates, that the article is one of the obscurest documents by which ever a politician attempted to befog his followers. . . . \(^{172}\)

Sign. This proof was used very seldom in this speech with most of the statements being thoroughly examined.

The system of compromises as a whole proved a failure. \(^{173}\)

Assumptions. The entire speech is predicated upon the premise of Schurz assuming that he was right and Douglas was wrong regarding their respective stands on slavery. Schurz also made assumptions on the stand which future historians would take and how the followers of Douglas would react in the future.

Such will be the verdict of future historians. They will indulge in curious speculations about the times when such doctrines could be passed off as sound statesmanship—a statesmanship indeed, the prototype of which may be found, not in Plutarch, but in Aristophanes—but they will be slow to believe that there were people dull enough to be deceived by it. \(^{174}\)

I see the time coming when many of those who

\(^{171}\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 93-94.}\) \(^{172}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 84.}\) \(^{173}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 80.}\) \(^{174}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 89.}\)
rallied around Douglas's colors because they believed in his principles, will, from his most devoted friends, become his most indignant accusers. 175

"Artistic proof."

Inductive reasoning—argument from generalization. Schurz used this type of reasoning throughout this speech especially concerning actions and beliefs.

Having no moral convictions of his own to stand upon, he could never address himself to the moral sense of the people. . . . look into the record of the champion of 'popular sovereignty'; scan it from syllable to syllable, and then tell me, you Douglasites of the South, do you find one word there indicating a moral conviction that slavery is right? And you Douglasites of the North, who are in the habit of telling us that you are the true anti-slavery men, and that popular sovereignty will surely work the overthrow of the institution—did your master ever utter a similar sentiment? Do you find in his record one word of sympathy with the downtrodden and degraded? One spark of the humane philosophy of our age? One syllable in vindication of the outraged dignity of human nature? One word which might indicate a moral conviction that slavery is wrong? Not one! 176

Argument from causation. Schurz used this type of argument a great deal in this speech—both cause to effect and effect to cause—but seemed to prefer the effect to cause method.

It was the dodge of a man who was well aware that, in order to be elected President of the United States, the vote of a few Northern States must be added to the united vote of the South. . . . So he endeavored to catch both sections of the Union successively in the trap of a double-faced sophistry. He tried to please them both in trying to cheat them both. But he placed himself between the

175 Ibid., pp. 90-91. 176 Ibid., pp. 104-105.
logic of liberty on one, and logic of slavery on the other side. He put the sword of logic into the hands of his opponents, and tried to defend himself with the empty scabbard of 'unfriendly legislation.'

Argument from analogy. Little use was made of this type of argument and when it was used, it was not gone into in detail.

I once heard of a Jesuit college where they used a textbook of history, in which the French Revolution was never mentioned, while the Emperor Napoleon figured there only as modest Marquis Bonaparte, who held a commission under Louis XVII, and fought great battles for the glory of the Catholic Church. So it is with Mr. Douglas and the history of our country. He ignores the universal principles of the Declaration of Independence, and represents the great founders of the Republic as merely paving the way for his 'great principles,' while a few village politicians get up an abusive ordinance, adverse to the general tendency of things.

Deductive reasoning—argument by syllogism. Schurz used no specific syllogisms in this speech. He did set up one that Douglas would have to follow if he were to be logically consistent. It said in effect:

Slavery exists only by virtue of local law.
A certain territory has not enacted laws establishing slavery.
Therefore, slavery cannot exist in that territory.

The entire speech was really a disjunctive syllogism which stated that: Either Judge Douglas and his view of popular sovereignty were wrong and illogical, or, the Lincoln-Schurz crowd were wrong and illogical. (Because their respective views were diametrically opposed to each other.)

---

177 Ibid., pp. 88-89.  
178 Ibid., pp. 101-102.  
179 Ibid., p. 83.
Since the Lincoln-Schurz crowd was right and logical, Douglas must be wrong and illogical. (Throughout the speech, example after example was brought out to prove this.)

Argument by enthymeme. Occasional use of this type of argument appeared in this speech.

... either slavery is excluded from the territories so long as it is not admitted by a special act of territorial legislation; or, if a slaveholder has the right to introduce his slave property there before such legislation is had, he can possess that right by virtue of no other but the only law existing there, the Constitution of the United States.180

Either slavery has no rights in the territories except those springing from positive law or municipal character, ... or the Constitution by its own force carries slavery wherever it is the supreme law of the land, that Congress is obliged to enact a slave code for its protection, and that popular sovereignty means the power of the people to vote for slavery but by no means against it. There is no escape for this dilemma.181

Ethical proof (ethos).

Intelligence. Schurz exhibited his knowledge of the slavery question throughout this speech. In the following passage, his refutation of Douglas's stand on the Jeffersonian plan brings out the thoroughness with which he knew the subject.

Although with a large numerical majority in its favor (16 to 7), this article did, indeed, fail to obtain a constitutional majority, the vote of New Jersey not being counted in consequence of there being but one delegate present; yet it had been drawn up by Mr. Jefferson, introduced by Mr. Jefferson and sustained by Mr. Jefferson's vote. ... Does Mr. Douglas not know that on the

180 Ibid., p. 87. 181 Ibid.
16th of March, 1785, a proposition was introduced into Congress by Rufus King, to exclude slavery from the States described in the resolve of April 23, 1784, and to make this provision part of the compact established by that resolve? Does he not know that this provision, restoring the Jeffersonian feature to the 'Jeffersonian plan,' was committed by the vote of eight States against four? Does he not know that the plan of 1784 never went into practical operation, but was expressly set aside by Congress in 1787? Does he not know that the ordinance of 1787 was the first legislative act ever practically organizing a territory of the United States, and that one of its most prominent features was the proviso excluding slavery from all the territories then in possession of the United States?182

Character. One of the outstanding features of Mr. Schurz's character brought out in this speech was his respect for his fellow man's honest beliefs.

Among the fire-eaters of the South there are men who speak of the moral basis of slavery, and believe in it; who speak of the blessings of servitude and believe in it; who assert that slavery is right, and believe it. Atrocious as their errors may be, and deeply as I deplore them, yet I respect their convictions as soon as I find them to be such.183

Good will. A good example of Schurz's good will in this speech was his attitude toward the followers of Douglas.

I see the time coming when many of those who rallied around Douglas's colors because they believed in his principles, will, from his most devoted friends, become his most indignant accusers. They are already unwittingly denouncing his doctrines, even while trying to defend him; they will not be sparing in direct denunciations as soon as they discover how badly they have been deceived and how ignominiously they were to be sold.184

Emotional proof (pathos).

Anger. Schurz left no doubt of his low opinion of Douglas and the anger in his statements was readily apparent.

He vindicate the signers of the Declaration of Independence! Indeed, they need it sadly. I see the illustrious committee of five arise from their graves—at their head Thomas Jefferson, his lips curled with the smile of contempt, and I hear him say to Mr. Douglas: 'Sir, you may abuse us as much as you please, but have the goodness to spare us with your vindications of our character and motives.' 185

But as long as the moral vitality of this nation is not entirely exhausted, Mr. Douglas and men like him will in vain endeavor to reduce the people to that disgusting state of moral indifference which he himself is not ashamed to boast of. I solemnly protest that the American people are not to be measured by Mr. Douglas's self-made moral standard.186

Love. Schurz had a genuine affection for his fellow men and for the United States of America which typifies the principle of liberty and equality for all men, regardless of their race, color, or creed.

Not only the supremacy of old England is to be shaken off, but a new organization of society is to be built up on the basis of liberty and equality. That is the Declaration of Independence! That is the American Revolution! All men free and equal! Not even the broad desert of the Atlantic Ocean stops the triumphant shout.187

But the dignity of great characters and the glory of great events find their vindication in the consciences of the people. It is vain for demagogism to raise its short arms against the truth of history. The Declaration of Independence stands there... It is the summing up of the results of the philosophical development of the age; it is the practical embodiment of the progressive...
ideas which, very far from being confined to the narrow limits of the English colonies, pervaded the very atmosphere of all civilized countries. That code of human rights has grown on the very summit of civilization, not in the miry soil of a South Carolina cotton-field. 188

Fear. Schurz's main concern in this speech was that he was afraid that Douglas would be successful in the immediate future; he had no doubt that Douglas and his "Cohorts" would ultimately be defeated.

In vain will our important mock giants endeavor to make the test-question of our age turn on a ridiculous logical quibble, or a paltry legal technicality; in vain will they attempt to drag down the all-absorbing contest to the level of a mere pothouse quarrel between two rival candidates for a Presidential nomination. The wheel of progressing events will crush them to atoms, as it has crushed so many abnormities... 189

Confidence. Schurz enthused confidence throughout this speech. He was mainly confident that the people of this country and the world were not in accord with the Douglas 'don't care' attitude toward human bondage.

However degraded some of our politicians may be, the progress of the struggle will show that the popular conscience is still alive, and that the people DO CARE. 190

Shame. The entire speech was in effect based upon this emotion. Schurz repeatedly built his case to shame Douglas for the stand he had taken on popular sovereignty and slavery.

It is a common thing for men of a coarse cast of mind so to lose themselves in the mean pursuit of selfish ends as to become insensible to the grand and sublime.

188 Ibid., p. 98. 189 Ibid., p. 107. 190 Ibid.
Measuring every character and event in history by the low standard of their own individualities, applying to everything the narrow rule of their own motive, incapable of grasping broad and generous ideas, they will belittle everything they cannot deny, and drag down every struggle of principles to the sordid arena of aspiring selfishness or of small competing interests.  

But today, in the midst of the nineteenth century, in a Republic whose program was laid down in the Declaration of Independence, there comes a man to you, and tells you with cynical coolness that he does not care! And because he does not care, he claims the confidence of his countrymen and the highest honors of the Republic; because he does not care, he pretends to be the representative statesman of the age.

**Pity.** The only pity that Schurz showed in this speech was for the people who were duped and deceived by Douglas. He had no pity for Douglas whatsoever because he thought that Douglas was deliberately trying to deceive the people in order to be elected president.

We might, indeed, feel tempted to pity him, if we had not to reserve that generous emotion of our hearts for those who are wrong by mistake and unfortunate without guilt.

**Envy.** Schurz used no envy in this speech. Instead of being envious of Douglas and begrudging him his position, he was deeply ashamed of Douglas and all that he stood for.

**Emulation.** Many times during the speech, Schurz gave examples of Douglas emulating some vacillating or equivocating character. He certainly did not want his audience to copy

---

Douglas but thought that they should emulate men like Franklin, Jefferson, Madison, et cetera.

It is a common thing for men of a coarse cast of mind so to lose themselves in the mean pursuit of selfish ends as to become insensible to the grand and sublime. Measuring every character and every event in history by the low standard of their own individualities, applying to everything the narrow rule of their own motive, incapable of grasping broad and generous ideas, they will belittle everything they cannot deny, and drag down every struggle of principles to the sordid arena of aspiring selfishness or of small competing interests.\(^\text{194}\)

He is in the position of that Democratic candidate for Congress in the West, who, when asked, 'Are you a Buchanan or Douglas man?' answered, 'I am.' If you ask Mr. Douglas: 'Do you hold that slavery is the creature of local law, or that a slaveholder has the right to introduce his slave property where there is no local law?' he will answer, 'I do.'\(^\text{195}\)

In the following illustration, Schurz factitiously referred to Douglas as a "Statesman" and that since he was a "Statesman," he should emulate true statesmanship.

Of all men, Mr. Douglas ought to be the first to know what the true intent and meaning of the Nebraska bill and the principle of popular sovereignty are. He is said to be a statesman, and it is to be presumed that his measure rests upon a positive idea; for all true statesmanship is founded upon positive ideas.\(^\text{196}\)

II. ARRANGEMENT

Schurz used the three-divisional approach to organization in the composition of this speech. In the Introduction he went on record as being opposed to Douglas's stand on popular

\(^\text{194}\)Ibid., p. 97. \(^\text{195}\)Ibid., p. 88. \(^\text{196}\)Ibid., p. 82.
sovereignty and gave a hint of what was to come later in the speech when he held Douglas up to ridicule.

In the Discussion phase of this speech, Schurz took Douglas's stand apart, point by point, in order to show that it was illogical and was put forth mainly for selfish reasons. Schurz could not see how any human being could be indifferent or disinterested when it came to human servitude which Douglas claimed was his attitude.

In the Conclusion, Schurz expresses confidence that history will place Douglas in his proper place which is essentially the same place that Schurz has relegated him to during the speech.

The wheel of progressing events will crush them to atoms, as it has crushed so many abnormities, and a future generation will perhaps read on Mr. Douglas's tombstone the inscription: "Here lies the queer sort of a statesman, who, when the great battle of slavery was fought, pretended to say that he did not care whether slavery be voted up or down."

III. STYLE

Level. The style level that Schurz used in this speech was mainly the middle. It ranged from the very chatty to the most sublime, but for the most part was a middle-of-the-road approach. Diction or word choice. Schurz's remarkable vocabulary was used with notable effect in this speech. His thoughts came

to life through his choice of words.

They heartily welcomed in their scattered towns and plantations the new ideals brought forth by that sudden progress of humanity, and, meditating them in the dreamy solitude of virgin nature, they had enlarged the compass of their thoughts and peopled their imaginations with lofty ideals. 198

Sentence structure. Schurz varied his sentence structure according to the tempo he wanted to induce into a certain passage. The following sentences are symbolic of the wide range of sentence structure that Schurz used in this speech.

What? Is that all? 199

Sir, look over this broad land, where the struggle has raged for years and years; and across the two oceans, around the globe, to the point where the far West meets the far East; over the teeming countries where the cradle of mankind stood; and over the workshops of civilization in Europe, and over those mysterious regions under the tropical sun, which have not yet emerged from the night of barbarism into the daylight of civilized life,—and then tell me how many hearts you find that do not tremble with mortal anguish or exultant joy as the scales of human freedom or human bondage go up or down? 200

Rhetorical devices and figurative language.

Analogy. Schurz made limited use of this device in this speech.

I once heard of a Jesuit college where they used a textbook of history, in which the French Revolution was never mentioned, while the Emperor Napoleon figured there only as modest Marquis Bonaparte, who held a commission under Louis XVII, and fought great battles for the glory of the Catholic Church. So it is with Mr. Douglas and the history of our country. He ignores the universal principles of the Declaration of Independence, and repre-

198 Ibid., p. 92. 199 Ibid., p. 95. 200 Ibid., p. 105.
sents the great founders of the Republic as merely paving the way for his 'great principles,' while a few village politicians get up an abusive ordinance, adverse to the general tendency of things.

**Epigram.** No use of epigrammatical statements was found in this speech.

**Epithet.** Schurz used this device a great deal in this speech, mostly to heap caustic abuse upon Douglas and his allies.

But Mr. Douglas is a statesman—so are they all, all statesmen. . . .

. . . but a hypocritical piece of special pleading, drawn up by a batch of artful pettifoggers, who, when speaking of the rights of man, meant but the privileges of a set of aristocratic slaveholders. . . . These are your boasted revolutionary sires, no longer heroes and sages, but accomplished humbuggers and hypocrites. . . .

**Humor.** It appeared that Schurz made no attempt to employ humor in this speech.

**Rhetorical question.** This was Schurz's predominant device in this speech and he hammered his points home by using a series of rhetorical questions every so often in the speech.

What? Slavery is the creature of local law, and yet a slaveholder has a right to take his slave property into a territory before any local law has given him that right? A slave does not become free when voluntarily brought by his owner upon the soil of a territory where no positive local law establishing slavery exists? How is this possible? How can even the elastic mind of a Democratic candidate for the Presidency unite these contradictory assumptions?

---

What else does Mr. Buchanan assert, but that slavery exists in the territories by virtue of the Federal Constitution? Where is, then, the point of difference between Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Douglas? Why all this pomp and circumstance of glorious war? Whence these fierce battles between the Montecchi and Capuletti of the democratic camp? Are ye not brothers? 205

And Mr. Douglas, after having emphatically admitted the right of property in a slave, where that right can spring from no other law but the Constitution, then dares to speak of unfriendly legislation? Where is his conscience? Where is his oath? Where is his honor? 206

What? Is that all? Is that little heap of quicksand the whole substructure on which a new organization of society was to be built? The whole foundation upon which the proud and ponderous edifice of the United States rests? 207

Does Mr. Douglas not know that on the 16th of March, 1785, a proposition was introduced in Congress by Rufus King, to exclude slavery from the States described in the resolve of April 23, 1784, and to make this provision part of the compact established by that resolve? Does he not know that this provision, restoring the Jeffersonian feature to the 'Jeffersonian plan,' was committed by the vote of eight States against four? Does he not know that the plan of 1784 never went into practical operation, but was expressly set aside by Congress in 1787? Does he not know that the ordinance of 1787 was the first legislative act ever practically organizing a territory of the United States, and that one of its most prominent features was the proviso excluding slavery from all the territories then in possession of the United States? 208

Interrogation. Schurz used this device in order to give more punch to his speech. It gave him a change of pace and added to the overall vividness of the speech.

What does the Constitution mean in regard to slavery? That question remains to be settled. What does the

---

205 Ibid., p. 96. 206 Ibid., p. 87. 207 Ibid., p. 95. 208 Ibid., pp. 100-101.
Nebraska bill mean? This question depends upon the settlement of the former. 209

Suppose, for argument's sake, a slave might escape from his owner in a territory, without being in actual danger of recapture, would that in any way affect the constitutional right of the slaveholder to the possession and enjoyment of his property? I have already quoted Mr. Douglas's own answer to this question. 210

Will he be bold enough to say that slavery, being the creature of local law only, is excluded from the territories in the absence of positive law establishing it, or will he be honest enough to concede that, according to his own proposition in his New Orleans speech, slavery exists in the territories by virtue of the Federal Constitution? He will neither be bold enough to do the first, nor honest enough to do the second: he will be just bold and honest enough to do neither. 211

Contrast. Schurz built this entire speech upon the element of contrast: Douglas with Jefferson, slavery with freedom, the Nebraska bill with the Declaration of Independence, et cetera.

Turn your eyes away from the sublime spectacle of 1776, from that glorious galaxy of men whose hearts were large enough for all mankind, and let me recall you to the sober year of 1857. There is Springfield, the capital of Illinois, one of those States which owe their greatness to an ordinance originally framed by the same man whose hand wrote the Declaration of Independence. In the hall of the assembly there stands Mr. Douglas, who initiates an eager crowd into the mysteries of 'popular sovereignty.' 212

That true Jeffersonian plan rested, indeed, on the principle of popular sovereignty, but it will be conceded that Mr. Jefferson's great principle was as widely different from that of Mr. Douglas as the ordinance of 1787 is as different from the Nebraska bill. While Jeff-

209 Ibid., p. 82. 210 Ibid., p. 86.
211 Ibid., p. 88. 212 Ibid., p. 94.
erson's notion of popular sovereignty sprang from the idea that man has certain inalienable rights which the majority shall not encroach upon, Mr. Douglas's doctrine rests upon the idea that the highest development of liberty consists in the right of one class of men to hold another class of men as slaves, if they see fit to do so. While Mr. Jefferson excluded slavery from the territories, in order to make room for true popular sovereignty, Mr. Douglas invents his false popular sovereignty in order to make room for slavery.\textsuperscript{213}

\textbf{Repetition.} Schurz used his basic idea many times during the speech. This idea was that Douglas's stand on popular sovereignty was illogical and immoral. He also used repetition of words, phrases, sentences, et cetera, in order to give his ideas more punch. Notice how he used the same opening phrase for each of the rhetorical questions in this series. This series of rhetorical questions is a mode of repetition in itself.

\begin{quote}
Does Mr. Douglas not know that . . . ? Does he not know that . . . ? Does he not know that . . . ? Does he not know that . . . ?\textsuperscript{214}
\end{quote}

In the following passage he built up the ordinance of 1787 by repeating its importance.

The ordinance of 1787 stands written on the very gateposts of the Northwestern States; written on every grain field that waves in the breeze, on every factory that dots the course of their rushing waters, on every cottage that harbors thrifty freemen; written in every heart that rejoices over the blessings of liberty. There it stands in characters of light. Only a blind man cannot see; only a fool can misunderstand it; only a knave can wilfully misinterpret it.\textsuperscript{215}

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{213}]\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 102-103.
\item[\textsuperscript{214}]\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 100-101.
\item[\textsuperscript{215}]\textit{Ibid.}, p. 103.
\end{itemize}
Allusion and reference. Schurz made allusions and references to a wide variety of things in this speech.

... and like a second Constantine he points his finger at the great principle of popular sovereignty. ... 216

Bastiles are blown into the dust, as by the trumpets of Jericho.217

Eighteen hundred years ago, there were men who saw nothing in incipient Christianity but a mere wrangle between Jewish theologians, got up by a carpenter's boy, and carried on by a few crazy fishermen. Three hundred years ago, there were men who saw in the great reformatory movement of the sixteenth century, not the emancipation of the individual conscience, but a mere fuss kicked up by a German monk who wanted to get married. Two hundred years ago, there were men who saw in Hampden's refusal to pay the ship-money, not a bold vindication of constitutional liberty, but the crazy antics of a man who was mean enough to quarrel about a few shillings. And, now, there are men who see in the Declaration of Independence and in the American Revolution, not the reorganization of human society upon the basis of liberty and equality, but a dodge of some English colonists who were unwilling to pay their taxes.218

This indeed, is the play of Hamlet with the character of Hamlet omitted.219

Climax. This speech had a series of climaxes in it with each climax tying together the section of the speech which has preceded it and then the final climax summarizes the entire thought content of the speech.

But look into the record of the champion of 'popular sovereignty'; scan it from syllable to syllable, and then tell me, you Douglasites of the South, do you find one word there indicating a moral conviction that slavery is right? And you Douglasites of the North, who are in the

216Ibid., p. 80. 217Ibid., p. 94. 218Ibid., pp. 97-98. 219Ibid., p. 100.
habit of telling us that you are the true anti-slavery men, and that popular sovereignty will surely work the overthrow of the institution—did your master ever utter a similar sentiment? Do you find in his record one word of sympathy with the downtrodden and degraded? One spark of the humane philosophy of our age? One syllable in vindication of the outraged dignity of human nature? One word which might indicate a moral conviction that slavery is wrong? Not one!  

There is the slavery question; not a mere occasional quarrel between the two sections of country, divided by a geographical line; not a mere contest between two economic interests for the preponderance; not a mere wrangle between two political parties for power and spoils; but the great struggle between two antagonistic systems of social organization; between advancing civilization and retreating barbarism; between the human conscience and a burning wrong.  

But as long as the moral vitality of this nation is not entirely exhausted, Mr. Douglas and men like him will in vain endeavor to reduce the people to that disgusting state of moral indifference which he himself is not ashamed to boast of. I solemnly protest that the American people are not to be measured by Mr. Douglas's self-made moral standard. However degraded some of our politicians may be, the progress of the struggle will show that the popular conscience is still alive, and that the people DO CARE.  

Example. Several examples were used in this speech and they tended to liven the style.  

If you ask Mr. Douglas: 'Do you hold that slavery is the creature of local law, or that a slaveholder has the right to introduce his slave property where there is no local law?' he will answer, 'I do.'  

Let your imagination carry you back to the year 1776. You stand in the hall of the old colonial courthouse of Philadelphia. Through the open door you see the
Continental Congress assembled; the moment of a great decision is drawing near. Look at the earnest faces of the men assembled there, and consider what you may expect of them.

... there are men who see in the Declaration of Independence and in the American Revolution, not the reorganization of human society upon the basis of liberty and equality, but a dodge of some English colonists who were unwilling to pay their taxes.

Figure of speech:

Simile. Schurz used this device very little in this speech.

Men who look only at the surface of things will, like bad physicians, pretend to remove the disease itself by palliating its most violent symptoms.

... and like a second Constantine he points his finger at the great principle of popular sovereignty.

Metaphor. Schurz did not use this device in this speech.

Personification. Schurz did not use this device in this speech.

Alliteration. Schurz made no effort to include this device in this speech and the following example contains just about as much alliteration as it is possible to find in this speech.

measured by Mr. Douglas's self-made moral standard.
"GENERAL AMNESTY"

I. INVENTION

Logical proof (logos)—"non-artistic proof."

Evidence. Schurz used very little evidence in this speech. What he did use was mostly in reference to what his colleagues in the Senate had done.

The Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Sawyer) has already given notice that he will move to strike out the exceptions from the operation of this act of relief for which the bill provides. 229

The Senator from Indiana (Mr. Morton) took great pains to inform us that it is absolutely necessary to exclude somebody from office in order to demonstrate our disapprobation of the crime of rebellion. 230

The Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Buckingham), whom I am so unfortunate as not to see in his seat to-day, when he opened the debate, endeavored to fortify his theory by an illustration borrowed from the Old Testament... 231

I have heard the reason very frequently stated upon the floor of the Senate; it is because those men had been educated at the public expense, and their turning against the Government was therefore an act of peculiar faithlessness and black ingratitude. 232

I mean General Longstreet... the President nominated him for an office, and your consent, Senators, made him a public dignitary. 233

Authority. The only authorities that Schurz used in this speech were the Senators who had spoken on the horrors of the Civil War. He agreed with them on the wickedness of the war

---

but could not go along with them on the conclusions which they had drawn for dealing with the South.

In the course of this debate we have listened to some Senators, as they conjured up before our eyes once more all the horrors of the rebellion, the wickedness of its conception, how terrible its incidents were and how harrowing its consequences. Sir, I admit it all; I will not combat the correctness of the picture; and yet, if I differ with the gentlemen who drew it, it is because, had the conception of the rebellion been still more wicked, had its incidents been still more terrible, its consequences still more harrowing, I could not permit myself to forget that in dealing with the question now before us we have to deal not alone with the past, but with the present and future interests of this Republic.\textsuperscript{234}

\textit{Sign.} Schurz used this form of proof very little in this speech.

This expectation was disappointed. An amendment to the bill was adopted.\textsuperscript{235}

No American was ever inclined to recognize in others public rights and privileges from which he himself was excluded; and for aught I know, in this very feeling, although it may take an objectionable form, we find one of the safeguards of popular liberty.\textsuperscript{236}

\textit{Assumptions.} This entire speech is, in essence, built upon assumptions. Schurz assumed that the only way to benefit the entire country was to grant a general amnesty to all of the people who had participated in the rebellion against the United States.

I beg leave to say that I am in favor of general, or as this word is considered more expressive, universal amnesty, believing as I do that the reasons which make it desirable that there should be amnesty granted at all,

\textsuperscript{234}Ibid., p. 321. \textsuperscript{235}Ibid. \textsuperscript{236}Ibid., p. 330.
make it also desirable that the amnesty should be universal.\textsuperscript{237}

\ldots I do assert that the existence of disabilities, which put so large and influential a class of whites in point of political privileges below the colored people, could not fail to inflame those prejudices which stood in the way of a general and honest acceptance of the new order of things.\textsuperscript{238}

The scandals of misgovernment in the South which we complain of, I admit, were not the first and original cause of the Ku-Klux outrages. But every candid observer will also have to admit that they did serve to keep the Ku-Klux spirit alive. Without such incitement, it might gradually by this time, to a great extent at least, have spent itself.\textsuperscript{239}

Thus, sir, the penalty of treason as provided for by law remained a dead letter on the statute-book, and we instinctively adopted a generous policy, adding fresh luster to the glory of the American name by doing so.\textsuperscript{240}

But more than that: you relieve that class of persons, those old misleaders, of their exclusion, and they will soon discover that the people whom they once plunged into disaster and ruin have in the meantime grown, if not as wise as they ought to be, certainly too wise to put their destinies in the hands of the same men again.\textsuperscript{241}

"Artistic proof."

Inductive reasoning—argument from generalization.

Schurz used generalizations throughout this speech.

Look at the Southern States as they stand before us today. Some are in a condition bordering upon anarchy, not only on account of the social disorders which are occurring there, or the inefficiency of their local governments in securing the enforcement of the laws; but you will find in many of them fearful corruption pervading the whole political organization; a combination of rascality

\textsuperscript{237} Ibid., p. 321.  \textsuperscript{238} Ibid., p. 330.  \textsuperscript{239} Ibid., p. 332.  
\textsuperscript{240} Ibid., p. 335.  \textsuperscript{241} Ibid., p. 341.
and ignorance wielding official power; their finances deranged by profligate practices; their credit ruined; bankruptcy staring them in the face; their industries staggering under a fearful load of taxation; their propertyholders and capitalists paralysed by a feeling of insecurity and distrust almost amounting to despair.\textsuperscript{242}

Methinks the American people have signified their disapprobation of the crime of rebellion in a far more pointed manner. They sent against the rebellion a million armed men. We fought and conquered the armies of the rebels; we carried desolation into their land; we swept out of existence that system of slavery which was the soul of their offense and was to be the corner-stone of their new empire.\textsuperscript{243}

I mean General Longstreet. He had obtained his military education at the expense of the American people. He was one of the wards, one of the pets of the American Republic, and then he turned against it as a rebel. Whatever of faithlessness, whatever of black ingratitude there is in such conduct, it was in his; and yet, in spite of all this, the President nominated him for an office, \textsuperscript{244} and your consent, Senators, made him a public dignitary.

Why do you think of granting any amnesty at all? Is it not to produce on the popular mind at the South a conciliatory effect, to quicken the germs of good intentions, to encourage those who can exert a beneficial influence, to remove the pretexts of ill-feeling and animosity and to aid in securing to the Southern States the blessings of good and honest government?\textsuperscript{245}

Then came the Civil War, and after four years of struggle their whole power and pride lay shattered to atoms at our feet; their sons dead by tens of thousands on the battlefields of this country; their fields and their homes devastated; their fortunes destroyed; and more than that, the whole social system in which they had their very being, with all their hopes and pride, utterly wiped out; slavery forever abolished, and the slaves themselves created a political power before which they had to bow their heads; and they, broken, ruined, helpless and hopeless in the

\textsuperscript{242}Ibid., pp. 322–323. \textsuperscript{243}Ibid., pp. 333–334. \textsuperscript{244}Ibid., pp. 341–342. \textsuperscript{245}Ibid., p. 344.
dust before those upon whom they had so haughtily looked
down as their vassals and inferiors. Sir, can it be
said that the rebellion has gone entirely unpunished? 246

Argument from causation. Schurz used a good deal of
this type of argument in this speech. In the following
typical example, Schurz stated that in civilized countries
the crime of rebellion had been treated differently from other
crimes and then explained why.

Whatever may be said of the greatness and the
heinous character of the crime of rebellion, a single
glance at the history of the world and at the practice
of other nations will convince you, that in all civilized
countries the measure of punishment to be visited on those
guilty of that crime is almost uniformly treated as a
question of great policy and almost never as a question
of strict justice. And why is this? Why is it that a
thief, although pardoned, will never again be regarded
as an untainted member of society, while a pardoned rebel
may still rise to the highest honors of the State, and
sometimes even gain the sincere and general esteem and
confidence of his countrymen? Because a broad line of
distinction is drawn between a violation of law in which
political opinion is the controlling element (however
erroneous, may however revolting that opinion may be, and
however disastrous the consequences of the act) and those
infamous crimes of which moral depravity is the principal
ingredient; and because even the most disastrous political
conflicts may be composed for the common good by a con-
ciliatory process, while the infamous crime always calls
for a strictly penal correction. You may call this just
or not, but such is the public opinion of the civilized
world, and you find it in every civilized country. 247

Argument from analogy. Schurz used an analogy only
once in this speech.

For the killing of his brother, Absalom had lived
in banishment from which the King, his father, permitted

246 Ibid., p. 346. 247 Ibid., p. 337.
him to return; but the wayward son was but half pardoned, for he was not permitted to see his father's face. And it was for that reason, and then, that he went among the people to seduce them into a rebellion against his royal father's authority. Had he survived that rebellion, King David, as a prudent statesman, would either have killed his son Absalom or he would have admitted him to his table, in order to make him a good son again by unstinted fatherly love. But he would certainly not have permitted his son Absalom to run at large, capable of doing mischief, and at the same time by small measures of degradation inciting him to do it. And that is just the policy we have followed. We have permitted the late rebels to run at large, capable of doing mischief, and then by small measures of degradation, utterly useless for any good purpose, we incited them to do it.²⁴⁸

Deductive reasoning—argument by syllogism. Schurz used no direct syllogistic arguments in this speech but the entire speech followed the pattern of a disjunctive syllogism:

Either we must grant general amnesty to the civil war rebels, or we must kill all of them.

We are not going to kill off all of the civil war rebels.

Therefore, we must grant general amnesty to the civil war rebels.

Argument by enthymeme. Schurz used many enthymemes in this speech but they were usually very much contracted.

If an act of generous statesmanship, or of statesmanlike generosity, is to bear full fruit, it should give not as little as possible, but it should give as much as possible.²⁴⁹

... nor will it obliterate from the Southern mind the overwhelming experience, that he who raises his hand against the majesty of this Republic is doomed to disastrous humiliation and ruin.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 335-336. ²⁴⁹Ibid., p. 344. ²⁵⁰Ibid., p. 351.
Ethical proof (ethos).

Intelligence. Schurz's intelligence was quite evident throughout this speech. The following paragraph illustrated his knowledge on what had happened in the South.

It is a well-known fact that the more intelligent classes of Southern society almost uniformly identified themselves with the rebellion; and by our system of political disabilities just those classes were excluded from the management of political affairs. That they could not be trusted with the business of introducing into living practice the results of the war, to establish true free labor and to protect the rights of the emancipated slaves, is true; I willingly admit it. But when those results and rights were constitutionally secured there were other things to be done. Just at that period when the Southern States lay prostrated and exhausted at our feet, when the destructive besom of war had swept over them and left nothing but desolation and ruin in its track, when their material interests were to be built up again with care and foresight—just then the public business demanded, more than ordinarily, the cooperation of all the intelligence and all the political experience that could be mustered in the Southern States. But just then a large portion of that intelligence and experience was excluded from the management of public affairs by political disabilities, and the controlling power in those States rested in a great measure in the hands of those who had but recently been slaves and just emerged from that condition, and in the hands of others who had sometimes honestly, sometimes by crooked means and for sinister purposes, found a way to their confidence.251

Character. Schurz again in this speech demonstrated his high moral character especially his humility and his unselfish work for his fellow man. In the following example, he showed his honesty by disagreeing with his good friend, Mr. Sumner.

---

251 Ibid., pp. 324-325.
And I may say to my honorable friend from Massachusetts (Mr. Sumner), who knows well how highly I esteem him, and whom I sincerely honor for his solicitude concerning the welfare of the lowly, that my desire to see their wrongs righted is no less sincere and no less unhampered by any traditional prejudice than his; although I will confess that as to the Constitutional means to that end we may sometimes seriously differ. But I cannot refrain from expressing my regret that this measure should be loaded with anything that is not strictly germane to it, knowing as we both do that the amendment he has proposed cannot secure the necessary two-thirds vote in at least one of the houses of Congress, and that therefore it will be calculated to involve this measure also in the danger of common failure.252

Good will. Schurz exhibited his good will toward his audience by stating that they all wanted to do what was best for America.

That end and aim of our endeavors can be no other than to secure to all the States the blessings of good and free government and the highest degree of prosperity and well-being they can attain, and to revive in all citizens of this Republic that love for the Union and its institutions, and that inspiring consciousness of a common nationality, which, after all, must bind all Americans together.253

In the following selection he pointed out that he was not just pleading for the rebels but for all Americans because what affects one American affects all Americans.

I repeat, it is not merely for the rebels I plead; it is for the whole American people, for there is not a citizen in the land whose true interests, rightly understood, are not largely concerned in every measure affecting the peace and welfare of any State of this Union.254

Emotional proof (pathos).

252Ibid., pp. 348-349. 253Ibid., p. 322. 254Ibid., p. 349.
Anger. Schurz showed his anger at those who took the short-sighted view of wanting to punish the South for the part they took in the Civil War.

In the course of this debate we have listened to some Senators, as they conjured up before our eyes once more all the horrors of the rebellion, the wickedness of its conception, how terrible its incidents were and how harrowing its consequences. Sir, I admit it all; I will not combat the correctness of the picture; and yet, if I differ with the gentlemen who drew it, it is because, had the conception of the rebellion been still more wicked, had its incidents been still more terrible, its consequences still more harrowing, I could not permit myself to forget that in dealing with the question now before us we have to deal not alone with the past, but with the present and future interests of this Republic.255

Sir, such appeals as these, which we have heard here so frequently, may be well apt to tickle the ear of an unthinking multitude. But unless I am grievously in error, the people of the United States are a multitude not unthinking.256

And those, I apprehend, expose themselves to grievous disappointment, who still think that by dinning again and again in the ears of the people the old battle-cries of the civil war, they can befog the popular mind as to the true requirements of the times, and overawe and terrorize the public sentiment of the country.257

In the following passage, Schurz revealed his anger at the attitude of the southern slaveholders before the war.

There was a proud and arrogant aristocracy planting their feet on the necks of the laboring people, and pretending to be the born rulers of this great Republic. They looked down, not only upon their slaves, but also upon the people of the North, with the haughty contempt of self-asserting superiority. When their pretensions to

rule us all were first successfully disputed, they re-
solved to destroy this Republic, and to build upon on
the cornerstone of slavery an empire of their own in which
they could hold absolute sway. They made the attempt with
the most overweeningly confident expectation of certain
victory. 258

Love. This entire speech was alive with Schurz's love
for his fellow man and his desire to secure for all of them the
liberty and freedom which he had come to know and appreciate.

That end and aim of our endeavors can be no other
than to secure to all the States the blessings of good and
free government and the highest degree of prosperity and
well-being they can attain, and to revive in all citizens
of this Republic that love for the Union and its institu-
tions, and that inspiring consciousness of a common nation-
ality, which, after all, must bind all Americans together. 259

Nay, sir, I plead also for the colored people of
the South, whose path will be smoothed by a measure cal-
culated to assuage some of the prejudices and to disarm
some of the bitternesses which still confront them; and
I am sure that nothing better could happen to them,
nothing could be more apt to make the growth of good
feeling between them and the former master-class easier
than the destruction of a system which, by giving them
a political superiority, endangers their peaceable enjoy-
ment of equal rights. 260

Fear. Schurz used this emotion throughout this speech
to the viewpoint that he was afraid of the consequences to
America if general amnesty was not granted to the rebels. He
was also cognizant of some of the fears of his colleagues.

If there is anything that could prevent them from
voting for universal amnesty, it might be the fear, if
they entertained it at all, of seeing Jefferson Davis
once more a Senator of the United States. 261

258 Ibid., pp. 345-346. 259 Ibid., p. 322.
Confidence. Schurz was confident that the act of general amnesty would help to make America a land of brothers.

I do not, indeed, indulge in the delusion that this act alone will remedy all the evils which we now deplore. No, it will not; but it will be a powerful appeal to the very best instincts and impulses of human nature... sir, your good sense as well as your heart must tell you that, when this is truly a people of citizens equal in their political rights, it will then be easier to make it also a people of brothers.262

Shame. Schurz thought it a shame that we took away almost all of the native Southern leadership.

... at the same time we branded a large number of men of intelligence, and many of them of personal integrity, whose material interests were so largely involved in honest government, and many of whom would have cooperated in managing the public business with care and foresight—we branded them, I say, as outcasts, telling them that they ought not to be suffered to exercise any influence upon the management of the public business, and that it would be unwarrantable presumption in them to attempt it.263

Schurz thought that the original conspirators would be shamed much more by including them in a general amnesty.

And now as to the original conspirators, what has become of them? Some of them are dead; and as to those who are still living, I ask you, sir, are they not dead also? ... But you relieve them of their exclusion, and they will at once become conscious of their nothingness, a nothingness most glaringly conspicuous then, for you will have drawn away that veil that has concealed it.264

Pity. Schurz pitied the colored people of the South and the role they had assumed after the war because he knew

---

262 Ibid., p. 352-353. 263 Ibid., pp. 327-328.
264 Ibid., pp. 340-341.
that they had not been properly trained or educated while they were in slavery.

That as a class they were ignorant and inexperienced and lacked a just conception of public interests, was certainly not their fault; for those who have studied the history of the world know but too well that slavery and oppression are very bad political schools.\textsuperscript{265}

I do not blame the colored people for it; still less do I say that for this reason their political rights and privileges should have been denied them. Nay, sir, I deemed it necessary then, and I now reaffirm that opinion, that they should possess those rights and privileges for the permanent establishment of the logical and legitimate results of the war and the protection of their new position in society. But, while never losing sight of this necessity, I do say that the inevitable consequence of the admission of so large an uneducated and inexperienced class to political power, as to the probable mismanagement of the material interests of the social body, should at least have been mitigated by a counterbalancing policy.\textsuperscript{266}

Schurz thought it would be a wise policy to grant the original conspirators amnesty in order to keep them from being pitied.

Truly, to refrain from making an act of amnesty general on account of the original conspirators, candidly speaking, I would not consider worth while. I would not leave them the pitiable distinction of not being pardoned.\textsuperscript{267}

\textit{Envy.} Schurz claimed that a general amnesty for the rebels would put the United States of America in an envious position.

\ldots it is certainly true that after the close of the war we treated the rebels with a generosity never excelled in the history of the world. And thus in advising a general amnesty it is not merely for the rebels I plead. But I plead for the good of the country, which in its best
interests will be benefited by amnesty just as much as the rebels are benefited themselves, if not more.  

Emulation. Schurz thought that the rest of the country should emulate the example of statesmanship which was shown by the colored people following the Civil War.

To their honor be it said, following a just instinct, they were among the very first, not only in the South but all over the country, in entreating Congress to remove those odious discriminations which put in jeopardy their own rights by making them greater than those of others. From the colored people themselves, it seems, we have in this respect received a lesson in statesmanship.  

He thought that we should set a policy toward the South which would be emulated by a great, noble and wise country.

... I would not have the past forgotten, but I would have its history completed and crowned by an act most worthy of a great, noble and wise people. By all the same means which we have in our hands, I would make even those who have sinned against this Republic see in its flag, not the symbol of their lasting degradation but of rights equal to all; I would make them feel in their hearts, that in its good and evil fortunes their rights and interests are bound up just as ours are, and that therefore its peace, its welfare, its honor and its greatness may and ought to be as dear to them as they are to us.

II. ARRANGEMENT

"General Amnesty" followed the conventional method of arrangement of Introduction, Discussion, and Conclusion. In the Introduction, Schurz stated that he had hoped that the bill then pending before the Senate would have been passed.

---

268 Ibid., p. 348. 269 Ibid., p. 331. 270 Ibid., p. 352.
without difficulty but since he had hoped in vain he wished to speak in its behalf.

In the Discussion part, Schurz made a thorough analysis of the slavery problem including what had led up to the Civil War, what had happened during and since the war, and what the results would be in the future of any current actions they might take.

In the Conclusion, he reiterated his stand that general amnesty in and of itself would not be a cure-all but that it would be a foundation upon which a country of brothers could be built.

III. STYLE

Level. The style level was middle. Schurz knew that in order to get the general amnesty bill passed, he was going to have to deliver a hard-hitting address in order to impress upon his fellow Senators the beneficial effects the bill would have on his entire country. He realized that he was up against some very strong opposition so pulled out all the oratorical stops in an attempt to sway the balance of power in his favor. Diction or word choice. Schurz must have chosen his words with great care because they seemed to convey just the right meaning to put across the ideas that Schurz wished to propagate. The words in this speech were overwhelmingly concrete and Schurz varied his word choice according to the meaning he wanted to
put across and in order to keep his style lively and moving. 

**Sentence structure.** Schurz's sentence structure covered the entire possible sentence structure range. Witness the two following consecutive sentences.

But look at the difference. We issued from this great conflict as conquerors; upon the graves of our slain we could lay the wreath of victory; our widows and orphans, while mourning the loss of their dearest, still remember that the blood of their husbands and fathers was not spilled in vain; that it flowed for the greatest and holiest and at the same time the most victorious of causes; and when our people labor in the sweat of their brow to pay the debt which the rebellion has loaded upon us, they do it with the proud consciousness that the heavy price they have paid is infinitely overbalanced by the value of the results they have gained: slavery abolished; the great American Republic purified of her foulest stain; the American people no longer a people of masters and slaves, but a people of equal citizens; the most dangerous element of disturbance and disintegration wiped out from among us; this country put upon the course of harmonious development greater, more beautiful, mightier than ever in its self-conscious power.271

**Rhetorical devices and figurative language.**

**Analogy.** Schurz used only one analogy in this speech. He took an illustration from the Old Testament which had been used by Senator Buckingham of Connecticut and shrewdly drew an analogy from it to the policy that the United States had been following in the South.

For the killing of his brother, Absalom had lived in banishment from which the King, his father, permitted him to return; but the wayward son was but half pardoned, for he was not permitted to see his father's face. And it was for that reason, and then, that he went among the

people to seduce them into a rebellion against his father's royal authority. Had he survived that rebellion, King David, as a prudent statesman, would either have killed his son Absalom or he would have admitted him to his table, in order to make him a good son again by unstinted fatherly love. But he would certainly not have permitted his son Absalom to run at large, capable of doing mischief, and at the same time by small measures of degradation inciting him to do it. And that is just the policy we have followed. We have permitted the late rebels to run at large, capable of doing mischief, and then by small measures of degradation, utterly useless for any good purpose, we incited them to do it.²⁷²

Epigram. Schurz did not resort to epigrammatical statements in this speech.

Epithet. Schurz used epithets frequently in this speech such as calling the former slaves "the colored people" and the former slaveholders "the Southern people." In the following selection, he refers to the people who participated in the rebellion as the "rebels."

No, sir, it is not merely for the rebels I plead.²⁷³

Humor. It appeared that Schurz did not use humor in this speech.

Rhetorical question. Schurz used rhetorical questions for many purposes in this speech. Sometimes he used them for emphasis, sometimes for transition, sometimes for a change of pace, et cetera.

If we sincerely desire to give to the Southern States good and honest government, material prosperity and measurable contentment, as far at least as we can con-

²⁷²Ibid., pp. 335-336. ²⁷³Ibid., p. 345.
tribute to that end; if we really desire to weaken and disarm those prejudices and resentments which still disturb the harmony of society, will it not be wise, will it not be necessary, will it not be our duty to show that we are in no sense the allies and abettors of those who use their political power to plunder their fellow-citizens, and that we do not mean to keep one class of people in unnecessary degradation by withholding from them rights and privileges which all others enjoy? Seeing the mischief which the system of disabilities is accomplishing, is it not time that there should be at least an end of it? Or is there any good it can possibly do to make up for the harm it has already wrought and is still working?

Look at it. Do these disabilities serve in any way to protect anybody in his rights or in his liberty or in his property or in his life? Does the fact that some men are excluded from office, in any sense or measure, make others more secure in their lives or in their property or in their rights? Can anybody tell me how? Or do they, perhaps, prevent even those who are excluded from official position from doing mischief if they are mischievously inclined? Does the exclusion from office, does any feature of your system of political disabilities, take the revolver or the bowie-knife or the scourge from the hands of anyone who wishes to use it? Does it destroy the influence of the more intelligent upon society, if they mean to use that influence for mischievous purposes?274

Is it not the part of wise men, sir, to acknowledge the failure of a policy like this in order to remedy it, especially since every candid mind must recognize that by continuing the mistake, absolutely no practical good can be subserved?275

... can you tell me, in the name of common-sense, what harm in this case the taking of that oath will prevent? Or have we read the history of the world in vain, that we should not know yet, how little political oaths are worth to improve the morality of a people or to secure the stability of a government? And what do you mean to accomplish by making up and preserving your lists of pardoned persons? Can they be of any possible advantage to the country in any way? Why, then, load down an act like this with such useless circumstance, while as an act of grace and wisdom it certainly ought to be as straightfor-

274 Ibid., pp. 331-332. 275 Ibid., p. 333.
ward and simple as possible? Interrogation. Schurz used this device a great deal in this speech and he used it mostly as a lead-in to topics which he wanted to develop or enlarge upon.

What are the best means for the attainment of that end? This, sir, as I conceive it, is the only legitimate question we have to decide. Certainly all will agree that this end is far from having been attained so far.

Was that policy we followed wise? Was it calculated to promote the great purpose we are endeavoring to serve? Let us see.

Now, what happened in the South? It is a well-known fact that the more intelligent classes of Southern society almost uniformly identified themselves with the rebellion; and by our system of political disabilities just those classes were excluded from the management of political affairs.

Why did we not? Because the American people instinctively recoiled from the idea.

Contrast. Schurz used contrast throughout this speech and in so doing he enforced his stand for general amnesty. In the following instance, he pointed out the difference between the emancipated slaves in our country and people in other countries of history who have been liberated.

Look into the history of the world, and you will find that almost every similar act of emancipation, the abolition of serfdom, for instance, was uniformly accompanied by atrocious outbreaks of a revengeful spirit; by the slaughter of nobles and their families, illumined by the glare of their burning castles. Not so here. While all the horrors of San Domingo had been predicted as certain to follow upon emancipation, scarcely a single act of re-

\[
\text{276} \text{Ibid., p. 344.} \quad \text{277} \text{Ibid., p. 322.} \quad \text{278} \text{Ibid., p. 323.} \\
\text{279} \text{Ibid., p. 324.} \quad \text{280} \text{Ibid., p. 334.}
\]
venge for injuries suffered or for misery endured has darkened the record of the emancipated bondmen of America.\textsuperscript{281}

In the following example, Schurz was arguing that there was a big difference between a "rebel" and other types of criminals.

Why is it that a thief, although pardoned, will never again be regarded as an untainted member of society, while a pardoned rebel may still rise to the highest honors of the State, and sometimes even gain the sincere and general esteem and confidence of his countrymen? Because a broad line of distinction is drawn between a violation of law in which political opinion is the controlling element (however erroneous, nay however revolting that opinion may be, and however disastrous the consequences of the act) and those infamous crimes of which moral depravity is the principal ingredient. . . .\textsuperscript{282}

In the following passage, Schurz pointed out the contrasting conditions of the North and the South that existed following the Civil War.

But look at the difference. We issued from this great conflict as conquerors; upon the graves of our slain we could lay the wreath of victory; our widows and orphans, while mourning the loss of their dearest, still remember with proud exultation that the blood of their husbands and fathers was not spilled in vain; that it flowed for the greatest and holiest and at the same time the most victorious of causes; and when our people labor in the sweat of their brow to pay the debt which the rebellion has loaded upon us, they do it with the proud consciousness that the heavy price they have paid is infinitely over-balanced by the value of the results they have gained; slavery abolished; the great American Republic purified of her foulest stain; the American people no longer a people of masters and slaves, but a people of equal citizens; the most dangerous element of disturbance and dis-integration wiped out from among us; this country put upon the course of harmonious development, greater, more beautiful, mightier than ever in its self-conscious power. And thus, whatever losses, whatever sacrifices, whatever sufferings we may have endured, they appear before us in a blaze.

\textsuperscript{281} Ibid., p. 325. \textsuperscript{282} Ibid., p. 337.
of glory.

But how do the Southern people stand there? All they have sacrificed, all they have lost, all the blood they have spilled, all the desolation of their homes, all the distress that stares them in the face, all the wreck and ruin they see around them, all for nothing, all for a wicked folly, all for a disastrous infatuation: the very graves of their dead nothing but monuments of a shadowy delusion; all their former hopes vanished forever; and the very magniloquence which some of their leaders are still indulging in, nothing but a mocking illustration of their utter discomfiture! Ah, sir, if ever human efforts broke down in irretrievable disaster, if ever human pride was humiliated to the dust, if ever human hopes were turned into despair, there you behold them.283

Repetition. There was much repetition in this speech with the preceding paragraph of this paper a typical example. Schurz used this device in many different forms which gave a lot of force to the ideas he set forth in this speech.

... will it not be wise, will it not be necessary, will it not be our duty ...?284

... it will be a powerful appeal to the very best instincts and impulses of human nature; it will, like a warm ray of sunshine in springtime, quicken and call to light the germs of good intention wherever they exist; it will give new courage, confidence and inspiration to the well-disposed; it will weaken the power of the mischievous, by stripping of their pretexts and exposing in their nakedness the wicked designs they still may cherish; it will light anew the beneficent glow of fraternal feeling and of National spirit. ...285

Allusion and reference. Frequent use of this device was made by Schurz in this speech.

_____________
While all the horrors of San Domingo had been predicted as certain to follow upon emancipation. . . . 286

We hear the Ku-Klux outrages spoken of as a reason why political disabilities should not be removed. 287

Well, if at the close of the war we had assumed the stern and bloody virtue of the ancient Roman, and had proclaimed that he who raises his hand against this Republic must surely die. . . . 288

It seems to me that story of Absalom contains a most excellent lesson, which the Senate of the United States ought to read correctly. 289

Climax. Schurz used several climaxes in this speech with each one summarizing the unit which preceded it and then the final climax summarized the entire speech.

. . . the heavy price they have paid is infinitely overbalanced by the value of the results they have gained: slavery abolished; the great American Republic purified of her foulest stain; the American people no longer a people of masters and slaves, but a people of equal citizens; the most dangerous element of disturbance and disintegration wiped out from among us; this country put upon the course of harmonious development, greater, more beautiful, mightier than ever in its self-conscious power. And thus, whatever losses, whatever sacrifices, whatever sufferings we may have endured, they appear before us in a blaze of glory. 290

I do not, indeed, indulge in the delusion that this act alone will remedy all the evils which we now deplore. No, it will not; but it will be a powerful appeal to the very best instincts and impulses of human nature; it will, like a warm ray of sunshine in springtime, quicken and call to light the germs of good intention wherever they exist; it will give new courage, confidence and inspiration to the well-disposed; it will weaken the power of the mischievous, by stripping of their pretenses and exposing in their nakedness the wicked designs they still may cherish; it will light anew the beneficent glow of fraternal feeling.

289Ibid., p. 335.  290Ibid., p. 347.
and of National spirit; for, sir, your good sense as well as your heart must tell you that, when this is truly a people of citizens equal in their political rights, it will then be easier to make it also a people of brothers.²⁹¹

Example. Schurz used examples throughout this speech which helped to add liveliness to his style.

We might have thought that by erecting a row of gallows stretching from the Potomac to the Rio Grande, and by making a terrible example of all those who had proved faithless to their allegiance, we would strike terror into the hearts of this and coming generations, to make them tremble at the mere thought of treasonable undertakings.²⁹²

... because every wise man remembered that where insurrections are punished and avenged with the bloodiest hands, there insurrections do most frequently occur; witness France and Spain and the southern part of this hemisphere.²⁹³

Look at the nations around us. In the Parliament of Germany how many men are there sitting who were once what you would call fugitives from justice, exiles on account of their revolutionary acts, now admitted to the great council of the nation in the fullness of their rights and privileges—and, mark you, without having been asked to abjure the opinions they formerly held, for at the present moment most of them still belong to the Liberal opposition. Look at Austria, where Count Andrassy, a man who, in 1849, was condemned to the gallows as a rebel, at this moment stands at the head of the imperial Ministry; and those who know the history of that country are fully aware that the policy of which that amnesty was a part, which opened to Count Andrassy the road to power, has attached Hungary more closely than ever to the Austrian Crown, from which a narrow-minded policy of severity would have driven from her.²⁹⁴

When the Southern people con over the distressing catalogue of the misfortunes they have brought upon themselves, will it not be well, will it not be 'devoutly to

²⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 352-353. ²⁹² Ibid., p. 334.
²⁹³ Ibid. ²⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 338.
be wished for our common future, if at the end of that catalogue they find an act which will force every fairminded man in the South to say of the Northern people: 'When we were at war they inflicted upon us the severities of war; but when the contest had closed and they found us prostrate before them, grievously suffering, surrounded by the most perplexing difficulties and on the brink of new disasters, they promptly swept all the resentments of the past out of their way and stretched out their hands to us with the very fullest measure of generosity, anxious, eager, to lift us up from our prostration'?

Figures of speech:

Simile. Schurz used this figure of speech several times during the course of this speech.

... a fascination like that of the serpent's eye, which irresistibly draws on its victim. 296

... it will, like a warm ray of sunshine in springtime, quicken and call to light the germs of good intention wherever they exist... 297

Metaphor. Schurz did not make use of the metaphor in this speech.

Personification. Schurz did not make use of personification in this speech.

Alliteration. Several examples of alliteration were found in this speech but whether or not it was intentional on the part of Schurz is questionable.

... outcasts, telling them that they ought not to... 298

... his spirit with the stinging stigma...? 299

---

... is it not time that there ...?

... have heard here ... apt to tickle the ....


"THE AIMS OF THE LIBERAL-REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT"

I. INVENTION

Logical proof (logos) - "non-artistic proof."

Evidence. Schurz used no direct or concrete evidence in this speech as he was dealing primarily with ideals, ideals, and the theoretical aspects of the political movement which he and his colleagues had started.

Authority. Schurz made no use of this type of proof in this speech.

Sign. Schurz used no examples of sign in this speech.

Assumptions. Schurz built this entire speech upon assumption. He assumed that all of the members of the convention were of common interests and purposes; he assumed that what they were doing was the right and honorable thing to do; and he assumed that they were to be victorious in their mission if they deserved it.

He who calmly and impartially surveyed this spectacle could not fail to be deeply alarmed, not only at the wrongs that had been and were being perpetrated, but at the subjugation of the popular spirit which did not rise up against them.302

We can do all this, but we can do it only by throwing behind us the selfish spirit of political trade. We obey the purest and loftiest inspirations of the popular uprising which sent us here. A great opportunity; it is as great as the noblest ambition might desire, but

302Ibid., p. 355.
equally great—nay, to my mind, fearful—is the responsibility it brings with it, an opportunity like this momentous period in the history of a nation. An uprising of the people such as we behold will not occur every day, nor every year, for it must spring from the spontaneous impulse of the popular mind.\(^{303}\)

As to our platform, we shall be wise enough to keep in mind those things which a republic stands most in need of. The very fact of our having come together is proof of our substantial agreement.\(^{304}\)

I candidly believe the people are waking up to the truth, for, unless I greatly mistake the spirit of this day, what the people now most earnestly demand is, not that mere good intentions, but that a superior intelligence, coupled with superior virtue, should guide our affairs; not that merely an honest and a popular man, but that a statesman be put at the head of our Government.\(^{305}\)

"Artistic proof."

Inductive reasoning—argument from generalization.

Schurz used this type of proof in several instances in this speech. In the following example, he generalized about the patriotic spirit that he thought prevailed at that time.

The crust of narrow prejudices, of selfish partisanship, which but yesterday seemed to stop every free pulsation of the popular heart, is suddenly burst asunder. The patriotic citizen rises above the partisan. We begin to breathe again as freemen. We dare again call things by their right names. We have once more the courage to break through the deceptions with which the popular mind has been befogged; we feel once more that our convictions of right and wrong are our own, and that our votes belong to the country, and thus we defiantly set our sense of duty against the arrogance of power, like the bugle blast of doomsday.\(^{306}\)

\(^{303}\)ibid., pp. 356-357.  
\(^{304}\)ibid., p. 357.  
\(^{305}\)ibid., p. 359.  
\(^{306}\)ibid., p. 356.
In the following instance, he generalized about the opportunity that faced the new Liberal-Republican movement.

We have a grand opportunity before us, grand and full of promise. We can crush corruption in our public concerns; we can give the Republic a pure and honest Government; we can revive the authority of the laws; we can restore to full value the Constitutional safeguard of our liberties; we can infuse a higher moral spirit into our political life; we can reanimate in the hearts of the whole people in every section of the land a fraternal and proud National feeling.

Argument from causation. Schurz used very little of this type of argument in this speech.

I have not, I assure you, come here for the purpose of urging the claims or advancing the interests of any one man against all others. I have come here with sincere and ardent devotion to a cause, and to use my best endeavors to have that cause put under the care of men who are devoted to it with equal sincerity and possess those qualities of mind and heart which will make it safe in their keeping.

Argument from analogy. Schurz used no analogies in this speech.

Deductive reasoning—argument by syllogism. Schurz used no direct syllogisms in this speech but the entire speech took the form of a categorical syllogism.

Those who speak up for the welfare of their country are patriots. The Liberal-Republicans were speaking up for the welfare of their country. Therefore, the Liberal-Republicans were Patriots.

Argument by enthymeme. Schurz used several enthymemes in this speech.

---

307 Ibid. 308 Ibid., p. 358.
If we present men to the suffrages of the people whose character and names appeal to the loftiest instincts and aspirations of the patriot-citizen, we shall have on our side that which ought to be and now I trust will be the ruling arbiter of political contests, the conscience of the Nation.  

If you mean reform, intrust the work to none but those who understand it and honestly do care, and care more for it than for their own personal ends.  

Ethical proof (ethos).  

Intelligence. Schurz showed that he understood the background and the events leading up to the Liberal-Republican movement.  

We saw the American people just issued from a great and successful struggle, and in the full pride of their National strength, threatened with new evils and dangers of an insidious nature, and the masses of the population apparently not aware of them. We saw jobbery and corruption stimulated to unusual audacity by the opportunities of a protracted civil war, invading the public service of the Government, as well as almost all movements of the social body, and we saw a public opinion most deplorably lenient in its judgment of public and private dishonesty. We saw the Government indulging in wanton disregard of the laws of the land, and resorting to daring assumptions of unconstitutional power, and we saw the people, apparently at least acquiescing with reckless levity in the transgressions, threatening the very life of our free institutions. We saw those in authority with tyrannical insolence thrust the hand of power through the vast machinery of the public service into local and private affairs, and we saw the innumerable mass of their adherents accept those encroachments upon their independence without protest or resentment. We saw men in the highest places of the Republic employ their power and opportunities for selfish advantage, thus stimulating the demoralization of our political life, and by their conspicuous example, and the loud chorus of partisan sychophancy, drown the voice of honest criticism. We saw part of our common country,
which had been convulsed by a disastrous rebellion, most grievously suffering from the consequences of the civil war; and we saw the haughty spirit of power refusing to lift up those who had gone astray and were now suffering, by a policy of generous conciliation and statesmanship of common-sense.\textsuperscript{311}

\textbf{Character.} Schurz showed his sterling character in this speech when he stated that he was striving for long term success for America and not just temporary achievements.

\begin{quote}
I do not struggle for the mere punishment of an opponent, nor for a temporary lease of power. There is to me a thing no less, nay, more important even than our success in this campaign, and that is that the American people shall not be disappointed in the fruits which our victory is to bear. If we should fail to select men who will carry out the beneficent reforms we contemplate, then, let me say it boldly, it would be better had this movement never been undertaken; for continuance of those in power who possess it now would mean only a reformatory movement deferred and an opportunity lost.\textsuperscript{312}
\end{quote}

We know that not every one of us can be gratified by the choice of his favorite; many of us will have to be disappointed; but in this solemn hour our hearts should know but one favorite, and that is the American Republic.\textsuperscript{313}

\textbf{Good will.} At the very start of his introduction in this speech, Schurz displayed the good will which he felt toward his audience.

\begin{quote}
Nobody can survey this vast and enthusiastic assembly, gathered from all parts of the Republic, without an emotion of astonishment and hope—astonishment considering the spontaneity of the impulse which has brought it together, and hope considering the great purpose for which it has met. The Republic may well congratulate itself upon the fact that such a meeting was possible.\textsuperscript{314}
\end{quote}

Emotional proof (pathos).

Anger. Schurz demonstrated anger in this speech at those who control political organizations for their own benefit.

Let us despise as unworthy of our cause the tricky manipulations by which, to the detriment of the Republic, political bodies have so frequently been controlled. 315

Love. Schurz left no doubt of his love for America in this speech and his wish to help maintain the liberty and independence which America represents.

The virtue, the spirit of independence, the love of liberty, the republican pride of the American people are not dead yet and do not mean to die, and that answer is given in thunder-tones by the convention of American freemen here assembled. 316

Fear. Schurz expressed the fear in this speech that Americans were in danger of losing their individual liberties if they did not take immediate action to preserve these liberties.

He who calmly and impartially surveyed this spectacle could not fail to be deeply alarmed, not only at the wrongs that had been and were being perpetrated, but at the subjugation of the popular spirit which did not rise up against them. 317

Schurz thought that the opportunities open to the Liberal-Republican movement were frightening in their scope of possibility.

We obey the purest and loftiest inspirations of the popular uprising which sent us here. A great opportunity; it is as great as the noblest ambition might

315 Ibid., p. 360. 316 Ibid., p. 355. 317 Ibid.
desire, but equally great--nay, to my mind, fearful--is the responsibility it brings with it, an opportunity like this momentous period in the history of a nation.

Confidence. Schurz stated in this speech that the members of the convention which he was addressing were confident that they would meet with success in their endeavors to preserve American democracy.

Indeed, those who three months ago first raised their voices, did so with an abiding faith that their appeals could not remain without response, but the volume of that response has now far exceeded their anticipations.

Shame. Schurz thought that it was shameful the way certain tyrannical, dictatorial politicians were trying to subjugate the American people.

We observed this, and at the same time a reckless and greedy party spirit, in the name of a great organization, crowned with the laurels of glorious achievements, striving to palliate or justify these wrongs and abuses, to stifle the moral sense of the people and to drive them by a tyrannical party discipline not only to submit to this for the present, but to perpetuate it, that the political power of the country might be preserved in the hands of those who possessed it.

Pity. Schurz thought it would be a pity if the Liberal-Republican movement should fail.

... while our failure now would mean a great reform movement sunk to the level of a farce, a great opportunity lost and the hope of a people turned into discouragement and disgust, let us discard at least the fatal error into which many seem to have fallen, that no statesmanship is required to conduct the affairs of a great government.

---

Envy. Schurz pointed out that the Liberal-Republicans would be in a very envious position if they gave the people a thorough reform of the American government.

Then we shall successfully overcome those prejudices which now confront us, and the insidious accusation, that this great Convention is a mere gathering of disappointed and greedy politicians, will fall harmless at our feet, for we shall have demonstrated by our action that we were guided by the purest and most patriotic of motives.\textsuperscript{322}

Emulation. Schurz reminded his audience that the candidates they nominated would have to emulate the actions of true statesmen if the reform movement was to reach its goal.

As to the men whom we shall present for the high offices of the Government, let us, I entreat you, not lose sight of the fact that great reforms, the overthrow of inveterate abuses, the establishment of a better order of things are not accomplished by mere promises and declarations, but require the wise and energetic action of statesmen if this is to be truly a reform movement, and if it be not merely on paper.\textsuperscript{323}

II. ARRANGEMENT

In the composition of the speech, "The Aims of the Liberal-Republican Movement" followed the three-divisional method of organization. In the Introduction, Schurz boosted the ego of his audience by telling them of the desirability of the actions they were taking on the reform movement. Thusly, he established good will with his audience and made them receptive for what he was to say in the rest of his speech.

\textsuperscript{322}Ibid., p. 360. \textsuperscript{323}Ibid., p. 358.
In the Discussion division, Schurz told of the events leading up to the start of the reform movement; the opportunities and responsibilities his audience were faced with; and what they had to look forward to in the future.

In the Conclusion, he summarized his speech and tried to inspire his audience so that they would go forward with the reform movement with undiminished effort and enthusiasm.

III. STYLE

Level. The style level was middle. Schurz took a middle-of-the-road approach in this speech as he made it inspirational and at the same time concrete and practical.

Diction or word choice. Schurz seemed to have a particular ability of picking particular words to give vivid imagery to his style. His choice of words ranged from the mono-syllabic to the poly-syllabic and he used them with good taste. The majority of his words were concrete with the meanings readily apparent and to the point.

Sentence structure. Schurz used a wide variety of sentences but were probably mostly of the "compound" type. The typical range can be seen from the following examples.

As to the men whom we shall present for the high offices of the Government, let us, I entreat you, not lose sight of the fact that great reforms, the overthrow of insalubrious abuses, the establishment of a better order of things are not accomplished by mere promises and declarations, but require the wise and energetic action of statesmen if this is to be truly a reform movement, and if it be
not merely on paper.\textsuperscript{324} And this can be done.\textsuperscript{325}

**Rhetorical devices and figurative language.**

**Analogy.** Schurz used no analogies in this speech.

**Epigram.** Schurz made no use of the epigram in this speech.

**Epithet.** Schurz made use of the epithet several times during the speech and the following example is a typical one.

The patriotic citizen rises above the partisan.\textsuperscript{326}

**Humor.** Schurz made no use of humor in this speech.

**Rhetorical question.** Schurz used only one rhetorical in this speech.

Personal friendship and State pride are noble sentiments; but what is personal friendship, what is State pride, compared with the great duty we owe to our common country, and the awful responsibility resting upon our action as sensible men?\textsuperscript{327}

**Interrogation.** Frequent use of Interrogation and answer was found in this speech.

\ldots have the American people become so utterly indifferent to their true interests, to their National harmony, to the purity of their political life, to the integrity of their free institutions, to the very honor of the American name, that they should permit themselves to be driven like a flock of sheep by those who assume to lord it over them? That question has now found an answer.\textsuperscript{328}

Is it possible that such should be the result of our doings? It is possible, if we do not rise to the full

\textsuperscript{324}Ibid. \textsuperscript{325}Ibid., p. 360. \textsuperscript{326}Ibid., p. 356. \textsuperscript{327}Ibid., pp. 360-361. \textsuperscript{328}Ibid., p. 355.
height of our duty.\textsuperscript{329}

What does availability mean in our case? Let us look for the best men we have, and from the very best let us select the strongest.\textsuperscript{330}

Contrast. Schurz used much contrast in this speech, especially between what they had at that time and what he believed the people wanted.

We do not merely want another, but we want a better President than we now have. We do not want a mere change of persons in the Administration of the Government; we want the overthrow of a pernicious system; we want the eradication of flagrant abuses; we want the infusion of a loftier moral spirit into our political organization; we want a Government which the best people of this country will be proud of.\textsuperscript{331}

\ldots what the people now most earnestly demand is, not that mere good intentions, but that a superior intelligence, coupled with superior virtue, should guide our affairs; not that merely an honest and a popular man, but that a statesman be put at the head of our Government.\textsuperscript{332}

Repetition. Schurz used repetition to a large extent in this speech.

We saw the American people. \ldots We saw jobbery and corruption. \ldots We saw the Government \ldots, and we saw the people. \ldots We saw those in authority. \ldots we saw the innumerable mass. \ldots We saw men. \ldots We saw part of our common country. \ldots we saw the haughty spirit of power. \ldots.\textsuperscript{333}

We can crush corruption in our public concerns; we can give the Republic a pure and honest Government; we can revive the authority of the laws; we can restore to full value the Constitutional safeguard of our liberties; we can reanimate in the hearts of the whole people in every section of the land a fraternal and proud National

\textsuperscript{329}Ibid., p. 357. \textsuperscript{330}Ibid., p. 360. \textsuperscript{331}Ibid., pp. 358-59. \textsuperscript{332}Ibid., p. 359. \textsuperscript{333}Ibid., pp. 354-355.
feeling. We can do all this, but we can do it only by throwing behind us the selfish spirit of political trade.\textsuperscript{334}

Allusion and reference. Schurz made several allusions in this speech.

\ldots we attempt to control and use this movement by the old tricks of the political trader. \ldots \textsuperscript{335}

I earnestly deprecate the cry we have heard so frequently, 'Anybody to beat Grant.'\textsuperscript{336}

Climax. Schurz built his main climax at the end of the discussion division of this speech and then at the end he gave a milder climax summarizing his feelings about the reform movement.

If that be done, success will be certain. Then we can appeal to the minds and hearts, to the loftiest ambition of the people, with these arguments and entreaties which spring only from a clear conviction of right. Then we shall not appeal in vain for their support to those of our fellow-citizens who hitherto were separated from us by party divisions, who desire honestly to work for the best interests of the country in this crisis, and whom we shall welcome with fraternal greeting in this struggle for a great cause, whether they call themselves Democrats or Republicans. Then we shall successfully overcome those prejudices which now confront us, and the insidious accusation, that this great Convention is a mere gathering of disappointed and greedy politicians, will fall harmless at our feet, for we shall have demonstrated by our action that we were guided by the purest and most patriotic of motives. And this can be done.\textsuperscript{337}

Pardon me for these words of warning and entreaty. I trust nobody will consider them misplaced. I fervently hope the result of our deliberations will show that they were not spoken in vain. I know that they have sprung from

\textsuperscript{334}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 356-357.  \textsuperscript{335}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 357.
\textsuperscript{336}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 358.  \textsuperscript{337}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 360.
the most anxious desire to do what is best for our country, and thus I appeal to you with all the fervor of anxious earnestness. We stand on the threshold of a great victory, and victory will surely be ours if we truly deserve it.\footnote{Ibid., p. 361.}

**Example.** Schurz used this device only a couple of times in this speech.

He who calmly and impartially surveyed this spectacle could not fail to be deeply alarmed, not only at the wrongs that had been and were being perpetrated, but at the subjugation of the popular spirit which did not rise up against them.\footnote{Ibid., p. 361.}

**Figures of speech.**

**Simile.** Schurz used just one simile in this speech.

... we defiantly set our sense of duty against the arrogance of power, like the bugle blast of doomsday.\footnote{Ibid., p. 356.}

**Metaphor.** Schurz used no metaphors in this speech.

**Personification.** Schurz used several examples of personification in this speech.

... the breath of victory is in the very air which surrounds us. ...\footnote{Ibid., p. 355.}

... we shall have on our side that which ought to be and now I trust will be the ruling arbiter of political contests, the conscience of the Nation.\footnote{Ibid., p. 360.}

**Alliteration.** Examples of alliteration were found throughout this speech.

... as well as almost all. ...\footnote{Ibid., p. 354.}

... and to submit to this for the present, but to perpetuate it, that the political power of the country might. ...\footnote{Ibid., p. 360.}
... and that answer is given in thunder-tones by the convention of American freemen... 345

... is suddenly burst asunder. 346

... can crush corruption. ... 347

... to the loftiest instincts and aspirations of the patriot-citizen... 348

345Ibid. 346Ibid., p. 356. 347Ibid. 348Ibid., p. 360.
"ELECTION OF SENATOR CALDWELL"

I. INVENTION

Logical proof (logos)—"non-artistic proof."

Evidence. Schurz used several pieces of concrete evidence in this speech including a quotation from the Constitution plus a couple of newspaper editorials.

But the Constitution of the United States provides also that 'each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members'...349

This was written while the proceedings were still going on—'The House of Representatives is presenting just such an opportunity in its treatment of the Credit Mobilier question. It is acting as if it lacked the courage to follow the men who have thrown the first stone. The evidence against Brooks and Ames is overwhelming. It is their own evidence. The only possible ground for excusing them is that what they have done is not bad for Congressmen to do. The case of all Congressmen who have held Credit Mobilier stock is also plain. The stock was an improper one to hold. It created an interest in defrauding the Government. To refuse to censure the holders of that stock is to say that the Congressional standard of morals is not high enough to condemn it.'

Now, now, gentlemen, do you know what paper published this article? Not the New York Tribune, or the World, but the New York Times. Other usages of evidence by Schurz after the Credit Mobilier proceedings had closed follow:

'The action of the House of Representatives on Judge Poland's Credit Mobilier report, in substituting a vote of censure and condemnation for the resolution expelling Ames and Brooks, and passing over the other inculpated members without notice, fell far short of the just expectations of the country. It was a clear case of moral coward-

349Ibid., p. 453.
ice, an unmanly shirking of responsibility. After reject-
ing a resolution which involved a denial of its right to
expel Ames and Brooks for the offense with which they were
charged, after finding them guilty by a more than two-
thirds vote, the House adopted a resolution which virtually
declares that a member may offer or accept a bribe and yet
not be disqualified from retaining his seat in Congress.

'Absolute condemnation must be the verdict of the country
on such a lamentable exhibition of moral pusillanimity.'

Who was the man who wrote that article? It appeared in
Harper's Weekly, and I presume was written by our friend
the Hon. George William Curtis. 350

Authority. In the following instance, Schurz quoted
from the Senator from Kansas and then went on to say that the
Kansas Senator was wrong in the stand which he had taken.

He says the Senate cannot unseat that person by
declaring the election invalid, because the Senate has not
the Constitutional power to go behind the regular certi-
ficate of election, signed by the governor and bearing
the great seal of the State; and, secondly, he says that
the Senate cannot expel such a person by a two-thirds vote,
because the act of bribery was committed before that person
was a Senator, and the jurisdiction of the Senate cannot
date back to an offense committed antecedent to the elec-
tion; ergo, the Senate has absolutely no power at all in
such a case. 351

In the following example, Schurz quoted from one of the bribers
in order to point out their method of operation.

... as was shown before the Credit Mobilier Com-
mittee of the House, when Mr. Durant testified that when
he gave money for an election, it was entirely indifferent
to him whether the man was a Democrat or a Republican pro-
vided he was 'a good man'. 352

Sign. Schurz only used sign as a means of proof once
in this speech.

350 Ibid., pp. 465-466. 351 Ibid., pp. 451-452.
352 Ibid., pp. 464-465.
Now, one thing has been accepted as a legal maxim from time immemorial, and that is, that fraud vitiates a contract, vitiates a bond, a judgment. 353

Assumptions. Schurz based a great deal of his case in this speech upon assumptions.

He has, I presume, no personal enemy here. We also know that in case he should be removed from his seat in the Senate, the legislature of Kansas is certain to put a successor into his place who will be of exactly the same party complexion, and there can, therefore, be no political loss or gain involved in a change as to party strength on this floor. If there ever was a case which might be treated upon its own merits, it is this. 354

That civil war, with its fluctuations of values and its tempting opportunities for the rapid acquisition of wealth, has left behind it a spirit of speculation and greed stimulated to most inordinate activity. There is prevalent a morbid desire to get rich and to indulge in extravagant enjoyments; and the more it grows the greater will grow also the unscrupulousness of men in the employment of means to attain that end. 355

Now, sir, such words are not those of papers which are in the habit of finding fault with the Administration and the majority. The party service rendered by these papers justifies us in supposing that such words were extorted from them by facts which they could and would neither deny nor gloss over; and certainly, when they speak of public sentiment, they will not make that public sentiment in a darker color than it really bears. 356

I repeat, it is the purity, it is the very existence of the representative character of our institutions that is at stake; for when it is known that seats in this body can be bought and held by right of purchase, sellers and purchasers will multiply in the same measure as the wealth of this country grows to be plundered, as the interests vary to be subserved, as the rapacity of greed increases to be glutted, and the day will come when this body will represent the blood-suckers and the oppressors of the people, and no longer the people themselves. 357

356 Ibid., p. 466. 357 Ibid., pp. 468-469.
"Artistic proof."

Inductive reasoning—argument from generalization.

Schurz used this type of argument quite a bit in this speech. The following is a typical example.

Nor can that pretended encroachment consist in this, that the State is thereby deprived of its elected representative, for, in the case I have assumed, first, that representative is not legally elected; secondly, it must be presumed, in common-sense and decency, that the State who would rather desire to be relieved of a representative who has defrauded it, (and I include in the term representative Senators also), and that it would itself annul its own act if it had the power to do so, which it has not; and, thirdly, the State is not deprived of its representation nor of its choice, for upon the unseating of a member for such a cause a new election will be ordered in the State at once; the whole matter is turned over to the State legislature for its action, and it may elect the same person turned out by the Senate if it so sees fit.358

Argument from causation. Examples of this type of argument were found throughout this speech—both cause-to-effect and effect-to-cause reasoning.

The Senate by annulling an election carried by fraud or bribery only does by virtue of its Constitutional powers what the State would be glad to do, but cannot; and when that is done the whole matter is turned over to the State once more for a new election, and the State after all is the final arbiter.359

The country at this very moment is ringing with the cry of corruption. . . . Never before have the agencies been so powerful which seek to serve private interests by a corrupt use of money, and never before has the field of political life been so well prepared for their work.360

Argument from analogy. Schurz made an analogy with the U. S. House of Representatives in arguing that the Senate

358 Ibid., p. 458. 359 Ibid. 360 Ibid., p. 463.
should also have the right to determine the legality of the election of its members.

Now does anybody question, has anybody ever doubted, that the House of Representatives has always held so under the Constitutional clause which applies to both houses alike? The House of Representatives has always exercised the power, under this clause, to judge whether a man had been really and honestly and legally elected by a majority of the legal votes cast. Has it ever been questioned that the House of Representatives had the power, under this clause, to declare an election illegal and void, if that election had been controlled by bribery and fraud? As far as I know, nobody in the world has ever questioned it; and you will notice that power was exercised by the House of Representatives by virtue of identically the same clause of the Constitution under which we, as Senators, are to exercise our judgment?361

Inductive reasoning—argument by syllogism. Schurz used no specific examples of syllogisms in this speech but the entire speech followed the pattern of a categorical syllogism.

Federal legislative bodies have a constitutional right to determine the legality of the election of their members.
The U. S. Senate is a federal legislative body.
Therefore, the U. S. Senate has the right to determine the legality of the election of its members.

Argument by enthymeme. Schurz used enthymemes throughout this speech.

... if such a case had ever been disclosed to the American Senate, then the American Senate would have found a remedy and would not have hesitated to apply it.362

If I were a juryman, acting under the oath of a juryman, called upon to give my verdict, my verdict would be as I have stated...363

either that movement of healthy reaction will succeed, the social and political atmosphere will be purified and all will go well,—or the movement will fail; a feeling of discouragement, and then of torpid indifference, will settle upon the popular mind; further effort will be deadened by hopelessness, and corruption will riot, not as it did before, but far worse than ever before; and nobody knows where it will end. I need not say to which of these two results the American Senate should use its powers to contribute.

Ethical proof (ethos).

Intelligence. Schurz demonstrated his intelligence throughout the entire speech; he left no doubt of his knowledge concerning the bribery scandals and all of their ramifications.

Character. Schurz's character shines forth in many instances in this speech.

I would listen to the clamor of the mob just as little as any man on this floor; neither would I, in order to gain the confidence of the mob, descend to do a thing which my conviction of duty did not clearly command. I would face the mob without flinching to prevent a wrong. But I would not treat with contempt, I would treat with respect, that popular voice which calls upon me for nothing else but that I should fearlessly do my duty.

Mr. Caldwell has never offended me. I bear him the same kindly feelings that I bear to any fellow-man. Nothing is further from my nature than to harm any human being, without justice and necessity. Did I believe him innocent, I should not only refrain from everything that might do him harm, but I should be among the first to stand between him and the sacrifice; and even now I assure him it is with the profoundest pain that I see him in his deplorable situation.

364 Ibid., pp. 470-71. 365 Ibid., p. 467.
366 Ibid., pp. 471-472.
Good will. Schurz showed his good will toward Alexander Caldwell and the members of the U. S. Senate in the Introduction of this speech.

Every Senator who has spoken upon the subject before us has treated it as a matter of most painful interest; and quite naturally so, for nobody could approach it without reluctance. It is hardly possible that there should be the least personal or political bias in this debate, at least none unfavorable to the gentleman most nearly concerned. As far as I know, the conduct of the Senator from Kansas on this floor has been uniformly inoffensive and courteous. He has, I presume, no personal enemy here. 367

Emotional proof (pathos).

Anger. Schurz left no doubt of his anger at the people who had been participating in the bribery.

Now, sir, I find here not a mere isolated instance of the indiscretion of an over-zealous friend, but I find here bribery systematically organized; I find here a bacchanalian feast and riot of corruption. And when you read the testimony your imagination will fairly recoil from the spectacle of baseness and depravity that presents itself. 368

Love. Schurz had a genuine affection for the American Representative Government and he held it above any person.

... no consideration of personal kindness and sympathy, no emotion of compassionate friendship, can I permit to seduce me, nor should it seduce anyone here, to sacrifice to one individual what is higher than he and higher than all of us—the dignity and the honor of the American Senate, the moral authority of the laws we make, the purity of our representative government, and the best interests of the American people. 369

Fear. Schurz was afraid that America would lose the

representative character of her institutions if the bribery was allowed to continue.

You speak of partisan recklessness that might unscrupulously employ such a power for its own selfish ends. I know that danger as well as anyone knows it; I fear it just as much as anyone; I am certainly not inclined to underestimate it; but I entreat you to consider that, by assuring impunity to such offenses as we are here dealing with, by securing the full fruits of their iniquity to those who purchase seats in this body, you will invite to the Senate of the United States an element which, in its very nature corrupt, will be the readiest, the most servile, the most dangerous tool in the hands of reckless partisanship. 370

Confidence. Schurz was confident that the Senate was given the power by the Constitution to act in this matter and that they would do so.

The Constitution provides in the first place that the Senate, as well as the House of Representatives, shall have the discretionary power to expel a member by a two-thirds vote. That power is not limited to this or that offense; but it is vested in the discretion of each house of Congress, and it has already been demonstrated with irrefutable arguments that although an act of bribery by which a person lifted himself into one of these seats was indeed antecedent to his becoming a Senator, nevertheless that act of bribery, being the very stepping-stone upon which he rose into his legislative office, is so intimately connected with his becoming and being a Senator that the two things cannot be separated; that therefore this power to expel a member must necessarily apply. This is so clear, so self-evident, that not a word more is required. 371

Shame. To Schurz, one of the most shameful aspects of the bribery scandals was that it tended to make the American people lose faith in their elected representatives in government.

370 Ibid., p. 468. 371 Ibid., p. 453.
That fact it is useless to disguise, and we had better fully understand and appreciate it; it is that the confidence of the American people in the integrity of their public men is fearfully shaken. That is the truth, and nobody who knows the country will deny it. Whatever you may think of the causes which have brought forth this result, whatever of the justice of this sentiment, one thing is certain; the fact itself is a public calamity; for, as has often been said in these days, and as can never be repeated too often, what is to become of the respect of the people for the laws if they lose their confidence in the law-makers?

Pity. Schurz thought that it would be a pitiful situation if we did not take action to preserve the American democracy.

But there have been republics before this just as sound and healthy in their original constitution as ours, but which have died from the slower but no less fatal disease of corruption and demoralization, and of that decay of constitutional principles and that anarchy of power which always accompany corruption and demoralization. It is time for us to keep in mind that it takes more to make and to preserve a republic than the mere absence of a king, and that when a republic decays, its soul is apt to die first, while the outward form is still lasting to beguile and deceive the eyes of the unthinking. I hope and trust that we are still far from that point; but I think no candid observer will deny that there have been symptoms of a movement in that direction; and I say it with gladness, there are also symptoms justifying the hope that the downward movement may soon be checked if the checking has not already commenced.

Envy. The closest that Schurz came to using this emotion in this speech was when he stated that the Senate should set an envious example for the American people to follow.

When the American people struggle against the poser of corruption, their Senate at least should march

\[372\textit{Ibid.}, p. 467. \quad 373\textit{Ibid.}, p. 469.\]
in the front rank of the advancing column; their Senate at least should hold high its own standard of honor and purity, which is to restore the waning confidence of the masses in the integrity of the law-makers.  

**Emulation.** Schurz believed that there was no reason why the Senate should not emulate the action of the House of Representatives since they both had approximately the same powers.

The House of Representatives has always acted on that principle by virtue of the Constitutional provision conferring upon the Senate and the House the same power in the same language. Then I will ask, why not the Senate?  

II. ARRANGEMENT

This speech, "Election of Senator Caldwell," followed the three-divisional method of organization in the composition of the speech. In the Introduction, Schurz built up good will by stating that all of the previous speakers in the Senate had, quite naturally, approached the subject with reluctance, and he proceeded to state that the Caldwell Case could very well be settled upon its own merits.

In the Discussion division, Schurz went into the history of the case quite thoroughly, examined the available evidence, and then reached some conclusions as to the course of action to be taken in this case.

Schurz told, in the Conclusion, of the way he was going to vote on this case and that he believed his fellow senators

---

should follow the same course of action because the whole American system of government was really at stake in this case and not just the personal relationship of one man.

III. STYLE

Level. The style level of this speech was middle. He ranged from the very low level to the most sublime but for the most part he stayed in the middle bracket in this speech.

Diction or word choice. Schurz used both mono-syllabic and poly-syllabic words and he used them to give his speech a change of pace, vividness, and emphasis. His words were, for the most part, concrete, and when he did use abstract words they were part of a concrete idea.

Sentence structure. In this speech Schurz used all types of sentences and they varied from the very simple to the most compound-complex as is witnessed by the following examples.

Let us see.\footnote{Ibid., p. 458.}

Let no man say that of all parliamentary bodies in the world this is the only one—yes, the Senate of the United States, with all exalted attributes, with all the plenitude of its power, with all its vast responsibilities— is the only one that has no power to judge whether its members are honestly elected, and to declare an election illegal and void on the ground of bribery, fraud and crime; that this is the only parliamentary assembly on earth which, doubting its own authority, is helplessly to surrender to the invasion of men who purchase with money their way to the highest legislative dignity of the greatest of republics, and, having bought their seats, will sell our laws.\footnote{Ibid., p. 470.}
Rhetorical devices and figurative language.

Analogy. Schurz drew an analogy between the Senate and the House of Representatives in order to strengthen his argument that the Senate was endowed, by the Constitution, with the right to determine the legality of its members.

Now does anybody question, has anybody ever doubted, that the House of Representatives has always held so under the Constitutional clause which applies to both houses alike? The House of Representatives has always exercised the power, under this clause, to judge whether a man had been really and honestly and legally elected by a majority of the legal votes cast. Has it ever been questioned that the House of Representatives had the power, under this clause, to declare an election illegal and void, if that election had been controlled by bribery and fraud? As far as I know, nobody in the world has ever questioned it; and you will notice that power was exercised by the House of Representatives by virtue of identically the same clause of the Constitution under which we, as Senators, are to exercise our judgment?\(^{378}\)

Epigram. Schurz made no use of this device in this speech.

Epithet. Schurz used this device throughout this speech.

\[\ldots\] the wise men who made the Constitution. \ldots^\text{379}\]

Are not your great railroad kings and monopolists boasting today \ldots^\text{380}\]

\[\ldots\] the day will come when this body will represent the blood-suckers and the oppressors of the people, and no longer the people themselves.\textsuperscript{381}\]

\[^{378}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 454}.\]
\[^{379}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 452}.\]
\[^{380}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 464}.\]
\[^{381}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 469}.\]
Humor. Schurz did not use this device in this speech.

Rhetorical question. Schurz used this device a great deal in this speech; one time he used seven rhetorical questions in a row and another time he used six in a row.

Who will deny that fraud would vitiate also that which we might call a conditional relation between a constituency and a Representative, and the Legislative branch of the Government? But if each house is Constitutionally the judge, not only of the qualifications and of the returns, but also of the essence of an election, must it not have power to judge whether an election is vitiated by fraud or not? \(^{382}\)

Let me ask you what we can do, what we shall do, under such circumstances? What is the duty of those who have arrived, from their study of the case, at the same convictions that I entertain, and I know there are many upon this floor? Shall we say that although the testimony convinces us that here a seat in the Senate has been purchased with money, yet that seat shall be held by the purchaser as if it had been acquired by an honest and fair election? Shall we declare, are you, Senators of the United States, prepared to declare that when a man buys a seat upon this floor, buys the high quality of a Senator of the United States, and pays for it, it belongs to him as his property, and that, according to the fifth article of amendment to the Constitution, no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation? Is that the light in which you look at a transaction like this? Shall we increase the temptation already working to so fearful a degree by assuring to the purchaser of a seat in the Senate of the United States full security of enjoyment? Have you considered the consequences of such indulgence? \(^{383}\)

Do you think, sir, that the consequences now and here will be different from what they have been at other times and elsewhere? Are not your great railroad kings and monopolists boasting to-day that they own whole legislatures and State governments and courts to do their bidding? Have we not seen some of them stalking around in this very Capitol like the sovereign lords of creation?

\(^{382}\)Ibid., p. 455.  \(^{383}\)Ibid., pp. 462-463.
Are not some of them vaunting themselves now that they have made and can make profitable investments in members of Congress and in Senators of the United States? Have we not had occasion to admire the charming catholicity, the delicious cosmopolitan spirit with which these gentlemen distribute their favors, as was shown before the Credit Mobilier Committee of the House, when Mr. Durant testified that when he gave money for an election, it was entirely indifferent to him whether the man was a Democrat or a Republican provided he was 'a good man'? And now let them know that a man who has purchased his seat here, or for whom it has been purchased with money, will be secure in the enjoyment of the property so bought, and, I ask you, will not their enterprise be limited only by their desires, and will not the rapacity of their desires be limited only by their opportunities?  

Interrogation. Schurz used this device constantly during this speech. Sometimes he used it for vividness, sometimes for emphasis, and sometimes to develop an interest in some ramification of the main question which he wished to develop.

What, then, can that clause of the Constitution mean? We have to judge of three different things. . . .

Why does the Constitution put the election of Senators thus under the control of Congress just as it does the election of members of the House of Representatives? Because the Constitution does not regard a Senator as a mere diplomatic agent of the State. . . .

And now, sir, when it is discovered that the election of a Senator has been effected by fraud or bribery, has a sovereign State the power to undo its own act to set itself right? Not at all.

But if there is no precedent in our past history, is it not time to make one? All precedents are once made for the first time, and I hope, if such a duty devolves

---

384Ibid., pp. 464-465.  
385Ibid., p. 454.  
386Ibid., p. 456.  
387Ibid., p. 457.
upon us, we shall not shrink from it.388

I have read this testimony, every line of it, as carefully and conscientiously as it was possible for me to do; and now, sir, what do I find here? I find a man unknown to the political world.389

Now, gentlemen, do you know what paper published this article? Not the New York Tribune, or the World, but the New York Times. . . .

Who was the man who wrote that article? It appeared in Harper's Weekly, and I presume was written by our friend the Hon. George William Curtis.390

Contrast. Schurz used this device in order to show the difference between the powers of the State and the National Government.

The whole pretense, therefore, of an encroachment on the sovereign and rightful powers of the State vanishes into utter nothingness. The State retains unimpaired the full scope of its Constitutional powers and rights. The Senate by annulling an election carried by fraud or bribery only does by virtue of its Constitutional powers what the State would be glad to do, but cannot; and when that is done the whole matter is turned over to the State once more for a new election, and the State after all is the final arbiter. The exercise of this power by the Senate does, therefore, not impair, but, looking at it without prejudice, you will find that it virtually protects the rights of the States.391

Repetition. Schurz used some of his ideas in many different forms during the course of this speech. In the following example, he used this device to point out that the stand that the Senate should take was quite apparent.

Such, Mr. President, is our condition. Everybody sees it; everybody feels it; everybody knows it is so; and

390Ibid., p. 466.  391Ibid., pp. 458-459.
if we do not, the people of the United States do.\footnote{Ibid., p. 465.} He used repetition in the following selection to forcefully state his position.

I, for my part, shall vote for this resolution to declare the election of Mr. Caldwell illegal and void. I shall vote for it, clearly convinced as I am, that Mr. Caldwell's election was effected by the corrupt use of money. I shall so vote, firmly convinced that the Senate of the United States, under the Constitution, does possess the power to declare void an election so carried, and effected. If this resolution should fail, and I hope and trust it will not, then I shall vote for the resolution offered by the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Alcorn) to expel Mr. Caldwell, firmly believing, as I do, that the corruption shown in this case touches his character as well as his election, and clearly unfit him for a seat in the Senate of the United States.\footnote{Ibid., p. 460.}

\textbf{Allusion and reference.} The closest that Schurz came to using this device was when he made a reference to the rumors then in circulation concerning election bribes.

It is not from Kansas alone, it is from different States, that rumors reach of us of the election of Senators by bribery, undoubtedly groundless in some cases, utterly so, I hope; but in other cases, bearing a very serious appearance.\footnote{Ibid., p. 471.}

\textbf{Climax.} In this speech, Schurz built to a climax for each of the major phases of his over-all argument and then in the final climax, he tied all of the parts together and summarized the whole argument.

But, sir, no consideration of personal kindness and sympathy, no emotion of compassionate friendship, can I permit to seduce me, nor should it seduce anybody here, to sacrifice to one individual what is higher than he and
higher than all of us—the dignity and the honor of the American Senate, the moral authority of the laws we make, the purity of our representative government, and the best interests of the American people.\textsuperscript{395}

\textbf{Example.} Schurz used several examples in this speech.

Suppose a person has taken his seat here, elected by a State legislature, presenting when he appeared among us regular credentials in the correctest form, and proving by the unusual evidence that in his election every prescription of law had been fully complied with. Suppose, then, it is subsequently shown that the election of that person was effected and carried by gross bribery; suppose a clear case discloses itself of a purchase with money of a seat in the Senate of the United States. Then the question arises: Has the Senate any power to protect itself by the exclusion of such a person?\textsuperscript{396}

You might just as well say that I arrogate to myself your right to draw upon my deposit in a bank, or that I encroach upon your right to educate my children.\textsuperscript{397}

\textbf{Figures of speech. Simile.} Schurz used the simile very little in this speech.

Have we not seen some of them stalking around in this very Capitol like the sovereign lords of creation?\textsuperscript{398}

\textbf{Metaphor.} No use of this device was made in this speech.

\textbf{Personification.} Schurz did not use personification in this speech.

\textbf{Alliteration.} Schurz used this devoce mostly with the "t" sound being repeated in this speech.

... Senator that the two things cannot be separated; that therefore this... 399

... act to set itself right? Not at all. 400

... that it virtually protects the rights of the States. 401

399 Ibid., p. 453.  400 Ibid., p. 457.
401 Ibid., p. 459.
"THE VENEZUELAN QUESTION"

Ⅰ. INVENTION

Logical proof (logos)—"non-artistic proof."

Evidence. Schurz used very little evidence in this speech with the following passage coming the closest to this classification.

Last summer, the President, through the Secretary of State, in a despatch reviewing the case at length, and containing an elaborate disquisition on the Monroe doctrine, asked the British Government whether it 'would consent or decline to submit the Venezuela question in its entirety to impartial arbitration,' calling for 'a definite decision.'

Authority. In this speech, Schurz referred to Lord Salisbury and President Cleveland. Schurz quoted General Sherman in the following example as to a definition of war.

General Sherman, whose memory is dear to us all, is reported to have said, in his vigorous way: 'You want to know what war is? War is hell.' And nobody who has seen war as he had, and as some of us have, will question the truthfulness of this characteristic saying.

Sign. Schurz used only a few examples of sign in this speech.

I am well aware of the strange teachings put forth among us by some persons, that a war, from time to time, would by no means be a misfortune, but rather a healthy exercise to stir up our patriotism, and to keep us from becoming effeminate.

---

402 Ibid., V, p. 252.  403 Ibid., p. 251.  404 Ibid., p. 250.
I shall not discuss now whether those who honestly think that our present difference with Great Britain would, as to cause or object, justify war, or those who think the contrary, are right. 405

Assumptions. Schurz based this speech primarily upon assumptions which he held as valid.

But I am sure that all good citizens, whether they approve or disapprove of it, and while they would faithfully stand by their country in time of need, sincerely and heartily wish that the pending controversy between the United States and Great Britain would be brought to a peaceable issue. 406

They would be likely to furnish, if not a complete and conclusive decision, at least a basis for a friendly agreement. The very appointment of such a joint commission by the two Governments would be apt at once to remove the point of honor, the most dangerous element, from the controversy, and thus go very far to relieve the apprehension of disastrous possibilities which has so unsettling an depressing an effect. 407

Owing to this superiority of our staying power, a war with the United States would be to any foreign nation practically a war without end. No foreign Power or possible combination in the old world can, therefore, considering in addition to all this the precarious relations of every one of them with other powers and its various exposed interests, have the slightest inclination to get into a war with the United States and none of them will, unless we force it to do so. 408

"Artistic proof."

Inductive reasoning—argument from generalization. Schurz used many generalizations in this speech, and the type of generalizing he used was illustrated by the selection below where he was talking about the strength of the American Republic.

405 Ibid., p. 252. 406 Ibid., p. 250.
407 Ibid., p. 256. 408 Ibid., pp. 257-258.
We are a very powerful people—even without an Army or Navy immediately ready for action, we are, in some respects, the most powerful people on earth. We enjoy peculiar advantages of inestimable value. We are not only richer than any European nation in men, in wealth and in resources yet undeveloped, but we are the only nation that has a free hand, having no dangerous neighbors and no outlying exposed possessions to take care of. We are, in our continental position, substantially unassailable. A hostile Navy may destroy what commercial fleet we have, blockade our ports, and even bombard our seaboard towns. This would be painful enough, but it would only be scratching our edges. It would not touch a vital point. No foreign Power or possible combination could attack us on land without being overwhelmed on our soil by immensely superior numbers. We are the best fitted, not, perhaps, for a war of quick decision, but for a long war. Better than any other nation we can, if need be, live on our own fat. We enjoy the advantage of not having spent our resources during long periods of peace on armaments of tremendous cost without immediate use for them, but we would have those sources unimpaired in time of war to be used during the conflict. Substantially unassailable in our continental fastness, and bringing our vast resources into play with the patriotic spirit and the inventive genius and energy of our people, we would, on sea as well as on land, for offensive as well as defensive warfare, be stronger the second year of a war than the first, and stronger the third than the second, and so on.409

Argument from causation. Schurz relied upon this type

a great deal in this speech.

This correspondence and this message, by their tone as well as their substance, have essentially changed the situation. It is no longer a mere question of boundary, or of the status of the Monroe doctrine, but after a demand and a call for a definite decision, and a definite refusal of the thing demanded, and in answer to this something that may be understood as a threat of war, it has assumed the most ticklish form of a question of honor.410

Argument from analogy. Schurz did not use this type of argument in this speech.

Deductive reasoning—argument by syllogism. No use of the formal syllogism was made in this speech but the entire speech followed the form of a categorical syllogism:

No country will fight the United States unless they are forced to do so.
England is a country.
Therefore, England will not fight the United States unless she is forced to do so.

Argument by enthymeme. Schurz used this type of argument several times during the course of this speech. Such uses were typified by the following one.

... we shall always see our rights respected and our demands, if they are just and proper. ... 411

Ethical proof (ethos).

Intelligence. Schurz displayed his intelligence throughout this speech. It is aptly shown when he pointed out the glaring fault of the commission and how it could be corrected.

The President has appointed an American Commission to inquire into British claims as to the Venezuela boundary. As I have already pointed out, the findings of that commission will, owing to its one-sided origin, lack an essential element of the moral authority required to command general credit. This authority would be supplied if an equal number of eminent Englishmen, designated by the British Government, were joined to the Commission to cooperate in the examination of the whole case, and if the two parties, to prevent deadlock between them, agreed upon some distinguished person outside to preside over and direct their deliberations and to have the casting vote. ... 412

Character. Schurz's character was brought out when

411 Ibid., p. 258. 412 Ibid., p. 255.
he looked at the viewpoint of both sides in determining the fairness of the Commission selected.

The Commission just appointed by the President, indeed, consists of patriotic and wise men. They will, no doubt, conduct their inquiry with conscientious care and fairness. So we think here. But we have to admit that after all it is a one-sided contrivance, and as such lacks an important element of authority.413

Good will. Schurz's good will was most readily apparent in his introductory remarks when he stated that he was sure that all good citizens sincerely wanted this controversy to be settled peaceably.

As an honorary member of the Chamber of Commerce, I am thankful for the privilege of seconding the resolution offered by the Committee. I yield to no one in American feeling or pride; and, as an American I maintain that international peace, kept in justice and honor, is an American principle and an American interest. As to the President's recent message on the Venezuela case, opinions differ. But I am sure that all good citizens, whether they approve or disapprove of it, and while they would faithfully stand by their country in time of need, sincerely and heartily wish that the pending controversy between the United States and Great Britain be brought to a peaceable issue.414

Emotional proof (pathos).

Anger. Schurz showed anger against those people who proposed that the United States had to go to war in order to maintain her position in the world.

The idea that the stalwart and hard-working American people engaged in subduing to civilization an immense continent, need foreign wars to preserve their manhood from dropping into effeminacy, or that their love of country will

413 Ibid., p. 254. 414 Ibid., pp. 249-250.
flag unless stimulated by hatred of somebody else, or that they must have bloodshed and devastation as an outdoor exercise in the place of other sports—such an idea is as preposterous as it is disgraceful and abominable. 415

Love. Schurz showed in this speech that his one great love, above any personal considerations, was his love for the United States of America.

This is not a mere idealistic fancy. It is the natural position of this great Republic among the nations of the earth. It is its noblest vocation, and it will be a glorious day for the United States when the good sense and the self-respect of the American people see in this their 'manifest destiny.' . . . It is surely to-day the Americanism of those who love their country most. 416

Fear. Schurz was afraid that we would be forced into war unless we gave Great Britain a fair and honorable settlement on the boundary dispute.

Bloody wars have happened in spite of an earnest popular desire for peace on both sides, especially when points of honor inflamed the controversy. It may be in vain to cry 'Peace! Peace!' on both sides of the ocean, if we continue to flaunt the red flag in one another's faces. 417

Confidence. Schurz was confident that the plan which he proposed would go a long way toward lessening the chance of war.

It may be said that such an arrangement would not entirely remove the uncertainty as to the final outcome. I believe, however, that it would at least very greatly lessen that uncertainty. I think it probable that the findings and recommendations of a commission so constituted

would have high moral authority, and carry very great weight with both governments. They would be likely to furnish, if not a complete and conclusive agreement, at least a basis for a friendly agreement. The very appointment of such a joint commission by the two Governments would be apt at once to remove the point of honor, the most dangerous element, from the controversy, and thus go very far to relieve the apprehension of disastrous possibilities which usually has so unsettling and depressing an effect.\textsuperscript{418}

**Shame.** Schurz thought that it would be shameful if the United States and Great Britain should go to war.

It is generally said, in Great Britain as well as here, that there will be no war. The belief is born of the wish. It is so general because almost everybody feels that such a war would be a disaster not only calamitous but also absurd and shameful to both nations.\textsuperscript{419}

**Pity.** Schurz thought that it would be a pity if the United States did not keep her demands just and proper.

They will, on the contrary, carefully avoid such a quarrel as long as they can, and we may be confident that without firing a gun, and even without having many guns ready for firing, we shall always see our rights respected and our demands, if they are just and proper. . . .\textsuperscript{420}

**Envy.** Schurz was of the opinion that the United States stood in a very envious position and that we should respect and protect that position.

Owing to this superiority of our staying power, a war with the United States would be to any foreign nation practically a war without end. No foreign Power or possible combination in the old world can, therefore, considering in addition to all this the precarious relations of every one of them with other Powers, and its various exposed interests, have the slightest inclination to get into a war with the

\textsuperscript{418}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 256. \textsuperscript{419}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 253. \textsuperscript{420}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 258.
United States, and none of them will, unless we force it to do so.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 257-258.}

**Emulation.** Schurz thought that we should set ourselves up as an ideal example so that the other countries would want to emulate us.

With all its latent resources for war, it should be the great peace Power of the world. It should never forget what a proud privilege and what an inestimable blessing it is not to need and not to have big armies or navies to support. It should seek to influence mankind, not by heavy artillery but by good example and wise counsel. It should see its highest glory, not in battles won, but in wars prevented. It should be so invariably just and fair, so trustworthy, so good tempered, so conciliatory that other nations would instinctively turn to it as their mutual friend and the natural adjuster of their differences, thus making it the greatest preserver of the world's peace.\footnote{Ibid., p. 254.}

II. ARRANGEMENT

"The Venezuelan Question" followed the three-divisional method of organization. In the Introduction, Schurz established contact with his audience and told of their common wish for a peaceable solution to the pending controversy.

In the Discussion part, Schurz went into various aspects of the boundary dispute and some of the mistakes that had been made in attempting to settle it.

In the Conclusion, Schurz told of the glorious position that America held as the leader of nations and that we should
do everything in our power to maintain this position honorably.

III. STYLE

Level. The level of style was middle.

Diction or word choice. Schurz used an abundance of mono-syllabic words in this speech but there was a liberal sprinkling of poly-syllabic words. Most of the words were concrete ones which brought Schurz's ideas clearly into focus.

Sentence structure. Schurz covered the full range of use in his employment of sentences as can be seen by the following examples of the extremes to which he went.

So we think here.\textsuperscript{423}

This authority would be supplied if an equal number of eminent Englishmen, designated by the British government, were joined to the Commission to cooperate in the examination of the whole case, and if the two parties, to prevent dead-locks between them, agreed upon some distinguished person outside to preside over and direct their deliberations and to have the casting vote—the joint commission to be not a court of arbitration, and as such to pronounce a final and binding decision of the whole case—the thing which Lord Salisbury objected to—but an advisory council, to report the results of its inquiry into the whole case, together with its opinions, findings and recommendations to the two governments for their free acceptance or rejection.\textsuperscript{424}

Rhetorical devices and figurative language.

Analogy. Schurz used no analogies in this speech.

Epigram. Schurz did not use this device in this

\textsuperscript{423}Ibid., p. 254. \textsuperscript{424}Ibid., pp. 255-256.
speech.

**Epithet.** Schurz made frequent use of epithets in this speech.

- the stalwart and hard-working American people. 425
- There are also corrupt politicians eager to plunder . . . and unscrupulous speculators. . . . 426

**Humor.** Schurz used no humor in this speech.

**Rhetorical question.** Schurz used only one rhetorical in this speech.

- Is not this peace with honor? 428

**Interrogation.** Schurz made frequent use of interrogation in this speech and he used it mostly in order to develop aspects of the problem which he thought needed elucidation.

- How then? It is quite possible that a vast majority of the British people care very little about the strip of territory in dispute, and would have been satisfied to let the whole of it go to arbitration. 429

- What is the rule of honor to be observed by a Power so strong and so advantageously situated as this Republic is? Of course, I do not expect it meekly to pocket real insults if they should be offered to it. 430

- Is not this good Americanism? It is surely to-day the Americanism of those who love their country most. 431

---

431 Ibid., p. 259.
Contrast. During the entire speech Schurz contrasted what our attitudes were with what they should be; in the following selection he used the Irish Americans as an example.

It is also said that there are some American citizens of Irish origin, who wish the United States would get into a war with England, because they believe such a war would serve to relieve Ireland of the British connection. We all value the willingness of the Irish-born American citizens to fight for their adopted country if need be; and nobody will deny that their hearty love for their native land is, as such, entirely natural and entitled to respect. But as American citizens, having sworn exclusive allegiance to the United States, not one of them should ever forget that this Republic has a right to expect of all its adopted citizens, as to their attitude toward public affairs, especially questions of peace or war, the loyal and complete subordination of the interests of their native countries to the interests of the United States.\(^{432}\)

Repetition. Schurz's major theme throughout this entire speech was that we should treat Great Britain fairly and not force them into war over the boundary dispute when it could be settled peaceably. He repeated this idea over and over again and he also used other forms of repetition as is witnessed by the following selections.

No war is justifiable unless its cause or object stands in just proportion to its cost in blood, in destruction, in human misery, in waste, in political corruption, in social demoralization, in relapse of civilization; and even then it is justifiable only when every expedient of statesmanship to avert it has been thoroughly exhausted.\(^{433}\)

With all its latent resources for war, it should be the great peace Power of the world. It should never

\(^{432}\)Ibid., pp. 250-251.  \(^{433}\)Ibid., pp. 251-252.
forget what a proud privilege and what an inestimable blessing it is not to need and not to have big armies or navies to support. It should seek to influence mankind, not by heavy artillery, but by good example and wise counsel. It should see its highest glory, not in battles won, but in wars prevented. It should be so invariably just and fair, so trustworthy, so good tempered, so conciliatory that other nations would instinctively turn to it as their mutual friend and the natural adjuster of their differences, thus making it the greatest preserver of the world's peace. 

Allusion and reference. Schurz used no true allusion or reference in this speech.

Climax. Schurz had several minor climaxes in the discussional phase of this speech and then his major climax came in his summary conclusion.

This is not a mere idealistic fancy. It is the natural position of this great Republic among the nations of the earth. It is its noblest vocation, and it will be a glorious day for the United States when the good sense and the self-respect of the American people see in this their 'manifest destiny.' It all rests upon peace. Is not this peace with honor? There has, of late, been much loose speech about 'Americanism.' Is not this good Americanism? It is surely to-day the Americanism of those who love their country most. And I fervently hope that it will be and ever remain the Americanism of our children and children's children.

Example. Schurz used several examples in this speech. In the following instance, he was supporting his argument that America was a powerful nation.

We are, in our continental position, substantially unassailable. A hostile Navy may destroy what commercial fleet we have, blockade our ports, and even bombard our seaboard towns. This would be painful enough, but it would only be scratching our edges. It would not touch

434 Ibid., pp. 258-259. 435 Ibid., p. 259.
a vital point.\textsuperscript{436}

In the following case he was talking about the rule of honor to be observed by a Power so strong and so advantageously situated as America was.

\ldots I do not expect it meekly to pocket real insults if they should be offered to it. But surely, it should not, as our boyish jingoes wish it to do, swagger about among the nations of the world with a chip on its shoulder, and shaking its fist in everybody's face.\textsuperscript{437}

**Figures of speech. Simile.** Schurz used this figure many times during the course of this speech.

Indeed, there are some of them busily looking around for somebody to fight as the crazed Malay runs amuck looking for somebody to kill.\textsuperscript{438}

There are also corrupt politicians eager to plunder the public under a cheap guise of patriotism and unscrupulous speculators looking for gambling and pilfering opportunities in their country's trouble, and wishing for war as the piratical wrecker on his rocky shore wishes for fogs or hurricanes.\textsuperscript{439}

Every business calculation will be like taking a gambler's chance.\textsuperscript{440}

**Metaphor.** Schurz did not make use of this figure in this speech.

**Personification.** Schurz made little use of personification in this speech. In the following selection, he is talking about the American Republic.
As a true gentleman, conscious of his strength and his dignity, it should be slow to take offense.\cite{441}

Alliteration. Schurz used alliteration in many different instances in this speech but never used it to excess in any given instance.

\begin{itemize}
\item \ldots \text{Britain be brought}. \ldots \cite{442}
\item \ldots \text{want to know what war}. \ldots \?\cite{443}
\item \ldots \text{than any European nation in men, in wealth}
\item \ldots \text{on our own}. \ldots \cite{445}
\end{itemize}

\begin{flushleft}
\textit{Ibid.}, p. 258. \hspace{1cm} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 250.
\textit{Ibid.}, p. 251. \hspace{1cm} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 257.
\textit{Ibid.}.
\end{flushleft}
"THE GERMAN MOTHERTONGUE"

I. INVENTION

Logical proof (logos)--"non-artistic proof."

Evidence. Schurz used no direct or concrete evidence in this speech.

Authority. Schurz did not use this type of proof in this speech.

Sign. Schurz used sign only once in this speech.

It would be superfluous here to speak of the literature which has grown up in the German language and includes every field of intellectual activity, for its imposing scope has been recognized by the whole civilized world.446

Assumptions. Schurz built almost all of his case in this speech upon assumptions.

There is no language in the world which offers so many difficulties to the translator as the German, and none in which all the idioms and poetic meters of other languages can be so exactly rendered and which has so rich and complete a collection of translations.447

We possess, in truth, a treasure which we cannot prize highly enough, especially we who have a new home in the new world speaking another language. It is sometimes expected of our compatriots in America that they shall not only learn English, but that they shall entirely cast aside the old mothertongue. That is very unwise advice.448

The idea that the preservation of the German language together with the English may hinder the development of our American patriotism is as silly as it would be to say that it makes us less patriotic to be able to sing Hail, Columbia, in two languages. There are thousands of Americans who study German without becoming less patriotic; it only makes them more cultured and more accomplished.449

446 Ibid., p. 336. 447 Ibid. 448 Ibid. 449 Ibid., p. 337.
"Artistic proof."

Inductive reasoning—argument from generalization. Schurz did not use this type of argument in this speech.

Argument from causation. Schurz used this type of argument when he was telling why the toast to the German mothertongue should be responded to in music instead of giving him a speech of response.

The toast to the German mothertongue ought to be responded to in music. This the Liederkrantz has done so often and with so much feeling—and again only the other day—that it might be better were the chorus now to stand in my place, for to-day we celebrate more especially the German mothertongue as it speaks to us in song. There may indeed be other languages which on account of the resonance of their vowels and the softness of their consonants are better adapted to singing, but in no other language do the people sing as much as in German and no other nation has given us so great a treasure of melodies that the people sing, songs of such deep feeling and of such virile force. Together with the mothertongue, the German Lied sprang from the German heart and it has made its way around the world. Whatever may resist German intellect and German enterprise—nothing can withstand German song.450

Argument from analogy. This speech contained no argument from analogy.

Deductive reasoning—argument by syllogism. Schurz used no syllogisms in this speech.

Argument by enthymeme. Several enthymemes were used in this speech and the following one is typical of those used.

... if you say anything clever or graceful in German, you cannot make it sound any more clever than it

450 Ibid., pp. 334-335.
Ethical proof (ethos).

Intelligence. The following paragraph points out quite clearly the thoroughness with which Schurz knew the subject upon which he was speaking.

There is no language in the world which offers so many difficulties to the translator as the German, and none in which all the idioms and poetic meters of other languages can be so exactly rendered and which has so rich and complete a collection of translations. Homer, Dante, Hafiz, Shakespeare, Aristotle, Bacon, Thucydides, Tacitus, Macaulay, Victor Hugo, Walter Scott, Tolstoy—the poetry, philosophy, science, history, fiction of all nations have naturally found a home in the German language, through the translations which are worthy of the originals by their fidelity, their strength and beauty. Indeed, the German language opens up to us more than any other the wealth of the literature of the whole world.\(^{452}\)

Character. The following selection brought out Schurz's character by showing that he practiced what he preached.

I am not preaching as one of whom it might be said: 'Follow his words but not his deeds.' I flatter myself that I am as dutiful an American as anyone, and I have tried to learn English and so have my children. But in my family circle only German is spoken, much German is read and our family correspondence is carried on only in German. I may therefore be permitted to express myself strongly on this point. And so I say to you when I see how German-American parents neglect to secure for their children the possession of the mothertongue, often from mere indolence, how they wantonly cast aside the precious gift—then my German heart and my American common-sense rise up in indignant protest.\(^{453}\)

\(^{451}\)Ibid., p. 335. \(^{452}\)Ibid., p. 336. \(^{453}\)Ibid., pp. 337-338.
Good will. Schurz showed his good will when he identified himself with his audience.

We must be forgiven if, when speaking of our German mother tongue, we become a little sentimental, for that is not a sign of weakness. You may remember Heine's lines about the 'sentimental oaks.' The German mother tongue is a treasure for every thoughtful person who possesses it, the value of which is to him much more than a mere matter of sentiment. We Germans like to hear honesty spoken of as one of the prominent traits of the German national character; and I, for my part, am particularly pleased when the better elements of the American people rely upon the support of German-Americans when questions about honest government and honest money arises.454

Emotional proof (pathos).

Anger. Schurz demonstrated his anger at those German-Americans who failed to keep the German language alive in their homes.

And so I say to you when I see how German-American parents neglect to secure for their children the possession of the mother tongue, often from mere indolence, how they wantonly cast aside the precious gift—then my German heart and my American commonsense rise up in indignant protest.455

Love. This entire speech was predicated upon a basis of genuine affection for the German language as is witnessed by the following excerpt.

There may indeed be other languages which on account of the resonance of their vowels and the softness of their consonants are better adapted to singing, but in no other language do people sing as much as in German and no other nation has given us so great a treasure of melodies that the people sing, songs of such deep feeling and such virile force. Together with the mother tongue, the German Lied

454Ibid., p. 335. 455Ibid., p. 338.
sprang from the German heart and it has made its way around the world.\textsuperscript{456} 

**Fear.** Schurz was afraid that the German-Americans might follow unwise advice and discard their native German tongue and thus he attempted to warn them against this kind of advice.

We possess, in truth, a treasure which we cannot prize highly enough, especially we who have made a new home in a new world speaking another language. It is sometimes expected of our compatriots in America that they shall not only learn English but that they shall entirely cast aside the old mothertongue. That is very unwise advice.\textsuperscript{457}

**Confidence.** Schurz was confident that nothing could withstand the German song.

Together with the mothertongue, the German Leid sprang from the German heart and it has made its way around the world. Whatever may resist German intellect and German enterprise—nothing can withstand German song.\textsuperscript{458}

**Shame.** Schurz thought that it was shameful that some German-American parents did not teach their children the German language when it could be done so easily and at the same time help to preserve the German mothertongue.

Parents who neglect to give their children an opportunity to learn the German language without effort are sinning against their sacred obligation to preserve the mothertongue.\textsuperscript{459}

**Pity.** Schurz pitied those who had to acquire the Ger-

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{456}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 334-335.
\item\textsuperscript{457}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 336.
\item\textsuperscript{458}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 335.
\item\textsuperscript{459}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 338.
\end{itemize}
man language through much laborious effort and thought that the German-Americans were very fortunate in that all they had to do was not to forget their native language in order to have this treasure.

There are thousands of Americans who study German without becoming less patriotic; it only makes them more cultured and more accomplished. They learn German with laborious effort, for German is very difficult. We German-Americans have brought this treasure over the ocean with us. We need not study German—we need only not to forget it. Our children will have without trouble what others can acquire only with great difficulty, if we are but sensible and conscientious enough to cultivate and to foster it in our families.460

Envy. Schurz thought that the German-Americans who maintained the German language were in an envious position.

All the more do I honor a German-American society in which the German language is valued and cherished as it is here; it is doing an incalculable service to our contemporaries as well as to coming generations.461

Emulation. Schurz thought that the other German-Americans should emulate him in the way he dealt with the German and English languages.

I flatter myself that I am as dutiful an American as anyone, and I have tried to learn English and so have my children. But in my family circle only German is spoken, much German is read and our family correspondence is carried on only in German.462

II. ARRANGEMENT

"The German Mothertongue" followed the three-divisional

---

460Ibid., p. 337. 461Ibid., p. 338.
462Ibid., pp. 337-338.
method of organization in the composition of the speech. In the Introduction, Schurz identified himself with his audience and told of the greatness of the German language.

In the Discussion division, Schurz compared the German language with other languages as to their relative merits in many different aspects such as speaking, translating, et cetera. He then went into the desirability of the German-Americans keeping their native language alive and functioning along with their obligation to learn English, the language of their adopted country.

In the Conclusion, Schurz summarized his response by paying a glowing tribute to the German mothertongue.

... for the mothertongue is the bond which holds and binds its members together. The German mothertongue the dear, strong, noble, tender, sacred mothertongue—may it live everlastingly here and all the world over.

III. STYLE

Level. The level of style was low. In this speech, Schurz was making a response to a toast and his main purpose was to inspire a group of his fellow German immigrants. This speech almost had to be on this plane in order to be adequate for the occasion.

Diction or word choice. The words in this speech ranged from mono-syllabic to five and six syllables but was weighted toward

463 Ibid., p. 338.
the mono-syllabic end of the continuum. Abstract words were a rarity in this speech and when Schurz did use them, he used them in a concrete text so that the over-all idea was driven home.

**Sentence structure.** Schurz kept his sentences relatively simple in this speech but he would occasionally make them more complicated. The following sentences are typical of the sentence range he used in this speech.

> We Germans like to hear honesty spoken of as one of the prominent traits of the German national character; and I, for my part, am particularly pleased when the better elements of the American people rely upon the support of German-Americans when questions about honest government and honest money arise.  

Homer, Dante, Hafiz, Shakespeare, Aristotle, Bacon, Thucydides, Tacitus, Macaulay, Victor Hugo, Walter Scott, Tolstoy—the poetry, philosophy, science, history, fiction of all times and of all nations have naturally found a home in the German language, through the translations which are worthy of the originals by their fidelity, their strength and beauty.

We possess, in truth, a treasure which we cannot prize highly enough, especially we who have made a new home in a new world speaking another language.

That is very unwise advice.

He owes it to his new country and he owes it to himself.

**Rhetorical devices and figurative language.**

**Analogy.** Schurz used no analogies in this speech.

---

464 Ibid., p. 335.  465 Ibid., p. 336.  466 Ibid.  
467 Ibid.  468 Ibid., p. 337.
Epigram. Schurz did not use this device in this speech.

Epithet. Schurz used this device very little in this speech other than referring to nationalities such as Germans, German-Americans, Americans, et cetera.

It is sometimes expected of our compatriots in America. . . 469

Humor. The writer could find no use of humor in this speech.

Rhetorical question. Schurz used only one rhetorical in this speech.

What is there in any other language that can excel the vigor of the German Bible, the powerful, sonorous sublimity of Schiller's dramas, the captivating word-music of Heine's lyrics? 470

Interrogation. Schurz did not use this device in this speech.

Contrast. Schurz used several examples of contrast in this speech. In the following selection he explained the difference between what some people thought the German immigrants to this country should do and the course of action they really should take.

It is sometimes expected of our compatriots in America that they shall not only learn English, but that they shall entirely cast aside the old mothertongue. That is very unwise advice. Nobody will dispute that the German-American must learn English. He owes it to his new

469Ibid., p. 336. 470Ibid.
country and he owes it to himself. But it is more than folly to say that he ought, therefore, to give up the German language. As American citizens we must become Americanized; that is absolutely necessary. I have always been in favor of a sensible Americanization, but this need not mean a complete abandonment of all that is German. It means that we should adopt the best traits of American character and join them to the best traits of German character.  

In the following example Schurz showed the contrast between those Americans who learn the German language through laborious effort and those German-Americans who learned the German language easily in their childhood.

There are thousands of Americans who study German without becoming less patriotic; it only makes them more cultured and more accomplished. They learn German with laborious effort, for German is very difficult. We German-Americans have brought this treasure over the ocean with us. We need not study German—we need only not forget it.

Repetition. Schurz repeated many times during this speech his main idea that the German-Americans should keep their native language alive in their adopted country. In the following example, Schurz reinforced, by means of repetition, his theme that German is a language which is made up of sublime elements.

Moreover, like a great organ it commands the whole range of musical expression, of force, of grandeur, of lofty enthusiasm, of passion, of delicate feeling. What is there in any other language that can excel the vigor of the German Bible, the powerful, sonorous sublimity of Schiller's

Ibid., pp. 336-337.  
Ibid., p. 337.
dramas, the captivating word-music of Heine's lyrics?[^1]

**Allusion and reference.** Schurz used a number of allusions and references in this speech.

You may remember Heine’s lines about the ‘sentimental oaks’.[^2]

What is there in any other language that can excel the vigor of the German Bible, the powerful, sonorous sublimity of Schiller's dramas, the captivating word-music of Heine’s lyrics?[^3]

Homer, Dante, Hafiz, Shakespeare, Aristotle, Bacon, Thucydides, Tacitus, Macaulay, Victor Hugo, Walter Scott, Tolstoy—the poetry, philosophy, science, history, fiction of all times and of all nations have naturally found a home in the German language. . . .[^4]

**Climax.** Schurz made only one real climax in this speech and that was at the end of the speech when he paid an inspirational tribute to the Liederkranz and the German mothertongue.

May the Liederkranz, in the unnumbered years that we all hope are still in store for it, remain as faithful to this noble duty as it has been in the half-century just elapsed—for the mothertongue is the bond which holds and binds its members together. The German mothertongue, the dear, strong, noble, tender, sacred mothertongue—may it live everlastingly here and all the world over[^5]

**Example.** Schurz used this device quite sparingly in this speech.

Other languages, particularly the Romance, are distinguished for the refined and graceful elegance of their melodious diction. In these languages it is easy to say things that sound very pretty and mean very little. In German that is more difficult.^[6]

[^1]: Ibid., p. 336.
[^2]: Ibid., p. 335.
[^3]: Ibid., p. 336.
[^4]: Ibid.
[^5]: Ibid., p. 338.
[^6]: Ibid., p. 335.
The idea that the preservation of the German language together with the English may hinder the development of our American patriotism is as silly as it would be to say that it makes us less patriotic to be able to sing *Hail, Columbia* in two languages.\(^{479}\)

**Figures of speech.** Simile. Schurz used little simile in this speech. In the following selection, he compared the German language to a great organ.

Moreover, like a great organ it commands the whole range of musical expression, of force, of grandeur, of lofty enthusiasm, of passion, of delicate feeling.\(^{480}\)

**Metaphor.** Schurz did not use the metaphor in this speech.

**Personification.** Schurz did not use this figure of speech in this speech.

**Alliteration.** Many examples of alliteration were found in this speech.

... German intellect and German enterprise—nothing can withstand German song.\(^{481}\)

... much more than a mere matter... \(^{482}\)

... German, and none in... \(^{483}\)

... patriotism is as silly as... \(^{484}\)

... on only in German.\(^{485}\)

---

\(^{479}\)Ibid., p. 337.  \(^{480}\)Ibid., p. 336.  \(^{481}\)Ibid., p. 335.  
\(^{482}\)Ibid.  \(^{483}\)Ibid., p. 336.  \(^{484}\)Ibid., p. 337.  
\(^{485}\)Ibid.
"THE 48'ERS"

I. INVENTION

Logical proof (logos) -- "non-artistic proof."

Evidence. This speech contained very little concrete evidence.

In September, 1848, I took part in a congress of students which met in Eisenach at the foot of the Wartburg. I was sent there as a delegate from the University of Bonn. The other German universities were also represented.

Authority. Schurz used only one authority in this speech and that one was the banquet chairman.

You, Mr. Chairman, have already pointed out that there is a great difference of opinion as to the cause and the expediency of the present war, but that now, since the war has actually begun, we must all, man for man, stand together in the defense of our common country. Gentlemen, not only is this quite self-evident, but I go even further...

Sign. Schurz used this type of proof in several instances in this speech.

In 1848, for the first time, a sense of German national unity was felt and consciously developed with a life-giving force.

The youth inspired by the spirit of '48 fought honestly for these great aims, these high ideals; he was ready to give his life for them, and whatever his mistakes or his foolhardiness the German people have every reason to be proud of him instead of scoffing at the 'mad year.'

Assumptions. This speech was built upon the basic

---

486 Ibid., p. 468.  
487 Ibid., p. 470.  
488 Ibid., p. 467.  
489 Ibid., pp. 469-470.
assumptions that the "48ers" had done the right thing in Germany, although they had made some errors of judgment, and that they should strive to preserve in the United States the ideals which they had fought for in Germany. The speaker went on the assumption that the audience was of the same opinion as he was and agreed with him; he was undoubtedly right in this assumption because the audience was honoring Schurz and his compatriots at a banquet for the actions they had taken.

The great union of Germany has been achieved and it may be confidently predicted that the continuance of the united German Empire will be all the more firmly assured the more popular and free the form of its government. The more arbitrary the supreme power, the more dangerous will anti-nationalism become. The more popular the administration of state affairs, the more patriotic will be the people and the more patriotic the people the stronger and safer the Empire. The fact that the German nation now represents a free and proud people united by a feeling of patriotism in which it rejoices, and not merely an alliance of princes, is the surest guarantee of its permanence.490

It is my conviction that few things are so dangerous to the ethical basis of democratic government as a protracted state of war. Under prevailing conditions the policy to be pursued by the true advocate of peace should be as follows: for peace as long as it can be maintained; after the outbreak of hostilities, for the most vigorous management of the war in order to put an end to the state of war as quickly as possible with a decisive victory. Again for peace as soon as the first chance of peace presents itself.491

"Artistic proof."

Inductive reasoning—argument from generalization.

490Ibid., p. 469. 491Ibid., p. 471.
Probably the best example of this type of reasoning in this speech was when Schurz made a generalization about the members of the German revolution of 1848 who migrated to this country.

Surely no one will deny that those German representatives of the movement of 1848 who have sought and found a new home in America have always been good and conscientious citizens of their new fatherland. The intellectual freshness and vivacity which they brought with them greatly stimulated at the time the political and social life of the Germans in America, and when, with the movement of secession, danger threatened the new fatherland, the German '48ers, each in his way, were among the first who, with self-sacrificing devotion rushed to the defense of the Union and liberty. Most of them have proved that the revolutionary agitators of 1848 could become reliable and conservative citizens under a free government. 492

**Argument from causation.** Schurz used several arguments of this type in his speech.

The delegates of the Vienna universities appeared at our Congress clad in the picturesque uniform of the Academic Legion; they were handsome, chivalrous youths and general favorites, owing to their winning, genial manners. 493

We were still in the midst of our student festivities and full of youthful exuberance of spirits when our Austrian friends suddenly announced, with agitated mien, that they were obliged to return to Vienna without delay. To our question, 'Why?' they answered that they had received letters from headquarters warning them that the final crisis was impending, that the cause of freedom required the presence of all her champions. 494

**Argument from analogy.** Schurz used no analogies in this speech.

---

Deductive reasoning—argument by syllogism. Schurz used no formal syllogisms in this speech.

Argument by enthymeme. Schurz used several enthymemes in this speech.

The fact that the German nation now represents a free and proud people united by a feeling of patriotism in which it rejoices, and not merely an alliance of princes, is the surest guarantee of its permanence.\textsuperscript{495}

\ldots{} the man who now most eagerly advocates peace must, under the circumstances, recommend the most energetic conduct of the war, as only by a speedy and decisive victory of the United States can peace be soon restored.\textsuperscript{496}

Ethical proof (ethos).

Intelligence. Schurz's knowledge of his subject was apparent throughout this speech, and the following selection brought out quite clearly the thoroughness with which he recalled the events that had happened some 50 years previously.

There were present, among others, nine or ten young men, delegates of the University of Vienna, who belonged to the Academic Legion of that city. This legion played a prominent part in the revolutionary developments of the time and seemed, for a short period, to exert a decisive influence on the Austrian Government. In their headquarters, the aula of the university, the leaders of the legion received deputations bringing petitions for the redress of grievances and for the introduction of reforms, as if the armed students were, indeed, the reigning power. Then came the reaction. It had grown strong by the union of the Court party and the Army with the nationalities hostile to Germany. A violent end seemed to threaten the revolutionary movement and at the time of our student congress at Eisenach the catastrophe was

\textsuperscript{495}Ibid., p. 469. \textsuperscript{496}Ibid., pp. 470-471.
rapidly approaching.\textsuperscript{497}

\textbf{Character.} Schurz’s character was epitomized by the following which showed him devoting himself to a cause and not thinking of his own selfish interests.

I have always been glad that I took part in such a movement in my early youth. Whoever has had a similar experience knows what it means to have been one of a numerous body who dedicated themselves to a cause, which to them was a noble and sacred one; who, with the boundless devotion of youth and with the idealism that is free from all thought of self or of personal interest, were ready for any sacrifice.\textsuperscript{498}

\textbf{Good will.} Schurz showed his good will at the very start of this speech when he thanked the people who were doing honor to the "Forty-eighters" and revealed the esteem in which he held the memories of the 1848 period.

I have often asked myself which of the memories of my somewhat eventful life I should most wish to preserve and which I could most readily spare, and I have always come to the conclusion that the recollections of the period of 1848 are among my dearest and most precious. I would not give them up at any price.\textsuperscript{499}

\textbf{Emotional proof (pathos).}

\textbf{Anger.} Schurz showed anger at those who did not hold the actions of the '48ers in the proper perspective.

It has become the fashion in certain quarters in

\textsuperscript{497}Ibid., p. 468. \textsuperscript{498}Ibid., pp. 467-468. \textsuperscript{499}Ibid., pp. 466-467.
Germany to scoff at the year '48 as the 'mad year.' That is such a foolish, yes, such an almost childish, view, of which only those who are capable who cannot or will not grasp great historic facts in their true significance.

**Love.** Schurz's genuine affection for his '48 compatriots was in evidence throughout this speech and is especially evident in the following passage.

The youth inspired by the spirit of '48 fought honestly for these great aims, these high ideals; he was ready to give his life for them, and whatever his mistakes, or his foolhardiness the German people have every reason to be proud of him instead of scoffing at the 'mad year.'

**Fear.** Schurz was afraid that the Spanish-American War, which was taking place when he gave this speech, would expand into a protracted state of war and thus would be a threat to our democratic form of government.

It is my conviction that few things are so dangerous to the ethical basis of democratic government as a protracted state of war. . . . Every patriotic citizen will, therefore, wish most speedy and decisive success to the arms of the Republic. He will support every demand of the Government with the most self-sacrificing devotion in order to regain the 'desired peace.'

**Confidence.** Schurz was confident that the German Empire at that time would last longer under a free and popular government than it would under any other form of government.

The great union of Germany has been achieved, and it may be confidently predicted that the continuance of the united German Empire will be all the more firmly

---

assured the more popular and free the form of its govern-
ment. 503

In the following selection, Schurz expressed confidence that
the German '48ers would be exonerated for their actions.

Most of them have proved that the revolutionary
agitators of 1848 could become reliable and conservative
citizens under a free government. I believe that public
opinion will on the whole give them a good character--and
if it does not we will give it to ourselves. 504

Shame. Schurz thought that it would be shameful if
the Spanish-American War should be turned into a war of conquest.

He will oppose every attempt to degrade a war
which was heralded to all the world as a war for humanity
to an ordinary war of conquest, an attempt which, if success-
ful, will dishonor the flag and bring new wars and untold
disaster upon the American people. 505

Pity. Schurz thought that it was a shame that some
of his youthful companions in Europe had to give up their lives
in the fight for freedom but thought that the results they ob-
tained were worthwhile.

I still see before me the scene of our parting.
When, with a last hand-clasp, we called out, 'Auf Wieder-
sehen!' one of them answered with a questioning inflec-
tion: 'Auf Wiedersehen? we go to battle from here--look
at the lists of the fallen, perhaps you will there find
our names!' It was the 'Morituri salutamus' spoken in
the first freshness of youth. Soon after came the terrible
October fights in Vienna in which the blood of the Academic
Legion flowed in streams. 506

Envy. Schurz thought that the action which they had
taken in 1848 put Germany (Prussia) in an envious position.

503 Ibid., p. 469. 504 Ibid., p. 470.
505 Ibid., p. 470. 506 Ibid., p. 469.
The year '48 forever completely put an end to such an unsettled state of mind and in its place awakened in every heart the mighty longing for national unity which grew to be an irresistible moral impulse, until at last came the great consummation.\textsuperscript{507}

Emulation. Schurz thought that the youth of 1898 should emulate the spirit and action of the youth of 1848.

It is to be wished that in the youth of to-day a living spark of that same self-sacrificing idealism might be kindled and that this spark might never be choked and extinguished by a puerile ambition for personal aggrandizement.\textsuperscript{508}

II. ARRANGEMENT

"The '48ers" followed the three-divisional method of organization in the composition of the speech. In the Introduction Schurz established a common ground with his audience by stating how much the recollections of 1848 meant to him.

In the Discussion division, he went into various aspects of the 1848 period and the results which were the consequences of the actions the '48ers had taken.

In the Conclusion, Schurz compared the 1898 period with the 1848 period and showed how the drive for the preservation of freedom, liberty, and democracy was prevalent in both situations. He then summarized the speech by telling of his hope for the future of the American Republic.

\textsuperscript{507}Ibid., p. 467. \textsuperscript{508}Ibid., p. 470.
III. STYLE

Level. The level of style was low. In this speech, Schurz was making a "thank you" speech to the people who were honoring him and his colleagues at the banquet. This speech almost had to be friendly and chatty in order to be suitable for the occasion.

Diction or word choice. Although Schurz covered a wide range of word choice in this speech both as to the number of syllables and as to the concrete-abstractness of the words, he used a predominant number of mono-syllabic words.

Sentence structure. The following examples show the range of sentence structure that Schurz used in this speech but he kept most of his sentences relatively simple.

Such was the spirit of a great part of the German youth of 1848.\footnote{Ibid., p. 469.}

Certainly.\footnote{Ibid.}

Let us hope that the great American Republic, among whose most loyal citizens we old '48ers count ourselves, may honorably emerge from this crisis with her democratic institutions unimpaired, with her promise honestly fulfilled, that her victorious arms shall not serve the lust of conquest, but shall be unselfishly used only in the name of humanity, of civilization and liberty--thus winning anew the confidence and respect of the world.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 471-472.}

Rhetorical devices and figurative language.

Analogy. Schurz used no analogies in this speech.

Epigram. Schurz used no epigrams in this speech.
Epithet. Schurz's favorite epithet in this speech was "the '48ers" but he also used several others.

... us old 'Forty-eighters' ... 512
... prefer to be French rather than Prussian. 513
Every patriotic citizen ... 514
... most loyal citizens ... 515

Humor. Schurz used no humor in this speech.

Rhetorical question. Schurz did not use this device in this speech.

Interrogation. Schurz only made use of this device once in this speech and that was when he defended the actions which had been taken by the '48ers even though they had made some mistakes and blunders.

Were there not many wild blunders made and much attempted that was foolish and unattainable? Certainly. But many of the things that were then aspired to have since been realized and others should and will be realized in the course of time. 516

Contrast. Schurz made some use of this device in this speech. In the following instance, he showed the difference between what some people thought of the '48ers and what they really should have thought if they had interpreted the actions of the '48ers correctly.

The youth inspired by the spirit of '48 fought honestly for these great aims, these high ideals; he was
ready to give his life for them, and whatever his mistakes or his foolhardiness the German people have every reason to be proud of him instead of scoffing at the 'mad year.'\textsuperscript{517}

In the following example, Schurz contrasted the differences between various types of peace.

Mature reflection and a serious consideration of all the aspects of the problem have made me a fast friend of peace—\textit{not} peace at any price, but peace as long as it is compatible with the honor and safety of the Nation.\textsuperscript{518}

\textbf{Repetition.} Schurz used this device quite a bit in this speech and in the following selection he is reinforcing his idea, through the means of repetition, that a government will last longer if it is based upon the free and popular choice of the people.

The great union of Germany has been achieved and it may be confidently predicted that the continuance of the united German Empire will be all the more firmly assured the more popular and free the form of its government. The more arbitrary the supreme power, the more dangerous will anti-nationalism become. The more popular the administration of state affairs the more patriotic will be the people and the more patriotic the people the stronger and safer the Empire. The fact that the German nation now represents a free and proud people united by a feeling of patriotism in which it rejoices, and not merely an alliance of princes, is the surest guarantee of its permanence.\textsuperscript{519}

Schurz repeated various things that every patriotic citizen will do in the following passage.

\begin{quote}
Every patriotic citizen will, therefore, wish most
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{517}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 469-470. \item\textsuperscript{518}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 471. \item\textsuperscript{519}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 469.
\end{footnotes}
speedy and decisive success to the arms of the Republic. He will support every demand of the Government with the most self-sacrificing devotion in order to regain the 'desired peace,' as President McKinley calls it in his last message. He will oppose every attempt to degrade a war which was heralded to all the world as a war for humanity to an ordinary war of conquest, an attempt which, if successful, will dishonor the flag and bring new wars and untold disaster upon the American people.\footnote{Ibid., p. 471.}

Allusion and reference. Other than his major references to the 1848 period, Schurz used this device only once in this speech.

\ldots in order to regain the 'desired peace,' as President McKinley calls it in his last message.\footnote{Ibid.}

Climax. Schurz made only one true climax in this speech and that came at the conclusion of the speech.

Let us hope that the United States may be spared the heavy responsibility which would devolve upon them if this war should kindle a far-reaching conflagration, a danger which is all the more threatening the longer the war lasts. Let us hope that the great American Republic, among whose most loyal citizens we old '48ers count ourselves, may honorably emerge from this crisis with her democratic institutions unimpaired, with her promise honestly fulfilled that her victorious arms shall not serve the lust of conquest, but shall be unselfishly used only in the name of humanity, of civilization and liberty--thus winning anew the confidence and respect of the world.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 471-472.}

Example. Schurz used a number of examples in this speech.

I was born on the left bank of the Rhine, and I distinctly remember how strong French traditions and French sympathies were among the people there in the days of my boyhood. Many of them were not sure that they did not
prefer to be French rather than Prussian. 523

The delegates of the Vienna universities appeared at our Congress clad in the picturesque uniform of the Academic Legion; they were handsome, chivalrous youths and general favorites, owing to their winning, genial manners. 524

I still see before me the scene of our parting. When, with a last hand-clasp, we called out, 'Auf Wiedersehen!' one of them answered with a questioning inflection: 'Auf Wiedersehen? we go to battle from here--look at the lists of the fallen, perhaps you will there find our names!' 525

Figures of speech. Simile. Schurz did not use simile in this speech.

Metaphor. Schurz used no metaphor in this speech.

Personification. Schurz used no personification in this speech.

Alliteration. Schurz made use of alliteration throughout this speech but usually used it with a good deal of discretion.

... played a prominent part... 526

... they brought with them greatly stimulated at the time the political... 527

... war which was... 528

... only in the name of humanity, of civilization and... 529

523 Ibid., p. 467. 524 Ibid., p. 468. 525 Ibid., p. 469.
526 Ibid., p. 468. 527 Ibid., p. 470. 528 Ibid., p. 471.
529 Ibid., p. 472.
Logical proof (logos)—"non-artistic proof."

Evidence. Schurz's use of evidence depended upon the type of speech he was giving and upon the occasion for giving it. In the eight speeches studied in this thesis, Schurz covered the continuum from no direct evidence to a great deal of it. In "The Aims of the Liberal-Republican Movement" and in "The German Mothertongue" he used no concrete evidence and in "Douglas and Popular Sovereignty" and in "Election of Senator Caldwell" he used much evidence. In the other four speeches studied, he used various amounts of evidence.

Authority. The number of authorities used and the extent of their use varied a great deal from speech to speech. In two of his speeches, "The Aims of the Liberal-Republican Movement" and "The German Mothertongue," Schurz made no use of this type of proof.

Sign. Schurz made use of sign very sparingly in all of the speeches studied excepting in "The Aims of the Liberal-Republican Movement" in which he did not use sign at all.

Assumptions. This was an integral element of proof in all of the speeches studied. In "The Aims of the Liberal-
Republican Movement," the only type of "non-artistic proof" that he used was assumption.

"Artistic proof."

**Inductive reasoning—argument from generalization.** Schurz made extensive use of this type of argument in all of the speeches studied excepting in "The German Mothertongue" where he did not use it at all.

**Argument from causation.** Schurz made use of this type of argument in all of the eight speeches and in most of them he used causal relationship both from cause to effect and effect to cause.

**Argument from analogy.** Schurz made limited use of analogies in half of the speeches studied: "True Americanism," "General Amnesty," "Election of Senator Caldwell," and "Douglas and Popular Sovereignty"; in the other four speeches he did not use this type of argument.

**Deductive reasoning—argument by syllogism.** In only two speeches, "Douglas and Popular Sovereignty" and "True Americanism," did Schurz make use of this type of argument and in these two he greatly restricted the use to which it was put. However, the over-all forms of all the speeches studied followed syllogistic patterns.

**Argument by enthymeme.** Schurz made extensive use of
enthymemes in all eight speeches and he used this type of argument with potent force to bring out the concise meanings of his ideas.

**Ethical proof (ethos).**

**Intelligence.** Schurz ably demonstrated his intelligence and his knowledge of the subject in each of the speeches studied.

**Character.** Various features of Schurz's character were brought out in the different speeches. Among the more prominent qualities apparent were humility, honesty, fairness, reliability, integrity, tolerance and unselfishness.

**Good will.** Schurz displayed good will toward his immediate audience in all of the speeches studied and in most of them he also exhibited good will for all of his fellow men.

**Emotional proof (pathos).**

**Anger.** Examples of this emotion were found in all eight speeches and it was directed mostly against those who were selfish and short-sighted.

**Love.** Schurz used love in all of the speeches studied. In "The German Mothertongue," Schurz showed that he had a genuine affection for the German language. In "The '48ers" Schurz's adoration for his compatriots was mainly in evidence. The other six speeches were alive with Schurz's love for his
fellow man and his desire to secure for all of them the liberty and freedom which he had come to know and appreciate in the United States of America.

**Fear.** Schurz used this emotion with considerable force in all eight speeches.

**Confidence.** Schurz was confident that the stands which he took and the causes which he advocated were the most practicable, feasible and beneficial ones which were possible to take and advocate.

**Shame.** This emotion was found in all eight speeches and was mostly directed toward the shamefulness of actions which had been taken or might be taken in the future.

**Pity.** Schurz made use of pity in all of the speeches studied but he pointed it in different directions and contexts from speech to speech.

**Envy.** Schurz used this emotion in all of the speeches excepting in "Douglas and Popular Sovereignty."

**Emulation.** Schurz used this emotion in a favorable light in all of the speeches but "Douglas and Popular Sovereignty" in which he held Douglas up to ridicule.

II. SUMMARY OF ARRANGEMENT

All eight speeches studied followed the three-divisional method of organization (Introduction, Discussion and Conclusion)
in the composition of the speech.

III. SUMMARY OF STYLE

Level. Schurz varied his level of style according to the subject of the speech, the occasion on which it was delivered, and the audience for which it was intended. In "True Americanism," he used the sublime or elevated style; in "The German Mother-tongue" and "The '48ers" he used the low style; and in the other five speeches, his level of style would be rated in the middle classification.

Diction or word choice. No appreciable difference in Schurz's diction was found among the eight speeches studied. In all of them his diction was extraordinary. He always seemed to have used the right word to convey the right meaning. He did not depend on either mono-syllabic or poly-syllabic words primarily but used them with a deft touch to put his meaning across and to give emphasis to what he was saying. His words were mostly concrete and contained much imagery.

Sentence structure. Schurz's over-all sentence structure ranged from the very "Simple" to the "Compound-complex" type. He varied his sentence structure according to the meaning and emphasis he wanted to give an idea.

Rhetorical devices and figurative language.

Analogy. In 50% of the speeches studied, Schurz
used no analogies and only in "True Americanism" did he use this device to any extent.

**Epigram.** No use of epigrammatical statements was found in any of the eight speeches studied.

**Epithet.** Schurz used some epithets in all of the speeches but used them in some of the speeches much more than in others.

**Humor.** If Schurz used humor in any of these speeches, it was not apparent to this reporter.

**Rhetorical question.** Only in one speech, "The '48ers," did Schurz fail to use this device. In "The German Mother-tongue," "The Aims of the Liberal-Republican Movement," and "The Venezuelan Question," Schurz used only one rhetorical question per speech. In the other four speeches, Schurz used a multitude of rhetorical questions; sometimes he used them for emphasis, sometimes for transition, sometimes for a change of pace, et cetera.

**Interrogation.** Schurz did not use this device in "The German Mothertongue" and used it only once in "The '48ers" but used it rather abundantly in the other six speeches studied. Sometimes he used it for vividness, sometimes for emphasis, and sometimes to develop an interest in some ramification of the main question which he wished to develop.
Contrast. Schurz worked this device hard in all of the speeches studied in order to point out difference between the good and the bad, the desirable and the undesirable, the beneficial and the detrimental, the pleasant and the unpleasant, the perfect and the imperfect, et cetera.

Repetition. Schurz used repetition in all eight speeches and he used this device in every conceivable form—words, phrases, sentences, interrogation and answer, ideas, et cetera—in order to give his ideas more punch. In addition to this, he repeated his main ideas in many different forms.

Allusion and reference. Schurz used this device to some extent in all of the speeches except "The Venezuelan Question." The subjects to which he made allusion and reference covered a wide range but one of his favorite sources was the Bible.

Climax. In the "German Mothertongue" and "The '48ers" Schurz used only a final climax but in the other six speeches he used a minor climax for each main idea he was trying to put across in addition to the climax in the peroration.

Example. Schurz used both concrete and hypothetical examples and some were found in every speech. His examples helped to add liveliness to his style.

Figures of speech. Simile. Schurz used this device
rather sparingly in most of the speeches and did not use it at all in "The '48ers."

**Metaphor.** Schurz's use of this device was nil in all eight speeches.

**Personification.** Schurz's use of personification was negligible in the speeches studied.

**Alliteration.** Schurz used alliteration in many different instances in his speeches but never used it to excess in any given instance and kept it quite well concealed within the context of the speech.

**IV. GENERAL SUMMARY**

Schurz's eight speeches which were taken from the 1859-1898 period were built, from the rhetorical viewpoint, upon a basis of Invention, Arrangement, and Style. He strongly emphasized "assumptions," "generalizations," and "enthymemes" as modes of proof in the area of *logos*. In the field of *ethos*, his intelligence, character, and good will were quite prominently apparent. In the region of *pathos*, Schurz covered the whole continuum but the emotion of "love" was probably the one which was most eminently displayed.

His arrangement emulated the three-divisional method of organization (Introduction, Discussion and Conclusion) in the composition of the speech.
Schurz varied his style level with the speech. He diversified his diction and sentence structure a great deal within each speech which added greatly to his vividness and emphasis. He used a lot of rhetorical devices and figurative language.

Schurz seemed to have employed overwhelmingly those types of rhetorical proofs and devices which were the more ardently recommended by the rhetoricians who were used as authorities in this study.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

This study was concerned with only a minor portion of a much larger field of possible study. Only eight speeches were dealt with by this writer while Schurz delivered dozens of them during his lifetime. No attempt was made to delve into the attributes of Schurz's delivery. Such a study may prove to be a very worthwhile study in itself as American history testifies to the effectiveness of Schurz's oratorical prowess. An attempt was made in this study to make a survey of the highlights of Schurz's public speaking career in the United States including both those speeches delivered in German and those in English. It may be highly desirable, in possible future studies, to examine specific phases of Schurz's speech-
making such as the period he spent in the Senate or the period prior to the Civil War. Still another possibility would be to study the speeches according to the language in which they were delivered. In the over-all analysis, it was readily apparent that much work and study remains to be done, not only on Schurz's public addresses but on himself as a personality in order to determine adequately how firmly Schurz deserves a place among the prominent public speakers in American history.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


180
APPENDIX

TRUE AMERICANISM

MR. PRESIDENT AND GENTLEMEN:—A few days ago I stood on the cupola of your statehouse, and overlooked for the first time this venerable city and the country surrounding it. Then the streets, and hills, and waters around me began to teem with the life of historical recollections, recollections dear to all mankind, and a feeling of pride arose in my heart, and I said to myself, I, too, am an American citizen. There was Bunker Hill; there Charlestown, Lexington, and Dorchester Heights not far off; there the harbor into which the British tea was sunk; there the place where the old liberty-tree stood; there John Hancock's house; there Benjamin Franklin's birthplace;—and now I stand in this grand old hall, which so often resounded with the noblest appeals that ever thrilled American hearts, and where I am almost afraid to hear the echo of my own feeble voice;—oh, sir, no man that loves liberty, wherever he may have first seen the light of day, can fail on this sacred spot to pay his tribute to Americanism. And here, with all these glorious memories crowding upon my heart, I will offer mine. I, born in a foreign land, pay my tribute to Americanism? Yes, for to me the word Americanism, true Americanism, comprehends the noblest ideas which ever swelled a human heart with noble pride.

It is one of the earliest recollections of my boyhood, that one summer night our whole village was stirred up by an uncommon occurrence. I say our village, for I was born not far from that beautiful spot where the Rhine rolls his green waters out of the wonderful gate of the Seven Mountains, and then meanders with majestic tranquility through one of the most glorious valleys of the world. That night our neighbors were pressing around a few wagons covered with linen sheets and loaded with household utensils and boxes and trunks to their utmost capacity. One of our neighboring families was moving far away across a great water, and it was said that they would never again return. And I saw silent tears trickling down weather-beaten cheeks, and the hands of rough peasants firmly pressing each other, and some of the men and women hardly able to speak when they nodded to one another a last farewell. At last the train started into motion, they gave three cheers for America, and then in the first gray dawn of the morning I saw them wending their way over the hill until they disappeared in the shadow of the forest. And I heard many a man say, how happy he would be if he could go with them to that great and free country, where a man could be himself.
That was the first time that I heard of America, and my childish imagination took possession of a land covered partly with majestic trees, partly with flowery prairies, immeasurable to the eye, and intersected with large rivers and broad lakes—a land where everybody could do what he thought best, and where nobody need be poor, because everybody was free.

And later, when I was old enough to read, and descriptions of this country and books on American history fell into my hands, the offspring of my imagination acquired the colors of reality, and I began to exercise my brain with the thought of what a man might be and become when left perfectly free to himself. And still later, when ripening into manhood, I looked up from my school-books into the stir and bustle of the world, and the trumpet-tones of struggling humanity struck my ear and thrilled my heart, and I saw my nation shake her chains in order to burst them, and I heard a gigantic, universal shout for Liberty rising up to the skies; and at last, after having struggled manfully and drenched the earth of Fatherland with the blood of thousands of noble beings, I saw that nation crushed down again, not only by overwhelming armies, but by the dead weight of customs and institutions and notions and prejudices which past centuries had heaped upon them, and which a moment of enthusiasm, however sublime, could not destroy; then I consoled an almost despondent heart with the idea of a youthful people and of original institutions clearing the way for an untrammeled development of the ideal nature of man. Then I turned my eyes instinctively across the Atlantic Ocean, and America and Americanism, as I fancied them, appeared to me as the last depositories of the hopes of all true friends of humanity.

I say all this, not as though I indulged in the presumptuous delusion that my personal feelings and experience would be of any interest to you, but in order to show you what America is to the thousands of thinking men in the old world, who, disappointed in their fondest hopes and depressed by the saddest experience, cling with their last remnant of confidence in human nature, to the last spot on earth where man is free to follow the road to attainable perfection, and where, unbiased by the disastrous influence of traditional notions, customs and institutions, he acts on his own responsibility. They ask themselves: Was it but a wild delusion when we thought that man has the faculty to be free and to govern himself? Have we been fighting, were we ready to die, for a mere phantom, for a mere product of a morbid imagination? This question downtrodden humanity cries out into the world, and from this country it expects an answer.
As its advocate I speak to you. I will speak of Americanism as the great representative of the reformatory age, as the great champion of the dignity of human nature, as the great repository of the last hopes of suffering mankind. I will speak of the ideal mission of this country and of this people.

You may tell me that these views are visionary, that the destiny of this country is less exalted, that the American people are less great than I think they are or ought to be. I answer, ideals are like stars; you will not succeed in touching them with your hands. But like the seafaring man on the desert of waters, you choose them as your guides, and following them you will reach your destiny. I invite you to ascend with me the watchtower of history, overlooking the grand panorama of the development of human affairs, in which the American Republic stands in so bold and prominent relief.

He who reviews the past of this country in connection with the history of the world besides, cannot fail to discover a wonderful coincidence of great events and fortunate circumstances, which were destined to produce everlasting results, unless recklessly thrown away by imbecile generations.

Look back with me four or five centuries. The dark period of the middle ages is drawing near its close. The accidental explosion of that mysterious black powder, discovered by an obscure German monk, is the first flash of lightning preluding that gigantic thunderstorm which is to shatter the edifice of feudal society to pieces. The invention of gunpowder strips the feudal lord of his prestige as a warrior; another discovery is to strip him of his prestige as a man! Gutenberg, another obscure German, invents the printing press, and as gunpowder blows the castles of the small feudal tyrants into the air, so the formidable artillery of printed letters batters down the citadels of ignorance and superstition. Soul and body take up arms and prepare themselves for the great battle of the Reformation. Now the mighty volcano of the German mind bursts the crust of indolence which has covered it. Luther's triumphant thunder rattles against the holy see of Rome. The world is ablaze, all the elements of society are rising up in boiling commotion—two ages are battling against each other.

This is the time when the regeneration of the old world is to take place. But the old order of things, fortified in customs and prejudices and deeply-rooted institutions, does not surrender at the first blast of trumpets. The grand but fearful struggle of the reformatory movement plunges all Europe into endless confusion. The very wheel of progress seems to grind and
crush one generation after another. The ideas which concerned
the highest and most sacred relations of humanity seem at the
same time to call into their service the basest and most vio­
lent passions of the human heart, and in all Europe the wars of
great principles degenerate into wars of general devastation.

But, meanwhile, a new country has opened its boundless
fields to those great ideas, for the realization of which the
old world seems no longer to be wide enough. It is as though
the earth herself had taken part in the general revolution, and
had thrown up from her sea-covered womb a new battle-ground for
the spirit of the new era. That is America. Not only the in­
vvention of gunpowder and of the printing press, but also the
discovery of America, inaugurates the modern age.

There is the new and immense continent. The most rest­
less and enterprising elements of European society direct their
looks towards it. First, the greediness of the gold-hunting ad­
vventurer pounces upon the new conquest; but, his inordinate appe­
tites being disappointed, he gradually abandons the field to men
in whose hearts the future of the new world is sleeping, unborn.

While the coast of Virginia is settled by a motley im­
migration, led and ruled by men of ideas and enterprise, the
sturdiest champions of principle descend upon the stony shores
of New England. While the Southern colonies are settled under
the auspices of lordly merchants and proprietaries, original
democracy plants its stern banner upon Plymouth Rock. Mercantile
speculation, aristocratic ambition and stern virtue that seeks
freedom and nothing but freedom, lead the most different classes
of people, different in origin, habits and persuasion, upon the
virgin soil; and entrust to them the task of realizing the great
principles of the age. Nor is this privilege confined to one
nationality alone. While the Anglo-Saxon takes possession of
New England, Virginia and Pennsylvania, the Frenchman plants his
colonies on the soil of French Florida and the interior of the
continent; the Hollander locates New Netherlands on the banks
of the Hudson; the Swede, led there by the great mind of Oxen­
stiern, occupies the banks of the Delaware; the Spaniard main­
tains himself in peninsular Florida, and a numerous immigration of
Germans, who follow the call of religious freedom, and of Irishmen,
gradually flowing in, scatters itself all over this vast extent
of country. Soon the social and national elements of the civilized
world are represented in the new land. Every people, every
creed, every class of society has contributed its share to that
wonderful mixture out of which is to grow the great nation of
the new world. It is true, the Anglo-Saxon establishes and main­
tains his ascendancy, but without absolutely absorbing the other
national elements. They modify each other, and their peculiar
characteristics are to be blended together by the all-assimilating power of freedom. This is the origin of the American nationality, which did not spring from one family, one tribe, one country, but incorporates the vigorous elements of all civilized nations on earth.

This fact is not without great importance. It is an essential link in the chain of historical development. The student of history cannot fail to notice that when new periods of civilization break upon humanity, the people of the earth cannot maintain their national relations. New ideas are to be carried out by young nations. From time to time, violent, irresistible hurricanes sweep over the world, blowing the most different elements of the human family together, which by mingling reinvigorate each other, and the general confusion then becomes the starting-point of a new period of progress. Nations which have long subsisted exclusively on their own resources will gradually lose their original vigor and die the death of decrepitude. But mankind becomes young again by its different elements being shaken together, by race crossing race and mind penetrating mind.

The oldest traditions of history speak of such great revulsions and general migrations, and if we could but lift the veil, which covers the remotest history of Asiatic tribes, we should discover the first scenes and acts of the drama of which the downfall of the Roman Empire is a portion. When that empire had exhausted its natural vitality, the dark forests of the North poured forth a barbarous but vigorous multitude, who trampled into ruins the decrepit civilization of the Roman world, but infused new blood into the veins of old Europe, grasping the great ideas of Christianity with a bloody but firm hand—and a new period of original progress sprang out of the seeming devastation. The German element took the helm of history, but, in the course of time, the development of things arrived at a new turning point. The spirit of individualism took possession of the heart of civilized humanity, and the reformatory movement of the sixteenth century was its expression. But continental Europe appeared unable to incorporate the new and progressive ideas growing out of that spirit, in organic political institutions. While the heart of Europe was ravaged by a series of religious wars, the Anglo-Saxons of England attempted what other nations seemed unable to accomplish. But they also clung too fast to the traditions of past centuries; they failed in separating the Church from the State, and did not realize the cosmopolitan tendency of the new principle. Then the time of a new migration was at hand, and that migration rolled its waves toward America. The old process repeated itself under new forms, milder and more con-
genial to the humane ideas it represented. It is now not a barbarous multitude pounding upon old and decrepit empires; not a violent concussion of tribes accompanied by all the horrors of general destruction; but we see the vigorous elements of all nations, we see the Anglo-Saxon, the leader in the practical movement, with his spirit of independence, of daring enterprise and of indomitable perseverance; the German, the original leader in the movement of his ideas, with his spirit of inquiry and his quiet and thoughtful application; the Celt, with the impulsive vivacity of his race; the Frenchman, the Scandinavian, the Scot, the Hollander, the Spaniard, and the Italian—all these peaceably congregating and mingling together on virgin soil, where the backwoodsman's hatchet is the only battle-axe of civilization; led together by the irresistible attraction of free and broad principles; undertaking to commence a new era in the history of the world, without first destroying the results of the progress of past periods, undertaking to found a new cosmopolitan nation without marching over the dead bodies of slain millions. Thus was founded the great colony of free humanity, which has not old England alone, but the world, for its mother-country.

This idea is, perhaps, not palatable to those who pride themselves on their unadulterated Anglo-Saxondom. To them I have to say that the destinies of men are often greater than men themselves, and that a good many are swerving from the path of glory by not obeying the true instincts of their nature, and by sacrificing their mission to one-sided pride.

The Anglo-Saxon may be justly proud of the growth and development of this country, and if he ascribes most of it to the undaunted spirit of his race, we may not accuse him of overweening self-glorification. He possesses, in an eminent degree, the enviable talent of acting when others only think; of promptly executing his own ideas, and of appropriating the ideas of other people to his own use. There is, perhaps, no other race that, at so early a day, would have founded the stern democracy of the Plymouth settlement; no other race that would have defied the trials and hardships of the original settler's life so victoriously. No other race, perhaps, possesses in so high a degree not only the daring spirit of independent enterprise, but at the same time the stubborn steadfastness necessary to the final execution of great designs. The Anglo-Saxon spirit has been the locomotive of progress; but do not forget, that this locomotive would be of little use to the world if it refused to draw its train over the iron highway and carry its valuable freight towards its destination; that train consists of the vigorous elements of all nations; that freight is the vital ideas of our age; that destination is universal freedom and the ideal development of
man. That is the true greatness of the Anglo-Saxon race; that ought to be the source of Anglo-Saxon pride. I esteem the son who is proud of his father, if, at the same time, he is worthy of him.

Thus, I say, was founded the colony of free humanity on virgin soil. The youthful elements which constitute people of the new world cannot submit to rules which are not of their own making; they must throw off the fetters which bind them to an old decrepit order of things. They resolve to enter the great family of nations as an independent member. And in the colony of free humanity, whose mother-country is the world, they establish the Republic of equal rights, where the title of manhood is the title to citizenship. My friends, if I had a thousand tongues, and a voice strong as the thunder of heaven, they would not be sufficient to impress upon your minds forcibly enough the greatness of this idea, the overshadowing glory of this result. This was the dream of the truest friends of man from the beginning; for this has mankind waded through seas of blood and tears. There it is now; there it stands, the noble fabric in all the splendor of reality.

They speak of the greatness of the Roman Republic! Oh, sir, if I could call the proudest of Romans from his grave, I would take him by the hand and say to him, Look at this picture, and at this! The greatness of thy Roman Republic consisted in its despotic rule over the world; the greatness of the American Republic consists in the secured right of man to govern himself. The dignity of the Roman citizen consisted in his exclusive privileges; the dignity of the American citizen consists in his holding the natural rights of his neighbor just as sacred as his own. The Roman Republic recognized and protected the rights of the citizen, at the same time disregarding and leaving unprotected the rights of man; Roman citizenship was founded upon monopoly, not upon the claims of human nature. What the citizen of Rome claimed for himself, he did not respect in others; his own greatness was his only object; his own liberty, as he regarded it, gave him the privilege to oppress his fellow-beings. His democracy, instead of elevating mankind to his own level, trampled the rights of man into the dust. The security of the Roman Republic, therefore, consisted in the power of the sword; the security of the American Republic rests in the equality of human rights! The Roman Republic perished by the sword; the American Republic will stand as long as the equality of human rights remains inviolate. Which of the two Republics is the greater—the Republic of the Roman, or the Republic of man?

Sir, I wish the words of the Declaration of Independence
"that all men are created free and equal, and are endowed with
certain inalienable rights," were inscribed upon every gate-post
within the limits of this Republic. From this principle the Re-
volutionary Fathers derived their claim to independence; upon
this they founded the institutions of this country; and the
whole structure was to be the living incarnation of this idea.
This principle contains the programme of our political existence.
It is the most progressive, and at the same time the most con-
servative one; the most progressive, for it takes even the low-
liest members of the human family out of their degradation, and
inspires them with the elevating consciousness of equal human
dignity; the most conservative, for it makes a common cause of
individual rights. From the equality of rights springs identity
of our highest interests; you cannot subvert your neighbor's
rights without striking a dangerous blow at your own. And when
the rights of one cannot be infringed without finding a ready
defense in all others who defend their own rights in defending
his, then, and only then, are the rights of all safe against the
usurpations of governmental authority.

This general identity of interests is the only thing that
can guarantee the stability of democratic institutions. Equality
of rights, embodied in general self-government, is the great
moral element of true democracy; it is the only reliable safety-
valve in the machinery of modern society. There is the solid
foundation of our system of government; there is our mission;
there is our greatness; there is our safety; there, and nowhere
else! This is true Americanism, and to this I pay the tribute
of my devotion.

Shall I point out to you the consequences of a deviation
from this principle? Look at the slave States. There is a class
of men who are deprived of their natural rights. But this is
not the only deplorable feature of that peculiar organization
of society. Equally deplorable is it, that there is another
class of men who keep the former in subjection. That there are
slaves is bad; but almost worse is it that there are masters.
Are not the masters freemen? No, sir! Where is their liberty
of the press? Where is their liberty of speech? Where is the
man among them who dares to advocate openly principles not in
strict accordance with the ruling system? They speak of a repub-
lican form of government—they speak of democracy, but the des-
potic spirit of slavery and mastership combined pervades their
whole political life like a liquid poison. They do not dare to
be free, lest the spirit of liberty become contagious. The sys-
tem of slavery has enslaved them all, master as well as slave.
What is the cause of all this? It is that you cannot deny one
class of society the full measure of their natural rights without
imposing restraints upon your own liberty. If you want to be free, there is but one way: it is to guarantee an equally full measure of liberty to all your neighbors. There is no other.

True, there are difficulties connected with an organization of society founded upon the basis of equal rights. Nobody denies it. A large number of those who come to you from foreign lands are not as capable of taking part in the administration of government as the man who was fortunate enough to drink the milk of liberty from his cradle. And certain religious denominations do, perhaps, nourish principles which are hardly in accordance with the doctrines of true democracy. There is a conglomeratation on this continent of heterogeneous elements; there is a warfare of clashing interest and unruly aspirations; and with all this, our democratic system gives rights to the ignorant and power to the inexperienced. And the billows of passion will lash the sides of the ship, and the storm of party warfare will bend its masts, and the pusillanimous will cry out—"Master, master, we perish!" But the genius of true democracy will arise from his slumber, and rebuke the winds and the raging of the water, and say unto them—"Where is your faith?" Aye, where is the faith that led the Fathers of this Republic to invite the weary and burdened of all nations to the enjoyment of equal rights? Where is that broad and generous confidence in the efficiency of true democratic institutions? Has the present generation forgotten that true democracy bears in itself the remedy for all the difficulties that may grow out of it?

It is an old dodge of the advocates of despotism throughout the world, that the people who are not experienced in self-government are not fit for the exercise of self-government, and must first be educated under the rule of a superior authority. But at the same time the advocates of despotism will never offer them an opportunity to acquire experience in self-government, lest they suddenly become fit for its independent exercise. To this treacherous sophistry the fathers of this republic opposed the noble doctrine, that liberty is the best school for liberty, and that self-government cannot be learned but by practicing it. This, sir, is a truly American idea; this is true Americanism, and to this I pay the tribute of my devotion.

You object that some people do not understand their own interests? There is nothing that, in the course of time, will make a man better understand his interests than the independent management of his own affairs on his own responsibility. You object that people are ignorant? There is no better schoolmaster in the world than self-government, independently exercised. You object that people have no just idea of their duties as citizens?
There is no other source from which they can derive a just notion of their duties than
the enjoyment of the rights from which they arise. You object that people are mis-
led by their religious prejudices, and by the intrigues of the
Roman hierarchy? Since when have the enlightened citizens of
this Republic lost their faith in the final invincibility of
truth? Since when have they forgotten that if the Roman or
any other church plants the seed of superstition, liberty sows
broadcast the seed of enlightenment? Do they no longer believe
in the invincible spirit of inquiry which characterizes the
reformatory age? If the struggle be fair, can the victory be
doubtful? As to religious fanaticism, it will prosper under
oppression; it will feed on persecution; it will grow strong by
proscription; but it is powerless against genuine democracy. It
may indulge in short-lived freaks of passion, or in wily in-
trigues, but it will die of itself, for its lungs are not adapted
to breathe the atmosphere of liberty. It is like the shark of
the sea: drag him into the air, and the monster will perhaps
struggle fearfully and frighten timid people with the powerful
blows of his tail, and the terrible array of his teeth, but leave
him quietly to die and he will die. But engage with him in a
hand-to-hand struggle even then, and the last of his convulsions
may fatally punish your rash attempt. Against fanaticism gen-
uine democracy wields an irresistible weapon—it is Toleration.
Toleration will not strike down the fanatic, but it will quietly
and gently disarm him. But fight fanaticism with fanaticism,
and you will restore it to its own congenial element. It is
like Antaeus, who gained strength when touching his native earth.

Whoever reads the history of this country calmly and
thoroughly, cannot but discover that religious liberty is slowly
but steadily rooting out the elements of superstition, and even
of prejudice. It has dissolved the war of sects, of which per-
secution was characteristic, into a contest of abstract opinions,
which creates convictions without oppressing men. By recognizing
perfect freedom of inquiry, it will engender among men of dif-
ferent belief that mutual respect of true convictions which
makes inquiry earnest and discussion fair. It will recognize
as supremely inviolable, what Roger Williams, one of the most lumin-
ous stars of the American sky, called the sanctity of conscience.
Read your history, and add the thousands and thousands of Romanists
and their offspring together, who, from the first establishment
of the colonies, gradually came to this country, and the sum
will amount to many millions; compare that number with the num-
ber of Romanists who are now here, and you will find that millions
are missing. Where are they? You did not kill them; you did not
drive them away; they did not perish as the victims of persecution.
But where are they? The peaceable working of the great prin-
ciples which called this Republic into existence, has gradually
and silently absorbed them. True Americanism, toleration, the equality of rights, has absorbed their prejudices, and will peaceably absorb everything that is not consistent with the victorious spirit of our institutions.

Oh, sir, there is a wonderful vitality in true democracy founded upon the equality of rights. There is an inexhaustible power of resistance in that system of government, which makes the protection of individual rights a matter of common interest. If preserved in its purity, there is no warfare of opinions which can endanger it—there is no conspiracy of despotic aspirations that can destroy it. But if not preserved in its purity! There are dangers which only blindness cannot see, and which only stubborn party prejudice will not see.

I have already called your attention to the despotic tendency of the slaveholding system. I need not enlarge upon it; I need not describe how the existence of slavery in the South affected and demoralized even the political life of the free States; how they attempted to press us, you and me, into the posse of the slave-catcher by that abominable act which, worse than the "alien and sedition laws," still disgraces our statute-book; how the ruling party, which has devoted itself to the service of that despotic interest, shrinks from no violation of good faith, from no adulteration of the constitutional compact, from no encroachment upon natural right, from no treacherous abandonment of fundamental principles. And I do not hesitate to prophesy that, if the theories engendered by the institution of slavery be suffered to outgrow the equalizing tendency of true democracy, the American Republic will, at no distant day, crumble down under the burden of the laws and measures which the ruling interest will demand for its protection, and its name will be added to the sad catalogue of the broken hopes of humanity.

But the mischief does not come from that side alone; it is in things of small beginnings, but fearful in their growth. One of these is the propensity of men to lose sight of fundamental principles, when passing abuses are to be corrected.

Is it not wonderful how nations who have won their liberty by the severest struggles become so easily impatient of the small inconveniences and passing difficulties which are almost inseparably connected with the practical working of self-government? How they so easily forget that rights may be abused, and yet remain inalienable rights? Europe has witnessed many an attempt for the establishment of democratic institutions; some of them were at first successful, and the people were free, but the abuses and inconveniences connected with liberty became at once
apparent. Then the ruling classes of society, in order to get rid of the abuses, restricted liberty; they did, indeed, get rid of the abuses, but they got rid of liberty at the same time. You heard liberal governments there speak of protecting and regulating the liberty of the press; and, in order to prevent that liberty from being abused, they adopted measures, apparently harmless at first, which ultimately resulted in an absolute censorship. Would it be much better if we, recognizing the right of man to the exercise of self-government, should, in order to protect the purity of the ballot-box, restrict the right of suffrage?

Liberty, sir, is like a spirited house; she will have her whims, she will be somewhat unruly sometimes, and, like so many husbands, you cannot always have it all your own way. She may spoil your favorite dish sometimes; but will you, therefore, at once smash her china, break her kettles, and shut her out from the kitchen? Let her practise, let her try again and again, and even when she makes a mistake, encourage her with a benignant smile, and your broth will be right after a while. But meddle with her concerns, tease her, bore her, and your little squabbles, spirited as she is, will ultimately result in a divorce. What then? It is one of Jefferson's wisest words, that "he would rather be exposed to the inconveniences arising from too much liberty, than to those arising from too small a degree of it." It is a matter of historical experience, that nothing that is wrong in principle can be right in practice. People are apt to delude themselves on that point; but the ultimate result will always prove the truth of the maxim. A violation of equal rights can never serve to maintain institutions which are founded upon equal rights. A contrary policy is not only pusillanimous and small, but it is senseless. It reminds me of the soldier, who, for fear of being shot in battle, committed suicide on the march; or of the man who would cut off his foot, because he had a corn on his toe. It is that ridiculous policy of premature despair, which commences to throw the freight overboard when there is a suspicious cloud in the sky.

Another danger for the safety of our institutions, and perhaps the most formidable one, arises from the general propensity of political parties and public men to act on a policy of mere expediency, and to sacrifice principle to local and temporary success. And here, sir, let me address a solemn appeal to the consciences of those with whom I am proud to struggle side by side against human thraldom.

You hate kingcraft, and you would sacrifice your fortunes and your lives in order to prevent its establishment on the soil of this Republic. But let me tell you that the rule of political parties
which sacrifice principle to expediency, is no less dangerous, no less disastrous, no less aggressive, of no less a despotic nature, than the rule of monarchs. Do not indulge in the delusion, that in order to make a government fair and liberal, the only thing necessary is to make it elective. When a political party in power, however liberal their principles may be, have once adopted the policy of knocking down their opponents instead of voting them down, there is an end of justice and equal rights. The history of the world shows no example of a more arbitrary despotism, than that exercised by the party which ruled the National Assembly of France in the bloodiest days of the great French Revolution. I will not discuss here what might have been done, and what not, in those times of a fearful crisis; but I will say that they tried to establish liberty by means of despotism, and that in her gigantic struggle against the united monarchs of Europe, revolutionary France won the victory, but lost her liberty.

Remember the shout of indignation that went all over the Northern States when we heard that the border ruffians of Kansas had crowded the free-State men away from the polls and had not allowed them to vote. That indignation was just, not only because the men thus terrorized were free-State men and friends of liberty, but because the government of that territory was placed on the basis of force, instead of equal rights. Sir, if ever the party of liberty should use their local predominance for the purpose of disarming their opponents instead of convincing them, they will but follow the example set by the ruffians of Kansas, although legislative enactments may be a genteeler weapon than the revolver and bowie knife. They may perhaps achieve some petty local success, they may gain some small temporary advantage, but they will help to introduce a system of action into our politics which will gradually undermine the very foundations upon which our republican edifice rests. Of all the dangers and difficulties that beset us, there is none more horrible than the hideous monster, whose name is "Proscription for opinion's sake." I am an anti-slavery man, and I have a right to my opinion in South Carolina just as well as in Massachusetts. My neighbor is a pro-slavery man; I may be sorry for it, but I solemnly acknowledge his right to his opinion in Massachusetts as well as in South Carolina. You tell me, that for my opinion they would mob me in South Carolina? Sir, there is the difference between South Carolina and Massachusetts. There is the difference between an anti-slavery man, who is a freeman, and a slaveholder, who is himself a slave.

Our present issues will pass away. The slavery question will be settled, liberty will be triumphant and other mat-
sters of difference will divide the political parties of this country. What if we, in our struggle against slavery, had removed the solid basis of equal rights, on which such new matters of difference may be peaceably settled? What if we had based the institutions of this country upon a difference of rights between different classes of people? What if, in destroying the generality of natural rights, we had resolved them into privileges? There is a thing which stands above the command of the most ingenious of politicians: it is the logic of things and events. It cannot be turned and twisted by artificial arrangements and delusive settlements; it will go its own way with the steady step of fate. It will force you, with uncompromising severity, to choose between two social organizations, one of which is founded upon privilege, and the other upon the doctrine of equal rights.

Force instead of right, privilege instead of equality, expediency instead of principle, being once the leading motives of your policy, you will have no power to stem the current. There will be new abuses to be corrected, new inconveniences to be remedied, new supposed dangers to be obviated, new equally exacting ends to be subserved, and your encroachments upon the natural rights of your opponents now, will be used as welcome precedents for the mutual oppression of parties then. Having once knowingly disregarded the doctrine of equal rights, the ruling parties will soon accustom themselves to consult only their interests where fundamental principles are at stake. Those who lead us into this channel will be like the sorcerer who knew the art of making a giant snake. And when he had made it, he forgot the charmword that would destroy it again. And the giant snake threw its horrid coils around him, and the unfortunate man was choked by the monster of his horrid creation.

On the evening of the 2nd day of November, 1855, there stood on this very platform a man, known and loved by every true son of Massachusetts, who, unmoved by the whirlwind of prescriptive movement howling around him, spoke the following words:

It is proposed to attaint men for their religion, and also for their birth. If this object can prevail, vain are the triumphs of civil freedom in its many hard-fought fields; vain is that religious toleration which we all profess. The first of Smithfield, the tortures of the inquisition, the proscription of the Non-conformists, may all be revived. Slowly among the struggling sects was evolved the great idea of the equality of all men before the law, without regard to religious belief; nor can any party now organize a proscription merely for religious (and I may add political) belief, without calling in question this unquestionable principle.
The man who said so was Charles Sumner. Then the day was not far off when suddenly the whole country was startled by the incredible news, that his noble head had drooped under the murderous blows of a Southern fanatic, and that his warm blood had covered the floor of the Senate Chamber, the noblest sprinkling that ever fertilized a barren soil. And now I tell you, when he lay on the lounge of the ante-chamber, his anxious friends busy around him, and his cowardly murderers slinking away like Cain—if at that solemn moment the first question addressed to his slowly returning senses had been: Shall those who support your dastardly assailants with their votes be deprived of their suffrage? he would have raised his bleeding head, and with the fire of indignation kindling in his dim eye, he would have answered: "No! In the name of my country, no! For the honor of Massachusetts, no! For the sake of the principles for which my blood is flowing, no! Let them kill me, but let the rights of man be safe!"

Sir, if you want to bestow a high praise upon a man, you are apt to say he is an old Roman. But I know a higher epithet of praise; it is—He is a true American! Aye, Charles Sumner is a true American; he is a representative of the truest Americanism, and to him I pay the tribute of my enthusiastic admiration.

Sir, I am coming to the close of my remarks. But I cannot refrain from alluding to a circumstance which concerns myself. I understand it has been said, that in speaking a few words on the principles of Jeffersonian democracy a few evenings since, I had attempted to interfere with the home affairs of this State, and to dictate to the Republicans their policy. Ah, sir, is there a man in Massachusetts, except he be a servant of the slave-power, who cannot hear me advocate the equal rights of man, without feeling serious pangs of conscience? Is there a son of this glorious old Commonwealth who cannot hear me draw logical conclusions from the Declaration of Independence—who cannot hear me speak of the natural right of man to the exercise of self-government, without feeling a blush fluttering upon his cheeks? If so, sir, I am sorry for him; it is his fault, not mine.

Interfere with your local matters! How could I? What influence could I, an humble stranger among you, exercise on the action of Massachusetts? But one thing I must tell you. It ought never to be forgotten that this old Commonwealth occupies a representative position. Her history is familiar to the nation; even South Carolina knows it. The nation is so accustomed to admire her glorious deeds for freedom, that with this expectation their eyes are turned upon her. Massachusetts can do noth-
ing in secret; Massachusetts can do nothing for herself alone; every one of her acts involves a hundred-fold responsibility. What Massachusetts does is felt from the Atlantic to the Pacific. But Massachusetts need only be herself, in order to be great. This is her position among the free States, recognized by all. Can there be a more honorable one? Sons of Massachusetts, you may be proud of it. Do not forget that from her greatness you cannot separate your responsibility.

No, I will not meddle with your home concerns. I will however, say a word for the West. Strenuous advocate of individual rights and of local self-government as I am, if you ever hear of any movement in the West against the integrity of the fundamental principles underlying our system of government, I invite you, I entreat you, I conjure you, come one and all, and make our prairies resound and our forests shake, and our ears ring and tingle, with your appeals for the equal rights of man.

Sir, I was to speak on Republicanism at the West, and so I did. This is Western Republicanism. These are its principles, and I am proud to say its principles are its policy. These are the ideas which have rallied around the banner of liberty not only the natives of the soil, but an innumerable host of Germans, Scandinavians, Scotchmen, Frenchmen and a goodly number of Irishmen, also. And here I tell you, those are mistaken who believe that the Irish heart is devoid of those noble impulses which will lead him to the side of justice, where he sees his own rights respected and unendangered. Under this banner, all the languages of civilized mankind are spoken, every creed is protected, every right is sacred. There stands every element of Western society, with enthusiasm for a great cause, with confidence in each other, with honor to themselves. This is the banner floating over the glorious valley which stretches from the western slope of the Alleghanies to the Rocky Mountains—that Valley of Jehoshephat where the nations of the world assemble to celebrate the ressurection of human freedom. The inscription on that banner is not "Opposition to the Democratic party for the sake of placing a new set of men into office"; for this battle-cry of speculators our hearts have no response. Nor is it "Restriction of slavery and restriction of the right of suffrage," for this—believe my words, I entreat you—this would be the signal of deserved, inevitable and disgraceful defeat. But the inscription is, "Liberty and equal rights, common to all as the air of Heaven—Liberty and equal rights, one and inseparable!"

With this banner we stand before the world. In this
sign—in this sign alone, and no other—there is victory. And thus, sir, we mean to realize the great cosmopolitan idea, upon which the existence of the American nation rests. Thus we mean to fulfill the great mission of true Americanism—thus we mean to answer the anxious question of down-trodden humanity—"Has man the faculty to be free and to govern himself?" The answer is a triumphant "Aye," thundering into the ears of the despots of the old world that "a man is a man for all that"; proclaiming to the oppressed that they are held in subjection on false pretences; cheering the hearts of the despondent friends of man with consolation and renewed confidence.

This is true Americanism, clasping mankind to its great heart. Under its banner we march; let the world follow.
Gentlemen:—When great political or social problems, difficult to solve and impossible to put aside, are pressing upon the popular mind, it is a common thing to see a variety of theories springing up which purport to be unfailing remedies and to effect a speedy cure. Men who look only at the surface of things will, like bad physicians, pretend to remove the disease itself by palliating its most violent symptoms, and will astonish the world by their inventive ingenuity, no less than by their amusing assurance. But a close scrutiny will, in most cases, show that the remedies offered are but new forms of old mistakes.

Of all the expedients which have been invented for the settlement of the slavery question, Mr. Douglas's doctrine of popular sovereignty is certainly the most remarkable, not only by the apparent novelty of the thing, but by the pompous assurance with which it was offered to the nation as a perfect and radical cure. Formerly compromises were made between the two conflicting systems of labor by separating them by geographical lines. These compromises did indeed produce intervals of comparative repose, but the war commenced again with renewed acrimony, as soon as a new bone of contention presented itself. The system of compromises as a whole proved a failure. Mr. Douglas's doctrine of popular sovereignty proposed to bring the two antagonistic elements into immediate contact and to let them struggle hand to hand for the supremacy on the same ground. In this manner, he predicted, the slavery question would settle itself in the smooth way of ordinary business. He seemed to be confident of success; but hardly is his doctrine, in the shape of a law for the organization of territories, put upon the statute-book, when the struggle grows fiercer than ever, and the difficulties ripen into a crisis. This does not disturb him. He sends forth manifesto upon manifesto, and even during the State campaign of last fall, he mounts the rostrum in Ohio in order to show what he can do, and like a second Constantine he points his finger at the great principle of popular sovereignty, and says to his followers: In this sign you will conquer. But the tendency of events appeared unwilling to yield to his prophecy. There seemed to be no charm in his command; there was certainly no victory in his sign. He had hardly defined his doctrine more elaborately than ever before, when his friends were routed everywhere, and even his great party is on the point of falling to pieces. The failure is magnificently complete.
There certainly was something in his theories that captivated the masses. I do not speak of those who joined their political fortunes to his, because they saw in him a man who some day might be able to scatter favors and plunder around him. But there were a great many who, seduced by the plausible sound of the words "popular sovereignty," meant to have found there some middle ground, on which the rights of free labor might be protected and secured without exasperating those interested in slave labor. They really did think that two conflicting organizations of society, which are incompatible by the nature of things, might be made compatible by legislative enactments. But this delusion vanished. No sooner was the theory put to a practical test, than the construction of the Nebraska bill became no less a matter of fierce dispute than the construction of the Constitution had been before. Is this pro-slavery, or is it anti-slavery? it was asked. The South found in it the right to plant slave labor in the territories unconditionally and the North found it had the right to drive slavery out of them. Each section of the country endeavored to appropriate the results of the Nebraska bill to itself, and the same measure, which was to transfer the struggle from the halls of Congress into the territories, transferred it from the territories back into Congress, and there the Northern and Southern versions of the Nebraska bill fight each other with the same fury with which the Southern and Northern versions of the Constitution have fought each other before. What does the Constitution mean in regard to slavery? That question remains to be settled. What does the Nebraska bill mean? This question depends upon the settlement of the former.

Of all men, Mr. Douglas ought to be the first to know what the true intent and meaning of the Nebraska bill and the principle of popular sovereignty are. He is said to be a statesman, and it is to be presumed that his measure rests upon a positive idea; for all true statesmanship is founded upon positive ideas.

In order to find out Mr. Douglas's own definition of his own "great principle," we are obliged to pick up the most lucid of his statements, as we find them scattered about in numerous speeches and manifestoes. After multifarious cruisings upon the sea of platforms and arguments, Mr. Douglas has at last landed at the following point: "A slave," says he, in his famous Harper's Magazine article, "a slave, within the meaning of the Constitution, is a person held to service
or labor in one State 'under the laws thereof'—not under the Constitution of the United States, or under the laws thereof, nor by virtue of any federal authority whatever, but under the laws of the particular State where such service or labor may be due." This is clear, and with his eyes firmly fixed upon the people of the North, he goes on:

If, as Mr. Buchanan asserts, slavery exists in the territories by virtue of the Constitution of the United States, then it becomes the imperative duty of Congress, to the performance of which every member is bound by his conscience and his oath, and from which no consideration of policy or expediency can release him, to provide by law such adequate and complete protection as is essential to the enjoyment of an important right secured by the Constitution; in one word, to enact a general slave code for the territories.

But Mr. Douglas is not satisfied with this. In order to strengthen his assumption, and to annihilate Mr. Buchanan's construction of the Nebraska bill still more, he proceeds:

The Constitution being uniform everywhere within the dominions of the United States, being the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitutions or laws of any of the States to the contrary notwithstanding—why does not slavery exist in Pennsylvania just as well as in Kansas or in South Carolina, by virtue of the same Constitution, since Pennsylvania is subordinate to the Constitution in the same manner and to the same extent as South Carolina and Kansas?

Just so. Mr. Douglas having been so positive, he cannot deny us the privilege of making a few logical deductions from his own premises. We expect him to proceed in the following manner: "Since a slave is held under the laws of a State, and not under the Constitution or the laws of the United States, slavery exists only by virtue of local law," or, as the Court of Appeals of Kentucky expressed it, "the right to hold a slave exists only by positive law of a municipal character and has no foundation in the law of nature or the unwritten and common law." If slavery cannot exist except by virtue of local law of a municipal character, it
follows as an irresistible consequence, that a slaveholder cannot hold a slave as property in a territory where there is no local law of a municipal character establishing that right of property. And, further, the right to hold a slave having no foundation in the law of nature or the unwritten and common law, we are forced to the conclusion, that a slave, brought by his owner upon the soil of a territory before the territorial legislature has enacted laws establishing slavery, becomes of necessity free, for there is no local law of a municipal character under which he can be held as a slave. This principle is recognized by the decisions of several Southern courts. Having gone so far (and, indeed, I cannot see how a logical mind can escape these conclusions from Mr. Douglas's own premises), Mr. Douglas would be obliged to define his popular sovereignty to be the right of the people of a territory, represented in the territorial legislature, to admit slavery by positive enactment. if they see fit, but it being well understood that a slaveholder has not the least shadow of a right to take his slave property into the territory before such positive legislation had been had. This definition would have at least the merit of logical consistency.

But what does Mr. Douglas say? "Slavery," so he tells us in his Harper's Magazine article, "being the creature of local legislation and not of the constitution of the United States, it follows that the Constitution does not establish slavery in the territories, beyond the power of the people to control it by law." What? The Constitution does not establish slavery in the territories beyond a certain something! What does that mean? If slavery is the creature of local law, how can the Constitution by its own force permit slavery to go into a territory at all?

Here is a dark mystery, a pitfall, and we may well take care not to fall into the trap of some sophistry. Why does he not speak of the admission of slavery by positive enactment? Why not even of the power of the people to exclude it by law? We look in vain for light in Harper's Magazine -- (and is it indeed true what Judge Black intimates, that the article is one of the obscurest documents by which ever a politician attempted to befog his followers) but we may
gather Mr. Douglas's real opinion from another manifest preceding this. In his New Orleans speech, delivered after his recent success in Illinois, he defined his position, in substance, as follows: "The Democracy of Illinois hold that a slaveholder has the same right to take his slave property into a territory as any other man has to take his horse or his merchandise."

What? Slavery is the creature of local law, and yet a slaveholder has a right to take his slave property into a territory before any local law has given him that right? A slave does not become free when voluntarily brought by his owner upon the soil of a territory where no positive local law establishing slavery exists? How is this possible? How can even the elastic mind of a Democratic candidate for the Presidency unite these contradictory assumptions? And yet there it stands, and nothing that Mr. Douglas ever said can be more unequivocal in its meaning. And here again we may claim the privilege of drawing a few logical deductions from Mr. Douglas's own premises. If, as Mr. Douglas distinctly and emphatically tells us, a slaveholder has a right to take his slave as property into a territory and to hold him there as property, before any legislation on that point is had, from what source does that right arise? Not from the law of nature—for the right to hold a slave is "unfounded in the law of nature and in the unwritten and common law," and even Mr. Douglas, little as he may care about nature and her laws, will hardly dare to assert that the system of slave labor is the natural and normal condition of society. It must then spring from positive law. But from what kind of positive law? Not from any positive law of a local and municipal character, for there is none such in the territory so far. Where is its source then? There is but one kind of positive law to which the territories are subject, before any local legislation has been had, and that is the Constitution of the United States. If, therefore, Mr. Douglas asserts, as he does, that a slaveholder has a right to take his slave as property into a territory, he must at the same time admit that, in the absence of local legislation positively establishing slavery, the Constitution of the United States, the only valid law existing there, is the source of that right. What else does Mr. Buchanan assert, but that
slavery exists in the territories by virtue of the Federal Constitution? Where is, then, the point of difference between Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Douglas? Why all this pomp and circumstance of glorious war? Whence these fierce battles between the Montecchi and Capuletti of the democratic camp? Are ye not brothers?

But Mr. Douglas is a statesman—so they are all, all statesmen—and pretends that the Constitution does not establish slavery in the territories, "beyond the power of the people to control it by law." What does that mean? It means that the people of the territory shall have the power to embarrass the slaveholder in the enjoyment of his right by "unfriendly legislation." "The right to hold slaves," say he, in another place, "is a worthless right, unless protected by appropriate police regulations. If the people of a territory do not want slavery, they have but to withhold all protection and all friendly legislation." Indeed a most ingenious expedient.

But alas! Here is one of those cases where the abstract admission of a right is of decisive importance. Suppose, for argument's sake, a slave might escape from his owner in a territory, without being in actual danger of recapture, would that in any way affect the constitutional right of the slaveholder to the possession and enjoyment of his property? I have already quoted Mr. Douglas's own answer to this question. "If," says he, "slavery exists in the territories by virtue of the Constitution" (that is, if a slaveholder has a right to introduce his "slave property" where there is no other law but the Constitution) "then it becomes the imperative duty of Congress, to the performance of which every member is bound by his oath and conscience, and from which no consideration of policy or expediency can release him, to provide by law such adequate and complete protection as is essential to the enjoyment of that important right."

And Mr. Douglas, after having emphatically admitted the right of property in a slave, where that right can spring from no other law but the Constitution, then dares to speak
of unfriendly legislation? Where is his conscience? Where is his oath? Where is his honor?

But Mr. Douglas says more: "The Constitution being the supreme law of the land in the States as well as in the territories, then slavery exists in Pennsylvania just as well as in Kansas and in South Carolina, and the irrepressible conflict is there? Aye, the irrepressible conflict is there, not only between the two antagonistic systems of labor, but between Mr. Douglas's own theories; not only in the States and territories, but in Mr. Douglas's own head. Whatever ambiguous expressions Mr. Douglas may invent, the dilemma stares him in the face (and here I put myself on his grounds): either slavery is excluded from the territories so long as it is not admitted by a special act of territorial legislation; or, if a slaveholder has the right to introduce his slave property there before such legislation is had, he can possess that right by virtue of no other but the only law existing there, the Constitution of the United States. Either slavery has no rights in the territories except those springing from positive law of a local or municipal character, or, according to Judge Douglas's own admission, the Southern construction of the Constitution and of the principle of popular sovereignty is the only legitimate one: that the Constitution by its own force carries slavery wherever it is the supreme law of the land, that Congress is obliged to enact a slave code for its protection, and that popular sovereignty means the power of the people to vote for slavery but by no means against it. There is no escape from this dilemma.

Which side will Mr. Douglas take? Will he be bold enough to say that slavery, being the creature of local law only, is excluded from the territories in the absence of positive law establishing it, or will he be honest enough to concede that, according to his own proposition in his New Orleans speech, slavery exists in the territories by virtue of the Federal Constitution? He will neither be bold enough to do the first, nor honest enough to do neither. He is in the position of that Democratic candidate for Congress in the West, who, when asked, "Are you a Buchanan or Douglas man?" answered, "I am." If you ask Mr. Douglas: "Do you hold that slavery is the creature of local law, or that a slaveholder has the right to introduce his slave property where there is no local law?" he will answer, "I do."
Such is Mr. Douglas's doctrine of popular sovereignty. But after having given you Mr. Douglas's own definitions in his own words, I see you are puzzled all the more, and you ask me again: "What is it?" I will tell you what judgment will be passed upon it by future historians, who may find it worth while to describe this impotent attempt to dally and trifle with the logic of things. They will say: "It was the dodge of a man who was well aware that, in order to be elected President of the United States, the vote of a few Northern States must be added to the united vote of the South. Knowing by experience that the Democratic road to the White House leads through the slaveholding States, he broke down the last geographical barrier to the extension of slavery. So he meant to secure the South. But in conceding undisputed sway to the slaveholding interests, he saw that he was losing his foothold in the Northern States necessary to his election; he availed himself of the irresistible pressure of the free-State movement in Kansas, and opposed the Lecompton Constitution. So he saved his Senatorship in Illinois, as the champion of free labor. But the South frowned, and immediately after his victory he went into slaveholding States and admitted in his speeches that slavery may go into the territories without a special act of territorial legislation. Believing the South satisfied, and seeing his chances in the North endangered, he wrote his Harper's Magazine essay, assuming that slavery can exist only by virtue of local law. The South frowning again, he endeavored to make his peace with the slave-holders by declaring that he would submit to the Charleston Convention, and instructing his nearest friends in the House to vote for the Administration candidate for the Speakership. So he endeavored to catch both sections of the Union successively in the trap of a double-faced sophistry. He tried to please them both in trying to cheat them both. But he placed himself between the logic of liberty on one, and logic of slavery on the other side. He put the sword of logic into the hands of his opponents, and tried to defend himself with the empty scabbard of "unfriendly legislation." Unfriendly legislation, which in one case would have been unnecessary, in the other unconstitutional—the invention of a mind without logic and of a heart without sympathies; recognized on all sides as a mere subterfuge, behind which the moral cowardice of a Presidential candidate entrenched itself."

Such will be the verdict of future historians. They will indulge in curious speculations about the times when such doctrines could be passed off as sound statesmanship—a statesmanship indeed, the prototype of which may be found, not in Plutarch, but in Aristophanes—but they will be slow to believe that there were people dull enough to be deceived by it.
Leaving aside the stern repudiation which Mr. Douglas's popular sovereignty has received at the hands of the people at the last State elections all over the Union, it is a characteristic sign of the times that even one of his political friends, an anti-Lecompton Democrat, recently went so far as to declare on the floor of Congress that he would not vote for Mr. Douglas if nominated by the Charleston Convention, unless a clear and unequivocal construction were affixed to the re-affirmation of the Cincinnati platform. A wise precaution, indeed! But whatever construction might be given to the Cincinnati platform, what will that gentleman do with the double-faced platform which Mr. Douglas has laid down for himself? What will the abstract pledge of a convention be worth to him, if Mr. Douglas's principles pledge him to nothing? What will he do with a man who, when pressed to take an unequivocal position, is always ready to sneak behind a superior authority, declaring that "these are questions to be settled by the courts"?

Mr. Douglas's position is certainly a very perplexing one. On one side he is ostracised by the Administration Democracy for his illogical and unconstitutional doctrine, that the legislature of a territory has control over slavery; and on the other hand one of his nearest friends, Mr. Morris, of Illinois, in his recent speech on the President's message, denounces the doctrine that slave property may be carried into the territories, just like other property, as an atrocious "abomination." Was Mr. Morris not aware that this "abomination" is the identical doctrine advocated by Mr. Douglas in his New Orleans speech? Let Mr. Morris examine the record of Judge Douglas, and he will find out that whatever abominations Mr. Buchanan may bring forward in his message, he advocates none that is not a direct logical consequence of Mr. Douglas's own admissions.

I see the time coming when many of those who rallied around Douglas's colors because they believed in his principles, will, from his most devoted friends, become his most indignant accusers. They are already unwittingly denouncing his doctrines, even while trying to defend him; they will not be sparing in direct denunciations as soon as they discover how badly they have been deceived and how ignominiously they were to be sold. We might, indeed, feel tempted to pity him, if we had not to reserve that generous emotion of our hearts for those who are wrong by mistake and unfortunate without guilt.

Mr. Douglas's ambiguous position, which makes it possible for him to cheat either the North or the South, without adding a new inconsistency to those already committed, makes it at the same time necessary for him to put his
double-faced theories upon an historical basis, which re-lieves him of the necessity of expressing a moral conviction on the matter of slavery either way. To say that slavery is right, would certainly displease the North; to say that slavery is wrong, would inevitably destroy him at the South. In order to dodge this dangerous dilemma, he finds it expedient to construe the history of this country so as to show that this question of right or wrong in regard to slavery had nothing whatever to do with the fundamental principles upon which the American Republic was founded. Dealing with slavery only as a matter of fact, and treating the natural rights of man and the relation between slavery and republican institutions as a matter of complete indifference, he is bound to demonstrate, that slavery never was seriously deemed inconsistent with liberty, and that the black never was seriously supposed to possess any rights which the white man was bound to respect.

But here he encounters the Declaration of Independence laying down the fundamental principles upon which the Republic was to develop itself; he encounters the ordinance of 1787, the practical application of those principles; both historical facts, as stern and stubborn as they are sublime. But as Mr. Douglas had no logic to guide him in his theories, so he had no conscience to restrain him in his historical constructions. To interpret the Declaration of Independence according to the evident meaning of its words would certainly displease the South; to call it a self-evident lie would certainly shock the moral sensibilities of the North. So he recognizes it as a venerable document, but makes the language, which is so dear to the hearts of the North, express a meaning which coincides with the ideas of the South.

We have appreciated his exploits as a logician; let us follow him in his historical discoveries.

Let your imagination carry you back to the year 1776. You stand in the hall of the old colonial courthouse of Philadelphia. Through the open door you see the Continental Congress assembled; the moment of a great decision is drawing near. Look at the earnest faces of the men assembled there, and consider what you may expect of them. The philosophy of the eighteenth century counts many of them among its truest adepts. They heartily welcomed in their scattered towns and plantations the new ideas brought forth by that sudden progress of humanity, and, meditating them in the dreamy solitude of virgin nature, they had enlarged the compass of their thoughts and peopled their imaginations with lofty ideals. A classical education (for most of them are by no means illiterate men) has put all the treasures of historical knowledge at their disposal, and enabled them
to apply the experience of past centuries to the new problem they attempt to solve. See others there of a simple but strong cast of mind, whom common sense would call its truest representatives. Wont to grapple with the dangers and difficulties of an early settler's life, or, if inhabitants of young uprising cities, wont to carry quick projects into speedy execution, they have become regardless of obstacles and used to strenuous activity. The constant necessity to help themselves has developed their mental independence; and inured to political strife by the continual defense of their colonial self-government, they have at last become familiar with the idea of introducing into practical existence the principles which their vigorous minds have quietly built up into a theory.

The first little impulses to the general upheaving of the popular spirit—the tea tax, the stamp act—drop into insignificance; they are almost forgotten; the revolutionary spirit has risen far above them. It disdains to justify itself with petty pleadings; it spurns diplomatic equivocation; it places the claim to independence upon the broad basis of eternal rights, as self-evident as the sun, as broad as the world, as common as the air of heaven. The struggle of the colonies against the usurping government of Great Britain has risen to the proud dimensions of a struggle of man for liberty and equality. Behold, five men are advancing towards the table of the president. First Thomas Jefferson, whose philosophical spirit grasps the generality of things and events; then Benjamin Franklin, the great apostle of common sense, the clear wisdom of real life beaming his serene eye; then the undaunted John Adams, and two others. Now Jefferson reads the Declaration of Independence, and loudly proclaims the fundamental principle upon which it rests: "All men are created free and equal!" It is said history tells you what it meant. The scepter of royalty is flung back across the ocean; the prerogatives of nobility are trodden into the dust; every man a king, every man a baron; in seven of the original colonies the shackles of the black men struck off; almost everywhere the way prepared for gradual emancipation. "No recognition of the right of property in man!" says Madison. "Let slavery be abolished by law!" says Washington. Not only the supremacy of old England is to be shaken off, but a new organization of society is to be built upon the basis of liberty and equality. That is the Declaration of Independence! That is the American Revolution! All men free and equal! Not even the broad desert of the
Atlantic ocean stops the triumphant shout. Behold, the nations of the old world are rushing to arms. Bastiles are blown into the dust, as by the trumpets of Jericho, and, like a pillar of fire by night and a pillar of cloud by day, the great watchword of the American Revolution shows forever the way to struggling humanity. All men are created free and equal! Whence the supernatural power in these seven words?

Turn your eyes away from the sublime spectacle of 1776, from that glorious galaxy of men whose hearts were large enough for all mankind, and let me recall you to the sober year of 1857. There is Springfield, the capital of Illinois, one of those States which owe their greatness to an ordinance originally framed by the same man whose hand wrote the Declaration of Independence. In the hall of the assembly there stands Mr. Douglas, who initiates an eager crowd into the mysteries of "popular sovereignty." He will tell you what it meant, when the men of 1776 said that "all men are created free and equal." He says:

No man can vindicate the character, the motives and the conduct of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, except upon the hypothesis that they referred to the white race alone, and not to the African, when they declared all men to have been created free and equal—that they were speaking of British subjects on this continent being free and equal to British subjects born and residing in Great Britain—that they were entitled to the same inalienable rights, and among them were enumerated life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The Declaration of Independence was adopted merely for the purpose of justifying the colonists in the eyes of the civilized world in withdrawing their allegiance from the British crown and dissolving their connection with the mother country.

What? Is that all? Is that little heap of quicksand the whole substructure on which a new organization of society was to be built? The whole foundation upon which the proud and ponderous edifice of the United States rests? They did, then, not mean all men, when they said all men. They intended,
perhaps, even to disfranchise those free blacks who, in five of the original thirteen colonies, enjoyed the right of voting. They meant but the white race. Oh no! by no means the whole white race; not the Germans, not the French, not the Scandinavians; they meant but British subjects: "British subjects on this continent being equal to British subjects born and residing on the other side of the great water!"

There is your Declaration of Independence, a diplomatic dodge, adopted merely for the purpose of excusing the rebellious colonies in the eyes of civilized mankind. There is your Declaration of Independence, no longer the sacred code of the rights of man, but a hypocritical piece of special pleading, drawn up by a batch of artful pettifoggers, who, when speaking of the rights of man, meant but the privileges of a set of aristocratic slaveholders, but styled it "the rights of man," in order to throw dust into the eyes of the world, and to inveigle noble-hearted fools into lending them aid and assistance. These are your boasted revolutionary sires, no longer heroes and sages, but accomplished humbuggers and hypocrites, who said one thing and meant another; who passed counterfeit sentiments as genuine, and obtained arms and money and assistance and sympathy on false pretenses! There is your great American Revolution, no longer the great champion of universal principles, but a mean Yankee trick—a wooden nutmeg—the most impudent imposition ever practised upon the whole world!

This is the way Mr. Douglas wants you to read and understand the proudest pages of American history! That is the kind of history with which he finds it necessary to prop his mongrel doctrine of popular sovereignty! That is what he called vindicating the character and the motives and the conduct of the signers of the Declaration of Independence! Thus he did not blush to slander Jefferson, who, when speaking of his fellow citizens, meant mankind; and Franklin, in whose clear head theory and practice were the same, and who, having declared "all men to be created free and equal" became the first president of the first great abolition society; and John Adams, the representative of that State which abolished slavery within its limits with one great stroke of legislation; and Washington, who declared it to be "his fondest wish to see slavery abolished by law," and affixed to the Declaration of Independence the broad signature of his heroic sword; and Madison, who deemed it "absurd to admit the idea of property in man"; and the framers of the
Constitution, who took care not to disgrace that instrument with the word "slavery," and before adopting it finally, blotted out from the extradition clause the word "servitude," avowedly, because it signified the condition of a slave, and substituted the word "service," avowedly, because it signified the condition of a freeman. Thus Mr. Douglas dares to speak of all those true men who, after having proclaimed their principles in the Declaration, endeavored to introduce them into practical life in almost every State in the way of gradual emancipation! That they failed in this, is it a fault of theirs? It shows not that they were less great and sincere, but that subsequent generations were hardly worthy of so noble an ancestry!

There is Mr. Douglas's version of your history. He despairs of converting you without slandering your fathers. His present doctrines cannot thrive unless planted in a calumny on the past. He vindicate the signers of the Declaration of Independence! Indeed, they need it sadly. I see the illustrious committee of five arise from their graves—at their head Thomas Jefferson, his lips curled with the smile of contempt, and I hear him say to Mr. Douglas: "Sir you may abuse us as much as you please, but have the goodness to spare us with your vindications of our character and motives."

It is a common thing for men of a coarse cast of mind so to lose themselves in the mean pursuit of selfish ends as to become insensible to the grand and sublime. Measuring every character and every event in history by the low standard of their own individualities, applying to everything the narrow rule of their own motive, incapable of grasping broad and generous ideas, they will belittle everything they cannot deny, and drag down every struggle of principles to the sordid arena of aspiring selfishness or of small competing interests. Eighteen hundred years ago, there were men who saw nothing in incipient Christianity but a mere wrangle between Jewish theologians, got up by a carpenter's boy, and carried on by a few crazy fishermen. Three hundred years ago, there were men who saw in the great reformatory movement of the sixteenth century, not the emancipation of the individual conscience, but a mere fuss kicked up by a German monk who wanted to get married. Two hundred years ago, there were men who saw in Hampden's refusal to pay the ship-money not a bold vindication of constitutional liberty, but the crazy antics of a man who was mean enough to quarrel about a few shillings. And, now, there are men who see in the
Declaration of Independence and in the American Revolution, not the reorganization of human society upon the basis of liberty and equality, but a dodge of some English colonists who were unwilling to pay their taxes.

But the dignity of great characters and the glory of great events find their vindication in the consciences of the people. It is vain for demagogism to raise its short arms against the truth of history. The Declaration of Independence stands there. No candid man ever read it without seeing and feeling that every word of it was dictated by deep and earnest thought, and that every sentence of it bears the stamp of philosophical generality. It is the summing up of the results of the philosophical development of the age; it is the practical embodiment of the progressive ideas which, very far from being confined to the narrow limits of the English colonies, pervaded the very atmosphere of all civilized countries. That code of human rights has grown on the very summit of civilization, not in the miry soil of a South Carolina cotton-field. He must have a dull mind or a disordered brain, who misunderstands its principles; but he must have the heart of a villain, who knowingly misrepresents them.

Mr. Douglas's ambition might have been satisfied with this ignominious exploit. But the necessities of the popular sovereignty doctrine do not stop there. After having tried to explain away the fundamental principles underlying this Republic, which are hostile to slavery and its extension, Mr. Douglas finds it exceedingly inconvenient to encounter facts which prove, beyond doubt, that these principles, from a mere theoretical existence, rose to practical realization. Popular sovereignty, which is at war with the doctrines of the Declaration of Independence, demands the slaughter of the ordinance of 1787, and Mr. Douglas is up to the task. He does not stop at trifles. And here we must return to the Harper's Magazine manifesto. He leads us through a century of colonial history in order to show that the people of the colonies claimed the right to legislate on the subject of slavery. And, remarkably enough, all the instances quoted show a uniform tendency adverse to the peculiar institution. Mr. Douglas then proceeds to discover the germs of his popular sovereignty doctrine in the first Congressional legislation concerning the territories. I will not undertake to criticize that singular historical essay, although some of
its statements are such as to make the freshmen of our colleges smile. The "statesman" Douglas does not seem to be aware that the ability to read history ought to precede the attempt to write it. He leads us back to the Congress of 1784. Mr. Jefferson and his colleagues have just executed the deed of cession of the Northwestern territory, and the same Mr. Jefferson, as chairman of a committee, then submits "a plan for the temporary government of the territories ceded or to be ceded by the individual States to the United States." Mr. Douglas proceeds to describe how the territorial governments were to be organized, what rights and powers were put into the hands of the people and how they were to be exercised; and after having demonstrated that the term "new States" meant the same thing which is now designated by "territories," he comes to the conclusion that the spirit pervading that plan was in exact consonance with his doctrine of "popular sovereignty." Mr. Douglas ostentatiously calls this "the Jeffersonian plan." "it was," says he, "the first plan of government for the territories ever adopted in the United States. It was drawn by the author of the Declaration of Independence, and revised and adopted by those who shaped the issues which produced the Revolution, and formed the foundations upon which our whole system of American government rests." But Mr. Douglas skips rather nimbly over the significant fact, that the same "author of the Declaration of Independence" put into that plan a proviso, excluding slavery from the territories. Was that a mere accident? Mr. Jefferson showed thereby conclusively that, in his opinion, the exclusion of slavery by Congressional legislation was by no means inconsistent with the spirit of "popular sovereignty" which Mr. Douglas discovers in the plan of 1784, but this does not disturb Mr. Douglas. "The fifth article," says he, "relating to the prohibition of slavery, having been rejected by Congress, never became a part of the Jeffersonian plan of government for the territories, as adopted April 23, 1784."

Although with a large numerical majority in its favor (16 to 7) this article did indeed, fail to obtain a constitutional majority, the vote of New Jersey not being counted in consequence of there being but one delegate from that State present; yet it had been drawn up by Mr. Jefferson, introduced by Mr. Jefferson and sustained by Mr. Jefferson's vote. Nevertheless, Mr. Douglas persists in calling a plan, from which the peculiar Jeffersonian feature had been struck out, the "Jeffersonian plan." This, indeed, is the play of Hamlet with the character of Hamlet omitted. "This charter
compact," proceeds Mr. Douglas, "with its fundamental conditions which were unalterable without joint consent of the people interested in them, as well as of the United States, then stood upon the statute book unrepealed and irrepealable, when on the 14th day of May, 1787, the federal convention met at Philadelphia." Does Mr. Douglas not know that on the 16th of March 1785, a proposition was introduced in Congress by Rufus King, to exclude slavery from the States described in the resolve of April 23, 1784, and to make this provision part of the compact established by that resolve? Does he not know that this provision, restoring the Jeffersonian feature to the "Jeffersonian plan," was committed by the vote of eight States against four? Does he not know that the plan of 1784 never went into practical operation, but was expressly set aside by Congress in 1787? Does he not know that the ordinance of 1787 was the first legislative act ever practically organizing a territory of the United States, and that one of its most prominent features was the proviso excluding slavery from all the territories then in the possession of the United States?

Mr. Douglas's historical recollections of the ordinance of 1787 seem to be very indistinct. Indeed, he deems it only worthy of an occasional, passing, almost contemptuous notice. He speaks of it as "the ordinance of the 12th of July, 1787, which was passed by the remnant of the Congress of the Confederation, sitting in New York, while its most eminent members were at Philadelphia, as delegates to the Federal Convention." For three quarters of a century people were in the habit of thinking that the ordinance of 1787 was an act of the highest order of importance, but now we learn that it was a rather indifferent affair, passed on an indifferent occasion by an exceedingly indifferent set of fellows, while the plan of 1784, a mere abstract program completely overruled by subsequent legislation, is represented as the true glory of the age. How is this? The reason is obvious.

Mr. Douglas belongs to that class of historians who dwell upon those facts which suit their convenience, and unceremoniously drop the rest. I once heard of a Jesuit college where they used a text-book of history, in which the French Revolution was never mentioned, while the Emperor Napoleon figured there only as modest Marquis Bonaparte, who held a commission under Louis XVI, and fought great battles for the glory of the Catholic Church. So it is with Mr. Douglas and the history of our country. He ignores the universal principles of the Declaration of Independence, and represents the great founders of the Republic as merely paving the way for his "great principles," while a few village politicians get up an abusive ordinance, adverse to the general tendency of
things. But as those Jesuits could never prevent their students from peeping out of their college windows into the wide world, where they perceived a very different state of things, so Mr. Douglas cannot prevent us from travelling out of the yellow covers of Harper's Magazine into the open records of history, where we find Mr. Jefferson's anti-slavery clause, although accidentally lost in 1784, strenuously insisted upon by the leading spirits of the Republic, incorporated in the great act of 1787, solemnly reaffirmed by the first Congress under the Constitution, and firmly maintained even against the petition of the people of one of the territories. This is the true "Jeffersonian plan," the plan which Jefferson framed, voted for and which was carried out in his spirit; not that mangled report of 1784, which Mr. Douglas wants us to take as the foundation of all territorial government, because an historical accident happens to coincide with his schemes.

That true Jeffersonian plan rested, indeed, on the principle of popular sovereignty, but it will be conceded that Mr. Jefferson's great principle was as widely different from that of Mr. Douglas as the ordinance of 1787 is different from the Nebraska bill. While Jefferson's notion of popular sovereignty sprang from the idea that man has certain inalienable rights which the majority shall not encroach upon, Mr. Douglas's doctrine rests upon the idea that the highest development of liberty consists in the right of one class of men to hold another class of men as slaves, if they see fit to do so. While Mr. Jefferson excluded slavery from the territories, in order to make room for true popular sovereignty, Mr. Douglas invents his false popular sovereignty in order to make room for slavery. The ordinance of 1787, the true "Jeffersonian plan," was indeed no mere accident, no mere occasional act of legislation. It sprang from the idea, as Madison expressed it, that "republican institutions would become a fallacy where slavery existed," and in order to guarantee republican institutions to the territories, they excluded slavery.

The ordinance of 1787 was the logical offspring of the principles upon which your independence and your Constitution are founded; it is the practical application of the Declaration of Independence to the government of the territories. Its very existence sets completely a nought Mr. Douglas's doctrine and historical construction, and the dwarfish hand of the demagogue tries in vain to tear this bright page out of your annals. The ordinance of 1787 stands written on the very gateposts of the Northwestern States; written on every grain field that waves in the breeze, on every factory that dots the course of their rushing waters, on every cottage that harbors thrifty freemen;
written in every heart that rejoices over the blessings of liberty. There it stands in characters of light. Only a blind man cannot see; only a fool can misunderstand it; only a knave can wilfully misinterpret it.

Such is Mr. Douglas's principle of popular sovereignty in its logical and historical aspect; apparently adopting the doctrine that slavery is the creature of local law only, and fighting against a Congressional slave code, but, on the other hand, admitting the very principle on which protection to slave property becomes a logical necessity; and again assuming the ground, that slave property may be introduced where there is no local law, but explaining away the logical consequences of that doctrine by the transparent sophistry of unfriendly legislation; dragging the proudest exploits of American statesmanship into the dust, emasculating the Declaration of Independence because incompatible with its principles; setting aside the ordinance of 1787 because that stern fact is a conclusive historical argument against it; a Jesuitical piece of equivocation and double-dealing; unable to stand before the criticism of a logical mind, because it is a mixture of glaring contradictions; unable to stop the war of principle and interests, because it is at war with itself.

It is true, its principle champion worked hard to cover with bullying boisterousness the moral cowardice from which it sprang, but in vain; He mistakes the motive-power which shapes the actions of free nations. Having no moral convictions of his own to stand upon, he could never address himself to the moral sense of the people. Having no moral convictions of his own! This is a grave charge, but I know what I say. I respect true convictions wherever I find them. Among the fire-eaters of the South there are men who speak of the moral basis of slavery, and believe in it; who speak of the blessings of servitude and believe in it; who assert that slavery is right, and believe it. Atrocious as their errors may be, and deeply as I deplore them, yet I respect their convictions as soon as I find them to be such. But look into the record of the champion of "popular sovereignty"; scan it from syllable to syllable, and then tell me, you Douglasites of the South, do you find one word there indicating a moral conviction that slavery is right? And you Douglasites of the North, who are in the habit of telling us that you are the true anti-slavery men, and that popular sovereignty will surely work the overthrow of the institution—did your master ever utter a similar sentiment? Do you find in his record one word of sympathy with the downtrodden and degraded? One spark of the humane philosophy of our age? One syllable in vindication of the outraged dignity of human nature? One word which might indicate a moral convic-
tion that slavery is wrong? Not one!

But one thing he does tell you: "I do not care whether slavery be voted up or down." There is then a human heart that does not care! Sir, look over this broad land, where the struggle has raged for years and years; and across two oceans, around the globe, to the point where the far West meets the near East; over the teeming countries where the cradle of mankind stood; and over the workshops of civilization in Europe, and over those mysterious regions under the tropical sun, which have not emerged yet from the night of barbarism into the daylight of civilized life,—and then tell me how many hearts you find that do not tremble with mortal anguish or exultant joy as the scales of human freedom or human bondage go up or down? Look over the history of the world, from the time when infant mankind felt in its heart the first throbings of aspiring dignity, down to our days, when the rights of man have at last found a bold and powerful champion in a great and mighty Republic; where is the page that is not blotted with blood and tears shed in that all-absorbing struggle; where a chapter which does not tell a tale of jubilant triumph or heartbreaking distress, as the scales of freedom or slavery went up or down? But to-day, in the midst of the nineteenth century, in a Republic whose program was laid down in the Declaration of Independence, there comes a man to you, and tells you with cynical coolness that he does not care! And because he does not care, he claims the confidence of his countrymen and the highest honors of the Republic. Because he does not care, he pretends to be the representative statesman of the age!

Sir, I always thought that he can be no true statesman whose ideas and conceptions are not founded upon profound moral convictions of right and wrong. What, then, shall we say of him who boastingly parades his indifference as a virtue? May we not drop the discussion about his statesmanship, and ask, What is he worth as a man? Yes, he mistakes the motive power which shapes the events of history. I find that in the life of free nations mere legal disquisitions never turned the tide of events, and mere constitutional constructions never determined the tendency of an age. The logic of things goes its steady way, immovable to eloquence and deaf to argument. It shapes and changes laws and constitutions according to its immutable rules, and those adverse to it will prove no effectual obstruction to its onward march. In times of great conflicts, the promptings and dictates of the human conscience are more potent than all the inventive ingenuity of the human brain. The conscience of a free people, when once fairly ruling the action of the masses, will never fail to make new laws when those existing are contrary to its tendency, or it will put
its own construction upon those that are there. Your dis-
quissions and plausibilities may be used as weapons and-
stratagems in a fencing match of contending parties, but,
powerless as they are before the conscience of man, posterity
will remember them only as mere secondary incidents of a
battle of great principles, in which the strongest motive
powers of human nature were the true combatants.

There is the slavery question; not a mere occasional
quarrel between the two sections of country, divided by a
geographical line; not a mere contest between two economic
interests for the preponderance; not a mere wrangle between
two political parties for power and spoils; but the great
struggle between two antagonistic systems of social organi-
zation; between advancing civilization and retreating bar-
barism; between the human conscience and a burning wrong.
In vain will our impotent mock giants endeavor to make the
test-question of our age turn on a ridiculous logical quibble,
or a paltry legal technicality; in vain will they invent small
dodges and call them "great principles"; in vain will they
attempt to drag down the all-absorbing contest to the level
of a mere pothouse quarrel between two rival candidates for a
Presidential nomination. The wheel of progressing events will
crush them to atoms, as it has crushed so many abnormities,
and a future generation will perhaps read on Mr. Douglas's
tombstone: "Here lies the queer sort of statesman, who, when
the great battle of slavery was fought, pretended to say that
he did not care whether slavery be voted up or down."

But as long as the moral vitality of this nation is
not entirely exhausted, Mr. Douglas and men like him will in
vain endeavor to reduce the people to that disgusting state
of moral indifference which he himself is not ashamed to boast
of. I solemnly protest that the American people are not to
be measured by Mr. Douglas's self-made moral standard. How-
ever degraded some of our politicians may be, the progress
of the struggle will show that the popular conscience is still
alive, and that the people DO CARE.
MR. PRESIDENT:—When this debate commenced before the holidays, I refrained from taking part in it, and from expressing my opinions on some of the provisions of the bill now before us, hoping as I did that the measure could be passed without difficulty, and that a great many of those who now labor under political disabilities would be immediately relieved. This expectation was disappointed. An amendment to the bill was adopted. It will have to go back to the House of Representatives now unless by some parliamentary means we get rid of the amendment, and there being no inducement left to waive what criticism we might feel inclined to bring forward, we may consider the whole question open.

I beg leave to say that I am in favor of general, or as this word is considered more expressive, universal amnesty, believing as I do that the reasons which make it desirable that there should be amnesty granted at all, make it also desirable that the amnesty should be universal. The Senator from South Carolina (MR. SAWYER) has already given notice that he will move to strike out the exceptions from the operation of this act of relief for which the bill provides. If he had not declared his intention to that effect, I would do so. In any event, whenever he offers his amendment I shall most heartily support it.

In the course of this debate we have listened to some Senators, as they conjured up before our eyes once more all the horrors of the rebellion, the wickedness of its conception, how terrible its incidents were and how harrowing its consequences. Sir, I admit it all; I will not combat the correctness of the picture; and yet, if I differ with the gentlemen who drew it, it is because, had the conception of the rebellion been still more wicked, had its incidents been still more terrible, its consequences still more harrowing, I could not permit myself to forget that in dealing with the question now before us we have to deal not alone with the past, but with the present and future interests of this Republic.

What do we want to accomplish as good citizens and patriots? Do we mean only to inflict upon late rebels pain, degradation, mortification, annoyance, for its own sake, to torture their feelings without any ulterior purpose? Certainly such a spirit could not by any possibility animate high-minded men. I presume, therefore, that those who still favor the continuance of some of the disabilities imposed by the fourteenth amendment, do so because they have some higher object of public
usefulness in view, an object of public usefulness sufficient
to justify, in their minds at least, the denial of rights to
others which we ourselves enjoy.

What can those objects of public usefulness be? Let
me assume that, if we differ as to the means to be employed,
we are agreed as to the supreme end and aim to be reached.
That end and aim of our endeavors can be no other than to se­
cure to all the States the blessings of good and free govern­
ment and the highest degree of prosperity and well-being the;
can attain, and to revive in all citizens of this Republic
that love for the Union and its institutions, and that in­
spiring consciousness of a common nationality, which, after
all, must bind all Americans together.

What are the best means for the attainment of that
end? This, sir, as I conceive it, is the only legitimate
question we have to decide. Certainly all will agree that
this end is far from having been attained so far. Look at the
Southern States as they stand before us today. Some are in a
conditions bordering upon anarchy, not only on account of the
social disorders which are occurring there, or the inefficiency
of their local governments in securing the enforcement of the
laws; but you will find in many of them fearful corruption
pervading the whole political organization; a combination of
rascality and ignorance wielding official power; their finances
deranged by profligate practices; their credit ruined; bank­
ruptcy staring them in the face; their industries staggering
under a fearful load of taxation; their property-holders and
capitalists paralyzed by a feeling of insecurity and distrust
almost amounting to despair. Sir, let us not try to disguise
these facts, for the world knows them to be so, and knows it
but too well.

What are the causes that have contributed to bring
about this distressing condition? I admit that great civil
wars resulting in such vast social transformations as the
sudden abolition of slavery are calculated to produce similar
results; but it might be presumed that a recuperative power
such as this country possesses might during the time which has
elapsed since the close of the war at least have very materially
alleviated many of the consequences of that revulsion, had a
wise policy been followed.

Was the policy we followed wise? Was it calculated to
promote the great purposes we are endeavoring to serve? Let
us see. At the close of the war we had to establish and secure
free labor and the rights of the emancipated class. To that end we had to disarm those who could have prevented this, and we had to give the power of self-protection to those who needed it. For this reason temporary restrictions were imposed upon the late rebels, and we gave the right of suffrage to the colored people. Until the latter were enabled to protect themselves, political disabilities even more extensive than those which now exist, rested upon the plea of eminent political necessity. I would be the last man to conceal that I thought so then, and I think now there was very good reason for it.

But, sir, when the enfranchisement of the colored people was secured, when they had obtained the political means to protect themselves, then another problem began to loom up. It was not only to find new guaranties for the rights of the colored people, but it was to secure good and honest government for all. Let us not underestimate the importance of that problem, for in a great measure it includes the solution of the other. Certainly, nothing could have been better calculated to remove the prevailing discontent concerning the changes that had taken place, and to reconcile men's minds to the new order of things, than the tangible proof that the new order of things was practically working well; that it could produce a wise and economical administration of public affairs, and that it would promote general prosperity, thus healing the wounds of the past and opening to all the prospect of a future of material well-being and contentment. And, on the other hand, nothing could have been more calculated to impede a general, hearty and honest acceptance of the new order of things by the late rebel population than just those failures of public administration which involve the people in material embarrassments and so seriously disturb their comfort. In fact, good, honest and successful government in the Southern States would in its moral effects, in the long run, have exerted a far more beneficial influence than all your penal legislation, while your penal legislation will fail in its desired effects if we fail in establishing in the Southern States an honest and successful administration of the public business.

Now, what happened in the South? It is a well-known fact that the more intelligent classes of Southern society almost uniformly identified themselves with the rebellion; and by our system of political disabilities just those classes were excluded from the management of political affairs. That they could not be trusted with the business of introducing into living practice the results of the war, to establish true free labor and to protect the rights of the emancipated slaves, is true; I willingly admit it. But when those results and rights
were constitutionally secured there were other things to be
done. Just at that period when the Southern States lay prostrated and exhausted at our feet, when the destructive besom of war had swept over them and left nothing but desolation and ruin in its track, when their material interests were to be built up again with care and foresight—just then the public business demanded, more than ordinarily, the cooperation of all intelligence and all the political experience that could be mustered in the Southern States. But just then a large portion of that intelligence and experience was excluded from the management of public affairs by political disabilities, and the controlling power in those State rested in a great measure in the hands of those who had but recently been slaves and just emerged from that condition, and in the hands of others who had sometimes honestly, sometimes by crooked means and for sinister purposes, found a way to their confidence.

This was the state of things as it then existed. Nothing could be farther from my intention than to cast a slur upon the character of the colored people of the South. In fact, their conduct immediately after that great event which struck the shackles of slavery from their limbs was above praise. Look into the history of the world, and you will find that almost every similar act of emancipation, the abolition of serfdom, for instance, was uniformly accompanied by atrocious outbreaks of a revengeful spirit; by the slaughter of nobles and their families, illumined by the glare of their burning castles. Not so here. While all the horrors of San Domingo had been predicted as certain to follow upon emancipation, scarcely a single act of revenge for injuries suffered or for misery endured has darkened the record of the emancipated bondmen of America. And thus their example stands unrivalled in history, and they, as well as the whole American people, may well be proud of it. Certainly, the Southern people should never cease to remember and appreciate it.

But while the colored people of the South thus earned our admiration and gratitude, I ask you in all candor could they be reasonably expected, when, just after having emerged from a condition of slavery, they were invested with political rights and privileges, to step into the political arena as men with the intelligence and experience necessary for the management of public affairs and for the solution of problems made doubly intricate by the disasters which had desolated the Southern country. Could they reasonably be expected to manage the business of public administration, involving to so great an extent the financial interests and the material well-being of the people, and surrounded by difficulties of such fearful perplexity,
with the wisdom and skill required by the exigences of the situation? That as a class they were ignorant and inexperienced and lacked a just conception of public interests, was certainly not their fault; for those who have studied the history of the world know but too well that slavery and oppression are very bad political schools. But the stubborn fact remains that they were ignorant and inexperienced; that the public business was an unknown world to them, and that in spite of the best intentions they were easily misled, not infrequently by the most reckless rascality which had found a way to their confidence. Thus their political rights and privileges were undoubtedly well calculated, and even necessary, to protect their rights as free laborers and citizens, but they were not well calculated to secure a successful administration of other public interests.

I do not blame the colored people for it; still less do I say that for this reason their political rights and privileges should have been denied them. Nay, sir, I deemed it necessary then, and I now reaffirm that opinion, that they should possess those rights and privileges for the permanent establishment of the logical and legitimate results of the war and the protection of their new position in society. But, while never losing sight of this necessity, I do say that the inevitable consequence of the admission of so large an uneducated and inexperienced class to political power, as to the probable mismanagement of the material interests of the social body, should at least have been mitigated by a counterbalancing policy. When ignorance and inexperience were admitted to so large an influence upon public affairs, intelligence ought no longer to so large an extent to have been excluded. In other words, when universal suffrage was granted to secure the equal rights of all, universal amnesty ought to have been granted to make all the resources of political intelligence and experience available for the promotion of the welfare of all.

But what did we do? To the uneducated and inexperienced classes—uneducated and inexperienced, I repeat, entirely without their fault—we opened the road to power; and, at the same time, we condemned a large proportion of the intelligence of those States, of the property-holding, the industrial, the professional, the tax-paying interest, to a worse than passive attitude. We made it, as it were, easy for rascals who had gone South in quest of profitable adventure to gain the control of masses so easily misled, by permitting them to appear as the exponents and representatives of the National power and of our policy; and at the same time we branded a large number of men of intelligence, and many of them of personal integrity, whose
material interests were so largely involved in honest government, and many of whom would have cooperated in managing the public business with care and foresight—we branded them, I say, as outcasts, telling them that they ought not to be suffered to exercise any influence upon the management of the public business, and that it would be unwarrantable presumption in them to attempt it.

I ask you, sir, could such things fail to contribute to the results we read to-day in the political corruption and demoralization, and in the financial ruin of some of the Southern States? These results are now before us. The mistaken policy may have been pardonable when these consequence were still a matter of conjecture and speculation; but what excuse have we now for continuing it when those results are clear before our eyes, beyond the reach of contradictions?

These considerations would seem to apply more particularly to those Southern States in which the colored element constitutes a very large proportion of the voting body. There is another which applies to all.

When the rebellion stood in arms against us, we fought and overcame force by force. That was right. When the results of the war were first to be established and fixed, we met the resistance they encountered, with that power which the fortunes of war and the revolutionary character of the situation had placed at our disposal. The feelings and prejudices which then stood in our way had under such circumstances but little, if any, claim to our consideration. But when the problem presented itself of securing the permanency, the peaceable development, the successful working of the new institutions we had introduced into our political organism, we had as wise men to take into careful calculation the moral forces we had to deal with; for let us not indulge in any delusion about this; what is to be permanent in a republic like this must be supported by public opinion, it must rest at least upon the willing acquiescence of a large and firm majority of the people.

The introduction of the colored people, the late slaves, into the body-politic as voters pointedly affronted the traditional prejudices prevailing among the Southern whites. What should we care about those prejudices? In war, nothing. After the close of the war, in the settlement of peace, not enough to deter us from doing what was right and necessary; and yet, still enough to take them into account when considering the manner in which right and necessity were to be served. Statesmen will
care about popular prejudices as physicians will care about the diseased condition of their patients, which they want to ameliorate. Would it not have been wise for us, looking at those prejudices as a morbid condition of the Southern mind, to mitigate, to assuage, to disarm them by prudent measures and thus to weaken their evil influence? We desired the Southern whites to accept in good faith universal suffrage, to recognize the political rights of the colored man and to protect him in their exercise. Was not that our sincere desire? But if it was, would it not have been wise to remove as much as possible the obstacles that stood in the way of that consummation? But what did we do? When we raised the colored people to the rights of active citizenship and opened to them all the privileges of eligibility, we excluded from those privileges a large and influential class of whites; in other words, we lifted the late slave, uneducated and inexperienced as he was,--I repeat, without his fault,--not merely to the level of the late master class, but even above it. We asked certain white men to recognize the colored man in a political status not only as high but even higher than their own. We might say that under the circumstances we had a perfect right to do that, and I will not dispute it; but I ask you most earnestly, sir, was it wise to do it? If you desired the white man to accept and recognize the political equality of the black was it wise to embitter and to exasperate his spirit with the stinging stigma of his own inferiority? Was it wise to withhold from him privileges in the enjoyment of which he was to protect the late slave? This was not assuaging, disarming prejudice; this was rather inciting, it was exasperating it. American statesmen will understand and appreciate human nature as it has developed itself under the influence of free institutions. We know that if we want any class of people to overcome their prejudices in respecting the political rights and privileges of any other class, the very first thing we have to do is to accord the same rights and privileges to them. No American was ever inclined to recognize in others public rights and privileges from which he himself was excluded; and for aught I know, in this very feeling, although it may take an objectionable form, we find one of the safeguards of popular liberty.

You tell me that the late rebels had deserved all this in the way of punishment. Granting that, I beg leave to suggest that this is not the question. The question is, what were the means best calculated to overcome the difficulties in the way of a willing and universal recognition of the new rights and privileges of the emancipated class? What were the means to overcome the hostile influences impeding the development
of the harmony of society in its new order? I am far from asserting that, had no disabilities existed, universal suffrage would have been received by the Southern whites with universal favor. No, sir, most probably it would not; but I do assert that the existence of disabilities, which put so large and influential a class of whites in point of political privileges below the colored people, could not fail to inflame those prejudices which stood in the way of a general and honest acceptance of the new order of things. They increased instead of diminishing the dangers and difficulties surrounding the emancipated class. And nobody felt that more keenly than the colored people of the South themselves. To their honor be it said, following a just instinct, they were among the very first, not only in the South but all over the country, in entreating Congress to remove those odious discriminations which put in jeopardy their own rights by making them greater than those of others. From the colored people themselves, it seems, we have in this respect received a lesson in statesmanship.

Well, then what policy does common-sense suggest to us now? If we sincerely desire to give to the Southern States good and honest government, material prosperity and measurable contentment, as far at least as we can contribute to that end; if we really desire to weaken and disarm those prejudices and resentments which still disturb the harmony of society, will it not be wise, will it not be our duty to show that we are in no sense the allies and abettors of those who use their political power to plunder their fellow-citizens, unnecessary degradation by withholding from them rights and privileges which all others enjoy? Seeing the mischief which the system of disabilities is accomplishing, is it not time that there should be at least an end of it? Or is there any good it can possibly do to make up for the harm it has already wrought and is still working?

Look at it. Do these disabilities serve in any way to protect anybody in his rights or in his liberty or in his property or in his life? Does the fact that some men are excluded from office, in any sense or measure, make others more secure in their lives or in their property or in their rights? Can anybody tell me how? Or do they, perhaps, prevent even those who are excluded from official position from during mischief if they are mischievously inclined? Does the exclusion from office, does any feature of your system of political disabilities, take the revolver or the bowie-knife or the scourge from the hands of any one who wishes to use it? Does it destroy the influence of the more intelligent upon society, if they mean to use that influence for mischievous purposes?
We hear the Ku-Klux outrages spoken of as a reason why political disabilities should not be removed. Did not these very same Ku-Klux outrages happen while disabilities were in existence? Is it not clear, then that the existence of political disabilities did not prevent them? No, sir, if political disabilities have any practical effect it is, while not in any degree diminishing the power of the evil-disposed for mischief, to incite and sharpen their mischievous inclination by increasing their discontent with the condition they live in.

It must be clear to every impartial observer that, were ever so many of those who are now disqualified, put in office, they never could do with their official power as much mischief as the mere fact of the existence of the system of political disabilities with its inevitable consequences is doing today. The scandals of misgovernment in the South which we complain of, I admit, were not the first and original cause of the Ku-Klux outrages. But every candid observer will also have to admit that they did serve to keep the Ku-Klux spirit alive. Without such incitement it might gradually by this time, to a great extent at least, have spent itself. And now, if the scandals of misgovernment were, partly at least, owing to the exclusion of so large a portion of the intelligence and experience of the South from the active management of affairs, must it not be clear that a measure which will tend to remedy this evil, may also tend to reduce the causes which still disturb the peace and harmony of society?

We accuse the Southern whites of having missed their chance of gaining the confidence of the emancipated class when, by a fairly demonstrated purpose of recognizing and protecting them in their rights, they might have acquired upon them a salutary influence. That accusation is by no means unjust; but must we not admit, also, that by excluding them from their political rights and privileges we put the damper of most serious discouragement upon the good intentions which might have grown up among them? Let us place ourselves in their situation, and then ask you, how many of us would, under the same circumstances, have risen above the ordinary impulses of human nature to exert a salutary influence in defiance of our own prejudices, being so pointedly told every day that it was not the business of those laboring under political disabilities to meddle with public affairs at all? And thus, in whatever direction you may turn your eyes, you look in vain for any practical good your political disabilities might possibly accomplish. You find nothing, absolutely nothing, in their practical effects but the aggravation of evils already existing and the prevention of a salutary development.
Is it not the part of wise men, sir, to acknowledge the failure of a policy like this in order to remedy it, especially since every candid mind must recognize that by continuing the mistake, absolutely no practical good can be observed?

But I am told that the system of disabilities must be maintained for a certain moral effect. The Senator from Indiana (MR. MORTON) took great pains to inform us that it is absolutely necessary to exclude somebody from office in order to demonstrate our disapprobation of the crime of rebellion. Methinks the American people have signified their disapprobation of the crime of rebellion in a far more pointed manner. They sent against the rebellion a million armed men. We fought and conquered the armies of the rebels; we carried desolation into their land; we swept out of existence that system of slavery which was the soul of their offense and was to be the corner-stone of their new empire. If that was not signifying our disapprobation of the crime of rebellion, then I humbly submit, your system of political disabilities, only excluding some persons from office, will scarcely do it.

I remember, also, to have heard the argument that under all circumstances the law must be vindicated. What law in this case? If any law is meant, it must be the law imposing the penalty of death upon the crime of treason. Well, if at the close of the war we had assumed the stern and bloody virtue of the ancient Roman, and had proclaimed that he who raises his hand against this Republic must surely die, then we might have claimed for ourselves at least the merit of logical consistency. We might have thought that by erecting a row of gallows stretching from the Potomac to the Rio Grande, and by making a terrible example of all those who had proved faithless to their allegiance, we would strike terror into the hearts of this and coming generations, to make them tremble at the mere thought of treasonable undertakings. That we might have done. Why did we not? Because the American people instinctively recoiled from the idea; because every wise man remembered that where insurrections are punished and avenged with the bloodiest hands, there insurrections do most frequently occur; witness France and Spain and the southern part of this hemisphere; that there is a fascination in bloody reckonings which allures instead of repelling—a fascination like that of the serpent's eye, which irresistibly draws on its victim. The American people recoiled from it, because they felt and knew that the civilization of the nineteenth century has for such evils a better medicine than blood.

Thus, sir, the penalty for treason as provided for by law remained a dead letter on the statute-book, and we instinctively, adopted a generous policy, adding fresh luster to the glory
of the American name by doing so. And now you would speak of vindicating the law against treason, which demands death, by merely excluding a number of persons from eligibility to office? Do you not see that, as a vindication of the law against treason, as an act of punishment, the system of disabilities sinks down to the level of a ridiculous mockery? If you want your system of disabilities to appear at all in a respectable light, then, in the name of common-sense, do not call it a punishment for treason. Standing there, as it does, stripped of all the justification it once derived from political necessity, it would appear only as the evidence of an impotent desire to be severe without the courage to carry it out.

But having once adopted the policy of generosity, the only question for us is how to make that policy most fruitful. The answer is: We shall make the policy of generosity most fruitful by making it most complete.

The Senator from Connecticut (MR. BUCKINGHAM), whom I am so unfortunate as not to see in his seat today, when he opened the debate, endeavored to fortify his theory by an illustration borrowed from the Old Testament, and I am willing to take that illustration off his hands. He asked: "If Absalom had lived after his treason and had been excluded from his father's table, would he have had a just reason to complain of an unjust deprivation of rights?" It seems to me that story of Absalom contains a most excellent lesson, which the Senate of the United States ought to read correctly. For the killing of his brother, Absalom had lived in banishment from which the King, his father, permitted him to return; but the wayward son was but half pardoned, for he was not permitted to see his father's face. And it was for that reason, and then, that he went among the people to seduce them into a rebellion against his royal father's authority. Had he survived that rebellion, King David, as a prudent statesman, would either have killed his son Absalom or he would have admitted him to his table, in order to make him a good son again by unstinted fatherly love. But he would certainly not have permitted his son Absalom to run at large, capable of doing mischief, and at the same time by small measures of degradation inciting him to do it. And that is just the policy we have followed. We have permitted the late rebels to run at large, capable of doing mischief, and then by small measures of degradation, utterly useless for any good purpose, we incited them to do it. Looking at your political disabilities with an impartial eye, you will find that, as a measure of punishment, they did not go far enough; as a measure of policy they went much too far. We were far too generous to subjugate the hearts of our late enemies by
terror; and we mixed our generosity with just enough of bitterness to prevent it from bearing its full fruit. I repeat, we can make the policy of generosity most fruitful only by making it most complete. What objection, then, can stand against this consideration of public good?

You tell me that many of the late rebels do not deserve a full restoration of their rights. That may be so; I do not deny this; but yet, sir, if many of them do not deserve it, is it not a far more important consideration how much the welfare of the country will be promoted by it?

I am told that many of the late rebels, if we volunteer a pardon to them, would not appreciate it. I do not deny this; it may be so, for the race of fools, unfortunately, is not all extinct yet; but if they do not appreciate it, shall we have no reason to appreciate the great good which by this measure of generosity will be conferred upon the whole land?

Some Senator, referring to a defaulting paymaster who experienced the whole rigor of the law, asked us, "When a poor defaulter is punished, shall a rebel go free? Is embezzlement a greater crime than treason?" No, sir, it is not; but again I repeat, that is not the question. The question is whether a general amnesty to rebels is not far more urgently demanded by the public interest than a general pardon for thieves. Whatever may be said of the greatness and the heinous character of the crime of rebellion, a single glance at the history of the world and at the practice of other nations will convince you, that in all civilized countries the measure of punishment to be visited on those guilty of that crime is almost uniformly treated as a question of great policy and almost never as a question of strict justice. And why is this? Why is it that a thief, although pardoned, will never again be regarded as an untainted member of society, while a pardoned rebel may still rise to the highest honors of the State, and sometimes even gain the sincere and general esteem and confidence of his countrymen? Because a broad line of distinction is drawn between a violation of law in which political opinion is the controlling element (however erroneous, nay, however revolting that opinion may be, and however disastrous the consequences of the act) and those infamous crimes of which moral depravity is the principal ingredient; and because even the most disastrous political conflicts may be composed for the common good by a conciliatory process, while the infamous crime always calls for a strictly penal correction. You may call this just or not, but such is the public opinion of the civilized world, and you find it in every civilized country.
Look at the nations around us. In the Parliament of Germany how many men are there sitting who were once what you would call fugitives from justice, exiles on account of their revolutionary acts, now admitted to the great council of the nation in the fulness of their rights and privileges—and, mark you, without having been asked to abjure the opinions they formerly held, for at the present moment most of them still belong to the Liberal opposition. Look at Austria, where Count Andrassy, a man who, in 1849, was condemned to the gallows as a rebel, at this moment stands at the head of the imperial Ministry; and those who know the history of that country are fully aware that the policy of which that amnesty was a part, which opened to Count Andrassy the road to power, has attached Hungary more closely than ever to the Austrian Crown, from which a narrow-minded policy of severity would have driven her.

Now, sir, ought we not to profit by the wisdom of such examples? It may be said that other Governments were far more rigorous in their first repressive measures, and that they put off the grant of a general manesty much longer after suppressing an insurrection than we are required to do. So they did; but is not this the great Republic of the new world which marches in the very vanguard of modern civilization, and which, when an example of wisdom is set by other nations, should not only rise to its level, but far above it?

It seems now to be generally admitted that the time has come for a more comprehensive removal of political disabilities than has so far been granted. If that sentiment be sincere, if you really do desire to accomplish the greatest possible good by this measure that can be done, I would ask you, what practical advantage do you expect to derive from the exclusions for which this bill provides? Look at them one after another.

First, all those are excluded who, when the rebellion broke out, were Members of Congress, and left their seats in these halls to join it. Why are these men to be excluded as a class? Because this class contains a number of prominent individuals, who, in the rebellion, became particularly conspicuous and obnoxious, and among them we find those whom we might designate as the original conspirators. But these are few and they might have been mentioned by name. Most of those, however, who left their seats in Congress to make common cause with the rebels were in no way more responsible for the rebellion than other prominent men at the South who do not fall under this exception. If we accept at all the argument that it will be well for the cause of good government and the material welfare
of the South to readmit to the management of public affairs all the intelligence and political experience in those States, why, then, exclude as a class men who, having been Members of Congress, may be presumed to possess a higher degree of that intelligence and experience than the rest? If you want that article at all for good purposes, I ask you, do you not want as large a supply of that article as you can obtain?

Leaving aside the original conspirators, is there any reason in the world why those Members of Congress should be singled out from the numerous class of intelligent and prominent men who were or had been in office and had taken the same oath which is administered in these halls? Look at it. You do not propose to continue the disqualification of men who served this country as foreign Ministers, who left their important posts, betrayed the interests of this country in foreign lands to come back and join the rebellion; you do not propose to exclude from the benefit of this act those who sat upon the bench and doffed the judicial ermine to take part in the rebellion; and if such men are not to be disfranchised, why disfranchise the common run of the Congressmen, whose guilt is certainly not greater, if it be as great? Can you tell me? Is it wise even to incur the suspicion of making an exception merely for the sake of excluding somebody, when no possible good can be accomplished by it, and when you can thus only increase the number of men incited to discontent and mischief by small and unnecessary degradation?

And now as to the original conspirators, what has become of them? Some of them are dead; and as to those who are still living, I ask you, sir, are they not dead also? Look at Jefferson Davis himself. What if you exclude even him—and certainly our feelings would naturally impel us to do so; but let our reason speak—what if you exclude even him? Would you not give him an importance which otherwise he would never possess, by making people believe that you are even occupying your minds enough with him to make him an exception to an act of generous wisdom? Truly, to refrain from making an act of amnesty general on account of the original conspirators, candidly speaking, I would not consider worth while. I would not leave them the pitiable distinction of not being pardoned. Your very generosity will be to them the source of the bitterest disappointment. As long as they are excluded, they may still find some satisfaction in the delusion of being considered men of dangerous importance. Their very disabilities they look upon today as a recognition of their power. They may still make themselves and others believe that, were the Southern people only left free in their choice, they would eagerly raise them again to the highest honors.
But you relieve them of their exclusion, and they will at once become conscious of their nothingness, a nothingness most glaringly conspicuous then, for you will have drawn away the veil that has concealed it. I suspect that gentlemen on the Democratic side of the House, whom they would consider their political friends, would be filled with dismay at the mere thought of their reappearance among them. If there is anything that could prevent them from voting for universal amnesty, it might be the fear, if they entertained it at all, of seeing Jefferson Davis once more a Senator of the United States.

But more than that: you relieve that class of persons, those old misleaders, of their exclusion, and they will soon discover that the people whom they once plunged into disaster and ruin have in the meantime grown, if not as wise as they ought to be, certainly too wise to put their destinies in the hands of the same men again. I hope, therefore, you will not strip this measure of the merit of being a general amnesty to spare the original plotters this most salutary experience.

So much for the first exception. Now to the second. It excludes from the benefit of this act all those who were officers of the Army or of the Navy and then joined the rebellion. Why exclude that class of persons? I have heard the reason very frequently stated upon the floor of the Senate; it is because those men had been educated at the public expense, and their turning against the Government was therefore an act of peculiar faithlessness and black ingratitude. That might appear a very strong argument at first sight. But I ask you was it not one of the very first acts of this Administration to appoint one of the most prominent and conspicuous of that class to a very lucrative and respectable public office? I mean General Longstreet. He had obtained his military education at the expense of the American people. He was one of the wards, one of the pets of the American Republic, and then he turned against it as a rebel. Whatever of faithlessness, whatever of black ingratitude there is in such conduct, it was in his; and yet, in spite of all this, the President nominated him for an office, and your consent, Senators, made him a public dignitary. Why did you break the rule in his case? I will not say that you did it because he had become a Republican, for I am far from attributing any mere partisan motive to your action. No; you did it because his conduct after the close of hostilities had been that of a well-disposed and law-abiding citizen. Thus, then, the rule which you, Senators, have established for your own conduct is simply this: you will in the case of officers of the Army or the Navy waive the charge of peculiar faithlessness and ingratitude, if the persons in question after the war have become law-abiding and well-disposed citizens. Well,
is it not a fact universally recognized, and I believe entirely uncontradicted, that of all classes of men connected with the rebellion there is not one whose conduct since the close of the war has been so unexceptionable, and in a great many instances so beneficial in its influence upon Southern society, as the officers of the Army and the Navy, especially those who before the war had been members of our regular establishments? Why, then, except them from this act of amnesty? If you take subsequent good conduct into account at all, these men are the very last who, as a class, ought to be excluded. And would it not be well to encourage them in well-doing by a sign on our part that they are not to be looked upon as outcasts whose influence is not desired, even when they are inclined to use it for the promotion of the common welfare?

The third class excluded consists of those who were members of State conventions, and in those State conventions voted for ordinances of secession. If we may judge from the words which fell from the lips of the Senator from Indiana, they were the objects of his particular displeasure. Why this? Here we have a large number of men of local standing who in some cases may have been leaders on a small scale, but most of whom were drawn into the whirl of the revolutionary movement just like the rest of the Southern population. If you accept the proposition that it will be well and wise to permit the intelligence of the country to participate in the management of the public business, the exclusion of just these people will appear especially inappropriate because their local influence might be made peculiarly beneficial; and if you exclude these persons, whose number is considerable, you tell just that class of people whose cooperation might be made most valuable, that their cooperation is not wanted, for the reason that, according to the meaning and intent of your system of disabilities, public affairs are no business of theirs. You object that they are more guilty than the rest. Suppose they are—and in many cases I am sure they are only apprently so—but if they were not guilty of any wrong, they would need no amnesty. Amnesty is made for those who bear a certain degree of guilt. Or would you indulge here in the solemn farce of giving pardon only to those who are presumably innocent? You grant your amnesty that it may bear good fruit; and if you do it for that purpose, then do not diminish the good fruit it may bear by leaving unplanted the most promising soil upon which it may grow.

A few words now about the second section of the bill before you, which imposes upon those who desire to have the benefit of amnesty the duty of taking, before some public officer, an oath to support the Constitution, that oath to be regis-
tered, the lists to be laid before Congress and to be preserved in the office of the Secretary of State. Sir, I ask you, can you or anyone tell me what practical good is to be accomplished by a provision like this? You may say that the taking of another oath will do nobody any harm. Probably not; but can you tell me, in the name of common-sense, what harm in this case the taking of that oath will prevent? Or have we read the history of the world in vain, that we should not know yet, how little political oaths are worth to improve the morality of a people or to secure the stability of a government? And what do you mean to accomplish by making up and preserving your lists of pardoned persons? Can they be of any possible advantage to the country in any way? Why, then, load down an act like this with such useless circumstance, while as an act of grace and wisdom it certainly ought to be as straightforward and simple as possible?

Let me now in a few words once more sum up the whole meaning of the question which we are now engaged in discussing. No candid man can deny that our system of political disabilities is in no way calculated to protect the rights or the property or the life or the liberty of any living man, or in any way practically to prevent the evil-disposed from doing mischief? Why do you think of granting any amnesty at all? Is it not to produce on the popular mind at the South a conciliatory effect, to quicken the germs of good intentions, to encourage those who can exert a beneficial influence, to remove the pretexts of ill-feeling and animosity and to aid in securing to the Southern States the blessings of good and honest government? If that is not your design, what can it be?

But if it be this, if you really do desire to produce such moral effects, then I entreat you also to consider what moral means you have to employ in order to bring forth those moral effects you contemplate. If an act of generous statesmanship, or of statesmanlike generosity, is to bear full fruit, it should give not as little as possible, but it should give as much as possible. You must not do things by halves if you want to produce whole results. You must not expose yourself to the suspicion of a narrow-minded desire to pinch off the size of your gift wherever there is a chance for it, as if you were afraid you could by any possibility give too much, when giving more would benefit the country more, and when giving less would detract from the beneficent effect of that which you do give.

Let me tell you it is the experience of all civilized nations the world over, when an amnesty is to be granted at
all, the completest amnesty is always the best. Any limitation you may impose, however plausible it may seem at first sight, will be calculated to take away much of the virtue of that which is granted. I entreat you, then, in the name of the accumulated experience of history, let there be an end of these bitter and useless and disturbing questions; let the books be finally closed, and when the subject is forever dismissed from our discussions and our minds, we shall feel as much relieved as those who are relieved of their political disabilities.

Sir, I have to say a few words about an accusation which has been brought against those who speak in favor of universal amnesty. It is the accusation resorted to in default of more solid argument, that those who advise amnesty, especially universal amnesty, do so because they have fallen in love with the rebels. No, sir, it is not merely for the rebels I plead. We are asked, shall the rebellion go entirely unpunished? No, it shall not. Neither do I think that the rebellion has gone entirely unpunished. I ask you, had the rebels nothing to lose but their lives and their offices? Look at it.

There was a proud and arrogant aristocracy planting their feet on the necks of the laboring people, and pretending to be the born rulers of this great Republic. They looked down, not only upon their slaves, but also upon the people of the North, with the haughty contempt of self-asserting superiority. When their pretensions to rule us all were first successfully disputed, they resolved to destroy this Republic, and to build upon the cornerstone of slavery an empire of their own in which they could hold absolute sway. They made the attempt with the most overweeningly confident expectation of certain victory. Then came the civil war, and after four years of struggle their whole power and pride lay shivered to atoms at our feet; their sons dead by tens of thousands on the battlefields of this country; their fields and their homes devastated; their fortunes destroyed; and more than that, the whole system in which they had their very being, with all their hopes and pride, utterly wiped out; slavery forever abolished, and the slaves themselves created a political power before which they had to bow their heads; and they, broken, ruined, helpless and hopeless in the dust before those upon whom they had so haughtily looked down as their vassals and inferiors. Sir, can it be said that the rebellion has gone entirely unpunished?

You may object that the loyal people, too, were subjected to terrible sufferings; that their sons, too, were slaughtered by tens of thousands; that the mourning of countless widows and
orphans is still darkening our land; that we are groaning under terrible burdens which the rebellion has loaded upon us, and that therefore part of the punishment has fallen upon the innocent. And it is certainly true.

But look at the difference. We issued from this great conflict as conquerors; upon the graves of our slain we could lay the wreath of victory; our widows and orphans, while mourning the loss of their dearest, still remember with proud exultation that the blood of their husbands and fathers was not spilled in vain; that it flowed for the greatest and holiest and at the same time the most victorious of causes; and when our people labor in the sweat of their brow to pay the debt which the rebellion has loaded upon us, they do it with the proud consciousness that the heavy price they have paid is infinitely overbalanced by the value of the results they have gained: slavery abolished; the great American people no longer a people of masters and slaves, but a people of equal citizens; the most dangerous element of disturbance and disintegration wiped out from among us; this country put upon the course of harmonious development, greater, more beautiful, mightier than ever in its self-conscious power. And thus, whatever losses, whatever sacrifices, whatever sufferings we may have endured, they appear before us in a blaze of glory.

But how do the Southern people stand there? All they have sacrificed, all they have lost, all the blood they have spilled, all the desolation of their homes, all the distress that stares them in the face, all the wreck and ruin they see around them, all for nothing, all for a wicked folly, all for a disastrous infatuation: the very graves of their dead nothing but monuments of shadowy delusion; all their former hopes vanished forever; and the very magniloquence which some of their leaders are still indulging in, nothing but a mocking illustration of their utter discomfiture! Ah, sir, if ever human efforts broke down in irretrievable disaster, if ever human pride was humiliated to the dust, if ever human hopes were turned into despair, there you behold them.

You may say that they deserved it all. Yes, but surely, sir, you cannot say that the rebellion has gone entirely unpunished. Nor will the Senator from Indiana, with all his declamation, make any sane man believe that, had no political disabilities ever been imposed, the history of the rebellion, as long as the memory of men retains the recollection of the great story, will ever encourage a future generation to rebel again, or that, if even this great example of disaster should fail to extinguish the spirit of rebellion, his little scarecrow of exclusion
from office will be more than a thing to be laughed at by little boys.

And yet, sir, it is certainly true that after the close of the war we treated the rebels with a generosity never excelled in the history of the world. And thus in advising a general amnesty it is not merely for the rebels I plead. But I plead for the good of the country, which in its best interests will be benefited by amnesty just as much as the rebels are benefited themselves, if not more.

Nay, sir, I plead also for the colored people of the South, whose path will be smoothed by a measure calculated to assuage some of the prejudices and to disarm some of the bitternesses which still confront them; and I am sure that nothing better could happen to them, nothing could be more apt to make the growth of good feeling between them and the former master-class easier than the destruction of a system which, by giving them a political superiority, endangers their peaceable enjoyment of equal rights.

And I may say to my honorable friend from Massachusetts (Mr. Sumner), who knows well how highly I esteem him, and whom I sincerely honor for his solicitude concerning the welfare of the lowly, that my desire to see their wrongs righted is no less sincere and no less unhampered by any traditional prejudice than his; although I will confess that as to the Constitutional means to that end we may sometimes seriously differ. But I cannot refrain from expressing my regret that this measure should be loaded with anything that is not strictly germane to it, knowing as we both do that the amendment he has proposed cannot secure the necessary two-thirds vote in at least one of the houses of Congress, and that therefore it will be calculated to involve this measure also in the danger of common failure.

I repeat, it is not merely for the rebels I plead; it is for the whole American people; for there is not a citizen in the land whose true interests, rightly understood, are not largely concerned in every measure affecting the peace and welfare of any State of this Union.

Believe me, Senators, the statesmanship which this period of our history demands, is not exhausted by high-sounding declamation about the greatness of the crime of rebellion, and fearful predictions as to what is going to happen unless the rebels are punished with sufficient severity. We have heard so much of this from some gentlemen, and so little else, that
the inquiry naturally suggests itself, whether this is the whole compass, the be-all and the end-all, of their political wisdom and their political virtue; whether it really is their opinion that the people of the South may be plundered with impunity by rascals in power; that the substance of those States may be wasted; that their credit may be ruined; that their prosperity may be blighted; that their future may be blasted; that the poison of bad feeling may still be kept working where we might do something to assuage its effects; that the people may lose more and more their faith in the efficiency of self-government and of republican institutions; that all this may happen, and we look on complacently, if we can only continue to keep a thorn in the side of our late enemies, and to demonstrate again and again, as the Senator from Indiana has it, our disapprobation of the crime of rebellion?

Sir, appeals such as these, which we have heard here so frequently, may well be apt to tickle the ear of an unthinking multitude. But unless I am grievously in error, the people of the United States are a multitude not unthinking. The American people are fast becoming aware that, great as the crime of rebellion is, there are other villainies beside it; that much as it may deserve punishment, there are other evils flagrant enough to demand energetic correction; that the remedy for such evils does after all not consist in the maintenance of political disabilities, and that it would be well to look behind those vociferous demonstrations of exclusive and austere patriotism to see what abuses and faults of policy they are to cover, and what rotten sores they are to disguise. The American people are fast beginning to perceive that good and honest government in the South, as well as throughout the whole country, restoring a measurable degree of confidence and contentment, will do infinitely more to revive true loyalty and a healthy National spirit, than keeping alive the resentments of the past by a useless degradation of certain classes of persons; and that we shall fail to do our duty unless we use every means to contribute our share to that end. And those, I apprehend, expose themselves to grievous disappointment, who still think that by dinning again and again in the ears of the people the old battlecries of the civil war, they can befog the popular mind as to the true requirements of the times, and overawe and terrorize the public sentiment of the country.

Sir, I am coming to a close. One word more. We have heard protests here against amnesty as a measure intended to make us forget the past and to obscure and confuse our moral appreciation of the great events of our history. No, sir;
neither would I have the past forgotten, with its great experiences and teachings. Let the memory of the grand uprising for the integrity of the Republic; let those heroic deeds and sacrifices before which the power of slavery crumbled into dust, be forever held in proud and sacred remembrance by the American people. Let it never be forgotten, as I am sure it never can be forgotten, that the American Union, supported by her faithful children, can never be undermined by any conspiracy ever so daring, nor overthrown by any array of enemies ever so formidable. Let the great achievements of our struggle for National existence be forever a source of lofty inspiration to our children and children's children.

But surely, sir, I think no generous resolution on our part will mar the luster of those memories, nor will it obliterate from the Southern mind the overwhelming experience, that he who raises his hand against the majesty of this Republic is doomed to disastrous humiliation and ruin. I would not have it forgotten; and, indeed, that experience is so indelibly written upon the Southern country that nothing can wipe it out.

But, sir, as the people of the North and of the South must live together as one people, and as they must be bound together by the bonds of a common National feeling, I ask you, will it not be well for us so to act that the history of our great civil conflict, which cannot be forgotten, can neither be remembered by Southern men without finding in its closing chapter this irresistible assurance: that we, their conquerors, meant to be, and were, after all, not their enemies, but their friends? When the Southern people con over the distressing catalogue of the misfortunes they have brought upon themselves, will it not be well, will it not be "devoutly to be wished" for our common future, if at the end of that catalogue they find an act which will force every fair-minded man in the South to say of the Northern people: "When we were at war they inflicted upon us the severities of war; but when the contest had closed and they found us prostrate before them, grievously suffering, surrounded by the most perplexing difficulties and on the brink of new disasters, they promptly swept all the resentments of the past out of their way and stretched out their hands to us with the very fullest measure of generosity, anxious, eager, to lift us up from our prostration?"

Sir, will not this do something to dispel those mists of error and prejudice which are still clouding the Southern mind? I ask again, will it not be well to add to the sad memories of the past which forever will live in their minds,
this cheering experience, so apt to prepare them for the
harmony of a better and common future?

No, sir; I would not have the past forgotten, but I
would have its history completed and crowned by an act most
worthy of a great, noble and wise people. By all the means
which we have in our hands, I would make even those who have
sinned against this Republic see in its flag, not the symbol
of their lasting degradation, but of rights equal to all; I
would make them feel in their hearts, that in its good and
evil fortunes their rights and interests are bound up just
as ours are, and that therefore its peace, its welfare, its
honor and its greatness may and ought to be as dear to them
as they are to us.

I do not, indeed, indulge in the delusion that this
act alone will remedy all the evils which we now deplore. No,
it will not; but it will be a powerful appeal to the very best
instincts and impulses of human nature; it will, like a warm
ray of sunshine in springtime, quicken and call to light the
germs of good intention wherever they exist; it will give new
courage, confidence and inspiration to the well-disposed; it
will weaken the power of the mischievous, by stripping of their
pretexts and exposing in their nakedness the wicked designs
they still may cherish; it will light anew the beneficent glow
of fraternal feeling and of National spirit; for, sir, your
good sense as well as your heart must tell you that, when this
is truly a people of citizens equal in their political rights,
it will then be easier to make it also a people of brothers.
Nobody can survey this vast and enthusiastic assembly, gathered from all parts of the Republic, without an emotion of astonishment and hope—astonishment considering the spontaneity of the impulse which has brought it together, and hope considering the great purpose for which it has met. The Republic may well congratulate itself upon the fact that such a meeting was possible. Look at the circumstances from which it has sprung. We saw the American people just issued from a great and successful struggle, and in the full pride of their National strength, threatened with new evils and dangers of an insidious nature, and the masses of the population apparently not aware of them. We saw jobbery and corruption stimulated to unusual audacity by the opportunities of a protracted civil war, invading the public service of the Government, as well as almost all movements of the social body, and we saw a public opinion most deplorably lenient in its judgment of public and private dishonesty. We saw the Government indulging in wanton disregard of the laws of the land, and resorting to daring assumptions of unconstitutional power, and we saw the people, apparently at least acquiescing with reckless levity in the transgressions, threatening the very life of our free institutions. We saw those in authority with tyrannical insolence thrust the hand of power through the vast machinery of the public service into local and private affairs, and we saw the innumerable mass of their adherents accept those encroachments upon their independence without protest or resentment. We saw men in the highest places of the Republic employ their power and opportunities for selfish advantage, thus stimulating the demoralization of our political life, and by their conspicuous example, and the loud chorus of partisan sycophancy, drown the voice of honest criticism. We saw part of our common country, which had been convulsed by a disastrous rebellion, most grievously suffering from the consequences of the civil war; and we saw the haughty spirit of power refusing to lift up those who had gone astray and were now suffering, by a policy of generous conciliation and the statesmanship of common-sense. We observed this, and at the same time a reckless and greedy party spirit, in the name of a great organization, crowned with the laurels of glorious achievements, striving to palliate or justify these wrongs and abuses, to stifle the moral sense of the people, and to drive them by a tyrannical party discipline not only to submit to this for the present, but to perpetuate it, that the political power of the country might be preserved in the hands of those who possessed it. He who calmly and impartially surveyed this spectacle could not fail to be deeply alarmed,
not only at the wrongs that had been and were being perpetrated, but at the subjugation of the popular spirit which did not rise up against them.

The question might well have been asked, have the American people become so utterly indifferent to their true interests, to their National harmony, to the purity of their political life, to the integrity of their free institutions, to the very honor of the American name, that they should permit themselves to be driven like a flock of sheep by those who assume to lord it over them? That question has now found an answer. The virtue, the spirit of independence, the love of liberty, the republican pride of the American people are not dead yet and do not mean to die, and that answer is given in thunder-tones by the convention of American freemen here assembled. Indeed, those who three months ago first raised their voices, did so with an abiding faith that their appeals could not remain without response, but the volume of that response has now far exceeded their anticipations. The crust of narrow prejudices, of selfish partisanship, which but yesterday seemed to stop every free pulsation of the popular heart, is suddenly burst asunder. The patriotic citizen rises above the partisan. We begin to breathe again as freemen. We dare again call things by their right names. We have once more the courage to break through the deceptions with which the popular mind has been befogged; we feel once more that our convictions of right and wrong are our own, and that our votes belong to the country, and thus we defiantly set our sense of duty against the arrogance of power, like the bugle blast of doomsday. The summons is resounding North and South and East and West. The conscience of the people, which seemed dead, has arisen. From every point of the compass the hosts are flocking together, and here we are, let me hope, ay, I do hope, with fearless determination, to do our whole duty, as if nothing could withstand a movement so irresistibly inspiring. Indeed, the breath of victory is in the very air which surrounds us, and that victory will not escape from our grasp if we are true to our mission, but you must bear with me if in this hour of enthusiasm, when our hearts are big with proud presentiments, I address to you a word of soberness.

We have a grand opportunity before us, grand and full of promise. We can crush corruption in our public concerns; we can give the Republic a pure and honest Government; we can revive the authority of the laws; we can restore to full value the Constitutional safeguard of our liberties; we can infuse a higher moral spirit into our political life; we can reanimate
in the hearts of the whole people in every section of the land—a fraternal and proud National feeling. We can do all this, but we can do it only by throwing behind us the selfish spirit of political trade. We obey the purest and loftiest inspirations of the popular uprising which sent us here. A great opportunity; it is as great as the noblest ambition might desire, but equally great—nay, to my mind, fearful—is the responsibility it brings with it, an opportunity like this momentous period in the history of a nation. An uprising of the people such as we behold will not occur every day, nor every year, for it must spring from the spontaneous impulse of the popular mind. Disappoint the high expectations brought forth by that spontaneous impulse, and you have not only lost a great opportunity, but you have struck a blow at the confidence which the people have in themselves, and for a long time popular reform movements will not rise again under the weight of the discredit which you will have brought upon them. Is it possible that such should be the result of our doings? It is possible, if we do not rise to the full height of our duty. It is possible, if, instead of following the grand impulse of the popular heart, we attempt to control and use this movement by the old tricks of the political trader, or fritter away our zeal in small bickerings and mean, selfish aspirations. We have come together to give shape, point and practical productive force to this great upheaval of the popular conscience. It is our business to lay down certain principles and propositions of policy, and we have to present to the suffrage of the people, men for the highest offices of the Republic, who, if elected, are to carry those principles and propositions into a living reality.

As to our platform, we shall be wise enough to keep in mind those things which a republic stands most in need of. The very fact of our having come together is proof of our substantial agreement. Let us only, in what we promise to the people, be honest and straightforward and not attempt to cheat those whom we ask to follow our lead, by deceitful representations. As to the men whom we shall present for the highest offices of the Government, let us, I entreat you, not lose sight of the fact that great reforms, the overthrow of inveterate abuses, the establishment of a better order of things are not accomplished by mere promises and declarations, but require the wise and energetic action of statesmen if this is to be truly a reform movement, and if it be not merely on paper. But it must be embodied in the men we trust with the power to infuse the spirit of reform into practical action. You will hardly excel them in the profusion of high-sounding professions and you will never excel them in the art of how not to do it.
Reform must become a farce in the hands of those who either do not understand it or do not care for it. If you mean reform, intrust the work to none but those who understand it and honestly do care, and care more for it than for their own personal ends. Pardon me if I express myself on this point with freedom and frankness. I have not, I assure you, come here for the purpose of urging the claims or advancing the interest of any one man against all others. I have come here with sincere and ardent devotion to a cause, and to use my best endeavors to have that cause put under the care of men who are devoted to it with equal sincerity and possess those qualities of mind and heart which will make it safe in their keeping. I earnestly deprecate the cry we have heard so frequently, "Anybody to beat Grant." There is something more wanted than to beat Grant. Not anybody who might, by cheap popularity, or by astute bargains and combinations, or by all the tricks of political wirepulling, manage to scrape together votes enough to be elected President. We do not merely want another, but we want a better President than we have now. We do not want a mere change of persons in the Administration of the Government; we want the overthrow of a pernicious system; we want the eradication of flagrant abuses; we want the infusion of a loftier moral spirit into our political organization; we want a Government which the best people of this country will be proud of. Not anybody can accomplish that, and, therefore, away with the cry, "Anybody to beat Grant"; a cry too paltry, too unworthy of the great enterprise in which we are engaged. I do not struggle for the mere punishment of an opponent, nor for a temporary lease of power. There is to me a thing no less, nay, more important even than our success in this campaign, and that is that the American people shall not be disappointed in the fruits which our victory is to bear. If we should fail to select men who will carry out the beneficent reforms we contemplate, then, let me say it boldly, it would be better had this movement never been undertaken; for continuance of those in power who possess it now would mean only a reformatory movement deferred and an opportunity lost. Still, while our failure now would mean a great reform movement sunk to the level of a farce, a great opportunity lost and the hope of a people turned into discouragement and disgust, let us discard at least the fatal error into which many seem to have fallen, that no statesmanship is required to conduct the affairs of a great government.

I candidly believe the people are waking up to the truth, for unless I greatly mistake the spirit of this day, what the people most earnestly demand now is, not that mere good intentions, but that a superior intelligence, coupled with superior virtue, should guide our affairs; not that merely an
honest and popular man, but that a statesman be put at the head of our Government. In selecting candidates for office, politicians are accustomed to discuss the question of availability. What does availability mean in our case? Let us look for the best men we have, and from the very best let us select the strongest. The people earnestly desire a thorough reform of our Government. They want not only a change, but a change for the better. They want also, therefore, to be assured that it will be for the better, and that the best candidate is likely to be the most available. If we present men to the suffrages of the people whose character and names appeal to the loftiest instincts and aspirations of the patriot-citizen, we shall have on our side that which ought to be and now I trust will be the ruling arbiter of political contests, the conscience of the Nation. If that be done, success will be certain. Then we can appeal to the minds and hearts, to the loftiest ambition of the people, with these arguments and entreaties which spring only from a clear conviction of right. Then we shall not appeal in vain for their support to those of our fellow-citizens who hitherto were separated from us by party divisions, who desire honestly to work for the best interests of the country in this crisis, and whom we shall welcome with fraternal greeting in this struggle for a great cause, whether they call themselves Democrats or Republicans. Then we shall successfully overcome those prejudices which now confront us, and the insidious accusation, that this great Convention is a mere gathering of disappointed and greedy politicians, will fall harmless at our feet, for we shall have demonstrated by our action that we were guided by the purest and most patriotic of motives. And this can be done.

Let us despise as unworthy of our cause the tricky manipulations by which, to the detriment of the Republic, political bodies have so frequently been controlled. Let us, in the face of the great things to be accomplished, rise above all petty considerations. Personal friendship and State pride are noble sentiments; but what is personal friendship, what is State pride, compared with the great duty we owe to our common country, and the awful responsibility resting upon our action as sensible men? We know that not every one of us can be gratified by the choice of his favorite; many of us will have to be disappointed; but in this solemn hour our hearts should know but one favorite, and that is the American Republic.

Pardon me for these words of warning and entreaty. I trust nobody will consider them misplaced. I fervently hope the result of our deliberations will show that they were not spoken in vain. I know that they have sprung from the most anxious desire to do what is best for our country, and thus I appeal to
you with all the fervor of anxious earnestness. We stand on the threshold of a great victory, and victory will surely be ours if we truly deserve it.
MR. PRESIDENT:—Every Senator who has spoken upon the subject before us has treated it as a matter of most painful interest; and quite naturally so, for nobody could approach it without reluctance. It is hardly possible that there should be the least personal or political bias in this debate, at least none unfavorable to the gentleman most nearly concerned. As far as I know, the conduct of the Senator from Kansas on this floor has been uniformly inoffensive and courteous. He has, I presume, no personal enemy here. We also know that in case he should be removed from his seat in the Senate, the legislature of Kansas is certain to put a successor into his place who will be of exactly the same party complexion, and there can, therefore, be no political loss or gain involved in a change as to party strength on this floor. If ever there was a case which might be treated upon its own merits, it is this.

We have to meet here first; a question of law; secondly, a question of fact; and then, also, what I might call a question of policy as to the rigorous or lenient application of the law to the facts and the person.

In discussing the question of law, I invite the Senate to assume a state of facts as fully established. Suppose a person has taken his seat here, elected by a State legislature, presenting when he appeared among us regular credentials in the correctest form, and proving by the unusual evidence that in his election every prescription of law had been fully complied with. Suppose, then, it is subsequently shown that the election of that person was effected and carried by gross bribery; suppose a clear case discloses itself of a purchase with money of a seat in the Senate of the United States. Then the question arises: Has the Senate any power to protect itself by the exclusion of such a person?

An argument has been submitted by the Senator from Kansas, and as that argument goes further in its assumptions than any other, I will discuss it first.

He says the Senate cannot unseat that person by declaring the election invalid, because the Senate has not the Constitutional power to go behind the regular certificate of election, signed by the governor and bearing the great seal of the State; and, secondly, he says that the Senate cannot expel such a person by a two-thirds vote, because the act of bribery was committed before that person was a Senator, and the jurisdiction of the Senate cannot date back to an offense.
committed antecedent to the election; ergo, the Senate has absolutely no power at all in such a case. If I understood the argument submitted by the Senator from Kansas correctly, these were its salient points. What follows? The Senate must sit still, and with absolute quietness and submission suffer not only that person to take his seat, but, as the case may be, must suffer one after another of these seats to be filled by men who have acquired them by bribery, purchase, fraud and not by honest election, for to each one of those cases the same reasoning will apply which is now applied to this. However outrageous their proceedings, however glaring their corrupt practices may have been, we must treat such political merchants as brother Senators; we must suffer them to exercise the same influence upon the legislation of this Republic which is exercised by others; and all this, no matter what may become of the honor of the highest legislative body of this Republic; no matter what may become of the confidence of the people in their lawmakers, and therefore of their respect for the laws; no matter what may become of the purity and integrity of representative government and of republican institutions.

This, sir, is the argument submitted by the Senator from Kansas. It would seem to me as if the mere statement of the consequences which necessarily must flow from such an assumption would in itself be sufficient to show that in the very nature of things it cannot be correct; that the wise men who made the Constitution of this country cannot have left the highest law-giving body of the land in so pitifully helpless a condition. The mere supposition appears on its very face absurd.

Now, in inquiring into the power of the Senate to act upon such a case, I shall not consume any time in a discussion of the English precedents which have been quoted here, and this partly for the reason that I am not as learned and have not made myself as familiar with their details as others; but mainly because I consider those precedents by no means conclusive, when we have before us a document which gives us all the law we need; and that is the Constitution of the United States.

The Constitution provides in the first place that the Senate, as well as the House of Representatives, shall have the discretionary power to expel a member by a two-thirds vote. That power is not limited to this or that offense; but it is vested in the discretion of each house of Congress, and
it has already been demonstrated with irrefutable arguments that although an act of bribery by which a person lifted himself into one of these seats was indeed antecedent to his becoming a Senator, nevertheless that act of bribery, being the very stepping-stone upon which he rose into his legislative office, is so intimately connected with his becoming and being a Senator that the two things cannot be separated; that therefore this power to expel a member must necessarily apply. This is so clear, so self-evident, that not a word more is required.

But the Constitution of the United States provides also that "each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members"; and in discussing that clause I shall give particular attention to the remarks submitted to us to-day by the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Scott).

It strikes me that in this discussion one thing, with regard to the meaning of the Constitutional clause just quoted, has been overlooked; and that is the very important fact that this clause of the Constitution applies to both houses of Congress exactly alike; that its meaning for both houses of Congress must be exactly the same; for it reads that "each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members." No difference is made between the two.

What, then, can that clause of the Constitution mean? We have to judge of three different things: first, of the "qualifications," and what they are the Constitution itself states; then of the returns, and what they are we all know; but we have also to judge of the elections—"elections" kept distinct from "qualifications," and from "returns." The qualifications may be complete; the returns may be in the most perfect order upon their face; and yet the Senate as well as the House of Representatives, both under the same clause of the Constitution, which must necessarily mean as to both houses the same thing, have to apply their judgment also to the election of their respective members. What does it mean, I ask? Must it not mean that the judgment of each house shall not only go to the forms, but also to what I might call the essence, of an election? Has not each house to judge whether that which pretends to be an election is in truth and reality an election or not? If the word "election" in that clause of the Constitution means anything, it must mean that; if it does not mean that, it means nothing. Now does anybody question, has anybody every doubted, that the
House of Representatives has always held so under the Constitutional clause which applies to both houses alike? The House of Representatives has always exercised the power, under this clause, to judge whether a man had been really and honestly and legally elected by a majority of the legal votes cast. Has it ever been questioned that the House of Representatives had the power, under this clause, to declare an election illegal and void, if that election had been controlled by bribery and fraud? As far as I know, nobody in the world has ever questioned it; and you will notice that power was exercised by the House of Representatives by virtue of identically the same clause of the Constitution under which we, as Senators, are to exercise our judgment.

Now, one thing has been accepted as a legal maxim from time immemorial; and that is, that fraud vitiates a contract, vitiates a bond, a judgment. Who will deny that fraud would vitiate also that which we might call a conditional relation between a constituency and a Representative, and the Legislative branch of the Government? But if each house is Constitutionally the judge, not only of the qualifications and of the returns, but also of the essence of an election, must it not have power to judge whether an election is vitiated by fraud or not? The House of Representatives has always acted on that principle by virtue of the Constitutional provision conferring upon the Senate and the House the same power in the same language. Then I will ask, why not the Senate?

But it is objected that the position of a Senator is widely different from the position of a Representative; that a Senator represents a State; that the election of a Senator by a State legislature according to law is the conclusive act of a State sovereign in its sphere, and that, if duly certified, it cannot be questioned. It is claimed that there is a certain mysterious power attaching to the great seal of a State affixed to a certificate of election which is foreign to the certificate of election of a Representative. I need not say to the Senate that I am as firm an advocate and defender of Constitutional State-rights and of local self-government as any member of this body; but I affirm that the Constitution does not give a State sovereign control over its Senators, but it does just the reverse. True, the Constitution provides "that the Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the legislature thereof for six years, and each Senator shall have one vote." In so far Senators may be regarded as the representatives of their respective States, and undoubtedly they are. But the Constitution does not regard the election
of a Senator as in every respect a matter of discretion with
the State. The Constitution does not permit a State to ap-
point a Senator just as it pleases. The Constitution gives
Congress the power to regulate by law the manner in which
Representatives shall be elected. The only difference is as
to the place of election. Congress has made such laws, pre-
scribing on what day of the session of a legislature the
election of a Senator shall be proceeded with, how the votes
shall be taken in both branches separately, how in joint con-
vention, and so on.

Why does the Constitution put the election of Senators
thus under the control of Congress just as it does the elec-
tion of members of the House of Representatives? Because
the Constitution does not regard a Senator as a mere diplo-
matic agent of the State, of one sovereignty near another
sovereignty, appointed to take care of the interest of that
State only, and remaining under the control of that State.
By no means. The Constitution regards the Senate of the United
States not as an assembly of State agents, but as a branch of
the Legislative department of the General Government. It re-
gards a Senator here as being appointed to take part in legis-
lation concerning the interests of all the States and of all
the people, and, when once elected as a member of that Legis-
lative department, that Senator is, during his Constitutional
term of office, entirely, completely out of the control of
his State, just as the member of the House of Representatives
is out of the control of his district constituency.

The Constitution indeed provides that the number of
Senators from each State shall be two, undoubtedly to preserve
as much as possible a certain equality of the influence of the
different States upon the legislation of the country. It
indeed provides that Senators shall be elected by the State
legislatures, looking upon the legislatures as more represen-
tative of the individuality of the States, and also possibly
to secure to the highest law-giving body of this country a
superior class of men. But in point of fact it is absolutely
certain, and it cannot be denied, that while the constituencies
are different, the relation of a Senator, when once elected,
to his constituency is in no essential point different from
the relation a member of the House of Representatives to his,
and I defy denial of this fact. Neither the Senator nor the
Representative can be recalled. The Representative and the
Senator are equally out of the reach and the control of their
respective constituents. With regard to the Senator, there-
fore, the sovereignty of the State becomes utterly inoperative
as soon as the fact of his election is accomplished. When the
Senator has once been elected, even before he is sworn into office at that desk, the State has no power to reconsider that election, nor to recall him.

And now, sir, when it is discovered that the election of a Senator has been effected by fraud or bribery, has a sovereign State the power to undo its own act to set itself right? Not at all. Not at all. Not even the discovery made before the Senator has taken his seat would enable the legislature to reconsider its election. It can, in such a case, only memorialize the Senate of the United States, setting forth the facts, and then the Senate only can act in the case upon its own knowledge and judgment, for the Senator has passed entirely out of control of his State, and entirely within the control of the Senate. Thus, when the people of a State have been defrauded, say by the purchase of a senatorial election, they are, with all their sovereignty, bound hand and foot, and not the State, but only the Senate, can furnish the necessary relief.

Now if the Senate, by virtue of its Constitutional powers, does declare a fraudulent election invalid, does that constitute what was called here an encroachment upon the rights of the State? Let us see. In what would such encroachment consist? Not in this, that the Senate in declaring such an election invalid arrogates a power to itself which belongs to the State, for no such power ever belonged to the State, and certainly you cannot encroach upon a power which does not exist. You might just as well say that I arrogate to myself your right to draw upon my deposit in a bank, or that I encroach upon your right to educate my children. Nor can that pretended encroachment consist in this, that the State is thereby deprived of its elected representative, for, in the case I have assumed, first, that representative is not legally elected; secondly, it must be presumed, in common-sense and decency, that the State would rather desire to be relieved of a representative who has defrauded it, (and I include in the term representative Senators also), and that it would itself annul its own act if it had the power to do so, which it has not; and, thirdly, the State is not deprived of its representation nor of its choice, for upon the unseating of a member for such a cause a new election will be ordered in the State at once; the whole matter is turned over to the State legislature for its action, and it may elect the same person turned out by the Senate if it so sees fit.

The whole pretense, therefore, of an encroachment on the sovereign and rightful powers of the State vanishes into
utter nothingness. The State retains unimpaired the full scope of its Constitutional powers and rights. The Senate by annulling an election carried by fraud or bribery only does by virtue of its Constitutional powers what the State would be glad to do, but cannot; and when that is done the whole matter is turned over to the State once more for a new election, and the State is after all the final arbiter. The exercise of this power by the Senate does, therefore, not impair, but, looking at it without prejudice, you will find that it virtually protects the rights of the States.

I have now endeavored to show, in a way at least satisfactory to myself, if to nobody else, that the power to act as the judge of the election of its members means the same thing for both houses of Congress; secondly, that it covers for both houses of Congress alike the power to vacate a seat filled by an election carried by fraud or bribery; third, that by the exercise of that power by the Senate, no Constitutional rights of the States are impaired.

But, sir, we are reminded that the resolution now before us for our action has no precedent in the history of the Senate. I admit that; but Senators will be obliged to admit also that the disclosures here have made no precedent in the history of this body; and for the honor of the American people I will suppose that were there a precedent for the one, there would be a precedent for the other; that if such a case had ever been disclosed to the American Senate, then the American Senate would have found a remedy and would not have hesitated to apply it.

But if there is no precedent in our past history, is it not time to make one? All precedents are once made for the first time, and I hope, if such a duty devolves upon us, we shall not shrink from it.

It is said, also, that the acceptance of the doctrine upon which this resolution is based would arm a bare majority with dangerous powers. Sir, there is certainly the possibility of an abuse of the power. I feel it keenly. There is no power on earth ever so carefully guarded but is liable to abuse. It is the nature of power. But I invite Senators to consider whether the danger on the other side is not more to be dreaded than the danger on this. What will be the consequence if, under circumstances such as are now surrounding us, we do reject that doctrine which gives us the power to declare a seat vacated upon the ground of bribery? Look around you. It is not from Kansas alone, it is from different states, that rumors reach
of the election of Senators by bribery, undoubtedly groundless in some cases, utterly so, I hope; but, in other cases, bearing a very serious appearance. Do we not all know that after two senatorial elections within a few months, those who had presented themselves as senatorial candidates were arrested upon charges of bribery and are now under indictment? I am very far from desiring to pre-judge any of those cases; but the testimony here before us discloses a tendency of a most alarming nature, which I am afraid is not confined to one State nor confined to one portion of the country.

Here I come to the question of fact. We have been advised by the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. Carpenter) to read this testimony, and then to form our own conclusions. I have followed that advice, or rather I acted upon my own impulses in doing so before the advice was given. I have read this testimony, every line of it, as carefully and conscientiously as it was possible for me to do; and now, sir, what do I find here? I find a man unknown to the political world. After the learned definition of the phrase "political status," which was given us yesterday by the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Logan), I will not apply that term; I will simply say that he had not signalized himself by conspicuous public service, that he was unknown to political fame, that he had given no evidence of uncommon ability in a public career; that, in other words, he had not shown those qualities which are usually apt to draw upon a man the eyes of the people with reference to high political office. That may be nothing to the dishonor of the Senator from Kansas, for not all men have had the same opportunities. But it appears as a fact that he was mainly distinguished by one thing, and that was, an uncommon abundance of money. He appeared as a candidate for the Senatorship surrounded by a horde of those political managers, whose whole political wisdom consists in a knowledge of the low tricks of the trade, in the handling of the appliances of corruption. And behind that group there loomed up one of those great moneyed corporations which now so frequently thrust their hands into the legislation of this country, who have already acquired so dangerous a power, and are threatening to extend it in a still more dangerous degree. He first buys off one competing candidate for $15,000, cash down, who did engage to transfer to him his following in the legislature, like so many head of cattle. So surrounded he steps upon the scene. The cry goes forth that there is money in that election, much money, money for all who are willing to aid. The presence of the temptation stimulates at once every vicious appetite within its reach; one man who has a vote obtains money for casting it; another learns of it and asks himself why should he cast his vote for nothing? The frequency of the practice blunts the individual conscience,
and that legislature is transformed into a market where votes are bought and sold. It is thus, as I read this testimony, that Mr. Caldwell was elected a Senator of the United States.

Now, sir, I find here not a mere isolated instance of the indiscretion of an over-zealous friend, but I find here bribery systematically organized; I find here a bacchanalian feast and riot of corruption. And when you read the testimony your imagination will fairly recoil from the spectacle of baseness and depravity that presents itself.

Well, sir, from the testimony as I find it, one thing has become clear to my mind; it is that this is not one of those cases of bribery in a single instance which we have heard spoken of as tainting an election, and, therefore, I do not discuss the question whether by a single case of bribery the election would be invalidated. But what has become clear to my mind is, that Mr. Caldwell could never have been elected Senator of the United States but for the corrupt use of money all around him.

In other words, it was the corrupt use of money and nothing else that effected and carried that election. Sir, I ask nobody to believe my mere statement and assertion; I invite every Senator to take this testimony into his own hands, to read it word for word and line after line, and if they do not come to the same conclusion, let them not vote as I shall. If I were a juryman, acting under the oath of a juryman, called upon to give my verdict, my verdict would be as I have stated; and let me say to Senators who have discussed the question of the facts that that discussion has strengthened rather than weakened my conviction.

Sir, it is to be feared that cases like this are not entirely isolated, and I beg you to consider that they certainly will not stand alone if you permit a case like this to pass with impunity. Let me ask you what can we do, what shall we do, under such circumstances? What is the duty of those who have arrived, from their study of the case, at the same convictions that I entertain, and I know there are many upon this floor? Shall we say that although the testimony convinces us that here a seat in the Senate has been purchased with money, yet that seat shall be held by the purchaser as if it had been acquired by an honest and fair election? Shall we declare, are you, Senators of the United States, prepared to declare than when a man buys a seat upon this floor, buys the high quality of a Senator of the United States, and pays for it,
it belongs to him as his property, and that, according to the fifth article of amendment to the Constitution, no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation? Is that the light in which you look at a transaction like this? Shall we increase the temptation already working to so fearful a degree by assuring to the purchaser of a seat in the Senate of the United States full security of enjoyment? Let me ask your attention to one of them. To-day, Senators, we may still be able, when we know that a seat has been acquired by purchase, to vacate it by a majority vote; but if you encourage this practice, by the promise of impunity, do you know how long it will be before so many of these seats are filled by purchasers, that the struggle will become utterly hopeless? This is not a mere dark fancy, not a mere offspring of a morbid imagination.

The country at this very moment is ringing with the cry of corruption. Is it without reason? Never before have the agencies been so powerful which seek to serve private interests by a corrupt use of money, and never before has the field of political life been so well prepared for their work. The same causes will always and everywhere bring forth similar effects. We have had a great civil war. That civil war, with its fluctuations of values and its tempting opportunities for the rapid acquisition of wealth, has left behind it a spirit of speculation and greed stimulated to most inordinate activity. There is prevalent a morbid desire to get rich and to indulge in extravagant enjoyments; and the more it grows the greater will grow the unscrupulousness of men in the employment of means to attain that end. But more than that. More than ever before has the Government of the United States extended its functions beyond its legitimate sphere; more than ever has the public Treasury been pressed into the service of private interests. Do we not all know it? Do we not see and understand what is going on around us? I ask you, sir, what is it that attracts to this National capital the horde of speculators and monopolists and their agents who so assiduously lay siege to the judgment and also the conscience of those who are to give the country its laws? What is it that fills the lobbies behind these green doors with an atmosphere of temptation so seductive that many a man has fallen a victim to it who was worthy of a better fate? What is it that has brought forth such melancholy, such deplorable exhibitions as the country witnessed last winter -- exhibitions which we should have been but too glad to hide from the eyes of the world abroad? Is it that policy which seeks to use the power of this great Republic for the advantage and benefit of private interests; it is that policy which takes money out of the pockets of the
people to put it into the pockets of a favored few; it is that policy which, wherever it has prevailed, in every age and every country, has poisoned the very fountains of legislation. Do you think, sir, that the consequences now and here will be different from what they have been at other times and elsewhere? Are not your great railroad kings and monopolists boasting to-day that they own whole legislatures and State governments and courts to do their bidding? Have we not seen some of them stalking around in this very Capitol like the sovereign lords of creation?

Are not some of them vaunting themselves now that they have made and can make profitable investments in members of Congress and in Senators of the United States? Have we not had occasion to admire the charming catholicity, the delicious cosmopolitan spirit with which these gentlemen distribute their favors, as was shown before the Credit Mobilier Committee of the House, when Mr. Durant testified that when he gave money for an election, it was entirely indifferent to him whether the man was a Democrat or a Republican provided he was "a good man"? And now let them know that a man who has purchased his seat here, or for whom it has been purchased with money, will be secure in the enjoyment of the property so bought, and, I ask you, will not their enterprise be limited only by their desires, and will not the rapacity of their desires be limited only by their opportunities? As long as such evils are permitted to exercise their influence, they will spread with the power of contagion, and nothing but the most unflinching resistance can check the evil.

Such, Mr. President, is our condition. Everybody sees it; everybody feels it; everybody knows it is so; and if we do not, the people of the United States do. And we must not be surprised if now and then the voice of some organ of public opinion comes to us with a loud complaint of the pusillanimity of Congress in dealing with such things. The Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. Carpenter) the other day spoke of it with a somewhat lofty contempt as the clamor of the mob. It may be such sometimes, but let us see what mob it is we have to deal with now. I will read a few newspaper extracts about the Credit Mobilier investigation of the House:

The House of Representatives--

This was written while the proceedings were still going on--

The House of Representatives is presenting just
such an opportunity in its treatment of the Credit Mobilier question. It is acting as if it lacked the courage to follow the men who have thrown the first stone. The evidence against Brooks and Ames is overwhelming. It is their own evidence. The only possible ground for excusing them is that what they have not done is bad for Congressmen to do. The case of all Congressmen who have held Credit Mobilier stock is also plain. The stock was an improper one to hold. It created an interest in defrauding the Government. To refuse to censure the holders of that stock is to say that the Congressional standard of morals is not high enough to condemn it.

Now, gentlemen, do you know what paper published this article? Not the New York Tribune, or the World, but the New York Times.

Here is another, written after the Credit Mobilier proceedings had closed:

The action of the House of Representatives on Judge Poland's Credit Mobilier report, in substituting a vote of censure and condemnation for the resolution expelling Ames and Brooks, and passing over the other inculpated members without notice, fell far short of the just expectations of the country. It was a clear case of moral cowardice, an unmanly shirking of responsibility. After rejecting a resolution which involved a denial of its right to expel Ames and Brooks for the offense with which they were charged; after finding them guilty by more than a two-thirds vote, the House adopted a resolution which virtually declares that a member may offer or accept a bribe and yet not be disqualified from retaining his seat on Congress.

Absolute condemnation must be the verdict of the country on such a lamentable exhibition of moral pusillanimity.

Who was the man who wrote that article? It appeared in Harper's Weekly, and I presume was written by our friend the Hon. George William Curtis.

Now, sir, such words are not those of papers which are in the habit of finding fault with the Administration and the majority. The party service rendered by these papers justifies
us in supposing that such words were extorted from them by facts which they could and would neither deny nor gloss over; and certainly, when they speak of public sentiment, they will not make that public sentiment appear in a darker color than it really bears.

I do not quote this language as having the least possible direct or indirect bearing upon the merits of the question now before us, but I quote it to show you a fact which to us as every citizen is of the highest possible public importance. That fact it is useless to disguise, and we had better fully understand and appreciate it; it is that the confidence of the American people in the integrity of their public men is fearfully shaken. That is the truth, and nobody who knows the country will deny it. Whatever you may think of the causes which have brought forth this result, whatever of the justice of this sentiment, one thing is certain; the fact itself is a public calamity; for, as has often been said in these days, and as can never be repeated too often, what is to become of the respect of the people for the laws if they lose their confidence in the law-makers? I say this not in order to cast a slur upon any one, but to admonish the Senate not to forfeit or jeopardize or weaken that confidence which it may still enjoy. But the Senate will weaken that confidence if, with such evidence before its eyes as confronts us here, it refuses to employ that power which it wields for the protection of its integrity; for the people would be justified in thinking that, if we permit seats here to be bought, we cannot, if we were willing, prevent legislation from being sold.

I would listen to the clamor of the mob just as little as any man on this floor; neither would I, in order to gain the confidence of the mob, descend to do a thing which my conviction of duty did not clearly command. I would face the mob without flinching to prevent a wrong. But I would not treat with contempt, I would treat with respect, that popular voice which calls upon me for nothing else but that I should fearlessly do my duty.

I am far from asking anybody who, upon a conscientious examination of the evidence before us, has not arrived at the same conclusions that have grown up in my mind, to vote as I shall vote; but to those who have formed the same convictions let me say, there is something higher at stake here than the fate of one individual, whom we might regard with sympathy and compassion; something higher also than the danger that might possibly grow from an abuse of power by the majority in vacating seats or annulling elections; and that something is the purity; nay, the very existence of the representative character
of our institutions. You speak of partisan recklessness that might unscrupulously employ such a power for its own selfish ends. I know that danger as well as any one knows it; I fear it just as much as any one; I am certainly not inclined to underestimate it; but I entreat you to consider that, by assuring impunity to such offenses as we are here dealing with, by securing the full fruits of their iniquity to those who purchase seats in this body, you will invite to the Senate of the United States an element which, in its very nature corrupt, will be the readiest, the most servile, the most dangerous tool in the hands of reckless partisanship. For you must know that those who feel themselves most vulnerable, those who have to shun the searching light of inquiry, will never have that courage of independence which defies attack, but are apt to be the first to earn, by the most abject and slavish service, refuge and security under the protecting wing of a powerful party. Secure the exclusion from our legislative halls of that class of men who, accustomed to the use of ignoble means, must, in the very nature of things, serve ignoble ends, and you will have secured a much better safeguard against the transgressions of a reckless partisan spirit than by confiding our power within narrower limits than those by which the Constitution has circumscribed it.

I repeat, it is the purity, it is the very existence of the representative character of our institutions that is at stake; for when it is known that seats in this body can be bought and held by right of purchase, sellers and purchasers will multiply in the same measure as the wealth of this country grows to be plundered, as the interests vary to be subserved, as the rapacity of greed increases to be glutted, and the day will come when this body will represent the bloodsuckers and the oppressors of the people, and no longer the people themselves.

Sir, it is at last time that we should look the dangers which threaten this Republic in the face. This Republic has no monarchical traditions; it has no pretenders of historic right to disturb its repose or to plot its overthrow. It is not likely to succumb to the shock of force. But there have been republics before this just as sound and healthy in their original constitution as ours, but which have died from the slower but no less fatal disease of corruption and demoralization, and of that decay of constitutional principles and that anarchy of power which always accompany corruption and demoralization. It is time for us to keep in mind that it takes more to make and to preserve a republic than the mere absence of a king, and that when a republic decays, its soul is apt to die first, while the outward form is still lasting to beguile
and deceive the eyes of the unthinking. I hope and trust that we are still far from that point; but I think no candid observer will deny that there have been symptoms of a movement in that direction; and I say it with gladness, there are also symptoms justifying the hope that the downward movement may soon be checked if the checking has not already commenced.

I ask you, what is our office under such circumstances? This is the Senate of the United States. No parliamentary body in the world, not even the House of Lords of Great Britain, possesses such exalted attributes, enjoys such a plenitude of power, is loaded with such vast responsibilities. No parliamentary assembly has in its past history been more adorned with genius and public virtue. Let no man say that of all parliamentary bodies in the world this is the only one—yes, the Senate of the United States, with all its exalted attributes, with all the plenitude of its power, with all its vast responsibilities—is the only one that has no power to judge whether its members are honestly elected, and to declare an election illegal and void on the ground of bribery, fraud and crime; that this is the only parliamentary assembly on earth which, doubting its own authority, is helplessly to surrender to the invasion of men who purchase with money their way to the highest legislative dignity of the greatest of republics, and, having bought their seats, will sell our laws. When the American people struggle against the power of corruption, their Senate at least should march in the front rank of the advancing column; their Senate at least should hold high its own standard of honor and purity, which is to restore the waning confidence of the masses in the integrity of the law-makers.

Sir, whatever personal disagreements, whatever partisan quarrels, may divide us, upon this, at least, all American Senators should be unanimous. For I entreat you not to forget—and no man who has read the history of the world with profit will or can forget—that when, in a republic circumstanced like this, the power of corruption has grown great, and threatens to become overwhelming, and a movement of the popular mind has sprung up to resist and check it, one of two results will follow: either that movement of healthy reaction will succeed, the social and political atmosphere will be purified and all will go well,—or the movement will fail; a feeling of discouragement, and then of torpid indifference, will settle upon the popular mind; further effort will be deadened by hopelessness, and corruption will riot, not as it did before, but far worse than ever before; and nobody knows where it will end. I need not say to which of these two results the American Senate should use its powers to contribute.
I, for my part, shall vote for this resolution to declare the election of Mr. Caldwell illegal and void. I shall vote for it, clearly convinced as I am, from my careful reading of this testimony, that Mr. Caldwell's election was effected by the corrupt use of money. I shall so vote, firmly convinced that the Senate of the United States, under the Constitution, does possess the power to declare void an election so carried and effected. If this resolution should fail, and I hope and trust it will not, then I shall vote for the resolution offered by the Senator from Mississippi (MR. ALCORN) to expel Mr. Caldwell, firmly believing, as I do, that the corruption shown in this case touches his character as well as his election, and clearly unfit him for a seat in the Senate of the United States.

It was with profound regret when I heard the Senator from Illinois (MR. LOGAN) say that there was here evident an ungenerous and even vindictive desire to persecute Mr. Caldwell, and to sacrifice him as an innocent victim to popular clamor, something like a wide-spread conspiracy to ruin the reputation and the social and political future of that one man. I cannot refrain from repelling this as a most reckless imputation. The Senators whom I know to entertain, with regard to the merits of this case, views similar to my own, are certainly not among the least generous, the least conscientious, and the least honorable of this body. As to myself, I know my own motives. I feel that they need no vindication. Mr. Caldwell has never offended me. I bear him the same kindly feelings that I bear to any fellow-man. Nothing is further from my nature than to harm any human being, without justice and necessity. Did I believe him innocent, I should not only refrain from everything that might do him harm, but I should be among the first to stand between him and the sacrifice; and even now I assure him it is with the profoundest pain that I see him in his deplorable situation. But, sir, no consideration of personal kindness and sympathy, no emotion of compassionate friendship, can I permit to seduce me, nor should it seduce anybody here, to sacrifice to one individual what is higher than he and higher than all of us—the dignity and the honor of the American Senate, the moral authority of the laws we make, the purity of our representative government, and the best interests of the American people. Whatever sacrifice we may be willing to offer, these things at least should not constitute the victim.
THE VENEZUELAN QUESTION

MR. PRESIDENT:—As an honorary member of the Chamber of Commerce, I am thankful for the privilege of seconding the resolution offered by the Committee. I yield to no one in American feeling or pride; and, as an American, I maintain that international peace, kept in justice and honor, is an American principle and an American interest. As to the President's recent message on the Venezuela case, opinions differ. But I am sure that all good citizens, whether they approve or disapprove of it, and while they would faithfully stand by their country in time of need, sincerely and heartily wish that the pending controversy between the United States and Great Britain be brought to a peaceable issue.

I am well aware of the strange teachings put forth among us by some persons, that a war, from time to time, would by no means be a misfortune, but rather a healthy exercise to stir up our patriotism, and to keep us from becoming effeminate. Indeed, there are some of them busily looking round for somebody to fight as the crazed Malay runs amuck looking for somebody to kill. The idea that the stalwart and hard-working American people, engaged in subduing to civilization an immense continent, need foreign wars to preserve their manhood from dropping into effeminacy, or that their love of country will flag unless stimulated by hatred of somebody else, or that they must have bloodshed and devastation as an outdoor exercise in the place of other sports—such an idea is as preposterous as it is disgraceful and abominable.

It is also said that there are some American citizens of Irish origin, who wish the United States to get into a war with England, because they believe such a war would serve to relieve Ireland of the British connection. We all value the willingness of the Irish-born American citizens to fight for their adopted country if need be; and nobody will deny that their hearty love for their native land is, as such, entirely natural and entitled to respect. But as American citizens, having sworn exclusive allegiance to the United States, not one of them should ever forget that this Republic has a right to expect of all its adopted citizens, as to their attitude toward public affairs, especially questions of peace or war, the loyal and complete subordination of the interests of their native countries to the interests of the United States.

264
There are also corrupt politicians eager to plunder the public under a cheap guise of patriotism and unscrupulous speculators looking for gambling and pilfering opportunities in their country's trouble and wishing for war as the piratical wrecker on his rocky shore wishes for fogs or hurricanes. They deserve the detestation of every decent man.

But aside from these classes it may safely be assumed that all seriously minded American citizens earnestly hope for a continuance of the long existing friendly relations between this country and Great Britain. General Sherman, whose memory is dear to us all, is reported to have said, in his vigorous way: "You want to know what war is? War is hell." And nobody who has seen war as he had, and as some of us have, will question the truthfulness of his characteristic saying. True, war sometimes develops noble emotions and heroic qualities in individuals or in a people; but war is hell for all that. If our boasted civilization and Christianity are to mean anything, they should mean this: No war is justifiable unless its cause or object stands in just proportion to its cost in blood, in destruction, in human misery, in waste, in political corruption, in social demoralization, in relapse of civilization; and even then it is justifiable only when every expedient of statesmanship to avert it has been thoroughly exhausted.

I shall not discuss now whether those who honestly think that our present difference with Great Britain would, as to cause or object, justify war, or those who think the contrary, are right. I expect them both to cooperate in an earnest endeavor to encourage those expedients of statesmanship by which war may be averted in either case. Confronting a grave emergency, we must, as practical men, look at the situation, not as it might have been or ought to be, but as it is. For several years our Government has been seeking to bring a boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana to a friendly settlement but without success. Last summer, the President, through the Secretary of State, in a despatch reviewing the case at length, and containing an elaborate disquisition on the Monroe doctrine, asked the British Government whether it "would consent or decline to submit the Venezuela question in its entirety to impartial arbitration," calling for "a definite decision." Lord Salisbury, after some delay, replied, in a despatch also discussing the Monroe doctrine from his point of view, that the Venezuela question might be in part submitted to arbitration, but he refused so to submit it in its entirety as asked for. Thereupon President Cleveland sent a message to Congress recommending...
appropriations for a commission to be appointed by the Executive, which commission "shall make the necessary investigation" of the boundary dispute, and report to our Government; and when such report is made and accepted, it will, in the President's opinion be the duty of the United States to resist, by every means, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands, or the exercise of any governmental jurisdiction over any territory, which, after investigation, we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela."

And Congress, by unanimously voting the appropriation asked for, without qualification, virtually made the position taken by the President its own.

This correspondence and this message, by their tone as well as their substance, have essentially changed the situation. It is no longer a mere question of boundary, or of the status of the Monroe doctrine, but after a demand and a call for a definite decision, and a definite refusal of the thing demanded, and in answer to this something that may be understood as a threat of war, it has assumed the most ticklish form of an international difference—the form of a question of honor. Questions of fact, of law, of interest, of substantial justice and right it may sometimes be difficult to determine; but there are rules of evidence, of legal construction, of equity and precedents to aid us. A question of honor is often inaccessible to these aids, for it is a matter of sentiment. Affairs of honor have caused as many follies as affairs of love. It is a strange fact, that while the mediaeval conception of honor which regarded the duel as the only adequate settlement of a question of that nature, has yielded to more enlightened and more moral views in several highly civilized countries, nations are in such cases still apt to rush to arms as the only means of satisfaction.

It is generally said, in Great Britain as well as here, that there will be no war. The belief is born of the wish. It is so general because almost everybody feels that such a war would be a disaster not only calamitous but also absurd and shameful to both nations. From the bottom of my heart I trust the prediction will prove true. But the prediction itself, with the popular sentiment prompting it, will not be alone sufficient to make it true. Bloody wars have happened in spite of an earnest popular desire for peace on both sides, especially when points of honor inflamed the controversy. It may be in vain to cry "Peace! Peace!" on both sides of the ocean, if we continue to flaunt the red flag in one another's faces.

The Commission just appointed by the President, indeed,
consists of eminent, patriotic and wise men. They will, no
doubt, conduct their inquiry with conscientious care and fair­ness. So we think here. But we have to admit that after all it is a one-sided contrivance, and as such lacks an important element of authority. Suppose the report of the Commission goes against the British contention. Suppose then we say to Great Britain: "Our investigation shows this, and we decide accordingly. Take this, or fight!" How then? It is quite possible that a vast majority of the British people care very little about the strip of territory in dispute, and would have been satisfied to let the whole of it go to arbitration. It is not impossible even that Lord Salisbury himself, in view of the threatening complications in Europe and other parts of the world, and of the manifold interests involved, might at last rather let it be so submitted than have a long quarrel about it. But it may well be doubted whether any statesman at the head of the British or any other great Government would think that he could afford to yield what he otherwise would be disposed to yield, under a threat of war. Similar circumstances would produce similar effects with us. The fact is, therefore, that however peaceable the popular temper may be on both sides of the water, the criti­cal moment will come at the time when the Commission reports, and, if that Commission remains one-sided as it is now, the crisis may become more exciting and dangerous than ever.

But in the meantime there will be something calling for the most earnest attention of the business world on both sides of the Atlantic. While that critical period is impending there will be—who knows how long—a dark cloud of uncertainty hanging over both nations, an uncertainty liable to be fitfully aggravated on occasion, or even without occasion, by speculative manufacturers of rumors. Every business calculation will be like taking a gamba­lers chance. The spirit of enterprise will be depressed by vague anxiety as to the future, by the apprehension—paralysis, and I need not tell you as experienced business men what all this means as to the confidence which is necessary to set in motion the rich man's money and the poor man's labor, and thus to develop general prosperity. It is of the highest importance, therefore, that this uncertainty be removed, or at least lessened as much and as soon as possible; and the peace sentiment prevailing here as well as in England, of which the friendly message from the Chamber of Commerce in Edinburgh is so cheering an evidence, may perhaps be practically set to work for the accomplishment of that end.

A thought occurred to me when studying President Cleve­land's Venezuela message, which, indeed, may well have occurred, at least in general outline, to many others at the same time, because it seems so natural. I am glad to notice that something
in the same line was suggested by an English journal. The President has appointed an American Commission to inquire into British claims as to the Venezuela boundary. As I have already pointed out, the findings of that Commission will, owing to its one-sided origin, lack an essential element of the moral authority required to command general credit. This authority would be supplied if an equal number of eminent Englishmen, designated by the British Government, were joined to the Commission to cooperate in the examination of the whole case, and if the two parties, to prevent dead-locks between them, agreed upon some distinguished person outside to preside over and direct their deliberations and to have the casting vote—the joint commission to be not a court of arbitration, and as such to pronounce a final and binding decision of the whole case—the thing which Lord Salisbury objected to—but an advisory council, to report the results of its inquiry into the whole case, together with its opinions, findings and recommendations to the two Governments for their free acceptance or rejection.

It may be said that such an arrangement would not entirely remove the uncertainty as to the final outcome. I believe, however, that it would at least very greatly lessen that uncertainty. I think it probable that the findings and recommendations of a commission so constituted would have high moral authority, and carry very great weight with both governments. They would be likely to furnish, if not a complete and conclusive decision, at least a basis for a friendly agreement. The very appointment of such a joint commission by the two Governments would be apt at once to remove the point of honor, the most dangerous element, from the controversy, and thus go very far to relieve the apprehension of disastrous possibilities which usually has so unsettling and depressing an effect.

I do not know, of course, whether such a plan would be accepted by either Government. I think, however, that each of them could assent to it without the slightest derogation to its dignity, and that if either of them received it, upon proper presentation, even with an informal manifestation of favor, the way would easily be opened to a mutual understanding concerning it. At any rate, it seems to me worth the while of a public spirited and patriotic body like this, and of other friends of peace here or abroad, to consider its expediency, and at the close of my remarks I shall move a tentative resolution to that effect, in addition to the one now pending.

I repeat, I am for peace—not, indeed, peace at any price, but peace with honor. Let us understand, however,
what the honor of this great American Republic consists in. We are a very powerful people—even without an Army or Navy immediately ready for action, we are, in some respects, the most powerful people on earth. We enjoy peculiar advantages of inestimable value. We are not only richer than any European nation in men, in wealth and in resources yet undeveloped, but we are the only nation that has a free hand, having no dangerous neighbors and no outlying and exposed possessions to take care of. We are, in our continental position, substantially unassailable. A hostile Navy may destroy what commercial fleet we have, blockade our ports, and even bombard our seaboard towns. This would be painful enough, but it would only be scratching our edges. It would not touch a vital point. No foreign Power or possible combination could attack us on land without being overwhelmed on our own soil by immensely superior numbers. We are the best fitted, not, perhaps, for a war of quick decision, but for a long war. Better than any other nation we can, if need be, live on our own fat. We enjoy the advantage of not having spent our resources during long periods of peace on armaments of tremendous cost without immediate use for them, but we would have those resources unimpaired in time of war to be used during the conflict. Substantially unassailable in our continental fastness, and bringing our vast resources into play with the patriotic spirit and the inventive genius and energy of our people, we would, on sea as well as on land, for offensive as well as defensive warfare, be stronger the second year of a war than the first, and stronger the third than the second, and so on. Owing to this superiority of our staying power, a war with the United States would be to any foreign nation practically a war without end. No foreign Power or possible combination in the old world can, therefore, considering in addition to all this the precarious relations of every one of them with other Powers and its various exposed interests, have the slightest inclination to get into a war with the United States, and none of them will, unless we force it to do so. They will, on the contrary, carefully avoid such a quarrel as long as they can, and we may be confident that without firing a gun, and even without having many guns ready for firing, we shall always see our rights respected and our demands, if they are just and proper—may be, after some diplomatic sparring—at last fully complied with.

What is the rule of honor to be observed by a Power so strong and so advantageously situated as this Republic is? Of course, I do not expect it meekly to pocket real insults if they should be offered to it. But surely, it should not, as our boyish jingoes wish it to do, swagger about among the nations
of the world, with a chip on its shoulder, and shaking its
fist in everybody's face. Of course, it should not tamely
submit to real encroachments upon its rights. But, surely,
it should not, whenever its own notions of right or interest
collide with the notions of others, fall into hysterics and
act as if it really feared for its own security and its very
independence. As a true gentleman, conscious of his strength,
and his dignity, it should be slow to take offense. In its
dealings with other nations it should have scrupulous regard,
not only for their rights, but also for their self-respect.
With all its latent resources for war, it should be the great
peace Power of the world. It should never forget what a proud
privilege and what an inestimable blessing it is not to need
and not to have big armies or navies to support. It should
seek to influence mankind, not by heavy artillery, but by
good example and wise counsel. It should see its highest
glory, not in battles won, but in wars prevented. It should
be so invariably just and fair, so trustworthy, so good tem­
pered, so conciliatory that other nations would instinctively
turn to it as their mutual friend and the natural adjuster of
their differences, thus making it the greatest preserver of
the world's peace.

This is not a mere idealistic fancy. It is the natural
position of this great Republic among the nations of the earth.
It is its noblest vocation, and it will be a glorious day for
the United States when the good sense and the self-respect of
the American people see in this their "manifest destiny." It
all rests upon peace. Is not this peace with honor? There
has, of late, been much loose speech about "Americanism." Is
not this good Americanism? It is surely to-day the American­
ism of those who love their country most. And I fervently
hope that it will be and ever remain the Americanism of our
children and children's children.
THE GERMAN MOTHERTONGUE

MY FRIENDS:—The toast to the German mothertongue ought to be responded to in music. This the Liederkranz has done so often and with so much feeling— and again only the other day— that it might be better were the chorus now to stand in my place, for to-day we celebrate more especially the German mothertongue as it speaks to us in song. There may indeed be other languages which on account of the resonance of their vowels and the softness of their consonants are better adapted to singing, but in no other language do people sing as much as in German and no other nation has given us so great a treasure of melodies that the people sing, songs of such deep feeling and of such virile force. Together with the mothertongue, the German Leid sprang from the German heart and it has made its way around the world. Whatever may resist German intellect and German enterprise—nothing can withstand German song.

We must be forgiven if, when speaking of our German mothertongue, we become a little sentimental, for that is not a sign of weakness. You may remember Heine's lines about the "sentimental oaks." The German mothertongue is a treasure for every thoughtful person who possesses it, the value of which is to him much more than a mere matter of sentiment. We Germans like to hear honesty spoken of as one of the prominent traits of the German national character; and I, for my part, am particularly pleased when the better elements of the American people rely upon the support of German-Americans when questions about honest government and honest money arise. Pardon me for referring to such questions here; I do so only because honesty is also one of the principal characteristics of the German mothertongue.

Other languages, particularly the Romance, are distinguished for the refined and graceful elegance of their melodious diction. In these languages it is easy to say things that sound very pretty and that mean very little. In German that is more difficult. I would not imply that I consider it admirable, where a sign announces "German spoken here," for one to be as rude as one pleases—I mean rather than an insincere or stupid thought expressed in German really sounds so. And if you say anything clever or graceful in German, you cannot make it sound any more clever than it really is. In other words, the German mothertongue is not the language of vain display. Moreover, like a great organ it commands the whole range of musical expression, of force, of grandeur, of lofty enthusiasm, of passion, of delicate feeling. What is there in any other language that can excel the vigor of the German Bible, the powerful, sonorous sublimity of Schiller's dramas, the captivating word-music of Heine's lyrics?
It would be superfluous here to speak of the literature which has grown up in the German language and includes every field of intellectual activity, for its imposing scope has been recognized by the whole civilized world. But it is not only German literature which the mother tongue has to give us.

There is no language in the world which offers so many difficulties to the translator as the German, and none in which all the idioms and poetic meters of other languages can be so exactly rendered and which has so rich and complete a collection of translations. Homer, Dante, Hafiz, Shakespeare, Aristotle, Bacon, Thucydides, Tacitus, Macaulay, Victor Hugo, Walter Scott, Tolstoy—the poetry, philosophy, science, history, fiction of all times and of all nations have naturally found a home in the German language, through the translations which are worthy of the originals by their fidelity, their strength and beauty. Indeed, the German language opens up to us more than any other the wealth of the literature of the whole world.

We possess, in truth, a treasure which we cannot prize highly enough, especially we who have made a new home in a new world speaking another language. It is sometimes expected of our compatriots in America that they shall not only learn English, but that they shall entirely cast aside the old mother tongue. That is very unwise advice. Nobody will dispute that the German-American must learn English. He owes it to his new country and he owes it to himself. But it is more than folly to say that he ought, therefore, to give up the German language. As American citizens we must become Americanized; that is absolutely necessary. I have always been in favor of a sensible Americanization, but this need not mean a complete abandonment of all that is German. It means that we should adopt the best traits of American character and join them to the best traits of German character. By so doing we shall make the most valuable contribution to the American nation, to American civilization. As Americans we ought to acquire the language of the country, but we must not lose our German mother tongue.

The idea that the preservation of the German language together with the English may hinder the development of our American patriotism is as silly as it would be to say that it makes us less patriotic to be able to sing Hail, Columbia in two languages. There are thousands of Americans who study German without becoming less patriotic; it only makes them more cultured and more accomplished. They learn German with laborious effort, for German is very difficult. We German-Americans have brought this treasure over the ocean with us. We need not study German—we need only not to forget it. Our children will have
without trouble what others can acquire only with great difficulty, if we are but sensible and conscientious enough to cultivate and to foster it in our families. That may not suffice to give our children as thorough a knowledge of the language as is desirable, but it will immensely facilitate the acquisition of what is lacking.

I am not preaching as one of whom it might be said: "Follow his words but not his deeds." I flatter myself that I am as dutiful an American as anyone, and I have tried to learn English and so have my children. But in my family circle only German is spoken, much German is read and our family correspondence is carried on only in German. I may therefore be permitted to express myself strongly on this point. And so I say to you when I see how German-American parents neglect to secure for their children the possession of the mothertongue, often from mere indolence, how they wantonly cast aside the precious gift—then my German heart and my American common-sense rise up in indignant protest. Parents who neglect to give their children an opportunity to learn the German language without effort are sinning against their sacred obligation to preserve the mothertongue. All the more do I honor a German-American society in which the German language is valued and cherished as it is here; it is doing an incalculable service to our contemporaries as well as to coming generations.

May the Liederkranz, in the unnumbered years that we all hope are still in store for it, remain as faithful to this noble duty as it has been in the half-century just elapsed—for the mothertongue is the bond which holds and binds its members together. The German mothertongue, the dear, strong, noble, tender, sacred mothertongue—may it live everlastingly here and all the world over!
MY FRIENDS:—Allow me to express my sincere thanks for the honor you do us old "Forty-eighters" by your warm welcome this evening.

I have often asked myself which of the memories of my somewhat eventful life I should most wish to preserve and which I could most readily spare, and I have always come to the conclusion that the recollections of the period of 1848 are among my dearest and most precious. I would not give them up at any price.

It has become the fashion in certain quarters in Germany to scoff at the year '48 as the "mad year." That is such a foolish, yes, such an almost childish, view, of which only those are capable who cannot or will not grasp great historic facts in their true significance. It was in 1848 that the ruling German Powers so completely broke the bonds of absolutism that a return to the old form of government was made impossible. All the constitutional development they have had they owe to that period.

In 1848, for the first time, a sense of German national unity was felt and consciously developed with a life-giving force.

I was born on the left bank of the Rhine, and I distinctly remember how strong French traditions and French sympathies were among the people there in the days of my boyhood. Many of them were not sure that they did not prefer to be French rather than Prussian. The year '48 forever completely put an end to such an unsettled state of mind and in its place awakened in every heart the mighty longing for national unity which grew to be an irresistible moral impulse, until at last came the great consummation.

To us youths, however, the period of '48 was something even more than that. I have always been glad that I took part in such a movement in my early youth. Whoever has had a similar experience knows what it means to have been one of a numerous body who dedicated themselves to a cause, which to them was a noble and sacred one; who, with the boundless devotion of youth and with the idealism that is free from all thought of self or of personal interest, were ready for any sacrifice. That was the spirit of 1848. Whoever was young then will cherish the memory as a proud and dear one. I always vividly remember a tragic incident of those days. In September, 1848, I took part in a congress of students which met in Eisenach at the foot of the Wart-
The more arbitrary the supreme power, the more dangerous will anti-nationalism become. The more popular the administration of state affairs the more patriotic will be the people and the more patriotic the people the stronger and safer the Empire. The fact that the German nation now represents a free and proud people united by a feeling of patriotism in which it rejoices, and not merely an alliance of princes, is the surest guarantee of its permanence. May the powers that be in Germany always keep in mind this fact.

The youth inspired by the spirit of '48 fought honestly for these great aims, these high ideals; he was ready to give his life for them, and whatever his mistakes or his foolhardiness the German people have every reason to be proud of him instead of scoffing at the "mad year." It is to be wished that in the youth of to-day a living spark of that same self-sacrificing idealism might be kindled and that this spark might never be choked and extinguished by a puerile ambition for personal aggrandizement.

Surely no one will deny that those German representatives of the movement of '48 who have sought and found a new home in America have always been good and conscientious citizens of their new fatherland. The intellectual freshness and vivacity which they brought with them greatly stimulated at the time the political and social life of the Germans in America, and when, with the movement of secession, danger threatened the new fatherland, the German '48ers, each in his way, were among the first who, with self-sacrificing devotion, rushed to the defense of the Union and liberty. Most of them have proved that the revolutionary agitators of 1848 could become reliable and conservative citizens under a free government. I believe that public opinion will on the whole give them a good character—and it it does not we will give it to ourselves.

Now we have dwindled to a very small band and again we find ourselves facing a crisis which makes special demands on the patriotism of the citizens of this Republic. You, Mr. Chairman, have already pointed out that there is a great difference of opinion as to the cause and the expediency of the present war, but that now, since the war has actually begun, we must all, man for man, stand together in the defense of our common country. Gentlemen, not only is this quite self-evident, but I go even further in saying that the man who now most eagerly advocates peace must, under the circumstances, recommend the most energetic conduct of the war, as only by a speedy and decisive victory of the United States can peace be soon restored.
burg. I was sent there as a delegate from the University of Bonn. The other German universities were also represented. There were present, among others, nine or ten young men, delegates of the University of Vienna, who belonged to the Academic Legion of that city. This legion played a prominent part in the revolutionary developments of the time and seemed, for a short period, to exert a decisive influence on the Austrian Government. In their headquarters, the aula of the university, the leaders of the legion received deputations bringing petitions for the redress of grievances and for the introduction of reforms, as if the armed students were, indeed, the reigning power. Then came the reaction. It had grown strong by the union of the Court party and the Army with the nationalities hostile to Germany. A violent end seemed to threaten the revolutionary movement and at the time of our student congress at Eisenach the catastrophe was rapidly approaching.

The delegates of the Vienna universities appeared at our Congress clad in the picturesque uniform of the Academic Legion; they were handsome, chivalrous youths and general favorites, owing to their winning, genial manners. We were still in the midst of our student festivities and full of youthful exuberance of spirits when our Austrian friends suddenly announced, with agitated mien, that they were obliged to return to Vienna without delay. To our question, "Why?" they answered that they had received letters from headquarters warning them that the final crisis was impending, that the cause of freedom required the presence of all her champions. In great haste they left us. I still see before me the scene of our parting. When, with a last hand-clasp, we called out, "Auf Wiedersehen!" one of them answered with a questioning inflection: "Auf Wiedersehen? we go to battle from here--look at the lists of the fallen, perhaps you will there find our names!" It was the "Morituri salutamus" spoken in the first freshness of youth. Soon after came the terrible October fights in Vienna in which the blood of the Academic Legion flowed in streams.

Such was the spirit of a great part of the German youth of 1848. But we are asked: Were there not many fantastic vagaries indulged in? Were there not many wild blunders made and much attempted that was foolish and unattainable? Certainly. But many of the things that were then aspired to have since been realized and others should and will be realized in the course of time. The so-called "Forty-eighters" were striving principally for the realization of two great ideals: national unity and representative government. The great union of Germany has been achieved and it may be confidently predicted that the continuance of the united German Empire will be all the more firmly assured the more popular and free the form of its government.
The more arbitrary the supreme power, the more dangerous will anti-nationalism become. The more popular the administration of state affairs the more patriotic will be the people and the more patriotic the people the stronger and safer the Empire. The fact that the German nation now represents a free and proud people united by a feeling of patriotism in which it rejoices, and not merely an alliance of princes, is the surest guarantee of its permanence. May the powers that be in Germany always keep in mind this fact.

The youth inspired by the spirit of '48 fought honestly for these great aims, these high ideals; he was ready to give his life for them, and whatever his mistakes or his foolhardiness the German people have every reason to be proud of him instead of scoffing at the "mad year." It is to be wished that in the youth of to-day a living spark of that same self-sacrificing idealism might be kindled and that this spark might never be choked and extinguished by a puerile ambition for personal aggrandizement.

Surely no one will deny that those German representatives of the movement of '48 who have sought and found a new home in America have always been good and conscientious citizens of their new fatherland. The intellectual freshness and vivacity which they brought with them greatly stimulated at the time the political and social life of the Germans in America, and when, with the movement of secession, danger threatened the new fatherland, the German '48ers, each in his way, were among the first who, with self-sacrificing devotion, rushed to the defense of the Union and liberty. Most of them have proved that the revolutionary agitators of 1848 could become reliable and conservative citizens under a free government. I believe that public opinion will on the whole give them a good character—and if it does not we will give it to ourselves.

Now we have dwindled to a very small band and again we find ourselves facing a crisis which makes special demands on the patriotism of the citizens of this Republic. You, Mr. Chairman, have already pointed out that there is a great difference of opinion as to the cause and the expediency of the present war, but that now, since the war has actually begun, we must all, man for man, stand together in the defense of our common country. Gentlemen, not only is this quite self-evident, but I go even further in saying that the man who now most eagerly advocates peace must, under the circumstances, recommend the most energetic conduct of the war, as only by a speedy and decisive victory of the United States can peace be restored.
Mature reflection and a serious consideration of all the aspects of the problem have made me a fast friend of peace— not peace at any price, but peace as long as it is compatible with the honor and safety of the Nation. It is my conviction that few things are so dangerous to the ethical basis of democratic government as a protracted state of war. Under prevailing conditions the policy to be pursued by the true advocate of peace should be as follows: for peace as long as it can be maintained; after the outbreak of hostilities, for the most vigorous management of the war in order to put an end to the state of war as quickly as possible with a decisive victory. Again for peace as soon as the first chance of peace presents itself. Every patriotic citizen will, therefore, wish most speedy and decisive success to the arms of the Republic. He will support every demand of the Government with the most self-sacrificing devotion, in order to regain the "desired peace," as President McKinley calls it in his last message. He will oppose every attempt to degrade a war which was heralded to all the world as a war for humanity to an ordinary war of conquest, an attempt which, if successful, will dishonor the flag and bring new wars and untold disaster upon the American people. Let us hope that the United States may be spared the heavy responsibility which would devolve upon them if this war should kindle a far-reaching conflagration, a danger which is all the more threatening the longer the war lasts. Let us hope that the great American Republic, among whose most loyal citizens we old '48ers count ourselves, may honorably emerge from this crisis with her democratic institutions unimpaired, with her promise honestly fulfilled that her victorious arms shall not serve the lust of conquest, but shall be unselfishly used only in the name of humanity, of civilization and liberty—thus winning anew the confidence and respect of the world.
ABSTRACT

RHETORICAL QUALITIES IN THE SPEECHES OF
CARL SCHURZ

The purpose of this study was to discover the rhetorical qualities in Carl Schurz's speeches in order to try to determine his relative position among the outstanding orators in American history. Specifically, it was desirable to delve into the areas of Invention, Arrangement, and Style in Schurz's speeches and to see how this phase of his rhetoric compared to a composite form which was set up from the criteria advocated by some of the outstanding rhetoricians of history.

An attempt was made in this study to make a survey of the highlights of Schurz's public speaking career in the United States by selecting eight representative speeches, some of which were delivered in German and some in English. An attempt was also made to diversify the speeches selected by picking them from various stages of his lifespan. The speeches selected and year in which they were delivered included:

1. True Americanism—1859.
5. Election of Senator Caldwell--1873.
6. The Venezuelan Question--1896.
7. The German Mothertongue--1897.
8. The '48ers--1898.

Schurz's eight speeches were built, from the rhetorical viewpoint, upon a basis of Invention, Arrangement, and Style. He strongly emphasized "assumptions," "generalizations," and "enthymemes" as modes of proof in the area of logos. In the field of ethos, his intelligence, character, and good will were quite prominently apparent. In the region of pathos, Schurz used all of the emotions listed by Aristotle, but the emotion of "love" was probably the one which was most eminently displayed.

His arrangement emulated the three-divisional method of organization (Introduction, Discussion, and Conclusion) in the composition of the speech.

Schurz varied his level of style according to the audience and occasion. He diversified his diction and sentence structure a great deal within each speech, which added greatly to the vividness and emphasis of his style. He used rhetorical devices and figurative language quite freely.

Schurz, in the eight speeches studied, seemed to have employed predominantly those types of rhetorical proofs and devices which were the more ardently recommended by the rhetoricians who were used as authorities in this study.