Structure and function in Plato's "Republic"

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STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

by

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Books 1 and 10 of Plato's Republic have long been regarded as problematic when viewed alongside the Republic as a whole. Scholars have claimed that these books were originally written separately, that the placement of these books impedes and obscures the main portion of the work, or that the style and content of these books is not up to the standards set by Books 2 through 9.

This paper seeks to settle the questions concerning Books 1 and 10 by analyzing their dramatic function in the composition of the Republic. Primarily, this is done by showing that the structure of the entire work is based on the analogies of the Divided Line and the Cave, so that the Republic reflects the journey of the philosopher (in his ascent to the surface and return to the Cave) in the content of the discussions which Socrates holds with his interlocutors. The Republic also reflects the levels of knowledge portrayed on the Divided Line in the different capacities for understanding which are displayed by the dramatic persons of the dialogue.

This analysis shows that these books are in fact integral parts of the Republic, performing several functions which enhance the work as a whole. Book 1 shows the metaphorical prisoners of the Cave and how Socrates attempts to correct their incomplete, misleading, or incorrect conceptions of Justice. Glaucion and Adeimantus, with their refusal to accept the situation at the end of Book 1, force the discussion into higher and higher levels of understanding, culminating with the description of the offspring of the Good in Book 6. The discourse on the decline of the individual and the state in Books 8-9 returns the level of understanding once again to that of the prisoners in the Cave. Book 10 shows Poetry in the context of the Cave, and the Myth of Er becomes the poetic analogy of the Republic, with which Socrates attempts to give the message of the rest of the work to those whose comprehension falls short of understanding it in its philosophic form.
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Chapter One

Scholarly Opinions on Books 1 and 10

Books 1 and 10 of Plato's Republic have long been regarded as puzzling and somewhat out of place in a dialogue that is otherwise considered one of the most renowned works in Western literature and philosophy. While acknowledging the greatness of the Republic, critics have, at various times, judged the content of both books to be sophistic, juvenile, contradictory, or only very distantly related to the remainder of the composition. Even when the critics can offer explanations for these purported blemishes, the explanations serve only to gloss over what are still perceived as defects in the dialogue. In this chapter I will examine criticisms of Books 1 and 10 and propose a solution which may solve some of the difficulties in interpreting these Books, as well as the Republic as a whole.

A long line of scholars have seen Book 1 as an earlier dialogue on justice in the Socratic manner, suggesting that Plato was dissatisfied with this dialogue initially and set it aside, realizing that the subject required much more extensive treatment. Later, (this theory continues) he worked it into the Republic as an introduction to a work which better expressed his thoughts on justice. The highly dramatic presentation, the discussion
centering around a single topic, and the destruction of established opinions without putting forward anything new to replace them are all traits reminiscent of the early dialogues, and it is easy to see how a reader can come to the conclusion that this book was written separately, especially when compared to the remainder of the Republic, where drama is almost completely lacking, a multitude of subjects raise their heads at every turn, and Socrates does virtually nothing but teach. However, these differences in style and content are the least of the criticisms leveled at Book 1.

More serious are the criticisms of the arguments used by Socrates to refute his interlocutors, especially Thrasymachus. They are roundly denounced as "complicated, specious, and amusing", "dubious", "irritating", "weak and unconvincing to an amazing degree", and "simply fallacious". It is true that the critics who make these statements usually try to advance some reason for the pitiful state of these arguments, such as "the traditional definitions of justice have been reduced to shambles, revealing the need for a fresh start"; "they have not defined justice, but they have succeeded in defining the problem of justice"; or

There is no reason to think that [Plato] considered these arguments fallacious, or realized how bad they are, but he did see that a Thrasymachus or a Callicles would think them only trivial and quibbling. ... In the rest of the Republic we move to a different style of arguing...
These "apologies" for Book 1 point in the right direction; they state that there is some external reason for writing these arguments into the dialogue here, although they all still tacitly condemn the fact that the arguments exist at all, being as bad as they are. The assumption here, implicit or explicit, is that Plato did not realize how bad Book 1 is, how "trivial and quibbling" it appears when compared to the remainder of the Republic. Scholars would rather just ignore Book 1, and a final type of criticism recommends that we do just that.

The final theory states that the arguments in Book 1 are not to be taken seriously: they merely clear away any previous misconceptions of what justice is, so that we are prepared for the "true" answer to the question "What is justice?" when it is given in the following books. It seems that we must hurry through the philosophical "site preparation" of Book 1 as quickly as possible in order to reach the point where the dialogue really begins, with the challenges by Glaucon and Adeimantus. White says in his Preface:

I urge readers of all kinds not to dwell too much on Book 1 of the Republic. It is an introduction and is not intended by Plato to be a complete, or even a fully cogent, treatment of the issues which it broaches. .... it is not even a good book to use in introductory courses in philosophy ... because it annoys students more than it stimulates their thoughts, and it convinces them that Plato and Socrates were dishonest. Readers of the Republic should not allow themselves to become bogged down in it.
White also notes at the end of his commentary on Book 1, "the serious part of Plato's discussion of justice is to follow, in Books 2-10...". Rather than try to make any sense out of the arguments in Book 1, this type of criticism suggests that we should almost pretend that the Book is not there (and perhaps wonder how Plato could have taught his introductory Philosophy courses with it). After reading these types of criticism, we should be very much surprised if in reading Book 1 we did not become bored with its triteness, annoyed at its dishonesty, or eager to see how much Plato's thought had changed since last he took up his quill.

The situation with Book 10 is similar to that of Book 1. Many critics express their disappointment at the bathetic conclusion to an otherwise impressive work, and point out that the metaphysics, esthetics, and psychology of Book 10 are at odds with the rest of the Republic. Annas states her dissatisfaction very strongly:

Why did Plato not end the Republic with Book 9, instead of tacking on this collection of further points, hanging together rather awkwardly and most very problematic? We can only make suggestions, and the most obvious is this. Plato always wanted to show that justice was ... worth having both for itself and its consequences. ... The bulk of the Republic is Plato's most successful attempt. ... Ideas that have powerful expression in the main coherent body of the book are presented at the end in a much cruder form, which Plato none the less believes can add to our understanding. And so the Republic, a powerful and otherwise impressively unified book, acquired its lame and messy ending.
Besides the criticisms of its content, there also exist the same doubts as to this Book's original inclusion with the Republic. Else has argued that Book 10 consists of no less than four separate sections, written at different times, which were later "tacked onto" the work as we have it in response to the theories of art and poetry which Aristotle was supposedly spreading through the Academy in the years before Plato's death. Plato, in a gallant last effort to combat this fifth column, rewrote and added to an original Book 10 material designed specifically to refute Aristotle's theses. Although most scholars dismiss this hypothesis, and are willing to grant the original character of the Book, they also refer to it as an "appendix", or "exrescence" which Plato added to the end of the Republic, for one of several reasons, depending on which section of Book 10 they are attempting to justify. The section on the banning of imitative poetry is said to be placed here because it would have disrupted the unity of the rest of the Republic, or because it requires an understanding of material covered in the intervening books. The section on the immortality of the soul is placed here because it prepares for the myth of Er, and the myth of Er is here because it allows Plato to show that justice is also advantageous for the rewards which accompany it, something he could not do in the previous books. Perhaps it is a measure of our desperation with Book 10 that we
look so anxiously for an explanation of its awkwardness, since, unlike Book 1, we are not dealing with refutations of naive persons or sophists, but with ideas put forward by Socrates (or Plato) himself.

These are the criticisms leveled at Books 1 and 10: the Books are so radically different from the rest of the Republic in style, content, and characterization that they do not belong with the other Books; their arguments are pitiful; and they could therefore easily be done away with, leaving a much more cohesive and impressive work. There is an element of truth in some of these criticisms; it is intuitively obvious that Books 1 and 10 differ from the others, but whether they were written at different times than the rest of the Republic is something that is ultimately both unknowable and inconsequential. What is important is that even if Plato did write them twenty years earlier, or later, in radically different styles, yet when the Republic as a whole was composed Plato "published" it in the form in which we have it. Therefore we are either left with the interpretation that Plato was insensitive to the contrast in style, characterization, and content, in which case these differences mean nothing other than Plato was not the literary craftsman he is esteemed to be, or that, considering the exacting sense of artistry and literary craftsmanship seen in the dialogues, Plato was very much aware of these distinctions and in fact placed them
there intentionally, which means that they must fulfill some purpose in the Republic.

This latter suggestion leads us to consider the second type of criticism; namely, that the arguments used in these Books are weak at best and fallacious at worst. Even if we grant the truth of these comments, is it really possible that Plato could have been so insensitive to the nature of these arguments? This is a central question for readers of the Republic: how can a work so carefully constructed, so rich in thought, and with themes so intricately interwoven contain such seemingly blatant gauchness? If the arguments are as patently obvious as is claimed, the suggestion is ludicrous. Yet even if they are only the weapons which Socrates uses to disarm Polemarchus and Thrasymachus, why write them in at all? Why waste our time in recounting mistaken opinions of men long dead? The same question confronts the third criticism, that the first book is a frivolous waste of time which delays our arrival at the "real" dialogue: why? If the construction of Book 1 is so flawed and its ideas so worthless, why does Plato not simply begin with Glaucon's statement of the three types of good and his demand to have justice defended? Why does he do such violence to his reputation as a writer and as a philosopher by serving us such trifles? The excuses that Book 1 sets the stage for the remainder of the dialogue or introduces the
problem at least show the understanding that Book 1 does have a function in the Republic which extends beyond the quality of its arguments or the style with which it was written. This type of explanation, given to resolve the "problems" of Books 1 and 10, is only partially satisfactory; we are left content with the thought that these Books are indeed original members of the Republic, but uncertain as to what this arrangement really means. Can we find an explanation for Book 1 and 10 which will not only explain why they were written in such a manner, but also show that they make such a great deal of sense that way that they could hardly have been written otherwise?

H.D.F. Kitto, in his book Poiesis, shows how our interpretation of Greek literature can be clarified considerably by examining ἡ σύνθεσις τῶν πραγμάτων, the arrangement of the material in a literary work, and how this arrangement affects the meaning of the work we are examining. Kitto deals primarily with Attic drama, but also discusses Homer, Plato, and Thucydides as well. His argument is basically that Greek literature, until the mid-fourth century, is meant to be read both intellectually and imaginatively -- its form is inseparable from its content. In many instances, therefore, an awareness of the organization of the material in the work we are reading will help us understand it better: as in the Oresteia, the Odyssey.
or even Pindar's Odes, for example. A salient characteristic that Kitto finds in these works is the method of making a point without stating it explicitly; as he says, "Why keep a dog and bark yourself?"

In Greek literature the skeleton is more important than in other literatures, and accordingly the flesh is less ample. Aeschylus writes for Eteocles that final speech about Polyneices and Dike just before the two brothers kill each other, and he leaves the audience to draw the obvious conclusion...We now have to face the horrid fact that even writers of prose would do this kind of thing, with of course the same consequences: we can gravely misunderstand their meaning if we insist on reading them as prosaically as possible....We shall find that even Plato could write in this mimetic tradition - as indeed Aristotle implies, when he includes "the Socratic dialogues" among his few illustrations of mimesis in prose.18

The Republic itself, being one of the foremost of the "Socratic dialogues", can certainly be considered imitative poetry from beginning to end, and we may recall another passage from the Poetics: Aristotle notes that one of the reasons why Homer is so preeminent among epic poets is that "he alone...is not unaware of the part to be played by the poet himself in the poem. The poet should say very little himself, as he is no imitator when doing that".19 Except for several short sections at the beginning (e.g., 327a-328c, 336b, 357a), the Republic is composed entirely of direct quotation, and Plato never reveals a character's unspoken thoughts, much less speaks in the first person. Plato, on this evidence, is writing imitative poetry himself; we will want to remember this when we discuss Book 10.
The fact that the Platonic dialogues are not only expositions is obvious; therefore, if the Republic is not exclusively an expository treatise, but also a drama, the examination of the work from the standpoint of its structure and the disposition of its material is valid, and answers to the troubling questions about Books 1 and 10 may be found in this structure. We cannot be certain that a knowledge of what is said in the Republic will accurately convey Plato's thought to us without the corresponding knowledge of where and how it is said. As Bloom states:

The dialogue...is an organic unity. Every argument must be interpreted dramatically, for every argument is incomplete in itself and only the context can supply the missing links. And every dramatic detail must be interpreted philosophically, because these details contain the images of the problems which complete the arguments.20

If, then, we have difficulty understanding Books 1 and 10, it is more than possible that the difficulty lies in our misunderstanding of the structure, and not in our understanding of the material itself. We may analyze and dispute the individual arguments we find there, taken out of context and without regard for the overall purpose of the Republic, and thus convince ourselves that we have found Plato out, discovering places where he was obviously wrong or unsure of what he was doing.

It is the purpose of this paper to show that Plato knew exactly what he was doing when he wrote Books 1 and 10, and that the criticisms leveled
against them are not valid, since Plato could change his prose style if he wished, even in the same work, and did, in fact, construct the Republic in exactly this way for dramatic and philosophical purpose. Throughout the Republic, the level of understanding shown by each of the dramatis personae is analogous to one of the levels of understanding described on the Divided Line, and the entire work is an allegory of the Philosopher's journey similar to that described in the analogy of the Cave in Book 7. Books 1 and 10 represent to the reader graphically and dramatically the people and opinions of the lowest level of the Cave, and the characters in Book 1 are intentionally depicted as groping in the realm of 
\[ \text{εἰκασία} \], with their discussions centering around common terms and the opinions commonly held about those terms, these opinions being the misconceptions or \[ \text{εἰκόνες} \] of these characters. The challenges by Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book 2 raise the discussion above this level and begin the allegorical ascent from the Cave, which continues until we reach the Forms and the similes of the Sun, Line, and Cave in the central Books. The discussion of the decay of the state and the individual in Books 8-9 begins to return to a more mundane level, reflecting the dialogue's descent through its subject matter, and in Book 10 we return completely to the shadows of \[ \text{εἰκασία} \]. This paper will show Plato's method in this arrangement by examining the nature of the arguments used in Book 1 (as
opposed to the validity of the arguments themselves), the characterization of
the participants in Book 1, and the elements of the narrative which
foreshadow the Line and the Cave. A shorter chapter on Books 2-9 will
examine the sections in the central Books where the text mirrors the changes
in the dialogue, reflecting again the structure of the Line and the allegorical
journey of the philosopher. This will be followed by a scrutiny of the
content of Book 10, keeping in mind the structure of the Republic as a whole,
to show that Book 10 can only be considered a failure, or anti-climactic, by
failing to take into consideration its place and purpose. As the level of
understanding descends once more to εἰκασία and the philosopher returns
to the Cave to dispute over shadows of phantoms of Justice, Socrates speaks
to these people again, but at their own level of understanding.

Of course, a great deal of the interpretation of any Platonic dialogue
depends on the purpose the interpreter believes the dialogue has. In this
paper, it will be assumed that the Republic was written not only to expound
doctrine, but to incite the reader to think further and more deeply on the
issues it raises. Indeed, part of the purpose of this paper is to show that
Books 1 and 10 make the Republic all the more effective in provoking
vigorous objections and further discussion because of Books 1 and 10.
Plato's *Republic* thus becomes both a picture of Fifth century Athens and a process which occurs in our minds whenever we read it.

Kitto says, concerning the use of his method,

Proof, in such a case, can never be rigid, but in order to be acceptable it must satisfy certain conditions. Such a method of composition must be shown to be habitual with the author; it should be seen to combine naturally with, and to help explain, other features of his composition; it will also be a recommendation if (to put it bluntly) it makes the author and his work look less incompetent than does the other approach...

Considering some of the opinions expressed about Books 1 and 10, there is a great opportunity here to make Plato look less incompetent, and Kitto has shown that this method of composition, in which the *ποίησις*, or crafting of the matter, is just as important as the *λέξις*, or the text itself, was habitual with Greek *ποιηταί* from Homer down to Plato. His discussions of the *Gorgias* and the *Protagoras* show that an understanding of Plato's *ποίησις* can help to explain the sometimes bewildering structure and content of these two dialogues, but an even clearer illustration of Plato's use of *ποίησις* in this fashion - to lead the reader, almost physically, by the structure of the text, through the same experiences described in the content of the text - can be seen in the opening lines of the *Phaedo*.

The elaborate opening conversation of this dialogue, some 35 lines explaining in minute and apparently pointless detail the exact timing of
Socrates' execution, both begins and ends in the prison, with Socrates on the
day of his death. It is thus cast in a circular pattern, echoing the chief
doctrine to be argued in the dialogue, the circular pattern of the soul's
existence, coming from a previous life, passing through this one, and
returning at death whence it came. As the reader progresses through these
opening lines, he recapitulates in his own experience the cyclical nature of
life, as he encounters the following phrases: 22

... παρεγένου Σωκράτει ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὡς τὸ φάρμακον ἐπιεύχ ἐν
τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ...(were you with Socrates on that day when he
drank the poison in the prison?)

... ἔτυχεν γὰρ τῇ πρωτεραίᾳ τῆς δῖκης ἡ πρώμα ἐστεμένη τοῦ
πλοίου ὦ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναίοι πέμπουσιν....(For the stern of the
boat which the Athenians send to Delphi happened to be crowned on
the day before the trial)

... τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι ηὐξαντῷ...(they prayed to Apollo)

νόμος ἔστιν αὐτοῖς... μηθένα ἀποκτεινώναι, πρὶν ἄν εἰς Δῆλον
tε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεύρο...(it is their law...to kill
no one until the boat goes to Delos and comes back)

... ὁ ἱερέας τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος (the priest of Apollo)

... στάσῃ τὴν πρώμαν τοῦ πλοίου... τούτο δ' ἔτυχεν... τῇ
πρωτεραίᾳ τῆς δῖκης γεγονός....(crowns the stern of the boat...
and this happened to occur on the day before the trial)

... διὰ ταύτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῇ
dεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξύ τῆς δῖκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου. (because of
these things Socrates was in the prison a long time between the
trial and his death)
The structure of the vocabulary in this section reflects the material being discussed, foreshadows the doctrine put forward later in the dialogue, and leads the reader through a protreptic experience of it. It is clear, then, that Plato was familiar with the sort of ἀρχή discussed by Kitto and used it to good effect in several of his dialogues. Let us turn to the Republic and see if, considering its importance among his dialogues, Plato might have also found it useful, indeed indispensable, to have employed this same ἀρχή in constructing this most intricately interwoven of dialogues.
Chapter One Notes

1. Friedländer, p. 178.
2. Bloom, p. 335.
3. Annas, p. 31.
4. Annas, p. 32.
5. Annas, p. 50.
11. White, p. 73.
13. Else, op. cit. His major contention is that, of the four separate sections he discerns in Book 10, only one is original in the sense that it was written at the same time as the rest of the Republic.
15. Annas, p. 335.
17. White, p. 247.
18. Kitto, p. 244. (The reference is to the Poetics, 1447b11).

20. Bloom, xvi.


22. *Phaedo*, 57a1-58c5 (See Appendix 1). My thanks to Prof. John Madden for pointing this out to me.
Chapter Two

Book 1: Its Place in the Republic

Criticisms of Book 1 tend to make the point that its differences from the rest of the Republic would indicate either that it had a separate origin, or that it is somehow "unworthy" of the rest of the work. The arguments in this chapter will attempt to show that this Book foreshadows the Cave, the levels of understanding on the Divided Line, and the types of men that Socrates is to describe in Books 6-9, and is thus an integral part of the Republic, reflecting not only the situations from which the great analogies of the central Books are drawn, but also the need to define Justice and show that it is worthwhile pursuing, so that young men like those listening to Socrates may be inspired to follow the philosopher's path, rather than the tyrant's.

Book 1 begins at the lowest level of reality, in the realm of ἐικασία, and the characters, situations, and arguments which Plato portrays in this Book foreshadow the realities and the corresponding mentalities and characters which the Divided Line and the Cave portray in allegory.

In addition to the criticisms noted in Chapter 1, several odd situations in Book 1 demand attention. Why do Cephalus, Thrasymachus, Polemarchus, and Cleitophon all make appearances in Book 1 and nowhere else, with one exception at the beginning of Book 5? Are we supposed to take Socrates'
arguments and refutations seriously? And why do Glauccon and Adeimantus say nothing in Book 1 (with one important exception), and then monopolize the rest of Socrates' time in the Republic? If these things are merely literary devices on Plato's part, then there is no need to take further notice of them, since they are only "thrown in" before the dialogue "really" begins; there is the possibility, however, that they are just the sort of dramatic details which Bloom claims "must be interpreted philosophically, because these details contain the images of the problems which complete the arguments".

As in many of the dialogues, the wealth of narrative details ends with the beginning of the "philosophical" portion, and should prompt us, as was supposed in the first chapter, to see whether there is a "philosophical" reason for these seemingly "dramatic" details. Instead of getting through Book 1 as quickly as possible, then, we will examine closely how it is written, paying special attention to plot and characterization. This will enable us not only to show that the common criticisms of Book 1 miss the point, but also that the book is in fact well suited to its purpose in the Republic.

I. Plot

One of the distinguishing features of the Republic is the manner in which Plato interweaves so many topics in a deceptively unadorned style.
Sider gives an example:

Consider...the discussion on literature and music in Books II-III. There are enough forward and backward looking references by Socrates to make the gross divisions of literature and music; piety, bravery, and sophrosyne; content and form; gods and men; rhythm and harmony only partially satisfactory.²

If Book 1 were an earlier composition, we should not expect to find this sort of cross-referencing woven into it, but this is just the thing that we do find. Bloom, for example, notes that in addition to being a discussion of Justice and the myriad of topics which accompany it, the Republic is also an extended Apology, showing Socrates put on trial by the young men he was accused of corrupting, and how he actually strives to improve them to the benefit of the city.³ This happens in the case of the symbolic "seizing" of Socrates by the slave of Polemarchus (327b) and the subsequent confrontation with Polemarchus and his friends (327c-328b), which foreshadows the practical problem of the impotence of philosophy in the Republic - the philosophers in most cities are forced to do the bidding of the "gentlemen", who control them through the power of the many.⁴ It also appears in the numerous legal and legislative metaphors that appear throughout the Republic: the debate and decision to remain in Piraeus (327c-328b), the demand of a fine by Thrasymachus (337d), and the frequent references by Socrates to his trial and punishment if he fails.⁵ The Republic
is, then, not only an example of the ideal state, but also the exposition of Socrates' ideal apology - the full justification of his life and views which he would have presented at his trial if it were possible. This strand is introduced clearly in Book 1 and is woven through all the subsequent books.

Another strand of plot obvious in the Republic is the philosopher's journey, set forth explicitly at 513c ff., describing how the philosopher must start from the bottom of the Cave, work his way up to the contemplation of the sun, and then return to the Cave once more. While it is less obvious that Plato has woven a strong and definite foreshadowing of the journey to and from the Cave into the Republic from the beginning of Book 1, there are still a number of indications which strongly suggest that Plato is presaging the Cave in the events which he describes before the discussion of Justice even starts. Many of the details that precede this discussion could conceivably be left out, if we are reading the dialogue as a treatise, waiting for its "real" beginning: the description of the festival, the encounter with Polemarchus, the mention of the torch race on horseback, or even the group's arrival at the house of Cephalus are all really unnecessary to the discussion of Justice, unless these events perform functions which extend beyond what they simply say. Bloom has shown one of these functions in the case of the meeting with Polemarchus. If we examine these details with the idea that
they are setting a scene in the dramatic equivalent of the Cave, they do indeed make sense.

The very first word of the work, Κατεβην, makes us think at once of descending, and suggests a setting below some more desirable place, from which Socrates is very reluctant to stay away. In the Phaedrus, the only other dialogue in which Socrates departs from Athens, the following conversation takes place:

Phaedrus. You don't leave the city, either to go abroad or even, it seems to me, to go outside the walls.

Socrates. Forgive me, best of men, for I love learning, and the country and the trees don't want to teach me anything, but the men in the city do. (230d)

Socrates does not leave Athens because only there can he engage in philosophy, and here, in the Republic, he is attempting to return to the city when he is accosted and amicably compelled to remain and talk, though unwillingly. Even more than reluctance of the historical Socrates to speak, this unwillingness presages the feelings of the philosopher who must return to the Cave and dispute with its prisoners, even though he would much rather remain above in contemplation of the Good. The contrast of Athens with the Piraeus underlines the parallel between the setting of the dialogue and the Cave: being the center of commercial activities, the Piraeus corresponds to the lowest, commercial class in the state and to the ἐπιθυμίαι.
in the soul, while Athens, as the center for government, philosophy, and deliberative thought, corresponds to the ruling and calculating part of the soul. Physically, too, the cities will remind readers of the topography of the Cave, as the Piraeus lies at sea level, while Athens rises to the height of the Acropolis, and at the time of the dialogue (ca. 411) the two cities were joined by the Long Walls, providing a passage from one city to the other, just as a “rough, steep, upward way” lies between the Cave and the surface (515e). Also, Socrates is persuaded to remain in the Piraeus for a religious festival, rather than a philosophical discussion. This, as well as other references to religion in the opening tableau, seem to show that religion is the substitute for philosophy at this level of understanding.

There are several verbal echoes of the description of the Cave in the opening of Book 1. The slave of Polemarchus comes up behind Socrates and Glaucon, takes hold of Socrates’ himation, and commands them both to “stay there”, περιμένετε (327b); later, in the description of the prisoners in the Cave, Socrates says “see men...with their legs and necks in bonds so that they are fixed” ὡστε μένειν τε αὐτοὺς (514b). As the Cave is illuminated by fire, which gives it dim and unreliable light (514a), so in attempting to convince Socrates to remain with them in Book 1, Adeimantus promises him a torch-race on horseback that evening at the festival of the goddess Bendis.
(328a), which, in addition to foreshadowing the fire in the Cave, also introduces another religious element. In describing Cephalus, Plato speaks of him as garlanded and just come from sacrificing, religious symbols which are later reinforced by the statements which Cephalus makes. Once again, the emphasis here is on religion, which is the traditional means of determining what is just. Cephalus continues Socrates' imagery of descent in his very first sentence, by speaking of his guest "coming down to the Piraeus" (καταβαίνων εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ) (328c), and of his own inability to go up to the city, foreshadowing again the return of the philosopher to the cave in Book 7, as well as admitting his own inability to make the journey out of the cave.

A final point: why does Socrates mention in the first sentence that he was with Glaucon when he came down to the festival? Is this just a naturalistic detail, or is this perhaps a small indication that Glaucon, too, has come down to this place from higher regions? We will see indications that Glaucon is viewed throughout in a different light by Socrates; he is certainly at a higher level of understanding than anyone else in the dialogue (except for Socrates himself), and it will be natural to pair Socrates with Glaucon at the outset, since they are the ones who will actually pursue the vision of the Republic.
When the actual discussion of Justice begins, Socrates, as has been observed by everyone since Thrasymachus, does not say what his definition of Justice is, but he contents himself with pointing up the inadequacies of everyone else's. But is this because he will not, or cannot? Clearly he can, since he spends the rest of the Republic defining the concept at length; why, then, is he unwilling to speak in Book 1? The traditional answer is that Plato did not yet have a clear concept of Justice when he wrote the "earlier" Book 1, but a better answer is found in the images presented in the book. These images suggest, as we have seen, that the discussion is beginning at the lower reaches of the Cave, and the mentalities of the major interlocutors reinforce the suggestion: Cephalus refuses to discuss his beliefs, Thrasymachus is only interested in showing off his own rhetorical ability by trying to overcome Socrates, and Polemarchus is confused and unable to think through his position; none of these interlocutors would be able to understand or participate in the dialectic with which Socrates sets forth what he really thinks about Justice, and in fact none of them do participate in it.

Plato's artistry in these details is deceiving, for it makes us forget that he could have begun the Republic with the discussion itself, as he did in such other dialogues as Ion or Meno. Since he did not, he must have expected his readers to make the effort to understand why he did not. Socrates and the
discussions which he holds in Book 1 are a flesh-and-blood representation of
the situation mentioned in Book 7, when the philosopher returns to the Cave
and disputes with its inhabitants over the shadows of Justice.

II. Characterization

The characterizations of Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus -
what they actually do say when they are not merely responding to the
questions of Socrates - provide another solid link between Book 1 and the
rest of the Republic, for Plato has carefully delineated these characters so as
to exemplify the different levels of understanding described on the Divided
Line in Book 6, and the different types of men described in Book 8.

A. Cephalus:

The character of Cephalus which emerges in Book 1 is that of an
average but good man, concerned with his reputation and trusting that the
stories told about the gods and Justice are true. Cephalus has correctly
identified the shadow of Justice on the wall, but has no idea what produces
it, or even that it is something other than a shadow; he believes that it is
Justice. His religious nature is evident in the statements which he makes
about the afterlife:
As the pleasures of the body wither away, those connected with speech or reason increase (328d)

Old age gives peace and freedom from the desires and pleasures of youth (329a-d)

The decent man who is not poor is the one who bears old age easily (330a)

The greatest good that comes from wealth is its ability to allay the fears of the afterlife by helping a man not to lie or cheat, and to give what is owed to gods and other men (330d-331b)

The things which he says are commonplace slogans that most men could agree with, and we note that Socrates does not disagree with Cephalus or treat him harshly; his purpose is to have Cephalus refine his own definition of justice rather than change it, since Cephalus acts very much as Socrates' ideally just man would; indeed, Socrates echoes the manner in which Cephalus talked about justice when he proclaims (442e-443a) the list of items which the just man would never do: e.g., stealing a deposit, robbing a temple, neglecting parents. The reason why Socrates cannot allow this definition of justice to pass unchallenged is that it is an ungrounded fancy (εἰκασία) which just happens to be right opinion (δόξα). Cephalus has the correct concept of how to act justly, but he does not understand the reasons why he should act this way; he is merely following the myths and conventions of society, which is why he cannot discuss the matter further with Socrates, and withdraws.
Cephalus symbolizes the traditional, religious view of justice: the gods ordain what is just and unjust, and all that men are required to do is to follow unquestioningly the injunctions of the gods. He is also a symbol of the traditional view of the afterlife, worrying over the stories of the punishments in Hades (a foreshadowing of the myth of Er in Book 10). He is mainly concerned with his money and private property in general, and he bases his definition of justice on it. As soon as Socrates attempts to engage him in a discussion of this definition, however, he withdraws ἀπὸ τὰ ἱερὰ ("to the sacrifices" or "into the realm of the holy"); his conception of justice is religious, and he cannot and will not subject it to the rational discussion which makes up the rest of the dialogue.

Cephalus also foreshadows the model of the Democratic man in Book 8, with his constantly changing desires and preoccupations. In his youth, he exerted himself to make money and enjoy himself (330b, 330d-331a), but now he has "gotten religion" and attempts to atone for his past with the sacrifices he is now offering. In just this way Socrates describes the Democratic man:

... he also lives along day by day, gratifying the desire that occurs to him, at one time drinking and listening to the flute, at anotherdowning water and reducing; now practicing gymnastic, and again idling and neglecting everything; and sometimes even spending his time as though he were engaged in philosophy.
...there is neither order nor necessity in his life, but calling this life sweet, free, and blessed he follows it throughout. (561c-d)

Finally, as Cephalus is dependent on the gods for his morality, so he is also dependent on his fellows for the means of expressing himself; when Socrates asks him about old age, the consolations of wealth, and the greatest good of wealth, Cephalus answers with quotations from Sophocles, Themistocles, and Pindar. In addition to reflecting the second-hand knowledge characteristic of the lowest reaches of the Cave (reflections of other's ideas), this also gives an example of the reason for Plato's revulsion toward poetry in Book 10: Cephalus is the sort of person who does what the gods say is just, and the oracles and poets tell him what the gods say. This is normally satisfactory; Cephalus knows that he should not lie or steal, but when a situation arises which is not covered in the Iliad or the Works and Days he is at a loss. This sort of person is also taken in by the beauty of what the poets say, and is inclined merely to recite quotations without critical or reflective thought. In sum, Cephalus shows himself to be very conventional in his opinions, which he has taken over wholesale from the poets without really thinking about them. Is this not the archetype of the prisoner at the lowest level of the cave? He has never thought about Justice; he will not even listen when someone tells him that the shadows which he is
so adept at identifying are not real, but at least he knows what the shadow of Justice looks like, and Socrates allows him to depart in peace.

B. Polemarcus

As Polemarchus is Cephalus' son and heir (331d), following him in time, vigor, openness to argument, and intellectual perceptivity; thus his characterization reflects the next levels up in the Cave and on the Divided Line. Polemarchus is literally the heir of the argument; he inherits his father's conventional morality, but he has been touched by the new intellectual freedom of Athens, and he is willing at least to discuss the reasons for his beliefs, trying to justify them to the satisfaction of Socrates without relying on religious sanctions. It is this willingness to argue that gets Polemarchus in trouble, because he has not thought out the basis for his orthodoxy and becomes extremely confused once he becomes involved in the argument, although at one point he feels strongly enough to say that he knows something is true, even if he can't explain why (334b). The things which Polemarchus does say are commonplace; most people would agree with them and most people, whether they would agree with them or not, live according to these precepts.

It is just to give to each what is owed (331e)
One owes good to friends and harm to enemies (332a)

A friend is one who seems to be, and is, good, and an enemy is one who seems to be, and is, bad (335a)

In contrast to his father, though, Polemarchus makes one mistake which Socrates takes some pains to correct - the idea that enemies are "owed" evil. As in the case of Cephalus, Socrates is not interested in forcing his own definition on Polemarchus, only in correcting what he perceives are the weak points in others'. Polemarchus has also identified the image of Justice, and perhaps has some notion that there is more to it than just a shadow, but what that something is he cannot say. He has moved into terra incognita here, and has no idea where he is. Is he not a clear example of the prisoner in the Cave who realizes that something is making the shadows on the wall, but is still too confused to know what or how? Socrates is trying to encourage his curiosity by making him question the beliefs which he received from his father, and Socrates has succeeded to a certain extent, because at the end Polemarchus agrees to the very un-Greek idea that one should not do harm to one's enemies, a position which Cephalus could not have reached -- he could not have stood up to the argumentation -- and which shows some progress up toward the full light of day.

Polemarchus represents the Oligarchic man, whom Socrates describes in Book 8 as principally concerned only with money (554a). Polemarchus is
honorable, but Socrates exposes his weakness by directing his first question to money and Polemarchus's attitude toward it (332a–b). The description of the Oligarch fits him very closely:

... when such a man has a good reputation in other contractual relations—because he seems to be just—he is forcibly holding down bad desires, which are there, with some decent part of himself. He holds them down not by persuading them that they 'had better not' nor by taming them with argument, but by necessity and fear... (554c–d)

C. Thrasymachus

Thrasymachus is very different from both Cephalus and Polemarchus: he is very sure of his position and he is extremely eager to defend it.

Justice is the advantage of the stronger (338c)

The rulers in each city make laws to their advantage, and it is just for their subjects to obey them (338e–339a)

The ruler is a ruler only in so far as he does not err in ruling; once he does, he is not a ruler (340d–341a)

The ruler considers the ruled only in what ways they may benefit him (343b–343c)

The unjust man always has more and is happier than the just man (343d–344c)

Thrasymachus is obviously a different case, and Socrates must take a good deal of time and effort to show that he is completely wrong, rather than trying to make small adjustments in his view. He is also different in that
while the positions of Cephalus and Polemarchus were true, if vague and confused, reflections of Justice, those of Thrasymachus are perverse distortions of it. Yet Thrasymachus's logic is well developed - far superior to that of Cephalus and Polemarchus. His mentality thus seems to represent a higher level in the Cave and on the Divided Line, though a perverse one. He can well be described as one who has misunderstood and misinterpreted what he saw on the wall of the Cave. He is thus without a true mentality and perhaps insane. He certainly appears animalistic: he is described as a wild beast (336b), and he is rude and insulting to Socrates, even in defeat. His attitude is "if we can't play by my rules, then I won't play the game." Therefore, although he argues his position strongly and forces Socrates to meet his objections in the rest of the Republic, his understanding in terms of reality can only be termed ἀγνῶτα, apprehending only τὸ μὴ ὅν. When viewed in light of the vision of the Good, his conduct and opinions could legitimately be called insane, yet the arguments that Socrates uses to embarass him are, as we saw in Chapter 1, widely regarded as suspect: Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus all express their dissatisfaction with the state of the question after Thrasymachus's "surrender". The nature of the arguments which Socrates uses against Thrasymachus is a question which will be deferred until later in this chapter.
Thrasymachus is clearly the model of the Tyrannic man; he espouses whatever crimes one can get away with, and says that the Tyrant is most happy in his perfect injustice (344a). Socrates, in Book 9, mentions some of the deeds that a Tyrannic man might do in peacetime (575b); these sound very much like the acts Thrasymachus enumerates in Book 1 (344b).

D. Cleitophon

The next character to be considered in the discussion of Book 1 is Cleitophon, who enters only long enough for a brief dispute with Polemarchus in the middle of the discussion Socrates is having with Thrasymachus.

Justice, or the advantage of the stronger, is what the ruler believes to be his advantage (340a-b).

We do not have much information here to allow us to say what real purpose the characterization of Cleitophon is fulfilling in the text. We may ask, however, why this break in the dialogue takes place. The logical point raised by the interruption is, of course, in what sense "the advantage of the stronger" is to be taken: whether it is what is actually the advantage of the stronger, or what seems to be the advantage of the stronger. The point must have been important to Plato, for in addition to this interruption, when Thrasymachus re-enters the discussion (340d-341a) he delivers a long
speech on the difference between one who is skilled in the general sense (i.e., who seems to be skilled) and one who is skilled in the strict sense (who is so in reality).

What is gained by suspending the forward movement of the dialogue with these two very minor characters? A heightened awareness, probably, of the distinction between mere appearance and actuality, a distinction whose importance in the Republic as a whole cannot be underestimated. Every interruption in the Republic signals an important change, and this one elaborately points up a distinction which has already been introduced in Polemarchus's discussion (of who a friend really is), and one which is continued by Glaucon, Adeimantus, and Socrates throughout the rest of the Republic. Since Socrates and Thrasymachus cannot interrupt themselves, and since Cephalus has already departed, other characters must enter. As soon as their function is complete, they disappear, having introduced, once again, a major theme of the remainder of the Republic in Book 1.

As the debate with Thrasymachus continues, Glaucon also interrupts Socrates and Thrasymachus to ask Socrates what he means by saying that a penalty for not ruling is one of the wages for rulers. Again, Glaucon does not say enough to characterize himself clearly in this short exchange; and the reply which Socrates gives will be examined in the next section, but it is
interesting, and indicative of the attitude some scholars have toward the
*Republic*, that the presence of Glaucon at this sole point of Book 1 (after the
dialogue "really" begins) has prompted some to consider this section a later
interpolation:

> ...[the interchange with Glaucon] looks very much...as though it
came in after Book 1 became part of the *Republic* as a whole, for
not only does Glaucan not appear again as a speaker till Book 2,
but some of Socrates’ claims about rulers read very oddly
unless we have the central books in mind. 7

Such arguments compel us to guess that the statements of Cleitophon
and Polemarchus must also be later interpolations, since neither character
appears again in Book 1 (or Books 2-4 either). If we are simply plodding
along through Book 1, reading the arguments without giving any thought to
the context in which they occur, a passage like this is bound to sound like an
interpolation. But if we can expand our contextual horizons, the passage
makes sense in, and even contributes to, its location. In his current
predicament, Thrasymachus has just finished changing his position. He
started off by arguing with Socrates over what “the just” is, but now he has
moved on to claim that the life of the unjust man is more profitable than
that of the just man. By making Glaucon interrupt with his question at this
point, Plato allows Socrates to do two things in his answer (347a-e); first,
Socrates can tell a friendly observer his own feelings about the discussion,
i.e., that he disagrees strongly with Thrasymachus over the original proposition (that the just is the advantage of the stronger), but that Thrasymachus's second statement (the life of the unjust is better than that of the just) is far more important. Second, Plato shows us, with just a bit of foreshadowing, what sort of person Glaucon is. Because he and Adeimantus have not taken any part in the discussion thus far, we have no idea as yet how they feel about all this. This short interruption shows that Glaucon is on the side of the angels, and thus his demand at the beginning of Book 2 to hear Socrates praise Justice comes as less of a surprise. The rest of Socrates' statement will be dealt with in the next section.

We have seen that Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus follow the Divided Line and the Cave in their levels of awareness and argumentation, and foreshadow the characters of Book 8-9. In the following chapter we will see how Glaucon and Adeimantus fit into this pattern, but now let us examine Socrates.

III. Levels of Argument

The philosopher cannot speak to the prisoners of the Cave on his own level, but must do so in terms they can understand. When we examine the statements which Socrates makes to each of the characters in Book 1, it is
easy to see that they are shaped by his anticipation of the levels of reality and knowledge to be revealed in the doctrine of the Divided Line and the analogy of the Cave. Let us examine his rejoinders to the various interlocutors.

**Socrates to Cephalus:**

A borrowed sword should not be returned to a madman (331c)

Socrates' only pronouncement to Cephalus is perfectly concrete, utilizing an obvious object of harm in an indisputably dangerous situation. Once Cephalus has agreed that returning a sword in such a situation would not be just, he has completely lost the grip on his own definition of Justice, and he immediately withdraws from the conversation and the dialogue. This inability to generalize shows that Cephalus is unable to climb higher on the Line or out of the Cave.

**Socrates to Polemarchus:**

A deposit of gold should not be returned to a friend, when this causes harm to either party (332a-b)

Bloom notes that when Polemarchus steps in for his father, Socrates gives him the same type of example, but with an ambiguous twist: instead of a sword, which can only be used for harm, he substitutes money, which can harm or help either the borrower or the lender. This forces Polemarchus up
a step on the Line and out of the Cave. From a slogan, Polemarchus is forced to think of a more general rule of conduct than his father could comprehend, and this is Socrates' general plan throughout his conversation; he leads Polemarchus to generalize and think in more abstract terms:

The arts give what is owed and fitting to the objects of the arts (332c-d)
   a) medicine
   b) cooking

The practitioner of an art must have someone in need of his art in order to practice it (332e)
   a) the doctor - patients
   b) the pilot - passengers

For any specific matter, the skilled practitioner of an art is more useful than the just man (333a-c)
   a) the player of checkers
   b) the housebuilder
   c) the harp player
   d) the horse expert
   e) the shipbuilder

Now that Polemarchus has generalized his own view, Socrates turns to arguments using τέχναι as examples. These arguments are so simple and direct that Polemarchus has no trouble understanding them, although he is repeatedly led to acknowledge positions beyond what he originally intended. Socrates speaks to him in terms he understands, in order to lead him beyond his conventional reasoning. Polemarchus therefore comes to acknowledge that:
Justice seems to be useful for things which are not being used (333d-e)
   a) money on deposit
   b) a pruning hook
   c) a shield
   d) a lyre

The expert practitioner of an art is also the expert at producing the opposite of the art's intended effect (333e-334b)
   a) the boxer
   b) the doctor
   c) the soldier
   d) the guard

Socrates uses more arguments based on τέχναι, to help Polemarchus see the relationships which exist behind things, much as the cut-outs lie behind the shadows on the wall:

   Men often mistake the good for enemies, and the bad for friends (334c-d)

   The man who actually is good is a friend, and the one who actually is bad, an enemy (334e-335a)

Here Socrates raises for the first time the question of reality: what is the difference between being and seeming, and how can one know what that difference is? Though his purpose here is limited to making a point with Polemarchus this theme is raised throughout the Republic and is the cornerstone of the epistemology discussed in Book 5. Once again, the elements of Book 1 foreshadow the rest of the Republic.

When things are injured, they become worse in regard to their characteristic virtue (335b-c)
a) horses  
b) dogs  
c) humans  

The practitioners of an art cannot bring about its opposite effect when they practice their art correctly (335c-d)  
a) musicians  
b) horseman  

A condition cannot create its opposite (335d)  
a) heat - cold  
b) wet - dry  

Harming is thus the work of the unjust, rather than the just man (335d-e)  

By getting Polemarchus to agree to this conclusion, Socrates has succeeded in expanding the young man's mental horizons, since "harm your enemies with the same fervor that you love your friends" was almost second nature among the Greeks. By questioning the assumptions of his contemporaries, Polemarchus takes the first step toward becoming a philosopher.  

Socrates to Glaucon:  

Good men must be forced to rule, since they are not willing to rule for money or honor (347b-e)  

In this short speech there are no examples: Socrates instead speaks of several things that have had no place in the dialogue up to this point: "the most decent men", οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι, "the love of honor", τὸ φιλότιμον,  

Socrates to Glaucon:
"the love of money", τὸ φιλάργυρον, and "a city of good men, if it should come to be". As Annas remarked, this might sound very strange in Book 1, but if Glaucon did indeed "come down" with Socrates as the dialogue began, then there is nothing strange about it: Plato is continuing the device of having Socrates speak to his interlocutors in the Republic at the level of understanding which they can comprehend. The phrases quoted above, which Socrates uses in his short discussion with Glaucon, are substantized adjectives used as abstract terms. They are a stylistic innovation in late 5th Century Greek, and they point not only to the abstract reasoning which Socrates will employ with Glaucon and Adeimantus later, but also to the linguistic origins of Plato's theory of Forms. Here, however, they also show that Glaucon's understanding, as well as his motive for participating in the discussion, are different from that of all the other interlocutors, since Glaucon is not trying to propound or defend his personal view of Justice, but is eager to search for the truth, even if he is not familiar with it. His eagerness is reflected in his question to Socrates, the first legitimate question anyone has asked Socrates since the discussion began. Though Annas has asserted that "some of Socrates' claims about rulers read very oddly" unless we look forward to the yet unseen central books, it is equally true that some things read very oddly unless they are carefully prepared for, and
Plato has done quite a bit of foreshadowing in Book 1 already. The astute reactions of Glaucon in Book 2 seem much more natural if we have some indication that he has not been thinking in simple terms thus far - and his characterization in Book 1 provides this amply.

**Socrates to Thrasymachus:**

People searching for gold would never willingly make way for one another in their search (336e)

You cannot ask a question and then forbid a man to answer correctly (337b), e.g., how much is twelve?

If the pankratiast is stronger than we are, and eats beef, then beef is advantageous and just for us (337c-d)

If it is just both to obey the stronger, and to do what is to the stronger's advantage, then sometimes we will obey the stronger, but unwittingly do what is not to the stronger's advantage. Under Thrasymachus's definition, this would still be just. (338b-e)

Socrates forces Thrasymachus to define his position more carefully than he presumably was accustomed to do, by speaking with a literalness which draws more insults from Thrasymachus.

The arts provide what is advantageous to their objects, and are not concerned with wage-earning or the arts themselves (341c-342c)

a) medicine works to the advantage of the body

b) horsemanship works to the advantage of the horse

The practitioner of an art considers the advantage of what is ruled by it and is weaker than it (342c-e)
a) doctor - patients
b) pilot - sailors

None of the arts include wage-earning; that art is separate from all others (346a-347a)
   a) medicine furnishes health
   b) piloting furnishes safety in sailing
   c) housebuilding furnishes a house
   d) ruling furnishes benefit to those ruled

Returning to the consideration of τέχναι, Socrates manages, albeit with a great deal of resistance, to win his first concession from Thrasyamachus: that the arts look to the advantage of their objects, not of their practitioners. This effectively divides ruling from exploitation and forces Thrasyamachus to justify πλεονεξία on its own grounds. But Socrates argues that:

Men try to get the better of those who are unlike them, not of those who are like them (349b-350c)
   a) musical
   b) medical
   c) wise

A common enterprise requires justice among its members, even if the enterprise is unjust (351c-352a)
   a) an individual
   b) a city
   c) an army
   d) pirates or robbers

Each thing has a work which it alone can do, or can do better than other things (352d-353a)
   a) a horse
   b) eyes
   c) ears
d) a pruning knife

Things cannot do their proper work without their proper virtue
(353b-354a)
   a) eyes
   b) ears
   c) the soul

By arguing that injustice is the work of the ignorant, that perfect
injustice cannot accomplish anything, and that the unjust soul will be
unhappy, Socrates manages to silence Thrasymachus, but the fine line that
Plato has been walking here has often been noted: if Socrates cannot
convince Thrasymachus that he is wrong, or at least cause him to withdraw
from the argument, there is no opportunity for Glaucon and Adeimantus to
come back and state the argument for injustice yet more strongly. But if
Socrates defeats Thrasymachus utterly, there is likewise no reason to discuss
justice in such depth as the rest of the Republic does. Therefore the
arguments with Thrasymachus fulfill several purposes; first, they continue
the pattern of the level of understanding in Book 1, the three main
interlocutors having but vague inklings of the reality of Justice. Second, they
show how Socrates must argue with a Sophist: in lowering himself to
Thrasymachus's level of discussion, his arguments, even though they "defeat"
Thrasymachus, have been perenially condemned -- they are "sophistical"
themselves -- yet Socrates has, throughout Book 1, spoken to his
interlocutors in terms which they could understand. The discussion with Thrasymachus is no different; since Socrates silences the Sophist on his own ground, with his own chosen weapons, it would be surprising if the arguments Socrates uses in conversing with him did not contain "sophistic" elements. Finally, these sophistical arguments of Socrates provide a tight connection with the rest of the Republic. Thrasymachus states a position of ethical nihilism, but being a crude and overbearing person, he does so in a crude and overbearing manner, as would be expected of someone whose understanding is of τὸ μὴ δύν. Socrates deals with him, but the doubts that Thrasymachus raises are not so easily dismissed, and in Book 2 Glaucon and Adeimantus "polish them up" in a way that Socrates cannot ignore or avoid answering.

IV. Summary

At the end of Book 1, the state of the question is far from being a stalemate, or the ἀπορία of many early dialogues. It is true that a valid definition of justice has not been formulated, and Socrates himself says that he has not had a fine banquet, either, but if we look at what has transpired, the view is broad, and compelling.
We have seen Socrates amicably compelled to engage in a conversation at a place and time which was not to his liking. When the discussion turned to Justice, Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus all claimed to have knowledge of it, and while Socrates was content to refine and clarify the definitions of Cephalus and Polemarchus, he considered Thrasymachus to be completely wrong. In the course of these discussions, Plato, the author, has foreshadowed literally the key topic of seeming versus actuality, the future level of Glaucon's understanding, and his own vision of a city filled with ideal or corrupt men. But the most important things he has foreshadowed are the metaphors of the Cave and the Divided Line. We have seen Socrates try to show everyone why their understanding of Justice is inadequate, using examples that are as elementary as his interlocutors can understand. Therefore, when we finally reach Books 6 and 7, we encounter there passages which raise very strong feelings of déjà vu when compared to Book 1.

So you must go down, each in his turn, into the common dwelling of the others and get habituated along with them to seeing the dark things. And, in getting habituated to it, you will see ten thousand times better than the men there, and you'll know what each of the phantoms is, and of what it is a phantom, because you have seen the truth about fair, just, and good things. (520c)

Do you suppose it is anything surprising if a man, come from acts of divine contemplation to the human things, is graceless
and looks quite ridiculous when - with his sight still dim and before he has gotten sufficiently accustomed to the surrounding darkness - he is compelled in courts or elsewhere to contest about the shadows of the just or the representations of which they are the shadows, and to dispute about the way things are understood by men who have never seen justice itself? (517d-e)

The image of these two passages, of the philosopher returning to the cave with the knowledge of reality, but surrounded by men who have no point of reference save the shadows on the wall, recalls vividly the situation we encountered in Book 1, where all of Socrates' interlocutors are eager to parade a knowledge which Socrates must patiently try to show is made up of little but misconceptions. At this early level, Socrates cannot teach his interlocutors anything of what justice truly is, since they have neither the desire nor the ability to see it, and so, frustrating as it must be for him (οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἰστικαί - 354a), he must use only images of reality, images which they can understand. These images will not bring them true knowledge of justice, but if planted in the right place, they may give birth to the desire to know more. In the next chapter it will be suggested that the beginning of Book 2 indicates quite clearly that Glaucon and Adeimantus have this desire, and how this desire changes the personalities, methods, and topics of the remainder of the Republic.
The measure of the true success of Book 1 may be seen precisely in the very degree of criticism it has provoked. The purpose of the Republic is to incite the reader to think more deeply on the issues raised. After reading what Thrasymachus has to say, most people want to see him refuted because of their hope that there is a nobler definition of Justice which can be intellectually justified. Socrates in Book 1 discredits Thrasymachus, but does not provide such a definition because, as we have seen, his interlocutors could not understand it; what he does provide is the impetus to thought which inspires Glaucon and Adeimantus to continue the discourse in Book 2, and which has caused so many critics to wring their hands over his words. Plato was an astute enough observer of human nature to know what sort of reaction Book 1 would provoke; he has reflected it exactly in the reactions of Glaucon and Adeimantus. Throughout the remainder of the Republic they are at pains not to let Socrates cheat them by leaving out of any section of the argument, as if they saw this entire discussion as something vastly more important than an afternoon's talk with friends. This urgency is lost if we remove Book 1, or condemn it, or rush through it to get at the "meat" of the dialogue. In Book 1, we see the situation as it still exists today among most of us: people urging either the Golden Rule or the Law of the Jungle; this dilemma prompts anyone who would be a philosopher to seek a deeper
understanding and a better way, and the rest of the Republic furnishes just that.
Notes for Chapter Two

1. Bloom, p. xvi.

2. Sider, p. 337.


5. E.g., 419a-420b, 450a, 451b-c, 474a, 607b. As these examples are all from later books, they show how Book 1 introduces another theme which is continued through the Republic.

6. E.g., 360e-362a, 365b-c, the entire discussion of knowledge in Book 5, 476c-480a.

7. Annas, p. 47.


11. οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἰστίαμαι (354a)
Chapter Three:
The Central Books

Books 2 through 9 have comparatively few dramatic details, but there are enough to show that the structural pattern established in Book 1, mirroring the structure of Socrates' Divided Line and the journey out of the Cave, continues through the central books. At each major change in the topics and levels of discussion, Plato gives us clear indications that the level of understanding required to follow the dialogue is changing, and he does this in terms borrowed from the Cave analogy.

I. Books 2-4: The Ascent from the Cave

According to that analogy, the first thing that happens in the departure of a prisoner from the Cave and the release from his bonds, is that he turns from the shadows on the wall to look at the fire for the first time (515c). This turning is motivated by his desire for truth, and his search for the truth results from that desire. Just such a process of turning and pursuing is described at the beginning of Book 2, as the desire to know now forces Glaucon and Adeimantus to turn away from the misconceptions and inconclusive arguments of Book 1 – the shadows on the wall – and demand that Socrates continue the argument, as they shake off their bonds and look...
toward the fire of truth for the first time. This helps explain why Socrates' exchange with Glaucon in Book 1 was so different from all the other discussions in that book; Plato was indicating there that Glaucon was a man who would not remain in the realm of ἐικασία. Socrates, realizing this, spoke to him on a level the others would never reach: the level of νοητά, in which he could employ abstract concepts and terminology. This also helps explain the unusual employment of characters in Book 1, as contrasted with the remainder of the Republic. Glaucon and Adeimantus played virtually no role there because their mentalities did not belong to the same category as those of Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus, since they were not interested in impressing the others with their fine thoughts and words on Justice. It is significant that the one passage in which Glaucon spoke in Book 1 was prompted by his desire to understand more clearly a point of Socrates.

Glaucon and Adeimantus, Plato's own brothers, let the rest of the group dispute over the shadows on the wall, but when the rest have all fallen silent, for one reason or another, it is they who boldly come back to Socrates and say, "We are not satisfied; teach us more." By this act they signal their readiness to leave behind the bonds of the prisoners in the cave and start the long ascent to true knowledge. Socrates is delighted, and suggests that a divine intervention has occurred in the conversation:
I listened, and although I had always been full of wonder at the nature of Glaucon and Adeimantus, at this time I was particularly delighted. For something quite divine must certainly have happened to you, if you are remaining unpersuaded that Injustice is better than justice when you are able to speak that way on its behalf. (367e-368a)

What in Glaucon's and Adeimantus's appeal has made Socrates so happy? Let us examine the arguments Glaucon and Adeimantus use in their challenges to Socrates, keeping in mind the sort of arguments we had seen in Book 1.

Glaucon:

There are three types of good (357b-357d)
   a) a good for its own sake
   b) a good for its own sake and its consequences
   c) a good for its consequences alone

Injustice is praised by many, but not Justice. I want to hear Justice praised itself for itself \( \alpha\nu\tau\omicron\ ικα\theta \alpha\nu\tau\omicron \) (358a-d)

The origin of Justice lies in an agreement made by those who are unable to do Injustice with vigor (358e-359a)

Anyone who is able commits Injustice, if he thinks he can escape detection like Gyges, and he thinks that Injustice is more beneficial to him than Justice (359b-360d)

Take a just and unjust man as an example, and give all honors and reputation for Justice to the unjust man, and the opposite to the just. Let them end their lives with the extreme consequences attendant on their respective reputations, and judge which of them is happier (360e-362c)
Adeimantus:
Men teach their children to be just, not because of justice itself, but because of the rewards which both men and gods will bestow upon them (363a-e)

Poets and priests say that justice is good but difficult to achieve, and gods and men can be influenced by sacrifices and incantations (364a-365a)

If the previous two statements are true, young men will realize that it is best to achieve the reputation for justice without the hard work involved. If thereby they offend the gods, they will sacrifice and appease them with their ill-gotten gains (365a-366b)

No one is ever willingly just except the one who cannot be unjust, and even those who praise justice never praise it for itself, but for the benefits which come from it. So tell us why it is good to possess justice in itself (366b-367e)

In comparing these arguments with those of Book 1, differences are immediately clear, and can be seen in both their content and form. Regarding content, Glaucon and Adeimantus emphasize again and again that they want to hear justice praised "itself for itself"; they realize that there is a difference between being and seeming just; they take justice out of the physical realm of right action and place it in the realm of character. In all these topics they are far in advance of the two basic definitions of justice in Book 1: do good to your friends and harm to your enemies, or do whatever you can get away with. They take great pains that Socrates should not impute to them the positions they are expounding, but they also want him to
know that they are at a loss as to how they can refute ideas such as these. This is certainly a foreshadowing of the confusion of the newly-released prisoner, who knows that what he saw before were shadows, but is still too uncertain to understand the truth of what he now sees:

Take a man who is released and suddenly compelled to stand up, to turn his neck around, to walk and look up toward the light; and who, moreover, in doing all this is in pain and, because he is dazzled, is unable to make out those things whose shadows he saw before. (515c)

In contrast to the arguments used by both Socrates and his interlocutors in Book 1, the form of these arguments also signals a change. Instead of relying on the tangible and specific, the statements of Glaucon and Adeimantus more nearly exhibit the traits of formal logical arguments: they itemize evidence, divide topics, use deduction, speak in universal terms ("no one", "anyone"), and seek the origin of, and explanation for, the evidence they have. This attitude of questioning, rather than dogmatic assertion, indicates more clearly than anything the difference between Books 1 and 2.

Glaucon and Adeimantus have been released "by something quite divine" and have turned around to see, for the first time, something other than the shadows that everyone else is watching and quarrelling over. Yet they are dazzled, unsure of what it is they are seeing, and they beg Socrates for help as they start their journey up from the bottom of the cave. By this
drastic difference in style between Books 1 and 2, Plato shows us dramatically and stylistically what he will repeat to us poetically and philosophically in Books 6 and 7: the difference in the nature of knowledge and understanding between those who dwell in εἰκασία, accepting the world and the opinions of the many at face value, and those who are released from this bondage and see what the true nature of the physical world is. The latter do not yet perceive reality, but now they know that the shadows on the wall of the cave are not reality, and they are open to further inquiry so that they may travel, perhaps, out of the cave to the contemplation of the Good.

Glaucon is explicitly named by Adeimantus in Book 8 as the model of the Timocratic man, "as far as love of victory (φιλονικία) goes" (548d). In Glaucon, "the part that loves victory and is spirited" (550b) predominates, and it is this spiritedness which causes him to rebel, and force the discussion to continue after Thrasymachus has acquiesced.

As we have seen, the beginning of Book 2 coincides with the symbolic turning of Glaucon and Adeimantus away from the shadows on the wall, to face the fire and begin their journey upward in understanding. Thus, after the accounts of Glaucon and Adeimantus, when Socrates is persuaded to come to the aid of Justice, he says, "...the investigation we are undertaking is
no ordinary thing, but one for a man who sees sharply" (δεν βλέποντος), in the same way as the philosopher, on returning to the cave and becoming used to its light once more, sees "infinitely better" than the prisoners (368c; 520c). The rest of the dialogue is almost the exclusive property of Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus; the others are present and listening to what is being said, but cannot join in, since their understanding does not reach so high. Throughout Books 2–4, the logical and intellectual atmosphere becomes more rarefied and abstract as the journey upward continues. Thus, the dialogue passes from the foundation of an ideal city (369ff) to the qualities of its citizens (374ff), and their education (376ff), and eventually to the logical rigor of the Principle of Contradiction (436) and the three parts of the Soul (437–444). By the end of Book 4, Socrates has shown what Justice is, manifested in an individual and in a state. This is as far as he can take any explanation on the current intellectual level. In order to view Justice itself, without any physical appurtenances, a further degree of abstraction will be necessary.

II. Books 5–7: The Upper Reaches of Reality

The next great stylistic break occurs between Books 4 and 5, as we move from the world of substances and unreality to that of intangibles and
reality. We are prepared for this change near the end of Book 4, when Socrates has finished his delineation of the psyche and his establishment of the state, and he can now look back on the principle of Justice in the state as "some kind of phantom of Justice" (εἰδώλιον τύ), which was useful in helping us ascend to our current level, but which we can now see for what it really was (443c). This leads very quickly to the beginning of Book 5, where Plato takes a great deal of trouble to emphasize that he is interrupting the main argument (so much trouble that, naturally, some scholars have speculated that Books 1(1) - 4 formed a separate, earlier work to which the rest was later added.1) Toward the end of Book 4 (435d), Socrates mentions a "longer road" necessary to get a precise grasp on the question (the phrase is repeated at the end of Book 6 (504b), in the context of the need for further precision). As Book 5 actually begins, Polemarchus and Thrasy-machus re-enter for the last time in the dialogue (449b, 450a), to interrupt explicitly the discourse which Socrates says he was about to start, and they join forces with Glaucon and Adeimantus to change the course of the discussion until Socrates returns to the same point at the beginning of Book 8 (543c), where he mentions again (in case anyone has forgotten) how he was interrupted, and what he was going to say. This interruption, separating off Books 5-7, is
made so obvious, and referred to so often, that it must fulfill some purpose in the dialogue.

Up to the end of Book 4, Socrates has examined Justice in the visible world as it exists in the soul and in the state. In terms in of the Cave analogy, he has discussed the fire and the true nature of the objects which are paraded along in front of the fire. But now there must be some motivation for the companions of Socrates to continue on their upward journey toward Justice itself, just as something must drag the prisoner in the Cave along the rough upward way into the light of the sun. This motivation is ἔρως, and it is revealed when Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Adeimantus, and Glaucon all band together, demanding to have their curiosity about the communality of wives and children satisfied. This desire is the beginning of their search for the Good, as it is in the Symposium, where Diotima tells Socrates:

... the right way to approach the things of love (τὰ ἐρωτικά), or to be led by another, is this: beginning from these beautiful things (τὰ καλά), to mount for that beauty's sake ever upwards, as by a flight of steps, from one to two, and from two to all beautiful bodies, and from beautiful bodies to beautiful pursuits and practices, and from practices to beautiful learnings, so that from learnings he may come at last to that perfect learning which is the learning solely of that beauty itself, and may know at last that which is the perfection of beauty. There in life and there alone ... is life worth living for man, when he contemplates Beauty itself (αὕτω τὸ καλόν).2
The interruption of Books 5-7, motivated by ἐπός, gives us the definition of the true philosophers, the discussion of what really is, the Forms and the different levels of understanding, the Cave, and the detailed description of the continued education in the ideal state; all of these topics belong to the section of Socrates' Divided Line above mere πίστις, and require this additional motivation for the interlocutors to follow them out of the realm of the the Cave, into the light of the Sun.

III. Books 8-9: Climbing Back Down

At the end of Book 7 we have finished the examination of the rarified entities existing without matter, situated on the upper segment of the Line, and Book 8 begins with another long dialogue which recalls the setting at the beginning of the detour in Books 5-7. This points out that we are resuming an earlier discussion at a lower level: we will now examine not Justice Itself, nor even how it is manifested in the ideal city, but the decay of that ideal and the consequent degeneration of the man who lives in it. As Socrates resumes his discussion, he speaks of the ruin and dissolution (φθορά, λύσις - 546a) of the ideal aristocracy he has founded, and then he playfully invokes the Muses. The major transition this clearly indicates was even noted by Adam, who remarks:
Homer appeals to the Muses at the turning point of his narrative ... and Plato, like Milton ("Of man's first disobedience and the fruit of that forbidden tree, sing heavenly Muse"), fitly invokes them at the commencement of his Epic of the Fall of Man.5

Throughout Books 8 and 9, the emphasis of the content is on decay, as Socrates describes the states and individuals as increasingly worse and more wretched as they move farther and farther from his ideal. Also, the form of the arguments returns to that of Books 2-4, with examples and deductions drawn from concrete tangible circumstances. Finally, Socrates proves that a tyranny and the tyrannic man are the most wretched of all states and men, especially if that type of man happens to head that type of state.

The discussion of Book 10, and the indications that it reflects once more ἐκκοσια and the realm of the Cave, rightly belong in the following chapter, but the pattern emerging thus far is already clear enough to suggest with conviction that Plato wrote the Republic with a structure that is both cyclic and pyramidal, in effect, three-dimensional (see diagram below). Just as Socrates builds the ideal state in Books 2-4, so he traces its decay in Books 8-9, and shows in parallel how man deteriorates in virtue and happiness until we reach the most wretched of men, the tyrant. At the same time, the level of the discussion and the understanding required to participate in it rise in abstractness to the point at which Socrates tells Glaucon that they will
be able to comprehend no more than the offspring of τὸ ἀγαθόν for now (506e); this is the apex of the pyramid, close to the center of the text of the Republic, and the level of the discussion descends from there.

Levels of Understanding and of Logical Abstraction

τὸ ἀγαθὸν

νόησις

διάνοια

πίστις

ἐικασία

Books 5-7
The Upper World

Books 2-4
The Ascent

Books 8-9
Degeneration

Book 1
The Cave

Book 10
Poetry

Dramatic Movement of the Dialogue

To see how inextricably this structure is bound up with the content of the Republic, imagine another Republic, containing the same material, written with equal artistry, and containing the same insights. This one, however, will be arranged differently. Proceeding directly from the end of Book 4 to the beginning of Book 8 without the notorious interruption, the genesis of the ideal state and its degeneration into the other four constitutions is completed before the interlocutors make the demand which provokes the present Books 5-7. This gives a very straightforward structure to the dialogue: beginning with the squabbling and inconclusive argument, it
rises through the mundane realms of politics to higher and higher realms of understanding until it terminates in the Forms and the contemplation of the Good (leaving out the "bothersome" Book 10, since it makes little sense anyway). At first glance, the construction of this version of the Republic would be just as good as Plato's version, possibly even more so, for beginning with the popular misconceptions of Justice, we move on to ideal Justice in the individual and state, and finally a vision of Justice Itself, and beyond that. The Good - just as in the Divine Comedy Dante takes us from the depths of Hell to the empyrean, and ends with a vision of the "Eternal Good" and "universal form". But Plato's vision is not a Christian allegory ending in an eternal other world, and to arrange the Republic in this way would suggest one fundamental change in the meaning of the simile of the Cave: the philosopher would not be expected to return to the Cave. This however, is contrary to Socrates' repeated intentions in the Republic:

"Then our job as founders," I said, "is to compel the best natures ... to see the good and to go up that ascent, and ... not to permit them what is now permitted."

"What's that?"

"To remain there," I said, "and not be willing to go down again among the prisoners or share their labors and honors, whether they be slighter or more serious."
The "great interruption" of Book 5-7 is explicable if we see it as part of the allegorical journey of the philosopher. Beginning with the images on the wall of the Cave (Book 1), we turn around (beginning of Book 2), see the Fire, and begin our ascent to the surface (Books 2-4), but we cannot remain in our contemplative rapture there (Books 5-7), and must go back down and do our duty, to help the prisoners in the Cave. This corresponds to the structure of the Republic as we have it, and the constant references in Books 8 and 9 to decay and dissolution reinforce the impression that we are headed down into less wholesome regions than those we were just discussing. At each major turning point of the Republic, we have seen how Plato indicates dramatically that the philosophical content of the dialogue is changing. By the end of Book 9, we have ascended to the sunlight and returned to the Cave, amid the destruction, corruption, madness, and unreality of the tyrannical state. Our discussion has risen from misconceptions to idealized actualities (states) to abstractions (the arguments on the soul) to pure forms, and has descended back among concrete actualities (degenerate states); ending in a tyranny. We are now ready to grope back among its physical and intellectual prisoners.
Notes for Chapter Three

1. Notably Adam, I, 353. This was mainly in an attempt to show that Book 5 was "responding" to the *Ecclesiæzusæ* of Aristophanes, which, according to this theory, was written to lampoon the equality of women as described in the "first" version of the *Republic*, Books 1-4.


3. Adam, II 203, n.27


5. 519c–d.

6. 545a, 546a, 550d, 552a, 554e, 556e, 563e, 577c–d.
Chapter Four:

Poetry and the Meaning of Book 10

We have seen that the Republic portrays a vigorous rational attempt on the part of Socrates to woo Glaucon and Adeimantus away from tyranny to philosophy by showing them what true Justice is. The Republic is also an allegory, showing the journey of the philosopher by means of the imagery of the Cave. When we reach the beginning of Book 10 it seems that there is little left to say, if we think that the Republic is merely an expository treatise on Justice, and it seems that Plato has indeed said little worth noticing in his last book, doing us a disservice with this "lame and messy ending". If we look at Book 10 in a different light, however, we will find that Plato is accomplishing several goals here.

Criticisms of Book 10 fall into three categories: criticisms of its form ("a ragbag"), its content ("gratuitous and clumsy...full of oddities"), or its placement ("an appendix"). If the interpretation of the Republic as a structure corresponding to the Divided Line and the Cave is correct, this interpretation should be able to solve some of these difficulties. Still, as in the case of Book 1, all of these criticisms have some grounds in the text. At first glance, structure appears to be almost lacking in Book 10, with succeeding sections on the place of poetry in the nature of reality, the effects
of poetry on the soul, the immortality of the soul, and the Myth of Er. The
topics which Socrates discusses, and the casual, offhand manner in which he
shifts from one to another of them, contrast strongly with the careful
preparation and intricate interweaving of subjects which seems to occur in
the preceding books. Also, the arguments themselves come under intense
criticism, especially the "proof" of the immortality of the soul: "This is one of
the few really embarrassingly bad arguments in Plato..."5, "These difficulties
are serious, and possibly fatal..."6, "Plato does not see, or is unmoved by, the
question-begging nature of this argument..."7. Aside from the arguments, the
content itself seems to differ from the rest of the Republic: the nature of the
soul, of poetry, and of the Forms are discussed in terms which seem
fundamentally different than the previous books. Books 4-9, for instance,
employ a tripartite soul, corresponding with the classes in the city, while
Book 10 seems to suppose either a unitary or a bipartite soul.8 In Books 2-3,
some poetry is imitative but can still be put to use; in Book 10, however, all
imitative poetry should be banished. Finally, the Forms in Books 5-7 are
described in a different fashion, or used toward a different end, than in Book
10. In the earlier books they are employed in metaphysical and
epistemological contexts, and appear to be derived by the "Argument from
Opposites",9 while in Book 10 their usage seems to indicate that they are
simply being employed as universals, derived by the "One over Many" argument.¹⁰

It cannot be denied that Book 10 exhibits variances from the rest of the Republic which are readily pointed out, but once again, if a doctrinal explanation is lacking for what we read in the book, perhaps we should look for a dramatic one instead. It will be the argument of this Chapter that the content, format, and placement of Book 10 are deliberate, and are intended to show the methods the philosopher must use on his return to the Cave, and the main obstacles he will face in attempting to work with its prisoners. Also, the level of understanding being addressed in this book is no longer that of the potential philosopher like Glaucon and Adeimantus, but that of those with no potential for philosophy.

It will first be argued that the discussion returns to the Cave in Book 10. In light of this knowledge, the topics of the book and the manner of their presentation will be discussed. Since Book 10 does not include the same variety of speakers as Book 1 does, we cannot look to differences in viewpoint to help with interpretation, and must rely essentially on what Socrates is saying to Glaucon. Yet this lack of interlocutors will help us also, since we will have no need to debate what Socrates' position really is; he tells it to us directly, just as he has told us for the past eight books. As in the
case of Book 1, we will see how the foregoing structure of the *Republic* has prepared us for the meaning to be found in Book 10.

I. The Return to the Cave

The examination of Books 1-9 has shown how Plato, at critical points in the dialogue, gives clear indications that the level of the discussion (with reference to the analogy of the Cave, and the understanding required to follow this discussion, is changing. The opening of Book 10 demonstrates this principle once more, albeit on a more modest scale than in Book 1. Close to the beginning of Book 10 (595c), Socrates and Glaucon have an exchange which is unusual, in that it is more jocose and informal than the majority of the discussions we have been following since Book 2:

"Could you tell me what imitation in general is? For I myself scarcely comprehend what it wants to be."

"Then I," he said, "of course will comprehend it."

This sarcasm is unusual, therefore drawing attention to itself, and Socrates immediately follows it with a direct reference to the Cave (596a):

"That wouldn't be anything strange," I said, "since men with duller vision have often, you know, seen things before those who see more sharply (δυστέρον βλέποντων)."

This statement is absurd on the face of it, and can only make sense when viewed as corresponding to the return of the philosopher to the Cave
with his "maimed" eyes. It is also an exact echo of Book 2 (368c), where Socrates, just beginning to converse with Glaucon and Adeimantus, had told them that "...the investigation we are undertaking is no ordinary thing, but one for a man who sees sharply" (δεξὺ βλέποντος). The statement in Book 2 was made when Socrates was just beginning to lead the two brothers out of the Cave, and he mentions it again now that they are returning to it, showing that this "sharp sight", which was a prerequisite for the bulk of their investigation, now may actually hinder their inquiry. The only situation in which Socrates has acknowledged that the philosopher may be at a disadvantage is on his initial return to the Cave (516e-517a):

"If such a man were to come down (καταβάς) again and sit in the same seat, on coming suddenly from the sun wouldn't his eyes get infected with darkness?"

"Very much so," he said.

"And if he once more had to compete with those perpetual prisoners in forming judgements about those shadows while his vision was dim, before his eyes recovered, and if the time needed for getting accustomed were not at all short, wouldn't he be the source of laughter, and wouldn't it be said of him that he went up and came back with his eyes corrupted, and that it's not even worth trying to go up?"

Socrates' joking allusion at the beginning of Book 10 clearly indicates that we are to consider the dialogue descending through those levels once more. The connection between the Cave and Book 10 becomes even closer
when we examine what has been said just before this playful exchange with Glaucon, and recall the comparison of "sight" to "thought" which is expounded in the analogy of the Sun in Book 6 (507ff.).

Throughout Book 9, the type of state and man discussed has become worse and worse, ending with the tyrant, and as soon as Book 10 begins, Socrates begins speaking again of poetry - imitative poetry in particular. This should lead us to suspect that poetry will play an important, if not pivotal role in this book, and Socrates does say almost immediately thereafter, "all such things (imitative poetry) seem to maim the thought (or understanding: ἱκλαυνόμενα) of those who do not have, as a remedy, knowledge of how they really are" (595b 9-10). Taken in the context of our re-entry of the Cave, this seems to indicate that poetry is a very powerful force on this level. Just as those coming out of the sunlight are unable to see in the darkness of the Cave until their eyes adjust to the reduced light, so the philosopher, newly come from seeing things in the world of Reality, is temporarily unable to think clearly about issues which are of great import in the world of the senses. This implies the relationships Poetry : Mind :: Darkness : Eyes. Socrates had said in Book 7 that the philosopher who tries to deal with shadows in the Cave will be confused until his eyes adjust to the
weak and uncertain light, and now he says that in dealing with imitation, the essence of έικασία, he (Socrates) will be at a disadvantage.

Socrates goes still further: six times in Book 10 he refers to poets as the makers or imitators of a "phantom" (έιδωλον). In describing the return of the Philosopher to the Cave in Book 7, he had said:

"And, in getting habituated to [the Cave], you will see ten thousand times better than the men there, and you'll know what each of the phantasms (έιδωλα) is, and of what it is a phantom (έιδωλον), because you have seen the truth about fair, just, and good things." (520c)

And a little further on:

"Then", I said, "the release from bonds and the turning around from shadows to the phantoms (έιδωλα) and the light, the way up from the cave to the sun; and, once there, the persisting inability to look at the animals and plants and the sun's light, and looking instead at the divine appearances in water and at shadows of the things that are, rather than as before at shadows of phantasms (έιδωλα) cast by a light that, when judged in comparison with the sun, also has the character of a phantom (έιδωλον)...." (532b-c)

These passages clearly indicate that poetry is akin to the cutouts which create the shadows of the Cave. One implication is clear: we have returned to the Cave. There is another which follows from this: poetry, more than anything else in the realm of έικασία, is the force which the philosopher must contend with, both in continuing to live the philosophic life, and in attempting to aid the inhabitants of the Cave to start on the road
to philosophy, as we have been watching Socrates do throughout the
Republic.

II. The Structure, Placement, and Content of Book 10

Now that we have seen that Book 10 has indeed returned to the Cave, we must use this knowledge to explain the structure, placement, and content of the book, all of which have been criticized, as we have seen. Although the reason for all three is the same, the separate examination of each will better show how they are deliberately and artistically placed to form a fitting conclusion to a great work.

The structure of Book 10 must involve poetry, since poetry is its main subject. Bloom's comment is apt:

Book 10 begins with a criticism of Homeric poetry and ends with an example of Socratic poetry. Separating the two is a discussion of the immortality of the soul. The difference between the old poetry and the new lies in their understanding of the soul; the old poetry seems to lead necessarily to a view of the soul which is inimical to philosophy. ... Socrates outlines a new kind of poetry which leads beyond itself, which does not present man's only alternatives as tragic or comic, which supports the philosophic life.12

In other words, Socrates is continuing to assist his listeners, but instead of refining and correcting their beliefs, as he did in Book 1, he is trying here to change the way they see their place in the world. The old
Type of poetry required a passive listener, who would merely absorb what he heard; the new Socratic poetry provokes its listener and compels him to think, to question, and to become a part of the "poem" himself, by thinking through what he hears, debating it, and at times objecting to it. Homeric poetry showed men as the puppets of the gods; Socratic poetry shows them as masters of their own fate. The structure of Book 10 brings out this contrast by showing that a philosopher cannot allow himself to succumb to the charms of Homer; he must put aside these childish things and concentrate on the well-being of his soul, that is, on the pursuit of philosophy. (One is reminded of Jerome trying to put aside Cicero so that he can immerse himself in Scripture). Far from being a haphazard pot-pourri, Book 10 is deliberately constructed so as to raise the mental horizons of its readers and exhort them once more, in a slightly different fashion from Books 2-9, to pursue the philosophic life.

The placement of Book 10 is the culmination of the long process of building the overall structure of the Republic. Rather than being an appendix or afterthought, it is the fitting conclusion to the journey which we have seen on three separate levels: physically, in the descent of Socrates from Athens to the Piraeus, philosophically, in the text of the dialogue, and allegorically, in the simile of the Cave. With this structure, the Republic
would be incomplete if it did not return to its lowest level, and leave us in the Cave. By doing so, Plato reminds us once more that the philosopher must return to the Cave and sit down with its prisoners. Ending Book 10 in this way completes both the ring structure and the three-dimensional shape. Its placement at the end of the Republic is therefore essential.

But what of the content of Book 10? If Plato had nothing worthwhile to say after Book 9, the completion of the structure would be a poor excuse to continue on for another 26 Stephanus pages. What we have seen of the structure and placement of the book allows us to guess that the content will follow the same pattern: a further appeal to the audience, on a different level of comprehension, to pursue the philosophic life. Even a casual examination of Book 10 will reveal that poetry is the main topic of the book, either in the various criticisms of it by Socrates, or in the new "Socratic" poetry of the Myth of Er. Why renew the discussion of poetry after the original discourse over its place in the ideal state? Again, let us look to the situation in which Plato has placed his characters. We have seen the Forms, and ideal Justice manifested in the state and in the individual, but now we have returned to the Cave, and soon Socrates must go back up to the city, and we must put down the Republic and live once more in the "real" world. Book 1 has shown us the "normal" types of people we will have to deal with,
and how desperate is the need for a true understanding of justice among them (though they may not even know it): how can we keep the vision of the Republic pure in such a world, and continue on the path of philosophy for as long as possible? To rephrase the question in the terms which Plato may well have seen it: what is the greatest threat to the philosophic life? The return to the Cave in Book 10 allows Plato to give the answer: imitative poetry.

Since education in Athens before the Sophists "consisted of learning by heart the works of the poets" once one had learned basic reading, writing, and arithmetic, poetry held a position in Classical Greece very different from anything comparable today. Considering its position in Greek life and education at this point in history, we can say that, using the imagery of the Cave, poetry is the creation of the σκεύη, or artifacts, by means of whose shadows the prisoners obtain such knowledge as they have, and the ones who carry these artifacts back and forth in front of the fire, some uttering sounds and others not, must be the poets or "makers", some of whom speak or write, while the others merely create in silence (painting, sculpture, bronze work, etc.) If this is true, and Socrates is now back at their level, trying to communicate something of the reality of justice in terms that the prisoners will understand, then it is clear that he will have to employ poetry
for that purpose. He cannot simply run up and down, "forcing" people to turn around, face the fire, and begin an ascent to the surface; Book 1 showed how difficult it was for Socrates to tell people that their basic beliefs are false or incorrect, and the references there to his seizure and trial remind us that he was eventually killed for trying to attempt even the modest amount of "correction" which we saw exemplified in Book 1. Instead, those who have true potential for philosophy must themselves make the effort to see beyond the conventions and misconceptions of their day, turning to the fire of their own accord, as did Glaucon and Adeimantus.

We saw that in Book 1 Socrates could only speak to his interlocutors in terms which they could understand; therefore, the best which he could do was to correct their deficiencies with either homely examples or Sophistic tricks. Now, in Book 10, he is speaking to the same group once more: those who are unable to pursue the love of wisdom. White acknowledges this change in the intended audience:

...the argument of Books 2-9 as a whole may be thought of as addressed to those who have the potential to be philosopher-rulers, and who have some ability, though incomplete (506b-507a), to understand the notion of the Good. This interpretation would also explain the role of Book 10 in the economy of the work. For that book would turn out to be addressed to those not addressed in Book 2-9, that is, to those without the capacity to understand the philosophical concepts involved in them. ... This is not, however, to deny that Plato believes much of the
content of these arguments, but only to deny that he thinks that they have full rigor and cogency.15

The content of Book 10 must, therefore, be seen in this context: whatever it is that Plato is saying here, he is saying it in a different dramatic and philosophical setting. His sole interlocutor in Book 10, Glaucon, is standing in for all those who will not be philosophers.

The first section of Book 10 discusses several aspects of poetry and imitation which are, needless to say, controversial. It dwells on the condemnation of the imitation of an object as third in line from the reality of the object's Form, the complaint that poets have never really accomplished anything concrete, the drawing of a distinction between using, making, and imitating an object, and the examination of the effects of imitation on one's soul. Does this section reveal Plato's actual views, or not? Are the arguments to be taken seriously? If we take into account the dramatic situation at the beginning of Book 10, and accept the idea that Plato is speaking to a different audience here than in the books just ended, and speaking to them on their own terms, then one thing becomes clear: Book 10, as might be expected from the ring pattern of the Republic's composition, is very similar to Book 1, since the setting (the Cave) is the same, and the people addressed in it (prisoners in darkness) are the same. Therefore, the
answers to the questions we asked above concerning Plato's true intentions may very well be the same, also.

In Book 1, the statements which Plato apparently believed he put in the mouth of Socrates, although in some cases he did not argue very convincingly for them, but the reason why he did not write into the Republic the objections to these arguments which some of his later critics wish that he had is that those statements fulfilled a dramatic purpose, rather than a philosophic one. Here in Book 10 the same is true: Plato obviously feels very strongly that imitative poetry is not a good educator; in fact it is dangerous to education and philosophy, and only a willful misreading of the text can claim otherwise. He is, therefore, perfectly serious in his opposition to imitation. In Book 3, he had allowed the imitation of one who was καλός κάγαθός (396b), simply because his audience was able to understand the context in which he was speaking and the restrictions under which he was placing this kind of imitation, but for his present audience in Book 10 the differences between the types of objects imitated, and the reasons for the difference in treatment for the various kinds of imitation, are beyond understanding with a simple slogan or formula, and therefore it is best for Plato simply to assert that imitative poetry is bad under any circumstances, and list several "proofs" in support of the assertion. These "proofs" or
arguments are not, therefore, to be taken as Plato’s definitive demonstrations on the subject; he is not interested here in building an ironclad demonstration for another philosopher. Rather, his purpose is to dissuade the layman from placing any faith in the extravagant claims made for poetry by giving four different reasons for avoiding poetry altogether.

These reasons may fail to satisfy, but we must remember the context in which they occur; anything more complex would not convince, or be understood by, his intended audience. Indeed, these “proofs”, in their philosophical deficiencies, betray the kind of weaknesses to which a beginner would be prone, demonstrating that in their formal logic they have returned to εἰκασία and the intellectual level of the Cave. By examining these arguments, we can see how they perform a two-fold function: while their deficiencies show that the intellectual level of the dialogue has returned to the Cave, they have been constructed in such a way as to further the purpose of Book 10 once more, by inciting the reader himself to think more deeply on the issues raised.

In the first argument (596a-598d), the use of “bed”, a physical, manufactured article, as an example of a Form is inept and misleading, and some evidence exists which suggests that this was never a tenet of Plato or
the Academy. Also, the suggestion that "a god" made the Form (597b) brings a jarring element of theology into a scheme in which theology has been conspicuously absent until now. Theology had no part in the metaphysics of Book 6, but it certainly hearkens back to the religious views of Cephalus and those described by Adeimantus in Book 2, in which the gods act by fancy or compulsion. Yet beyond this, the attempt to place "bed" on the Divided Line is certainly ludicrous, but makes sense if interpreted paedagogically, since the attempt will force the analyzation of "bed" into its simplest material and geometrical components, which can be placed on the Line. In attempting to place "bed" on the Line, the reader will thus rethink what Form is, and come to his own formal definition of "bed". As Guthrie says:

"The beds make Plato's three-tiered ontology absolutely clear ... and we should not, on the strength of this passage alone, decide that Plato believed in transcendent Forms of manufactured objects."  

The argument which says that poetry should be banished, because it appeals to the basest part of the soul, has a similar purpose. Since this section assumes a soul with a bipartite structure, it is unmistakably at odds with the description of the soul in Book 4. The soul still has its reasoning
part, τὸ λογιστικὸν (602e), but it also has a second part to which various names are applied.\textsuperscript{21} This second part sometimes appears as the ἑπιθυμητικὸν (606a-b), and sometimes as a degenerate form of the θυμοειδὲς (603a, 605c), exactly the sort of confused composite which the prisoners in the Cave might make.\textsuperscript{22} Yet this misconception once more points the way toward the light for those who wish to seek it; the confused second part of the soul has the same two aspects which have already been separated out and explained in Book 4. The reader who recalls this, and recognizes the discrepancy, will re-read the argument in Book 4, and realize that those aspects of poetry which gratify the lowest part of the soul may be worthless, but those which gratify and strengthen the middle may be beneficial, and the person who has thought sufficiently on this question to make that distinction is the person who can safely read imitative poetry.

The middle part of Book 10, the discussion of the immortality of the soul, is similar to the just-completed section on poetry: it is introduced in a seemingly flippant manner (608d), and the argument itself is "far-from-cogent"\textsuperscript{23}, "an ellipse"\textsuperscript{24}, or just plain "embarrassingly bad"\textsuperscript{25}. Once again, we have Plato writing arguments which seem to do him great discredit, but the solution to the dilemma is once more dramatic. As in the previous section on
poetry, Plato has a point to make: he wants us to think about the soul, and to think of it as immortal. The arguments he uses here are once again very concrete and elementary:

Good and bad exist, and the Bad destroys and corrupts everything, while the Good saves and benefits. (608d-e)

There is an Evil or Illness which is the Bad for each thing. (609a-b)

If the particular Evil for a thing does not destroy it, that thing is indestructible by nature. (609b)

Disease destroys the body, but vice does not destroy the soul, therefore the soul must be immortal. (609c-610e)

These arguments fulfill two functions: first, they focus the reader’s attention on the soul and immortality, widening his perspective and persuading him to think in more expansive terms. Second, as with the arguments in Book 1 and in this book concerning poetry, it is the most important subjects which seem to claim the most objectionable proofs, a sign that perhaps Plato knew that anyone with some interest in philosophy would be inclined to elbow Glaucon out of the way and say “Absolutely not!” to one of Socrates’s questions. This shows once more that the primary purpose of the dialogue is to incite, as well as to instruct, and in the Republic, the topics on which Plato wishes to provoke the greatest debate are Justice, Poetry, and the Soul (and he has succeeded admirably).
Finally, this "proof" of the immortality of the soul is very conspicuous, both in its placement and its content. It is the last argument in the Republic, and, by popular acclaim, it is the worst. Yet the way in which it is introduced warns us explicitly that it is not necessarily to be taken as a proof which the seasoned philosopher would construct, but one which a beginning philosopher could construct:

"Haven't you perceived," I said, "that our soul is immortal and is never destroyed?"

And he looked me in the face with wonder and said, "No, by Zeus, I haven't. Can you say that?"

"If I am not to do an injustice," I said. "And I suppose you can too, for its nothing hard." (608d)

The proof begins with, and relies on, the premise that the soul is simple and indestructible by most familiar means; this unitary nature clashes both with the tripartite soul of Book 4 and with the bipartite soul in the section of Book 10 just discussed. Therefore, not only is the argument bad, but its premises contradict those employed just previous to it; this is just the sort of sloppiness one would expect from a beginner (and we have been told directly that Glaucon could construct this proof). Yet the conclusion (611b-d) strongly contends that the true nature of the soul must be simple, a conclusion which alludes to the much more detailed proofs in
the *Phaedo* which rest chiefly on the same premise. The proof, then, once again forces the attentive reader to confront the problem of the conflicting natures of the soul, and, by its stress on its unitary nature, to return to the logic of the *Phaedo* and contemplate its reasoning further.  

The Myth of Er is the final part of Book 10, and even without having read it, one would expect that it must be one of the most important parts of the *Republic*, something for Plato to leave as a memorable conclusion to this *magnus opus*. It is indeed, summing up many of the main tenets of the work in symbolic form, yet many commentators devote far less space to it than the rest of the book. The reason for this imbalance can perhaps be explained by quoting Annas's comments on the Myth:

*The Myth of Er is a painful shock; its vulgarity seems to pull us right down to the level of Cephalus, where you take justice seriously when you start thinking about hell-fire. It is not only that the childishness of the myth jars; if we take it seriously, it seems to offer us an entirely consequentialist reason for being just, thus undermining Plato's sustained effort to show that justice is worth having for the agent in a non-consequentialist way.*

These comments are a clear warning of the inherent danger in ignoring the literary side of a Platonic dialogue. First, based on the examination of Book 1, Cephalus's understanding is nothing to disparage; Plato has shown that he possesses right opinion, even if it is only a guess,
and Socrates tries merely to correct his opinion, not criticize it. Second, is the Myth of Er in fact just another variation on the stories of "hell-fire"? The "standard" account of Hades is the Odyssey, Book 11, in which Odysseus is told that all mortals come to the same end: fleshless ghosts, who cannot speak to Odysseus until they drink from the blood he has placed in a pit for them (XI, 218-222). In this account, the lives which they led had nothing to do with their present condition, although other descriptions of an afterlife befitting the type of life led (Elysium or the Isles of the Blest) were also current, even within Homer (Odyssey, IV, 561-569). In contrast, the souls which Er meets seem very much like humans; they set up camps, greet each other, tell stories, lament or rejoice, journey to different places, and finally drink the waters of the Lethe and fall asleep. But the most important differences are the rewarding or punishing of souls newly dead, according to their just-completed lives, and the choosing of their next lives by the souls just completing their thousand-year sojourns. Therefore, although the setting for the Myth is generally the same as that of Hades, it contains very important differences which, far from "offering an entirely consequentialist reason for being just," does just the opposite, if we can only look at it in light of the philosopher's problem of reaching the prisoners in the Cave through the shadows on the wall. Just after the section of the Myth in which
Socrates tells how the souls choose their lots for their next lives, he turns to Glaucon and makes a passionate appeal to him (618b-619a) to follow the philosophic life, since it alone enables us to see reality, and to make the choices in our lives which allow us to live virtuously and happily, based on the knowledge of that reality. The main emphasis throughout the myth is on the choices that the souls make, the need for training to make those choices correctly, and the result that the responsibility for the choices made, and the effects which follow from them, are on the head of the individual making them and no one else. Is it not clear then that the Myth of Er is the εἰκών of the Republic, the shadow of the journey which Glaucon and Adeimantus have just taken with Socrates, but narrated so as to correspond to the level of understanding which the inhabitants of the Cave possess? Book 1 has shown us that very few people, even good people, can follow the vision of the Republic: shall we leave them chained to the wall, then? No, for the philosopher is compelled to return to the Cave in order to share their labors and honors, something which Plato shows us Socrates doing throughout the Republic. Socrates works to turn to the philosophic life those who are able, but for those who are not, he does give a bit of poetry, the essence of which corresponds to that of the Republic as a whole. The Myth of Er is then the allegory of the Republic itself: one man, having gained privileged information
from another plane of existence, returns to tell others what he has learned about Justice, so that the others may live more justly in their present life, and the substance of the message with which he returns is the same in both accounts: you determine the Justice or Injustice of your own life by the choices which you make; the pursuit of philosophy better prepares you to make those choices; and the Justice or Injustice of the choices carry their own rewards or punishments, aside from other consequences. The Myth of Er is poetry, told to appeal to the understanding of the inhabitants of the lowest level of the Cave and to their delight in ἐπικονεῖς, but it also contains a powerful statement of the individual's responsibility for the choice of his own character, and thus his own virtue and happiness. The climax of the myth, stripped of its context, could serve as the key to the entire Republic, just as well as any of the statements from the central books: "Virtue is without a master. As each man honors or dishonors her, he will have more or less of her. The blame is his who chooses; god is blameless."\(^3\) Could anything be farther from the popular belief, narrated by Adeimantus in Book 2 (364a-e), that the gods send fortune or misfortune based on the sacrifices and incantations one has offered? The Myth of Er is written to approximate the popular beliefs of Hades closely enough that most people will read it in that context, but the differences are there, and for those with
discrimination, these differences spell out what Plato thinks we must do in order to "fare well". As with all methods of communication in the Cave, it is not the truth, but it is the means by which we can be incited or inspired to seek the truth.

In retrospect, Book 10 is a fitting conclusion to the Republic, one that has been amply prepared for, and one which accomplishes several things at once. First, it completes the symbolic journey of the philosopher by returning us to the Cave and its prisoners. Second, it shows us how the philosopher must deal with the prisoners, by using a new type of poetry, since nothing else will work in the Cave. The new poetry is didactic, imitating reality rather than shadows, and it encourages them to pursue philosophy, rather than the aimless gratification of the lower parts of the soul. Third, the book completes the defense of Justice on a different level of comprehension, by demonstrating poetically, through the Myth of Er, the points which he has been making philosophically throughout the rest of the Republic: the just life is best in and of itself, and the just life is best achieved by the pursuit of wisdom. Rather than being "a lame and messy ending", Book 10 skillfully draws the numerous strands of Plato's thought together and ends the work with an inspiring summation of the whole.
The virtues of Books 2-9 of the Republic have long been acknowledged and applauded. This thesis has attempted to show that Books 1 and 10 also have their place in the work, and that, far from being afterthoughts or leftovers, Plato has lavished as much attention and artistry on them as on their more-appreciated companions. It is the function of Books 1 and 10 which gives them their place in the structure of the Republic, rather than the relative strengths or weaknesses of their "content" or arguments, vis-à-vis Books 2-9. When viewed in the light of this overall structure, the Republic becomes a more impressive and unified work, in which "most readers ... are convinced that from the initial κατέβην χθές to the final ἐν πράττωμεν, Plato has completely mastered all problems of organization; that he has said all that he wanted to say in just the way he wanted to say it."33
Notes for Chapter 4

1. Annas, p. 353.


3. Annas, p. 335.


5. Annas, p.345.


8. The section on the effect of imitation on the soul (603a-606d) speak of the "calculating" part (602e) or the "best" part (603a, 604d), and a part "opposed to it" (603a), which is called several things: "ordinary" (603a), "irrational" (604d), "mournful" (606a), and "laughing" (606c). The discussion of the immortality of the soul, on the other hand, assumes that the true nature of the soul does not contain variety or dissimilarity (611a-d).


11. 598b, 599a, 599d, 600e, 601b, 605c.


14. See especially Havelock, Chapters 3 and 4: "Poetry as Preserved Communication", and "The Homeric Encyclopedia".

15. White, p. 52.


18. Because a bed is composed of simpler Forms ("wood", "cloth", etc.), which are in turn composed of even simpler Forms, in various quantities and relations, which are themselves Forms with places on the Line.


21. See note 8 above.

22. Adam, II, p. 406. He notes that the one part has two aspects, and the second part is described as having a "quasi-intellectual power."

23. White, p. 259.


27. White, for example, devotes 16 pages to the rest of the book, and just over 2 pages to the Myth of Er. Annas devotes over 14 pages to the rest of the book, and 4 to the Myth.


29. 614e-615a, 616b, 620d-621b.

30. 615a-616a, 617d-618b.

32. (671e). ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον, ἣν τιμῶν καὶ ἀτιμάζων πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον αὐτῆς ἑκαστὸς ἔξει. αἰτία ἐλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος

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Appendix 1

The Beginning of the Phaedo

EX. Αὐτὸς, ὡς φαίδων, παρεγένου Σωκράτει ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὡς τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλου τοῦ ἱκουσας;

ΦΑΙΔ. Αὐτὸς, ὡς Ἐχέκρατες.

EX. τὶ σοῦ δὴ ἔστιν ἄττα εἶπεν ὃ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐτέλεστα; ἠδὲ ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ ἀκούσαμι. καὶ γὰρ ὅστε φλειάζων οὖθες πάντα τι ἐπιχυράζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθηναῖε, οὔτε τίς ξένος ἀφίκται χρόνῳ συχνοὶ ἐκεῖθεν ὡστὶς ἂν ἠμῖν σαφῆς τι ἀγγείλαι οἶδος τ′ ἢν περὶ τούτων, πλὴν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιὸν ἀποθάνοι· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὖθεν εἶχεν φράζειν.

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὖθε τά περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπύθεσας ὃν τρόπον ἐγένετο;

EX. Ναι, ταῦτα μέν ἡμῖν ἠγγειλε τις, καὶ ἐθαυμάζομεν γε ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ύστερον φαίνεται ἀποθάνων. τί σοῦ ἢν τότῳ, ὡς φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχη τῆς αὐτῆς, ὡς Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἔτυχεν γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἢ πρόμνα ἐστεμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναίοι πέμπουσιν.

EX. Τούτῳ δὲ δὴ τί ἔστιν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τοῦτ᾿ ἔστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὡς φασίν Ἀθηναίοι, ἐν ὃς θησεύσ ποτὲ εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δίς ἐπὶ τὰ ἐκεῖνους ψήφους ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσε τε καὶ αὐτός ἐσώθη. τῷ οἷς Ἀπόλλωνι ἠδέαντο ὡς λέγεται τότε, εἰ σωθεῖν, ἐκάστου ἕστων θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον· ἢν δὴ ἄει καὶ νῦν ἐξ ἐκεῖνου κατ᾿ ἐνεμαυτον τῷ θεῷ πέμπουσιν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτείνουν, πρὶν ἄν εἰς Δῆλον τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεύο· τούτῳ δ᾿ ἐνίοτε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὡστοσοὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀνεμοῖς ἀπολαβόντες αὐτοὺς. ἄρχῃ δ᾿ ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψῃ τὴν πρόμναν τοῦ πλοίου.
τούτο δ' ἔτυχεν, ὡσπερ λέγω, τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δύκης γεγονός. Διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δύκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.