Absorbed self: Investigations of consciousness

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WILDERNESS SOLITUDE:
The Sacred Will-of-the-Land

by

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B.S. University of Washington, 1980

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of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Interdisciplinary Studies
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The central theme of this thesis is that the wilderness characteristic -- solitude -- represents the sacred foundation for an emerging "will-of-the-land" philosophy. That wilderness solitude is the "Sacred Will-of-the-Land," contests the traditional agency interpretation of the concept and requires a more primal-religious-philosophic explication for this cosmology (cf. prologue). Hence, this thesis is intended to speak both to a religion and a philosophy of wilderness. Contemporary scholars -- e.g., Nash (1982), Hendee, Stankey & Lucas (1978), Tuan (1974), Graber (1976) and others have largely ignored the deeper religious and philosophic investigations of primal peoples attitudes, views and values of wilderness. These scholars project the imperialism of anthropocentrism -- i.e., human chauvinism -- onto primal peoples and conclude that, for example, "wilderness had no counterpart in the old world" and that "if paradise was man's greatest good, wilderness, its antipode was his greatest evil" (Nash 1982). This view is in error as evidenced by Chapters IV -- "Nature Awe: Celtic Views of Wildness" -- and III -- "Will-of-the-Land: Wilderness Among Early Indo-Europeans." Wilderness as the cognate for "sacred grove" and other traditional "wildland sanctuaries" reserved for sacred principles, literally derivates as "will-of-the-land," thereby implying a complex religious-philosophic nature ethos. Furthermore, solitude, in origin and meaning, breaks down to "soul" and "mood," hence implying the sublime and the solemn which are characteristic of the sacred (cf. Chapter II). These derivations for wilderness solitude -- the "Sacred Will-of-the-Land" -- impart an understanding of the deeper underlying principles which are manifest in the wild condition and are inherent to religious and philosophic acknowledgements. Such references are the quick of primal peoples' sacred insights into principal (that which manifests in agent form) and Principle (that which creates and underlies as motive) force which is the locus of the Algonkians' Kitchi Manitou concept and the early Indo-European "wildness in principle" (cf. Chapter IV). Out of this primal understanding, we can discern a clearer picture of will (wild) and rationalism (cf. Chapter V) which should in turn further our sacred-ethical relations with the Will-of-the-Land.
In 1979, I was employed as a professional wilderness specialist (outdoor recreation planner and forester) for the Rock Springs District, Bureau of Land Management, USDI. At this time, we were conducting wilderness reviews of the public lands at the mandate of the 1976 Federal Land Policy and Management Act. During this review, I became very concerned over the wilderness review criteria and began investigating it in a more conceptual manner. Subsequently in 1980, I began graduate studies at the University of Montana with the intent of explicating wilderness solitude. The breadth of this topic became apparent in the second year of my studies and in the fall 1982, my committee met deciding that I should narrow the specific focus. Consequently, we agreed to focus upon the sacred cosmological ideals of wilderness solitude. Hence, the present format is fundamentally a product of my Religious Studies training and scholarship.

In this endeavor, I would like to make several acknowledgements of gratitude. To the wilderness in manifesting the will-of-the-land where I've found myself, in my soul a primary wilderness. Despite difficulties with the BLM, USDI, I am indebted to it for my professional experiences in reviewing potential wilderness areas and for further kindling my interest in the wilderness solitude concept. That this thesis begins to reconcile other professionals' understanding of the wilderness criteria as specified by the 1964 Wilderness Act, I am pleased to hold no malice
or ill feelings towards the BLM, and my former colleagues -- both supervisors and professional peers.

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The purpose of this thesis is the study of solitude as it relates to wilderness. Although the 1964 Wilderness Act mandated that opportunities for solitude exist in wilderness, it failed to conceptualize and define this solitude condition. Wilderness professionals and public land managers consequently have found themselves employing contradictory notions of solitude in their attempts to assess its quality and quantity in wilderness and potential wilderness areas (during, for example, R.A.R.E, R.A.R.E. II and the BLM wilderness review process). Solitude assessment has by no means been an easy task, primarily because it lacked an adequate application formula. This is because there has been no clear understanding of the concept of solitude itself. For example, during the 1979 Bureau of Land Management (USDI) Wilderness Review, one district manager suggested that he had no idea whatsoever of the meaning and application of the solitude concept in wilderness. (1) His lack of understanding forced him to conclude that he could find solitude in a closet and he rhetorically asked "why are we looking for it [solitude] in all these wide-open spaces?" Of course, solitude in a closet is artificial and something very different from that characteristic to "wide-open spaces" or other wilderness settings. Solitude in a closet lacks whatever it is that stimulates the "wilderness experience." In another case, a 1980 guest lecturer at the University of Montana stated that he could not understand the wilderness
solitude concept, but that he did find solitude at his own breakfast table each morning. These amusing but high-handed dismissals of the validity of solitude as one of the characteristics of wilderness may be allayed with this explicit analysis of the concept's meaning.

That public land management agencies (Forest Service -- USDA; Park Service, Fish & Wildlife Service and the Bureau of Land Management -- USDI; and similar agencies of several states) identify wilderness solitude is a matter of recent legal history. While large acreages of de facto wilderness remained in North America following the European invasion and domination of the continent, it was only during the late 19th century that serious concern became manifest for wilderness preservation. At first, National Parks were the principal wilderness preserved (cf. Huth 1972: ch. 9, 148-164; also Nash 1982: ch.7, 108-121; and Hendee, Stankey & Lucas 1978: 30-33). During this call for wilderness preservation, much was written by romantic and transcendental philosophers, but no clear, rationally reasoned definition of wilderness appeared. Thus, the National Parks were established with vague conceptions of wilderness and its characteristics.

Following the National Parks precedent, specifically detailed wilderness formulations began to occur for the National Forests (cf. Nash 1982: ch. 12, 200-236; also Hendee, et al 1978: 30-33). In the 1920's, the Forest Service started by establishing a series of wilderness designations known as "primitive areas." Forest Service researchers (Hendee, et al 1978:33) have called this move by their agency "the first steps toward the explicit identification of wilderness
as a specific recreational resource and the development of appropriate management techniques." This action by the Forest Service was formulated on a first attempt to qualify wilderness character. Writing in 1921, forester Aldo Leopold posited that a primitive area ideally should be "a continuous stretch of country preserved in its natural state, open to lawful hunting and fishing, big enough to absorb a 2-week pack trip, and kept devoid of roads, artificial trails, cottages, or other works of man." (Hendee, et al 1978:35) Leopold was subsequently successful in convincing the Chief of the Forest Service to formulate a regulation (known as L-20) establishing primitive areas, which were defined as "areas managed to maintain primitive conditions of environment, transportation, habitation, and subsistence, with a view to conserving the value of such areas for the purposes of public education and recreation." (Hendee, et al 1978:61) Weak in character, the L-20 regulation was replaced in the 1930's by more substantive wilderness formulations known as the U regulations. The U regulations were influenced by Robert Marshall who was the chief of the Division of Recreation and Lands in the Forest Service. These regulations began to broaden the purpose of American wilderness preservation and specify more of its character. Under the U-regulations three wildland use designations were specified. These designations included wilderness areas -- "tracts of land not less that 100,000 acres;" wild areas -- "tracts of land between 5,000 and 100,000 acres;" and roadless areas which "were to be managed principally for recreation use 'substantially in their natural condition.'" (Hendee, et al 1978:62-63)."

Solitude as a character trait of wilderness is legally first
acknowledged with the introduction and passage of the Wilderness Act (in the 1950's & early 60's). In identifying wilderness areas as places having "outstanding opportunities for solitude" [Sec. 2(c)(a) 1964 Wilderness Act], Howard Zahnizer (the principal author of the Act) appears to be acknowledging the romantic and transcendental philosophies which make solitude (in its sublime and solemn corollaries) so much an ideal of wilderness.

Subsequent agency interpretations of the 1964 Wilderness Act have failed to acknowledge solitude in its romantic and transcendental ideal as it characterizes the sublime and solemn quality of wilderness. Their avoidance of these historical precedents -- to solitude -- as established in the Romantic and Transcendental Movements is patently manifest in agency wilderness review criteria.(4) Initially three Federal agencies were directed to conduct public land reviews for wilderness suitability. The lands and agencies involved were the National Forests administered by the Forest Service, USDA; the National Parks administered by the Park Service, and the National Wildlife Refuges administered by the Fish & Wildlife Service, both of the USDI. Subsequently, several states passed wilderness legislation and required their appropriate land management agencies to review and study suitable state administered lands for wilderness suitability. Finally, the most recent authorization for wilderness review appears as the mandate of the Bureau of Land Management (USDI) in the 1976 Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). That legal wilderness review mandates were given to public land management agencies fosters a responsibility onto such agencies for interpreting historical and legal wilderness
precedents for the purpose of conceptualizing suitable wilderness review criteria [legally respectful of sec. 2 (c) definition of wilderness, 1964 Wilderness Act]. With regard to wilderness solitude, what has been the approach and product of agency wilderness criteria formulations?(5) Two USDI agencies -- the National Park Service and the Fish & Wildlife Service -- appear to have taken a laissez faire approach when conceptualizing wilderness review criteria. Both agencies in reviewing potential wilderness areas concluded that areas meeting the size and naturalness criteria of the 1964 Wilderness Act automatically possessed outstanding opportunities for solitude unless otherwise proven. This approach appears to accept fundamental premises of historical arguments for the preservation of wilderness as voiced by the Romantic and Transcendental Movements.(6) In contrast, the criteria established by the USDA - Forest Service, and the USDI - BLM have generated substantial controversy and deserve close scrutiny.

The Forest Service began wilderness review with a process entitled Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE). In this initial endeavor, a wilderness quality index was developed based on ratings of scenic value, isolation potential, and variety of available recreational experiences. This wilderness quality index (WQI) was severely criticized for its conceptual and methodological weakness and inconsistent application. Critiques of the WQI and general public disapproval of the initial RARE process led the Forest Service to formulate a second method -- the Wilderness Attribute Rating System (WARS) -- for conducting a second Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE II). Very little pertinent information concerning the nature of wilderness solitude can be obtained
from the RARE I WQI because it failed to acknowledge the characteristic as defined in the 1964 Wilderness Act. That it posited "isolation potential" as a criterion for candidate wilderness areas demonstrates a solitariness interpretation for the solitude concept as it relates to wilderness. This interpretation appears weak and shallow in lieu of an etymological derivation for the solitude conceptual disposition. (cf. Ch. 2) The WARS system of RARE II is more specific in formulating wilderness solitude criteria. WARS attempts to determine outstanding opportunities for solitude identifying the following components for basing an evaluative rating:

size of area, topographic screening, vegetative screening, distance from perimeter to core, human intrusions, scaled as to their degree of impact on opportunity for solitude (USFS, WARS 1977:7)

The Forest Service based this interpretation of wilderness solitude upon a narrowly constricted definition which posits that

Solitude is defined as being isolated from the sights, sounds, and presence of others and from the developments and evidence of man. Solitude is a psychological state that varies form one individual to another -- what is a crowd to one person may be solitude to another. However, the issue is not one of defining the relative human density levels of each area; that can be changed by management. Instead, the rating system focuses on those intrinsic features of the roadless areas that offer users outstanding opportunities for solitude -- size of the area, presence of vegetation, topographic screening, and so forth. (USFS, WARS 1977:27)

While the Forest Service continues in its WARS manual to qualify the "intrinsic features" which it identifies with opportunities for solitude, these are not necessary for the purposes of this thesis presentation. Moreover, the core concern of this thesis is the formulation and conceptualization of the initial definition -- i.e., definition in principle -- of the wilderness solitude condition. Thus,
the preceding Forest Service formulation provides and adequate basis for considering the agency's approach to conceptualizing wilderness solitude. Before assessing the Forest Service formulation, it is logical to present the consistently similar formulation of the BLM.

Like the Forest Service, the BLM had difficulty distinguishing between opportunities for solitude or primitive and unconfined recreation. The BLM posits that

In most cases, the two opportunities could be expected to go hand-in-hand. However, the outstanding opportunity for solitude may be present in an area offering only limited primitive recreational potential. Also an area may be so attractive for recreation use that it would be difficult to maintain opportunity for solitude. Examples are around lakes or other bodies of water. In summary, an inventory unit must provide and be managed to maintain an outstanding opportunity for an individual to experience either solitude or a nonmotorized and nondeveloped type of recreation. [USDI-BLM, Wilderness Inventory Handbook (WIH) 1978:13]

Furthermore, the BLM concluded that it was essential to define both "outstanding" and "opportunity" as a means of measuring solitude,

-- Outstanding: Standing out among others of its kind; conspicuous; prominent. Superior to others of its kind; distinguished; excellent.

-- Opportunity: An appropriate or favorable time or occasion. A situation or condition favorable for attainment of a goal. (cf. WIH 1978:13)

In ongoing research, I have extracted and logically ordered the basic quality indices -- definition, traits, determination, considerations and constraints -- which the BLM formulated for wilderness solitude.

1. Definition -- The WIH (1978:13) explains that dictionaries define solitude as: "the state of being alone or remote from others; isolation. A lonely or secluded place."

2. Traits -- "Factors or elements influencing solitude may include size, natural screening, and ability of the user to find a secluded spot. It is the combination of these and similar
elements upon which an overall solitude determination will be made." (WIH 1978:13)

3. **Determination** -- "Determine whether or not the area has outstanding opportunities for solitude. This is not an easy determination to make and good judgments will be required. In making this determination, consider factors which influence solitude only as they affect a person's opportunity to avoid the sights, sounds and evidence of other people in the inventory unit." (WIH 1978:13)

Cf. "In evaluating solitude, refer to the definition on page 13 [WIH 1978:13]. The intent was to evaluate the opportunities that a person has to avoid the sights, sounds, and evidence of other people in the same unit, rather than to evaluate opportunity for solitude in comparison to habitations of man [Organic Act Directive #78-61, Change 3, item 1.f(3)(pp.2-3) & OAD#78-61, Change 2, item 3.e. (p.7)]."

4. **Considerations** -- "It may be difficult, for example, to avoid the sights and sounds of people in a flat open area unless it is relatively large. A small area, however, may provide opportunities for solitude if, due to topography or vegetation, visitors can screen themselves from one another." (WIH 1978:13)

5. **Constraints** -- "It is erroneous to assume that simply because a unit or portion of a unit is flat and/or unvegetated, it automatically lacks an outstanding opportunity for solitude. It is also incorrect to automatically conclude that simply because a unit is relatively small, it does not have an outstanding opportunity for solitude. Consideration must be given to the interrelationship between size, screening, configuration, and other factors that influence solitude [OAD#78-61, Change 3, item 1.f.(3)(pp.3-4)]."

There are logical problems inherent to both of these agencies' assessment procedures for determining wilderness solitude. Moreover, the definitions and procedures posited by each agency constitute serious errors; they are both categorically mistaken and allegorically misconceived which subsequently results in qualitative and quantitative deception. Categorically, that isolation should constitute the total meaning of wilderness solitude, implies that solitude itself is derivative of isolation. While isolation may be a condition
contributing to solitude, it is a categorial mistake to present solitude as a product of isolation. In the isolation definition there is a mistaken tendency to universally conceptualize solitude as a state of being alone, removed from others. This mistake denies the solitude concept its wilderness relationship (cf. Chapter II). Thus, the categorial mistake compounds error and results in allegorical misconception with its failure to connect with all of the solitude concept's relational meanings. The error debases and dishonors the spirit of the wilderness solitude concept. In this way, agency solitude definitions are qualitatively incorrect and thereby impoverished.

Furthermore, these errors are compounded in quantitative deception. First, the agencies use the wrong category a mistake which is non-symbolic of motive principle or conceptual meaning and thereby without qualification. In establishing quantifiable parameters -- such as, "size of area, topographic & and vegetative screening, etc. -- the agencies are masking the disposition of wilderness solitude. Moreover, the agencies posit qualitative isolation conditions which are recognizable, in order to claim objectivity, while failing to provide quantitative standards and procedures by which to measure these. Yet, they claim objective quantification. WARS and BLM wilderness inventory guidelines specify features which are of an objective material nature but offer only qualitative ratings for their assessment while claiming to substantiate quantification. This deception is evident in recognizing the ability to quantify qualitative features or conditions associated with the isolation definition. For example, a cartographer can identify physical screening from a topographic map and delineate
those areas which qualify in offering opportunities for isolation. This
is a relatively simple task which is easily quantifiable -- i.e.,
objectively one might conclude from the cartographer's assessment that
\( \underline{X} \) percent of the area offers topographic screening suitable for
isolation. Similarly vegetative screening analysis may be objectified,
as well as core dimensions, etc. Thus in their failure to develop
objectifiable quantification the agencies foster quantitative
deception which is mere illusionary qualification that selects against
their allegorically misconceived features of conditions.

Mindful of these fundamental errors, how ought we factor out the
distinctions, meanings and values associated with wilderness
solitude?(7) The 1964 Wilderness Act reflects a rich heritage of values
which have evolved over many years though a diverse array of minds.
Acknowledging this condition, legal analyst Michael McCloskey (1966)
comments on the background and meaning of the wilderness legislation:

The evolution [of the 1964 Wilderness Act] has blended many
political, religious and cultural meanings into deeply felt personal
convictions . . . Those who administer that law must look to these
convictions to understand why the law exists.

The legal reality which this law (the 1964 Wilderness Act) represents
should be viewed in proper context and it is this context which provides
a basis for factoring out the definition in principle of wilderness
solitude.

In the complex web that is societal values, we are dependent upon
moral mandates for fostering the social interest. Such mandates are
properly acknowledged as law. But what is the foundation for law?
Legal formulations are intended to secure equality and justice for the
social interest. In principle, the law thus reflects the moral imperative which is the ethos of a people. The foundation of law then is necessarily dependent upon an ethical formulation. Ethical formulations reflect deeper principles which ought themselves to constitute the realm of the sacred. It is in this context that a law such as the 1964 Wilderness Act emerges. We, therefore, must begin factoring out the distinctions, meanings and values inherent to the 1964 Wilderness Act by investigating the culture's sacred ethos which is itself the province of religious studies. Hence the sacred origins are the central focus for this explication of wilderness solitude.

These sacred origins of wilderness solitude are linguistically the product of Indo-European culture. Mindful of this cultural relativism where ought this explication begin? Do we begin with Medieval World views, or with the sacred traditions and cosmologies of primal Europe? Historically the Medieval ethos is largely the product of Christian influence and Christianity itself is a hybridization of several mid-east cults (Coulton 1964: 10-11) with the pagan heathenism of primal Europe. In many ways, this Christian hybridization is itself a profanation of the European pagan heathen traditions which are largely earth or ecologically centered whereas Christianity is primarily an abstract humanist tradition extolling a human chauvinism. In order to gain proper insight into the conceptual origins of wilderness solitude, we
must, therefore examine the primal European traditions which generated the concept.
CHAPTER I

NATURE AWE: Celtic Views of Wildness*

The traditional theme of sacred natural places, free from desecration by humans and their technology, is an ancient land ideal. These sacred natural places were wilderness in the deepest sense. Contemporary scholarship, however, implies that only members of our modern cultures can appreciate such wilderness. Wilderness historian Roderick Nash (1982), for example, suggests that "wilderness had no counterpart in the old world" and that "if paradise was man's greatest good, wilderness, its antipode, was his greatest evil." The implication is that wilderness is "instinctively understood as something alien to man - an insecure and uncomfortable environment against which civilization had waged an unceasing struggle."

Perhaps in terms of the modern belief in a dichotomy of wilderness versus civilization, this is true. But there is a primal reverence for 'wild' nature that predates the medieval/renaissance world view with its extolling of human chauvinism and its arrogant belief in the intrinsic value of civilization.(1)

The problem with contemporary scholars' historical treatment of wilderness is that they do not investigate the values of primal people. Nash concentrated his historical review of the wilderness concept on medieval Europe and ignored pre-Christian inhabitants - the early European cultures that thrived outside the rule of imperial Rome.

As the Roman State adopted Christianity, the Romans extended their imperial power over the primal peoples of northern Europe. In the Roman synthesis of Christianity and federalism, the wild took on the evil connotation of a desolate waste - a wilderness filled with demons and devils, witches and wizards who could take the shape of crows and ravens to do evil tricks and magic. Henry Gilbert's Robin Hood (1912) includes examples of this imperial Christian attitude towards 'wild' nature which influenced the superstitions of medieval serfs. The serfs were required to cross themselves as a sacred sign before entering a forest to ward off evil spirits. "To their simple minds they were risking the loss not only of their lives, but of their immortal souls, by venturing into these wild places, the haunts of wood-demons, trolls and witches." Imperial Christians used this attitude toward wild nature as a way of overpowering the nature deities that dominated Europe's primal cultures.

Much modern scholarship is the product of an imperialistic tradition that can be traced to Rome. Findings are thus skewed by an inability to fathom the primal mind and its values. This inability has led to a total disregard of the alternative traditions of primal
cultures which centered their beliefs upon sacred 'wild' nature - 'the
mother'.

The early Celts were an Old World people who passed down to us an
ancient counterpart to our modern concept of wilderness. The Celts
expressed their spirituality through worship of nature. The traditions
of their 'Nature Awe' religion, also known as Druidism, date back 3,000
years to the emergence of the Celts as a race.(2)

Originating in Bohemia, the Celtic tribes were the primary inhabi-
tants of Europe during the pre-Roman period, covering more than half
the continent. They were linked by language, religion and culture.
Celtic Europe extended from the west shores of the Black Sea to the
extremes of the British Isles, from the western limits of the Iberian
peninsula to the northern reaches of the Rhine and back to the far
southern extent of the Alps.

The deepest roots of conservation and wilderness preservation are
contained in the civilization of our Celtic European heritage. The
teachings of the Druidic Nature Awe religion demonstrate a sacred
ecology. MacCulluch (1948) explained that:

The earliest Celtic worship, like that of most peoples,
was given to spirits of nature, of the sea, rivers, trees,
mountains, sky and heavenly bodies. All parts of nature were
alive...where there was but one object of its kind - sun, moon,
earth, sea - the spirit of each would tend to become a being
more or less separated from it, yet still ruling it or
connected with it, a sun, moon, earth or sea deity. Thus in
time, besides the greater gods of nature, there would also be
groups of nature spirits, connected with rivers, forests,
mountains and other parts of nature.

This tradition of Nature Awe found expression in all phases of the
peoples' lives. For example, the people were inclined to take oaths such as, "May the sky fall upon my head," in order to insure their fidelity of promise. "On each occasion the man uttering the oath calls on the forces of nature, thus acknowledging that any failure to keep his promise will make him an outcast in the eyes not only of his own community but of the natural world and the gods who are above everyday life." (Markale 1977)

One of the ways this tradition of Nature Awe found expression was in earth festival days like Beltane, Samain (Hallowe'en) etc. The Beltane festival, for example, occurred on May Day and accounts of the Druidic Rites associated with it all point to purification and divination. Both these concepts emphasize the re-emergence of life associated with the coming of spring.

During the Beltane festival, fires were lit, people danced around the Maypole and the Druids recited incantations. These rites may be interpreted as an attempt to aid the coming of spring. The fires symbolized the warming season and its greening effect upon the earth. In the dance around the Maypole, the streamers became entwined to form a canopy similar to that of a living tree, urging it to flower and leout. The Druidic incantations were an added attempt to summon forth the 'sleeping' spirits of the plants and hasten their greening while establishing a sacred bond between human and plant. The Beltane rites were thus practices of sacred ecology associated with the greening of spring and a celebration of joy at this marvelous natural event. They reflected communion with nature and the moral obligation of living with the Earth.
The Celts practised their religion in open air sanctuaries. These sanctuaries were associated with the worship of trees (oaks in particular) and were known as nemetons. Nemetons are recognized as the earliest places of worship among the Celts. They were sacred groves deep within the forest, and the people made wilderness pilgrimages to them in order to worship. The 'wild' surroundings that protected the groves were part of their sacred condition.

The wild forest nemeton carried a land designation quality similar to the modern wilderness area. In order to see this, one must put aside the largely recreational valuation accorded contemporary wilderness areas. It is not our current idea of using the land for recreation, but rather the characteristic of solitude that contributes to the sublime 'nature awe' feeling in a wilderness area.

In origin and meaning, the term 'solitude' can be broken down to 'soul' and 'mood'. In this sense, solitude is similar to its etymological sister 'solemn' and its corollary 'sublime', both of which are central to the Nature Awe spiritual tradition.

Nemetons were also sacred places where the Druids learned their lore and developed their wisdom. The Druids were a literary, religious and philosophical order who guided the Celts' moral and spiritual affairs. Young people who aspired to be Druids had to study for up to 30 years to enter the order. There were several levels to the Druidic order, of which the title of Druid was the most esteemed and exclusive. There was no more highly respected position in the society than that of the Druid, who knew the most about nature. Evidence is
that it was an egalitarian office and that its power was respected in the society regardless of the Druid's sex. Commonly, Druids were known as the wise persons of the oak, receiving their power and wisdom from the nemeton. From this we can see how important the sacred groves were to the society.

The nemeton was central to the Celtic people's relationship to the land and to their understanding of the truth. The wild conditioned the spiritual, sacred experience by imbuing the people with a sense of the sublime. The wisdom of the spirits of wood and stream, leaf and flower, was the foundation of the union of humanity and wild nature, thus the land and its health were central themes of the whole Celtic world view. The Druids were charged with the understanding of ecology. From the wisdom they gathered in their study of the 'wild' in their nemetons, they guided the people's actions as they related to the environment (ecological ethics).(3)

Glimmerings of the Druidic wilderness ethic may be seen in the Arthurian legend. Arthur, like all Celtic rulers, was married to the land. The archetypal Druid, Merlin, explained what it meant to be King. "You will be the land and the land will be you. If you fail, the land will perish; as you thrive, the land will blossom." The King represented humanity in marriage to the land.

This communion between humanity and wild nature was broken with the coming of imperial Christianity. The Celtic civilization did not fail naturally. It was conquered by the Romans and displaced by force, the Druids put to death and the sacred groves burned. Celtic
civilization was crushed by oppression, much like the annihilation of Native American cultures by Euro-Americans. Imperial Christianity adopted a purposeful strategy to assimilate the sacred groves into church institutions, violating the nemetons by building human-made temples in sacred wilderness and violating the earth worship days by making them church holidays. There was, however, often resistance in rural areas, and the church had to resort to threatening the people's immortal souls, as well as burning 'non-believers' at the stake in order to effect the desired change of worship.

The medieval world view which Nash projects back over 'early man' is filled with forboding against wilderness. But bearing in mind the Nature Awe viewpoint, it makes little sense to call wilderness early 'man's' greatest evil. After all, it was in wilderness that humans evolved and learned, adapted also it the wild nourished and selected for humans; otherwise, how could the species have survived and emerged dominant? Wilderness served as early humanity's greatest good, not their greatest evil.

The Celts recognized this and centered their spiritual traditions upon the 'wild' earth. It is clear that these primal peoples had a much more sophisticated world view than previously believed. They had their own environmental ethic which reflected love, respect and admiration for the 'wild'.

In contrast to the primal Nature Awe concept of the sacred wildlands, the modern Western view is largely utilitarian. It does not readily exhibit the solemn awe of the ancient cultures or the love
and worship of nature. But the resurfacing of the wilderness concept in America today demonstrates our species' determination to avoid separation from the wild source that gave us birth. Despite the fear of the wildlands and their traditions that developed in medieval Europe, those primal traditions re-emerged in the Romantic and Transcendental periods, culminating in America in the creation of a National Wilderness Preservation System.

But we need to remember that the American concept of wilderness is new and innovative only within the confines of the Western tradition of utilitarianism and humanism. Since the earliest times, wildlands have been treated as sacred space free from alteration by humans. The modern wilderness characteristic of solitude ('soul-mood') may be the cornerstone to a minority contemporary view of wilderness as sacred space, and represents a re-emergence of the ancient Nature Awe in its recognition of the sacred, solemn and sublime religion of the 'wild'. This is perhaps the most profound of all the values associated with the wilderness concept.
CHAPTER II

THE EDGE OF WITHIN ...

Solitude in Origin and Meaning

We must find what is lost! The grail, only the grail can restore leaf and flower. Search the land, the labyrinth of the forest, to the edge of within ....

King Arthur in "Excalibur"

(Boorman 1981)

As Arthur suggests, there is an implicit connection between the forest, the edge of within, and the grail (ethics). The ancient Celtic Nature Awe cosmology contains a sacred-ethical-ecological ethos which is born of the peoples' worship in sacred groves or nemetons. Moreover, it is to the forest -- sacred grove, nemeton or wilderness sanctuary -- where Arthur directs his quest knights to find the grail -- i.e., the sacred-ecological ethic. For the Celts, then, it is in the wilderness where the sacred is most potently manifest. That solitude is "soul-mood" in deepest etymological derivation, combines this sacred condition with wilderness to produce the Nature Awe cosmology.

Arthur's action of sending the quest Knights to the forest, to seek and search for the grail "to the edge of within ....," is a demonstration of the deepest sense of wilderness solitude. Let us examine these connections between the forest, solitude and the ethical which are all characteristic to the Nature Awe cosmology. In early times, "all
unenclosed land was forest" (Shipley, p. 157 & 112). The Latin fors or foris first meant out of doors, and forest is short for the late Latin forestem silvam, the woods outside, or land which is not fenced in (Stipley, p. 157 & 124; also cf. Oxford English Dictionary 1971: 1055; 442). Thus, Arthur sent his quest knights to the out-of-doors, in order to find the edge of within. The out-of-doors or forest is central to Celtic religious practice as manifest with their designation of nemetons or wilderness sanctuaries. In the death of Arthur (LeMorte d'Arthur), the King is taken to the mythical isle of Avallon, itself a refuge for wilderness solitude. Markale (1977:68) explains that Avallon may in fact be the modern site of Glastonbury in western England and that the name also is said to have come from "Avalloc who went to live there with his daughters because of the solitude of the island." Fundamental to this contention is the need for solitude and a corresponding freedom from habitation and civilization.

Avallon, according to several sources, was indeed a "wild" setting. The theory that Glastonbury was Avallon confirms this wild character of the mythical isle. Today, Glastonbury is a group of hills almost entirely surrounded by flat meadows. These meadows were formerly swamp and marshland often flooded by the River Brue. It was only through a narrow ridge that approaches the river to the southwest that this isle could be reached in ancient times. The site has been "explained as the tenemos or enclosure of a great pagan Celtic sanctuary." Glastonbury is particulary well suited for this purpose. Its ample water provides many sacred pools and springs much like those spoken of by the classical writers. "The prominent natural hill of the Tor is a feature that would fit in with the concept of a sanctuary. A sanctuary of this kind would consist of an extent of land with sacred groves..."(Ashe 1968).

Ashe explained that, "The existence of a great pagan sanctuary would explain the foundation of an early Christian settlement at Glastonbury. It would not be the first time the Church took over heathen sacred sites and Christianized them: a policy recommended by certain early writers." This explanation of proponents of
Christianity's policy to assimilate the sacred groves into its order by building structured places of worship provides us with an important clue to the "wild" nature, of these pagan Celtic sanctuaries.

First of all, the Isle of Glastonbury is a substantial tract of land, much like any modern wilderness. It is worthy, then, of the larger grove designation of nemeton. There are two old Irish expressions, the nemed and the firnemed, both meaning a "sacred grove." It is likely that the firnemed may have been an individual sacred grove within the nemed. This is consistent with our observation of the Isle of Glastonbury. Within its island-like nature are several significant Christian sites; among these are the Glastonbury Abbey, the Chalice hill, St. Dunstan's Chapel and the Norman church atop the Tor. It is probable that these were sacred "wild" places of the Celtic Nature Awe worship, according to the Christian assimilation policy. If so, they would be ancient firnemed sites within the larger encompassing nemed or nemeton. Hence, the concept of the nemeton is similar to modern wilderness because both are large areas of "wild" lands with central places for people to be alone (in the "soul-mood").

In addition to Avalon or Glastonbury, there are at least two other major nemetons. In Britain, an especially sacred grove was found in Nottinghamshire during Roman times. In Scotland another nemeton was located somewhere near the Antonine Wall.(1)

Further demonstrating the out-of-door, wilderness basis for the forest of Arthur's quest, is the medieval legal definition for a forest. The Oxford English Dictionary (1971:1055;442) states that forests were "a woodland district, usually belonging to the king, set apart for hunting wild beasts and game, etc." and "having special laws and officers of its own." Of course, this medieval example of the king's forest or wildland is largely utilitarian in motive and unlike the cosmological dimension of the ancient Celtic nemeton. This example, however, demonstrates a heretofore undocumented way in which wilderness area designation has historically emerged in today's American land-use policy. It is, however, the "Nature Awe" cosmology associated with the forest which is of central concern in this wilderness solitude.
explanation. That one is called to quest into the forest, searching and
seeking "to the edge of within ...," implies that our human nature is
itself a reflection of the nature of the cosmos and that humans learn
most about their nature from nature itself where the wild is most
potently discovered. This discovery is a central formulation of
wilderness solitude in origin and meaning. Moreover, the root words for
solitude are sol and tude which essentially mean soul and mood - or
"soul-mood". This assessment becomes clear upon investigating the Latin
solitude from which the English solitude derives. Solitude's
etymological roots are solvs - tude (Glare 1980). The root word solus
is an adjective. But what does it describe? Solus is not itself a
prime word, moreover it is derived from sol -- "sun." Hence, sol is the
Latin noun for the sun and is probably derived from sawel through sawol,
swol which are cognate with the old Italian suryah and surah. Literally
these mean to shine, sun, 'to burn', "especially to burn without flame,
burn slowly" (Glare 1980; cf, Klien 1967; also Weekly 1967:1374). The
striking connection which manifests itself from this sol derivation of
solus, is the transferrence into English. In migrating from Latin
through old French, sol became soul in middle English (Skeat 1898:572).
Thus, that which animates the solar system, the sol or sun, is also the
core of the human as the soul. When combined with the -tude or tude
suffix, a soul state or condition is implied. The suffix tude appears
in abstract nouns when generally formed from Latin adjectives or
participles - for example, latitude and altitude. This model similarly
is the basis for the formation of new nouns, e.g., platitude. The
abstract condition of these nouns is clearly the product of the \textit{tude} suffix. These nouns are thus lacking in detail and, therefore, the \textit{tude} implies abstraction as characterized by mental reasoning and intellectual process -- i.e., thinking or contemplation. When we observe such thought action, we construe it as mood. Hence, \textit{tude} is a sense of the abstract state of mind or mood.

Soul-mood, as a solitude equivalent, is a cosmological ideal. It expresses a sacred or spiritual valuation of the wild. Fundamentally, "soul-mood" is the basis on which William James (1982:31) defines religion as

\begin{quote}
the feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.
\end{quote}

That William James defines religion with feelings, acts, and experiences in solitude demonstrates the sacredness of the "soul-mood" condition as put forth in this thesis. Soul-mood carries intrinsically a sacred numinous valuation of the wild as manifest about us -- both inwardly and outwardly. The writings of philosopher Henry Bugbee (1974) best articulate this sacred sense of solitude. He contents,

\begin{quote}
I think solitude is essentially a bringing to consciousness of this -- the manner of our being in the world with other beings -- and of engagement in the working out of the import continually and cumulatively borne upon us of participation. It, therefore, assumes the character of a reckoning, a coming to terms with one's very life, with one's disposition with regard to beings as formed in the lived relation with them. But if one's basic disposition were to exert command over the situation in which one 'exists' so far forth that would seem to preclude solitude (Bugbee 1974:4).
\end{quote}

That the 'soul-mood' is a reckoning, demonstrates the Arthurian quest to the "edge of within." Moreover, as Bugbee has shown, our being in the
world is directly dependent upon interaction with other beings. This acknowledgment is the point of Arthur's instructions to go search the labyrinths of the forest -- i.e., the out-of-doors -- the wilderness where being in its manifold sense is most potently discovered. Hence, in order to understand one's own disposition, one is called to observe the "speakings" of the land, that is, the "will-of-the-land" (cf. Chapter III), and this act of reckoning must be accomplished without intentionality and the burden of desirefulness, lest we fail in an affirmation of communion with others. Moreover, our sense of solidarity with other creatures must be founded not upon how we would utilize them, but upon our shared creatureliness and joint participation in the world, such communion is the 'soul-mood' which manifests the sacred.

Solitude in the 'soul-mood' derivation is thus sacred in experience. It is concomitant with a sense of "the numinous" (cf. Otto 1982). Hence, the sacred is the reckoning of our "soul-mood," which is our holiness in communion with the others of the world.

The sacred calls forth solemn devotion or religious observation -- i.e., ritual, ceremony and rite. Solemn deliberation is accompanied with meditation and atonement which in turn produce the sense of empathy and ecstasy. Such is the condition of holiness which characterizes the "soul-mood" of wilderness solitude and is demonstrative of the Arthurian quest to "the edge of within...." "Soul-mood" properly should be recognized as the quick of solitude. Hence it is the primal condition which is the basis of reckoning.

What connections are requisite for this "soul-mood" in its
connection with the forest, that is the wilderness? Moreover, are there intermediary conditions of solitude which work to manifest "soul-mood"?

Two traditional definitions -- the void and sole -- associated with the meaning of solitude imply that such is the case (2). Furthermore, a third standard of solitude -- the Interior -- directly connects the "soul-mood" with the wilderness itself (2). The primary context of interrelationship for these solitude themes is graphically depicted in figure 1. This interrelationship is holistic and dynamic at once which is a condition that inhibits written discussion. As a result, we must proceed singularly in thematic explication.

Born of the Interior, there are two states -- the void and sole -- which work to generate "soul-mood" and which in turn reflect upon our reckoning with the interior.

The void is characterized by a complete absence or lack -- i.e., dearth. In dealing with it, there is a contingency of emergent will, as in the sense which Bugbee articulated concerning our being in the world with other beings. Moreover, in solitude, we are confronted with the will-of-the-land (cf. Chapter III) which calls us to reckoning. It is this sense of the void which fills us with the dearthful intimidation of wilderness. The void may properly include threat, fear, estrangement, sombriety, gloom and desolation, as well as ponderous silence and timelessness. Demonstrating this condition of solitude as "imposed upon" in reckoning with the wild, is the case of Henry Thoreau's 1846 visits to the Maine woods. Thoreau has been criticized for his commentary concerning these wilderness experiences. Moreover, Nash
Figure 1. Solitude in primary thematic context.
(1982:91) contends,

The wilderness of Maine shocked Thoreau. He reported it as "even more grim and wild than you had anticipated, a deep and intricate wilderness." Climbing Mt. Katahdin, he was struck by its contrast to the kind of scenery he knew around Concord. The wild landscape was "savage and dreary" and instead of his usual exaltation in the presence of nature, he felt "more lone than you can imagine." It seemed as if he were robbed of his capacity for thought and transcendence. Speaking of man's situation in wilderness, he observed: "vast, Titanic, inhuman Nature has got him at disadvantage, caught him alone, and pilfers him of some of his divine faculty. She does not smile on him as in the plains."

While Thoreau has been traditionally interpreted as a Romantic idealist concerned for nature, these Maine experiences have been pointed to in order to claim that only when one is civilized and comfortable can one appreciate wilderness. This assessment may be unduly reflective of Romantic idealism which is not entirely Thoreau's philosophic grounding. Moreover, in the Maine wilderness, Thoreau was confronted with the "bare bones" of existence, the very core of reality. Such a confrontation is the loneliness of "sheer affliction, stamped on a person as a fatality with the force of a stigma..." (Bugbee 1974:2). The rendering of this kind of solitude -- the void -- is the disorientation, the unfamiliarity, the strangeness of being stripped bare before creation, i.e., wildness. It is no longer a romantic ideal, but a purification of soul, a preparation for understanding identity, and finally a basis for expansion. Confronting the void in this way is truly the basis of sacrifice which "entails some kind of giving up in consonance with an unconditional claim upon concern..." (Bugbee 1974:12). In this case, the unconditional concern which must be given up is egoism in the face of the will-of-the-land (cf. Chapter V). Hence, the void heightens the
urgency of the "soul-mood" as with the will-of-the-land.

The Romantic ideal projected onto Thoreau's wilderness perspective is founded upon the sole theme of solitude. This condition is born upon the sole-or-unique, that is, the sublimity which features of the wild landscape inspire. In this ideal of solitude, one is struck in wonderment before nature. This is wonderment over rarity or oddity, and the awe-inspiring sense of majesty. Such esthetic contemplation generates emotional gratification and solace in our being. Mircea Eliade (1959: 151-152) identifies this emotional gratification as the "esthetic, recreational, or hygienic values attributed to nature...."

Furthermore, Eliade (1959:153-154) suggests that the wilderness is the perfect place, combining completeness (mountain and water) with solitude, and thus perfect because at once the world in miniature and Paradise, source of bliss and place of immortality.

This "esthetic contemplation" produces an emotion which is fundamentally religious in experience. Thus, a religious dimension is itself the "soul-mood" of wilderness solitude (cf. James 1982:31).

This solitude of sole or unique definition is the basis for the Romantic and Transcendental Movements which are dependent upon inspiration of place. David Douglas (1983) has recently articulated this perspective in explaining certain spiritual values associated with wilderness, that is, silence, solitude (sole), and awe. He contends that silence draws people to wilderness and "has been an invaluable catalyst for prayer and contemplation." Furthermore, Douglas contends that solitude "is 'the most sublime state a human being can aspire to ... being in the wilderness alone with God.'" Wilderness is, thus, the
"source for the 'birth of awe.'" Moreover, "it is the one setting that a sojourner is unable to claim as his own handiwork."

Indeed, wildness is the source, the maxim of creation itself. We are here at its pleasure. Contemplation of the source, the uniqueness of that which manifests itself in wonder is thus the basis of the sole, unique or sublime meaning of solitude. It is the very foundation of the Romantic and Transcendental Movements which have so forcefully shaped the wilderness preservation movement in America (cf. Huth 1972, and Nash 1982).

The very foundation of the "soul-mood", the void and sole conditions of solitude, is the wilderness itself -- the Interior. The Interior theme of solitude is associated with the idea of space: The notion of a lonely, unfrequented, or uninhabited place, that is a solitude or solitudes in a metonymical usage where solitude (or solitudes) is (are) used figuratively. In this case the name of a thing is based upon that which is attributed to it in association. Ergo, wilderness is labeled solitude or solitudes, thereby representing a place of solitude or "soul-mood." The emphasis in this case is based upon the physical environment and the presence of natural conditions, e.g., wildlife, awesome material manifestations, physical forces (such as negative ions) present near waterfalls or at high elevation and essential wildness (i.e., the motive force of creation). Furthermore, the Interior (the wilderness) is the focal point for the "soul-mood." We are impelled to go to the Interior to find the interior -- i.e., the spiritual interior (of self) is a reflection of the physical interior
(of wilderness). In many cases, this condition of solitude also includes a human valuation of wilderness, such as opportunities for environmental screening in seclusion, and environmental spaciousness for loneliness, "soul-mood", etc. which reflect sensory perceptions of the landscape. A deeper more underlying theme connected with the Interior condition of solitude is that of wild creature solitude (the right and opportunity for wild animals -- wildlife, plants, and landscapes -- wildlands -- to be alone, undisturbed and free of human influence, presence, interference, control and dominance). In essence the Interior must be free from management if it is to reflect the true nature of the land. It is from this Interior sense of solitude that both the void and sole conditions are generated and responsible for the "soul-mood."

That one can find solitude in a closet (cf. Prologue) appears to be a misunderstanding of the reality of wilderness as source, the Interior. This conception of sensory deprivation (that is, cloistered in a closet) is representative of a fundamental error in the way in which solitude is defined. Moreover, the root sol is the primal condition for the solitude compound. That solus might be the basis of origin for the word solitude is an error of etymological scholarship. Moreover, solus is not a prime word in that it can be reduced to sol and -lus indicating a condition of being alone or solo (2). This condition is perhaps associated with the "soul-mood," but very different in its loneliness. Figure 2 indicates how this solitude theme differs from those of the "soul-mood" cosmology. There are, however, basic qualities of the solus or solitary being which work to effect the "soul-mood" condition.
SOL

+ US

SOLUS
(Alone)

+ TUDGE

SOLITUDE
("Soul-Mood")

VACUUM DOMICILIUM
Indeed, in the notion of isolation, we can observe a connection with the "soul-mood." The term isolation derives "in-sol-state," which is a condition much like the "soul-mood." With proper teaching, meditation and other religious observation it is possible to create this isolation within environments other than the wilderness Interior, however, improper balancing of the relationship between the human controlled, dominated environment and the wilderness or will-of-the-land serve to generate a diminishing of both nature and the Principle of nature which are essential to the "soul-mood."

This kind of disruption of the relationship between human will and the will-of-the-land results in the short-sighted perspective which characterized European invaders of North America and their policies for disinheriting the Native Americans. Moreover, the New England Puritans, for example, develop a solitude theme based upon development of the land. This theme is an invasion policy and is known as vacuum domicilium (2) or "without human habitation." Moreover, the land is thought to be lonely or desolate if it is without civilization and permanent human occupation. Hence, this is the theme for loneliness of place(s) in terms of human valuation. Such lands might be judged upon the utilitarian mode of how well they serve humans. Hence, value is determined upon the nearness of habitation versus remoteness from civilization. Vacuum domicilium, in theme, is an anthropocentric solitude model whereby the value of a landscape is determined via its human social worth as it favors the intrinsic value of civilization. This is a far cry from the primal concept of "soul-mood" and communion
with the will-of-the-land.

In summary, the concept of solitude has entered English from the Romance languages (specifically French and Latin). The subsequent translation has produced two distinctive conceptions -- (1) solus, (alone) and (2) "soul-mood." In the first case, solus represents the solitariness, seclusion and loneliness of life removed from others. A corollary of the solus conception is the vacuum domicilium where the absence of human works -- habitations, developments, "improvements" -- implies a diminished valuation of the land due to its lack of usefulness for human utilitarianism -- i.e., the maximization of human happiness and pleasure. This dimension of solitude has been used as a basis for disinheriting a people of the land to which they belong (3).

In the second case -- "soul-mood" -- solitude is a reckoning of our creatureliness, that is our manner of being in the world with others who are likewise present. That we could seclude ourselves from the presence of others -- or remove ourselves into solitary aloneness -- is a denial of reality and an assertion of anthropocentrism. Moreover, there is no aloneness in the wilderness, present therein are the vast manifold array of Being itself. In wilderness, we are crowded in relation with life and the creative process which is wild, ongoing and ever-active all about one. Thus, solitude cannot be an escapist retreat from others but rather a communion of our creatureliness in sharing empathy with the will-of-the-land. Hence, Wilderness Solitude is not escapism from others; it is communion with others, which is the acknowledgement of soul -- sol -- and the creative life force. The creative life force
that is the genesis of wildness which we all share in our very being, a being which is at the pleasure of the earth-sun logos of relationship.

Henry Bugbee (1974:6) explains this fellow creatureliness and our participation in the world as an ultimate claim of solitude and he (1974:10) contends that

The essence of solitude is the purifying and covenan ting of the heart in readiness to receive beings in this fashion, and to respond to them and with them concordantly.

This essence of solitude is fundamentally soul-purity and covenant of the heart; it is the quest for the grail which the Arthurian knights seek. In confronting the edge of within, Arthur asks,

"Have you found the secret I have lost?"

and Perceval responds:

"You and the land are one." (Boorman 1981)

It is in Wilderness Solitude that we empathize with the will-of-the-land, and this condition is a wildness atonement -- a oneness with creation.
CHAPTER III

WILL-OF-THE-LAND: Wilderness Among Early Indo-Europeans*

Nature's object in making animals and plants might possibly be first of all the happiness of each one of them, not the creation of all for the happiness of one. Why ought man to value himself as more than an infinitely small composing unit of the one great unit of creation?... The universe would be incomplete without man; but it would also be incomplete without the smallest transmicroscopic creature that dwells beyond our conceitful eyes and knowledge.

John Muir 1916

When the Scottish born John Muir embraced the wilderness movement in America, he was answering the call of his race. Muir and the Scottish peoples are members of the Celto-linguistic group of the Indo-European race. The ancient Celts worshipped Nature. Their's was a spiritual tradition born of "Nature Awe." For them Nature was alive -- nature spirits animated springs, rivers, forests, and mountains -- with the same creative life force that humans share. The Celtic conception of Will Power was extended wholly to nature -- in its entirety -- both the animate and the inanimate were recognized to have a compelling will-force "akin to that which impelled man... Even stationary nature -- the everlasting hills and the solid earth -- was endowed with feeling, will, and thought. All the mental powers that man found

controlling his actions were unconsciously transferred to nature."
(MacBain 1977) (1)

In writing of his Scottish boyhood and his fondness for "everything that was wild..." (Teale 1954), John Muir demonstrates a cultural predilection favoring this will-force. This ancient Celtic notion of "will" and will-force is in origin akin to the term wild. Wilderness historian Roderick Nash (1982) tells us that "Etymologically, the term [wilderness] means 'wild-deor-ness,'" the place of wild beasts. Nash argues that cognitive terms -- "wild" and "wildern" -- present an image of an environment alien to humans which is outside of civilization's order. In this account, Nash does not develop a deeper etymological derivation for wilderness.

Nash makes it clear that "the root seems to have been 'will' with a descriptive meaning of self-willed, willful, or uncontrollable. From 'willed' came the adjective 'wild' used to convey the idea of being lost, unruly, disordered, or confused." Recognizing "will" or "willed" as the root for wild, Nash focuses upon the Old English term "deor" (animal or deer) stating that it "was prefixed with wild to denote creatures not under the control of man." While this may be correct for the selected wild derivatives -- "wilder" and "wildern" -- it fails to deal adequately with the "ness" suffix. "Ness" is likewise a term derived from Old Gothonic languages. It is found in Old Norse, Swedish, Danish and Low German in various forms. It appears in Old English as "nass". The Oxford English Dictionary explains that later in Middle English it was "apparently retained only in place-names, from which the later use is probably derived..." and that the variant "ness may be due
either to the understressed position in place-names, to dialect variation, or to Scandinavian influence." This usage may explain the deceptiveness of the term wilderness to which Nash alludes in *Wilderness and the American Mind*. He explains that the "ness" suggests a quality "that produces a certain mood or feeling in a given individual and, as a consequence, may be assigned by that person to a specific place."

A "ness" is defined as "a promontory headland, or cape" (*OED*). Walter Skeat (1980) concurs with this definition, explaining that the term was preserved in place-names—e.g., Tot-ness and Sheerness. We also see it preserved in Scotland—Inverness and Loch Ness—both of which are areas that came under Scandinavian or Viking influence. Skeat further explains that in Anglo-Saxon, "ness" appears as "naes" or "nes" and is defined first as "the ground"; secondly as "a promontory, headland, as in Beowulf..." The promontory definition indicates a prominence of land or a prominent mass of land which is consistent with contemporary wilderness definitions. Thus, in recognizing the Middle English application of "ness" to place-names, it may well have been combined with wild in an entirely different sense of meaning than which Nash suggests.

Wildness then means "self-willed-land" or "self-willed-place" with an emphasis upon its own intrinsic volition. The middle syllable "der" of wilderness possibly represents the preposition-article combination "of the". Hence, in wil-der-ness, there is a "will-of-the-land"; and in wildōr, there is "will of the animal." A wild animal is a "self-willed animal"—an undomesticated animal—similarly, wildland is "self-willed land". In both cases the will, willful, uncontrollable
state or elements are maximized. This "willed" conception is itself in opposition with the controlled and ordered environment which is characteristic of the notion of civilization. While control, order, domination and management are true of civilization and domestication, they are not essentials to wild culture. Culture in this sense represents the Celts' social organization, rather than the city-state concept of civilization. The primal peoples of northern Europe were not bent upon dominating and controlling all environments. Thus, their "will-of-the-land" conception -- wilderness -- demonstrates a recognition of land for itself.

The animistic and the animatistic concepts of nature spirit or spirits of nature are themselves recognitions of the will inherent in nature. Such religious beliefs are often labeled pagan and "primitive". But to understand Muir's wilderness convictions and our culture's deepest roots of wilderness preservation, we must examine our ancient Indo-European heritage. Nature worship among primal Indo-Europeans evidences a traditional theme of sacred natural places, free from desecration by humans and their technology. Such sacred natural places were wilderness in the deepest sense; they were imbued with will-force, -- willed, willful, uncontrollable -- and with spirit. Thus, they held about them a scared mystery -- a numinous presence. It is from this tradition that the "will-of-the-land" -- wilderness -- concept emerges.

Among ancient Indo-European cultures there are many examples of wild sanctuaries. There was a "tree of the tribe" and a "love of country" (Keary 1882). In an article on "Tree Worship", John Taylor
(1979) describes Indo-European Oak worship which began with the appearance of forest-environments following the last glaciation. "In a purely animistic strain, the early Greeks believed the oak to be inhabited by a resident entity, the nymph or hamadryad." The Greek *temenos* was a sacred precinct beneath the branches of the oak. Sacred oak groves among the Italic peoples were inhabited by a sacred numen. Celtic and Gothonic peoples believed that humankind was born from elements of the oak, that the oak was an instrument of divination. The notion of a "World Tree" is found among both the Celts and the Goths. Ward Rutherford (1978) explains that "The 'World Tree' was a centre of gathering where the Druids... met to pass judgment and to make their most solemn decisions. This assembly, no doubt itself held under trees... demonstrates the sacred role of trees in the Celtic culture."

The Baltic-Slavic peoples maintained an early animistic notion centered upon a force called *siela* -- cf. Italic *anima*, Greek *pneuma*, and Estonian *usund*. These silvan spirits guarded the forest; they would not allow people to whistle or to shout there. They also protected animals, particularly the bear. Furthermore, Taylor explains that "Upon the death of an individual his spirit would be reincarnated most frequently into trees." The non-Indo-European, Finno-Ugric [Estonian] peoples also practiced an oak veneration. Trees were recognized to have a soul or spirit -- *ort*. The tree was perceived prosperous while the *ort* was within it; they withered and died when it moved away. Improper behavior -- shouts, songs, and noise -- could drive the *ort* away. Thus, a tree cult developed, in order to maintain friendly communication and mutual respect between humans and trees. "This special form of contact
was a pledge of friendship; originally it was represented by something concrete [granitic] such as a band made of straw, branches, hides, belts, flowers, ears of grain, and in general of anything that contained 'powers'." A tangible pact with the ort by visibly tying the pledge around the tree was thus consummated. A chant for this practice might go: "I am offering something to you, so that you will offer something to me in return." This custom served to assure a peaceful pact between the ort and the human (Holmberg 1927 & Paulson 1971). Taylor contends that "veneration of the oak continued among the northern Europeans until their sacred oaks literally came under the proverbial axe of the Christians."

Among the Celts, the temenos -- sacred precinct or consecrated place -- extended to sacred groves known as nemetons. These wilderness sanctuaries were located deep within the forest, and the people made long arduous pilgrimages to them in order to worship. The word nemeton contains the root nem, related to Breton nemu or "the heavens" in the sense of the Other World (paradise on Earth). A ton is a place, hence nemu + ton yields Heaven place. This conception of nemeton is consistent with Celtic mythology. The Celts maintained that form manifests motive force and both are merely two facets of a whole -- the Other World is really this world but is concerned with the naturalis of the natura (cf. Chapter IV). The symbolic proof of this ecological hierophany is demonstrated by the well-known Celtic myth where two flocks of sheep, one white, the other black, are grazing on opposite sides of a river. When a white sheep enters the water and emerges on the other side, it appears black and conversely, a black sheep emerges
white upon crossing the stream (Markale 1978). Furthering this cosmological doctrine of Nature Awe, sacred groves — nemetons — were regarded among the Celts as a "piece of heaven on earth..." (Markale 1977).

HEATHEN, HEATHENISM, HEATH

Heathen is a word common to all Gothonic languages, and is used in the sense 'non-Christian pagan'. This usage demonstrates that it could only have arisen with the introduction of Christianity. A direct derivative of the Gothic haipi, heath -- as in 'dweller on the heath' -- heathen reflects the primal religious practices of northern Europeans. Heathenism is defined as "the religious or moral system of heathens; heathen practice or belief; paganism." (OED) The term pagan derives from pāgānus which originally meant a villager -- rural or rustic person. Furthermore, as "Christianity became the religion of the towns," those persons of rural districts which retained "the ancient deities" became known as "pagan heathens." The impetus of these primal traditions -- heathenism -- becomes clear upon investigating the word heath. Characterized by the heather, this Gothonic term means "Open uncultivated ground; an extensive tract of waste land; a wilderness..." The term moor is a common synomyn; less common are glade and grove. Northern Europeans worshipped on the heath, or in the grove -- that is, in the wilderness. The spiritual leaders -- Druids among the Celts -- spent much of their time on the heath, in the groves, thus, in the wilderness. This practice interprets the Christian introduction of haipi; 'dweller on the heath'.
In consequence, a heathen is one who worships upon the heath -- moor, glade, grove, wild waste or wilderness. Heathenism is thus the religion of wilderness -- Nature Worship. Further demonstrating this conclusion are the remarks of the classical writer Gildas (c.560) who refused to enumerate the "diabolical" customs of the primal culture, stating, "Nor will I call out upon the mountains, fountains, or upon rivers, which now are subservient to the use of men, but once were an abomination and destruction to them, and to which the blind people paid divine honour." (MacBain 1977)

Nemetons were wilderness sanctuaries where Nature Worship occurred. The sacred grove was unmodified and it continued in its wild -- willed, willful, uncontrollable -- condition. Thus, the will-of-the-land, its spirit, its sacred numinous character manifested itself. The land was holy and the wild conditioned the spiritual, sacred experience imbuing the people with a sense of the sublime and the numen. According to Keary (1882), this "early" connection with the land is a form "of intimacy with those far-off branches of the tree or with that unsearched mountain summit which were then his heaven." Among the Celts, nemetons -- sacred groves -- continued until replace with temples as a result of the "overpowering Roman influence" (MacCulloch 1948).

In Gothonic languages the words for "place of worship" or "temple" often had the meaning "grove". Demonstrating this, "The Old High German harug is rendered in Latin as fanum, Lucas, nemus and the Old English hearg, commonly used for 'temple' or 'idol', had the meaning 'grove'."--cf. Old English bearu ('forest, holy grave, temple') and Gothic alhs -- temple, 'holy grove' (Turville-petre 1964). Likewise,
Scandinavian religion was practiced in sacred precincts or groves known as *irminsuls* (MacCulloch 1948).

Religion -- *Uskumus* -- among the Estonians was practiced in the forest. These Finno-Urgic peoples perceived the forest to be a living, feeling, knowing, desiring, functioning entity which exercised a decisive influence on human beings within its domain... Upon entering it the visitor had to greet the forest politely so that he would be guarded and protected against all dangers and misfortunes, and so that his wishes to obtain game, berries, mushrooms, etc., would be granted. [When proper respect was not shown] The forest could cause man to lose his way in its thicket, 'to hide in the forest'. If he did not behave correctly, that is, if in thought, word or deed he offended, destroyed or spoiled the forest, its plants, trees, animals, and birds, the forest could do him harm by causing him various illnesses, or letting the bear kill him, wolves tear at him, or snakes bite him. (Paulson 1971)

Keary (1882), concurs with these conceptions of wilderness behavior. He explains that the nature worship of Indo-Europeans "honoured the sacred silence which reigns about the grove."

These sacred groves were periodically the site for community worship -- particularly during the earth festival days. For example, among the Celts, the Beltane (May-day), Samain (Hallowe'en), etc. When these earth festivals were discontinued, in most instances as the result of compulsion by imperial force, the primal culture disintegrated. Rutherford (1978) explains that,

If we can detect a moment at which such change begins, it surely must be that at which urbanization begins and 'the city' in the true sense -- as a machine for living in -- emerges as centre. This with its communalized services brings men into a real interdependence with each other, a truly institutionalized life begins. But there is also a practical point involved, too: the concentration of population into a smaller area means they will expect to conduct worship within that area; they will no longer be
prepared to make pilgrimages into the heart of the countryside. They are now the centre; formerly it was the religious sanctuary, the *nemeton*, drawing families to worship in it from over a wide area.

Demonstrating a non-anthropocentric perspective, the Breton war leader Brennus (c.290 Before Present Era) conquered Delphi and "laughed aloud on entering a temple to see that the Greeks represented their gods in human form." (Markale 1978) The Celts clearly disliked human representations of divinities, preferring Nature in its "wild" -- willed, willful, uncontrollable -- condition as manifested in the *nemeton* -- wilderness sanctuary.

Furthermore, it was in these *nemetons* -- sacred groves -- where the Druids learned their lore and developed their wisdom. This wisdom of the spirits of wood and stream, leaf and flower, is the foundation of the kinship union between humanity and wild nature. This ancient wisdom constituted Druidic ecological ethics. Glimmerings of these Druidic wilderness ethics may be gleamed from the Arthurian legend. The archetypical Druid, Merlin, explains to Arthur, what it means to be King. "You will be the land and the land will be you, if you fail the land will perish, as you thrive, the land will blossom." Thus, kinship with land and its continued health are central themes of the Celtic worldview.

True to this Celtic heritage, John Muir devoted himself to wilderness. He practiced this heathenism in ways which the more domesticated could not understand. When Emerson visited Yosemite, Muir implored him writing:

Do not thus drift away with the mob while the spirits of these rocks and waters hail you after long waiting as
their kinsman and persuade you to closer communion.... I invite you to join me in a month's worship with Nature in the high temples of the great Sierra Crown beyond our holy Yosemite. It will cost you nothing save the time and very little of that for you will be mostly in eternity.... In the name of a hundred cascades that barbarous visitors never see...in the name of all the spirit creatures of these rocks and of this whole spiritual atmosphere Do not leave us now. With most cordial regards I am yours in Nature, John Muir. (1916)

Dwelling on the Sierra heaths and moors, John Muir rediscovered the primal mind -- the ancient wisdom. And in that wild beauty and sweetness which is the primal mind, Muir lived his name. For you see in Scotland, the dialect variation for moor -- wilderness -- is muir.
CHAPTER IV

KITCHI MANITOU: "Great Mysterious" and Wildness*

Introduction

To suggest that the concepts of wildness and Kitchi Manitou -- "Great Mysterious" -- are related, may at first glance appear profane. Clearly Kitchi Manitou is a sacred concept among the Algonkian related peoples. Conversely, the adjective "wildness" has come to describe a kind of morally void behavior or depraved condition. Such a definition has, however not always been germane for this concept. Thus the profane quality ascribed to wildness appears as a vulgarism of modernity.

Both concepts -- "wildness" and Kitchi Manitou -- imply "Great Mysterious" and sacred reality in principle. This cosmology is grounded in the ecological hierophany characterized by the naturalis of naturata -- that is the natural of nature -- which is itself principal, that which manifests itself as nature, and Principle, that which creates as natural. We may, however, fail to understand this cosmology due to our modern linguistics which exhibit a preoccupation with nominal objectivity. This philological nominalism of our modern languages accentuates the primacy of nouns as objects. Hence, our present-day linguistics are fundamentally noun or object central. Consequently, the

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subject is the central object while predicate influence is minimized to modifying the object complement. Verbs, which are central to relationships, are there by reduced in their significance. As a result, relationships are diminished in their meaningfulness. Furthermore, adjectives and adverbs are restricted to nominal finitude, a condition which restricts an active understanding of reality. The very structure of our modern languages, therefore conspire against an understanding of the primal outlook. We are today consumed with subject-predicate dualism and the nominalization of power. This condition may be termed nominalizationism. Moreover, in the nominalization process, power becomes authority, particularly in social hierarchy. Subsequently, you have class structure and epithets for the bourgousie elite -- e.g., Sir George, Lord Mountbatten, 'Your Royal Highness', 'His Majesty, the King', and 'Mr. President.' Inherent to this structure are enormous hidden costs which greatly impair an egalitarian ethos and further inhibit ecologically centered heirophanies. Modern cosmologies based upon this linguistic orientation are seriously handicapped in their comprehension of reality because of our contemporary desire to reduce the sacred into a singular abstract universal totality (cf. the nominalism discussion forthcoming). This impoverishment of language forces us to look upon the qualitativeness of religious conceptualizations with skepticism. Why? Because the cosmologies of the religiously devout have become froth with nominalizationism and its subsequent analytical objectivity. We, resultanty seek scientistic proof in understanding all manifestations of reality which is itself the practice of nominalizationism. This practice of scientistic skepticism and nominalization is
blatant reductionism.

**META-REDUCTIONISM**

Reductionism is "any doctrine that claims to reduce the apparently more sophisticated and complex to the less so." (Flew 1984:301) Traditional reductionism has a two fold logic: (1) scientific and (2) behavioristic. Scientific reductionism is materially oriented and comprises the search for indivisible particles — atoms (Greek for 'that which cannot be cut'). It is also a kind of reduction of mind to molecules. Hence, the second sense of reductionism is reflective of the first in behavioristic orientation. Behavioristic reductionism is largely formulated around the interpretative reduction of human behavior to that of "lesser" animals. This is a human value laden projection of "inferior knowledge" upon non-human beings. **Meta-reductionism** is an overarching, all encompassing endeavor based upon anthropocentricism — man as the central value of the universe (cf. note 1, chapter I). In contrast to traditional reductionism, meta-reductionism is applied in inverse process. The logic of meta-reductionism is (A) nominalizationism, (B) nominalism and (C) supernaturalism.

*Nominalizationism*(A) provides the point of departure into the meta-reductionary process (cf. Introduction). In its nominalization of power, *nominalizationism*(A) "paves" the way for *nominalism*(B). Nominalism posits a "view that universals have no existence independently of being thought and are mere names, representing nothing that really exists. The nominalist thus denies anything like Plato's theory of Forms or Ideas." (Flew 1984:250) In the process of nominalism, names
are given to powers. These are in turn ontologized into particular beings which subsequently are de-ontologized into abstract universals. God as an anthropomorphism serves to demonstrate this process of nominalism. Moreover, first there is the recognition of form (principal) which is in turn named and nominalized into being -- in this case man into God. This process constitutes nominalistic anthropomorphism. Next God becomes an abstract universal, that is God Almighty in the sense of a de-ontological framework, thereby representing Principle in separation from principal. In meta-reductionary logic, nominalism(B) is followed by supernaturalism(C) which projects human values in super-transcendence onto the sacred. Philosophers define the supernatural as "that which surpasses the active and exactive powers of nature -- or that which natural causes can neither avail to produce nor require from God as the complement of their kind. (Guthrie in Runes 1960:307) This philosophy establishes a dichotomy between the natural and the supernatural. Given this problem, we need an analysis of the term supernatural. The substantive "natural" is derivative from the Latin naturalis (of nature), therefore based upon the naturata (nature). Hence the nature of nature hierophany previously alluded to. "Nature" represents the inherent character and the basic constitution of "what is": It is thus an essence and a disposition at once. The nature of nature is thus the Principle of principal. "Nature" is, therefore the world -- the cosmos -- in its entirety. The prefix "super" connotes that which is over and above; it is conceded to that which is higher in quantity, quality, or degree, thus it implies "more than" or "greater than." But what can be
"more than" or "greater than" nature — which is itself, the world, the cosmos in its entirety? Before pursuing this argument, the conclusion of meta-reductionary logic is warranted. Moreover, Supernaturalism(C) which projects abstract human values onto "nature" is the nominalism(B) at work in the world. Furthermore, nominalism(B) is the product of nominalizationism(A) in its treatment of "powers." Thus, the concept of the "supernatural" is a clear example of cosmologic meta-reductionism in the theory of religion founded upon the nominalizationism of language (and world view). It is clear that the term "supernatural" implies separation between the natural — which is grounded in ecologic process and biologic reality — and the sacred which is presented as a super-transcendence of nature. There are several major problems associated with this meta-reductionism and its super-transcendence of nature. These difficulties include profound allegorical misconceptions and a meta-reductionist categorial mistake which serves to impoverish reality by making experience fraudulent while producing an abstract absolutist dogma.

Meta-reductionism of the ecologic hierophany — naturalis of naturata — produces the allegorical misconception. Moreover, in this allegorical error, the principal which is nature as manifest, is dichotomized and dualistically separated via supernatural nominalism from the Principle which is the naturalis or underlying motive force of the naturata — principal. In this disparaging of nature and debasing of reality, the allegorical misconception is rationalized upon a reductive categorial mistake which rests upon the false dichotomy
presented as natural versus supernatural.

The complex question of monotheism and its compulsion for nominalization provides a basis for understanding the preceding difficulties. Moreover, in nominal monotheism, God becomes the abstract -- supernaturally removed -- object of religion and represents the totality of the sacred in a singular universal. In conceiving the sacred as a singular ontological state, there is a denial of the manifold diversity of the natural world, which is subsequently the basis for an impoverished reality where experience is fraudulent (cf. Jenkins 1942). Thus in nominal monotheism the sacred is many times removed from the
naturata and the naturalis is separated from earthly affairs. But because "man" is alluded to be the centrally most important creation of the universe and created in the image of God (anthropomorphically), the human species is recognized as quasi-sacred, existing in a profane, natural surrounding which is the aftermath of "original sin." This anthropocentricism is a separation which fosters human narcissism based upon the species' identification with the ontologically similar God of the human personal familiar. Such is the foundation of superhuman desiring and human chauvinism towards non-human nature which is falsely perceived, rationalized and justified as a "resource" stockpile for humanity. Moreover, the natural is excluded from the divine and subsequently viewed as profane and simply a means to an end which is "man's" eternal and immortal salvation. Thus the natural-supernatural dichotomy of nominal monotheism presents a dilemma for those who would sense the sacred in nature. Hence in nominal monotheism, the sacred is
fundamentally "supernatural" and super-transcendent of natural law -- i.e., ecological process and biological reality which are falsely perceived as profane conditions. The results from this perspective are separation of principal -- the naturata -- from Principle -- the naturalis. Super-transcendence makes principal unnecessary and in no longer having principal, the separated Principle is destroyed. Moreover, Principle is dead because of the lack of a referant -- i.e., principal.

The faulty logic of this meta-reductionary process -- allegorical error and categorial mistake -- is evidenced in the experiential conditions of nature. Moreover, that which can be experienced is by definition natural. Hence, the supernatural is an impossible category, the product of Western meta-reductionism. The supernatural exists only within the abstraction of allegorical misconception. That is to say, in our place among the cosmos, we exist in the natural world, and therefore we can only experience the sacred through the natural. The natural is thus the foundation for all that is sacred, heretofore the supernatural. We are natural beings in a cosmic perspective where there is no super-transcendence of nature because what is must be natural. Thus it is merely our modern unfamiliarity with the ecological hierophany -- naturalis of naturata -- which is the basis for this meta-reductionary categorial mistake of nominal supernaturalism.

Supernaturalism becomes a central focus for absolutist dogmatism in its contention of pervasive supremacy over the natural. The dogma herein is that nature is much simpler and barer than it appears to us in experience. Hence the nominalist view of the sacred results in
impoverishment of reality where experience is fraudulent. As a result, virtue, beauty, and purpose are not real facts in nature; they must, then, result merely from the individual's reaction to and interpretation of nature. This means that they are real for each man only as he feels them, and he is to honor and accept no opinion concerning them except his own. Such negation of discipline can but culminate in coercive authority; and such denial of standards must issue in the doctrine that desire measures good and that right is synonymous with power (Jenkins 1942:546).

In projecting this meta-reductionary of the supernatural onto primal worldviews, we are committing the absolutist error of imperialism. Meta-reductionism leads us far astray from the primal understanding of reality where language is rich in the polysynthetic modality inherent to the ecological hierophany -- naturalis of naturata. Moreover, the primal understanding of sacred reality is grounded in the experimental.

In primal cases, sacred reality is glimpsed or dreamed, sensed or felt in ordinary daily affairs; it is relational without dichotomy in everyday living. This sensory relational quality of sacred reality requires a polysynthetic linguistic formulation which is at once active in disposition, descriptive in expression, and objective in orientation. Primal world views, conceive the ecological hierophany -- naturalis of naturata -- by making distinction between agent-form, that is principal manifest, and motive force which is Principle in transcendence. Moreover, underlying the hand you see (principal manifestation) is the hand of transcendence (in Principle). This dichotomy of meta-reductionism is avoided because the ecological hierophany is seen in dynamic relationship without the possibility of separation. That is to say, primal peoples make the distinction between principal and Principle without separation. Kitchi Manitou cosmology -- i.e., "Great
Mysterious" -- will enlighten this naturalis of naturata ecological hierophany.

**Kitchi Manitou in Perspective**

Kitchi Manitou is according to Christopher Vecsey (1983:80) "the creation of Christians." This deduction is based upon the translation Supreme Being -- "Great Spirit" -- or "High God."

Certainly, Christian missionary influence has had a potent and lasting effect. Often when faced with opposition to or rejection of their theology, Christians have resorted to force as a means of converting non-believers (Frederick Turner 1980 calls this practice "the Western Spirit Against the Wilderness," cf. Segal & Stinebeck, 1977 Puritans, Indians and Manifest Destiny, Slotkin, 1972 Regeneration Through Violence; Vest 1984 "Wild Mind, Primal Mind"). That Christian missionary efforts influenced, subjugated and perverted the Algonkian's belief into a "Great Spirit" or Supreme Being is clearly evident. It may not follow that the term Kitchi Manitou always translated as such. Moreover, Vecsey (1983) begins his investigation convinced of the nominalism of Ojibwa's --Algonkian peoples -- conceptions of the sacred. Vecsey (1983:4) states that for the Ojibwa "the ultimate sources of existence were extremely powerful beings called manitos." In this context manitos are clearly supernatural beings or gods. For example, Vecsey (1983:4-5) states:

The Ojibwa regarded the manitos as essential prerequisites for the continuance of life. Humans' existence depended ultimately upon their ability to establish and maintain relations with the manitos.
Ojibwas viewed the manitos as ultimate providers of food made available through hunting. Manitos also upheld human health and granted medicine in order to secure human longevity.

This account implies that Algonkian thought was structured in a subject-predicate duality which is characteristic of Western nominalization. Vecsey's perspective is one of meta-reductionism. Moreover, according to Vecsey (1983) these "supernatural" beings -- manitos -- are the supreme source of the sacred among the Ojibwa.

The problem with this nominalistic subject-predicate duality and its noun-being or ontologic conception of sacred "powers" may be one of translation. Could in contradistinction, for example, the Algonkians be using the manito, or manitos as agents or principals representing Principle? And if so, does the "power(s)" reside in the manito(s) -- i.e., in the agent-principal(s) -- or in the underlying Principles(s)? The more traditional scholarship suggests that a concept of Principle(s) is at work in these cases beyond the agent-principal(s) or manito(s) which Vecsey asserts. For example, among the Munsee-Mahican Delawares -- Algonkians -- Frank Speck (1945:40) was told that "the Creator, whose name is Pa'tama'was, translated as 'The Being Prayed to.'" That Pa'tama'was is a "Being" at all is questionable considering Speck's (1945) prefatory remarks for the Delaware Bear Sacrifice Ceremony. Moreover, in these remarks, Speck (1945) clears away some of the human chauvinistic problems associated with Western meta-reductionism. Speck (1945:vii) states that the Bear Sacrifice Ceremony of the Delawares is one of the world's pure nature conceptions of magnitude in a small firmament. Its limitations to the realm of pure nature
leave no fringe of space for the recognition of a human personality. There is no messianic personage, no defied revealer, no individual founder of doctrines, no transcendental emissary who appeared on earth to teach men the sacred rituals of rules of religious conduct. In short, the personified attachment of religious performance to creed is totally lacking.

Since "human personality" and the narcissism of human chauvinism are absent from the Delaware cosmology, then it would follow that a meta-reductionary God would likewise be missing. Conversely, the monotheistic traditions of the invading Europeans contained a doctrine "built upon mankind as the center of all existence!" (Speck 1945:viii)

The subject-object allegory of nominal monotheism works on a basis of seeing the sacred as a noun or entity of being. This standard monotheistic format presents believers with the notion of a sky-God or Supreme Being. That Pa'tama'was is a sky-God may reflect traditional Delaware cultural disruption and mis-translation. Moreover, could we think of Pa'tama'was as "The Principle Prayed to?" Speck (1935:29) agrees with Vecsey (1983) and others that the belief in an anthropomorphic Supreme Being among the Algonkians has its origin in these peoples' contact with the European monotheists.

Among the Montagnais-Naskapi [Algonkian], who at present are subject to classification as nominal Christians, we find the term Tce'mantu, "Great Spirit," in common use to denote the Christian God. Kantautci 'tuk', "Our Creator," and Kantce 'tapelto'k, "Our Great Master or Owner" are also used. (Speck 1935:29)

Although this Tce'mantu concept cannot be proven to be aboriginal in origin, Speck (1935:29) states, "The impression remains, however, after questioning widely among the older men that Tce'mantu is the author of creation; that he is not anthropomorphic." Furthermore,

The general opinion prevails among the laity of the bands,
that Tce 'mantu is a spirit having neither body nor form, that he is creator and controller of the universe.... Says the Mistassini headman: "He is a spirit (mantu) like the sun, moon, and stars, who created everything, including them. As to form or body -- ah! that is something no one can know because no one has ever seen him, The priests! Ah! they do not know anymore about that than we ourselves do! They talk about it, but it rests a mystery, for they have not seen him."

Thus, the Tce 'mantu or Kitchi Manitou remains mysterious despite nominalism. Perhaps upon analysis of the terms involved -- i.e., Kitchi Manitou, -- a clearer picture will emerge.

Among the notions of sacred reality present within Algonkian cultures is the concept of "operate mantu' (Manitu)" which Speck (1935:8) defines as "a native term the meaning of which we can scarcely grasp, but which represents something near our notion of unseen force."

Furthermore, this "operate mantu'" or "unseen force" thoroughly permeates "every act in life" (Speck 1935:9). Speck (1935:26) clarifies this Manitou concept with a "trivium of cosmology, religious practice, and ethics" which pervade the Labrador -- Algonkian -- Indians' religion. There are:

1. Mantu' (Ma'nitu): The universe, natural law, the unknown, spirit-forces, supreme power.

2. Mantoci'win: "Practice based upon mantu'." Man's relationship with nature, magical practice, shamanism (spirit control, magic power in art, in economic operation), divination, soul, or "great-man" control.


The background upon which these sacred relationships rest among the Algonkian peoples must be understood in the term Manitou. Speck (1935:27) explains that among the Montagnis-Naskapi:
The term [Manitou] cannot be adequately translated, since it is an abstraction having no definite compass in the genius of a vague philosophy. To the native it is not, as difficult a thought to grasp as it seems to us, for we use the term 'power' to think of transcendental qualities, whereas he does not. Everything not understood is implied in it. He intends the term to have no definite application.

In this way the term Manitou is free from the nominalization of power, characteristic to meta-reductionism, yet loaded with the polysynthetic descriptiveness necessary to qualify the sacred "powers." Consequently, the subject-object dichotomy is absent and is also without influence upon this understanding of the ecological hierophany. Speck (1935:27) further clarifies the Manitou concept explaining:

One informant will try to illustrate the meaning of the term by comparing it to natural physical force observable in electricity, gravity, heat, steam, while another will liken it to psychic principles operating in thought, invention, memory, co-ordination, in animal generation and human procreation, in heredity, and especially in supernatural control. While mantu' cannot be lexically defined, we can glean some little idea of its purport from the extensive use to which it is put in the spiritual vocabulary of the people. In the sense of 'spiritual being' or 'deity' we have glanced at its adaptation to Christian miracles of the shaman or conjuror. It often appears, moreover, in terms expressing mental states which result in producing physical effects.

Hence, Manitou is a pervasively mysterious principle. It is verbal in quality, yet polysynthetic in its combined characteristics of verb-noun-adjective. In this way Manitou is both an infinitive (c.f. the Latin Gerund) and a participle (c.f. the Latin Gerundive) -- i.e., representing both verbal noun and verbal adjective simultaneously. In modern English, the uncanny, incomprehensible adjective "mysterious" best represents these qualities. Kitchi is Algonkian for "Great"; ergo, Kitchi Manitou translates "Great Mysterious" where two adjectives free
of the nominalizing article "the" linguistically represent a deeply compacted and compounded polysynthesis of verb-noun-adjective, the meaning of which we can scarcely grasp. Further demonstrating this point of translation, the term Manitou may be combined to form abstract thought as in the case of mantu'elte'lta'tak', or 'spirit-power thinking', as well as forming the root for certain animal names — e.g., Mantu'c meaning 'snake,' 'worm,' and 'insect'; mantume'kuc 'smelt,' 'spirit fish' (Speck 1935:28). In this way, the sacred "power" or "principles" are acknowledged pervasively throughout the natural order and thereby free from meta-reductionism.

Wildness in Principle

In principle, wildness may represent an ancient, primal Indo-European counterpart of the Algonkian Manitou concept. Moreover, this Gothonic term connotes a "sacred will" in polysynthetic meaning. The "ness" suffix imparts a landed or earthy quality and is associated with a promontory or headland (cf. Chapter III). When added to nouns, they become deceptive like both an infinitive and a participle at once. Furthermore "ness" is derived from the same root for nose. In this context, it is associated with the breath and animation of spirit. Consequently, "ness" imparts a polysynthetic deception when it is added to substantive nouns. This practice effectively implies "spirit of" and is thereby a sacred qualification. For example, our shared humanness may lexically translate as the spirit of humanity, or the human spirit condition which we all share as members of the human species. When "ness" is added to place names which is its tradition usage (cf. Chapter
III), it imparts an earth-spirit to the place. Loch-ness, for example, is famed for its "ness" powers which are today meta-reductionistically associated with a nominalized monster. The slaying of such monsters and dragons which is characteristic of Christian fairy-tales is a mythic representation of the earth-spirit power(s) as conquered by the anthropocentric tradition of Christianity. This explains how the sacred sites of pagan heathens were transformed into Christian shrines.

The substantive wild is likewise deceptive. It is a contraction of willed, thereby representing a participle which implies in application a volition or a self-willed condition (cf. Chapter III). This self-willed volition or animistic condition is the basis for the wild state. Hence in the term wildness, there emerges concepts of sacred self-willed-land or self-willed-earth-spirit (the term "self" herein is used to construe any material entity -- from a rock to a human person). With this poly-synthetic quality in primal translation, the "willed" of wildness requires explication.

Will not only implies animation and volition, but imparts a logic of desire, intention, inclination, disposition, nature and principle. To understand the deeper underlying principle at work here, we need to briefly examine this logos of "will". When we say that one desires, we imply a conscious craving of wish fulfillment. This desirous impulse is often considered lustful and thereby connotative of greed. That wildland agent-principals can desire is patently absurd and furthermore an erroneous assumption which ignores the complex logos of ecologic harmony and balance germane to the wild-earth-spirit context of wildness.
Intentions suggest a determination or resolve which may be a concentrate of desire. Thus, to suggest that wildlands have desires and intentions is both allegorically incorrect and categorically mistaken. Wildland is, however, possessed with an inclination and disposition to nature and principle. Moreover, it is inclined to a principled state as defined by nature. The disposition of wildland is clearly evident in its condition of ecologic interrelationship — e.g., some lands are disposed out of climatic factors to be deserts while others are inclined to be rain forests. We classify this disposition of wildlands into ecosystems, thereby referencing their nature. But what is the essential nature of wildness — i.e., wildland and wild-earth-spirit? Let us posit here, that like the Manitou concept, it is mysterious interrelationship and principle of power(s). Principle denotes origin, source, and source of action; it emphasizes initial states and natural tendencies. It, therefore, posits motive force. Such must be the pervasive quality of wildness which is imbued with the principled maxim of origin and beginnings. Thus in sacred principle, wildness must impart creation like Pa'tama'was — i.e., it is a fundamental source and basis for the creation of all that is. This is no doubt the quick of Thoreau's maxim that "In wildness is the preservation of the world."
CHAPTER V

WILDERNESS WILL and Rationalism

The acknowledgement that wilderness means will-of-the land (cf. Chapter III), threatens contemporary anthropocentricism (cf. Note 1, Chapter I). This anthropocentricism is born from the human egoistic philosophy of rationalism, which is a subsequent tenet of meta-reductionism (cf. Chapter IV). Rationalism is a premise which gives rise to a notion of reality as universal abstraction. Moreover, reality is viewed as the manifestation of thought. In accepting this premise, the wilderness Historian Roderick Nash (1982:5) contends that there is a "tendency of wilderness to be a state of mind." Thus "to accept as wilderness those places people call wilderness. The emphasis here is not so much what wilderness is but what men think it is." The authors of Wilderness Management (Hendee, Stankey & Lucas 1978:9) agree and call wilderness "the terra incognito of people's minds."

Wilderness as a concept of mind bears out the anthropocentric management notion which is inherent to "mind over matter" rationalizations. The consequence of this rationalization is the categorial mistake which Nash, Hendee, et al make in conceiving wilderness as a state of mind. Moreover, this conclusion fosters the abstract perceptions of matter as the object of mind. Wilderness is thus conceived as an artifice of man's mind. The practical results of this thinking are managerial notions shaping the will-of-the-land --
hence, wilderness management. This positive is clear upon investigating
the origins of the term management. Manage, from the Old French
Menagerie, first meant the control of domestic animals, thus, it meant
to handle and was derived from the Latin manus (hand). It was, however,
éarly influenced by menage which is from Old French mesnage derived from
the late Latin form mansionaticum management of the manison (Shipley,
79). Thus manage is closely connected to domestic control (cf. Weekley
1967: 887). The suffix -ment derives from the Latin -mentum which was
added to verb-stems and generally expressed the result or product of the
verb's action, for example fragmentum (fragment), but at other times it
represented the means or instrument of the action, such as alimentum
(aliment). In the Old French adoption of this suffix, it retained these
original functions, but came also to represent a formative of active
nouns. English adopted it as a means of formulating words with concrete
senses, for example garment (Oxford English Dictionary 1971: 1770; 341)
and hence management. It is in this concrete sense, that management is
the working or cultivation of the land. In the active senses of the
verb formative (Old French), management denotes "the action or manner of
managing" that is, "the application of skill or care in the
manipulation, use, treatment, or control (of things or persons, or in
the conduct of an enterprise, operation, etc.) [OED 1971: 1711; 106].

Wilderness management thus implies that we will manipulate,
domesticate and control the will-of-the-land. Wilderness management is
clearly a contradiction of terms. A historical note which further bears
out the irony of this conception -- wilderness management -- is the way
in which Menagerie appeared in Old French. Moreover, Menagerie
originally represented the treatment given the chichevache - a mythical creature, destroyed by the civilized world (Shipley, 79). The civilized world is the epitomy of anthropocentricism. This human chauvinism manifests itself in the management of wildland for human habitat and subsequent recreation. We translate this practice as civilization and its policy represents the convenience that emerges from a human desiring for a world of order, control and domestication. This desiring culminates in a world -- civilization -- desiringly free from the dread of not-being which must confront all who are subject to the will-of-the-land. How can the will-of-the-land have meaning in such a civilized world? How can human -- civilized -- minds conceive the will-of-the-land? And how can wilderness exist in this menagerie of mental management.

The Mental Management of Wilderness

In order to address these questions, we must investigate the locus of this mental management ideology. The modern anthropocentric perspective postulates rationality as the primary requisite of will. Will is thus steeped with desirefulness and intentionality. Hence will is, in this case, essentially a tenet of rationalism which is another process germaine to meta-reductionism (cf. Chapter IV). Rationalism contends that "truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive." (Bourke in Runes 1960:263) DeCarte's "I think, therefore I am" implies that all being is dependent upon thought for existence. Moreover, in this conception, the reality of being is based upon the abstraction of thought. This perception gives rise to a notion of reality as
abstraction. It is clearly rationalism in the narrowest sense where reason alone provides insight into the nature of what exists. Also, the motive force of what exists is provided by the mind.

DeCartes' rationalism exemplifies nominalism in its deductive character and furthers the logic of meta-reductionism through a belief that everything is explicable and subservient to a single system - i.e. the mind of man. Furthermore, in advancing meta-reductionism, rationalism serves anthropocentrism in consigning will to desire and intentionality. In this way, wildland - agent principals are disenfranchised. The result is to deny wilderness -- the will which is wildness or the motive force (will-force) characteristic to the will-of-the-land cosmology. Rationalism clearly adds to meta-reductionism by furthering human chauvinistic doctrines which impoverish reality. Logically, then, philosophic rationalism acts through the psychological process of rationalization to foster the anthropocentric desire and intentionality rationales for which human dominance and control are characteristic of wilderness management.

It has, however, been posited that the desire and intentionality of rationalism do not properly reflect the deeper realities inherent to the will-of-the-land cosmology (cf. Chapter IV). Moreover, that the land has a will is more properly a recognition of its own inclinations and dispositions -- that is, the naturalis of natura. This insight is an acknowledgement of wildness as motive force. It is an ecological hierophany expressive of many primal peoples' cosmological doctrines. This will-of-the-land cosmology is based upon a primal quickening -- an insight which distinguishes between principal (naturata -- nature) and
principle (naturalis -- of nature). Principal is the agent-form or that which materially manifests itself. It is the wilderness as physically and materially experienced -- i.e., the naturata (nature). Principle is the underlying agent-of-form or that which generates and creates, moreover, it is motive force, the naturalis (of nature). Principle is thus unseen; it is meta-physically and spiritually experienced. There is, however, no separation inherent to this distinction. Principal and Principle are one in their wholeness. They are a sacred totality, an ecological hierophany -- the naturalis of naturata, and hence, they posit fundamental condition or truth.

Primal Perspectives on the Will-of-the-Land

As we have seen (cf. Chapter IV), the Algonkian peoples of the eastern woodlands acknowledged this uncanny interrelationship as Kitchi Manitou ("Great Mysterious"), a term which we today can scarcely grasp the meaning and importance of. Many other Native American cosmologies likewise acknowledge this ecological hierophany of principal and Principle. The Lakota, for example, call this sacred conception Wakan Tanka or "Great Mysterious." Professor Joseph Epes Brown explains that Wakan is best translated as mysterious powers as in sacred and that it is latent to all forms of the phenomenal world. The Lakota Shaman, Sword says that

Every object in the world has a spirit and that spirit is Wakan. Thus, the spirit of the tree or things of that kind, are also Wakan... The earth and the rock and the mountain pertain to the Chief Wakan. We do not see the real earth and rock but only their tonwami. When a Lakota prays to Wakan Tanka, he prays to the earth and to the rocks and all good Wakan beings. (Sword through J. R. Walker in Tedlock 1975:207)
Furthermore, Professor Brown explains that throughout the Plains Indian cultures, there is an ultimate recognition of the unity of powers -- the interrelationship of all things or "Wakan beings." These mysterious powers in holistic interrelationship -- Wakan Tanka -- are "Great Mysterious." (1) In both cases -- Lakota and Algonkian -- this sacred concept is expressed in the infinitive mode of two adjectives as opposed to the finite quality which a noun imparts. The hierophany is itself polysynthetic in formulation. It is at once active in disposition, descriptive in expression, and objective in orientation. This polysynthetic structure augments well with the way in which will became wild in expression of place. Moreover, the adjective wild operates as an infinitive and when connected with the suffix ness, they together connote a sacred condition which may make wilderness in principal and Principle an Indo-European equivalent for "Great Mysterious." (cf. Chapter IV).

This will-of-the-land cosmology is a central element of early Indo-European religion. These primal peoples acknowledge the ecological heirophany of wilderness in their daily lives. For example, the ancient Celtic conception will-force, is explained by MacBain (1917) to be creative life force animating being. All of nature, both "animate" and "inanimate," was conceived to be compelled by a willfulness and existed in a self-willed condition. (2) This perspective obligated the people to observe the "sacred silence" of the nemeton or wilderness sanctuary. The Celts recognized spirits and souls everywhere -- in ancient trees, weird rocks, and in rivers and bogs. This acknowledgement of the land for itself in material manifestation -- principal -- and again in
pervasive will-force or meta-physical Principle constituted the ecological heirophany of wilderness. Celtic mythology is filled with these weird relational qualities. The term weird is most appropriate for expressing this cosmology. Primarily a Scottish word in origin, thus hinting Celtic roots, weird is associated with will or agency of powers. (OED 1971: 3731;272-273) Furthermore, weird connotes magical powers and enchantment, such as the "wilderness experience" generates.

Many other primal religious traditions, likewise, share in this cosmological perspective of wilderness. For example, the "Shin" of Japanese Shinto denotes "nature spirit" and there is no separation between the universe and Divine Spirit. The Chinese Tao or "Way" is another acknowledgement of the ecological hierophany of wilderness. Taoism is based upon a natural unity and rhythm which is pervasive throughout the universe. Seyyed Hossein Nasr (1976:85-86) explains:

It is of cardinal importance that the Tao is both the Principle, the way to attain the Principle and also the order of things. It is in fact the order of nature if we remember all that Taoism means by nature. Tao, the Principle that is also the order and harmony of all things, is everywhere present, in everything that is great, or small. "The Tao does not exhaust itself in what is greatest nor is it ever about from what is least; and therefore, it is to be found complete and diffused in all things." . . . the Tao . . . pervades all things and also transcends all things.

. . .

[Hence] To be happy with nature means precisely to accept its norms and its rhythms rather than to seek to dominate and overcome it. Nature should not be judged according to human utility nor earthly man made the measure of all things. There is no anthropomorphism connected with man's relations with nature. Man should accept and follow the nature of things and not seek to disturb nature by artificial means. Perfect action is to act without self-interest and attachment, or, in other words, according to nature which acts freely and without greed, lust or other ulterior motives.
The way is in effect the will-of-the-land and it acts desirelessly, free from intentionality.

In Zen Buddhism, the concept of one mind, one body is universal. This conceptualization provides a means for nature veneration through biologically equalitarian principles. All creation, all beings are Buddhas and they provide "intrinsic enlightenment" or "Honsho". (Cook 1978:3) Japan's thirteenth-century Zen Master Dogen explains that the grass, the forest and so forth, are the mind, the body of the Buddha way. Nature then is the ultimate reality as one attains enlightenment by making the mind of grass one's own mind. It is the rocks and trees who preach the Dharma or Truth according to Dogen. (Cook 1978:115-125) The Buddha is recognized best in "the forms of the mountains and the sounds of the valley streams." (Cook 1978:112)

Furthermore, in the primal interpretations of the three great monotheistic traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, there are specific cosmological doctrines and mythic hierophanies which bear striking similarities to the preceding primal citations. These traditions, however, deserve closer scrutiny in a latter work which cannot adequately be presented herein because complex ambiguities are associated with these traditions and their anthropocentric influences.

Will-of-the-Land vs. Meta-reductionary rationalism

We can, however, observe in all of the cosmologies presented herein, a contradistinction with DeCarte's meta-reductionary philosophy of rationalism. Moreover, the primal cosmologies acknowledge that will is most potently discovered in the wild or wilderness as manifesting the
will-of-the-land. This primial recognition of will holds no dichotomy between the naturalis of naturata. When, for example, the Lakota, Sword explains that "we do not see the real earth and rock but only their tonwampi [which is their form or material manifestation]", he is expressing understanding of deeper, underlying Principle. The form -- earth, rock or tree -- is perceived materially but it is also identified with motive force or underlying Principle. This is the naturalis of naturata hierophany where distinction is made without separation. This ecological hierophany is pervasive in primal worldviews where the people have a relational contact with the will-of-the-land. When the naturalis of naturata hierophany is violated, then principal Principle are separated. This act is a profanation. For example, in the Finno-Ugric reverence for a tree soul or spirit -- ort, the people recognize that the ort may be disturbed when improper behavior is exercised in its presence (cf. Chapter III). Likewise when the land becomes degeneratedly domesticated -- controlled and ordered as in civilization (cf. Note 1, Chapter I) -- then it surrenders its free will and the will-force characteristic to the naturalis of naturata hierophany diminishes. Thus, it is extremely difficult to encounter the "soul-mood" in civilized settings. It is for this reason that primal peoples journeyed away from their habitations to sacred groves, mountains, etc. for religious quest. The wilderness requires of humans an acknowledgement of the sacred through the ecological hierophany -- the naturalis of naturata. In such cases, one cannot escape the reality of wildness and will-force as underlying Principle characteristic to the material agent-principals of wilderness which together generate the
will-of-the-land cosmology that is born from worshipping on the heath, moor, or in the grove.

Rationalism and Civilization

As civilization (cf. Chapter I) overcame primal culture and society -- subjugating will to human desire or exemplifying the practice of human chauvinism -- the human species made a grave error in shifting its relational ethos with the earth to a rationalized anthropocentrism. Carried away with a narcissistic sense of consciousness which characterizes rationalism, imperial religion subdued the primal perspective. Although built to recreate and stimulate the sublime awe and thereby emulate the naturalis of naturata inherent to wild settings, the churches, cathedrals and temples are within the ordered, domestic control of civilization. (3) As a result, imperial religion fosters rationalism and its concept of will in opposition to realism and its reality of will. The product of this practice is the domestication and degeneration of the will within the human species itself. Subsequently, humans have lost contact with the will-of-the-land which has denigrated into a restricted sense, that is, a concept of will where only humans can engage in mental acts of rationality. Proper respect for realism and genuine human rationality are thereby lost. How is this so?

The anthropocentrism characteristic to rationalized will denies the reality inherent to the will-of-the-land cosmology. Thus, a rock or a tree or even another "higher" animal cannot be a possessor of will. Rationalism, moreover, grounds will in desire and intentionality. It is associated with human longings for power and immortality. In
rationalism, the concept of will emerges from an escapist fantasy where humans are above and apart from the earth. In this conception, there is a dictohomizing and separation of the ecological hierophany, hence in this rationalism, Principle is most esteemed and alleged to elude or exist without principal. Through this rationalization, principal become profane while Principle is elevated to fantasy, free of realism. This delusion of rationalism is postulated from human desires to super-transcend life into immortal self which is non-reconcilable with the earthly processes of life and death characterized by the naturalis of naturata hierophany and the will-of-the-land cosmology. Hence, rationalism promotes a fantasy world of promise in the nether regions of heaven where the ego-self reigns supreme eternally. It in effect denies death because of the fear of losing personal identity in the face of "Great Mysterious."

Rationalism, therefore, promotes a "concept of will" which is realistically narcissism and human chauvinism in ethical practice. Moreover, the principle of utility, as espoused in utilitarianism, emerges as the dominant ethic by which humans should relate with non-humans -- whether they be other animals, plants, or the physical earth, itself. The maximization of utility, that is, the production of the greatest amount of pleasure or happiness for humans in the world at large, is then the ethical positive of rationalism. This ethos leads to the excessive projection of human values onto nature. A degenerate human will resonating with the desire for management is produced to argue that the wilderness is diabolical and evil so as to nurture rationalism and anthropocentric desires. Hence, rationalism is a
will-to-power notion of meta-reductionism where the logic is to make an enemy of the other -- nature in this case -- and then dominate or manage it so as to project self upon it. The result is the death of the other. Moreover, the logic of this meta-reductionism was presented in Chapter IV where the nominalization of "sacred power", the will-of-the-land, into an abstract individual entity (deity, or dragon as in the case of Loch Ness) robs the principal of its power. Power, then, without a home or agent manifestation is appropriated by a human position of power -- i.e., authority; in the form of the priesthood, hence giving birth to human chauvinism. Secular authority similarly is the result of nominalism identifying and concentrating the social power of the group into political position, and thus into social hierarchy and class structure. Thus, rationalism kills the relational connections between the reality of will which is the wildness in nature (including the human). It produces an ethos where the one species is "chosen" and is to be served at the expense of the many other species. This ethos is then an anthropocentric meta-reductionism where will-force -- motive-force -- is available only for the utility of the "chosen," -- the human, the one species which worships itself.

The philosophy of rationalism postulates that will is one of the two rational faculties of the human soul. Other animals are said to be totally sensory motivated and devoid of the ability to choose. The Aristotilian conception of potential bears this claim out with the notion that only the human intellect can be conscious of willing. In this conception, will has become the justification of reason and subject only to the human mind. Philosophers of rationalism further inform us
that true choice exists only in rational beings which is for them, solely the province of the human species. In this perception, the land can have no will, no sense of will-force; furthermore, even the other "higher" animals are incapable of will, because humans seek to be god-like. The human species has thus defined itself into a niche of separation where it is no longer natural like other animals nor yet supernatural as a god. This disruption epitomizes a categorial mistake of humans separate and outside of wildness and free from the laws of nature that characterize the naturalis of naturata ecological hierophany and will-of-the-land cosmology.
EPILOGUE: Continuing the Will-of-the-Land Cosmology

With these five chapters, we have only begun to factor out the Will-of-the-Land cosmology and many questions remain concerning will (wild) and ness in conceptual relationship. Furthermore, what are the values characteristic to wilderness solitude? In order to address these conceptual needs, I intend to continue this work with several forthcoming chapters:

VI. Wilderness of Will & Personal Identity. This chapter will include a further explanation of wilderness will. It will also formulate a relational basis for the self in personal identity with ecosystems, the planet and the cosmos concordant with the Will-of-the-Land cosmology.

VII. Nature-Ness & the Norse Gods. This chapter will further examine the ecological heirophany, the *naturalis* of *naturata*, while presenting the primary way the Norse Gods were understood by the Norse people. In addition it will continue the personal identity and wilderness relationship as it pertains to spirit and soul.

VIII. Celtic Fairies & the Feral Condition -- Spirit and soul in wilderness context will be the central point of explication in this chapter. It will, likewise, provide a more primary way of viewing fairies, spirits and souls which upholds the original sense of Nature Awe.
IX. Soul-Mood & Wildness Atonement -- As a summary chapter, this explication will focus upon the way in which the "soul-mood" quickens our person. As a result, it intends to factor out the reckonings of wilderness solitude, its psychological experience and ethical values.

Consequently, these first five chapters which compose this thesis should be accepted explicitly on their own merits and with recognition of future elaboration forthcoming. The end product will be a monograph which explicates a Will-of-the-Land cosmology.
END NOTES

PROLOGUE: The Question of Wilderness Solitude

(1) Mr. Fred Wolf was the District Manager responsible for this statement. He was, at that time, administratively responsible for the Rawlins District Office, BLM -- USDI.

(2) Promoting the "Sagebrush Rebellion" -- a move to remove federally held public lands into private ownership, -- Mr. Mon Tiegan was responsible for this statement.

(3) These Romantic and Transcendental movements and their call for wilderness preservation is well documented in Huth 1972 and Nash 1982. The Romantic period constitutes something of a revolution from traditional utilitarian values and is founded upon an inspiration of place. In Europe where the Romantic movement began as a poetic and philosophic expression, Edmund Burke's A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) stands out prominently. Burke's French counterpart Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) provides, perhaps the best articulation of this movement. (cf his Social Contract and the Reveries of the Solitary Walker, both of which are characterized by skepticism and criticisms of the Western civilization which he regarded as a sad deviation from the natural conditions of existence.) Further articulating this movement are the poetic works of William Blake (1757-1827), Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) and William Wordsworth (1770-1850), among others who prominently expressed a Romantic Naturism (cf. Bernbaum 1948). In America, the Romantic movement assumed a transcendental character positing the immanance of the divine in the finite existence of nature, thereby tending towards pantheism -- e.g., Ralph Waldo Emerson's "Nature", "oversoul", "The Transcendentalist." This doctrine was idealistic and intuitive and its ethics embraced idealism, individualism, mysticism, reformism, and optimism regarding human nature. It was broadly mystical and unitarian in its fundamental religious conceptualization.

(4) The Federal Land Management Agencies make no reference to any of the Romantic and Transcendental doctrines in developing their criteria for assessing wilderness character. Yet, wilderness historians Huth 1972 and Nash 1982, as well as others, clearly tie the precedent for wilderness preservation and our cultural thoughts about wilderness character into these movements. Acknowledged in note (3) both Movements posit a fundamentally religious ethos towards wild nature. In failing to factor these values into wilderness review criteria, the Agencies are guilty of serious neglect of the cultural ethos which the 1964 Wilderness Act was founded upon.
(5) Only the Federal Agencies will be discussed with regard to their wilderness solitude assessment criteria. State Agencies have generally followed their Federal counterparts in conducting wilderness reviews. They, therefore, have very little to offer in original ideals and criteria for these endeavors.

(6) From this conclusion, it may not immediately appear as true that the N.P.S. and the F.& W.S. used a laissez-faire approach to wilderness review. In failing to conceptualize other requisite wilderness criteria, both agencies have failed to respect Section 2(c)(a) of the 1964 Wilderness Act, whereby wilderness areas are defined as places having "outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation." These wilderness opportunities are central to the "wilderness experience" which is a fundamental mandate of the Law. In ignoring these "opportunities" and basing evaluation totally upon factors of size and naturalness, the respective agencies are debasing both the Law and the cultural mandate for the wilderness concept itself. This accusation should not be seen as a basis for concluding that solitude or primitive unconfined recreational opportunities might not be inherent in all wildlands, that such wildlands intrinsically possess such opportunities should properly be recognized as a given, however, in qualifying areas for wilderness designation, it is essential that we understand the basis -- essential features and attributes -- which characterize these experiential states.

(7) It should be acknowledged that the RARE II process was invalidated by the decision in California v. Bergland which was affirmed almost entirely upon appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Opinion of Oct. 22, 1982). The Appeals Court invalidated RARE II primarily because it failed to fulfill provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), specifically Section 4332 (42 U.S.C. 1976):

\[\text{... all agencies of the Federal Government shall --}\]

(A) Utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in decision-making which may have an impact on man's environment.

(B) Identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on Environmental quality established by Title II of this Act, which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decision-making along with economic and technical considerations;

\[\text{... ...}\]

(F) Recognize the world wide and long-range character of environmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions,
and programs designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world environment;

(G) Make available to states, counties, municipalities, institutions, and individuals, advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing the quality of the environment.

... ... 

The Appeals Court also cites provisions of the Forest Planning Act [36 C.F.R. §219.1(b), §219.13(c)(1) & (6)] as commanding attention to wilderness attributes and values, in the Forest Planning Process. Furthermore, the decision specifically cites the WARS process as faulty and inadequate.
(1) Human chauvinism and its arrogant belief in the intrinsic value of civilization is characterized by the conditions of anthropocentricism and homocentricism. The morality of these perspectives is comprised of utilitarian and teleological ethics where all of wild nature is subsumed into the human chauvinistic category of natural resources. This position serves to deny wild others their intrinsic value. Moreover, utilitarian and teleological ethics generate a morality whereby all of wild nature is measured by its ability to service human utility -- i.e., the maximization of human pleasure and happiness. Successional stages of this narcissistic value structure produce the basis for social hierarchy in relagating selected humans -- including both classes and entire cultures -- to non-egalitarian provinces of human society. Thus, an under privileged class or third world nation (culture) emerges as a "natural resource" for the social elite or bourgeoisie and upper classes. Hence, that which dominates and enslaves wild nature as natural resources, and that which produces social hierarchy and human resources -- humans as resources -- are both born of the same ethical structure which is itself the ethos of anthropocentricism and homocentricism.

The chauvinism or militant narcissism of both anthropocentricism and homocentricism is borne out with a thorough etymological analysis. Anthropocentricism is a compound of the Greek words for man and center. Hence, anthropocentricism is "centring in man; regarding man as the central fact of the universe, to which all surrounding facts have reference." [OED 1971: 90(360) & 91 (361) cf. Weekley 1967:55] Anthropocentricism is thus "A point of view which regards man as of central importance in the universe." (Winnick 1970:28) In its literal centering in man positive, the concept is "used in connection with extreme humanism, viewing the world in terms only of human experience." (Fern in Runes 1960:13) This perspective has been philosophically articulated as anthroposophy - i.e., "An occult system claiming that the key to wisdom and to an understanding of the universe lies in man himself. The original Greek coinage signified 'wisdom about man'. It is now applied to the philosophically eclectic teaching of Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925), who believed that cultivation of man's evolving spiritual perceptions was the most important task facing humanity." (Flew 1984:15) Hence, anthropocentricism is a condition which considers man to be the most significant entity of the universe and within its perspective, the world is both interpreted and regarded in terms of human values and experiences. Albeit, the anthroposophy positive may permit the development of an enlightened insight from the interior dimension of wilderness solitude (cf. Chapter II) and promote subsequent sacred-ethical values derivative from the wild "soul-mood" experience, it however becomes itself a profanation of the wild values characteristic of Nature through its connection with civilization and the promotion of baseless human desires and interests at the needless expense of wildness.
The analysis of civilization and its intrinsic value further clarifies this position on anthroposophy. Civilization is a compound of civilize and action. [OED 1971:422 (448)] Civilize is derivative from the Latin Civialis which means "of or pertaining to citizens, their private rights, etc., hence relating to the body of citizens and their commonwealth." [OED 1971: 422 (446-447)] Furthermore, civilis derives from the Latin civil and to civilize which is "to make civil, to bring out of a state of barbarism, to instruct in the arts of life, and thus elevate in the scale of humanity; to enlighten, to refine, polish," as well as to domesticate or tame wild animals. In addition, civilize means "to make 'civil' or moral, to subject to the laws of civil or social propriety." [OED 1971 422(448)]. The question is, who's values and morals establish social propriety? The references to barbarism and wild animals provide clues for answering this question. Barbarism is a reference to barbarians. Barbarian derives from "bable bable," etymologically meaning "A foreigner, one whose language and customs differ from the speaker's." Historically, this term has been applied to "One living outside the pale of the Roman empire and its civilization, applied especially to the northern nations who over threw them." It also applies to one who is not Greek and one who is outside the pale of Christianity [OED 1971:166 (663)] Barbarism is the valuative diminution given to those who hold a contradictory ethos -- or with opposing sacred and ethical More's and traditions. Those of a barbarous positive are thus those who are foreign and those who do not conform to the control and domination of the Greco-Roman civilization. Hence barbarians are wild. Greco-Roman civilization required that such cultures conform and submit to their values. This practice is a fundamental value intrinsic to the notion of civilization in opposition to wilderness. In the compound civilization, the suffix -action is used forms nouns of action from Latin participles. Thus, civilization is the act of civilizing or living in a civilized state or condition. It is, therefore, the rationale for domesticating, dominating and controlling others. It also posits a view to order the will of another to one's chosen values, that is, for example, to domesticate a wild animal. Moreover, this practice is the diminution of the wild animal's self-will, its very wildness is reduced in favor of the values of the civilizer. As a result the animal loses its volition and its very motive force. Such actions apply to humans as well, the fundamental conditions of civilization includes "internal social hierarchies, specialization, cities and large populations...." (Winnick 1970: 117) Herein, the city-state has an enormous importance in the maintenance of civilization. A city-state is "An autonomous state, consisting of a city and its outskirts. Usually there is a well-defined distinction between a peasant and a bourgeois class, as in Phoenecia or Greece." (Winnick 1970: 117) Consequently, city-states are not equalitarian societies and their intrinsic ethical structure is focused upon diminishing wilderness in favor of order and control as defined by social hierarchy. Values are as a result utilitarian and teleological in their maximization of the elites' pleasure
and happiness. This combination with anthropocentricism generates an ethos which posits others as resources - i.e., human chauvinism or the militant narcissism reflective of mankind as the central measure of the universe -- an absolved entity unto itself in transcendental divinity. The concept of homocentricism further advances a false dichotomy between man and nature. In its usage, homocentricism assumes a prima facie arrogance. The term homocentric is a compound of the Greek words for same and center, hence having the same center or likeness. [OED 1971: 1323(355)] The confusion characteristic to this term is its anthropological significance as derived from the Latin word meaning man. This condition is philosophically homological, that is, in English's borrowing of homo from both Greek and Latin, the term homocentricism is compounded with a structural correspondence which confuses its usage. For example, in English usage we commonly apply homocentricism to situations where we actually mean anthropocentricism. This homological error produces the arrogance of homocentricism, which is the prima facie conclusion of human chauvinism. Moreover, the anthropocentric consideration of man as the most significant entity of the universe and that all experiences must be interpreted and regarded in human valuation schemes, results in the a priori decision that we consider only other selected members of the human species who are like us, ergo we become homocentric, that is, concerned only with our same kind and thus imperious to the intrinsic values of others, particularly the wild which threatens our centricism.


(2) The basis for capitalizing "Nature Awe" is grounded in the naturalis of natura — i.e., the of nature of nature. Contrary to pantheism where all is conceived to be of God, Nature Awe cosmology is a complex ideology where the naturalis of natura represents principal in Logos with Principle — i.e., agent-form as manifest from motive force in holistic harmony, as in the yin-yang conception of Taoism. (cf. Chapter IV, "Wildness in Principle").

(3) Much fiction has been proposed concerning Celtic Druidism. The megalithic monuments of Stonehenge and an Avebury have, for example, been attributed to the Celts. (cf. MacBain 1917) Furthermore, it has been posited that the Druids practiced blood sacrifices. This hypothesis is, however, a fiction born of Christian narcissism. megalithic monuments such as Stonehenge and Avebury pre-date the Celts and their arrival in the British Isles. The megalithic peoples who built these monuments may have practiced blood sacrifice but there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the Celts conducted such practices. The Celts did, in fact, take these sites over for predicting seasonal periodicity related to agricultural practices, but there is no substantiative evidence supporting Druidic blood sacrifice. In using
these sites, the Celts found the Megalithic cairns and barrows very suitable for storing the cremated remains of their dead. Urns were thus deposited in these earthen structures and it is most probably this practice and the population control measure of infanticide which lead to the fiction of Druidic blood sacrifices. (cf. Markale 1978 and Cunliffe 1979)

(4) That the construction of man-made temples and other human structures profane a sacred site is a point of some contention. In addressing this contention, we should first recognize that the Nature Awe tradition was and is fundamentally a veneration of the naturalis of natura (cf. Chapter IV) and hence a tradition which acknowledged the will-of-the-land over and above the will-of-man (cf. Chapter III). Construction of temples, cathedrals, and other human artifices in wilderness sanctuaries results in a controlling and ordering of the sacred will-of-the-land. This practice is intentionally a means for fulfilling the desires of human pleasure and happiness. The structures inhibit natural ecological processes, thereby reducing the sacred actions and presences of both principal and Principle (cf. Chapter IV). The result is a reduced efficacy of site and a diminished will-of-the-land. Despite the fact that these structures were often built to emulate the natural features (cf. Cathedral design) which evoked the "soul-mood," they excluded the majority of wild agents which are essential to the will-of-the-land condition. Hence the sites became impotent of wildness in both principal and Principle; they came to serve only human utility -- the maximization of human pleasure and happiness -- but this human desire of convenience put an end to the Nature Awe religious traditions of empathy with the will-of-the-land and wildness atonement.

(5) It has been the primary purpose of this article to refute Nash's contention that no Old World people appreciated wilderness. In so doing, I may have over-emphasized the "positive" aspects of Nature Awe and its near romantic appearing veneration of wilderness. Of course, such a romantic interpretation would be a serious mis-construal of the Nature Awe tradition. That the ancient Celts very much appreciated wildness is clearly evident, however, they also found some aspects of nature frightening. MacCulloch (1948:15) states, "it should be noted that other beings, monstrous and harmful, dwelt in rivers or lakes, water-horses, water-bulls, and the like...." The fear of some aspects of nature is a normal inferiority before the naturalis and natura. Fear does not, however, entail loathing, hating or dread which have been the standard interpretations of European conceptions of nature.
CHAPTER II. THE EDGE OF WITHIN ...."
Solitude in Origin and Meaning

(1) This discussion of Avallon has been largely drawn from my original "Nature Awe" article published Spring 1983, Vol. nine, No. 1, Western Wildlands, Missoula, Montana Forest and Conservation Station, School of Forestry, University of Montana.

(2) The following definitions are provided for solitude:
I. SOLUS
   A. The state of being solitary: a solitary life, lonely life (Partridge 1958: 640) -- e.g., "The misanthrope enjoys his solitude" (Stein 1967).
      1. "The state of being or living alone; loneliness, seclusion, solitariness (of persons)" (OED 1971: 2913;404).
      2. "The state of being without opportunity for social intercourse; seclusion from society; lonely condition" (Funk 1963:2316).
      4. Other distinctions or meanings:
         a. time alone (without companions)
         b. loneliness
         c. seclusion
         d. solitariness
         e. remoteness from others
         f. isolation
         g. soliloquy and "stopping the internal dialogue"
         h. quest for being, personal identity and definition
         i. cloistered condition: sensory deprivation -- e.g., alone in a closet
         j. mindfulness -- introspective consciousness
         k. solitudinarian -- a recluse or hermit
         l. solo
         m. development of freedom and independence -- i.e., self-reliance and self-dependence
         n. autonomy -- development of adequate self-responsibility and adequate self-direction -- together with independence of social influences.

   B. Vacuum domicilium -- the notion that a place is desolate without permanent human habitation or civilization -- hence, loneliness (of places in human utilitarian valuation); "remoteness from habitations; absence of life or stir" (e.g., in a
II. COSMOLOGICAL THEMES of Solitude
A. Interior -- the idea of space.
A lonely unfrequented, or uninhabitated place (a solitude or solitudes). Solitude (or solitudes) is used metonymically, that is as a figure of speech where the name of one thing is given another based-upon associated or share attributes. Hence, the attribute solitude is used to define wilderness and, conversely, dictionaries will define solitude as wilderness. For example,
1. "A place that is deserted or lonely; a desert" (Funk 1963: 2316);
2. "A solitary or lonely place, as a desert or wilderness" (Webster 1970: 284);
3. "Wilderness; lonely place, desert" (Clifton 1923: 1191);
5. Other distinctions, meanings and values:
   a. An emphasis upon the physical environment
      1. presence of wildness
      2. presence of wildlife
      3. presence of physical forces
         (e.g., the negative ions associated with a waterfall, or following a thunderstorm, etc.)
   b. Relationship with human values of wilderness
      1. environmental screening for seclusion
      2. environmental spaciousness for
         loneliness, soul-mood, etc. (human sensory perceptions and values of landscapes).
      3. a place for finding the spiritual interior -- i.e., go to the interior to find the interior.
   c. Creature solitude i.e., the right and opportunity for other animals -- wildlife, and landscapes -- wildlands -- to be alone, undisturbed, untrammeled and free from human influence, presence, domination and interference.
B.  The VOID: "A complete absence or lack" (OED 1971: 2913, 404); "dearth" (Webster 1970: 284). The void is contingent upon emergent will. Associations with the void include:
1. in want or need
2. to be deficient or missing
3. to be short or have need of something
4. to stand in need of: suffer from the absence of deficiency of
5. inattention to present surroundings or occurrences
6. the scarcity that makes dear
7. an inadequate supply
8. synonymous with solitude in this void sense are lack, want, need, require: i.e., to be without something essential or greatly desired. Luck can imply either an absence or a shortage in supply, want adds to lack the notion of urgency in needing or desiring; need stresses urgent necessity more than absence or shortage, require often interchangeable with need, may heighten the implication of urgent necessity to the point of suggesting an imperativeness of needing or desiring.
9. intimidation from elemental wildness, including
   a. threat, fear
   b. estrangement
   c. sombriety and gloom
   d. desolation
10. serenity with wildness
    a. timelessness
    b. silence

C.  SOLE -- "The fact of being sole or unique" (OED 1971: 2913; 404). The condition of the sublime as founded upon sole - or - unique features of the wild landscape which are characterized by their:
1. being the only one
2. exclusive limited to one
3. specified individualness (unit or group)
4. single
5. exclusion of all else
6. producing only one result
7. being without a like or equal; unequaled
8. very rare or uncommon; very unusual
9. strange; bizarre; weird
10. sublimity; awe-inspiring
11. wonderment over rarity or oddity, etc.
END NOTES - Chapter II (continued)

12. esthetic contemplation (cf. Eliade 1959:152)
13. emotional gratification
14. majesty; majestic distinctiveness

D. "S O U L - M O O D "  -- a spiritual or sacred valuation of
the wild. "Soul-mood" is based on the deepest Latin
etymological derivation of solitude -- i.e., "sol"
(would in the middle English) and "mood" (based on
the Latin -tude suffix). The "soul-mood" is
characteristic of the sacred and religious devotion
to and reverence for the wild.
1. sacred in experience, a sense of the numinous
2. solemn as in religious observance -- i.e.,
ritual, ceremony and sacred rite -- e.g., in
wilderness sanctuaries, the occurrence of the
guardian or vision quest among native Americans
(the walk-about) Australian Aborigines, and in
the nemetons of the Nature Awe religions of
ancient Celts, Norse and other early
Indo-Europeans.
3. Meditation (cf. Eliade 1959: 153-4) which may be
soulful, re-creational and giving of solace.
4. Wildness atonement -- i.e., oneness with
wildness. This may be contemplative of the
numinous experience and of the naturalis of
naturata, the creative life force or spirit
pervasive to all that is. There is also herein
a reflection upon the unknown, and upon the
sacred relationship of principal, (form
manifest) and Principle (motive force). Hence
this "soul-mood" may be an intimacy with and
reflection upon "Great Mysterious" in the sense
of empathy, atonement and ecstasy.

(3) Vacuum domicilium became "a standard Christian argument ...
with which to justify their (the Puritans) occupation of native lands.
In the words of John Cotton, one of the leading Puritan ministers,
"Where is a vacant place, there is liberty for the son of Adam or Noah
to come and inhabit, though they neither buy it, nor ask their leaves
.... In a vacant soil, he that taketh possession of it, and bestoweth
culture and husbandry upon it, his right it is. And the ground of this
is from the Grand Charter given to Adam and his posterity in Paradise,
Genesis 1:28. Multiply and replenish the earth, and subdue it" (Segal &
Stinebeck 1977).
CHAPTER III. WILL-OF-THE-LAND:
Wilderness Among Early Indo-Europeans

(1) The reference to animate and inanimate nature should be recognized to be of modern origin, primal peoples would not acknowledge these categories. Furthermore, what is "stationary nature?" In lieu of the "new physics" (to) which McBain did not have access, we can be sure today that there is no such thing as "stationary nature." (cf. Capra 1980, Tablot 1981, and Zukav 1980)

(2) The problems of the concept of civilization are apparent in the discussion presented in note (1) Chapter I. Use of culture as an alternative has expression in Wendell Berry's The Unsettling of America: Culture & Agriculture (1970).
CHAPTER V. WILDERNESS WILL and Rationalism

(1) In presenting "Great Mysterious, the article "the" is deliberately omitted in order to avoid meta-reductionism. Should "the" be used, it would serve to the process of nominalizationism and subsequent nominalism of "Great Mysterious"; a condition which must be consciously avoided in order to be true to the cosmology. (cf. Chapter IV).

(2) Primal peoples, such as the Celts, do not acknowledge the categories of "animate" and "inanimate". Moreover, they perceive all that is to be "animate" in its nature. Hence there is an understanding present in these world views which perceives willfulness and self-willed positives as entity specific -- i.e., fundamental to the specific entity in Principle.

(3) The cathedral has emerged as a truly unique architectural product of northern Europe. The basis for its uniqueness is the sacred grove which it emulates. Moreover, the columns of cathedrals appear as the trunks of mature trees and the arches in their curving peak simulate the interface between two trees. Furthermore, the stain glass motifs appear in coloration to produce an effect much like sun-light upon a forest. One is inspired in a virgin mature forest to observe the shading and rays of light, and look through the trees to the heavens. This kind of forest produces a solemn, sublime effect upon the observer which is emulated in the vaulted ceiling of cathedrals. I am sure many other connections can be drawn between the cathedral and the sacred grove, that those presented are sufficient to acknowledge my point, is central to the fact that the cathedral is a technological recreation of the sacred grove. Hence, in representing the sacred grove, the cathedral occupies the site of the original grove and became profane (human technological) representation of agent-manifestation (i.e., principal) and agent-of-form (i.e., Principle) or motive force as observed in the wildness of the sacred grove.
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