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RELIGION, RUSSO-BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN ANNA IVANOVNA’S RUSSIA (1730-1740)

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RELIGION, RUSSO-BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

IN ANNA IVANOVNA’S RUSSIA (1730-1740)

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Religion, Russo-British Diplomacy, and Foreign Policy in Anna Ivanovna’s Russia (1730-1740)

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The reign of Russian empress Anna Ivanovna (1730-1740) has been known primarily for disproportionate “German” influence, Anna’s refusing the “conditions” imposed by the supposedly backward-looking noble faction that engineered her succession, and unflattering court spectacle. Religion and foreign policy have received relatively little attention. Meanwhile, the formalization of Anglo-Russian diplomatic and trade relations during Anna’s reign has been seen as the triumph of “modern” nobility who rose as a result of the Petrine reforms. Examination of the concomitant diplomatic relations has focused on the strategies and personalities of Anna’s “German” advisors and portrays Russia as dependent. Finally, the Russo-Turkish War of 1736-39, if mentioned at all, is generally seen as a humiliating defeat.

This study reveals the “Lutheran Yoke” as an aspect of the infamous “German Yoke,” in the context of ongoing integration of Lutheran Baltic German elites whose territories were annexed during Peter I’s reign. Religion had been a divisive issue within and without Russia when Peter’s church reforms were criticized as “Lutheran” by clergy with roots in Kiev and sympathetic to Catholic doctrine. 1730s Russia remained a locus of interdenominational cross-fertilization and conflict, integrated into confessional struggles across Europe.

Russia did not overcome backwardness to enter into the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734. Nor did the British carry off a diplomatic coup by forcing Russia to move forward without a reciprocal defensive alliance. Rather, after the resolution of decades of Jacobite/Hanoverian and strategic struggle that strained relations, Russia used the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 as leverage to secure the British/Dutch mediation that allowed it to remove troops from Poland during the War of the Polish Succession.

Though some attribute religious motivations to the Russo-Turkish war of 1736-39, nearly all historians consider control of the Crimea and Black Sea the objective. British correspondence reveals Russia’s additional motivation to maintain the Caucasian isthmus as a buffer and trade zone. The Treaty of Belgrade (1739), disallowing Russia from fortifying Azov or sailing its own ships on the Black Sea, appears less humiliating when we recognize that Russia continued to benefit from Persian trade without the expense of occupation.
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Introduction

Anna Ivanovna’s reign (1730 – 1740), a decade receiving relatively little attention in English-language Russian historiography, deserves fresh examination. The last English book-length exploration of Empress Anna’s rule was a biography published in 1974.¹ When Anna ascended in 1730, she became the third sovereign to reign since Peter I’s death in 1725 and in so doing thwarted the plans of a section of the nobility who attempted to place restraints on her monarchical power through the famous “conditions” she initially accepted. Her reign has been known primarily for the events surrounding her succession; disproportionate “German” influence; and unflattering, cruel court spectacle.²

Other aspects of her rule have been highlighted, however. The court returned to St. Petersburg in 1732 after having returned to Moscow during the reign of Peter II, resulting in a reinvigoration of the city and a rehabilitation of the navy. Anna’s court was known for its incredible splendor, rivaling those of Western Europe, as well as for the development of the ballet, and the Italianizing of court music.³ The Land Forces Cadet College, opened in Moscow in 1731, was the first indigenous institution to offer performing arts training, providing young men instruction in music and dance. In 1738 a ballet school, which would eventually become the St. Petersburg School of Ballet,

² Alexander Lipski, in ”A Re-Examination of the 'Dark Era' of Anna Ivanovna,” *American Slavonic and East European Review* 15 no. 4 (1956), rehabilitated Anna’s reign by countering vitriolic, anti-“German” nineteenth-century historiography with an emphasis on the westernizing achievements of prominent Germanophone servitors. Curtiss emphasized cultural developments but also positioned Anna’s reign as a dark harbinger of the most oppressive aspects of Soviet rule.
opened to males and females.\textsuperscript{4} In 1734, Russia decided officially to make the Orenburg fort complex across the Qupchaq steppe its “Window to the East,” initiating a more concerted effort to govern the nomadic peoples of the steppe, extend its frontiers into Central Asia, and build wealth through Central Asian trade.\textsuperscript{5}

In the legal sphere, Anna reversed Peter the Great’s Law of Single Inheritance in 1731, apparently securing noble women’s rights and over time, leading to an expansion of the rights of other women.\textsuperscript{6} In 1736, Anna “reduced the [noble] service requirement to 25 years and allowed one son to stay home and look after the estate.”\textsuperscript{7} Laws promulgated under Anna forbid peasants from buying “real estate or mills, establish factories, or become parties to government leases or contracts.” After 1731, “landlords acquired increasing financial control over their serfs, for whose taxes they were held responsible.” Subsequent to 1736, they had to obtain landlord permission before departing for temporary employment.\textsuperscript{8}

This work turns toward less explored and misinterpreted areas of Anna’s reign. Religion and foreign policy have received little attention relative to the above-mentioned developments. Additionally, the formalization of Anglo-Russian diplomatic and trade relations during Anna’s reign has been erroneously interpreted as the triumph of “modern” nobility who rose as a result of the Petrine reforms. Examination of the diplomatic relations surrounding the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 has

\textsuperscript{5} Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 156.
\textsuperscript{6} Barbara Alpern Engel, Women in Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) xv.
\textsuperscript{7} Lindsey Hughes, The Romanovs: Ruling Russia 1613-1917 (New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2008), 97.
focused on the strategies and personalities of Anna’s “German” advisors and portrays Russia as dependent on the British. Finally, the Russo-Turkish War of 1736-39, if mentioned at all, is generally seen as a humiliating defeat. Examination of these three areas allows us to begin to deepen our understanding of post-Petrine religious, diplomatic, and foreign policy developments.

Chapter 1 reveals that under Peter I and Anna Ivanovna, Russia underwent what we will call confessionalized westernization. The “Lutheran Yoke” emerges as an aspect of the infamous “German Yoke,” in the context of Russia’s ongoing integration of Lutheran Baltic German elites whose territories were annexed during Peter I’s reign (1682-1725). Russia had been undergoing “westernization” through Polish-Lithuanian and Ukrainian influences in the latter half of the seventeenth century, especially after the annexation of Kiev. In the early eighteenth century, religion became a divisive issue within and without Russia when Peter’s church reforms were criticized as “Lutheran” by clergy with roots in Kiev and sympathetic to Catholic doctrine. Additionally, during Peter I’s reign, a mixture of esoteric, Pietist, and additional influences from Jacobite notables impacted court culture. As we shall see, 1730s Russia remained a locus of interdenominational cross-fertilization and conflict, integrated into confessional struggles across Europe.

Chapter 2 focuses on the factors that enabled Russia and Britain to commence formal diplomatic and trade relations in 1734. Historians who have examined diplomatic maneuvers surrounding the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 have focused on the treaty itself, concluding that Russia had to capitulate without securing a much sought-after reciprocal defensive alliance. Moreover, Russia supposedly had to overcome
“backward” nobility without any interest in Western trade to want to secure the formal alliance. In actuality, after the resolution of decades of Jacobite/Hanoverian and strategic struggle that strained relations, Russia used the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 as leverage to secure the British/Dutch mediation that allowed it to remove troops from Poland during the War of the Polish Succession. This reveals not only that Russia actually did secure the outcome it desired from the negotiations but also that it is important to look beyond official treaties to understand the outcomes of states’ negotiations.

There may not be a more important question than why wars are fought. Though some attribute religious motivations to the Russo-Turkish war of 1736-39, nearly all historians consider control of the Crimea and Black Sea the objective. As we see in Chapter 3, however, British correspondence reveals Russia’s additional motivation to maintain the Caucasian isthmus as a buffer and trade zone. The Treaty of Belgrade that ended the war in 1739, disallowing Russia from fortifying Azov or sailing its own ships on the Black Sea, appears less humiliating when we recognize that Russia continued to benefit from Persian trade without the expense of continuing to occupy the territories it ceded just before hostilities broke out.

This study relies almost entirely on British diplomatic correspondence, which is, of course, inherently problematic. The British accounts are written primarily from the point of view of diplomat Claudius Rondeau and rely on court discussions and gossip, as well as conversations with Russian cabinet members or favorites.9 Upon his

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predecessor’s untimely death, Rondeau promptly married his widow and then faithfully served King George II until he perished from what seems to have been a cold in 1739. Rondeau’s assessments of affairs are not always accurate. This information may seem less reliable than the official communications or publications of statespersons, however, in many respects communications at court could have been just as dissimulative or revealing as official communications. Additionally, the correspondence includes the points of view of the king, the Secretary of the Northern Department in Britain, and reports from British residents across Europe. These dispatches, providing multiple points of view and valuable insights, have been underutilized.

The chief sources are three volumes of the Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva, or documents published by the Russian Historical Society. These books, printed in the late eighteenth century, contain transcriptions of British correspondence. This work is based on the years 1729 – 1739, representing around 1700 pages of dispatches. Additionally, the Hanbury Williams Papers from the Lewis Walpole Library in Farmington, CT have been utilized. Correspondence between Lord Harrington, Secretary of Britain’s Northern Department, and George Woodward, envoy to Saxony/Poland in Warsaw, provide insight into the religious strife occurring in Poland during the War of the Polish Succession.
Chapter I - Interdenominational Russia: Lutheranism and Elite Integration in the Post-Petrine Age

Anna Ivanovna’s reign (1730-1740) quickly became notorious for the disproportionate number of “Germans” who wielded influence at her court. While the historiography on her rule has shifted between emphases on “weak” and “strong” German influence, examined the conflicting motivations of statespersons, or celebrated the modernizing innovations of particular “German” notables, it has not considered “German” prominence as an aspect of ongoing elite integration. Though many of the Germanophone advisors at court hailed from areas outside of the empire, including Westphalia and Courland, others came from Baltic German territories that had been annexed by Russia during the Great Northern War (1700-21). These primarily Lutheran elites received a disproportionate number of official appointments and would continue to wield strong influence over governmental affairs through the nineteenth century.

Just as elite integration has received little attention, the religious aspect of conflict among the new elites has not been considered as an aspect of the “German Yoke.” This chapter examines two confessionally related incidents recorded in British diplomatic correspondence during Anna Ivanovna’s reign that have not been explored in English-language literature. First, in 1732 the Duke of Illyria, the previous Spanish envoy to the Russian court, published an inflammatory text with the help of Russian Orthodox clergy.

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11 Mina Curtiss devotes a chapter to “Church and Court” but focuses primarily on ceremony and the trials of church reformer Feofan Prokopovich during Peter II’s reign. He had been instrumental in Peter the Great’s church reforms and also justified the execution of Peter II’s father, Alexis. Curtiss mentions the troop deployment issue in the context of a discussion about Biron’s character. See Mina Curtiss, A Forgotten Empress - Anna Ivanovna and her Era (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co, 1974), 130-142 and 82-83.
denouncing Anna’s Lutheran-dominated regime and castigating Lutherans and Calvinists. Second, in 1734 the Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI (r. 1711-1740) refused to allow Ernst Johann Biron (1690 – 1772), Anna’s Great Chamberlain and quasi-husband, to build a Lutheran church on land the emperor had given him in the Silesian county of Wartenburg within the Holy Roman Empire (HRE). In response, the Russian court withheld the troops Charles desperately needed during the War of the Polish Succession (1733-1735). Placing these events in the context of early-eighteenth-century European confessional strife reveals that religion remained a powerfully divisive political and rhetorical force across Europe into the 1730s. Though issues related to religion alone did not cause The War of the Polish Succession, the events surrounding the war, and ongoing religious strife in Central and Eastern Europe, evoked primarily Lutheran-Catholic struggles that occurred throughout the first quarter of the eighteenth century. Events in Russia also evoked religious conflict from that time, when the promotion of St. Petersburg as a “new Jerusalem” and debates about Peter I’s church reforms circulated throughout Europe. That Anna Ivanovna’s decade, often associated with the “German yoke” of Baltic and Westphalian advisors, was also to some degree portrayed as a “Lutheran” yoke reveals continuity with Russian and Ukrainian criticisms of Peter the Great’s church reforms from earlier in the century. Further, the Lutheran Pietism and esotericism generally associated with Catherine II’s reign (1762 – 96) had roots in the Petrine era (1682 – 1725). In the 1730s, Russia remained a site of both pan-European confessional cross-fertilization and strife as Russia integrated the Baltic Germans, and Germanophone advisors negotiated for the Russian court’s interest, and their own commitment to the “Protestant Interest.”
Recent historiography has shifted away from the notion that Peter the Great’s church reforms coincided with a secularization of court culture. Robert Collis contributes to what has emerged as a major shift in Petrine studies, dislocating the tsar's image as a "rational," "Enlightenment"-espousing paradigm-shifter and emphasizing the religious and esoteric aspects of Petrine court culture. Collis illustrates that astrology and alchemy interested Peter's courtiers, clergy, and the tsar and shows that "mystical, eschatological and esoteric views" became influential before the Masonic and Rosicrucian influences penetrated during Catherine II's reign. He reveals that Peter was continually associated with Biblical figures rhetorically and through visual representations, and that in creating St. Petersburg as the "new Jerusalem," he took on a Davidic role and drew on European notions of a Christian utopia. Collis focuses especially on two British Jacobite companions of Peter’s who heavily influenced the development of Russia’s mining and printing as well as the institution of the botanical garden and kunstkamera, which would become aspects of the Academy of Sciences. Additionally, he examines Stefan Iavorskii and Feofan Prokopovich, who influenced Peter’s church reforms and crafted religiously-centered rhetoric. Jesuits with an interest in astrology and mysticism influenced Iavorskii. This influence might have been evident in a pamphlet written by Iavorskii, and published through the Kiev Academy in 1728, called *The Rock of Faith*, an anti-Protestant attack on Feofan Prokopovich that also provided a "veiled exposition of the Catholic doctrine of the two powers, of the

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14 Ibid., 385.
15 Ibid., 214.
superiority of the spiritual power of the church over secular authority.”\textsuperscript{16} In contrast to these Catholic influences, Collis argues that Prokopovich's worldview was informed by Pietism, "an Orthodox faith based on the writings of Eastern church fathers,” and “an esoteric worldview that embraced eclectic elements of Aristotelianism, Christian Neo-Platonism and Hermeticism.”\textsuperscript{17} Rather than a rational, scientific motivation, in Prokopivich's thought Collis sees an "Early Modern expression of eclecticism that incorporated Reformed Protestant chiliastic and Biblical exegesis, the distinct mysticism of early Eastern Church Fathers and a continuing belief in occult correspondences and powers."\textsuperscript{18} Clearly, Petrine elite culture, and religious reform and rhetoric, integrated wider European cultural/religious threads and conflicts.

During Peter I’s reign, this pan-European religious conflict manifested in Johann Franz Buddeas’ *Ecclesia Romana cum ruthenica irreconciliabilis*, published in Latin in the German town of Jena in 1719. The tract defended Peter I’s right to reform his church.\textsuperscript{19} During France’s Jansenist controversy, the Sorbonne published a memoir justifying the king’s independence from all powers and parties except God and promoting the union of the Catholic and Orthodox churches.\textsuperscript{20} Peter visited the Sorbonne himself in 1717 during his second trip to Western Europe and received a copy of the memoir. According to James Cracraft, Buddeas rigorously countered the union-related aspects of the Sorbonne memoir “from a rationalistic and Protestant point of view.” Further, Cracraft notes, “amidst the flattering references to Tsar Peter and the violent diatribes

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 41. Paul Bushkovitch claims that under Iavorskii, “a sort of Baroque semi-Catholic spirituality became predominant in the Russian church, lasting until midcentury,” in *Religion and Society in Russia* (New York: Oxford University press, 1992), 239. As we shall see below, however, Lutheran influence supplanted Catholic/Baroque influence before midcentury.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 272.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 44.
against the Roman church, one can detect the central thread of Buddeus’s argument: Peter ought not to surrender his supremacy over the church to the pope of Rome.”21 It seems as though this tract potentially inflamed Lutherans, Catholics on all sides of the Jansenist controversy, and the Orthodox.

This debate was evoked at the Russian court and in Central Europe in the early 1730s. On October 7, 1732, Rondeau reported that many Russian clergy had been “taken up of late and sent to the castle of this place, among whom are two archbishops,” but he did not know why.22 A week later he wanted to discuss the prospective Anglo-Russian commercial treaty with Baron Osterman, but the latter had been tasked with heading a commission interrogating two archbishops and the Russian clergy about the dissemination of “seditious” letters about Anna and her cabinet, as well as a religious tract published in Vienna.23 After one of the letters was discovered in the great hall of the court, Anna issued a decree declaring that anyone finding another must burn it without reading.24 Additionally, the Duke of Illyria, who had served as Spain’s resident at the court, had allowed his chaplain, Father Rivera, to print a book in Vienna called Examen Veri written in collaboration with clergy in St. Petersburg to defend the Orthodox Church against the Buddeus tract.25 In addition to defending the Orthodox church, the publication generated “the most scandalous reflexions that can be made against the lutherans and calvinists.”26 Rondeau continued, “this spanish priest, not satisfied with refuting Budeus, has made several reflections foreign to his subject in trying to shew the

21 Ibid., 47.
22 Russkoe istoricheskoe obshchestvo, Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva Volume 66 (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvo, 1891), 522.
23 Ibid., 535.
24 Ibid., 523-524.
25 Rondeau reported that when the tract was originally published during Peter I’s reign, he forbade the Orthodox clergy to defend it.
26 Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva Volume 66, 524.
greek church was in danger of being ruined by the lutherans, since the most considerable employments of this empire are given to foreigners of that persuasion.”27 Thus, the dissemination of these “seditious letters” at court and Examen Veri’s publication in Vienna, saturated the court with evocations of Lutherans ruining the Orthodox Church, as well as conflict over Lutherans’ influence.

That propaganda evoking conflicts from the early decades of the century emerged in the 1730s and associated the “German” Russian court with Lutheranism reveals ongoing religious tensions within and outside Russia as well as resentment of “foreign” influence within Russia.28 Examen Veri had the potential to inflame passions on a variety of levels. First, it defended the Russian Orthodox Church against Lutherans and attacked both Calvinists and Lutherans specifically, potentially raising denominational passions against Russians and Orthodoxy. Second, its portrayal of Russia as dominated by Lutherans could have alienated Catholics in the HRE at a time when the emperor depended upon Russia’s military assistance. We shall see below that Protestants in Austria and Poland faced forced migration and church demolition in 1732, the same year the Duke of Illyria published Examen Veri. As copies circulated in 1733, did readers consider Russia an oppressive, Lutheran force attempting to control Poland? How would Catholics respond to an evocation of the Jansenist controversy and/or consider the Russian alliance with the emperor? Next, Orthodox Christians living outside of Russia,

27 Ibid.
28 By contrast, the French editor of an Italian officer’s anti-Russian tract Muscovian Letters emphasized Anna’s captivity under foreign domination, but not the Lutheran issue. The French edition was published in Paris in 1735 and an English version in 1736. The British editor retained the original introduction. Though a more comprehensive survey of anti-Russian European tracts is necessary, this suggests that the religious issue did not offer as much propaganda value in France or Britain as it did in Austria. See William Musgrave, Muscovian letters. Containing An Account of the Form of Government, Customs, and Manners of that great Empire. Written By an Italian Officer of Distinction. Translated from the French Original, Printed at Paris 1735 (London, 1736), iv – vi.
in non-Orthodox lands, might have perceived the current regime as unwilling or unfit to protect them. Finally, identification of the foreign yoke oppressing Russians during Anna’s reign as specifically Lutheran, as opposed to “German,” adds a confessional dimension to the commonly circulated complaint that Russia suffered under foreign domination during the 1730s.29

Ernst Johann Biron, the figure most associated with Anna’s “German Yoke,” became integral to Anna’s court while she served as duchess of the German-speaking Duchy of Courland.30 When Peter the Great I renewed the medieval Rus practice of securing dynastic marriages with Western European courts, Anna, the daughter of his deceased half-brother Ivan V (r. 1682 – 1696), married the Duke of Courland, nephew to the King of Prussia.31 The wedding took place in 1710, not long after Peter’s soldiers had expelled the Swedes from the duchy during the Great Northern War. Unfortunately, on the way home from their wedding in St. Petersburg, Anna’s husband died (apparently as a result of alcohol poisoning brought on by Peter’s demanding celebration regimen), and his uncle, Ferdinand, became duke. Due to the war and conflict with the Courland

29 Buddeus’ work would also circulate in Russia in the late eighteenth century. Victoria Frede indicates that another tract, *Theses theologicae de atheism et supersitione* (1716), was published twice during Catherine II’s reign in 1774 and attributed to the above-mentioned Feofan Prokopovich. She indicates that early in the eighteenth century apologetic works that defended Christianity against real or imagined enemies began to be imported. Frede focuses on publications from the late eighteenth century, however, and refers to the fluid boundaries among Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Protestantism as emblematic of that time. We have seen, however, that the same intermingling occurred in Russia in the early part of the century. Catherine II, a German Lutheran who converted to Orthodoxy, embarked on social reforms associated with Baltic German Pietism. See Frede, 133-34. According to Curtiss, 140, during Peter II’s reign (1727-1730), Markel Radishchevski, an archimandrite from a Novgorod monastery, denounced Prokopovich, in part on charges of Augustinian and Lutheranism.


gentry, the new duke remained in Danzig.\(^{32}\) Anna lived in the duchy's capital, Mitava, until she ascended to the Russian throne in 1730.\(^{33}\) She maintained a presence in Courland because Russia had no other claim to the duchy; despite Sweden's occupation, it still remained under the protection of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.\(^{34}\) Biron, a non-noble, entered Anna’s service in approximately 1714 and reportedly quickly became her favorite and the most prominent member of her Courland court. To "ward off" scandal," she found a poor nobleman who would marry his daughter to Biron and the new couple moved into the Duchess' palace, occupying rooms that adjoined her apartments.\(^{35}\) They reportedly lived in a similar arrangement when Anna became Empress in 1730 until her death in 1740.

Biron was not the only of Anna’s “German” advisors. Elites such as the Levenwelde brothers from Livonia, a German-speaking area removed from Swedish control during the Great Northern War, played a prominent role in Anna’s diplomacy and foreign policy. Additionally, Heinrich von Osterman grew up in a Westphalian Lutheran pastor's family and joined his brother (who served as Anna Ivanovna and her sister's tutor) in Russia in 1697. After he proved instrumental in negotiating the Peace of Nystad in 1710, Peter I chose for Osterman a Russian wife.\(^{36}\) Pavel Iaguzhinskii, a Lithuanian, served as organist for the Moscow Lutheran church and became the first Procurator


\(^{34}\) Bagger, 43.


General of the Senate.\textsuperscript{37} With the exception of Osterman, these individuals were “Baltic Germans,” hailing from German-speaking territories that had been under Swedish control until the Great Northern War. While these men disagreed with one another and (in the case of Osterman and Biron at least) maintained various allegiances to foreign courts, they shared Lutheran roots. It is also worth noting that Catherine I, Peter I’s second wife and successor, met Peter as a result of living in lands occupied by Russian forces during the Great Northern War (in 1703 or 1704), and converted to Orthodoxy either from Lutheranism or Catholicism.\textsuperscript{38}

As a result of the Treaty of Nystadt, Baltic German nobles retained special, autonomous judicial, administrative, land/peasant control, educational and religious rights in areas with tightly controlled landed estates and highly lucrative trading cities such as Riga.\textsuperscript{39} The territories were divided into the corporations of Livland, Estland and the Island of Osel; Courland would not become integrated into the Russian Empire until 1795 as an outcome of the partitions of Poland. As mentioned above, Baltic Germans maintained a disproportionate influence over elite institutions within Russia through the nineteenth century. Moreover, they were a powerful constituency that held religious autonomy: the Lutheran church remained the official church in this area and Swedish church law stayed in effect until 1832.\textsuperscript{40} Thus, as an aspect of Russia’s Baltic conquests and integration of Baltic German elites, Lutherans, and to some degree Lutheranism, became woven into Russian institutions and court culture. A wedding that took place in

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 235.
St. Petersburg in May of 1733 provides an example of this integration. When a Major-General Bismarck married Biron’s sister-in-law in a Lutheran church, Rondeau reported that all of the foreign ministers and “almost all the court were present at church, and, after the ceremony was over, we had the honour to dine at court. At night there was a ball.” While the court and nobility would attend Orthodox Church services on Saints’ Days, or for other official celebrations, they were also expected to attend a Lutheran wedding.

This contrasts sharply with the treatment of Prince Mikhail Golitsyn, who married an Italian Catholic woman in Rome after converting in 1729 and attempted to keep the event a secret when he returned to Moscow early in Anna’s reign. When the secret was discovered, Anna subjected him to ritual humiliation, making him a cupbearer who served the fermented beverage kvass to the Empress at court. In legal documents Prince Golitsyn was then forced to use the name “Prince Kvassnik.” Anna demoted him from an infantry major to a page, and she forced him to sit in a giant nest and imitate a hen in front of the entire court. The Golitsyns were out of favor at this time, soon after attempting to force Anna to submit to the “conditions” that she rejected upon becoming empress. A kinsman supposedly reported the marriage to the court, however, revealing that Golitsyns were not singled out solely for their family affiliation. Catholicism was clearly unacceptable while Lutheranism was officially supported.

Biron’s access, as a Courlander rather than a Baltic German from annexed lands, derived from his role as a favorite. While Biron did not use every opportunity to leverage his position to his advantage, he profited handsomely from his level of influence, obtaining estates in Siberia, Ukraine and Livonia, and using negotiations during The War

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41 *Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva* Volume 66, 602.
42 For the information in this paragraph see Curtiss, 183.
of the Polish Succession to secure the position of Duke of the Duchy of Courland.\textsuperscript{43} Though his sense of superiority, proximity to the Empress, and wealth accumulation understandably alienated many Russians, in Courland he enjoyed prestige and influence. According to Alexander V. Berkis, "if he had behaved like a robber baron in Russia, he had also been Courland's patriot. The first period of Biron's rule (1737-1740) was the climax of Courland's prosperity during the eighteenth century."\textsuperscript{44}

Before Biron became Duke of Courland, his insecurity at the Russian court led him to seek protection elsewhere. This passage from a report written by British diplomat George Forbes to King George II (r. 1727 – 1760) in 1733-1734 reveals the diplomat’s conception of Biron’s predicament in the year before Russia finally dispatched troops to support the emperor:

\begin{quote}
Count Biron has thrown himself Intirely into the Emperours Interest, which he Espouses on all Occasions as farr as it is consistent with his Duty to his Sovereign. But as the Count, his Lady, and Family are Lutherans he seems rather to wish for the Protection of some Protestant Power, and often Expresses himself dissatisfied with the Emperours little Regard for the Protestant Interest.\textsuperscript{45}
\end{quote}

Biron developed a close relationship with the British ambassadors at the Russian court during this time, and often advocated Emperor Charles VI’s cause at their request, in opposition to Prussia’s interests. If something should happen to the Empress, Biron’s lack of popularity in Russia made it necessary to secure protection in other dominions,

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{43}] Berkis, 227.
\item[\textsuperscript{44}] Ibid., 245.
\item[\textsuperscript{45}] Michael Bitter, "George Forbes's 'Account of Russia,'" \textit{The Slavonic and East European Review} 82, no. 4 (2004): 917.
\end{itemize}
but he did not imagine surrendering his trust to the Catholic emperor, due to his disregard for the “Protestant Interest.”

What did it mean for Charles VI to disregard the “Protestant Interest” at this particular time? With the exception of Andrew C. Thompson’s 2006 monograph, *Britain, Hanover and the Protestant Interest, 1688 – 1756*, contemporary historians have not focused on confessional dimensions of the Polish Succession crisis. Generally, however, recent historiography has shifted away from the notion that warfare became entirely “rationalized” and “secularized” after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Pasi Ihalainen contends that as the 1720s began, “the possibility of the outbreak of a religious war between Catholics and Protestants in Germany was not yet out of the question” and that “grounds for Protestant internationalism, at least in the form of sympathy toward the persecuted brethren, were present until at least the Seven Years’ War,” and then declined rapidly. He claims that solidarity with persecuted Protestants inspired relief efforts, but especially united “Protestant members of a particular national community to defend their church and country against the potential threat of the same horrors being experienced at home.” Further, Sugiko Nishikawa refers to England in the early eighteenth century as “a member of the European-wide Protestant community.” Though Biron may have imagined himself as part of an international community of Protestants, he did not

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46 For a historiographic overview of the concept of the Protestant interest, see Thompson’s section “The protestant interest and the balance of power,” in *Britain, Hanover and the Protestant Interest* (Rochester: Boydell Press, 2006), 39-42.
49 Ibid., 238.
advocate uniformly for Protestant powers at court, most notably opposing Prussia’s machinations.\textsuperscript{51} It seems likely that he wanted to retreat to a country where he had both secured the sovereign’s favor and could practice his religion.

Well-publicized confessional strife in Central and Eastern Europe contributed to Protestants’ sense of threat in the years leading up to the War of the Polish Succession.\textsuperscript{52} Thompson devotes a chapter to the Thorn crisis, a struggle between Jesuits and Lutherans in Polish Prussia, which attracted international attention in 1724.\textsuperscript{53} Civil disorder broke out over a dispute during a Catholic procession; both Catholics and Lutherans took prisoners. As a result of Jesuit complaints to the Sejm, the town had to pay steep fines for damage to Catholic property, fifteen people were publicly executed, and Catholics took

\textsuperscript{51} In focusing on Protestant identity, due to time and space constraints, I do not give equal attention to pan-European Catholic perceptions of threat or cohesion. Additionally, I have yet to integrate work on Jewish worship in Silesia and Poland.

\textsuperscript{52} When Augustus II died in 1733, his son, Augustus III, stood to succeed him as the king of Poland and the elector of Saxony. The emperor backed Augustus III’s claim to the Polish throne in exchange for Saxon and Polish recognition of his daughter Maria Therese's right to leadership of the Holy Roman Empire through the Pragmatic Sanction, upon his death; see Thompson, 169. Another issue concerned Maria Therese’s fiancé, Francis Stephen of Lorraine. Most see the Hapsburg-Lorraine union, which would have extended the Austrian borderlands further into French territory, as the primary cause of the Polish succession conflict, with reaction to Stanislas Leszczyński’s election serving as a mere pretext. According to Rondeau’s account in the \textit{Russkoe istoricheskoе obshchestvo, Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva Volume 76} (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvo, 1891), 377, Leszczyński’s election was unacceptable to Russia because it would have meant encirclement by the French, Turks, Poles and Swedes. In September, 13,000 Polish nobility elected the French-supported Stanislaus, the father of Louis XV’s bride. 4000 would later elect Augustus III with Russian “protection” according to Jerzy Lukowski and Hubert Zawadzki, \textit{A Concise History of Poland, Second Edition} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 109-110. Russian forces immediately invaded Poland. The French "then declared war on Charles VI and invaded, taking two key Imperial fortresses on the Rhine...," according to Lukowski and Zawadzki, 171.

Charles W. Ingrao in \textit{The Habsburg Monarchy: 1618 – 1815, Second Edition} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 146 - 147, notes that Charles eventually sought backup from his Russian ally which dispatched 13,000 soldiers in 1735. In the end, Augustus III became king of Poland, Stanislaus Leszczyński received Lorraine (which France absorbed after his death), and for relinquishing his claim to Lorraine, Maria Therese’s fiancé Francis Stephen became Duke of Tuscany. In exchange for Tuscany, the Spanish Prince Don Carlos received Sicily, Naples, and the Tuscan Presidii Ports from the empire. The empire also gave Sardinia the western part of Milan. The Pragmatic Sanction received universal recognition. An initial Peace of Vienna (October 30, 1735) spelled out these terms, with the final Treaty of Vienna formalizing them in November of 1738 when the passing of the childless Duke of Tuscany allowed Francis Stephen to inherit the duchy.

\textsuperscript{53} Thompson, "The thorn crisis and European diplomacy, 1724-1727," 97-132.
over the last Protestant church in the town.\textsuperscript{54} Further, the archbishop of Salzburg had evacuated 20,000-30,000 Protestants in 1732, and "the Emperor expressed his concern over the persistence of pockets of Protestantism within the Austrian lands by forcibly resettling a thousand Carinthians and Upper Austrians in Transylvania."\textsuperscript{55} Mack Walker describes the Salzburg expulsion as “the most dramatic religious confrontation in Germany after the Thirty Years’ War.”\textsuperscript{56} Adding further insult, by 1733 Protestants could no longer participate in the Polish Sejm.\textsuperscript{57}

Additionally, negotiations in the early 1730s, surrounding a successor of Augustus II as king of Poland, evoked major setbacks faced by Protestants in 1697.

Then, Augustus II, elector of Saxony, converted from Lutheranism to Catholicism so that he could claim the Polish throne, which particularly disillusioned Protestants who remembered Saxony as "the birthplace of the Reformation."\textsuperscript{58} Simultaneous with Augustus' conversion in 1697, the fourth clause of the Treaty of Ryswick (ending the War of the League of Augsburg) allowed for churches that Catholics had claimed during Louis XIV's decimation of the Palatinate to remain Catholic after the departure of French troops.\textsuperscript{59} Thompson has demonstrated that overturning the Ryswick clause preoccupied many Protestants within the Empire during the lead-up to The War of the Polish Succession. He indicates, “the Peace of Westphalia had supposedly frozen the confessional balance in the Reich and further changes were not allowed. Approval by the Reich of the 1697 treaty therefore enabled a shift in the confessional balance that would

\textsuperscript{54} Thompson, 97.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 136.
\textsuperscript{57} Lukowski and Zawadzki, 115.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Thompson, 54.
Protestants worried because this development made the 1648 Westphalia treaty, which set the number of Protestant and Catholic churches, seem amendable rather than a fundamental of Imperial law. The issue raised "broader implications beyond the local situation in the Palatinate. Protestants perceived an increase in catholic power in the Empire." On the other hand, W.R. Ward indicates that Catholics believed "Westphalia itself was an act of force in which they had been pillaged by the Protestants with foreign assistance from France and Sweden." Negotiations surrounding the Treaty of Utrecht at the conclusion of the War of Spanish Succession in 1713 placed the fourth clause back on the table, but Pope Clement XI remained unmoved. The Corpus Evangelicorum within the HRE had continually, unsuccessfully, attempted to convince the Emperor to nullify the clause. Thompson contends that Charles’ need for support from princes and electors in 1733 provided an opportunity for Protestants to use revocation of the clause as a negotiating point. However, when France attacked, they did not hold out until the emperor changed his mind about Ryswick.

Despite much hand wringing, the Protestant powers did not take definitive action in support of Protestants in Poland. In 1731, the Prussian, English, Dutch and Russian

\[60\] Ibid.  
\[61\] Ibid., 179.  
\[62\] Ibid.  
\[64\] Ibid.  
\[65\] See Thompson, 179 and Peter H. Wilson, From Reich to Revolution, German History, 1558-1806 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004): 151 on the Corpus. Protestants united as a Corpus Evangelicorum in 1712 to advocate for their rights in the Reichstag and "other imperial institutions." It "leveled the distinctions between electors, princes, lords and cities, by grouping them in a single body."  
\[66\] See Thompson, 179 and Wilson, From Reich to Revolution, 151 on the Corpus. Protestants united as a Corpus Evangelicorum in 1712 to advocate for their rights in the Reichstag and "other imperial institutions." It "leveled the distinctions between electors, princes, lords and cities, by grouping them in a single body."  
\[67\] Thompson, 187.
representatives at the Polish court had united to support religious dissidents. Russia and Prussia also agreed to join together to support Orthodox and Protestant dissidents in Warsaw. In July of 1733, however, Rondeau wrote to Lord Harrington, Secretary of the Northern Department, indicating that the court considered Prussia an unreliable partner and Empress Anna wanted to settle a treaty with George II “to secure for the future the protestants of Poland in the free exercise of their religion.” The following week, Forbes wrote to Harrington indicating that one of Anna’s advisors complained of Woodward’s “reservedness in relation to the election of Poland,” appealing to “His Majesty's paternal care” for dissidents there. In August, however, Harrington pointed out that, though Anna’s minister had persisted in promoting a treaty of alliance, he dropped the notion of entering into a treaty on behalf of Polish dissidents. Forbes explained that the issue was not raised again because he insisted on George II’s “good offices” for them, carried out by Woodward in Warsaw, and the impossibility of backing up such a treaty by sea or land. In a private elaboration Harrington explained that George does not want to enter into a treaty to protect Protestants because it might “exasperate [The Poles] more, and make them eager to show their power and their freedom by some warm acts of bigotry.”

Meanwhile, in Poland’s religiously charged atmosphere, George Woodward, British envoy to Poland and Saxony, followed commands regarding advocacy for Protestants in Warsaw as communicated by George II through Lord Harrington, Secretary of the Northern Department. From the summer of 1732 to November of 1733, Harrington

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68 Lukowski and Zawadzki, 115.  
69 Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva 76, 21.  
70 Ibid., 24-25.  
71 Ibid., 49-50.  
72 Ibid., 91.  
73 Ibid., 44.
mixed concern for the fate of Polish Protestants with an emphasis on subduing fervent reaction to the demolition of Protestant churches.\textsuperscript{74} George II encouraged Protestants to seek redress for persecution, but eschewed entanglement in plots, and sought to prevent violent responses.

The British also took this tempered approach in relations with Russia. Though Britain sought neither a defensive nor a religious alliance with Russia, its envoys worked tirelessly to settle a commercial treaty. Russia pressed for a defensive guarantee continuously and Britain would not relent. Before the French had invaded the HRE, when the emperor reneged on his treaty-mandated duty to dispatch troops to secure the Polish election along with the Russians, British diplomats defused the issue, convincing Biron that the emperor’s move would give the French a pretext to attack. Then, in autumn 1734, when the emperor began asking for treaty-mandated Russian troop support in his Rhineland territories, the Russians demurred. A triangulation emerged as Russia stalled both in signing the commercial treaty and deploying troops to support the emperor. Meanwhile, despite consistent pressure from Russia, the British avoided entering into a defensive alliance with it and never committed to assisting the emperor militarily.

\textsuperscript{74} Lord Harrington to George Woodward, July 20/31 1732, Hanbury Williams Papers, Lewis Walpole Library, Farmington, CT (hereafter cited as LWL MSS 7 Vol. 3). I have yet to obtain the other side of this correspondence, so for now can only offer Harrington’s commentary. For communications relating to Protestants and the Protestant Interest, see Lord Harrington to George Woodward, August 6/17, 1732, LWL MSS 7 Vol. 3; Lord Harrington to George Woodward, November 14, 1732, LWL MSS 7 Vol. 3; Lord Harrington to George Woodward, March 9, 1733, LWL MSS 7 Vol. 3; Lord Harrington to George Woodward, March 30, 1733, LWL MSS 7 Vol. 3; Lord Harrington to George Woodward, May 8, 1733, LWL MSS 7 Vol. 3; Lord Harrington to George Woodward, May 25, 1733, LWL MSS 7 Vol. 3; Lord Harrington to George Woodward, June 19, 1733, LWL MSS 7 Vol. 3; Lord Harrington to George Woodward, July 17, 1733, LWL MSS 7 Vol. 3; Lord Harrington to George Woodward, August 31, 1733, LWL MSS 7 Vol. 3; and Lord Harrington to George Woodward, November 20, 1733, LWL MSS 7 Vol. 3.
In late February 1735, Rondeau wrote to Harrington that the envoy from Vienna continued, unsuccessfully, to pressure the Russians to send troops to Poland to assist the emperor. He thought that Anna delayed not only to see whether George II would assist the emperor, but also due to Biron’s displeasure over misrepresentations from Vienna regarding his Silesian land purchase. Rondeau wrote that Biron had “bought of late the county of Warttenberg in Silesia […] and when general count Levenvolde was last at Vienna, that ministry as good as promised him that, in case count Biron bought the above estate, he should be permitted to build a lutheran church at Warttenberg, which liberty the emperor now refuses to grant, saying it is contrary to the laws of the country.” Rondeau elaborated that because “nothing can be done here without his consent, the emperor must find some way to satisfy him, or else his affairs will go on but very slowly at this court.”

Soon after, he reported rumors that the issue had been resolved as a result of assurances that Charles VI would allow Biron to “build a lutheran church on estates he has bought in Silesia…”

Russia did deploy troops and a coin dated November 4, 1736 commemorates the consecration of Biron’s estate chapel. Biron’s hindrance of the Russo-Austrian troop deployment agreement does not appear in contemporary historical accounts focusing specifically on the war, which portray the events following Charles' request for troops as swift, or do not mention the delay.

75 Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva Volume 76, 375.
76 Ibid., 377-378.
78 For versions of the "quick response" narrative, see E.V. Anisimov, "The imperial heritage of Peter the Great in the foreign policy of his early successors," in Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, ed. by Hugh Ragsdale and V. N. Ponomarev (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993), 32-33; LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, 234; and Seergei M. Soloviev, Empress Anna: Favorites, Policies, Campaigns, History of Russia 34, edited by Walter J. Gleason, Jr., (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic

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While Rondeau indicates that Biron bought the land from the emperor, correspondence reveals that the Silesian land had been used as a gift to influence a series of notables at the Russian court. In late December of 1729, at the end of Peter II’s reign, Rondeau expressed concern about the Duke of Illyria’s inability to counterbalance Vienna at court because Emperor Charles VI planned to “give prince Alexey Grigorievitz Dolgoruky, the promised Czarina’s father, the principality in Silesia that did belong to prince Menshikoff and was the bribe which engaged that unfortunate gentleman to do all that the court of Vienna desired at that time.”

Prince Menshikov, a favorite of Peter I who had taken control in the first months of Peter II’s reign, was disgraced in large part due to Dolgorukii influence. Now, as Prince Dolgorukii’s daughter planned to marry Peter II, he would receive the emperor’s gift. This reveals Rondeau’s perception that this particular land grant was instrumental in Menshikov’s allegiance to Vienna. As Peter II died soon after this dispatch, and the Dolgorukiis were disgraced, the emperor no longer had a reason to curry Prince Dolgorukii’s favor.

Early into Anna’s reign, Biron became the most evident beneficiary of Emperor Charles VI’s largesse. The dynamic shifted after Vienna and Britain became allies in 1731. Now, rather than expressing concern over the emperor’s ability to wield influence with the land, Rondeau sought London’s assistance in bestowing it upon Biron. In late September, near the end of the second year of Anna’s reign, Rondeau wrote to London

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International Press, (1982), 162-163. Charles W. Ingrao attributes Russia’s late assistance with its Preoccupation in Poland and distance from the empire, 146. Michael Hochedlinger does not address the delay in Austria’s Wars of Emergence 1683-1797 (London: Longman, 2003), 205 - 209. General Manstein noted the delay in his memoir: “the Emperor, Charles IV. [sic] had repeatedly urged to [Empress Anna Ivanovna] his request of her sending succours to him on the Rhine.” Cristof Hermann Manstein and David Hume, Memoirs of Russia, Historical, Political, and Military, from the Year MDCCXXVII, to MDCCXLIV (London: Printed for T. Becket and P.A. De Hondt, 1770), 84. For our purposes, Manstein's recollection serves as corroboration of events reported elsewhere.

that Vienna’s resident, Count Wratislau, asked him to send a dispatch requesting that the British court “try to engage the court of Vienna to give count Biron the estates in Silesia formerly designed for prince Menshikoff and at the same time to make him a prince of the empire…” Rondeau was convinced that this action would “infallibly secure count Biron in our interest.” Wratislau wanted it to appear as though Rondeau generated the idea because he thought otherwise the emperor would look unfavorably on the suggestion. Rondeau did not indicate that the action would secure Vienna’s interests alone, but “our” interests: Britain’s and the Empire’s. On November 18, 1732 Rondeau indicated, “Count Wratislau told me yesterday, that he had been informed from his court that the emperor, his master, would give count Biron a considerable estate in Silesia, which he had acquainted his excellency with, so that now he is sure the french will not be able to do anything here.” Thus, Wratislau perceived that the land gift would prevent Biron from becoming susceptible to French influence.

In 1735 Rondeau indicated that Biron purchased the land, whereas in 1732 he had personally asked London to convince the court of Vienna to give it as a gift. It seems most likely that few knew that Biron received the land as a gift. When Levenwolde negotiated in Vienna over the church construction issue, he could easily have thought that Biron purchased the land, as the courts likely did not want it known that the transaction was designed to secure allegiance.

Although the emperor’s relenting to Biron seems to have caused the long-awaited troop deployment, all of the circumstances related to this Austrian-British-Russian triangulation resolved in February and March of 1735. On February 15, Rondeau

80 Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva Volume 66, 508-509.
81 Ibid., 530.
reported Anna’s hesitation about deploying troops as though she awaited word on what action George II would take to support the emperor.\(^82\) Within days, Rondeau received a copy of a resolution between the States General and Britain regarding the war; Anna and her ministers must also have received it around that time. On March 1, 1735, Rondeau reported that Anna would send troops, Charles VI would allow Biron to build his church, and the commercial treaty would finally be ratified. On March 16 Rondeau indicated that Anna was pleased with the part of the accommodation plan relating to Poland, the treaties were officially ratified, and within days Anna had dispatched orders for the deployment of 20,000 troops.\(^83\) As discussed further in Chapter 2, the timing strongly suggests that in lieu of a much sought-after defensive alliance Russia leveraged the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 for the resolution drafted by the States General, agreeing to ratify the commercial treaty only after receiving the resolution. With those issues settled, and Biron able to build his church on the land the British had helped him to obtain, Russia then deployed troops. Biron’s side deal, then, seems to have been an aspect of both the formal Austro-Russian alliance mandating the troop commitment as well as indirect reciprocity among the three empires that allowed them to assist one another without entering into official alliances that would further inflame hostilities.

That the church transaction did not rank in importance with the commercial and military items that simultaneously resolved amplifies its significance. This is the only time that the correspondence covering Anna’s reign, and collected in the *Russkoe istoricheskoe obshchestvo* volumes, reveals that a British diplomat wrote to the king from St. Petersburg requesting a quid-pro-quo favor for any individual. At a time when

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\(^82\) *Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva* Volume 76, 368.

\(^83\) Ibid., 369-378.
Charles VI undertook so much anti-Lutheran activity, allowing Biron to build a church that was apparently not worth securing the favorite’s allegiance. That it took the threat of withholding the troops Charles so desperately needed to force him to relent reveals the issue’s significance to the emperor.

After tensions in Poland subsided with Augustus’ victory secure, and plans began for the Diet of Pacification in August of 1735, Russia took a measured approach toward advocacy for Protestants. On August 2, Rondeau wrote that the Russian envoy in Warsaw would join with Woodward to support Protestants at the Diet. 84 On August 30, Rondeau reported that he assured the Protestant representative from Warsaw at the Russian court that Woodward would work in concert with the Russian envoy. He had heard however, that the Russian minister was ordered “to take the greatest care not to endanger the breaking of the diet…. by insisting too much on redressing the Protestant’s [sic] grievances,” since Augustus would settle them in the next diet if they failed initially. 85 On September 6 Rondeau reported that the Danish and Prussian envoys had urged Anna to attend to the Protestants but that some thought the Prussian king sought to cause difficulty for the diet through such advocacy rather than provide relief. This correspondence reveals that religious tensions continued to simmer as the Polish succession crisis subsided and demonstrates awareness that religious issues could be exploited to obstruct peace proceedings.

Unlike the princes and electors in the HRE who hoped to use overturning Ryswick as leverage, Biron’s access at the Lutheran-friendly Russian court allowed him to add one more Lutheran church to Silesia. Though Silesia had seen an increase in the

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84 Ibid., 428.
85 Ibid., 439.
number of Protestant churches subsequent to 1697, continued persecution of Silesian Lutherans throughout the first half of the eighteenth century made them particularly grateful for the assistance of Protestant powers. Pasi Ihalainen notes that before the Swedish king Charles XII entered into the Altranstadt Treaty with the emperor during the Great Northern War, allowing 120 churches to be returned to Protestants, “Lutheran Silesians considered Charles XII a messianic figure who would come to their help.”

Further, “the sufferings of Silesian Lutherans at the hands of the Counter-Reformation made news in Protestant papers up to 1740, when Frederick the Great of Prussia put an end to forced conversions of Lutheran parishes and earned himself the honorary title of a defender of Protestantism.”

Had the territory remained in Charles VI’s hands, Biron might have become legendary as a defender of Protestantism. Instead, Frederick the Great (r. 1740-86), the Protestant king of Prussia, annexed Silesia within a few years of the church’s construction. The Prussian king’s boldness changed Silesia’s trajectory and launched Europe into the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48), rendering Biron’s feat unworthy of even a footnote in English-language historiography. In the years before Frederick’s annexation, however, the impact could have been significant. In Wartenberg, the county Biron received, the last church in which Protestants had been allowed to worship burned down in 1637 and many of the congregation who could not receive permission to reconstruct emigrated.

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86 See Ihalainen, 238 – 239 and W.R. Ward, Christianity under the Ancien Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 93. That these churches were added reveals that, despite imperial Protestants’ concerns about catholicization, the number of Protestant churches in the empire had to a small degree increased since Ryswick.

87 Ibid., 239.

townspeople could attend services. Thus, though Biron played a small, and largely unacknowledged, role in restoring Lutheran worship in Silesia, to Lutherans in Wartenberg who could now worship locally, Biron may have seemed as heroic as Charles XII or Frederick the Great.

Considering these two incidents, the Buddeus refutation and Biron’s Silesian church construction, has allowed us to see that the Russian court remained a site of interdenominational convergence and conflict in the 1730s. During the lead-up to the War of the Polish Succession, Europe confronted dynastic changes that evoked religious tensions from decades earlier in the century while areas of Central and Eastern Europe encountered forced relocation of Lutherans and Protestant church destruction. At the same time, the publication of the refutation of Buddeus in Vienna evoked the contentious period of Peter I’s church reforms as well as the Jansenist controversy. During Peter I’s reign, as influential Baltic Germans became integrated into the elite as a result of the Great Northern War, Peter wrested autonomy from his church and created a new blend of sacral authority among the elite. Accusations of Lutheran sympathies emerged during Peter’s time and bubbled up again through the Buddeus refutation as Baltic Germans became prominent during Anna Ivanovna’s reign. While Russia remained officially Orthodox and the court adhered to Orthodox devotional ceremonial rites, Lutherans were integrated enough into the court that a favorite could used the empire’s leverage to ensure that a Lutheran church would be constructed on land he received to do a foreign power’s bidding. We see that in the 1730s Russia remained a locus of interdenominational cross-fertilization and conflict, integrated into the interdenominational struggles across Europe.

89 Ibid. This is from Wartenberg’s official German-language web site drawing on a number of sources. This information needs further corroboration.
Recognizing the “Lutheran Yoke” had roots in Peter’s reign, and that Catherine II’s reforms are associated with her Pietism, points the way toward future work on the role of religion in elite integration and cultural transfer throughout eighteenth century Russia.
Chapter 2 - Anglo-Russian Commerce as Diplomatic Leverage: Russia’s “Forward” Maneuvers in the War of the Polish Succession

Though Russia sought Britain’s military assistance against the French in the War of the Polish Succession (1733-35), it could not use contemporaneous commercial treaty negotiations as leverage to induce the British to enter into a formal defensive alliance.\(^{90}\)

In his 1938 monograph on the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734, Douglas K. Reading attributed Russia’s capitulation to the treaty without the guarantee to “the real dependence of the new Russian economic organism upon English commerce.”\(^{91}\) For Reading, the proof of this dependence lay in “the successful conclusion of the commercial treaty by the English notwithstanding their outright rejection of Muscovite political advances.”\(^{92}\) This notion of Russia’s dependence fit with Reading’s contention that the treaty represented “the first formal commercial agreement ever concluded between, on the one side, the most industrially and commercially advanced of all the contemporary European states, Great Britain, and on the other side, the most backward and undeveloped of these same states, Russia.”\(^{93}\)

\(^{90}\) For information about the background to the War of the Polish Succession, see Chapter 1.


\(^{92}\) Ibid.

\(^{93}\) Ibid., vii. Its context aside, given the extraordinary thoroughness of Reading’s work, one can understand why no one has written a similar monograph since 1938. One contemporary reviewer acknowledged its comprehensiveness while cautioning against "disturbing errors in judgment and detail," and urging scholars to make use of the “interesting and valuable material… gratefully, even if cautiously”\(^{\ast}\); B.H.S, ”The Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 by D.K. Reading,” *The English Historical Review* 55 no 217 (1940): 163-164. The tendency to reiterate Russian "backwardness" did not abate even after unselfconscious declarations of British cultural and economic superiority became complicated in the postcolonial era. The most ubiquitous Russian economic historian of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, Richard Hellie, combined notions of cultural and economic backwardness, linking the conditions of seventeenth- and eighteenth century Muscovy/Russia with the 1990s. He contended that indicating that "Russia was (and is) a poor country" with "equally bleak" natural and human endowments. After emphasizing the visual nature of Russian Orthodoxy he described its cognitive effects on Russian economic life: "the fact
“backwardness” trope has not disappeared since the 1930s, and contemporary work on the treaty negotiations emphasizes, as Reading did, individual statespersons’ goals and the failure of Anna Ivanovna’s chancellor Baron von Osterman to insist on a reciprocal guarantee.\textsuperscript{94} That the British did not offer a reciprocal defensive guarantee, however, did not reflect Britain’s superior diplomatic maneuvering. Simultaneous with the treaty’s ratification in early 1735, the British and Holland’s States General negotiated with the French to secure an agreement that ended the most intensive phase of Russia’s involvement in the War of the Polish Succession. Thus, Russia obtained its desired outcome without a formal alliance. Soon after, the British desperately sought a defensive alliance with Russia but the court demurred throughout the rest of Anna Ivanovna’s reign. Thus, Russia did not abandon its hopes for a defensive alliance because its new, westward-looking “economic organism” depended upon Britain. Along with this conception of Russian dependence, contemporary explanations for the commencement of formal trade relations with Britain during Anna Ivanovna’s reign have focused on the “old” Russian nobility’s displacement by a new, Western-looking elite.\textsuperscript{95} More than a relatively simple issue of “old” and “backward” vs. “new” and “Western,” British and Russian factional issues mixed with dynastic and strategic

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\textsuperscript{94} Michael Bitter, "Anglo-Russian relations during the 1730s: Evidence of the Impact of 'Germans' at the Court of Anna Ivanovna," in \textit{Germano-Slavica} 16 (2007).

considerations to impede a formal commercial agreement in the decades before Anna Ivanovna’s reign. The “Old Russian” nobility were not anti-western and many, in fact, preferred the British to “Germans” at court. Aside from to the resolution of factional and territorial/strategic issues related to the Duke of Holstein’s claim on Schleswig, the factor that most contributed to Russia’s formalization of commercial relations was Britain’s détente with Austria, Russia’s primary ally, in 1731.\textsuperscript{96} That Russia engaged in formal relations with Britain and then leveraged the commercial treaty for Britain’s and the States General’s resolution of the Polish Succession crisis reveals that Russia acted strategically based on its current alliances and defensive needs rather than overcoming its “backward” isolation in the wake of Peter the Great’s reforms.

An overview of Russo-British relations during the first part of the eighteenth century will provide context for the renewal of Anglo-Russian relations during Anna Ivanovna’s reign.\textsuperscript{97} English and British sovereigns consistently and unsuccessfully pressed for the conclusion of a commercial treaty throughout the first two decades of the eighteenth century as Russia gained a position of strength through its conquests in the Great Northern War. From at least 1705, Queen Anne sought such a treaty, using admittance into the Grand Alliance as leverage in 1707, and making additional overtures in 1711 and 1715. George I would continue to pursue a treaty of commerce from 1716 to

\textsuperscript{96} Reading, 99.
\textsuperscript{97} For a detailed analysis of seventeenth century trade and diplomatic relations see Paul Dukes et al., \textit{Stuarts and Romanovs – The Rise and Fall of a Special Relationship} (Glasgow, Scotland: Dundee University Press, 2009). For an overview heavily slanted toward the British see Reading’s IV and V “Political Background” chapters.
1720, at which time, as Russia had obtained a more advantageous strategic position, Peter I consistently used entry into a defensive alliance as leverage.98

Britain’s factional issues also impacted Russia’s approach to the British. As a result of its new supremacy over Sweden, in 1718 Russia replaced that nation as the Jacobites’ focus for foreign support. While two of Peter’s closest friends and advisors actively advocated for the Jacobite cause, and in 1719 there had reportedly been talk of his supporting the Duke of Holstein’s bid for the Swedish throne and an effort to reestablish Jacobite rule in England through a Scottish invasion, Peter continually reaffirmed his lack of Jacobite interest in diplomatic correspondence with the English court.99 When open hostilities emerged in 1720, in the form of a military challenge from the English in the Baltic, Peter assured merchants that he “[did] not condescend to blame the English people for this measure, but only the Hanoverians and their party.”100 After many protestations about Russia's lack of participation in Jacobite intrigue, this openly anti-Hanoverian rhetoric marks a distinct shift.

In 1724, the Duke of Holstein married Catherine I’s and Peter’s daughter, Anna Petrovna. After Catherine I's ascension upon Peter's death in 1725 we see continuity in factional influence and a more pronounced alliance between the Russian sovereign and the Jacobite cause. In 1725, Europe divided into an alliance between Austria and Spain on the one hand, and the Hanover Alliance of Britain, France, the United Provinces, and Prussia on the other. Davies indicates that "Russia as well as Austria had reason to fear the Hanover League, seeing it as an instrument by which Britain could block Russian

98 For these documents see Simon Dixon, et al, Britain and Russia in the age of Peter the Great: Historical Documents, School of Slavonic and East European Studies Occasional Papers No. 38 (Dorchester: The Dorset Press, 1998), 54, 63, 113, 170, 185, 212.
100 Dixon et al., 218.
interests in the Baltic" and Prussia could induce Sweden to join.\textsuperscript{101} Catherine I openly supported her son-in-law's Swedish monarchical aims and became involved in international Jacobite plotting.\textsuperscript{102} It is difficult to know what to make of these reports of factional alliances at the Russian court as the conflicting information could have emerged as an effect of disinformation, dissimulation, or misunderstanding. Thus, while supporting the Duke of Holstein clearly coincided with Catherine I's advocating the Jacobite cause, it is difficult to discern the level of commitment within the rest of the Russian court. Catherine I's death in May of 1727 seemingly ended Russia's official support of the Jacobites. Meanwhile, George II claimed the English crown months later, reaffirming Hanoverian legitimacy and extinguishing Jacobite hopes.

By August of 1728 England had dispatched Thomas Ward and Claudius Rondeau to St. Petersburg to attend to British trade issues, but as the envoys remained concerned primarily with wresting military textile contracts from the Prussians, they were unable to effect an entente between Britain and Russia.\textsuperscript{103} This was during the short reign of young Peter II (r. 1727-1730) who spent his minority first under Menshikov and then the Dolgorukii and Golitsyn families. As the Golitsyn and Dolgorukii families took control, the court returned to Moscow in early 1728, indicating a major break with symbolic and practical aspects of the Petrine legacy.\textsuperscript{104} This has been portrayed as a “backwards” or

\textsuperscript{101} Brian Davies, \textit{Empire and Military Revolution in Eastern Europe: Russia's Turkish Wars in the Eighteenth Century} (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group: 2011), 166.

\textsuperscript{102} In 1725 British Consul John Deane reported his perception of the Russian court's factional divides as they related to Britain on a brief and controversial visit during which it must have been difficult to gather accurate information. He identified two segments among the British population at the Russian court: those who supported the Jacobites and those who favored the Hanoverian king. Meanwhile, he saw the Russians as divided into those who supported the Duke of Holstein and those who remained committed to an alliance with Britain and France. Wills, 101.

\textsuperscript{103} Reading, 99.

\textsuperscript{104} On the symbolic attributions of St. Petersburg see Robert Collis, \textit{The Petrine Instauration: Religion, Esotericism and Science at the Court of Peter the Great, 1689-1725} (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2012).
reactionary move and the Dolgorukiis especially have often been referred to as xenophobic.\textsuperscript{105} A regime change in Russia soon followed when Anna Ivanovna became empress early in 1730. Then, in 1731, Russia minimized the threat to British interests in the Baltic by disallowing a potential heir to the Russian throne from controlling the duchy of Holstein.\textsuperscript{106} Additionally, in 1731 the British and Austrians reconciled through the second Treaty of Vienna. Later that year, at the suggestion of the Austrian envoy to St. Petersburg, the College of Foreign Affairs indicated that it would resume official diplomatic relations with Britain.\textsuperscript{107} By the summer of 1732 Baron von Osterman began discussing the possibility of a commercial treaty with a defensive guarantee.

This overview of early-eighteenth-century Anglo-British relations reveals that a number of factional and geostrategic considerations prevented the nations from seriously deliberating about a commercial agreement from 1720 to 1732. Prior to that time, while the British court sought a trade agreement, Peter I continually used the need for a reciprocal defensive alliance as leverage. Philip Clendenning’s analysis, on the other hand, does not address factionalism and geostrategic considerations, characterizing the transformation that took place in Russo-British relations from the conclusion of the Great Northern War in 1721 to the 1740s as possible due to a broad social transformation.\textsuperscript{108} According to Clendenning, Peter I’s “new aristocracy” displaced the “old conservative aristocratic families,” including the Dolgorukiis and Golitsyns, who in this period are most well known for attempting to impose the famous “Conditions” on Anna when the

\textsuperscript{106} Brian Davies, Empire and Military Revolution In Eastern Europe: Russia's Turkish Wars in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011),165. Russia signed a treaty recognizing Karl Friedrich's giving up his claim to Schleswig in exchange for compensation for Holstein.
\textsuperscript{107} Reading, 99.
\textsuperscript{108} See, for example, Le Donne, "Ruling Families.”
nobility chose her to rule after Peter II’s death.\textsuperscript{109} We saw, in actuality, that Peter I’s insistence on a defensive alliance, Jacobite sympathies, and outright Jacobite advocacy, prevented the Russian and British courts first from entering into a commercial agreement and then from engaging in any sort of diplomacy from 1720-28, with the Austro-British alliance providing the opportunity for a renewal of formal relations in 1731.

Clendenning relies upon the diplomatic correspondence of Edward Finch, who replaced Claudioius Rondeau as resident at the Russian court after his untimely death, near the end of Anna Ivanovna’s reign, in 1739. Finch wrote that the Old Rus showed no interest in a commercial treaty with a European nation but rather wanted to continue to favor “Asiatics.”\textsuperscript{110} As Britain had already entered into the commercial treaty of 1734 at this time, Clendenning might have been referring to the renewal of the treaty in 1742. Since Clendenning has identified a wide scale Petrine social transformation with Russia’s readiness to enter into a commercial agreement, however, examining what the nobility expressed during Rondeau’s early years in Russia, prior to commencement of the negotiations over the 1734 treaty, should tell us more than what Finch observed in the early 1740s. Rondeau made many observations about the Old Rus that counter assumptions about their association with “backwardness.” Rondeau’s Old Rus often preferred the British to “German” interests and considered it beneficial to maintain friendly relations with them.

According to Rondeau, the Old Rus were friendly to Mecklenburg and in opposition to the Dolgorukii. During Peter II’s reign, Rondeau mentioned that the "old

\textsuperscript{109} Clendenning, 477.  
\textsuperscript{110} Clendenning, 477. I use the term Old Rus; Rondeau uses both “old russ” and “old russ.” I do not presume that there was a category of people who identified themselves as Old Rus, but am utilizing Rondeau’s nomenclature.
rus nobility” wanted to see the young tsar marry the daughter of the Duke of Mecklenburg instead of a Dolgorukii.\textsuperscript{111} This is significant because Rondeau characterized the Old Rus in opposition to the Dolgorukiis who are conventionally seen as bastions of backwardness and xenophobia. Second, these Old Rus preferred dynastic marriage to a Western foreigner over a Russian noble.

Rondeau also portrayed the Old Rus as friendly to the British and in opposition to the Courlanders and Germans. When Rondeau first mentioned Ernst Johann Biron on May 11, 1730, he noted that many from Courland were in favor at court, which displeased the “old rus.”\textsuperscript{112} Soon after, Rondeau noted, "all the old russ are our friends and begin to murmur very much, that Her Majesty has so many courlanders and germans about her person.”\textsuperscript{113} Thus, the Old Rus did not dislike foreigners in general, as they preferred the British, but disliked the disproportionate number of people in Anna’s court from the Duchy of Courland and other Germanophone areas. This suggests that even without the disproportionate influence of Germanophone advisors, the Russian nobility would have accepted a commercial treaty with Britain in subsequent years.

Rondeau also indicated that the Old Rus disliked Austria and Baron von Osterman. As this was prior to the Anglo-Austrian détente in 1731, Britain still worked against Austria’s interests at the Russian court. When the Dutch envoy arrived at St. Petersburg, Rondeau stated, "He will, I don't doubt, join with us to weaken the emperor's interest at this court, which is yet very considerable, though he has all the old russ against

\textsuperscript{111} Russkoe istoricheskoe obschestvo, Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obschestva Volume 66 (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvo, 1891), 135.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 191.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 201.
him." Rondeau also thought that Osterman, who engineered the alliance with Austria, might have been afraid that he would be unable to persuade the Old Rus to meet Russia’s troop deployment obligation to Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI (r. 1711-1740) in case of war. Rondeau elaborated that Paul Ivanovitch Iaguzhinskii and others of the Old Rus nobility had tried to lessen Osterman's power, and described him as "almost the only person who… supported the german interest in this country since the going away of the duke of Holstein." Thus, the Old Rus disliked Osterman, Austria, and “the German interest.”

Though the Golitsyns have been associated with the “backwards” retreat to Moscow during Peter II’s reign, and the attempt to impose conditions upon Anna when she took power, Rondeau described one of the clan as a friend to Britain. When Field Marshal Golitsyn died, Rondeau noted his passing as regretted by Anna and the army and then described him as "a very honest old russ, incapable to be bribed, seeking always the real advantage of this country, and consequently our friend." Thus, an Old Rus from a notoriously “backward” family saw that it was best for his country to ally with Britain.

Rondeau then described the frustration of the Old Rus nobility as a result of their exclusion from Anna’s confidence. Rondeau indicated that Biron, the Levenwolde brothers, Paul Ivanovitch Iaguzhinskii, and Osterman had the most access and influence. Iaguzhinskii, the Old Rus, was the only among this crew who was Britain’s “real friend,” as Vienna and Prussia had bribed Biron and Count Levenwolde. This made

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114 Ibid., 208
115 Ibid., 273.
116 Ibid., 232. As we saw above, the Duke of Holstein was married to Peter I and Catherine I’s daughter, Anna Petrovna.
117 Ibid., 265.
118 Ibid., 232.
Rondeau fear that Anna would send 20,000 troops to Vienna per the 1726 defensive alliance with Russia, and act that he thought might make the Old Rus openly rebel.\(^{119}\)

We have seen, then, that in Rondeau’s nomenclature, the Old Rus revealed a variety of overlapping and contradictory characteristics. Without becoming mired in factional issues it is possible to say that there were Russian elites who favored diplomatic and commercial relations with the British over “Germans.” Yet, it was the “Germans” who oversaw negotiations for the Anglo-Russian Commercial treaty of 1734. Clearly it is difficult to generalize about what constituted Russian “backwardness” in terms of who favored ties with the West. This summation of Anglo-British relations and examination of Rondeau’s categorization of the Old Rus certainly reveals that we cannot consider the renewal of diplomatic and commercial ties with Britain as the result of forward-moving, Petrine progress.

A closer look at the Golitsyn and Dolgorukii families reveals that, though they have been associated with “backwardness,” they maintained long-term contact with the West. LeDonne describes the Dolgorukiis as "very conservative, xenophobic, and extremely devout despite their unbearable pride," noting that the clan's proximity to the opposition that had gathered around tsarevitch Alexis in 1718 had caused their political fortunes to suffer.\(^{120}\) The combination of the return to Moscow during Peter II’s minority and LeDonne's portrayal of isolation and religious devotion feeds into constructions of the Petrine/Muscovite divide into progressive vs. backward. It is true that the

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\(^{119}\) Ibid., 273.

\(^{120}\) John P. LeDonne, "Ruling Families and the Russian Political Order, 1689-1825," in Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique, 28 no. 3/4 (1987): 296. Alexis was the son by Peter I’s first wife Evdokia. He died in prison after a protracted treason investigation.
Dolgorukiis were noted to have resisted the Petrine reforms in dress. However, the family also boasted a long record of foreign service. First Grigory Dolgorukii and then his son Sergei served as envoys to Warsaw, the only court at which Russia posted residents before Peter's reign. Vasily Lukich Dolgorukii studied in France for over a decade before postings in Warsaw and then Denmark in 1707, and was also posted in Sweden. The family served in the Russian senate from its inception.

The Golitsyns also boasted a history of foreign service, as well as state appointments. Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn visited Rome, Naples and Venice, where he studied military-defensive topics. In 1707 he received the appointment of Voyevoda of Kiev, the cultural and intellectual capital of Russia, and would become Kiev's governor and the lieutenant of Smolensk. The area reflected a combination of "Latin, Roman and Catholic influence," as well as a mixture of Polish political traditions and Lithuanian legal statutes. During his time in Kiev, Golitsyn surrounded himself by scholars and arranged for translations of texts for Kiev Academy students (primarily from French and Polish), at his own behest and on Peter I’s behalf. Further, he received an appointment to the new College of Revenues in 1719. De Madariaga also tells us that

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121 Lindsey Hughes, Russia in the Age of Peter the Great (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1998), 285-286.
122 All of this information on the Dolgorukiis provided by Hughes, 60-61 and De Medariaga, 18.
123 See Hughes, 442.
124 Isabel De Madariaga, "Portrait of an Eighteenth-Century Russian Statesman: Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn," The Slavonic and East European Review 62 no. 1 (1984): 40. De Madariaga notes that "this was an extremely sensitive post, since the governor had to deal with supplies to the armed forces before and after the battle of Poltava, in 1709, and to steer his way through the upheaval in the Ukraine caused by the defection of Hetman Mazeppa to Charles XII of Sweden."
125 Ibid.
126 De Madariaga indicates that these included Aristotle's Politics, Grotius's Dejure paciet belli, Pufendorf's Dejure naturaet gentium, the Political Testament of Richelieu and Locke's Treatise on Civil Government," 40. On 41 De Madariaga indicates that In 1728, Golitsyn somewhat reluctantly assented to publishing The Rock of Faith, Stefan Yavorsky's anti-Protestant attack on Feofan Prokopovich, one of the principal architects of Peter's church reforms.
127 De Madariaga, 41.
the Golitsyn family was well liked in Ukraine, where they held estates, and surmises that the restoration of the Hetmanate in 1728 (while the Dolgorukiis and Golitsyns were in control during Peter II’s minority) after Peter’s elimination of it in 1722 demonstrates sympathy for Ukrainian traditions.\textsuperscript{128}

That neither of these families seems to have had significant Germanophone or British ties, but linkages to the Ukraine, Poland and France, might explain why they were considered “backward” during a time when Russia was at war with Poland and France. The Golitsyns, especially, maintained extensive connections in areas that had been annexed by Muscovy in the mid-late-eighteenth century. Yet, as we saw above, Rondeau described Field Marshal Golitsyn as sympathetic to the British. Again, there do not seem to have been straightforward divisions that we can attribute to Old and New Rus.

Now we shall move on to the significance of Russia’s concluding the 1734 treaty without a defensive guarantee, which, as we saw above, was contrary to the Petrine legacy of insisting on a reciprocal defensive guarantee. Michael Bitter explores this issue in a manner similar to Douglas Reading’s in 1938, examining the treaty negotiations in detail and comparing the approaches of Osterman and Biron.\textsuperscript{129} Bitter demonstrates that in an era known variously as the “Bironovschina” (time of Biron’s rule) or Russia’s era under the “German Yoke,” these two Germanophone advisors took very different

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 41. See also Lipski, 485. He notes that “Anna's government continued Peter's policy of further curtailing the privileges of the Ukrainians and subjected Ukrainian administrative bodies to strict supervision by Russian officials. In 1734 the Ukrainian Board (\textit{Malorossijskoe pravlenie}) was established. This body, headed by a Russian, Prince A. Shakhovskoj, became the chief Ukrainian governing Organ. Aiming at the Russification of the Ukraine, the cabinet instructed Prince Shakhovskoj to encourage ‘artfully’ marriages between Ukrainians and Great Russians.” Golitsyn's approach to Ukrainians seems to significantly distinguish him.

\textsuperscript{129} See Reading, 141-147.
approaches and Biron did not uniformly dominate. Biron did not advocate a defensive alliance and eventually his approach won out. Bitter indicates that Osterman, defeated, “adopted his rivals' attitude toward the commercial treaty… and the Russian court settled for a policy of strictly commercial engagement with Great Britain.” This analysis focuses our attention on personal approaches and preferences of statespersons and portrays one strategy as overriding another, with Russia “settling” due to pressure from Britain and a willingness of some at court to acquiesce.

Examining the correspondence from February and March of 1735, however, demonstrates that Russia did not simply capitulate to Britain’s demands. While the treaty was concluded in December of 1734, it was not ratified until a few months later, and its ratification coincided with a number of significant events. Per its 1726 alliance with Austria, Russia was obligated to assist the Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI when the French attacked his territories as part of the War of the Polish Succession. He had repeatedly asked for assistance and Russia delayed. Meanwhile, Russia had committed significant ground forces to securing its installation of the new king Augustus III in Poland. Though Britain and Austria had reconciled by this time, while Hanover committed troops to assist the Emperor Charles VI, Britain did not. On February 15, Rondeau reported Anna’s hesitation about deploying troops as though she awaited word on what action George II might take to support the emperor as the British king. Within days, Rondeau received a copy of a resolution drafted by Holland’s States General and

130 Bitter refers to these men as “ethnically German,” and does not point out that others of the “Germans” at court were “Baltic Germans” from lands absorbed by Russia during the Great Northern War. Biron was from the Duchy of Courland and Osterman hailed from Westphalia. For more discussion of “The German Yoke” see Chapter 1.
131 Bitter article.
132 Russkoe istoricheskoe obshchestvo, Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva Volume 76, 368.
Britain indicating that the French-supported, rival claimant to the Polish throne would retreat, after which Russia would remove its troops; Anna and her ministers must also have received it around that time. With Anna able to remove her troops to Poland, she had the capacity to comfortably assist the emperor. On March 1, 1735, Rondeau reported that Anna would send troops, Charles VI would allow Biron to build a Lutheran church on land within the HRE granted to him by the emperor, and the commercial treaty would finally be ratified. On March 16 Rondeau indicated that Anna was pleased with the part of the accommodation plan relating to Poland, the treaties were officially ratified, and within days Anna had dispatched orders for 20,000 troops to support the emperor. Meanwhile, Russia relinquished its remaining Persian possessions. The timing of the ratification strongly suggests that in lieu of a much sought-after defensive alliance Russia used the commercial treaty as leverage to secure a resolution coordinated by Britain and the States General, agreeing to ratify the commercial treaty only after receiving the resolution. Russia did not need Britain’s military commitment if its negotiations eliminated the need to maintain a strong presence in Poland so that it could follow through on its commitment to Emperor Charles VI.

It is difficult to assess how much Britain benefitted from the treaty. The British received most favored nation status and English merchants gained a one-third reduction on select tariffs, including on woolen cloth. This provided a considerable advantage over the Prussians, who had dominated this market in military uniform material since 1724 when they landed formerly British army contracts. Reading indicates that sales of British

133 For a discussion of the Biron church issue, see Chapter 1.
134 Russkoe istoricheskoe obschestvo Volume 76, 369-378.
cloth in Russia increased by about one-third in the decades that followed. However, we do not know exactly when the increase occurred. English merchants also received permission to import and export goods to and from Persia through Russia, and to pay tariff duties in Muscovite coinage rather than reichsdollars, representing a reduction of about three percent. The Persian privilege never became significant to the British and was soon revoked. Many of the other treaty provisions dealt with freeing English merchants from arbitrary action like forced conscription or billeting Russian soldiers, as well as corrupt business practices. Though Reading indicates that in the twenty-five years after the treaty the average annual amount of British exports to Russia doubled those of the preceding thirty-five years, it is difficult to attribute the increase directly to the treaty. By 1740, five years after the treaty’s conclusion, British exports to Russia were below 1720 levels. Between 1740 and 1750 they had more than doubled. Before attributing these phenomena directly to the 1734 treaty, other factors need eliminating, and the effects of the treaty’s renewal in 1742 need to be evaluated.

Subsequent to the multilateral exchange among Russia, Britain and Austria in early 1735, Russo-British diplomacy alternated between disaster and stagnation during Anna Ivanovna’s reign. The British resident at Constantinople so damaged Russian interests that, after much urging by Biron and Osterman, King George II finally recalled him. The tables turned as Britain desperately sought a defensive guarantee in

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136 Empress Elizabeth would revoke the Persian trade privilege in 1747 after Captain John Elton built a fleet for the Shah on the Caspian Sea. See Clendenning, 480; Herbert Kaplan, Russian Overseas Commerce with Great Britain During the Reign of Catherine II (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1995), 36; Reading, 298.
137 Reading, 298.
138 Ibid., 295.
139 Russkoe istoricheskoe obshchestvo Volume 76, 422.
December of 1738 due to renewed threat from Sweden, and Russia demurred; not until Elizabeth’s reign, in 1742, would Britain secure its defensive alliance. George II persistently offered good offices to resolve tensions between Russia and Turkey either to be brushed off by the Russians or completely excluded by Turkey in favor of the French. Osterman expressed frustration at Britain’s unwillingness to threaten the Ottomans with military action, or to rebuff them more strongly, but overall seemed to have few genuine expectations of British assistance with the Porte. The coordinated action of 1734/35 was the highlight and then Britain’s primary usefulness to Russia lay in its ability to negotiate with the emperor.

Russia did not overcome the backwardness of the Old Rus to enter into the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734. While Germanophone advisors primarily oversaw treaty negotiations, the friendliness many Old Rus expressed toward the British suggests that, had Anna not ascended, another Russian cabinet could have secured a commercial agreement. Nor did the British carry off a diplomatic coup by forcing Russia to move forward without a reciprocal defensive alliance. Rather, after the resolution of decades of factional struggle that strained relations, a formal commercial alliance became possible. Additionally, Britain’s reconciliation with Austria made its diplomatic efforts useful in the first half of Anna’s reign. Britain assisted with negotiations to end the War of the Polish Succession, freeing up Russia to fulfill its troop commitment to Austria and securing Russia’s chosen candidate for the Polish throne. In exchange, Russia ratified the commercial treaty. Meanwhile, Britain continued to consume the majority of Russia’s exports as had been the case for decades and finally, at the end of 1738, tenaciously

140 Russkoe istoricheskoe obshchestvo Volume 80, 402 and 541.
141 Russkoe istoricheskoe obshchestvo Volume 80, 382-383.
sought a defensive alliance that Anna Ivanovna’s cabinet never entered into. The formalization of Anglo-British diplomatic and commercial relations in the 1730s was an effect of Britain’s détente with Austria and Russia’s ability to use the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 as leverage to secure the mediation that allowed it to remove troops from Poland, freeing up troops to support Emperor Charles VI in his Rhineland territories.
Chapter 3 –
The Russo-Turkish War of 1736 and Maintenance of the Persian Buffer

The Russian army would first occupy the territory between the Dniepr and the Don; then, in 1737, the Crimea, the Kuban valley, and the Kabardas; in 1738, the low land of Bessarabia, Moldavia, and Wallachia; and in 1739, it would raise the Russian flag over Constantinople, where Anna would be crowned Orthodox empress, the counterpart of the Holy Roman Emperor in Frankfurt.¹⁴²

This passage describes one of the most common contemporary conceptions of Russia’s motivation for taking on the Russo-Turkish War of 1736-1739: in search of both religious glory and control of the Crimea and Black Sea, Empress Anna Ivanovna and her advisors would reclaim the former epicenter of Orthodox Christendom. Along the way, the Russian army would subdue the Crimean Tatars and put an end to borderland incursions. These attributions, however, omit additional, important explanations for the war. While rhetoric may have emphasized the religious element, British diplomatic correspondence from the Russian court in the years preceding hostilities reveals the importance to Russia of maintaining Persia as a buffer to prevent Turkey from taking over territories along the Caspian that Russia had recently ceded and/or where it maintained significant trade interests. One major reason for decimating the Crimean Tatars, then, was to prevent them from assisting the Ottomans against the Persians in the Caucasus region. While a number of authors mention Russia’s war with Persia in the 1720s, subsequent occupation, and strategic and trade interests there, they do not integrate these issues into discussions of the Russo-Turkish War. Russia’s capitulation to the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739, almost universally considered a humiliating defeat, appears less devastating if considered

in light of its maintenance of Persia as a buffer and continued to profit from Caspian trade.

After discussing the source base and reviewing the historiography, we shall move on to a summary of Russo-Turkish diplomacy from 1729, just before Anna Ivanovna’s reign began, to the conclusion of the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739, shortly before the end of her reign. Since the threat of war loomed almost constantly throughout this period, looking at the broader context of Russo-Turkish relations enables us to understand the causes and context of the 1736-39 war from a wider and deeper perspective than considering diplomacy immediately leading up to or during hostilities. The chronology is a consolidation of information related to Turkey from over 1700 pages of British diplomatic correspondence between the Russian and British courts from 1729-1739. Finally, a discussion of religion based on the correspondence allows us to look at its relative importance in opposition to territorial/strategic considerations.

There are a number of reasons to integrate the British correspondence into the overall discussion of the Russo-Turkish War of 1736-39, despite the problematic nature of relying on an external party’s accounts. Historians have made little use of British dispatches emanating from the Russian court in often-cited discussions of the war. Further, Britain became involved in diplomacy between St. Petersburg and the Porte through its resident in Constantinople during the lead-up to the conflict. Though British intervention often harmed rather than hurt Russian interests, or British help was not desired, the reports still provide insight into motivations, often through first-hand accounts of discussions with top members of Anna’s cabinet or other diplomats at court. This extraction of observations of, and participation in, Russo-Ottoman relations does not
provide a complete picture, but adds to our understanding of the causes and conclusion of the war. Claudius Rondeau, a British envoy at the court from 1728-1739, wrote most of the dispatches.¹⁴³

Many attribute Russia’s desire to gain access to the Black Sea, control the Crimea, and put an end to Tatar attacks as the chief causes of the Russo-Turkish war.¹⁴⁴ Brian Davies claims, “when war between Russia and the Turks and Crimean Tatars broke out in 1735, it was because Russia sought it, having discerned a window of opportunity in which to wage it and win the recovery of Azov.”¹⁴⁵ According to Karl Roider, Russia began seeking pretexts to attack Turkey in the years before the war: in 1733 and 1735 when Tatar khans marched through Dagestan.¹⁴⁶ While these explanations portray Russia as awaiting the opportunity for war, Evgenii V. Anisimov suggests that the conflict emerged from nowhere, stating, “in the autumn of 1735, Russia, quite unexpectedly, recommenced the war against Turkey,” on hold since the Pruth campaign ended in 1711.¹⁴⁷ None of these explanations acknowledge that the two countries had remained on the brink of war nearly continuously throughout Anna Ivanovna’s reign. As we shall see

¹⁴³ For information on Rondeau, see the introduction.
¹⁴⁵ Davies, 184.
¹⁴⁶ Roider, Austria’s Eastern Question, 69.
below, avoiding war with Turkey preoccupied much of the court’s energies in the years before the outbreak of hostilities.

Other, often conflicting, explanations focus on the goals of individual statespersons. A. Lentin attributes the outbreak of hostilities to “French agitation at Constantinople,” but focuses on the motivations of individuals in Russia’s cabinet. The war supposedly represented a reversal of Osterman’s containment policy; he counseled Anna to avoid war but Biron and Munnich overruled him. Further, Lentin contends that “all three were confident of a lightning victory with Austrian help, which would avenge the Pruth disaster of 1711, sweep the Turks out of Europe, and revive the tarnished prestige of Anna and the German clique.”

Karl Roider, on the other hand, attributes the desire to attain the Black Sea’s northern coast to Osterman. Lavender Cassels reinforces this notion and also attributes careerism as a motivation for Munnich, portrays Biron as seeking to enhance Anna’s renown and to benefit himself, and Anna as desiring to debase the Turks. The religiously focused explanation for the war that opened this chapter, involving the glorification of Anna as restorer of Christianity to Constantinople, seems to derive from Munnich’s “Oriental Project.” Gregory Bruess points out, however, that Munnich did not formulate the plan until 1737, the second year of the war, based on initial military victories and Austria’s involvement. As we shall see below, individual statespersons’ aspirations and visions alone do not provide a comprehensive explanation for Russia’s pursuit of the war.

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Additionally, while many authors who discuss the Russo-Turkish War also describe events in Persia, including the pivotal threat of the Tatar Khan’s marching through Dagestan, those events are not integrated into a diplomatic-strategic context. Brian Davies does describe Russian opposition to the march of the Crimean Tatars through the Caucasus to assist Sultan Mahmud against the Persians and Nadir Khan, indicating that “sending armies to the Caucasus required that they cross Kabarda and Daghestan, and moving Tatar troops through Kabarda risked provoking war with Russia.” He explains that, though under the Treaty of Resht in 1732 Anna had “abandoned the occupied provinces along the southern Caspian, destroyed the Russian forts south of the Greben’, and pulled Russian forces back to the Terek River…” she still sought to protect Christians in the mountains of Kabarda and was not willing to give up that area to the Ottomans or Khanate. Davies also indicates that the Russians withdrew from Derbent in exchange for the ability to trade freely with Bukhara and India. As a long-term effect of the Russian presence in these territories, however, he claims, “although Peter’s Persian War brought Russia no lasting territorial gains in the Transcaspian it did serve as a precedent for later Russian imperial interest in the region, and it provided the Russian army with valuable experience in mountain warfare and joint operations with the fleet.” Though he mentions both trade and the need to counterbalance the Ottomans, those do not emerge as significant factors necessitating the Russo-Ottoman war.

152 Davies, 185.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid., 146.
155 Ibid., 147.
156 Alfred J. Rieber, similarly, does not mention the strategic value of maintaining Persia as a buffer in the context of the war in The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands – From the rise of Early Modern Empires to the End of the First World War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 379.
Though Alfred Rieber does not discuss these aims in conjunction with Anna Ivanovna’s strategy, we may view hers as a continuation of Peter I’s efforts to prevent the Turks from reoccupying the southern Caucasus, “cut[ting] off the Russian penetration of Iran, and jeopardiz[ing] Russia’s commercial and strategic position all along the Caucasian and Pontic frontiers.”157 Rieber indicates that though Russia lost western Azerbaijan and the Georgian kingdoms to the Ottomans with the 1724 Treaty of Constantinople, it maintained control of the south and west coasts of the Caspian.158 According to Galina M. Yemelianova, the Giandzi agreement of 1735 forced Russia to cede control of the Caspian to Iran. Though the Russians gave up Derbent, she indicates that they “managed to strengthen their positions in northern Dagestan by founding the Russian town of Kyzliar.”159 Further, Rieber indicates that Ghilan remained an important center of trade for Russia through the 1780s, suggesting that occupying it became less important than maintaining commerce.160 Rieber describes Zubov’s 1795 Caucasus campaign under Catherine II in the context of intervening on behalf of Georgia against Aga Muhammed Khan’s claims. Catherine sought to assist the Georgian king without alarming the Porte and her general “followed Peter the Great’s campaign trail along the Caspian coast as a way of demonstrating Russia’s interest in protecting its commercial interests and keeping the south Caucasus free from domination by either the Qajars or the Ottomans.”161 If we can attribute strategic and commerce-related motivations to Peter I and Catherine II, we can certainly recognize that Anna Ivanovna likely sought to maintain a similar buffer without the human and financial cost of occupying the Persian

157 Ibid., 378.
158 Ibid., 379.
159 Yemelianova, 47.
160 Rieber, 383.
161 Ibid.
territories. Though Crimean supply lines were difficult to maintain and the war took an enormous human toll, fighting in, and maintaining a presence in, the Persian territories would have proven much more expensive over the long run.

Jos J.L. Gommans’ emphasis on the importance of the Iranian silk trade to Russia over the eighteenth century bolsters the notion that Persia served as an important strategic buffer against the Ottoman Empire for economic reasons. During Peter’s reign, the Armenians of Julfa in suburban Isfahan received generous trading rights in Russia, maintaining a virtual monopoly on silk imports. Gommans estimates that by the middle of the century, “as much as one third of the total Iranian silk production was directed towards Moscow and the market towns of Central Europe.” He describes Russo-Iranian trade as increasing over the eighteenth century “partly as a result of the enormous growth of the Russo-Siberian silver output, and indicates, “after the eclipse of Safavid Iran the Julfa Armenians were increasingly replaced by their compatriots from northern Iran, Russia, and Central Europe.”162 This contention runs counter to work indicating that the emphasis on trade shifted toward the east, away from Astrakhan. Scott Levi suggests that attention turned to overland trade with Khiva and Bukhara through Orenburg due to Nadir Shah’s oppression of Amenian and Indian merchants, disrupting their activities Astrakhan.163 Arcadius Kahan, however, seems to associate the growth of Orenburg, Troisk and Semipalatinsk with Russia’s concerns over Chinese tensions.164 Yemelianova’s, Reiber’s and Gommans’ work strongly suggests that even if Russia promoted and developed Orenburg trade, Persia and the Caspian trade maintained

strategic value for Russia and it continued to derive benefit from Persia’s remaining a buffer zone.

Just as many historians point to the need to control the Black Sea as a primary cause of the war, that the Russians could keep Azov only as an unfortified town, and had to move their cargo in Turkish ships, emerge as the most-cited humiliating aspect as the Treaty of Belgrade that concluded the war in 1739.165 Some gains are also acknowledged. According to Brian Davies, in lieu of territory, the Russian army again and again vanquished Tatars and Ottomans with few losses, “exposed the vulnerability of the Ottoman fortress chains on the Dnestr and Bug as well as Dnepr and Don, the front-line Ottoman defenses in Pontic Europe,” and along with the Kalmyk Horde and Don Host, “greatly reduced the aggressive capabilities of the Crimean Khanate and the Kuban Horde.” Davies concludes that, after two centuries, Left Bank Ukraine and southern Russia had become nearly invulnerable to Crimean Tatar raids.166 Shaw sees advantages in the sultan’s becoming responsible for Tatar raids, and the Russians’ ability to trade within the Ottoman Empire and travel to holy places, enabling them to stir up Christians. Additionally, they maintained a strong military reputation in Europe, revealing that successors had capably continued to develop Peter I’s modernization. Finally, the efforts informed advances against the Ottomans later in the century.167 Though Davies mentions the reduction of the Crimean Khanate and Kuban Horde, who could go to Turkey’s aid in the Caucasus, no one mentions preventing Turkey from encroaching on the Caspian.


166 Davies, 241.

167 Shaw, 245.
While the chronology below contradicts many historiographic conceptions, one of the most flagrant is the notion that Russia and Austria began the war simultaneously and with a concerted plan. Peter F. Sugar notes, “Before Russia moved she came to an agreement with [the Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI] in Vienna, proof once more of how in the eighteenth century no great power felt secure to act on her own. After the conclusion of the alliance the Russians started hostilities in 1736….”168 Shaw presents a variation in this by indicating, “the way for war was paved by a territorial agreement between Russia and Austria, with the former to get the Crimea and Azov and the latter Bosnia and Herzegovina…Russia then sent an ultimatum to the sultan denouncing him for a long series of violations of the Treaty of Pruth…”169 Aleksandr Kamenskii repeats this refrain: “In 1735, the two allies entered into war against the Ottoman Empire, during which Russian Troops under the command of Munnich seized and ravaged the Crimea and won a number of striking victories along the Sea of Azov and Moldavia…”170 The diplomatic correspondence makes clear that Austria did not enter the war with Russia in 1735. The emperor could not enter into hostilities in 1736 because his troops were held up with the evacuation of the Spanish and French from territories he claimed during the War of the Polish Succession.171 Although the Austrians and Russians drafted an operational plan for 1737, well into the year the emperor continued to attempt to act as a mediator, even at the Congress of Niemero.172 As we shall see below, according to Rondeau’s recollection, it was Vienna’s lackluster performance in Hungary that provided

168 Sugar, 204.
169 Shaw, 244.
170 Kamenskii, 154.
171 Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obschestva Volume 80, 11.
172 Ibid., 219.
the Porte with the confidence to abandon the congress in July of 1737 and gamble on its ability to defeat Russia and Austria.  

The first phase of Russo-Turkish relations lasted from 1729 – 1732 and focused primarily on the balance among Persia, Turkey and Russia, especially in relation to Russia’s Persian territories. Rondeau repeatedly emphasized that Russia would not under any circumstances allow the Ottomans to control the Caspian for economic and strategic reasons: to allow the Russians to fend off the Tatars, Persians and Turks. The possibility of conflict between Turkey and Persia presented the specter of Russia’s having to take a side in that conflict or fight against both sides if they united to attack Russian conquests. Rondeau specifically reported worry that the Persians and Porte would unite to drive the Russians out of Ghilan so that the Ottomans could reclaim the silk trade. There was also conflict between Russia and Turkey over who could claim the allegiance of Tatar princes in territories that had been divided between the Porte and Persia – especially the Dagestan Tatars. 

During this period Russia continually feared, and intermittently prepared for, war with Turkey. At times the Russians worried about a joint attack from the Porte and Sweden, spurred by the British and French (before the British allied with Vienna in 1731) or the French alone. Diplomats either genuinely worried or liked to scaremonger, indicating that war with Turkey would make Russia unable to meet its treaty obligation to supply troops to Austria per the powers’ 1726 treaty. Meanwhile, through court conversation, Rondeau discerned Turkish concern over Russian actions that violated the Treaty of Pruth: marching troops into Poland and building forts on Turkish frontiers. In

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173 Ibid., 216.
174 For correspondence related to Turkey from 1729-1732, see Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obschchestva Volume 66.
1731 Russia began constructing a fortification line from the Don to the Orel to fend off the Budzi and Crimean Tatars, who served the Turks.

1733 marked a new phase in the categorization of Ottoman relations, which were now seen in the context of the Polish Succession crisis. As Rondeau reported on the Ottoman-Persian war, he considered it a relief to Turkey’s “European Neighbors,” who were glad to see the Porte distracted. Rondeau reported the concern that Stanislaus Lezhenski’s election would result in an alliance among Poland, Sweden, Turkey and France. In October, news that the Porte had no plans to attack prompted Russian willingness to supply the emperor with the 45,000 troops promised in the Austro-Russian treaty (though they would not agree to deploy them until the following March). In late December the Russian court received a letter from the Porte “expostulating” about Polish affairs, but news of continual Persian military success quelled their fears.

1734-35 was marked by the ongoing threat of war and disastrous British intervention into Russo-Ottoman diplomacy. The need to ensure that Turkey did not overtake Persia (and thus the Caspian) remained the Russian impetus to war. The Russian court felt sufficiently confident in Persia’s strength in early 1735 to give up control of its remaining Persian territories. However, Turkey soon attacked Persia, placing Russia on a war footing once again.

As 1734 began, Russia was reportedly in preparations to attack Turkey. By mid-March the prospect of an offensive war faded despite encouragement by the Persian ambassador. In July Britain and the States General undertook a mediating role in

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175 For correspondence related to Turkey in 1733, see *Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva* Volumes 66 and 76.
176 For correspondence related to Turkey in 1734, see *Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva* Volume 76.
Constantinople between the Porte and Russia in order to prevent open hostilities. The Russian court seemed reasonably content with this arrangement until late November, when it became clear that the actions of British resident, Lord Kinnoul, did more to foment conflict at the Porte than prevent a rupture. At the end of that month Osterman requested that George II recall Lord Kinnoul.¹⁷⁷

In 1735 tensions that had been simmering since at least 1729 brought the Ottoman Empire and Russia close to war.¹⁷⁸ First, news in late January that the Ottomans did not plan to attack Russia, and thus it was no longer necessary to keep so many troops on Turkish borders, relieved the court. In May Rondeau reported that Anna felt sufficiently reassured that the Persians had enough strength to prevent the Ottomans from taking over any of the remaining territory in Russian control, and therefore had agree to relinquish them. In late June developments in Persia led to the most urgent talk yet of war between Turkey and Russia. News from Constantinople revealed that the Turks would attack the Persians in the areas the Russian court believed secure, requesting that a Crimean Tatar khan send an army through Persian territory to join the Turks. Though the Russians had received assurances from the Porte that the Tatar khan and his men would not cause harm to Russian subjects as they passed near their dominions, Osterman said directly to Rondeau that Anna would never allow the Turks to settle on the Caspian, and declared the same to the ambassadors from Poland and Vienna. Rondeau opined that Anna would never have relinquished the remaining Persian territories to the Persians had she believed the Ottomans would attack. The Russians dispatched soldiers to remain on watch in case

¹⁷⁸ For correspondence related to Turkey in 1735, see *Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obschestva* Volume 76.
the Tatar khan began his march toward Dagestan. The issue that the Turks raised in 1729, regarding the Russians inappropriately courting the allegiance of the Dagestan Tatars, came up again as Osterman declared “ancient privileges” over them and complained that the Turks would attempt to control them if they were allowed to take over Dagestan. Late in the year Russian troops evacuated Persia, leading Rondeau to believe that the Tatar khan would not pass through Dagestan that year. He assumed, due to the number of troops they were amassing in the Ukraine, that the Russians would attack Turkey in the spring. In August, the disruptive Lord Kinnoul was finally recalled by London.

Throughout the first months of 1736, the Russians attempted to discover the Tatar’s khan’s movements. By late February the Tatar Khan had turned back toward the Crimea, Tachmas Kuli Khan had taken command of the Dagestan Tatars in Derbent, and Turkey engaged in massive war preparations. The Russians indicated that they planned to attack in late March; after hostilities began there was still an opportunity to avoid full-blown war with Turkey. However, all sides played a waiting game. With Turkey and Persia still engaged Russia did not want to settle with the Turks for fear that Persia would also; Osterman was convinced that the Porte would attack immediately upon making peace with Persia. Emperor Charles VI of Austria faced difficulty freeing up troops as the French and Spaniards slowly evacuated the Italian territories he had acquired in the just-completed War of the Polish Succession. Vienna did not enter the war with Russia in 1736 and offended the court by attempting to mediate on behalf of Russia and the Turks rather than behave as Russia’s ally. The Russians would have

179 For correspondence related to Turkey in 1736, see Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obschestva Volumes 76 and 80.
preferred that the emperor admit he could not honor his commitment to supply troops rather than stall and act as an arbitrator; those who rationalized the defensive alliance with the emperor as necessary to securing a reliable ally against Turkey now had little basis for defending Vienna. Britain’s tepid diplomatic efforts also irked the Russian court. Before it would enter into peace negotiations, Russia insisted on receiving proposals from the Porte to redress all of the harm perpetrated along its borders. Russia did not think Britain insisted on these terms forcefully enough. Additionally, the court resented the efforts of the States General, Austria and Britain to generate proposals out of Vienna rather than through St. Petersburg. Not until late August would Anna order Osterman to draft conditions for peace. Subsequent to Munnich’s retreat from the Crimea in October, and internal tumult in Persia, Turkey sought to bring France and Sweden into negotiations to counterbalance the preponderance of nations it viewed as Russia’s allies. After months of communication regarding Turkish and Russian requirements for a meeting on the frontiers, in December Britain approved a back-channel plan suggested by Rondeau that would allow the Porte to save face by not submitting to Russia’s desire to propose peace conditions directly. Meanwhile, the Persians had reportedly negotiated peace with the Turkey. While Anna directed the Russian envoy at Vienna to collaborate on a plan for spring military operations, Biron complained that the emperor would not threaten to attack the Ottomans if they did not make peace with Russia that winter. Russia ended the year dissatisfied with its allies.

Much of 1737 revolved around conditions for meeting on the frontiers and the eventual Congress of Niemeroff, which met July through October.\textsuperscript{180} The congress failed

\textsuperscript{180} For correspondence related to Turkey from 1737, see Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva Volume 80.
when Vienna’s belated and unsuccessful military operations bolstered Turkish confidence. Much of the correspondence for the rest of the year focused on efforts to reconvene a congress.

The 1738 correspondence revolved primarily around the struggle for control of mediation with the Porte. Vienna’s desire to place mediation with the Porte in the hands of France alone, without the input of the maritime powers, would leave Russia without intermediaries by the year’s end. While the emperor insisted on France’s participation in mediation, Russia agreed to it only on the condition that the Dutch and British would also mediate. Vienna applied considerable pressure to no avail and eventually consented to the maritime powers’ inclusion. In May it became clear that the Porte would not consent to assembling a second peace congress as it ignored the letters from the Dutch and British residents on the subject. A victory at the Perecop in July did not diminish Russia’s strong desire for peace. The Russian court hoped that additional Russian and imperial victories might make the Porte ready to negotiate. In September Rondeau reported that a French courier from Constantinople communicated directly to Munnich that Turkey would settle if Anna returned Kinburn and Oczakof and razed Azov’s fortifications. Additionally, the emperor would need to satisfy the Protestant Transylvanian rebel Rakotzy. Meanwhile, in October irritation over the emperor’s paltry troop deployment in Hungary led Rondeau to surmise that the Russo-Austrian alliance might rupture. While the emperor had encouraged the Porte to take advantage of Dutch and British efforts in Constantinople, the French envoy eventually excluded the British and Dutch residents entirely from negotiations with Vienna’s knowledge. In November,

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181 For correspondence related to Turkey in 1738, see ibid.
in order to preserve their dignity, both Britain and Holland removed negotiating powers from their envoys at Constantinople.

In 1739 most of the diplomatic correspondence focused on renewing negotiations with the Porte through the British and Dutch residents in Constantinople. The Grand Vizier’s deposition in March provided a new opportunity for reconciliation and Russia secretly allowed the French sole control of the mediation.

After Munnich’s successes in early September led the Russians to believe they could drive Turkey to retreat, on September 11 Rondeau reported that Anna had raised forty thousand recruits. Then, on September 15 he indicated that an estafette had revealed that the emperor made a separate peace with the Porte. Vienna sent news on the 29th that Russia’s peace had been signed on the 18th. On October 13, after Rondeau’s untimely death, his secretary Bell reported that Anna had given full negotiating powers to the French envoy at Constantinople, Villeneuve. By the end of October the Treaty of Belgrade had been ratified.

As we have seen, in the years leading up to the war, the threat of a rupture with the Ottomans remained almost constant and the British diplomats at the Russian court repeatedly reported on the Russians’ need to prevent the Ottoman Empire from gaining control of the Caspian. Due to amicable relations with the Persians, the ability to trade in Persia duty free without the expense and difficulty of maintaining a garrison, and confidence that the Persians could fend off Turkey, in 1735 Russia ceded the few territories remaining of those Peter the Great’s soldiers had claimed in the 1720s. The Porte then rapidly attacked Persia, alarming the Russian court. Russia sought to prevent a Crimean Tatar Khan from crossing through Dagestan to Turkey’s aid; the ability to claim

182 For correspondence related to Turkey in 1738, see ibid.
the allegiance of the Dagestan Tatars emerged as a contentious issue in 1729 and 1736. According to the British correspondence, this march was the initial cause of hostilities in 1735, and in 1736 the indication that Turkey planned to attack Russia if the Persians surrendered put Russia on the offensive.

A survey of religious language as it related to the Russo-Turkish war reveals that it emerged from the British Northern Department rather than St. Petersburg. In February of 1735 Lord Harrington made two references to the “Christian powers.” First, he simply indicated that the resident in Constantinople assured the British court that “the Turks” would “not break out at least this year with any of the christian powers. . .”\(^{183}\) The following week, Harrington wrote regarding a Swedish envoy who had opposed the Russians in Poland and whose assignment to the Porte the Russians wanted to block. When describing the justification he would send to the resident in Stockholm to block the envoy, Harrington wrote that the resident should emphasize that his appointment would upset Anna, “since he was so active and zealous a person in the affairs of Poland while he continued in that kingdom, and may from the same principles fall in with those who are ready to animate the turks against the christian powers on that side, which His Majesty takes all the pains he can to prevent.”\(^{184}\) Thus, Britain and Sweden were not united to defend the Protestant interest. Rather, Britain sought to assist Russia in preventing the Swedish envoy from joining parties who sought to agitate the Porte against its Christian neighbors, Russia and Austria.

Rondeau would occasionally send descriptions of populations unfamiliar to the British court whose protection was a matter of dispute between Turkey and Russia. In

\(^{183}\) *Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obschestva* 76, 363.  
\(^{184}\) Ibid., 366.
April of 1736 he wrote about the Saporog Cossacks since they might be unfamiliar to the “Christian world”: “They profess the greek religion, and when they were under the protection of the turks, the patriarch of Constantinople furnished them with priests; but since these two years that they are under the protection of the Czarina, their priests are sent them by the archbishop of Kioff. They have only one church, which is served by an abbot and a few priests...”

In August of 1735 he wrote about Crimean khans: “twenty two sovereignties or khans are mahometans, and the Crim tartar khan pretends they are under his protection, which this court denies, and is a continual occasion of disputes between the russ and the turks.”

Rondeau provided these descriptions for whatever usefulness of knowledge they would provide to the king, however, he does not frame them as causes of the current war.

In addition to explaining the situations of specific populations, Rondeau reported on religious/national communities encountered through the course of hostilities. In June of 1736 when relaying news of Munnich’s taking the town of Kozolov, he indicated that the town was “a place of great trade, having a good harbour,” where there were, “a great many greeks and armeniens, and some jesuits; the latter are retired to Constantinople.”

In July of 1737 Field Marshal Lacy reported that a prince he had taken prisoner indicated that the Crimean khan had held an assembly at the Perecop in order to debate whether to submit to Anna, “since they found the Ottoman Porte was not at present in a condition to protect them against the russ. We shall soon hear, my lord, if the tartars take that

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185 *Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obschestva* 80, 503
186 *Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obschestva* 76, 432.
187 In contrast, Lindsey Hughes emphasizes the religious justification for Russia’s Crimean campaign under the regent Sophia in 1686. See *Sophia, Regent of Russia: 1657-1704* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 197.
188 *Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obschestva* 80, 530.
resolution; but as all those people are mahometans, few can yet persuade themselves, that they will submit to the Russ till the last extremity.” While Rondeau does not portray the Christians as in any way grateful for the Russians’ suzerainty, Crimean Tatar Muslims are portrayed as unwilling to submit to an Orthodox sovereign. Again, conversion and liberation are not revealed as motivations.

Finally, Rondeau reported on religious court ceremony associated with victories over Turkey and the Tatars. In June of 1736 when Russians took over Perecop, “the cannon of the citadel and admiralty were fired by the Czarina's order two hours after the arrival of the courier, and Her Majesty went to the church in the citadel to return god thanks for the great advantages her arms have gained over the tartars.” When Azov surrendered in July of the same year, “the cannon of the ctitadel and admiralty were fired, and Her Majesty went to the great church, where a Te Deum was sung.” In August of 1737, “Her Czarish Majesty went to church with a great train to return thanks to God for the good success of her arms over the infidels. All the great guns of the citadel and admiralty were fired.” Although Rondeau chose the word “infidel,” we can assume that Russian court’s victories over Muslims held special significance. Though Rondeau reported Anna’s visits to church in relation to a variety of other celebrations, no specific battle during the War of the Polish Succession merited a special church visit (or a report on one). Thus, the religious dimension of the conflict was to some degree integrated into court culture.

189 Ibid., 175.
190 Ibid., 518.
191 Ibid., 532.
192 Ibid., 197-98.
Though the court identified against its Muslim adversary, overall Rondeau’s dispatches counterbalance other sources that amplify Munnich’s “Oriental Project.” We saw above that Bruess indicated that Munnich generated the vision based on experiences on the ground. Rondeau’s reports support this notion of the generals’ encountering local Christian populations and the overall conflict between Turkey and Russia over the allegiance and protection of Orthodox communities. Comparing these religious issues with the need to control the Caucasus and Caspian for strategic purposes, however, diminishes their importance as a causative explanation.

If Russia could have claimed the Crimea, controlled the Black Sea, and reclaimed Constantinople, it would have gained glory and riches. Protecting against Tatar incursions was clearly necessary, as the Crimean and Budzi Tatars had caused enough concern to prompt the construction of a fortification line in 1731. Ensuring that the Ottomans could not disrupt the buffer zone maintained by the Persians and commandeer Caspian trade, however, were also compelling reasons to do battle against Ottoman allies on the Pontic Steppe and in the Crimea. The Russians were still able to benefit from trade originating in Persia and abandonment of the Persian possessions relieved the military servitors who complained of the difficult climate, unreliable supply lines, and massive human toll. Additionally, the expense of maintaining the Persian presence was prohibitive. Thus, the Russians knew how difficult it would have been to assist the Persians in their dominions relative to the battlefields the Russians chose. Further, whereas the issue of the Persian buffer zone remained constant, Rondeau did not mention Russia’s desire to overtake the Crimea until 1735. While religion clearly informed the court’s perception of its victories, and may have contributed to personal motivations, the
correspondence does not reveal them as long-standing motivations for war. Clearly, we should consider the British diplomatic correspondence, and what it reveals about the Russo-Persian-Ottoman balance, when considering Russia’s motivations for going to war against Turkey in 1736.


Conclusion

We have seen that generally in Europe, and specifically in Russia, confessional strife remained divisive into the 1730s. Additionally, both the cultural “Westernization” that occurred under Peter, and the “Germanization” under Anna Ivanovna exhibited Lutheran features. Peter’s top theologian and propagandist, Feofan Prokopovitch, whose Lutheran leanings attracted so much criticism, was restored to prominence in Anna’s reign after persecution under Peter II. Further, Anna’s court culture reinforced acceptance of Lutheranism while actively ridiculing Catholicism. The integration of elites from Baltic regions annexed during the Great Northern War, who kept their own church and legal/cultural institutions, largely explains the acceptance of Lutheranism. The elite cultural “westernization” that occurred during this time can be considered confessionalized westernization. Finally, in discussing “Germans” in Russia, scholars should make an effort to distinguish among foreign servitors and elites from integrated lands, as referring to them generally as “German” elides important differences.

While religious conflict held the potential to incite Catholics, Protestants and the Orthodox throughout Europe, statespersons did not make decisions about war and peace based on religious factors. Though religion was used to inflame passions, especially through the publication of pamphlets, and seems to have been extraordinarily important to people of all confessions, it did not unite heads of state. Protecting Orthodox and Protestant dissidents in Poland did not motivate Russia’s or Britain’s actions in the War of the Polish Succession. Further, while Anna may have held special church services to celebrate victories over the “infidel” “Turks,” the diplomatic correspondence does not reflect any efforts to unite Christian powers in a crusade. Similar to the language about
the “Protestant Interest,” references to “Christian Powers” come across as obligatory turns of phrase. Further, that Munnich developed his “Oriental Project” after securing victories and encountering Christians who sought Russia’s protection, supports the notion that territorial, strategic and economic concerns outweighed any fantasy about reclaiming Constantinople.

In the case of Russia’s war against Turkey from 1736-39, the need to keep a Persian buffer zone on the Caspian to maintain trade was an important motivation for exterminating Crimean Tatars. Eliminating populations sympathetic to the Ottoman Empire who could come to its aid in the Caucasus seems very likely to have increased the security of the Persian buffer zone, in addition to reducing incursions into Russian territory. Though the Russians may have preferred more advantageous Black Sea and Crimean gains, we can consider the maintenance of Caspian interests an important goal.

Finally, we saw that the “backward” “Old Rus” nobility did not prevent Russia from entering into a formal commercial agreement with Britain before 1734. British and Russian factional divisions and geostrategic considerations made it impossible for formal relations to resume until Jacobite hopes for a British invasion were quelled, the Schleswig/Holstein issue was resolved, and Britain reconciled with Russia’s primary ally, Austria. That Russia did not gain its much sought-after defensive alliance as part of the commercial treaty was not a diplomatic failure, a manifestation of one “German” statesman’s strategy winning out over another’s, or Russia’s dependence on Britain. Rather, in exchange for the ratification of the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734, Britain and the States General negotiated the evacuation of the pretender to the throne during the War of the Polish Succession, allowing Russia to remove its troops from
Poland and deploy them to assist the emperor. Britain’s alliance with Austria made it useful to the Russians during that period, whereas later in the reign it was Britain who desperately sought a defensive alliance with Russia and was repeatedly rebuffed.

While remaining narrow in its temporal focus, this work has challenged historiographic perspectives that obfuscate key aspects of Anna Ivanovna’s reign. Future work will integrate examinations of seventeenth-century cultural and confessional westernization and elite integration, continuity and change in the religious rhetoric justifying anti-Turkish alliances among European powers, trade and imperial expansion, and discussion of the ways in which reimagining Anna’s reign shifts our perceptions of eighteenth-century Russian foreign policy and diplomatic relations.
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