1954

Britain's Pacific dominions and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1902-1921

Lawrence A. Hill

The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
BRITAIN'S PACIFIC DOMINIONS AND THE
ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 1902-1921

by

LAWRENCE A. HILL
B.A., Montana State University, 1952

Presented in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY
1954

Approved by:

[Signatures]

Chairman, Board of Examiners
Dean, Graduate School

Date 1954
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer is deeply grateful to Professor Robert T. Turner whose general guidance and careful critical reading of this manuscript through its several revisions are largely responsible for whatever value lies therein.

Special thanks are also due Dr. Ellis Waldron and Dr. Nan Carpenter for their critical reading of the manuscript, as well as to the members, faculty and students, of the graduate seminar in history and political science before whom sections of this thesis were read, and whose critical suggestions were a valuable aid in matters of organization and style.
"The lack of the fabulous may make my work dull. But I shall be satisfied if it be thought useful by those who wish to know the exact character of events now past. . . ."

Thucydides
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. THE ALLIANCE--ORIGIN TO 1920</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE POST-WAR ALLIANCE</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE DOMINION VOICE IN IMPERIAL AFFAIRS</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. ASIATIC IMMIGRATION--A DEAD ISSUE EXCEPT IN CANADA</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. JAPANESE-DOMINION TRADE--TOO LITTLE AND TOO LATE</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. IMPERIAL DEFENSE--DISARMAMENT THE ANSWER EXCEPT IN CANADA</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. THE END OF THE ALLIANCE--CANADA PREVAILS</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

THE ALLIANCE: ORIGIN TO 1920

That Great Britain, a first rate European power and the staunch proponent of "splendid isolation" should ally herself with an Asian state whose strength had not yet been tested against any Great Power, and whose "colored" citizens were not granted equality when emigrating to "white" countries, was virtually beyond comprehension. Yet on January 30, 1902, Baron Hayashi and Lord Lansdowne\(^1\) affixed their signatures to a document whose renewals were to make Japan and Great Britain allies for twenty years. The complex story of the alliance involves the politics and diplomacy of three continents.

By 1870, Britain found her once-secure position in western Asia threatened by the entry of rival European powers. Britain's advance from the south and Russia's from the north brought the two powers to a point where only Afghanistan separated them. The British were not unwilling that Russia should have a sphere of influence in eastern Asia, namely in north China, but were fearful lest continued Russian

\(^{1}\)Baron Tadasu Hayashi: Japan's ambassador in London. Lord Lansdowne: Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
southward expansion threaten their position in India. Nor was Britain's Asian position in danger from Russian expansion alone; trouble appeared from yet another direction. After 1871, France had turned once more towards colonial empire, and although her intrigues in Burma were ended by Britain's annexing that nation in 1886, her position in Indo-China troubled British statesmen because British Burma and French Indo-China were separated only by Siam.²

Britain's European position at the same time was scarcely more certain than her Asian one. Since 1871, Germany under Bismarck had been building an alliance system which, although designed to isolate France, also left Britain isolated. Her isolation became more dangerous after the conclusion of a secret Franco-Russian alliance in 1891.³ Britain was thus confronted in Europe not only by the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy) but also by the Dual Alliance (France and Russia). The German-dominated group could probably hurt her little in Asia, but the Franco-Russian combination could do her considerable damage there, owing to the fact that Russia's geographic location made it possible for her to exert pressure in Asia without challenging Britain's invincible sea-power. British statesmen were convinced that although the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance were concerned wholly with Europe, there was little

³Ibid., p. 5.
doubt that the effects would be felt in Asia as well.

The reason for Britain's wish for an Asian ally in spite of her policy of splendid isolation is easily found. It had been a fundamental policy of the British foreign office for over a century to make Asian alliances to secure British hegemony in India.\(^4\) China in 1890, appeared to be Britain's best potential ally, Japan being considered too weak because she had not yet had time to overcome the stagnation resulting from almost three centuries of isolation under Tokugawa rule. The British government consequently lost few chances to enhance friendly relations with China, and in 1893, when Siam was at war with France, an opportunity for negotiation was presented. Britain asked of China, through her minister at Peking, a treaty for the protection of Siam against French aggression. Afraid of Russia and France, however, China declined the offer.\(^5\)

With China unwilling to enter an alliance against Russia and France, Britain's position in Asia became more uncertain, but in 1894 an event occurred which changed fundamentally the Far Eastern picture. The long-standing rivalry over Korea between China and Japan came to a head in an uprising in Korea of a nationalistic and anti-Chinese religious cult called the Tonk-haks. Korea asked Chinese aid in suppressing the revolt and China quickly sent troops

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 18.  
\(^5\)Ibid., p. 12.
as did Japan. The uprising, however, had been put down before the arrival of either Japanese or Chinese troops, but the damage had been done; the presence of both Chinese and Japanese troops in Korea resulted in increased friction, and Japan renewed her age-old demand that China recognize the independence of Korea. China refused, and at her behest the Korean government asked the Japanese forces to leave. Japan countered with a demand for barracks for her troops. Korea refused.

Actual hostilities broke out when Japanese forces fired on one British and on several Chinese ships carrying Chinese troops to Korea. At first, as might be expected, British sympathies lay with the Chinese, and the Japanese suspected Britain of furnishing the Chinese with military intelligence. The battles of Ping-Yang and the Yalu, however, displayed the pathetic weakness of China, and British policy executed an immediate about-face.

If China could not defend herself against a supposedly weak Japan, it was extremely doubtful that she could defend British interests in Asia. China was hardly worth the designation of even a second-rate power. Japan had become the power to be considered, and British statesmen were not slow to realize that Britain, opposed by Russia and France on the one hand and by Japan on the other, might lose

her dominant position in the Far East. Britain was in no
danger of expulsion from the Far East; given her sea-power,
she was too strong for that. But Britain was accustomed to
being the first power in Asia, and it was a position she had
no intention of losing.

The Sino-Japanese War also brought about a change in
the policies of other European governments toward China.
While before the war, they had worked more or less in harmony
in China, afterwards their rivalries appeared just as strongly
there as anywhere else. China emerged from the war as the
"sick man of Asia," and the possibility of a partitioning
whetted the appetites of all the Great Powers.\(^8\) Added to the
rivalry was the fact that immediately after the war Russia
made the decision to ally herself with China. In May 1896,
Li Hung-Chang was sent to Russia to conclude a secret treaty
(simply called a treaty of alliance) concerned with the
construction of a railroad to Vladivostok. China was to
open all ports to Russian shipping, and China and Russia
were to help each other with maximum military forces if
Japan exerted aggressive pressure.\(^9\) The treaty was signed
for a duration of fifteen years.\(^9\) Britain stood alone in
Asia against France, Russia and China.

---

\(^8\) Alfred L. P. Dennis, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*,

\(^9\) *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China*
1894-1919, compiled and edited by John V. A. MacMurray,
Japan's position was no more enviable than was Britain's; she was faced with the same combination of forces, and in addition had reason to suspect Britain of being a Chinese ally. During the Sino-Japanese War, Japan had felt the danger of her isolated position. A sudden Russian attack on her exposed flank was a very real fear to Japanese military leaders, and the intervention of Russia, France and Germany at Shimonoseki, at the conclusion of the war, convinced Japan that if she were to take her "rightful" place in the world—one of equality with other nations—it was not enough for her to defeat them on the battlefield, she must be prepared to meet them diplomatically as well.10

Japan preferred Russia over Britain as a European ally because she considered Russia more dangerous and felt that an alliance with Britain would bring about a Russo-Japanese war for which she was not yet prepared. Negotiations for a Russian alliance were therefore pressed until 1898 on the basis of Manchuria for Russia and Korea for Japan. Russia, however, refused to abandon her claims in Korea, and the negotiations came to nothing.11

Also recognizing the danger of Russia in Asia, Britain likewise desired some sort of an understanding with her to ease the pressure. In 1898, she offered Russia a plan for an agreement on the basis that Russian interests

11Ibid., p. 49.
in China did not conflict with her own as long as Russia accepted north China (the Valley of Huang-Ho) as her sphere of influence and left south China (the Yangtze Valley) under British influence. A proposal for an Asian alliance was extended by Britain in January, 1898, and at first Russia seemed inclined to look with favor on the proposition, but during the negotiations Britain received some political and commercial advantages in China which gave St. Petersburg an excuse to break off the negotiations.12

Having failed with Russia, Britain turned next to Germany and proposed an alliance to deal exclusively with the Far East, but the Kaiser would accept nothing unless Britain were to join the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. Furthermore Germany did not wish to antagonize Russia, nor did she wish to involve herself in a fight for British interests in Asia.13

Britain, however, did not despair of a German agreement, and in 1900 with her prestige suffering from the Boer War, and with Russia taking advantage of the situation to accelerate her aggression in China, Britain turned once again to Germany. On October 16, 1900, the "Agreement of the Four Agreements" was reached. Article I "Upheld the


principle of the open door in China;" Article II disclaimed any territorial designs upon China on the part of the contracting powers, who pledged themselves to the maintenance of Chinese integrity; Article III provided that if another power made use of complications in China in order to obtain territorial advantages, the signatories would discuss common actions; and Article IV provided that other interested powers should be invited to accept the principles recorded in it.\textsuperscript{14}

The agreement, although praised by British statesmen as a diplomatic victory, soon proved of no value. When the British foreign office discovered that China was being pressed by Russia to accept a secret treaty making a virtual Russian protectorate of Manchuria, it asked the German government, under the terms of the 1900 agreement, to cooperate with Britain and Japan in opposing Russian pressure. Much to the chagrin of British officials, the Wilhelmstrasse calmly announced that the agreement covered only China proper and therefore not Manchuria. Germany announced that she was not concerned with British interests in Manchuria but only with German interests in China.\textsuperscript{15}

Not yet discouraged, Britain tried once again in 1901 to effect an agreement with Germany. Negotiations were carried on in London between Lord Lansdowne and Baron von

\textsuperscript{14}\textit{MacMurray, Treaties with and Concerning China, Vol. I,} p. 265, no. 1900/5.  

Eckardstein. The talks were many and lengthy, but failed. Actually there was little chance for agreement, but because Eckardstein was overly anxious for an alliance, he failed to report accurately British desires to his home office with the result that the Wilhelmstrasse completely misunderstood the British position. Germany insisted that an alliance with Britain must include Britain in the European Triple Alliance and Britain was just as insistent that this should not happen. But because of Eckardstein's reports, Germany felt that Britain was so in need of an alliance that she would be forced to accept one at any price. When finally the ailing German ambassador in London, Count Hatzfeldt and Lansdowne met, it was immediately apparent that an agreement was impossible. Hatzfeldt found the British position much stronger than had been indicated by Eckardstein. Britain was not willing nor did she feel it necessary to pay the German price for an alliance. Thus the last chance for a German-British agreement failed, and Britain found herself standing alone both in Asia and in Europe with a greatly damaged prestige owing to the Boer War and Russian actions in Asia.

With a German alliance out of the question, the

---

16 Baron von Eckardstein, a German diplomat in London, acting for the ailing German ambassador, Count Hatzfeldt.

17 Baron von Eckardstein, Ten Years at the Court of St. James', 1895-1905, translated and edited by Professor George Young, London, 1921, p. 198.

British foreign office reviewed the Far Eastern picture and evaluated it in the following manner: First of all, it was assumed that Japan expected a Russian attempt on Korea, in which case Japan's answer must be war, preferably before the completion of the Manchurian railway. If France sided with Russia against Japan the latter would surely lose, and the result might be a renewal of the tripartite "entente" of Russia, France and Germany in China. If Britain were to allow Russia to defeat Japan and then attempt to intervene in the peace, she would probably earn the enmity of both powers. If the Japanese should win against Russia, the picture would be brightened by the fact that Russia and Japan, being enemies would check each other and could be played against each other. It was obvious, nevertheless, that Japan could not win a war against Russia if France intervened, and it was also obvious that Japan was aware of the fact. Therefore, if Britain did nothing to encourage Japan, she might in desperation turn to Russia. The British government appeared ready for an alliance with Japan.

Japan at the same time, had reached the conviction that an agreement with Russia on terms even moderately favorable to Tokyo was impossible. Repeated negotiations had failed and all the while continued Russian aggression had become increasingly intolerable. Growing confident of

20 Chang, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 78.
her military power, Japan felt capable of protecting her own interests against Russia, but only against Russia alone. The Japanese were agreed in 1901, that an understanding with Russia was impossible.21

Japan was ready to use force to stop Russia's aggressive policies, but could not hope to defeat both Russia and France. Britain was the natural friend for Japan because of her absence in the tripartite intervention at Shimonoseki, and because she shared the common enemy. If Japan and Britain could reach an understanding whereby Britain would neutralize France, while Japan fought Russia, it would be sure to elicit a hearty welcome from the whole Japanese nation.

With both parties ready for an alliance, negotiations were neither long nor difficult. Oddly enough they were initiated because of a remark Baron von Eckardstein in March, 1901, while he was negotiating for a German-British alliance.22 During the talks, Eckardstein had suggested an Anglo-Japanese-German alliance to Lansdowne, and had repeated his idea to Hayashi who quickly saw the advantage in the plan and advised Tokyo of its desirability. When Germany removed herself from the scene, Anglo-Japanese talks continued. On October 8, 1901, the Japanese government gave

---

21 Ibid.

Hayashi permission to negotiate an Anglo-Japanese alliance, and on November 6, Lord Lansdowne handed him the first draft. Only one anxious moment clouded the negotiations. While the treaty was being drafted, Prince Ito, Japan's first statesman, who was visiting St. Petersburg and on his way to Berlin, raised strong opposition to an Anglo-Japanese alliance. Although overruled by a command of the council of elder statesmen on December 7, 1901, Ito's opposition in conjunction with his visit to St. Petersburg served as a spur on the British foreign office; negotiations were hastened, and the final draft of the treaty was signed on January 30, 1902. It was fully published in London eleven days later and twelve days later in Tokyo.

The treaty's scope was apparent in the preamble which stated that both governments were "specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Corea. . . ."


24 Chang, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 81.

25 According to the Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi (See, A. M. Pooley, Japan's Foreign Policies, London, 1920, p. 11), the Ito mission to St. Petersburg was designed merely to alarm the British and to frighten them into hurrying the negotiation of the Japanese Alliance. Hayashi asserts that Ito himself was unaware that he was being used for this purpose and that he went to Russia in order to negotiate an understanding with that country. But Hayashi stresses that the Japanese government had no thought of a Russial alliance at this time.

26 Gooch, British Documents, Vol. II, p. 120, no. 126.

Article I stipulated a further break-down of the interests of the signatories. Japan was "interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea," while Britain's interests related "principally to China. . . ."\(^{28}\) Article II provided:

If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in a war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.\(^ {29}\)

If, however, another power should enter the conflict mentioned in Article II, the other contracting party was pledged in Article III to come at once to the assistance of its ally and to "conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it." The treaty was to last for five years.\(^ {30}\)

The scope of the alliance was limited to Korea and south China. Korea was to be a Japanese sphere of influence and Britain pledged herself to help Japan protect it, while in south China, Britain was to be supreme and was to have Japanese help. In both cases Russia was to be contained. That the alliance was anti-Russian there was no doubt; it was aimed definitely at keeping France out of a Russo-Japanese war. As long as Russia and Japan fought it out alone, Britain was to remain neutral, but should France join Russia, Britain

\(^ {28}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^ {29}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^ {30}\text{Ibid.}\)
would be brought into the war, and in the face of British sea-power, France could not hope to be of material assistance to Russia in a Far Eastern war. Actually, therefore, the alliance freed Japan from apprehension of outside interference should the expected Russo-Japanese war break out.

The alliance received favorable comments from most of the powers and from the British Empire. The Dominions considered it as a guarantee of immunity from the "yellow peril". They had been impressed with Japan's success against China and felt that a powerful Pacific ally greatly enhanced the Empire's defensive position in the Pacific. They were also pleased that the United States welcomed the alliance as a means of maintaining the Open Door.  

There was also universal good feeling in Japan. Tokyo had gained considerable international prestige from an alliance with a Great Power, and Japanese military leaders were overjoyed to know that at last they were free to strike at Russia. This they did when given the opportunity two years later. During the strain of the war, however, dissatisfaction with the alliance appeared in Japan. Many felt that it was a means whereby Britain was being freed from the Russian menace entirely through Japanese effort and blood. Nevertheless Japan realized that she had an enemy in Russia.

and that abrogation of the alliance would remove her only ally against Russia.¹²

After the Russo-Japanese War, the alliance was in need of revision to meet the changed conditions in the Far East. Consequently on August 8, 1905, while peace negotiations were in progress at Portsmouth, a second alliance was concluded. The new alliance was farther reaching than its predecessor in that Britain won the inclusion of India in its terms. Article IV of the 1905 alliance stated:

Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognises her rights to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.¹³

In return for the inclusion of India, Britain gave Japan a promise, not merely of neutrality and of preventing the intervention of another power, but of actual military aid in case of war. Her promise was given in Article II, which read:

If by reason of unprovoked attack of aggressive action, whenever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers, either contracting party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.¹⁴

¹²Lt. Cmdr. Tota Ishimaru, Japan Must Fight Britain, translated by Instructor Capt. G. V. Rayment, New York, 1926, p. 34.
¹⁴Ibid.
Britain also renewed her recognition of Japan's "paramount political, military and economic interests in Corea,\textsuperscript{35} and further, of "the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Corea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests..."\textsuperscript{36}

The new alliance was geographically more far reaching and had more teeth in it than that of 1902. Each power had conceded a point in order to gain another. Britain was aware that after being stopped by Japan in eastern Asia, Russian pressure would appear elsewhere, probably in central Asia, where it might well threaten the British position in India. The inclusion of India was therefore a British victory, for which she paid by promising to lend military assistance to Japan in case of any attack, even by a single power.

Reaction to the alliance's renewal in the Dominions was once again favorable. The Canadian press, for example, universally approved the arrangement and sent congratulations to Lord Lansdowne upon his successful diplomacy.\textsuperscript{37} Australia and New Zealand felt even more secure from the "yellow peril," and all the Dominions again were pleased that in the United States, the renewal was held as another triumph for the Open Door in China.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{36}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{37}Glazebrook, \textit{Canadian External Relations}, p. 265.

Japanese actions after 1905, however, led many in the Dominions to pause and examine the intentions of their ally. Japan had undergone an exhausting experience in the Russo-Japanese War and was anxious to avoid a repetition of that war. Her target in Asia was China, not Russia. If Japan and Russia could iron out their difficulties, both would be able to make a profit at Chinese expense. As a result, on July 30, 1907, Japan and Russia put an end to their long enmity in the Motono-Iswolsky treaty which, although pledging both powers to observe and protect the territorial integrity of China, also stated that each party would "respect . . . all the rights accruing to one and the other Party from the treaties . . . between them and China."39 In other words, the treaty gave both parties freedom to pursue their extraterritorial designs on China. Japan immediately began pushing a plan of exploitation in China which violated both the Portsmouth and Anglo-Japanese treaties, but with Russia as an ally and with Britain more concerned in Europe, Japan had a free hand in China until 1909 when the United States launched a program of energetic interference climax ed by the Knox plan for the neutralization of all railways in Manchuria.40

Knowing that Britain's interest in China was one of


commerce, but knowing also that in all probability she would not act against her allies, Japan again turned to Russia to stop American interference in China. A second Russo-Japanese agreement resulted in 1910 in which both parties pledged themselves to the maintenance of the status quo in China, and "to preserve the position proper to them in Manchuria from all interference on the part of other powers." Within a few months after the signing, Japan annexed Korea.

That Britain did not act during Japan's repeated violations of Chinese integrity (which damaged British commercial interests there) was due to events in Europe. In 1904 she had swung toward the French-Russian bloc through the Entente Cordiale with France. The first Moroccan crisis in 1905 had brought Russia and Britain together in common support of France, and in 1907, the Grey-Iswolsky Agreement had implemented the conversion of the Entente Cordiale into the Triple Entente. In 1908, Austria-Hungary had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, precipitating a crisis with Russia. Britain realized that her chief enemy was the Triple Alliance in Europe and that to check it she must remain in the Triple Entente. She also realized the value of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in that it allowed the concentration of the main portion of her fleet in the North Sea without endangering her Far Eastern interests. Britain was determined that nothing should interfere with her main objective of

maintaining a strong front against Germany, and it was this consideration which led her to refuse to cooperate with the United States in the latter's attempts to frustrate Japanese ambitions in China.42

Japanese-American trouble dated from the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. Until then, the United States had been friendly toward Japan, but soon after the situation changed. American obstruction of Japanese expansion in Manchuria and China and her forward policy there led to mistrust of American objectives by Japanese, while Japan's protests at the annexation of Hawaii and over the California immigration question tended to anger Americans. Relations became so strained that the possibility of war was freely discussed,43 and American displeasure at the Anglo-Japanese Alliance deepened. If war should occur, it appeared that Britain would be obligated to enter on the side of Japan under the terms of the 1905 alliance. There were some in the United States who therefore urged the consideration of Britain as an enemy who must be dealt with. Britain became concerned at American feeling as did the Dominions, especially Canada.44

Britain's alarm over American feeling was largely responsible for her suggesting a revision of the treaty in the spring of 1911. Japan, satisfied with the terms of the

---

42Chang, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 87.
43Ishimaru, Japan Must Fight Britain, p. 37.
44Ibid.
1909 treaty (which was not due for renewal until 1915), did not favor a revision; nevertheless, wishing to avoid the lapse of an alliance which had given her so much freedom in China, and which protected her from other European powers, she consented to a revision.\textsuperscript{45}

The object of a new alliance was obviously to free Britain from making war on the United States in case the latter fought Japan. This was effected on July 13, 1911, when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed for the second time. Britain and the United States already had concluded a treaty of general arbitration which was before the United States Senate for ratification. Article IV of the 1911 alliance provided:

\begin{quote}
Should either of the High Contracting Parties conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall impose on such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such an arbitration treaty is in force.\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}

The 1911 alliance was satisfactory to neither power to the degree that had been the case in the former treaties, but each party was willing to concede minor points in order to gain larger interests. For Britain, it was a case of sacrificing commercial interests in Asia for political ones in Europe; for Japan, freedom in Asia meant more than the inclusion of the United States within the treaty's terms.

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 38.

The reception of the alliance in the Dominions was not at all what it had been in 1902 and 1905. There was growing suspicion of the Japanese not only because of Japanese competition for their markets and Japanese exploitation of China, but also, and more important, because of the Japanese immigration problem. The Dominions maintained that the alliance denied them freedom to deal with Japanese immigration. Article IV quieted their fears that they might be involved in a war with the United States, but when the United States Senate refused to ratify the arbitration treaty, those fears reappeared with new vigor. The prevalent Dominion view was that wider Imperial interests had been allowed to sweep away Dominion interests.47

The United States naturally was not at all pleased with an alliance which had ceased to protect the Open Door in China, and in fact, which now worked against it. Also, the United States did not favor an alliance which might involve her in a war with Britain.

The question of the alliance and attitudes toward it were pushed into a secondary position during the early summer of 1914. A far more pressing issue appeared in the form of a European war. Toward the end of July, war with Germany appeared imminent if not inevitable. The Dominions concentrated on their constitutional status in the event of war.

47Charles J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient A Study in International Relations, Toronto, 1941, p. 157.
and paid even closer attention to self-defense. In Canada, there was great apprehension for the safety of British Columbia because the German Far Eastern squadron, consisting of a formidable force, had put to sea from Kiaochow shortly before the declaration of war. Late in July, it was believed that there were two German cruisers in the vicinity of the Straits of Juan de Fuca. Anxiety increased until on August 23, the Japanese battleship Idzuma arrived at Victoria followed a few days later by the arrival of yet another Japanese warship. Japan had entered the war, giving as her casus belli the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, even though technically its terms were limited to the Far East. Great Britain had not been anxious that Japan should enter the war, fearing that overly extensive Japanese operations might adversely affect public opinion in the United States. Further, neither Australia nor New Zealand would welcome Japan as a successor to Germany in the Pacific. Nevertheless Japan had declared war on Germany and had followed her declaration by immediately dispatching ships to protect Canada’s Pacific coast, a service continued by the Japanese until 1917 when the United States entered the war.

At the war’s outset the Dominions had reason to be thankful for the Japanese alliance because Japan proved

---

48 Ibid., p. 162.

49 Ian F. G. Milner, New Zealand’s Interests and Policies in the Far East, New York, 1939, p. 44.

50 Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 162.
herself able and willing to provide services under it. It was not long, however, before Japanese "services" became a cause for Dominion distress rather than gratitude. In November, 1914, the Japanese army captured the German port of Kiaochow on the Shantung peninsula of China and immediately began to consolidate and expand its conquest in violation of Chinese neutrality. A few months later, in April, 1915, Japan presented China with the famous 21 Demands, one of which demanded that China accept any settlement Japan might make with Germany regarding Shantung. From April on, Japanese diplomacy followed a consistent policy: to obtain unquestioned predominance in China. Britain, France and Russia were alarmed, but because of the war could do little. The United States, however, being neutral, took the lead in protecting China from the Demands, and her efforts were partially successful.

Japanese ambitions did not stop with China. Shortly after Japan's entry into the war, the British government informed Australia and New Zealand that Japanese action would not go beyond the China seas, but from the war's beginning, Japanese ships combed the entire Pacific for enemy vessels, and on October 7, 1914, Japanese marines landed on the island of Yap. Australia became anxious lest the Japanese penetrate into the south Pacific, as Yap is

---

51Ibid., p. 163.

52Ross, Australia and East, p. 28.
only 10 degrees north of the Equator.\textsuperscript{53}

During the fall of 1914, Australian alarm over Japanese actions became plainly evident, and in November, an expeditionary force was ordered to occupy the Marshalls, Carolines, and various smaller groups of German territory in the north-western Pacific. On the eve of its departure, November 24, the Commonwealth government was informed by London that Australian troops should not penetrate north of the Equator, as an agreement had been worked out between Britain and Japan giving Japan the German empire north of the Equator and the Dominions that part south of it.\textsuperscript{54} As a result, the Japanese occupied Pelew, the Carolines, the Marianne and Marshall groups, while Australian and New Zealand forces occupied German New Guinea and Samoa.

Once Britain saw that Japan would not confine her activities to the China Seas, she asked the Japanese for military aid in Europe. Japan refused to provide troops but agreed to send a number of destroyers to the Mediterranean for convoy work against German submarines. Realizing the seriousness of the submarine menace and the value of their help, the Japanese put a price on it which was support at the peace conference for a claim to the cession of German rights in Shantung and the Pacific islands north of the

\textsuperscript{53}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{54}\textit{Ibid.}
Britain, France and Russia acquiesced in an exchange of notes in February, 1917. The notes, of course, were secret and neither the United States nor China knew of them.

When the United States entered the war, she pressed China (among other neutrals) to do the same. The United States had sided clearly with China on the questions of the 21 Demands and on Shantung, and she wished China to be in a position to have a voice at the peace conference. China, although involved in perennial factional struggles, declared war on Germany in 1917, and even though not involved in any shooting, was able to seize German shipping interned in her ports, expel German traders and missionaries, abrogate German extraterritorial rights, cancel Germany’s share in the Boxer indemnity, and claim a seat at the peace table.

Japan opposed China’s entry into the war in 1914, and persisted in opposing it until spring 1917, when she relaxed pressure because she felt secure in her secret agreements with the European Allies. Japan also felt certain that China would cause her no trouble at the peace table because Tuan Chi-jui, the leader of the Chinese government, was also the head of a pro-Japanese military faction and was financed by


56 Ibid.

57 Ibid., p. 177.
dubiously secured Japanese loans. The Japanese, however, failed to attach due importance to, or even pay attention to, the growth of an intense nationalist sentiment among Chinese intellectuals who looked not towards Tuan and Peking for leadership, but rather to Canton where a new government called the Kuomintang had been formed. It was admittedly weak in military power, but tremendously strong in propaganda appeal both in China and abroad. The Canton government wanted China to appear at the peace conference as a unified nation, and it had the support of the Chinese people. Unable to withstand the pressure the Peking government consented to a delegation containing representatives from both the Peking and Canton factions, and as the peace conference opened it was clear that China's delegation would represent Chinese nationalist opinion and would be quite beyond Japanese influence.

When the peace conference met in Paris, both China and Japan had definite aims and desires. It was obvious from the outset that both could not be pleased. The conflict was too deep-seated to be erased or even eased by compromise. Japan, of course, held a predominant position of equality (at least theoretically) with Britain, France, Italy and the United States. She therefore was allotted five seats at the

---

58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., p. 178.
conference while China got two. 60

The outstanding issue between China and Japan was the Shantung question. Japan based her claims on the 21 Demands of 1915, her secret treaties with the allies of 1917, and on a secret agreement with the Peking government in 1918. The Chinese were unanimous in contesting the Japanese claim on the first two grounds, and the Canton representatives contested the third also. In the first place, China argued that the 1915 agreement had no validity because of the fact that it was obtained through coercion. As to the secret treaties of 1917 with the Allies (in which they agreed to consent to any decision which the Japanese and Germans might reach concerning Shantung) the Chinese maintained that China's entry into the war had completely altered her status; that as a belligerent China had abrogated Germany's treaty rights and therefore Germany had nothing to cede. China thereupon demanded immediate restoration of Shantung. 61 Not wishing to stress secret treaties because of their growing unpopularity owing to Wilson's utterances, the Japanese threw their argument upon the 1918 treaty with China. They pointed out that even if the validity of the 1915 Demands could be questioned on grounds of duress, the 1918 treaty had not been signed after an ultimatum. They further argued that the Germans had been evicted from Kiaochow, not by Chinese forces nor by Chinese

60 Hosea B. Morse and Harley Farnsworth MacNair, Far Eastern International Relations, Boston, 1931, p. 600.

61 Hudson, Far East In World Politics, p. 178.
abrogation of German treaty rights, but by the force of the Japanese army. 62

The controversy became extremely embittered and other leading powers became involved only to aggravate the dissen­sion. Britain and France felt bound to honor the 1917 treaties and were therefore forced to uphold the Japanese claim. The United States, on the other hand, took a strongly pro-Chinese attitude, Wilson refusing to consider himself bound by secret promises given by Britain and France. The negotiations resulted in a deadlock, and Japan's delegates threatened to withdraw unless their demands were accepted. In the end, Wilson was forced to give way, and the Japanese received the German holdings in Shantung. Germany made the cession in three articles of the Treaty of Versailles. 63 The Chinese never accepted the settlement and upon being denied permission to sign the treaty with reservations, refused to sign at all. 64 Japan had achieved her desires regarding Shantung, but in so doing had earned a dangerous antagonism in both the United States and China. France and Britain were also embarrassed at having been forced to uphold secret promises, and were doubly embarrassed because their promises forced them to support an entirely unpopular cause.

Japan came to Paris with two other major objectives:

---

62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., p. 179.
64 Ibid., p. 180.
to gain control over the German islands in the north Pacific and to obtain a "racial equality" clause. During the war, it will be remembered, Japan had been promised the German islands north of the Equator. The Allies honored their promise and in the peace settlement Japan received the desired islands as mandates under the League of Nations. Japan was not entirely satisfied, because under League rules no mandated territory could be armed, but the islands were to be under Japanese control and the Japanese government accepted the decision gracefully. Australia and New Zealand received the German islands south of the Equator as mandates, thus bringing the Japanese Empire and the Dominions geographically much closer together—and proximity to Japan spelled trouble to many in the Dominions.

Japan's last major objective at the peace conference, the racial equality principle, was her one conspicuous failure. It has sometimes been asserted that Japan's efforts on behalf of a racial equality clause were merely a smoke-screen behind which she could work for more important objectives such as Shantung. It is more likely that Japan proposed the clause because even though she had worked her way into the council of the Great Powers as an equal, her citizens continued to be second class people in "white" countries. Japan had long been offended by immigration policies, especially those of the United States, Canada, and Australia, not primarily because Japanese were not welcome
there, but because these nations had worded their immigration regulations in such a way as to make it obvious that they were discriminating against all Orientals, among whom the Japanese hated to be considered. Japan's fight for racial equality was one to compel the world to accept Japanese people as equals wherever they were. It was a matter of prestige.

The chief opposition to Japan's struggle for a racial clause came from Australia which saw in a racial equality principle, the possible end of the "White Australia" policy. The Australians, although not on the commission appointed by the conference to deal with the subject, brought strong pressure to bear on British members of the commission, and because unanimity was necessary for adoption, British opposition would have amounted to a veto. The British, supported by the United States, argued sympathetically with the Japanese and although they defeated the proposal, they assured Japan that no blow at her prestige had been intended.

Whether or not a blow at her prestige had been intended, as far as the Japanese were concerned, one had been delivered. Her citizens were still not equal to those of the "white" nations of the world. The color line had been drawn by the United States and by the British Dominions, and Japan was not likely to forget it.

65 Ross, Australia and the East, p. 29.
66 Ibid.
The end of the peace conference and the Japanese behavior there accentuated the fact that Japan had become a power which had grown strong enough to be feared. The Dominions had opposed her in both the mandate and racial equality struggles. The British Empire had been placed in the embarrassing position of having to support Japan on the Shantung issue, and most important, the United States had opposed Japan on each of her objectives. The war and the peace conference had served to heighten the existing animosity between Japan, and the United States and the Dominions. Now that the war had ended and a peace treaty had been drafted, a return to normal diplomacy would follow, and that return meant further consideration of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which was due for renewal in the next year.
CHAPTER II

THE POST-WAR ALLIANCE

The end of the Paris Peace Conference marked the closing of an era in the Pacific. For the European diplomat, the Pacific was no longer a vast stretch of uninterrupted ocean. The establishment of naval bases at far-flung points on the Pacific had destroyed the tranquillizing sense of immense sea distances separating Europe from the Pacific. Through the division of Germany's Pacific islands, the Japanese and British empires had been brought closer together, and the United States held Hawaii and the Philippines. The end of the World War had pacified Europe, at least temporarily, but American-Japanese friction in the Pacific continued unabated, and China had not accepted the Shantung settlement and had not hesitated to say so.

In pre-World War I years, Russia and Germany had been the main threats to British dominance in Asia. Both had been Great Powers but both had been European powers whose chief interests had been necessarily directed toward Europe. Russia had been the more dangerous of the two because her geographic location had allowed her to exert pressure in eastern Asia without depending on sea power. Nevertheless -32-
the Russo-Japanese War had proved that Russia could eclipse neither Japan nor Britain unless her sea power were infinitely strengthened. With the completion of the Manchurian railroad, her land armies could possibly drive Japanese or British forces off of the Asian continent, but unless her navies could make themselves felt in the Pacific, she could never defeat conclusively either of the great sea powers nor could she, without a huge merchant fleet, fill the vacuum which would be created by the absence of British and Japanese trade.

Germany's pre-war position in the Pacific had been much less menacing to Britain than Russia's. Unlike Russia, Germany had no overland route to eastern Asia and therefore had been forced to depend entirely on sea lanes dominated by Britain's navy. Germany had had several potential military bases in her Pacific islands and in Kiaochow, but because the German navy had never been able to control the seas between them and Germany, they had been isolated and rendered virtually valueless as military assets. In the face of British sea power, control of the seas had been denied Germany and therefore she had been able to exert little direct pressure in the Pacific or in eastern Asia.

World War I had removed (temporarily at least) Germany and Russia as threats to British Pacific dominance. The Bolshevist Revolution and the Russian collapse during the war had erased any chance of Russia being a vital factor in
Asia or in the Pacific in the years immediately following the peace conference, and Germany's defeat and her consequent loss of whatever sea power she had had and her loss of her Pacific possessions likewise had removed her from the scene.

Nevertheless the post-war Pacific presented Britain with a more dangerous situation than she had encountered before the war. Russia and Germany were gone, but in their places arose Japan and the United States, who at the war's end, emerged as the two powers capable, and apparently willing to install themselves as the dominant ones in the Pacific. Neither was interested exclusively or even primarily in Europe and both had considerable sea power. Either represented a greater threat to British Asian interests than had Russia or Germany at the peak of their power.

It had been apparent for years that Japanese and American interests in the Pacific were coming more and more into conflict, and antagonism had been growing apace with increased American interest in the Pacific. In 1907, war had appeared imminent and the "experts" in Europe, (the German General Staff and the British Admiralty), having considered war inevitable, were ready to give six to five odds on a Japanese victory.¹ In 1920 and 1921, an American-Japanese war in the Pacific again appeared a distinct

possibility. Had it not been for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Britain would have held the balance of power between the two nations, but as a member of the alliance it was not at all certain, in case of an American-Japanese war, that she was not legally obligated to support Japan. If so, she would be involved in a war which it was her prime objective to avert.

American distrust of Japan's aims extended to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which many Americans felt was a shield behind which Japan securely pursued her own objectives. Japanese activities in China damaged American interests there, and it was believed in Washington that the alliance had prevented Britain's joining in American protests to Japan upon more than one occasion. During World War I, relations between the United States and Japan had become increasingly strained, owing chiefly to the 21 Demands and the Shantung question. Furthermore, Washington realized that Japanese sea power was an important consideration, indeed a vital one, if any combination of circumstances should combine it with that of Great Britain. Although the terms of the 1911 alliance made it perfectly clear that Britain did not intend to allow herself to become involved in an American-Japanese war, Japan's increasing naval and military strength gave rise to anxiety which knowledge of

---


3See Chapter I, p. 19.
Britain's intentions could scarcely allay. 4

In China also, the alliance was an unwelcome fact. Japan's aims in China were obvious, the 21 Demands being only one of many overt Japanese moves to reduce China to the status of a dependency. During the war and again at the peace conference, the United States had been the most vocal champion of Chinese interests, and that Britain should become involved in a struggle with the United States on the side of China's major enemy, was something which Chinese statesmen viewed with well-founded alarm. 5

During the spring and summer of 1921, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance took a growing amount of space in British newspapers, and increased interest was reflected in the House of Commons. Time and again the prime minister and other members of the government were asked to give particulars on policies concerning the alliance, the most recurrent issue being the attitude of the United States toward it. On May 18, Ormsby-Gore 6 delivered an oration in which he maintained that all of North America thought that Britain and Japan, through the alliance, had obtained privileged positions in Chinese markets, and had extorted extraterritorial rights from the Chinese. He held that in North America there was a

4 Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 165.


6 The Honorable W. Ormsby-Gore, member of The House of Commons from Stafford, Stafford.
great sympathy for the Chinese people and that that sentiment would not tolerate further Anglo-Japanese exploitation of China. Therefore, he suggested, the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance depended upon the willingness and ability of the British and Japanese governments to:

... go hand in hand, and to really maintain the open door in China with equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of all nations, and with that object the Japanese and ourselves should use a helping hand to assist China back on her feet again.7

Commons pressed on to more specific points concerning the American position, the old question returning again and again: would Britain be dragged into a war between America and Japan? The government hastened to assure the members that although Article IV of the 1911 treaty had lost its meaning because of the American Senate's failure to ratify the arbitration treaty, Japan understood Britain's position and would abide by the spirit of the agreement. Furthermore, on September 15, 1914, Britain and the United States had ratified a Peace Commission Treaty under which, when all other diplomatic methods of adjustment had failed, all disputes between the two countries were to be referred to an investigation commission.8 The government assured Commons that although the new treaty was not technically a treaty of general arbitration, its objectives were the same, and that

for purposes of the alliance it would be considered the same by the British government.\(^9\)

Still Commons was not satisfied and questions continued to pour in, but during the summer the Imperial Conference met to discuss the subject, and Commons had to be satisfied to watch and wait. The consensus in Commons was that a renewal was desirable if, and only if, modifications were made to remove American objections to the alliance.\(^10\)

The spring of 1921 also saw intense Dominion interest in the alliance. Primarily interested were those whose shores were washed by the Pacific: Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Prime Minister Smuts of South Africa also expressed some interest in the alliance but felt it was largely a question of Imperial defense in the Pacific, in which "South African interests were only indirect."\(^11\) As a result South Africa played only a minor role in the renewal question, her largest contribution being Smuts' speeches at the Imperial Conference of 1921. The Pacific Dominions, however, were vitally concerned and their views were of great importance in a consideration of the alliance's future.

Opinion in Canada was more clearly defined than in her sister Dominions in the Pacific. Prior to 1914, it was

\(^9\)Ibid.


frequently heard in British Columbia (as in California) that the Japanese government encouraged emigration to British Columbia as a part of a plan to conquer it, not militarily perhaps, but at least economically. Following the immigration troubles of 1907, British Columbia pictured herself as a part of a Japanese-dominated Orient. It was even suggested that British Columbia should build a navy capable of protecting her merchant fleet lest it should fall into Japanese hands. Canada realized that alone she could not protect herself from Japan and that the practical application of her Oriental immigration laws depended entirely on the strength of the British Empire. If Empire support were lacking, it was argued, the Asiatic nations—Japan, China and India—could and would overwhelm Canada.

Preoccupation with World War I somewhat calmed Canada, but after the war speculation as to Japan's intentions revived. It was commonly believed in British Columbia that Japanese immigrants had been hand-picked by Tokyo and had been given military training prior to emigration; their assignment, to form a hard, well-trained military core which would strike from within when the time came to invade Canada. British Columbians were convinced that Japan was eager to go to war on the immigration issue. One politician

12 Woodworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 168.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 170.
asked:

Is it better to fight now when Japan controls only one-half of British Columbia or to leave the fighting until ten years hence when she will, by peaceful conquest, have absorbed the whole of British Columbia and have thousands of her trained troops scattered throughout British Columbia and the other provinces beyond the Rocky Mountains?\footnote{15}

The main reason, however, for Canadian misgiving concerning the alliance was the knowledge that the United States was definitely hostile to it. The influence of the United States, as a mighty and powerful neighbor against whom armed resistance was impossible, but with whom negotiation was not difficult, was the prime consideration in Canadian foreign policy. Both the French and the English in Canada agreed that: "There is not one single major problem of either internal or external policy which we can settle in Canada without reference to the policy of the United States."\footnote{16}

Finally, it was obvious that Quebec wholly disapproved of the alliance. Isolationism was particularly strong in French Canada, where British imperialism was regarded with considerable distrust.\footnote{17}

Canada was not alone in distrusting the Japanese. The mandate question had, in 1920 and 1921, caused considerable uneasiness in Australia and New Zealand. No Australian

\footnote{15}Ibid.

\footnote{16}F. H. Soward, et. al., Canada in World Affairs, the Pre-War Years, London, 1941, p. 20.

\footnote{17}Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 173.
government could watch Japan creeping southward without becoming highly alarmed, alliance or no alliance. On the other hand, the Japanese were probably even less happy regarding the mandates than were the Dominions. It was obvious in 1920 that Australia and New Zealand intended to apply "white policies" to the territories over which they had control. Australian feeling was bitterly opposed to the entrance of Japanese into the mandates and it mattered not at all that the mandates were supposedly of an international character. Some elements of the Australian press, however, took the trouble to demonstrate that the "white" policy was not so much for Australian protection as it was for the protection of the natives, a view in which there may have been some truth, but probably not the whole truth.

Nevertheless, Japanese feelings were injured over the protracted and acrimonious quarrel, and relations were not improved by the jingoistic rantings of the Australian press. At times in 1920, Japan's popular press also adopted a bitter tone and pressed the argument that Australia had conquered German New Guinea only because of the shelter of the Japanese fleet, yet now Japanese were treated as pariahs. It was probably only Japanese absorption with more pressing problems such as the Shantung occupation and the renewal of the immigration problem with the United States

18Ross, Australia and the East, p. 30.
19Ibid.
which kept the matter from coming to a serious crisis. Japan, moreover, became concerned lest any crisis should spell the destruction of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Accordingly, Japan accepted (for the time being) the limitation of the "white" policies in the mandates.20

Unfortunately, Japan's tactical withdrawal did little to quiet the querulous tone persisting in the Australian press. Queensland's premier, E. G. Theodore, was reported to have said "... anybody who doubted that Australians would soon be called upon to defend their homes against Asiatic invasion was living in a fools paradise."21 A more telling argument was the frequently repeated point that the Japanese were more restrictive in Japan than Australians in Australia. No Australian could own lands or houses in Japan, become a member of the bar, or join a stock exchange; and the restriction on competing Asiatic labor (Chinese and Indian) was at least as stringent in Japan as anywhere in the British Empire.22

The years 1920 and 1921 were therefore trying ones in Austral-Japanese relations. Besides the immigration question, Australian public feeling was embittered by what were considered unfair trade practices of Japan during World War I. Australians thought that Japan had dumped rubbish into

20 Ibid., p. 31.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 32.
Australia when other competitors were engaged in fighting. Much talk was made of matches that would not light, pencils with lead only at the ends, and rubber goods that rotted too quickly. Whether the charges were true or false, they could not but act detrimentally on the precarious goodwill between the two peoples.23

The most pressing distrust in Australia came not over Japanese immigration or trade policies, but over Japanese imperialistic designs. Australians feared these might lead to a war with the United States, in which Australia might be forced to fight because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. For Australia, however, a war with the United States was no more dangerous than one with Japan. She could not hope to defend herself against either power. The Japanese alliance might well involve her with the United States, but the lapse of that alliance could be the first step toward a Japanese war. It is no wonder that the Australian press and government stood solidly behind the Jellicoe Report of 1917-19, which advised the stationing of sixteen battleships (including eight battle-cruisers) at Singapore.24

Opinion in New Zealand tended to coincide quite closely with that in Australia chiefly because both were concerned with the same problem in the mandates and because of their similar geographic locations with the same problem of defense.

23Ibid.

24Ibid., p. 33.
Much less was said in New Zealand, however, because she had not experienced as extensive an intercourse with Japan in immigrants or trade as had Australia, and therefore had less reason to complain about the Japanese. Then too, New Zealand was generally content to let the London government deal with matters of Imperial foreign policy. Nevertheless, she was concerned over the future of the alliance and was anxious to take her place at the Imperial Conference of 1921.25

In addition to the friction between Japan and the Pacific Dominions, the League of Nations presented the British government with yet another problem concerning the renewal of the alliance. In Commons in April, 1921, the prime minister was asked whether the British government had communicated the terms of the alliance to the League, and if it had requested the League's opinion on the alliance's compatibility with the obligations entered into by both Britain and Japan under the Covenant of the League. The prime minister replied that London and Tokyo had sent the League a communication to the following effect:

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan have come to the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of the 13th July, 1911, now existing between the two countries, though in harmony with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations, is not entirely consistent with the letter of that Covenant, which both Governments earnestly desire to respect. They accordingly have the honor, jointly, to inform the League that they recognise the principle that if the said Agreement be contin-

25Milner, New Zealand's Interests and Policies in the Far East, p. 18.
ued after July 1921, it must be in a form which is not inconsistent with that Covenant.26

The note gave neither reason nor opportunity for a reply, and none was given, demonstrating that neither Great Britain nor Japan was willing that the League should stand in the way of the alliance's renewal.

Having disposed of the agreement's status with respect to the League, Britain and the Empire were free to settle the renewal problem to suit themselves. Had it not been for Dominion and American animosity toward Japan it is probable that with a few minor revisions (to pay lip service to the League), the alliance would have been renewed with a minimum of talk and trouble. Animosity between Japan on the one hand and the Dominions and the United States on the other, however, did exist, and Downing Street could not conceivably overlook it. The alliance could not be renewed until some sort of an Imperial agreement had been reached.

During World War I, the Imperial War Cabinet had decided that as soon after the war as possible, an Imperial meeting would be held to discuss constitutional problems. The Dominions felt that their part in the war entitled them to a stronger voice in Empire affairs, and the British government was willing to concede them at least an opportunity to voice their wishes. A post-war Imperial Conference was therefore a foregone conclusion, but the immediate reason

for its being called in the spring of 1921 was the pressing issue of the Japanese alliance.

The coming Imperial Conference stirred a great deal of interest in the British Parliament. The House of Commons was jealous of the part to be played by the Dominions in the consideration of the alliance and Prime Minister David Lloyd George was questioned closely on the status and nature of the conference and whether the Commons was to be entitled to discuss its agenda. Lloyd George stated flatly that the conference was an Imperial affair and would not be discussed by the Commons, that the proceedings were to be secret, and that the conference would have the final word as to which, if any, of its proceedings should be published.

But Commons was not to be put off by the government and demanded the chance to debate the question of the alliance and the wider Pacific relations involved. As a result, on June 17, just three days before the opening of the conference, an important debate took place. The majority agreed that the alliance should be renewed provided reservations were made which would bring it more into line with American and Chinese policy. Sir Samuel Hoare stated the popular view when he said:

30Lieutenant-Colonel, Sir Samuel, John Gurney Hoare, member of the House of Commons from Chelsea.
It seems to me that no alliance should be entered into or renewed that is likely to embitter our relations with any one of the six British Commonwealths or the United States. . . . I say if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is to be renewed it must be modified. . . . it must be modified to meet the just demands of China. China is a great sovereign power. Very often we are apt to underrate Chinese potentialities and the great future of the 450,000,000 people of its Empire.31

There were, however, other opinions voiced in the debate. Sir J. D. Rees32 answered a speech in which it had been argued that any renewal of the alliance should make provisions for the freeing of Korea. Rees asked what had the British taxpayer to do with Korea:

Why should not the Japanese annex Korea? Korea is as near to Japan as Ireland is to Britain. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has ever travelled there, but I have. The Koreans are the laziest people in the world. The Korean is the only man I know who is too lazy and too well dressed to sit down if he happens to be standing up. . . . What is it to him (the previous speaker) or his friends that Japan should annex Korea, and why should we gird at this great island Empire, so much like ourselves in all respects, and whose cooperation was of such immense value to us during the war?33

The debate was long and filled with impassioned oratory and at its conclusion one thing was clear; the House of Commons was greatly concerned about the alliance and the Pacific in general, but was in doubt as to a workable policy. Commons announced, however, that it would watch with closest


32Sir John D. Rees, member of the House of Commons from East Nottingham.

interest the forthcoming meeting of the Empire's prime ministers and would insist on exact information of the conference's decisions.

With the attention of the entire British Empire focused on London, the prime ministers of the Empire opened their meetings at 10 Downing Street on June 20, 1921, where they continued to meet until August 5. During the period, thirty-four sessions were held. Great Britain was represented by five cabinet members headed by Prime Minister Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, secretary of state for the colonies. The prime ministers of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, Arthur Meighen, William H. Hughes, W. F. Massey and General Smuts were the principal figures in the Dominion representation. E. S. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, represented that country. The Dominion of Newfoundland was not represented at the conference. The conference's proceedings have been kept confidential, the only official records published have been the opening speeches of the various members of the conference. These are of a general nature but give an indication of the attitudes of the different parts of the Empire.

Lloyd George, the host, gave the opening speech on June 20. He turned his first remarks upon the subject of

---

34Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India, Summary of Proceedings and Documents Held in June, July and August, 1921, Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 1474, p. 1. (Hereafter to be cited, Cmd. 1474.)
the relations of the Empire with the United States and Japan, and emphasized that there was no place where friendly relations and the need to avoid competition in armaments were more crucial to the Empire than in the Pacific and Far East. The Japanese Alliance, he said, had played a great part in achieving these aims in the past:

We have found Japan a faithful ally, who rendered us valuable assistance in an hour of serious and very critical need. The British Empire will not easily forget that Japanese men-of-war escorted the transports which brought the Australian and New Zealand forces to Europe at a time when German cruisers were still at large in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. We desire to preserve that well-tried friendship which has stood us both in good stead, and to apply it to the solution of all questions in the Far East, where Japan has special interests, and where we ourselves, like the United States, desire equal opportunities and the Open Door.35

Through mention of the Open Door, Lloyd George meant that it should be British policy to support the United States in her effort to promote equal trade opportunities in China for all nations:

We look confidently to the Government and people of the United States for their sympathy and understanding in this respect. Friendly cooperation with the United States is for us a cardinal principle, dictated by what seems to us the proper nature of things, dictated by instinct as much as by reason and common sense.36

Passing from the topic of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Lloyd George moved to another subject which, from the 1921

conference on, became entwined with the alliance: the question of naval disarmament. He stated that Britain, like the United States, desired stability and peace, and wished to avoid the growth of armaments in the Pacific, or anywhere else. The British government was ready to discuss with American statesmen proposals for the limitation of armaments which the Americans might wish to set out, and was ready to accept a reasonable solution. But:

In the meantime, we cannot forget that the very life of the United Kingdom, as also of Australia and New Zealand, indeed, the whole Empire, has been built upon sea power—and that sea power is necessarily the basis of the whole Empire's existence. We have, therefore, to look to the measures which our security requires; we aim at nothing more; we cannot possibly be content with less.37

After the opening speech by the British prime minister, the other prime ministers delivered addresses stating the general position of their respective Dominions. Meighen of Canada was the most elusive. He gave no indication of Canada's position on the alliance nor on the question of defense. He merely stated that he would seek to interpret what he believed to be prevailing opinion in Canada, and if possible, to reach an agreement with his fellow prime ministers not contrary to that opinion. He hinted, however, that Canada might prove sensitive on one issue, that of immigration:

As to the observations he (Lloyd George) made

on the principles to be kept in mind in our deliberations on the Japanese treaty and its renewal, we cannot over-estimate their importance. Possibly in the outlying Dominions we are not disposed to give the same attention to one feature which he draws attention to, the paramount necessity of seeing to it that no step is taken that leaves out of mind the importance of mitigating racial divisions.38

Prime Minister Hughes of Australia spoke next, and after talking at some length on general foreign policy, concentrated on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. His statement of Australian views was clear. He thanked the British government for postponing a settlement of the question until a time when the Dominions might meet and have their say, but he reminded the conference that the matter of the alliance was urgent and must be settled without delay.

His argument ran somewhat in the same vein as that of Lloyd George; he pointed to the long life of the treaty and to the fact that the treaty had changed only in minor degrees since its first signature twenty years previously, but he realized that it could not be continued in its present form because of the obligations owed by both governments to the League of Nations.39 For Australia, the treaty had special significance because of her geographic location. The case for renewal, he said, was strong if not overwhelming. "Speaking broadly, we are in favour of its renewal."40 But,

38 Cmd., 1474, p. 16.
40 Cmd., 1474, p. 19.
he warned, there were certain difficulties which must be faced before Australia could cast her lot for renewal. The most important was the attitude of the United States toward the treaty. He said:

I am sure I state the opinion of Australia when I say the people have a very warm corner in their hearts for America. They see in America to-day what they themselves hope to be in the future. We have a country very similar in extent and resources, and it may be laid down as a sine qua non that any future Treaty with Japan, to be satisfactory to Australia must specifically exclude the possibility of a war with the United States of America. 41

He conceded that the present treaty excluded the United States from its terms by implication, but that Australia would not be satisfied by anything so indefinite in any future treaty. In the future, there could be no room for misinterpretation; the United States must be excluded specifically. If that principle could be met, Australia would strongly favor renewal of the alliance.42

The chief advantage in the treaty's renewal was one of defense against Japan. Would not, Hughes asked, the Empire be in a better position to exercise greater influence over Japan's Eastern policy as an ally rather than as a potential enemy? If Japan were excluded from the councils of the great western powers--and the abrogation of the alliance would mean just that--she would be isolated and her sensitive national pride injured. On the other hand, a renewed treaty

41Cmd., 1474, p. 19.
42Cmd., 1474, p. 19.
would impose on her some of the restraints inseparable from treaty obligations. The treaty's renewal would be, he maintained, a boost for the cause of world peace, a blessing for China, and the wisest course for the safety and well-being of the British Empire.  

Hughes said that it had been suggested to him that a conference with the United States, Japan and the British Empire, whose purpose would be to ascertain what would be mutually acceptable, and to decide what would form a reasonable basis for renewal of the alliance, would be the best method of arriving at a solution most satisfactory to all concerned. He answered that if he were at all certain that the United States desired, or was even prepared to accept such a proposal, he would give it his strong support, but that he was certain that American statesmen were not at all interested in such a conference. He proposed instead that the British Empire should attempt to ascertain precisely American views toward the alliance, and work out a new alliance which would remove American doubts.  

With Prime Minister Meighen non-committal, and with Hughes rather strongly in favor of renewal, General Smuts, prime minister of the Union of South Africa, rose to give his opening remarks. He kept to a general discussion of

---

43 Cmd., 1474, p. 19.

44 Cmd., 1474, p. 20.
foreign policy but his attitude on the alliance was nonetheless clear.

In the first place, he emphasized, Britain's first and foremost aim must be to remain close to, and in harmony with, the United States. "To my mind," he said, "it seems clear that the only path of safety for the British Empire is a path on which she can walk together with America." He did not, however, want an American alliance, or for that matter, any other bipartite alliance:

The British Empire is not in need of exclusive allies. It emerged from the War quite the greatest Power in the world, and it is only unwisdom or unsound policy that could rob her of that great position. She does not want exclusive alliances. What she wants to see established is more universal friendship in the world.

By denouncing exclusive alliances, Smuts made it clear that he was opposed to a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, not primarily because he feared American animosity, apparently, but because he was opposed to any system of bipartite alliances in principle. He preferred a "real Society of Nations, away from the old ideals and practices of national domination or Imperial domination, which were the real root causes of the great War."

Turning from the matter of alliances, Smuts suggested a reorienting of Imperial foreign policy. The war, he

---

maintained, had altered the entire international position. Europe was no longer what it had been, its power and position in the world having been lost. The great European empires had disappeared (aside from the British, naturally): the Austrian Empire had ceased forever to exist, Russia and Germany would revive, but not in a generation or two, and when they did, time and events would have changed the world. The war had exhausted Europe; the victorious powers were scarcely any better off than the vanquished. Imperial diplomacy must not, therefore, make the mistake of looking upon Europe as the center of first importance. Rather it should attempt to gather friendly relations the world over, and especially in the Pacific:

The problems of the Pacific, are to my mind, the world problems of the next fifty years or more. In these problems we are, as an Empire, very vitally interested. Three of the Dominions border on the Pacific; India is next door; there, too, are the United States and Japan. There also is China. The fate of the greatest human population on earth will have to be decided. There, Europe, Asia and America are meeting and there, I believe, the next great chapter in human history will be enacted.

Massey, prime minister of New Zealand, agreed with Smuts that the future storm center of the world would be the Pacific and that the next war (he was not optimistic enough to believe that mankind had seen the last of wars) would be fought in the Pacific. He was therefore extremely interested

\[48\text{Cmd.}, 1474, p. 25.\]
\[49\text{Cmd.}, 1474, p. 25.\]
in the question of naval defense.\textsuperscript{50}

As to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, he more than moderately favored renewal. He pointed out at great length that during the war it was the Japanese navy which had made it possible for New Zealand’s troops to reach the front in Europe. Had Japan not entered the war under the alliance—and the alliance, as it stood, “did not compel Japan to come into the War in the circumstances in connexion with which the War was fought”\textsuperscript{51}—it would have been impossible for either Australia or New Zealand to have sent troops to the front, or for that matter, equipment for British military forces, or even goods for the civilian population of Britain.\textsuperscript{52} He was quite prepared to take the American point of view into consideration and would welcome any effort to join with the United States to prevent war, but he advocated renewing the alliance with or without American blessing.\textsuperscript{53}

With Massey’s speech, the opening addresses to the conference came to an end. The position of the Dominions had been generally stated, but the British foreign office had not yet presented the information it certainly must have had at hand; and to draw any conclusions from a series of speeches, reflecting in the main, public opinion in the

\textsuperscript{50}Cmd., 1474, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{51}Cmd., 1474, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{52}Cmd., 1474, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{53}Cmd., 1474, p. 31.
Dominions, is a trap into which one cannot be lured if he wishes to explain objectively the situation in 1921 and after.

Because the actual proceedings of the conference have never been published, it is necessary to draw upon other sources for something of a view as to what was actually done there. On July 11, midway through the conference, Lloyd George was asked in the House of Commons if he had any statement to make about the position of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. He replied that he was pleased to announce that the conference had, in answer to requests for statements of policy from the United States, China and Japan, received "extremely satisfactory" reports from the United States and China, but had not yet received formal word from Japan.

He continued by explaining upon what basis the conference attacked the problem of the alliance:

We were guided in our deliberations by three main considerations. In Japan, we have an old and proved Ally. The agreement of 20 years standing between us has been of very great benefit, not only to ourselves and her, but to the peace of the Far East. In China there is a very numerous people, with great potentialities, who esteem our friendship highly, and whose interests we, on our side, desire to assist and advance. In the United States we see to-day, as we have always seen, the people closest to our own aims and ideals with whom it is


55 Just what was contained in these "extremely satisfactory" reports is not mentioned by Lloyd George, nor is any reference made to them in any of the available materials on the 1921 conference.

for us, not merely a desire and an interest, but a deeply-rooted instinct to consult and co-operate. Those were the main considerations in our meetings, and upon them we were unanimous.  

The conference's objective was to find a method of combining these three factors in some policy which would remove the danger of overwhelming naval expenditures in the Pacific, and which would insure the development of peaceful and legitimate national interests of the nations in the Far East.  

The first problem in any discussion of a Far Eastern policy, Lloyd George reported, was to ascertain the exact status of the Empire in relation to the Japanese Alliance. After submitting the question to the Lord Chancellor, who considered it with the Law Officers of the Crown (the seven law lords of the House of Lords), it was obvious that if no denunciation were given, the treaty would continue indefinitely and that if the statement made to the League of Nations (concerning British and Japanese willingness to design the alliance to conform with the League Covenant) did constitute a denunciation, a year would pass before the treaty would lapse. The Lord Chancellor finally ruled that the note to the League was not a denunciation and that the treaty was, and would remain in force until twelve months after a denunciation had been delivered.  

57 Ibid., p. 916.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid.
With the legal status of the alliance settled, the conference turned to the first of their three main principles, which was the policy of friendly co-operation with the United States. The conference was convinced that upon this one factor more than any other, depended the peace of the world.60 The second principle, that of maintaining the Empire's close ties with Japan was discussed and it was agreed that the greatest merit of that friendship was that it harmonized the influences, activities and forces of the two greatest Asiatic powers, and therefore constituted the most reliable safeguard to the well-being of the British Empire in the Far East, and to the peace of the Far East in general.61 The well-being of China, the third great principle, was explained by the prime minister in a sentence. "We also aim at preserving the open door in China, and at giving the Chinese people every opportunity of peaceful progress and development."62

There was nothing new in Lloyd George's disclosure. He had given nothing more than general principles and euphemistic reasons for their adoption. His speech, however, contained one bit of exciting news; he announced that President Harding had invited the powers to a conference on the limitation of armaments, to be held in Washington in the

60ibid., p. 917.
61ibid., p. 918.
62ibid.
near future. Harding had also suggested a preliminary meeting on Pacific and Far Eastern questions among the powers most directly interested. The British Empire, reported Lloyd George, was most gratified to receive the request and would spare no effort to make the conference a success.63

The prime minister concluded his report to Parliament with a glowing account of the manner in which the Dominions had worked together:

Let me add only one word as to the part played in these events by the gathering of the Imperial Conference in Downing Street. I venture to say that the action that we have taken could not have been taken in so prompt, effective, and unanimous a fashion but for the intimate personal consultation between the Prime Ministers of the Empire and the representatives of India which this gathering has enabled us to enjoy. We have taken counsel together without reserve. With this result before us, I need not elaborate the inestimable value of that intimate collaboration in the conduct of the Empire’s affairs.64

At the end of the Imperial Conference only one fact was clear; the Dominions were divided in their wishes as to the value and desirability of a renewal of the alliance. Hughes of Australia had come out strongly in favor of the alliance on these grounds: If Japan were cut loose from the alliance, she would be offended and Australia would be at the mercy of the ever-increasing Japanese navy, but if Japan were placated by a renewal, Australia would be freed from

63Ibid.
64Ibid.
that worry. Of course, a renewal might well anger America, but Australian opinion tended to look upon America as a remote military threat. As Hughes himself said: "... we were afraid of Japanese warships, but we felt that the American ships would not attack us." Massey of New Zealand agreed with Hughes, and also spoke emphatically in favor of renewal. Meighen and General Smuts, however, were definitely not in favor of the alliance's renewal under any circumstances. Canada, said Meighen, could not accept the limitation imposed by the alliance on freedom to deal with the immigration problem, and moreover, could not afford to threaten her present friendly relations with the United States. Smuts opposed any bipartite alliance on the grounds that Imperial foreign policy should be one of independence.

Under the circumstances, an impasse had been reached and no decision was forthcoming. Fortunately an escape was offered when President Harding extended his invitation to the powers for a conference at Washington. The invitation was interpreted by the Empire to mean that a chance was being offered to work out Pacific problems on a broader basis, and most important, one in which the United States would have a

66 Ibid.
voice. The Dominions were naturally anxious that they should have a voice in any settlement concerning Pacific affairs and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. They were greatly disturbed, therefore, when the United States insisted (quite properly) that she could not deal with anyone but the United Kingdom with whom she had diplomatic relations. General Smuts was especially displeased and immediately set in motion a movement which culminated in the representation of Canada, Australia and New Zealand at Washington as parts of the Imperial delegation.

The Dominions, therefore, were to be represented at Washington as members of the United Kingdom delegation, but their voice was to be limited to throwing what influence it could upon the final empire vote. Since the questions of disarmament, the Pacific, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were all matters of foreign policy, it is necessary, before examining the Dominion effect on the Empire's vote at Washington, to discover Dominion status in relation to the formulation of Imperial foreign policy in general. Dominion views on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, divergent as they were, had been clearly stated in London, but would they have any effect on the eventual renewal or non-renewal of the alliance?

---


69 Ibid.
CHAPTER III

THE DOMINION VOICE IN IMPERIAL AFFAIRS

President Harding’s invitation to a conference in Washington set the stage for a drama of boundless possibilities. Among the dramatic personae were Japan, a dynamic Great Power with imperial ambitions; Britain, owner of the greatest and richest empire in the world; China, a chaotic power anxious only to be left alone to manage its own affairs; the United States, a growing nation, jealous of its rights and isolated by a disinclination to commit itself in advance to any program of action; France, a vengeful great nation, anxious for reparations from Germany and for French security in Europe; Italy, a Great Power in name only, smarting from her failure at the Versailles conference, and anxious to regain lost prestige; and the three British Dominions whose interests and security were involved in the outcome of whatever passed among the other powers. In the background was a vast network of treaty obligations, and a kaleidoscope of people of different races in all stages of civilization. The diplomatic handling of the problems

\[1\] The nine powers invited by Harding were: The United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy, China, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal.
certain to arise was of the utmost importance to the three Dominions who desired a voice in whatever transpired at Washington. But was existing constitutional machinery in the British Empire adequate for their purposes?

Dominion, as a technical term, denotes a colony possessing responsible government. The term owes its origin to a resolution of the Colonial Conference of 1907 which attempted to draw a clear distinction between such colonies and those whose administration was under the direct control of the United Kingdom.² The selection of the term had an obvious disadvantage because "His Majesty's Dominions" is the legal designation for the whole of the territories, including the United Kingdom, under the royal sovereignty. But it had the merit of recognizing the primacy of position among the colonies of Canada, which had been accorded the designation in 1867 with the passage of the British North America Act.³ What is important is that a Dominion has "responsible government." Knowledge of the meaning of that term is indispensible if one is to understand what voice the Dominions had, or could possibly have, in matters of foreign or Imperial affairs.

In general, responsible government in the British form exists when there are close relations between the

³Ibid.
executive and legislative branches of the government or, as they are called, the cabinet and parliament. Thus the small body initiating policies and overseeing the enforcement of the law (the executive) works in harmony with the much larger and essentially representative body (the legislature) which enacts the laws and exercises general deliberative, critical and supervisory functions. To do this effectively, the prime minister and other members of the cabinet have seats in parliament, from which they lead and direct its activities. They are at all times responsible to the House of Commons and must resign if they cannot retain its support and confidence. All members of the government, executive and legislative alike, are ultimately responsible to the people they represent and upon whom they rely for election to their positions.

If a government is to be responsible, it must be responsible to the people, but it must also be responsible for some defined body of powers. Responsibility, when applied to a Dominion government has come to mean responsibility for internal affairs. Designation of Dominion status on a British colony means that its government is solely (or almost so) responsible for the whole of the colony's domestic acts and policies.

At the opening of the Washington Conference, where the question of renewing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be settled, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and
Newfoundland held the proud title of "Dominion." But not all of them were to be represented at Washington. Because the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a matter of special concern only to the Dominions bordering the Pacific, Canada, Australia and New Zealand alone were included in the Empire delegation at Washington. Inclusion in the delegation, however, did not guarantee that the Dominion voice would achieve measurable results in determining the alliance's fate. The alliance had been negotiated in 1902, renewed in 1905 and again in 1911 without regard to Dominion opinion. Would a third renewal in 1921 be consummated on the same basis, or would the Dominions be able to convert their desires into actual results?

Canada in 1867 was the first of the British colonies to be accorded Dominion status with the passage of the British North America Act.\textsuperscript{4} For all practical purposes, the act gave the Canadian government complete power to regulate Canada's internal affairs; but Britain retained a veto power which gave the crown the right to veto any piece of Dominion legislation. The veto power, nevertheless, was more theoretical than actual and it has been used against Canada on only one occasion since 1867, in 1873 when a bill was declared to be \textit{ultra vires} of the Canadian parliament.\textsuperscript{5} The


\textsuperscript{5}Harvey Edward Fisk, \textit{The Dominion of Canada, Its Growth and Achievement}, New York, 1920, p. 132.
act also stipulated that Canada could not change her constitution without royal ratification; again this proved to be a matter of formality.\(^6\)

While giving almost complete internal freedom, the act said nothing about Canadian powers to deal in matters of foreign policy, the British government continuing to follow the advice given by Lord Durham in his 1838 report entitled "Affairs of British North America," in which he said:

\[\ldots\ldots\text{The constitution of the form of government, regulation of foreign relations, and of trade with the mother country, the other British Colonies, and foreign nations and the disposal of the public lands, are the only points on which the mother country requires a control.}\(^7\]

Thus Canada had won Dominion status and virtually complete freedom to regulate her internal affairs, but was yet without a voice in foreign affairs.

After having granted responsible government to Canada the British government felt it only proper that the other leading colonies should be granted the same privilege, but reserved for itself the right to judge when conditions in the colonies warranted the privilege. In Australia, the chief obstacle to responsible government was originally the fact that many of her citizens were convicts sent there under the old British policy of deporting criminals. This problem, however, was solved but another remained; the

\(^6\)Ibid.

\(^7\)Lionel Curtis, The Problem of Commonwealth, Toronto, 1916, p. 43.
various Australian colonies refused to unite into anything resembling a nation. The need for unity, nevertheless, was increasingly felt and by 1899 all the colonies with the exception of one had accepted a constitution calling for federation. Australians in 1899 sent the constitution to Britain with the request that an Imperial Act should be passed to implement it. Britain readily complied, and in July 1900, the "Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act" was passed at Westminster, and Australia became a Dominion.

The act was similar in substance to the British North America Act. Australia received responsible government in internal affairs but no power to deal responsibly in foreign matters.

New Zealand was accorded Dominion status in 1907 under an act much resembling that of Australia. That she was seven years behind Australia was owing more to New Zealanders than to any reluctance on the part of the British government. After 1885, there were two distinct voices in New Zealand: one spoke in terms of independence; it was confident and independent, willing to face the world alone because in a sensible world, reason and not useless sentiment governed politics. It was a strong but fading voice; it was the voice of the past. The majority in New Zealand spoke with the


9 Ibid., p. 219.
voice of the future. Conscious that New Zealand was small and weak in a world full of potential menace, the majority was also conscious that New Zealand was safe behind the shield of the British Empire.\(^\text{10}\) An additional reason for New Zealand indifference to formal recognition as a Dominion was the fact that after giving Canada and then Australia freedom in internal affairs, Britain reduced her control of New Zealand's until interference was practically unknown.\(^\text{11}\)

Thus by 1907, while the three Dominions had gained the legal freedom to deal with matters concerning themselves alone, they had not acquired any comparable freedom in foreign relations. The history of the colonial struggle for responsible government is largely a series of colonial demands and British concessions. Had the colonies at no time demanded freedom of action, it is questionable whether Britain would have granted it to them eventually. What they gained, they gained because they persisted in asking until Britain surrendered. Canada, being the oldest and most advanced of the colonies, bore the brunt of the struggle because her demands were the first heard and the first granted. Once conceded to one colony, a point was usually granted to others as soon as Britain was convinced that conditions in them were suitable for the freedom desired.

From the beginning of the struggle for responsible


\(^{11}\)Ibid., p. 60.
government, Imperial authorities had shown themselves willing to consult the wishes of the colonies on matters affecting them directly, but did not do so on questions of international policy, which remained the sole affair of the Imperial government, and in which for many years the colonies had no desire to take part. The colonies on the whole were entirely willing to let Britain worry about international problems as long as they felt themselves unaffected by them, but once concerned for their own safety, they cried for a voice in foreign relations. Canada was decidedly more vocal than any of the other Dominions, and by 1880 (largely through the work of the Canadians) the principle was adopted that in framing general commercial treaties with foreign powers, the United Kingdom should arrange it so that the treaties would not be applicable to the Dominions without the assent of Dominion governments, and that if a Dominion desired to conclude special arrangements with a foreign state, the Imperial government would use its efforts to secure a treaty for this end and would employ in the negotiations, along with its own representatives, a delegate from the Dominion. Difficulties were found in inducing foreign states to consider commercial treaties with special terms for the Dominions, and it was not until 1893 that the first of these was

12Keith, Dominion Home Rule, p. 30.
13The question of Dominion status in matters of commercial treaties will be discussed in some detail in Chapter V.
14Keith, Dominion Home Rule, p. 31.
concluded with France, in the negotiation of which, Sir C. Tupper, Canadian High Commissioner in London, was employed.\textsuperscript{15} A further step in the direction of fuller freedom for the colonies was taken in 1899, when the Dominions were given the right of separate withdrawal from, as well as separate adherence to, Imperial commercial treaties.\textsuperscript{16}

That Canadian pressure was able to win some commercial freedom from Britain, while the pleas of the other colonies went unheeded, proved the value of Dominion status and responsible government with respect to the colonial voice in Imperial affairs. At the time of the Canadian commercial struggle (1890-99), Canada was the only Dominion; she was the only colony having a responsible government as her spokesman. It was quite clear that only when a colony had a unified and responsible government, could it make its weight felt in foreign affairs.

By 1890, the colonies had achieved a remarkable degree of freedom. Three of the powers they held had never been given to colonies in any other of the world's empires; the powers of framing tariffs, controlling immigration and creating and maintaining fleets.\textsuperscript{17} But the process of decentralization was stopped short of anything which clearly affected the issues of peace and war. The whole power of

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{17}Curtis, \textit{Problem of Commonwealth}, p. 127.
conducting foreign affairs remained vested in the government responsible to the people of the United Kingdom. The Dominions, at the beginning of the twentieth century, were not satisfied with the powers they held and continued to insist on more voice in affairs of the Empire. Their agency was the Imperial Conference.

The Imperial Conference, or as it was first called, the Colonial Conference,\(^{18}\) was attended by the prime ministers of the self-governing colonies, and by the secretary of state for India. Britain was represented by her secretary of state for the colonies. To the conferences held before 1911 (the Colonial Conferences), the colonies brought their ideas and complaints which were heard by the British government but with no thought of allowing the colonies a voice in Imperial affairs. The conference was merely an opportunity for colonial prime ministers to express themselves vocally instead of through memorandums and notes. The colonies were not satisfied with the arrangement and were even offended by the title of the conference.

On April 20, 1905, a proposal was submitted to the colonies to rename the Colonial Conference, the Imperial Conference. It was to continue as in 1902 with the representation of India by her secretary of state (only when her immediate interests were involved) and of the self-governing

\(^{18}\)Colonial Conferences were held in 1897, 1902 and 1905. The Colonial Conference of 1907 changed its name to the Imperial Conference, and these have been held periodically ever since.
colonies by their prime ministers. In addition, the proposal suggested a council which would act as an executive board for the conference. The response of the colonies was not what the authors of the plan had hoped. Only Australia was enthusiastic; New Zealand did not reply and Canada, although not opposed to a change in the name of the conference, did not favor a permanent council which might conceivably interfere with the working of responsible government. The matter, therefore, was shelved with the understanding that it would be considered at the colonial conference of 1907.

At the 1907 conference, a number of changes in imperial structure were achieved, some of which were purely formal: the title of the conference was changed to "Imperial" and the self-governing colonies received the title, Dominions. More important was a substantive constitutional change. In 1902, the overseas prime ministers had met with the British colonial secretary, but in 1907, Great Britain was represented by her prime minister. While the change of title did not alter the actual nature of the conference, the Dominions took the change to mean that in this and future conferences the various governments of the Empire would meet on an equal footing to discuss problems which concerned them all. It was not claimed that all the governments were of equal

20 Ibid.
importance nor that each should have equal influence, but rather that they were equal in status and therefore could discuss matters with an equality of voice rather than as a father instructing adolescent children. Australia was especially vocal in denouncing the tradition of the colonial office, which she interpreted as unquestioned British predominance. Canada joined Australia in the drive for equality, and they carried their point in 1907 and again in 1909.

Both planned navies of their own when they decided that it was not consistent with their national pride to be defended solely by the British navy. The Australians and Canadians may have bolstered their national pride in the 1907 conference, but nothing concrete was done to enhance the Dominion voice in foreign affairs. This was left to the Imperial Conference of 1911.

Sir Joseph Ward of New Zealand confronted the 1911 conference with a proposal for the creation of an Imperial Parliament to be charged with the issues of war and peace, foreign policy, and all treaties affecting the Empire. He suggested the creation of an Imperial House of Representatives of 297 members (United Kingdom 220, Canada 37, Australia 25, South Africa 7, New Zealand 6, and Newfoundland 2) and an Imperial Council of Defense of twelve members, two for each Imperial unit. The two bodies would appoint an executive of fifteen to deal with the matters specified. The parliament

22 Ibid., p. 243.
was to have no taxing power, but its expenses were to be paid by the Dominions as they thought fit. The scheme actually amounted to the creation of an Imperial Parliament with legislative power in Imperial affairs and an executive of fifteen, responsible not to the British Parliament, but to the electorates of the six colonial representatives. To the British question whether the British Parliament was to surrender its responsibility for Imperial affairs or share it with the new Imperial Parliament, Ward could give no answer.

The Dominion representatives all negatived the proposal on the grounds that it would infringe on their hard-earned autonomy, while Sir Wilfrid Laurier of Canada was caustic at the expense of a body which could spend but not raise revenue. British prime minister Asquith, although taken by surprise, delivered a crushing retort to Ward's plan:

It would impair if not altogether destroy the authority of the Government of the United Kingdom in such grave matters as the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the declaration and maintenance of peace, or the declaration of war, and, indeed, all those relations with Foreign Powers, necessarily of the most delicate character, which are now in the hands of the Imperial Government, subject to its responsibility to the Imperial Government. That authority cannot be shared, and the co-existence side by side with the Cabinet of the United Kingdom of this proposed body—it does.

---

24 Curtis, Problem of Commonwealth, p. 100.
not matter by what name you call it for the moment—clothed with the functions and the jurisdiction, which Sir Joseph Ward proposed to invest it with, would, in our judgment, be absolutely fatal to our present system of responsible government.\textsuperscript{26}

Asquith continued by saying that of all public responsibilities, that of controlling foreign affairs and of determining the issues of peace and war was at once the most delicate and the most important. Proposals to divide it, when stripped of all verbiage, stood self-condemned. Events, he said, did not always wait on decisions, and least of all in foreign affairs. There were moments when a government might decide things in one way which, failing such decision, the events of a few hours would decide in another.\textsuperscript{27}

In the face of unanimous criticism, Ward’s plan failed dismally. In its place came many other attempts to enhance the prestige if not the actual voice of the Dominions. One such plan was that the Dominions be placed directly under the British prime minister instead of the colonial office. Asquith condemned this, on the ludicrous grounds that he would have a thousand papers to study annually. The suggestion that some Imperial conferences should be held in the Dominions was discarded when Ward and others stressed the disadvantage of Dominion ministers missing the opportunity to form acquaintances with Imperial ministers, which, of course, was possible only in London.\textsuperscript{28}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[27]Ibid., p. 102.
\end{footnotes}
The truly great achievement of the conference, and the one in which the Dominions made their greatest gain, was on the issue of consultation. It was agreed that in the future, instructions to British delegates to peace conferences should be drafted in communication with the Dominions and that draft conventions there arrived at, should be circulated to the Dominions before signature, while a similar procedure, when time and circumstances permitted, should be adopted as regards other international negotiations. The Dominions were well satisfied with the victory and did not choose to press it further. Laurier made it clear that he did not claim to be consulted on international relations as a matter of right, other than on issues immediately affecting Canada, because such a right, he felt, would imply a duty to assist if war should result from the policy initiated after consultation. The Dominions wanted a voice in foreign affairs but did not want to become involved in international troubles.

In addition to consultation, the Dominion prime ministers were also given a complete survey of the foreign affairs of the Empire, by Sir Edward Grey, British foreign minister. It was the first time anything of the sort had happened. Naturally they could not discuss what they had heard with their own parliaments and electorates, but the

---

29Ibid., p. 1188.
30Ibid.
information did serve to unify their opinions on matters of foreign policy. Nevertheless, the unifying effect was bound to be transient, because the foreign situation changes from day to day, and when the great war came just three years later, the review of foreign affairs to which they had listened in 1911 was in many ways obsolete, and in two of the Dominions there were prime ministers who had never attended an Imperial Conference. 31

Another Dominion contact with Imperial foreign policy was achieved at the 1911 conference by the consideration of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, at a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defense (a sub-division of the conference). Sir Edward Grey reviewed Imperial Pacific policy for the committee, and convinced the Dominion officials that it would be folly to drive Japan out of close cooperation with the United Kingdom. As a result, the alliance was renewed in 1911 with the full assent of the Dominion prime ministers. 32 The Dominions were not asked if they favored the alliance, however, and no indication was given that if they had not agreed that the alliance would not have been renewed.

The discussion of foreign affairs revealed the essential inequality of the Dominions with the United Kingdom. The members of the conference, however, chose to

31 Curtis, Problem of Commonwealth, p. 108.
ignore it and no one confessed that the conference was one of a government with its dependencies; it was obvious, nevertheless, that in issues of war and peace, the Dominions were dependent on the judgment of the ministers of the Imperial government in London. It must be said, however, that the condition of inequality existed partially because the Dominions wished it so; they had no desire to become entirely separate nations. Within the British Empire, Great Britain was dominant. She paid for most of the defense and therefore had supreme control over foreign policy. But this was simply because the other British colonies wished it so. They could, if they wished, pay for more of their defense and thus build a foreign policy of their own. But for the present, they were willing to abide the dominance of Great Britain.33

With the outbreak of World War I, effort in the Empire was turned toward the winning of the war,34 and although constitutional questions were not forgotten, they were pushed into the background. The Dominions' constitutional position in the war was and is open to debate. Under existing conditions the Dominions had no responsibility for the diplomacy which led up to the war, and yet they were involved in hostilities within a few days after the urgency of the crisis had become apparent. The speed of Dominion aid

33 Wood, Constitutional Development of Australia, p. 245.
34 The question of Dominion war-time status and war efforts will be discussed in some detail in Chapter VI.
was partially owing to the fact that the necessity of vindicating Belgium strongly appealed to Dominion peoples. They were, under the constitutional law of the Empire, perfectly free to remain outside the conflict as far as active participation was concerned.\textsuperscript{35}

The prosecution of the war made it necessary that the activities of all units of the Empire be integrated to a degree never before attained. Given the fact of responsible government in the Dominions, and the impossibility of any sort of an integrated effort from spasmodic Imperial conferences, it was seen that some new Imperial body was needed to handle problems as they arose. In 1917, a body called the Imperial War Cabinet was created which provided for the participation of the Dominion governments in forming the Empire's diplomatic as well as war policy. Inevitably the advent of the armistice was followed by a transformation of the War Cabinet into the British Empire delegation at the peace conference.\textsuperscript{36}

A division according to importance was made of all business during the war; the pressing problems of the war itself were handled by the War Cabinet under the direction of the British prime minister, while less important questions were left to the Imperial War Conference in which India was represented as well as the Dominions and over which the


\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 879.
secretary of state for the colonies presided.37 Actually
the Imperial War Cabinet differed from the Imperial War
Conference only in its more immediately important sphere of
operations and in formal matters such as the presiding of-

cifer.38 The cabinet did not meet continuously during the
war and was adjourned early in 1918, but in view of the
rapid Allied advance later in the year, it was found neces-
sary to summon the prime ministers to a new session to
consider the Empire's attitude in the peace conference.39

Dominion status in the War Cabinet is an elusive
element to isolate. It is true that on ultimate issues the
wishes of the Dominions were not allowed to prevail over
those of the Imperial government, but it is incorrect to
assume that Dominion views were not of importance in forming
British policy. Dominion leaders were convinced that the
War Cabinet represented a step forward in the struggle for
Dominion voice in foreign affairs. General Smuts of South
Africa stated in a speech to the Cabinet in 1917:

The status of the Dominions as equal nations
of the Empire will have to be recognized to a very
large extent. The Governments of the Dominions as
equal governments of the King in the British Com-
monwealth will have to be considered far more fully
than that is done to-day, at any rate in the theory
of the Constitution if not in practice.40

37Keith, Dominion Home Rule, p. 55.
39Keith, Dominion Home Rule, p. 55.
40Selected Speeches and Documents on British Colonial
Smuts, however, did not agree with many who proclaimed that the cabinet meant complete Dominion equality with the United Kingdom:

Too much, if I may say so, of the old ideas still clings to the new organism which is growing. I think that, although in practice there is great freedom, yet in actual theory the status of the Dominions is of a subject character. Whatever we may say, and whatever we may think, we are subject Provinces of Great Britain. That is the actual theory of the Constitution, and in many ways which I need not specify to-day that theory still permeates practice to some extent.\(^1\)

The fact is clear that the Imperial War Cabinet was not all that the Dominions wished. They still wanted a stronger voice in foreign relations, and felt that their position in the war entitled them to special consideration. Massey of New Zealand, was especially vocal in his agitation for more Dominion control:

The Imperial Conference, which has been in the habit of meeting every four years, and which in itself I am bound to say was a very important advance, admitted the right of the Dominions to be consulted in connexion with Imperial affairs. But something more than that is required at present, and something more than that must result from the position the Dominions have taken up during the present war.\(^2\)

As the cabinet moved through meeting after meeting, questions of constitutional affairs became more and more a part of each discussion until Borden of Canada, a member of the Imperial War Conference, suggested that constitutional problems were

\(^1\)Ibid.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 389.
too intricate to be discussed during the war emergency and that as soon as possible after the end of hostilities an Imperial conference should consider constitutional issues. Borden, however, did not imply that the Dominions were receiving the constitutional privileges to which they were entitled:

... Any such readjustment, while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth, should recognize their right to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern and for such necessary concerted action founded on consultation as the several governments may determine.

Actually, the Imperial War Cabinet bore a misleading title and evoked erroneous thinking especially from newspapers and other publications aimed at public consumption. But not only the public was misled; Sir Robert Borden insisted that the proceedings of 1917-1918 had been revolutionary. The Imperial government, he said, had formerly been a trustee for the Dominions in foreign affairs and in fact had not always bothered to consult them. But 1917 had brought about a change. The Dominions had been allowed to deal with foreign affairs on a basis of equality.

---

43 Ibid., p. 376.
44 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
Borden's reasoning was probably faulty. Dominions could at that time become independent only when recognized by other powers, in which case they would not automatically be involved in any of Britain's wars without their consent. But as long as they remained Dominions, and whether they liked it or not, they technically were at war whenever Britain was at war, and no growth of Dominion opinion could alter this fact.

The next great inter-Empire meeting after the Imperial War Cabinet (Dominion status at the Paris Peace Conference will be discussed in connection with their status in international organizations) was the promised post-war Imperial Conference. The date for the meeting was set for the spring of 1921 and at once speculation as to its nature became a favorite topic both in the Dominions and London. In view of the organization and functions of the war cabinet, there was an inclination to describe the meeting of 1921 as an Imperial cabinet. Winston Churchill (then secretary of state for the colonies) said that the coming conference would "not be like the old Imperial Conferences, which were occasional and periodical institutions but a meeting of the regular Imperial Cabinet of the Empire." 47 Churchill's statement brought prompt criticism from Canada's Arthur Meighen, who said that the use of the term was wrong and that the conference was merely a meeting of the premiers of the Empire. He feared

the 1921 session should in some way serve to bind or limit
Dominion governments thus strengthening the connection be-
tween the self-governing parts of the Empire and the central
authorities in London. The official title of the meeting
therefore became: "Conference of the Prime Ministers and
Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and
India." The primary topic for the 1921 conference was the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and in its consideration a great
constitutional advance was made by the Dominions. Discussion
of the alliance at the Imperial Conference of 1911 had been
by the defense committee of the conference and not before
the conference as a whole, while in 1921 the alliance, an
important matter of foreign policy, became the main consider-
ation for the entire conference. British policy in 1911 had
simply been stated for the information of the Dominion repre-
sentatives. In 1921, the case was greatly different; Dominion
statesmen were asked their views on the alliance and all of
them had discussed the matter with their parliaments before
coming to London. The conference reached no decision on
the alliance's renewal, but the British government listened
to Dominion views and thereby acknowledged the advance made
in the Dominion constitutional position.

48 Ibid.
Because the alliance was an urgent question in 1921, almost nothing was officially done in the matter of readjusting Imperial constitutional relations. There were, however, several plenary sessions devoted to a discussion of a proposed conference on constitutional relations, but a resolution was adopted in which the Dominion prime ministers decided that there was nothing to be gained by a constitutional conference. Nevertheless the Dominions did recommend that:

"The Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions and the Representatives of India should aim at meeting annually, or at such longer intervals as may prove feasible," and that:

The existing practice of direct communication between the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions, as well as the right of the latter to nominate Cabinet Ministers to represent them in consultation with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom are maintained.

Once again, the 1921 conference showed that the Dominions feared a great change in constitutional relations. While it might allow them more voice in Imperial affairs, it might also allow the Imperial government a stronger voice in Dominion affairs, something which they refused to chance. Strangely, many Britons were more in favor of increased

---

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
Dominion control in foreign affairs than were the Dominions themselves. Brigadier General Cockerill \(^5^4\) said in the House of Commons on June 17, 1921:

> It seems to me that if the British Empire is to have any real meaning or validity, no absolute sovereignty can vest in any one of the component parts of the British Empire in regard at any rate to foreign relations or such foreign relations as affect the vital interests of the other partners in the Empire.\(^5^3\)

Cockerill continued by suggesting some sort of an Imperial constitutional machine would "permit the general will of the component parts of the Empire to be ascertained with greater ease and rapidity than it has been ascertainable to my knowledge in the past, . . ."\(^5^6\) What Cockerill suggested was precisely the type of organization which the Dominions opposed on the grounds that it might infringe on their domestic autonomy. During the same session of Commons, Ormsby-Gore declared:

> The representatives of the Dominions meet as the representatives of free equal nations. That is the line which we are now developing in the Empire and no longer are people in this country desirous of imposing the super State.\(^5^7\)

Ormsby-Gore was incorrect when he stressed equality. The Dominions had won the right to be informed and consulted.

---

\(^{5^4}\) Brigadier General Cockerill, member of the House of Commons from Surrey Reigate.


\(^{5^6}\) Ibid.

\(^{5^7}\) Ibid., p. 838.
but information and consultation do not of necessity involve responsibility for the policy pursued. Apart from periodic meetings of the Imperial conference, there was no organ providing for joint responsibility for foreign policy. The United Kingdom had full responsibility for decisions which affected the entire Empire. Constitutionally the Dominions were free to enter or not to enter (as far as active participation was concerned) any war in which Britain became involved. This had definitely been the case in World War I. The Dominions, however, were not free to indulge in the diplomacy leading to a possible war; that privilege cannot be accepted unless the concomitant responsibility is assumed. The Dominions were not willing to accept responsibility, and so did not gain control.

The war and the part played in it by the Dominions, however, convinced them that not only were they entitled to a larger share in formulating Imperial policy but that they were also entitled to participation in international conferences. The first of these after the war was the Paris Peace Conference at which the Dominions insisted they be given a somewhat independent position. It was first suggested that they be granted the same representation as Belgium and other small allied powers, but because it was proposed to admit representatives of the small powers only when their special interests were under consideration Canada was not satisfied with the position of a small power. Borden, the Canadian
prime minister, pointed out:

... that Canada has no special interests, such as South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, in respect of additional territory, and that the basis of representation accorded to small allied nations would, therefore, be unsatisfactory from the Canadian point of view.58

It was finally decided that the Dominions and India would be members of the British Empire delegation, which meant that the Dominions would be represented at every session including the British Empire, and naturally the Empire would be represented at every session of importance.59

Even that concession did not satisfy Borden and others of the Dominion governments who demanded that:

... all the treaties and conventions resulting from the Peace Conference should be so drafted as to enable the Dominions to become parties and signatories thereto. This procedure will give suitable recognition to the part played at the Peace Table by the British Commonwealth as a whole and will at the same time record the status attained there by the Dominions.60

As a result of Dominion agitation, but more important because Great Britain was willing to give the Dominions a part at the peace conference, Dominion statesmen took part in the conference as part of the British delegation. The delegation's make-up amounted to a continuation of the Imperial War Cabinet procedure. But in addition, the Dominions sat at the conference table in their own right and in the end

58 Keith, British Dominions, p. 12.
59 Ibid., p. 13.
60 Ibid., p. 14.
signed the treaty separately and became independent charter members of the League of Nations. Thus through their part in the war the Dominions had won a place for themselves in international organizations.

Once in the League, the Dominions were not quite sure of their own status. In 1920, New Zealand suggested that Dominions should not exercise their right to act independently within the League but should work through Great Britain after consultation with her. New Zealand held solidly to the view that she was entitled to a voice in foreign affairs only as a very small fraction of the great Empire of which she was but one member. Thus, up to 1935, New Zealand upheld her thesis at Geneva and confined her criticism to confidential Imperial discussions. Her delegates occasionally took a useful and independent part on small matters, but on major issues they faithfully reflected the views of Britain. The other Dominions, especially Canada however, were not so inclined to submit to British influence, although on the whole they exercised remarkably little independence.

Actually, the application of the terms of the Covenant to the Dominions was full of complexities. Were the different parts of the Empire bound to guarantee the territorial integrity and existing political independence of one another?

---

61 Wood, New Zealand in the World, p. 98.
62 Ibid., p. 115.
63 Ibid., p. 116.
If one part went to war contrary to its commitments under Articles XII, XIII, or XV, could the other parts be required to apply to it measures of commercial and financial pressure or even armed force? Could matters between two parts of the Empire be treated as subjects suitable for investigation by the Council or the Assembly? Were treaties or compacts between parts of the Empire treaties within the meaning of the Covenant, so far as to be valid only if registered with the League Secretariat? These were questions which could not be answered in 1921 because no ruling by any accepted body had as yet been given.

In the League Assembly, the distinct status of the Dominions was marked by their each having a vote. Also their delegates were accredited not only by the Imperial government but in addition by their own governments to whom alone they were responsible. Rather strangely, moreover, no effort was made to coordinate the action of the various delegations by previous discussions, and divergences of view were many.

Closely connected with the League was the Permanent Court of International Justice on which the independent position of the Dominions and India was fully admitted. The very fact that the Dominions were independent raised some difficult and serious problems. If a Dominion were asked

---


65 Ibid., p. 886.
to agree to go before the court, would the rule that if one party had a judge on the court the other party was entitled to a like privilege become operative because there was a British judge? The mere fact that a Dominion might be asked to go before the court showed that in a sense it had international obligations, as was assumed in the Covenant of the League of Nations. On the other hand, could one Dominion demand that another should accept arbitration by the permanent court on some matter of difference? Or would such a dispute be ruled as not of an international character, as was maintained by the British government? It was clearly unsatisfactory from the outset that parts of the Empire should try to fight out quarrels before a court which was not interested in the Empire as such.

It was obvious in both the League and the Permanent Court that the Empire, on serious questions at least, would speak with one voice, and further that any problem arising between parts of the Empire would be settled without the aid of existing international machinery. It was this view which carried the day in the debate as to the status of the Dominions at the Washington Conference. The Empire would act as a unit or not act at all. And there can be no doubt that if it had come to a disagreement, the British view must have prevailed.

On the whole, it may be said that the years 1917-1918

---

66 Ibid., p. 338.
witnessed the greatest change in the Empire's constitutional machinery. Each part of the Empire (including Great Britain) managed her own internal affairs without interference from the rest; the British Cabinet in London and the Australian cabinet in Melbourne carried on just as usual. War operations which concerned one part of the Empire only were carried on by that part without outside interference. But over the whole Empire was set a new body, the Imperial War Cabinet, whose duty it was to manage the fighting of the Empire as a whole. The Cabinet had authority because each of its members was a minister who commanded a majority in a parliament. For example, Hughes could promise things in the name of Australia because he knew that the Australian parliament would support him, and if he chose to disagree with everyone else in the Imperial War Cabinet the Cabinet's majority could in no way compel him to do what it wanted. 67

Thus it was that the Dominions came to achieve some degree of equality with Britain. The record of responsible government is largely the history of successive surrenders of authority by the Imperial government until the point was reached where the Dominions could label themselves (without obvious absurdity) as equal members of the British Commonwealth of nations.

Yet equality in 1921 did not exist. One sign of

dependency was Dominion inability to legislate with extra-
territorial effect except under express Imperial legisla-
tion. 68 Autonomy was an absurd term to apply to a Dominion
so restricted. Another sign of dependency, in spite of the
Imperial War Cabinet, the Imperial Conferences and admission
of the Dominions into the League of Nations, was the fact
that there was no real Dominion equality in matters of foreign
policy. The issues of war and peace rested decisively with
the Imperial government. No Dominion could declare war, and
none could make peace except with the permission of the
Imperial government. No Dominion could accredit a minister;
that must be done by the Imperial government. The Imperial
government remained ultimately responsible for every wrong
done by subjects of the crown to foreigners, which under
international law gave rise to an international claim. 69

The unity of the Empire in 1921 was a fact which
implied a unified and not a joint control of foreign policy.
The advantages of unity for the Dominions were great. The
protection of the United Kingdom permitted development of
natural resources and railways, and it gave the Dominions
freedom to spend their money on immigration policies which
were so important to them rather than having to put it all
into fortifications which, in any major crisis, would have
proved at best second rate. The Dominions for the most part

69 Ibid., p. 1150.
realized the advantage of their Imperial connection and were willing and eager to maintain it. Massey of New Zealand saw that the permanent basis of New Zealand's relations with the outside world could be no other than close co-operation with the mother country. New Zealand was satisfied to trust Britain in foreign affairs and led the fight for the unity of the Empire by denouncing those whom she felt were undermining it.\textsuperscript{70}

While all the Dominions have at one time or another demanded participation in foreign policy, many have resisted any fixed scheme for such participation. Hughes of Australia, an astute politician, put the case forcibly when he said:

> When all is said and done, no one will deny that centralized unity of control is superior to divided control and where power is divided amongst men scattered all over the world... unity of action becomes difficult if not impossible.\textsuperscript{71}

Under such circumstances, Hughes would not ask Britain to relinquish centralized control of foreign affairs. Canada, on the other hand, repeatedly demanded more and more voice in foreign affairs, and although gaining much of what she desired was the only one of the Dominions in 1921 who seemed dissatisfied with her position.

In practice the Imperial government has given Dominion peoples control over every interest which they, through their

\textsuperscript{70}\textit{Wood, New Zealand in the World}, p. 1105.

parliaments, have finally insisted upon controlling; and this included two powers, the control of commercial relations and of immigration which, to judge from other empires, might be classed as essential powers for the central authority responsible for the issues of peace and war. Although responsible government has not been totally achieved, the reason for its lack of achievement has been that the Dominions simply have not insisted upon it. They have on many occasions asked to assume powers which have not been granted, but these have not been granted only because the Dominions have not insisted upon them. One must conclude that the Dominions were dependencies in matters of foreign relations because they realized the need for a central authority and were willing that Great Britain should be that authority.

When the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed in 1902, only Canada had been designated as a Dominion; Australia had federated in 1900, but New Zealand remained a colony without responsible government. None of the colonies was consulted during the alliance's negotiations, but merely informed of its ratification. Not until 1907, two years after the first renewal of the alliance, did New Zealand receive responsible government, and in that same year the title "Dominion" was made the official designation of all self-governing colonies.

In 1911, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was again renewed, and this time the Dominions were informed as to Britain's
policies in the Far East but were not yet asked to voice opinions of their own. Only in 1921 were they entitled to express their views toward the alliance. Nevertheless, by 1921, the Dominions were assured that their views would be considered, and past experience indicated that if they insisted on a point of view they would more than likely achieve it. But it was also clear that if it came to fundamental disagreement, Britain would prevail.

As the Washington Conference came near, it was therefore certain that Britain's voice would be the dominant one in the Empire delegation. Canada, Australia and New Zealand were to be represented at Washington where they would have the opportunity to express their desires and to share in formulating Britain's policies. Just what share they would have depended largely upon themselves. If they demanded and insisted, their impact would be considerable, but if they simply asked and then remained silent, they would be largely ignored. The Dominion voice in the final determination of the fate of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance therefore depended on how strongly it favored renewal or non-renewal. During the Imperial Conference of 1921, it was seen that Dominion concern with the alliance rested chiefly on three problems: Asiatic immigration, foreign trade and Imperial defense. If the alliance vitally affected any of these problems, the Dominions could be expected to take a definite stand on the alliance question. The absence of any effect of the alliance
on Dominion problems would be reflected by Dominion silence on the issue. In any case, before judging the effect of the Dominion voice on the final decision at Washington, it is necessary to examine Dominion problems of immigration, trade and defense in the light of their relationship to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
CHAPTER IV

ASIATIC IMMIGRATION--A DEAD ISSUE EXCEPT IN CANADA

Regardless of the fact that no Dominion was sure of the weight its voice would carry at the Washington Conference, each was certain to be represented as a part of the Imperial delegation. At the Imperial Conference of 1921, the Dominions had not agreed among themselves as to the fate of the alliance, and while disagreement had been expected at London, it would be disastrous at Washington where the Empire would have only one vote and could speak only with one voice. If the Dominions were to have any appreciable influence on the Empire's vote they would have to reach a modus vivendi among themselves. The problems most fundamental to Dominion consideration of the alliance's renewal were common to all the Dominions. Each was faced with the problem of regulating Asiatic immigration and each looked upon the alliance as an impairment of its freedom to deal with it.

Between 1902 and 1921, the Asiatic immigration problem changed complexion in each of the three Dominions. Each of the Dominions attempted to regulate Japanese immigration and in so doing found that whatever they did affected relations between Japan and Britain. No Dominion could demand outright exclusion without undermining the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance and therefore when asked to participate in the Washington Conference Dominion statesmen realized that Asiatic immigration must be one of their criteria in formulating policy for renewing or failing to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

At the 1921 Imperial conference, Arthur Meighen (Canada) had been the most outspoken critic of the alliance, and much of his argument was based on Canadian experience with Oriental immigrants. Early Asiatic immigrants to Canada were primarily Chinese, and as was true in California, their presence was not at first resented. By many it was desired. Chinese immigration was limited chiefly to British Columbia where, owing to the infancy of the region and the vast possibilities for development, the first Chinese were welcomed as a much-needed supply of cheap labor. But an anti-Chinese feeling was not long in developing. Several restrictive measures were presented to the British Columbian legislature during the 1860's but all were defeated. In 1871, British Columbia joined the federation of Canada and under the conditions of federation, the Dominion government secured a controlling authority with respect to aliens, but it was not until 1878 that Chinese immigration became a topic of discussion in the Dominion House of Commons.  

1Woodsworth, *Canada and the Orient*, p. 20.
2Ibid., p. 25.
The Ottawa government was reluctant to impose any restrictive measures on Chinese immigrants because they provided cheap labor for the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The government stressed that once the railway was completed the Chinese would leave, and even if they did not, the railway's completion would result in a growth of British Columbia's white population which would place the Chinese in a permanent and powerless minority.  

A second reason for Ottawa's reluctance to restrict Chinese immigration was an exaggerated notion concerning trade possibilities with the Far East. It was imagined that the exchange of goods with China and Japan would be an immense source of wealth to Canada and particularly to British Columbia because of her position on the Pacific; Vancouver Island was regarded "as the future emporium of the China and India trade."  

Despite Ottawa's reluctance, British Columbians continued to clamor for an anti-Chinese bill and in 1885 a moderate act was passed imposing a head tax of fifty dollars on every entering Chinese and limiting their immigration to one person for every fifty tons of the carrying vessel.  

Although the act was not as stringent as British Columbians wished, it was reasonably effective. From nearly 4,000

---

4Woodsworth, *Canada and the Orient*, p. 31.  
5Ibid., p. 39.  
Chinese arrivals into British Columbia in the first half of 1885, the number fell to an average of less than 700 a year between 1886 and 1889. 7

That British Columbia was the most outspoken province on the Chinese issue was owing to the fact that practically all Chinese immigrants settled there. The Canadian census of 1891 showed 9,129 Chinese in Canada of whom 8,910 were in British Columbia; Chinese comprised approximately one-eleventh of the province's total population. 8 The 1885 act settled, for all practical purposes, the Chinese immigration question, but the effects of the agitation were lasting and there has been an anti-Asiatic feeling in British Columbia ever since.

Chinese were not the only Asians to immigrate in numbers into Canada; they were only the first. Japanese followed, and although Canadian reaction against them did not reach serious proportions until years after the Chinese question had been settled, Canadian relations with Japan were, in view of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, much more important than Chinese-Canadian relations.

So far as is known, the first Japanese immigrant to reach Canada was an adventurous young sailor who left his ship when it touched at New Westminster in 1877. He settled in Canada and held several jobs: fisherman, longshore-

7Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 41.
8Ibid., p. 42.
man and business man. Eventually, he imported a wife and settled in Victoria. It was not until almost twenty years later that the next Japanese immigrants appeared. In 1894, small numbers of them settled in British Columbia; its geographic location, moderate climate and abundance of natural resources making it an attractive place for them and they engaged in fishing, coal mining and lumbering.  

In 1895, the Dominion government first became interested in the Japanese question. Although ever since the Meiji restoration in 1868 Japan had attempted to free herself from unequal treaties with western nations, the first step toward her fiscal freedom was not taken until July 1894 when a treaty of commerce and navigation was concluded with Great Britain under which the subjects of each power were granted "full liberty to enter, travel or reside in any part of the dominions and possessions of the other contracting party." It was agreed, however, that the treaty would not apply to the self-governing Dominions unless the Dominions notified Britain of their acceptance of the treaty. When, therefore, in December 1894, the Ottawa government was asked if it wished to adhere to the treaty, it stipulated:

... that the treaty shall not in any way affect the laws, ordinances and regulations with regard to trade, immigration of labourers, policy and public security which are in force or which may

---

9. G. Smith, A Study in Canadian Immigration, Toronto, 1920, p. 44.

hereafter be enacted. . .11

Ottawa further asked that the term laborer used in the treaty be more closely defined so that it would definitely include artisans.12

Great Britain refused to accept the reservations and the Canadian government consequently declined to adhere to the treaty. It based its refusal on two grounds: trade and immigration. It was feared that the treaty might encourage Japanese immigration, and that the most-favored-nation clauses might hamper Canada’s commercial freedom. The latter reason seems to have carried more weight, because even though Japan later signed a protocol stating her desire to allow the Dominions complete control over immigration of laborers and artisans, regardless of the terms of the treaty, the Canadian government again refused to adhere on grounds of trade.13

Japan’s growth as a world power had lasting significance for the British Empire. Australia and New Zealand could not but be affected by her expanding power, and India too was within Japan’s reach. For Canada, contact with the Far East was limited to Asiatic immigration; nevertheless attempts to restrict immigration from a rising Japan only compounded an already serious problem. During the last few

11Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 50.
12Ibid.
13Glazebrook, Canadian External Relations, p. 265.
years of the nineteenth century, the Japanese population in Canada increased rapidly. Prior to July 1, 1896, no statistics were kept of Japanese arrivals and it was not until 1902 that immigration figures were officially recorded. But a glance at the unofficial figures of 1897 and 1900 is sufficient to illustrate the problem's growth. In 1897, the number of Japanese landed at Canadian ports was 691, as compared with 10,302 in 1900.\(^{14}\)

The great majority of Japanese did not remain long in Canada. The census of 1901 found only 4,738 permanent residents, the rest remaining for only a season and then returning home. Many thousands en route to the United States landed first in Canada because in case of expulsion from the United States they would be deported to Canada and not to Japan.\(^{15}\) The magnitude of the transient trade was not known at the time and British Columbia was alarmed at the number of Japanese arrivals. As a result, what had hitherto been an anti-Chinese movement, became anti-Oriental.

The immigration question reached Imperial proportions for the first time when Japanese immigration into Canada and Australia was discussed at the Colonial Conference of 1897 where Joseph Chamberlain, secretary of state for the colonies, stressed the magnitude of the Empire's interests in the Pacific. Chamberlain declared that the home government was

\(^{14}\)Woodworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 50.

\(^{15}\)Ibid., p. 52.
in accord with Dominion attempts to regulate Asiatic immigration, but he asked Dominion leaders to keep in mind the traditions of the Empire:

... which makes no distinction in favour of, or against race or color; and to exclude, by reason of their color, all Her Majesty's Indian subjects, or even all Asiatics, would be an act so offensive to those peoples that it would be most painful, I am quite certain, to Her Majesty to have to sanction it.17

Chamberlain suggested that the other Dominions follow the pattern set the previous year by the Natal government which had enacted a law calling for a European language test for immigrants. He urged the adoption of this type of law because he had been assured by Baron Kato, Japanese minister in London, that Japan would not object to this method of excluding her citizens as it was not openly discriminatory.18

As a result of the conference, British Columbia in 1900 demanded a Natal-type immigration act, but the Canadian government refused a language act of any kind and replied that although it would be willing to raise the head tax on Chinese, it would not impose a tax of any kind on Japanese immigrants. Emphasizing the difficulties of Britain's position, Canada's prime minister ventured to hope that the people of British Columbia:

... will be prepared to put no obstacle in the

---

16 Ibid., p. 53.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 54.
way of an alliance between Japan and England; although it may call for a sacrifice for the sake of the mother country and for the sake of the United States.19

British Columbia, however, was not willing to make the sacrifice and passed a number of acts, many of which were disallowed by the Ottawa government, but some of which were allowed, owing to their local nature. One such act, the Vancouver Incorporation Act, denied Asiatics the municipal franchise.20 As far as British Columbia was concerned, the problem was a real one and could not be glossed over with smooth words from London or Ottawa; after all, the Asiatics were in British Columbia and not in London or Ottawa.

The situation might have reached a crisis stage had not the Japanese government adopted a policy of voluntary action in restricting emigration to both Canada and the United States. In early 1900, repeated warnings appeared in the Japanese press that excessive numbers of Japanese laborers were emigrating to the Pacific coast. It was reported that in April alone, 4,500 Japanese emigrants had arrived at Vancouver, many of them unable to find employment. Accordingly on May 17, the Japanese foreign office instructed local authorities to put limits on the issuance of travel permits to Canada, and the number of arrivals in Canada fell from 1,495 in June, 1900, to 685 in July.21 In addition, persons

---

19Ibid., p. 59.


21Woodworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 60.
of certain occupations (laborers and artisans) were denied the right of emigration to Canada at all. As a result, Japanese arrivals in Canada averaged about ten per month during the following two years. In informing Sir Wilfrid Laurier of his government's actions, the Japanese consul at Ottawa observed that the accusation that Japan was attempting to colonize British Columbia had been proved "absolutely baseless." 22

British Columbia, however, did not consider that Japan's limitations on emigration constituted a lasting settlement of the issue. Only three weeks after the Japanese controls were put into force, the legislature passed an immigration law requiring a language test for all persons entering the province, and no attempt was made to conceal the fact that it was aimed directly at the Chinese and Japanese. 23 The Japanese were insulted and Baron Hayashi, Japanese ambassador in London, requested Lord Lansdowne, British foreign secretary, to take steps to have the act disallowed. The British foreign office worked through Joseph Chamberlain, colonial secretary, who said the question was one of Imperial foreign relations and therefore ultra vires of the Provincial legislature. He urged the Dominion parliament to disallow it: "It is the particular desire of His Majesty's government, to do nothing especially at the

22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 61.
present time\textsuperscript{24} to impair existing friendly relations with Japan."\textsuperscript{25} Pressed in this manner, Ottawa immediately disallowed the act.

It was Imperial foreign policy, over which the Dominion had no control, which destroyed the work of the exclusionists in British Columbia. The Dominion found that it could not control immigration contrary to the wishes of London. At any rate, at the cost of domestic dissension, Canada had done her share to pave the way for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. The signature of the alliance, of course, made the future handling of the immigration question a matter for infinite care, and although British Columbia continued to press for sterner measures, the federal government had no choice but to continue in the policy urged upon it by London.

In 1902 and 1903, immigration, labor regulation and coal mine regulation acts were disallowed. In 1904, another immigration act was disallowed, and in 1905 three more met the same fate.\textsuperscript{26} The alliance, however, had another effect on the immigration policy. Whereas the Japanese were resentful of the treatment they had received, the alliance definitely served to offset the insult in Tokyo and the Japanese

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24}This incident took place late in 1901, at which time the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was being negotiated in London. Naturally the British foreign office was anxious that no Dominion should be allowed to insult the Japanese at that moment.
\item \textsuperscript{25}Woodsworth, \textit{Canada and the Orient}, p. 61.
\item \textsuperscript{26}Keith, \textit{Responsible Governments}, Vol. II, p. 820.
\end{itemize}
government did not feel the problem sufficiently serious to risk a rupture or a strain in relations with her new ally. In this manner, the alliance helped to ease the immigration issue rather than to complicate it.

While Imperial interests were chiefly responsible for Dominion opposition to a severe Japanese immigration policy, commercial interests played an increasingly important part in inducing Canada to follow the policy thus far upheld. Prior to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, Japanese trade with Canada was negligible. From 1902 on, however, there was a growing Canadian interest in the possibilities of an expanded trade, and the federal government therefore took added pains to curb precipitate action by British Columbia. It underlined the possible injurious effect of a severe restriction on Japanese pride and consequently on future trade agreements. The result was a double standard for treatment of Chinese and Japanese.

As early as 1903, there was definite reason to believe that trade possibilities between Canada and Japan were infinite. In 1903, Sydney Fisher, Dominion minister of agriculture, attended the Japanese Exhibition at Osaka, at which Canadian goods were displayed for the first time. He was cordially received by the emperor and by government officials, and on his return gave an enthusiastic report on

---


28Ibid., p. 266.
potential commercial possibilities, but he warned Canada to exercise extreme caution in her handling of Japanese immigration:

The Japanese are proud and rather sensitive. . . . They resent extremely the idea of being classed with the barbarian Chinese, and of having any special legislation against them in any country with which they are asked to trade.\(^{29}\)

No extensive immigration, he said, need be feared from Japan. The Japanese government had assured him in writing that its policy of restriction would be maintained and that only 400 persons a year would be granted emigration permits to Canada.\(^{30}\)

It was not long after the success achieved at Osaka that the Dominion government finally decided to adhere to the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1894. The most-favored-nation clauses were no longer considered a danger to Canadian commercial freedom and the Ottawa parliament felt that Japanese voluntary restriction of emigration was sufficient guarantee against an influx of Japanese.\(^{31}\)

All went well until 1907, when as a result of inducements offered by steamship companies, there was a renewed

\(^{29}\)Woodsworth, *Canada and the Orient*, p. 67.

\(^{30}\)It is interesting to note that years later when Fisher was asked to produce the document given him by the Japanese proving their policy of voluntary restriction, he could not produce it, nor could he account for his statement that he had ever had one in his possession. Nevertheless, the belief that one existed assisted the government in carrying out for some time, its policies with regard to Japanese immigration and trade.

\(^{31}\)Woodsworth, *Canada and the Orient*, p. 69.
influx of Japanese whose presence resulted in a discreditable riot at Vancouver in September. The Dominion government was quick to make good the losses suffered by the Japanese but recognized the necessity of preventing a recurrence.\(^{32}\) While not defending the rioters, the exclusionists also maintained that similar incidents would inevitably occur if Oriental immigration continued and in a series of mass meetings demanded complete exclusion even if it meant abrogating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. British Columbia, they said, had already done enough for Imperial interests in handing over a large part of her coastline to the United States in the Alaska boundary award. She would not, they continued, pay the further price of becoming an Asiatic colony in order to give Britain more security in the Far East.\(^{33}\)

The Japanese took the riots with equanimity and following the pattern laid down in their 1900 voluntary restriction, said that they felt a satisfactory settlement could be worked out. A leading Tokyo newspaper, the \textit{Jiji}, reported that because the Dominion government had considerable control over the people of Canada, it was sure that the fullest protection would be given Japanese citizens in the future.\(^{34}\)

The Kobe \textit{Herald} thought an amicable settlement between Japan and her British ally would be worked out which would protect

\(^{32}\text{Keith, }\textit{Responsible Governments}, \text{ Vol. II, p. 820.}\)

\(^{33}\text{Woodsworth, }\textit{Canada and the Orient}, \text{ p. 77.}\)

\(^{34}\text{Ibid., p. 81.}\)
British Columbia and yet not include a total exclusion of Orientals. 35

Wiser heads also prevailed in Canada. Ottawa pointed out that the source of much Japanese immigration was Hawaii and not Japan. In January 1907, the American government had excluded Hawaiian Japanese from entrance into the United States and subsequently many Japanese had gone to British Columbia, not with the object of settling there, but to circumvent the new American regulation and to make their way via Canada into the United States. It was pointed out that the Japanese foreign office had given the emigrants passports only to the Hawaiian Islands and that once there they had passed outside Tokyo's jurisdiction. Tokyo, therefore, was not responsible for the influx of Japanese. 36

As a result of the conciliatory spirit shown on both sides, a Canadian delegation was sent to Japan. It remained there five weeks, and with the assistance of the British ambassador, succeeded in negotiating with Baron Hayashi (now Japanese foreign minister) what has been called the "Gentlemen's Agreement." 37 It is not necessary to explain in detail the terms of the agreement; it merely listed four classes of persons who would be allowed by the Japanese government to emigrate to Canada. The agreement was a

35Ibid.
36Ibid., p. 83.
37Glazebrook, Canadian External Relations, p. 271.
re-assertion on Japan's part to continue her policy of voluntary restriction, now bolstered by a written document. The spirit of the agreement, as of the Japanese government, was admirably enunciated in a letter written by Baron Hayashi to the Canadian prime minister on December 23, 1907:

... I have the honour to state that although the existing treaty between Japan and Canada (the 1894 commercial treaty) absolutely guarantees to Japanese subjects full liberty to enter, travel and reside in any part of the Dominion of Canada, yet it is not the intention of the Imperial Government to insist upon the complete enjoyment of the rights and privileges guaranteed by those stipulations when that would involve disregard of special conditions which may prevail in Canada from time to time.38

Few of the agreement's terms were presented to the Ottawa parliament, but Hayashi's letter was read in full. Prime Minister Lemieux added that Canada had only two alternatives: either to abrogate the trade treaty with Japan, or to accept the "Gentlemen's Agreement." Japan's wheat imports from Canada, he pointed out, had increased 800 per cent in the past ten years and Canada could count on a continually expanding Japanese trade. He also warned that to exclude Japanese from Canada would mean a serious breach in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance:

Can we consistently ask the allies and friends of Great Britain to brand themselves before the whole world as an inferior race—which they are not? They are, on the contrary the rising power in the Far East.39

38 Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 293.
39 Ibid., p. 89.
On the whole, the "Gentlemen's Agreement" worked well. One point, however, caused continuous trouble. It had been understood in Canada that Japan had promised to limit emigration to a total of 400 persons a year. There never have been any documents found to substantiate this contention, and it is probable that the "fictitious" Fisher document contained the genesis of the idea; but in any event, Canadians believed that a total of 400 should include all immigrants under the four classes set down in the "Gentlemen's Agreement." As Japan interpreted the agreement, however, the quota applied only to domestic servants and agricultural laborers. Wives and children of Japanese already in Canada or of those who migrated there were not considered by Tokyo to come within its terms. The consequence of the Japanese interpretation is seen in the figures for Japanese immigration since 1908. Two groups (artisans and laborers) listed in the agreement, have never been brought to Canada under its terms, and persons making up the other two groups have never exceeded 253 in any one year. Yet from 1909 to 1928 (when the quota was reduced and the agreement made more explicit), the number of Japanese entering Canada exceeded 400 in every year except two. In some years the figure was doubled and in 1919 it rose as high as 1,178.

---

40 See page 114 above.
41 Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 91.
42 Ibid.
Another explanation of the increase lay in the nature of Japanese immigration during these years. Prior to 1907, Japanese immigration was limited almost exclusively to unmarried adult males. But after 1907, large numbers of Japanese women migrated to Canada since the "Gentlemen's Agreement" permitted unrestricted entrance of wives or children of resident Japanese in Canada. The fact that most Japanese males in Canada were unmarried was nullified by the "picture bride" system, through which a Japanese man abroad could be legally married under Japanese law to a bride in Japan. He would select his bride from a photograph, send word of his choice to Japan where the marriage would take place, and the bride would be sent to Canada. By this means, numbers of Japanese women came to both Canada and the United States. After 1907, the number of Japanese women migrating to Canada exceeded the number of men in nearly every year.43

The result on the Japanese population in Canada as a whole is obvious. In 1901, there were 4,738 Japanese in Canada, all of whom were male. In 1921, the Japanese population numbered 15,868, of whom 10,520 were male and 5,348 female. Of the total number, 4,334 were children born in Canada. Thus after 1907, the Japanese population problem in British Columbia was not one of immigration but one of natural increase.44

43Ibid., p. 92.
44Ibid., p. 93.
By 1909, the entire immigration policy of the Dominion government was under question. It was not only the Asiatic problem in the far west that bothered Ottawa, but the Dominion-wide picture as well. Canada had done little in the way of establishing a selective immigration legislative program with the result that critics of the government were able to compile considerable data showing the deplorable laxness which resulted. For example, while the number of rejections was high, the ratio of rejections to immigrants was not equal to that of even the United States. During 1908, 262,469 immigrants were admitted into Canada and 1,002 were rejected, a proportion of one to 262. In the United States during the same year, 782,820 were admitted but 10,907 rejected or one of every seventy-two. The figures definitely indicate that Canada's medical and police requirements were neither as stringent nor as well-enforced or both, as those of the United States.

By 1910, the need for a new comprehensive immigration law was felt in Canada and there was passed in May, the "Canadian Immigration Law" which defined what was meant by Canadian domicile and listed the conditions under which Canadian citizenship would be determined. Definitions of immigrant and alien were also given along with a list of classes of persons which were to be excluded. Some of these were "idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, epileptics,

45Smith, Canadian Immigration, p. 72.
insane persons, and persons who have been insane within five years previous to emigration." Although the law said nothing of Orientals per se, it did show a definite toughening of attitude toward immigration in general, and significantly not by British Columbia, but by the Dominion government.

On April 3, 1911, an old problem reappeared. Britain and Japan concluded a new treaty of commerce and navigation. As in the 1894 treaty, subjects of both territories were given "full liberty to enter, travel and reside" in each others' territories, but as before, the treaty stipulated that it would not apply to the self-governing Dominions without their specific adherence which must be given within two years. Because of certain commercial provisions, the Laurier government refused to adhere to the treaty, but at the same time offered to continue the existing 1894 treaty for two additional years.

With regard to the controversial mutual rights clause, Canada suggested to the Japanese government that in view of the "Gentlemen's Agreement," no specific mention of immigration need be made in the treaty and that its absence would ease the pressure of the opposition in Ottawa. The conservative opposition, however, reiterated that Canada had handed over the control of immigration to the Japanese government.

---

46 Ibid., p. 95.


48 Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 94.
Mackenzie King, minister of labor, who had just returned from travels in Japan, China and India, undertook to answer for the government. He maintained that the manner in which Canada handled the Oriental immigration problem was one of the Dominion's most important concerns. The problem, he said, could be handled in one of two ways: by diplomacy or by defying Orientals and excluding them from Canada. He agreed that restriction was necessary but urged that care be used in carrying it out. The government's position had not changed and a policy of moderate and diplomatic restriction based on the "Gentleman's Agreement" would be maintained as long as the Liberals were in office.

In the general election of 1911, however, the Liberal administration was defeated and the Conservatives under Sir Robert Borden came to power. The two-year agreement with Japan was to expire on July 17, 1913, and in January of that year, Borden promised British Columbia that when the treaty came up for consideration, Canada's immigration interests would be given special consideration that British Columbia would be consulted on matters that specially concerned her. On February 7, he notified the Japanese consul-general in Canada that the Dominion was willing to adhere to the trade treaty of 1911 if it should not be interpreted so as to repeal any of the immigration laws of 1910. On the face of

49 Glazebrook, Canadian External Relations, p. 281.
50 Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 96.
the matter, the reservation seemed inane because the law of 1910 did not mention Oriental immigration by name. It did, however, contain one clause which gave the governor-general the power to prohibit:

... for a stated period, or permanently, the landing in Canada... of immigrants belonging to any race deemed unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada, or of immigrants of any specified class, occupation or character.51

After consulting his government, Japan's consul answered that Tokyo would not object to the proposal since the 1910 law dealt with all immigration and did not discriminate against Orientals in general nor against Japanese in particular.52 Japan's acquiescence in the matter is another example of her willingness to work out immigration difficulties as long as her people were not openly discriminated against. Japan did not care about practical exclusion, but strongly resented nominatum exclusion.

With the outbreak of war in 1914, Japan became one of Britain's wartime allies. The Oriental immigration question dropped into the background and no attempt was made either in British Columbia or in Ottawa to restrict the further entry of Orientals. In fact Orientals were once more welcomed in the Dominion as the solution to the labor shortage caused by the enlistment of many men into the armed forces. Several organized schemes for increased importation of

51 Smith, Canadian Immigration, p. 84.
52 Glasebrook, Canadian External Relations, p. 283.
Japanese and Chinese were advanced but were met with British Columbian opposition and failed to pass the Ottawa legislature.\(^{53}\)

Depression and unemployment followed the war in Canada, and in British Columbia, where there were more Orientals than ever, agitation revived. Orientals were charged with holding monopolies on some industries (especially fishing), and the cry that British Columbia was paying the price for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was heard once more. Returned soldiers, unable to find jobs, were especially bitter in their denunciation of Orientals and asked for special taxes on Japanese fishermen and for outright exclusion.\(^{54}\) In 1919, the Dominion legislature tightened general immigration rules and in 1921 imposed added restrictions on Chinese. No further restrictions were placed on Japanese, however, and British Columbia remained unsatisfied. In 1921, petitions were circulated by ex-servicemen demanding the complete prohibition of Asiatic immigration, and as before the war, British Columbians asked that international affairs or Imperial policies should not be allowed to stand in the way of their freedom to regulate their own immigration policies.\(^{55}\)

When the Imperial Conference met in 1921 to discuss

---


\(^{54}\)Woodsworth, *Canada and the Orient*, p. 105.

\(^{55}\)Ibid.
the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the provincial government asked Meighen to oppose its renewal unless Canada was given the right to exclude Japanese immigrants. In November of the same year, the British Columbian legislature passed a resolution asking the federal government to terminate the Anglo-Japanese trade treaty as it applied to Canada.

It was obvious that British Columbia could never be persuaded to accept a moderate handling of Japanese immigration. It consistently demanded exclusion but was balked by the Dominion government which in turn was under pressure from London. That the Chinese received a more severe treatment than the Japanese indicated that it was Imperial policy which created the double standard; and Imperial policy meant the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Although the Oriental problem was centered chiefly in British Columbia, the Dominion government became more and more interested in it because it had a direct bearing on Canada's relations with foreign states and with the United Kingdom. After World War I the problem reappeared, and as has been seen, Meighen made reference to it in opposing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance at the Imperial Conference of 1921. British Columbia continued to believe that she was paying the price for the alliance and was not without sympathizers throughout the rest of Canada. If renewal of the alliance meant Canada was not free to deal with Asiatic immigration,

56 Ibid., p. 106.
Canada would not favor renewal. Meighen was not unwilling to adopt the same view.

Like Canada, Australia's earliest encounter with Oriental immigration came via China. The first sizeable influx came in the 1850's after the 1851 discovery of gold in Australia. At first, Australians tried through local legislation, to avoid possible evil results which might result from congregations of Chinese in parts of the colonies but gradually the feeling became one of determination to keep Australia "white". The white Australia policy grew in strength and the advent of the Commonwealth was marked in 1901 by the adoption of the "Immigration Restriction Act" which amounted to a none-too-polite Oriental exclusion bill. The 1901 Act was not limited to Chinese, and by implication included all Asiatics, among whom of course, were Japanese.

Australian contacts with Japan came much later than those with China. While China experienced centuries of desultory European trade, Japan stagnated under Tokugawa feudalism and isolation after 1603. The "opening" of Japan by Perry and by the Meiji restoration aroused considerable interest in Australia. From the earliest days of 1855, hard-pressed Australian squatters had looked upon Japan as a potential source of labor and supplies, and reports had been

---

58 Ibid., p. 871.
received of isolated Japanese who had migrated to Shanghai and other Chinese ports, just at the moment when Australians were troubled by the low physical quality of Chinese coolies coming to Australia, and at a time when methods of settling North Australia were needed.\(^{59}\)

Plans for small-scale white settlement failed and thus came a turn to the Orient as a source for settlers. Government officials were sent to Ceylon and Java, to Reunion and Madagascar, to recruit immigrants. Special agents imported South China coolies and Filipinos by the hundreds; there was even a plan to import Russian Mennonites.\(^{60}\) None of these measures sufficed and thus came the plan of 1876 which, had it succeeded, would have changed the whole nature of the Northern Territory's history and the social and economic development of Australia. The plan (one of the most startling in history) called for no less than the transportation of a portion of Japan \textit{in toto} to northern Australia. All classes of Japanese were included: laborers, farmers and aristocrats, and their position was not to be one of the Chinese coolies. They were to own lands in fee-simple and were to enjoy all the rights they had had in their native land, plus the privileges guaranteed by law to Australian citizens.\(^{61}\) Actual arrangements were made to transport the

\(^{59}\) Ross, \textit{Australia and the East}, p. 17.

\(^{60}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 18.

first group of emigrants, and the site of their settlement laid out, when suddenly the plan was ruined. 62

The new government in Japan was threatened by a reactionary rebellion and the rebels came dangerously close to restoring feudalism in Japan. Naturally such foreign ventures as the Australian plan could not be considered when a return to feudalism was imminent, and after further negotiations, the Japanese foreign office informed the Australian government that, "... as to the question of Japanese emigration to North Australia, it is a matter which the Japanese Government is not disposed to encourage or aid under present circumstances." 63 With the failure of the Japanese plan, the quest for cheap labor resulted in a renewed importation of Chinese coolies and in spasmodic negotiations with Manila and Batavia. 64 Australia was left free to pursue her "white" policy.

It is not until the 1890's, after the failure of the Japanese plan and after the great fight for Chinese exclusion, that any unified movement for a white Australia and a total exclusion of colored races can be traced. White Australia is a kind of a social and racial Monroe Doctrine, as applied to all colored and therefore "unassimilable" races. 65

65 *Smith, Thirty Years*, p. 22.
Actually there was little danger of Australia's being swamped by Asiatics in the nineties, and in 1901 there were only 47,000 Asiatics in the Dominion, but the trickle of Japanese immigration into Australia attracted the attention of "White Australia" fanatics who even in the early nineties saw in it a danger. They were suspicious of Japan's modernization and of her defeat of China in 1894. The movement of expansion which started in Korea, they said, might well end in Australia.66

So strong was the feeling that in a conference at Sydney in 1896, the colonies decided to apply anti-Chinese restrictions to other Asiatics. New Zealand, also present at the meeting, went along with the Australian colonies and adopted the same measures.67 In addition, the conference unanimously voted against adhering to the Anglo-Japanese trade treaty concluded two years previously on the grounds that it would prevent the colonies from dealing freely with the Japanese immigration issue.68 All of the measures, however, were temporarily shelved pending the meeting of the colonial conference in 1897.

In welcoming the delegates, Joseph Chamberlain spoke sympathetically on the Asiatic problem. But the British

66 Ross, Australia and the East, p. 22.
68 Ross, Australia and the East, p. 22.
Empire, he said, contained 300,000,000 Asiatics, all as loyal to the Crown as the delegates themselves and including many hundreds of thousands every bit as civilized. He advised the conference to limit its attention to the character and not the color of the immigrants. No real decision came from the conference although the colonies were advised to adopt a language test which would not discriminate against one race in particular.

Meanwhile, in the full flush of her victory over China, Japan protested against the Australian actions. Objecting to being lumped with colored races and to the indiscriminate method of exclusion, the Japanese asserted that a language test would be no insult, and the Japanese consul at Sydney made it clear that as far as Japan was concerned the matter was one of national prestige alone. Neither the government nor individuals in Japan, he maintained, desired any large-scale emigration to Australia.

In view of Japanese protests and in compliance with requests from London, the three colonies (New Zealand, Tasmania and Western Australia) passed language tests. Queensland, however, refused to follow the others and took

---

a more friendly attitude toward Japan. The colony adhered to the 1894 trade treaty and was satisfied with Japan's promise to limit emigration to numbers which the colony should determine. 72

Before federation, each Australian colony had adopted its own immigration rules with the result that the immigration question by 1900 was in a state of confusion. In 1900, however, federation was achieved and in the first federal elections the "White Australia" policy was a matter of primary concern. The newly elected government was pledged to introduce legislation to promote a "white Australia" and one of the first acts of the original Commonwealth parliament was the previously mentioned Commonwealth Immigration Restriction Act which prescribed a language test of fifty words in a European language for prospective immigrants. Although every immigrant coming to Australia did not have to pass the test, it was used as a means of excluding an immigrant, whatever his nationality, who was considered undesirable. Not even all Asiatics were excluded under it; merchants, students, and tourists from Japan and India (and after 1912, China) were admitted, but only for renewable short periods of time. 73

The 1901 act became the cornerstone of Australia's racial and social policy. There is today a striking unanimity

72 Ibid., p. 23.
of feeling on the matter, and the principle enunciated in the legislature of New South Wales in 1888 has received wide acclaim in Australia:

... we should not encourage or admit amongst us any class of persons whatever whom are not prepared to advance to all our franchises, to all our liberties as citizens, and to all our social rights, including the rights of marriage.74

But the real issues were racial and economic rather than social. The mass of Australians considered Japanese as inferior beings, and there were few workers in the Commonwealth who did not economically fear Asiatic competition.75

With the immigration act of 1901, the Japanese question had been swept into the wider fight for a completely "white" Australia, and the ultimate policy adopted made no discrimination between Japanese and the Kanakas, Pacific islanders, Indians, Chinese, and other eastern peoples among whom the Japanese objected to be considered. The Japanese put up a protracted fight to be exempted from anti-Asiatic measures and to be included among the Europeans. When efforts at Sydney failed, Baron Hayashi took up the matter in London. He said that the restriction act could only operate to the "detriment of friendly and commercial relations between Japan and Australia."76 But the British government refused to act, knowing that opinion in Australia

74Smith, Thirty Years, p. 23.
75Ross, Australia and the East, p. 14.
was unalterable, and also feeling that because Japan had previously signified her approval of the language test as a means of regulating immigration, no other steps were required.\textsuperscript{77}

Japanese sensibilities, however, were injured and the Japanese press and even some government officials described the "White Australia" act (1901) as "an offence against humanity" and "an insulting piece of legislation."\textsuperscript{78} But wider national interests prevailed over racial pride and as soon as Japan began to think of a diplomatic understanding with Great Britain, the question of immigration into Australia lapsed into the background where it has remained ever since.\textsuperscript{79} In Australia, as in Canada, the immigration question was settled, or if that term is too strong, at least mitigated, by Japanese willingness to put first things first.

By 1905, the immigration question had so quieted down and restrictions had become so entirely accepted that an informal arrangement could be made definitely removing any suspicion of a slight to Japan's dignity. This arrangement consisted of a "gentlemen's agreement" between Australia and Japan, under which Japan undertook to issue passports for Australia only to \textit{bona fide} merchants (engaged in foreign trade) students and tourists; Australia, on her side, agreed

\textsuperscript{77}Smith, \textit{Thirty Years}, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{78}Ross, \textit{Australia and the East}, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{79}Ibid.
to exempt Japanese holding passports from the language test.\textsuperscript{80} The agreement was clearly satisfactory to both parties and the friendly relations it established were strengthened by the passing of an Amendment Act in Australia altering the wording of the original 1901 restriction clause. The amendment provided that a future language dictation test, instead of being given in a European language, would be given in any prescribed language, the vagueness of the phrase removing the appearance of discrimination at the expense of Asiatics.\textsuperscript{81} The Australian government was pleased with the solution of the problem.

Australia nevertheless continued to be on guard against moves threatening her well-defended white policy and strongly opposed Japan's request for a racial equality clause at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The phrase was only a pious declaration but Prime Minister Hughes denounced it in no uncertain terms:

No matter how innocuous it may seem in form, it is certainly aimed at giving the League control of questions relating to immigration and naturalization and matters which cannot be surrendered by any state without such impairment of its sovereignty as to make it in effect a subject state. Australia could not sign the Covenant if it contained any such amendment. It would be unacceptable, no matter how drafted, for it strikes at the root of a policy vital to the existence and ideals of Australia.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{80}Ibid., p. 43.
\textsuperscript{81}Woodsworth, \textit{Canada and the Orient}, p. 164.
\textsuperscript{82}Ibid.
The racial equality clause was defeated largely through the efforts of the British Dominions and the United States.

Soon after the Peace Conference, the Japanese found that the course of events justified their theoretical complaints against racial discrimination. In her mandated possessions, Australia rigidly applied the white policy. The Japanese, who had enjoyed an unrestricted right of entry in the days of German control, consequently found themselves virtually excluded under a regime of international control which was nominally in the interests of humanity in general.  \(^8^3\)

Australia lost no time in explaining her side of the mandate issue and advanced two arguments: first, the proximity of the mandated islands to Australia made them of extreme strategic importance. Second, the effect of Asiatic competition upon the native population would be disastrous. Therefore, Australia was only protecting the natives with a white policy.  \(^8^4\) Whether either argument holds up under an objective examination is unimportant; the point is that Australia, although having won from Japan a voluntary restriction of emigration, continued to press her white policy in all lands under her control and in spite of an amicable and satisfactory agreement with Japan, internal legislation against Asiatics continued after World War I. In 1920 for example, a factory act was passed limiting the hours and


conditions under which an Asiatic could work. It further required that all furniture imported or manufactured in Australia must be stamped "European labor" or "Asiatic labor" as the case may have been.\(^{85}\) The act was openly anti-Asiatic and humiliating to Asiatic nations.

The figures on the Asiatic population in Australia indicate that Australian fears were grossly exaggerated. In 1921 there were 17,571 in Australia and these were fairly well scattered over the continent; nowhere did they constitute a dominant element in any community.\(^{86}\) Yet internal legislation against them as late as 1920 shows that fear of them persisted. Had there been a danger of a renewed influx of Orientals, there might have been some reason for such legislation, but with the Restriction Act of 1901 working against all but Japanese, and with the "gentlemen's agreement" limiting Japanese, there was no danger of influx. Nevertheless, fear of Asiatics continued.

The fact that in favoring renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance at the Imperial Conference of 1921, Hughes did not mention the immigration question, indicated that in official circles, at least, the problem was not considered dangerous or that the alliance in no way restricted Australia's freedom to deal with it. Or perhaps Hughes realized that Japan's desire for the alliance was one reason for her

\(^{85}\text{Keith, Responsible Governments, Vol. II, p. 817.}\)

\(^{86}\text{Ibid., p. 811.}\)
conciliatory attitude toward Australia's insulting white policy. Regardless of his reasons, Hughes' statements on the renewal of the alliance expressed little concern with the matter of Japanese immigration. By 1921, it was an almost dead issue. There was still fear in Australia, but the government was convinced that its arrangements with Japan were sufficient to hold Japanese immigration within bounds set up by Australia. Japanese immigration, therefore, would not be of primary concern to Australia's delegation at Washington.

New Zealand's "white" movement was born with, and grew up with, Australia's. New Zealand early adopted poll taxes and limited entries with respect to the tonnage of ships on which Asiatics arrived, her first measures also being directed solely against Chinese. Along with other Australasian colonies, she shared the nineteenth century distrust of Chinese who worked too hard on gold-fields, in market-gardens, in laundries, and who insisted on following, even in New Zealand, a Chinese way of life. The result, as in other colonies, was a series of anti-Chinese laws beginning in 1881. In 1896, she attended the inter-colonial meeting at Sydney and adopted the measures passed there, which included Japanese in anti-Chinese laws. She also raised, in 1896, the poll tax to 100 Pounds and limited Asiatic entries to one per 200 tons burden. In 1899, however, New Zealand finally consented under pressure from London to adopt the less offensive

[87 Ibid.]
Natal-type, or language test, in order to avoid or diminish the appearance of racial discrimination. By 1902, at the first signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, New Zealand was in line with Australia on immigration policies, and the Japanese were willing to allow the matter to rest because of their pleasure over the alliance.

It was Japanese willingness to let the immigration question slide that pushed it into the background as far as Imperial diplomacy went. In New Zealand and Australia there continued much talk of it, and the "yellow peril" was big a bogey as ever. New Zealand continued passing anti- Asiatic laws and in 1907 the Dominion made an effort to penalize Asiatics by means of a factory act but abandoned it after being warned that any such measure would be disallowed. In 1910, a still more vehement anti- Asiatic law was passed which exacted a surtax of twenty-five per cent on all ships engaged in the trade from New Zealand to Australia unless they met with New Zealand's coastal trade regulations and unless the pay and accommodations of the crews met with their approval—which meant that any ship having Asiatics on its crew would be taxed. The law was unwise, and after a discussion with London, the Dominion government disallowed it.89

The 1911 Imperial Conference gave the Dominions and the British government the long-wanted opportunity to discuss...

matters of immigration. Sir Joseph Ward, New Zealand's prime minister, stated New Zealand's position and his speech is curiously similar to Deakin's explanation of the white Australia policy:

I would like to dispel any wrong impression as to the reason why the policy of New Zealand is averse to admitting Asians, even including those who belong to a nation in alliance with Great Britain. The basis of policy of New Zealand is, that all the rights of citizenship are conferred upon every adult within our shores. We are entirely governed by our own people; we have spent millions of money up to date in educating them and to a very large extent at the State expense, to enable them to discharge the duties of citizenship; and why we object to allowing a large number of Asians into our country is because, in the first place, we believe them to be entirely unfitted for the duties of our citizenship. As regards one great Eastern nation, we know in our country, and I presume it is within the knowledge of every man here, that the people of this nation are under obligations, enforced by oath in the event of war arising, to take the side of their parent land even against the country that they have made their home.

Regardless of Dominion opinion, the 1911 conference acted as a brake upon the more radical methods of restriction. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was to be renewed, and the British government made it clear that it did not want complications in the form of immigration troubles. In 1913, however, agitation for further restriction arose, but without much foundation, and a year later immigration questions were swept aside by the more pressing problem of war.

New Zealand had reason to be thankful for the Japanese

alliance during the war and there was little talk of restriction, but at the peace conference she stood with Australia in opposing Japan's racial equality clause. New Zealand shared in the post-war depression, and during the early months of 1920 (in the worst of the depression) over 300 Chinese arrived. Believing that living standards would be undermined by the continuance of such an influx, Auckland watersiders threatened not to work ships carrying Asiatic immigrants. The New Zealand Herald restated the traditional white New Zealand mood in an aggressive editorial:

The time has come to declare to the world in terms that are not ambiguous that we object to the immigration of Asiatics as such. No diplomatic complications need be feared. The Chinese Government is not particularly interested in the emigration question. The Japanese have already set a precedent in regulating the admission of Chinese on the grounds that the economic standards of the countries differ. As a self-governing country the Dominion has an inalienable right to determine the character of her immigration and to refuse whom she will. The assertion of this right may embarrass the Imperial Government which has always sought to mask the purpose of our immigration laws in formulae soothing to Indian and Japanese susceptibilities. It should be made, nevertheless.

Finally, amidst such feeling, the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act of 1920 adopted the principle of permitting the entry of none without permits save British subjects by birth. The act meant that anyone except a

93 Milner, New Zealand in the Far East, p. 15.
94 Ibid.
British subject by birth could be excluded by the authorities with no reason being given. Thus the number of Asiatics to be admitted was susceptible to complete regulation.

That New Zealand's restrictive measures were successful is apparent when the figures are examined. The 1936 census showed that of the total population the percentage of European stock was 94.33 of which 96.5 per cent was English. The Maoris (natives of New Zealand) made up 5.23 per cent and all other races 0.44 per cent.\(^{96}\) Pride in a high British percentage of the national stock has remained a fairly constant feature of New Zealand life and has done much to fire racial prejudice in the Dominion.

New Zealand's policy has been more anti-Asiatic than anti-Japanese. There was uneasiness in the early 1920's because Japan was the only power which could conceivably attack New Zealand, but little rational ground could be produced for suspecting her of wishing to attack the Dominion, and public opinion remembered with gratitude Japan's help during the World War. Thus New Zealand went to the 1921 Imperial Conference prepared to support the Anglo-Japanese Alliance notwithstanding the fact that she viewed Japan with some uncertainty. She was prepared to look at Japan through the eyes of London primarily because her own contacts with Japan had been so slight. But she was prepared to support London's policy only were she allowed to retain independent

\(^{96}\)Milner, *New Zealand in the Far East*, p. 4.
control of immigration. 97

That the immigration question in all three Dominions did not come to a point of crisis was owing to the Japanese government. With the Meiji restoration in 1868, Japan started the tremendous task of building herself into a modern nation. As a result, the Japanese government did not readily endorse schemes of emigration and American planters were not able to induce Japanese to go to Hawaii until 1884. By 1896, 24,000 Japanese laborers had emigrated to Hawaii but only 1,100 had entered the United States and only a bare handful had entered Australia. The individual Japanese, moreover, was attached to his native land and customs and was not anxious to emigrate. 98

The history of Japan's negotiations with the Dominions and with the United States on the immigration question is one of Japanese voluntary restrictions based on a number of treaties, or informal agreements called "Gentlemen's Agreements." All showed Japan's wish to comply with the desires of the white nations to restrict Japanese immigration; Japan only asked that her pride be spared and that acts openly discriminatory be disallowed. For the most part, Japan was successful, and the "Gentlemen's Agreements" worked satisfactorily. For Japan, the immigration question was definitely of secondary importance, and was not to be allowed to

98Ross, Australia and the East, p. 22.
interfere with important political questions such as the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Nevertheless by 1920, Japan had a real population 
problem the essential basis of which was its phenomenal 
growth. She was largely agricultural but the cultivable 
area constituted (and still does) about twenty per cent of 
her total area and was approaching saturation. Japan was 
poor in those natural resources essential for the develop-
ment of industry—coal, iron and other minerals.99 The 
increasing severity of Japan's population pressure (bearing 
in mind that even to-day the majority of her people are en-
gaged in agriculture) is indicated by the fact that from a 
population density of 350 per square mile in 1909, she had 
reached a density of 448.9 by 1926. On the more important 
basis of cultivable ground, the density was in 1926, ap-
proximately 2,700 per square mile. Whether or not the 
decline in her birth rate recorded in 1920 will continue 
significantly, it was indisputable that Japan's population 
growth must continue at a steep rate for decades to come.100

Added to her own growing population, Japan was faced 
in the early twentieth century, with another problem. Owing 
to her rising living standards, she became a country 
attractive to immigrants from other Far Eastern countries 
and in spite of restrictive Asiatic legislation, there were

100 Ibid., p. 158.
in 1929, 25,000 Chinese and 18,000 Filipinos within her boundaries. More serious was emigration from Korea, as a result of which she received 388,000 Koreans between 1917 and 1929.  

Nevertheless, Japan's government has never considered emigration the answer to her population troubles. No amount of emigration could cope with the enormity of the problem, but that fact does not lessen the necessity of recognizing the psychological effect on the Japanese people of feeling, in the face of their urgent need, that the doors of the world are closed against them.

The closing of doors by the white race became a positive insult to the Japanese and gained in importance as success gave new life to Japanese national pride. International prestige and consciousness of military and naval strength quickened an innate contempt for the mysterious yet despised white race which could have become inflammable. The fact that it had not by 1921 prevented the continuance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is evidence of two facts: on the one hand stood the alliance's importance from a political point of view, and second, the Japanese government has used and has controlled the immigration question as a political instrument, as an apparent test of friendly relations, as a smoke-screen behind which to hide other policies, as a basis

101 Ibid., p. 159.
102 Ibid.
for diplomatic trading.\textsuperscript{103}

The British government acted in most cases as a moderator between the Dominions and the Japanese. London could see the true importance of the question and could see its possible effects on the Empire's Far Eastern relations. The Dominion governments, however, were not in so advantageous a position. Their populations were small, their geographic location much nearer to Japan than that of Britain, and they were genuinely fearful of growing Japanese might. It must not be forgotten that the military and naval preparations enabling Australia and New Zealand to take such an honorable part in World War I as allies of Japan, were instigated in the first place by fear of the expansion of the Japanese themselves.

The Imperial government acknowledged at the outset the reality of the menace offered to Australia and New Zealand by the overflow of capable and industrious artisans, laborers, and mechanics from China, and lent the Dominions loyal aid in endeavoring to bring the influx within bounds. London interfered only rarely with anti-Chinese legislation in the Dominions. The Japanese question, however, was a different one. Japan was an ally of Britain and as such could hardly be insulted by exclusion.\textsuperscript{104} As a result, the Dominions were never entirely free to deal as they wished with Japanese

\textsuperscript{103}\textit{Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance}, p. 39.

\textsuperscript{104}\textit{Scholfield, Pacific Past and Future}, p. 239.
immigrants.

When the Dominions went to Washington to help seal the fate of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, they had firmly in mind its possible effect on their immigration problems. They all recognized that Asiatic, or at least Japanese, immigration constituted less of a problem in 1921 than in 1902 because of the "Gentlemen's Agreements". Nevertheless, because the Dominions were to have a voice in the matter of the alliance in 1921, their ideas on immigration for the first time could directly influence the renewal or non-renewal of the alliance.

Japanese immigration into Australia and New Zealand by 1921 was almost a dead issue. In spite of spasmodic agitation from "white" fanatics for exclusion, both governments were satisfied with the "Gentlemen's Agreements" and felt that as long as the alliance did not abrogate them in favor of unlimited or even increased Japanese immigration there was no reason to oppose its renewal.

In Canada, however, feeling was different. Japanese settlement had been limited almost exclusively to British Columbia and further immigration was therefore violently opposed by citizens of this province who felt a genuine fear of being inundated by Asiatics. Although the "Gentlemen's Agreements" helped alleviate the problem, much bitterness remained, and the Canadian government under pressure from British Columbia demanded complete freedom to regulate Asiatic immigration. The Meighen government in 1921 held
that the alliance restricted Canada's freedom to exclude Japanese and therefore opposed the renewal of the present alliance, or even the negotiation for a totally new one.
CHAPTER V

JAPANESE-DOMINION TRADE--TOO LITTLE AND TOO LATE

Through the "Gentlemen's Agreements," the Dominions and Japan worked out the immigration problem in a manner which, although not wholly desirable to either, at least removed an obstacle to the acceptance of Anglo-Japanese trade agreements by the Dominions. But it was obvious that no "Gentlemen's Agreement" would ever completely satisfy Dominion demands for the total exclusion of Asiatics. Equally clear was the fact that while trade treaties might be negotiated without the odious "freedom of immigration" clauses, that as long as Japan was a political ally of Britain no Dominion could push for such a treaty. Such a step would be a gratuitous insult to a nation which London did not wish insulted.

In the summer and fall of 1921, the question was reduced to considering whether Japanese trade was worth the inconvenience caused by the immigration clauses. If renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance meant their continuation, was the alliance worth the price? On the other hand, was the alliance the only method of securing Japanese trade? Even if it were, did the Dominions need Japanese trade especially
since they were members of the British Commonwealth and had world-wide markets within that Commonwealth and since they enjoyed Imperial preference which gave them a favored position in those markets? Finally, there was the United States. If the alliance were continued in the face of American opposition, it might well be that loss of trade with the United States would offset conceivable gains with Japan. The problem confronting Dominion statesmen was complicated and suggested no clear and obvious solution.

The problem's complications resulted largely from the great change in the Dominion commercial position (both Imperial and international) since 1902. Because London had the sole power to conclude commercial treaties for the Dominions in 1902, they had depended on London to obtain whatever special concessions or terms they asked. If what they asked conflicted with British political interests, their requests were almost certain to be denied. In 1921, the Dominions could negotiate commercial agreements for themselves, but the London government could still disallow any Dominion treaty if it so desired. Dominion trade with Japan was negligible in 1902 but was increasing. Should the increase continue, and should trade with Japan become important to the Dominions by 1921, it is reasonable to expect that they would become dissatisfied with inclusion in Imperial commercial agreements with Japan and would insist on separate commercial treaties. If so, they would hardly risk insulting
the Japanese by supporting a termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance if they felt that the alliance materially affected Dominion-Japanese commercial relations.

Between her confederation in 1867 and 1921, Canada's commercial policy underwent numerous alterations owing to changing internal and external economic conditions but in three fundamental objectives it remained relatively constant: (1) the protection of domestic manufacturers by the tariff; (2) the encouragement of diversified exports through trade treaties and general trade promotion activities; and (3) the encouragement of the export of western products.¹

In order to export, Canada felt it necessary to protect her industries and the tariff was designed primarily for the protection of her manufacturers. As a result, it was usually high. Canada's tariff was of a threefold character: the general or protective tariff, the preferential tariff with Great Britain and some of the Dominions, and the intermediate tariff in which certain foreign nations shared.² The protective tariff covered all dutiable goods and applied to all nations not included in the other two types of tariff. The preferential tariff provided for reduced duties on goods coming from various parts of the Empire. For the most part

¹The Cambridge History of the British Empire, general editors, J. Holland Rose, A. P. Newton, and E. A. Benians, Advisor for Canada, W. P. M. Kennedy, for Australia, Ernest Scott, for New Zealand, J. Hight, Vol. VI, p. 642.

²Fisk, The Dominion of Canada, p. 92.
preference was reciprocal, but not always. Although being granted preference in Canada, Australia for example, did not extend preferential treatment to Canada.\(^3\)

The intermediate tariff also served to reduce duties and was extended to a nation upon the ratification of a commercial treaty. A 1907 commercial treaty between Canada and France, for instance, brought most French imports under special intermediate duties. Canada, however, was careful in extending many benefits under intermediate tariffs because she was a party to many most-favored-nation treaties. In 1907, when duties were lowered on French goods, Argentina, Denmark, Japan, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Venezuela were all entitled to the same reduction all being most-favored-nations.\(^4\) Although the tariff was used to develop manufacturing enterprises, it was in addition an important revenue producer. Until 1920, customs duties were the largest single source of Canada's revenue affording 43.33 per cent for the fiscal year 1920, and 51.30 per cent of the total for the period from 1914 to 1920.\(^5\) After 1920, the revenue aspect of the Canadian tariff declined in importance because of increased use of the personal income tax as an effective substitute. But historically the tariff played a paramount role in providing revenue for such internal

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 93.

\(^4\)Ibid.

\(^5\)Ibid.
programs as the construction of a vast transportation network and the development of the west in general. The expenditure of tariff receipts in the exploitation of Canada's natural potential facilitated the growth of the export industries and in addition stimulated domestic industries and internal trade. Even though the income tax diminished the importance of the tariff as a revenue collector, a reduction of duties did not follow. As the demand for a revenue tariff disappeared, the more the manufacturing groups, whose need for protection seemed insatiable, cried for higher rates.

Another less well recognized reason for a relatively high Canadian tariff was Canada's fear of fiscal absorption by the United States. It was felt that unless there was a protective tariff the Dominion would be flooded by American goods and her industries ruined. Ever since 1860, her tariff legislation has been designed to prevent such a disaster.

In all phases of her life, Canada has become closely tied to the United States. Canadian-American economic relations were probably intermeshed in 1920 to a greater extent than those between Canada and the United Kingdom. Besides the great exchange of goods, invisible items of the balance of payments on current and capital accounts with the United Nations were probably transferred in a greater extent than those between Canada and the United Kingdom.

Douglas Rudyard Annett, British Preference in Canadian Commercial Policy, Toronto, 1948, p. 3. (Hereafter cited, Annett, British Preference in Canada.)

Ibid.

States exerted a strong force in integrating the two economies. Canada has always felt as much fear of the United States in economic matters as in matters of defense.

In foreign commerce, Canada played an increasingly important part. Her commerce grew steadily year by year, her imports from 1902 to 1906 being approximately one-fifth as large as those for 1920 alone. Her export trade followed a similar pattern except that during World War I it grew disproportionately owing to the disruption of European industry. Canada's commercial growth has continued to the present time and today she ranks about third among the leading world traders. Over the years she has acquired a fundamental and valuable place in international business, and has made the most of her specialized resources by trading as advantageously as possible on the widest scale. Her entire economy has been geared to foreign trade and if she is to maintain or improve her standard of living, she must continue to be an extremely active trader. The fact that Canada has depended and still depends on foreign commerce for her economic stability certainly indicates that if the

10Fisk, Dominion of Canada, p. 96.
11Ibid.
13Annett, British Preference in Canada, p. 4.
Anglo-Japanese Alliance affected her trade, Canadian officials would have been most careful to examine that effect in their pre-Washington Conference preparations.

Australia has never held a position equal to Canada's in world trade. In the first place, her confederation came almost thirty-five years later than Canada's and while Canada was developing as a unit, the Australian colonies were involved in inter-colonial tariff wars. The obvious inability of the Australian colonies to enter into world trade as separate entities provided one important incentive for confederation, but even afterwards the battle over tariffs did not subside. It was not until 1902, two years after confederation that a tariff was worked out with uniform duties for all Australian colonies.\(^\text{14}\)

The first Australian tariff was a compromise between a prohibitive and a nominal tariff. It satisfied the protectionists and at the same time kept the free-traders hopeful that better things would follow. Australia was in 1920 (and still is) primarily an agricultural territory and worked out her tariff and commercial policies accordingly. Her duties on foreign agricultural goods were uniformly high, with the result that some elements in Australia complained that high tariff barriers worked to increase domestic prices; but because Australia was never able to find markets for her surplus products, it is doubtful if high duties caused any

\(^{14}\text{Root, Colonial Tariffs, p. 163.}\)
material increase in domestic prices. The case with manufactured goods, however, was different. By 1920, Australia was one of the world's largest importers of manufactured products and depended almost entirely on imports for supplying her industrial needs. Therefore, any change in Australian duties on manufactured goods caused considerable foreign comment.

Great Britain has traditionally been Australia's natural customer. Britain was always on the search for raw materials and for markets for finished products. Australia was both a source and a market. Because of the Imperial connection, Australia somewhat reduced her duties in order to facilitate trade between herself and the mother country but her reductions did not satisfy Britain. The 1920 Australian view, however, was that duties should be raised, not lowered, even for Britain. Australians also wanted in 1920 to raise duties on all foreign goods which were not only threatening to flood Australia but which were making serious inroads on her markets. Increased duties on foreign goods were not contrary to London's policy but Australia had long worked on a policy of uniform duties and any increase meant a like increase on British goods.

That Australia was never as dependent on the world

---

15 Ibid., p. 168.
16 Ibid., p. 169.
17 Ibid.
market as Canada is indisputable. The chief difference between the two economies is that while Canada faced economic inundation from a powerful neighbor, Australia faced no such threat. Asiatic nations never held for Australia an economic threat comparable to that of the United States for Canada. Because of the United States, Canada was forced to search for markets of her own and to exert every effort to make herself economically self-sufficient, while Australia depended more on British capital to cushion her and help her weather financial crises. As a result, Australia was not as concerned over foreign trade as Canada. She depended more on the Empire.

The commercial policies of New Zealand were essentially the same as those of Australia primarily because both were located in the same part of the world and New Zealand, like Australia, was an agricultural producer. Consequently the two became fierce competitors in the British market.\textsuperscript{18} New Zealand’s tariff, like Australia’s, was not prohibitive. Her duties have nevertheless been high enough to be moderately protective although not adequate to satisfy local producers and manufacturers who attempted in 1903 to penalize all non-British competition through the passage of an act giving preference to British goods.\textsuperscript{19} The act was aimed particularly at American goods which were causing considerable

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 184.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., p. 192.
concern to local producers. Not wishing to discourage all foreign trade, New Zealand also provided for reciprocal treatment of foreign nations if they were willing to negotiate a treaty through London. But New Zealand was never willing to give more than she received and was thus virtually beyond the scope of a reciprocal treaty with her most important foreign customer, the United States, which was notorious for harsh demands in reciprocal trade agreements.20

Like Australia and Canada, New Zealand functioned on the basis of a protective tariff which served the purpose of a revenue collector as well. All three Dominions were traditionally reluctant to reduce duties especially on foreign goods and Australia proved recalcitrant even in the matter of preferential treatment for other members of the Empire. Regardless of their different policies, there was one question on which all three agreed. They wanted complete self-government in fiscal affairs and the freedom to deal independently in matters of foreign trade.

The Dominion struggle for fiscal freedom has at its base an indifference on the part of Britain stemming from the successful revolt of the thirteen American colonies. After the loss of the colonies, there was at first some anger and regret but this was replaced by a conviction which persisted down to the twentieth century that the eventual separation of the Dominions from Great Britain was

20 Ibid., p. 195.
inevitable. 21 If so, said British statesmen, the wisest course would be to grant most Dominion wishes so that when separation occurred, it would be on the best possible terms.

During the eighteenth century Britain controlled colonial trade in virtually every manner. No colony could trade with a foreign state without express consent from London and even inter-colonial trade had to be carried on in British (including colonial) ships. 22 The tariff was the second great instrument of control which Britain exercised over colonial trade, and it was not until the middle nineteenth century that the colonies gained some freedom in erecting barriers against foreign goods, but even then had absolutely no right to levy duties on British goods. Britain, however, conceded preferential rates to some colonial goods thus encouraging certain colonial industries and conversely discouraged others by denial of preference. 23 The system was not unprofitable to the colonies but was controlled in its entirety by London.

The initial step in colonial fiscal freedom was the passage of the British Possessions Act in 1846 which enabled colonial legislatures to remove preferences on British goods and to enact their own coastwise navigation laws. 24 One

22 Glazebrook, Canadian External Relations, p. 60.
24 Porritt, Fiscal and Diplomatic Freedom, p. 43.
taste of freedom only whetted colonial appetites for more and Canada, as the oldest and most politically developed of the colonies and the most interested in foreign trade, took the lead in struggling for additional freedom.

In 1848, Canada initiated negotiations with the United States through London which resulted in the reciprocity treaty of 1854. During the negotiations it was urged that there should be direct communication between Washington and Montreal (then the seat of the government of the United Provinces). Within three months after making the suggestion, Canada had a delegation in Washington in the interests of reciprocity. The men of the delegation carried no diplomatic credentials but were closely associated with Britain's ambassador who was instructed to speak directly to American officials on Canada's behalf.

The status of colonial representatives in foreign nations was clearly stated by the British under-secretary for foreign affairs in 1854:

... the agents who may be sent from the British North American provinces will not assume any independent character, nor attempt to negotiate and conclude arrangements with the governments; but will only... be authorized to confer with the British Minister in each foreign country, and to afford him information with regard to the interests of the British North American provinces. 27

25 Ibid., p. 162.
26 Glazebrook, Canadian External Relations, p. 69.
With confederation of the Canadian provinces in 1867, the colonial delegation in Washington was sent home but its importance transcended the birth of the Dominion. Through the delegation, the British government had been compelled to concede to the North American colonies a more or less direct voice in treaty-making and further had given formal notice to the United States that representation in treaty-making had been conceded to the colonies.²⁸ A precedent had been set.

Having won a victory, the United Provinces (Upper and Lower Canada) turned their attention to tariff control and in 1859 submitted a bill to the Imperial government asking that the provincial government be allowed to tax imports from Great Britain in order to protect the industries of Canada. An immediate outcry was raised in Britain and the bill was not allowed but the Canadian government replied in a document which has since become tremendously important in Dominion self-government. The Provinces contended that no government could effectively govern Canada unless it controlled commercial affairs. No government, they claimed, would ever be able to command a majority in any Canadian parliament without commercial responsibility and control. To deny that commerce and industry must be treated as Dominion rather than Imperial interests meant denying the entire evolution of the theory of responsible

The Provincial government carried its point in theory but its tariff measure was nonetheless disallowed.

The third great Canadian effort came in 1865. It developed directly from concessions which the Imperial government had already given to the provinces. By 1865, Canada desired a renewal of her 1854 reciprocity treaty with the United States, or the negotiation of a completely new treaty, and dissatisfied with indirect powers of negotiation pressed the colonial office for direct representation at Washington.30 The request was studied by the colonial office and was granted in May, 1866. The British North American provinces were to be represented directly in the negotiations at Washington for a second reciprocity treaty.31 This decision had a profound effect on the fiscal freedom of all the Dominions. It was not so much a decision dealing only with Canada and the United States in 1866; it was a precedent.

Australia did not enter the struggle for fiscal freedom until 1870 when the Australian colonies asked for the right to levy duties on goods from other colonies including other Australian colonies. London answered that no such right could be given because of British opposition to differential tariffs. The colonial office hinted, however, that it would not be averse to an Australian customs union

---

29 Curtis, Problem of Commonwealth, p. 49.
31 Ibid., p. 162.
under which Australian colonies could control their internal commercial affairs.\textsuperscript{32} Prime Minister Gladstone, on the other hand, said that Australian control would mean fiscal anarchy and he was even more opposed to the Australian request to impose discriminatory duties on British goods. Such a right, he complained, had never been considered as a part of any commercial autonomy given to the colonies. He announced that no action should be taken by the colonial office until the public as well as the parliament had a free opportunity to express an opinion. The cabinet concurred in his opinion and the Australian question was indefinitely shelved.\textsuperscript{33}

Nevertheless, Australian agitation continued with the result that the secretary of state for the colonies pointed out to the prime minister, that there was no alternative but to submit to the demands of the Australian colonists. Gladstone reluctantly agreed:

\begin{quote}
I perceive you will give the Australian Colonies what they want. Some time hence they will probably seek for like favors with reference to their commercial intercourse with foreign powers and these also will be given. It is well, however, that they should bear in mind that we cannot exempt them from the obligations of any existing treaty.\textsuperscript{34}
\end{quote}

One week later, the cabinet backed the prime minister with the recommendation that the Australian colonies be given the

\textsuperscript{32}Cephas Daniel Allin, Australasian Preferential Tariffs and Imperial Free Trade A Chapter in the Fiscal Emancipation of the Colonies, University of Minnesota Press, 1929, p. 107.

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 194.
"power to make commercial arrangements among themselves in favor of their own produce."35 The cabinet's recommendation was drafted into law in May, 1873. Under the terms of the act, the Australian legislatures were empowered:

... to make laws with respect to the remission or imposition of duties upon the importation into such colonies of any article, the produce or manufacture of or imported from any other of the said colonies.36

It was an important victory for Australia but did not extend to foreign trade.

Having watched the Australian colonies win a victory in London, New Zealand immediately demanded the right to enter into international commercial treaties. The move was premature, however, and neither the colonial office nor parliament gave it the slightest encouragement, both bodies regarding it as a dangerous and possibly revolutionary attack on the unity of the Empire.37 New Zealand was also disappointed at receiving no support from the Australian government which believed it poor policy to confuse the simple question of inter-colonial reciprocity with the issues of international relations especially when the stand of the colonial office was so well defined. There was nothing to gain and much to lose by pushing the British government too far.38

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 197.
37 Ibid., p. 225.
38 Ibid.
Regardless of New Zealand's failure, the question of colonial freedom to negotiate foreign trade agreements did not lie dormant for long. Agitation continued in fits and starts, and by 1895 the British government felt compelled to make its position clear. The Marquess of Ripon (British colonial secretary) wrote to the governments of Canada and the Australian colonies a long letter in which he fully explained Britain's position and her reasons for adopting it. He asserted that the British government had often made commercial treaties whose terms included the colonies and that that was sufficient.\footnote{Keith, \textit{Colonial Policy}, Vol. II, p. 156.} To give the colonies the power of negotiating treaties for themselves, he continued, would give them an international status as separate sovereign states:

... and would be equivalent to breaking up the Empire into a number of independent States, a result which her Majesty's Government are satisfied would be injurious equally to the Colonies and to the Mother Country, and would be desired by neither.\footnote{Ibid., p. 159.}

As long as the colonies were not independent, Ripon argued that negotiations between the Empire and a foreign state must be carried on between the foreign state and the proper minister responsible to Her Majesty's government. The result of Canada's fight for a voice in the Washington negotiations in 1865 had never been forgotten in London, and Ripon showed Britain's willingness to allow the colonies a
voice in foreign negotiations under certain conditions:

It could hardly be expected, however, that he (the British minister) would be sufficiently cognisant of the circumstances and wishes of the Colony to enable him to conduct the negotiation satisfactorily alone, and it would be desirable, generally, therefore, that he should have the assistance, either as a second Plenipotentiary or in a subordinate capacity, as her Majesty's Government think the circumstances require, of a delegate appointed by the Colonial Government.41

The Imperial government was willing by 1895 to go even one step farther and stipulated that if an agreement were reached in any negotiations in which the colonies had a minor voice, the resulting agreement should be approved not only by the Imperial government, but also by colonial governments if it were to have any effect in those colonies.42 In other words, the colonies had won the right to accept or reject participation in the commercial treaties of the Empire.

By the first Colonial Conference in 1897, the colonies had won considerable freedom in matters of commerce. They had won the right to levy duties on British goods, a voice in the negotiation of commercial treaties with foreign powers, and the freedom to accept or reject the treaty once it was negotiated. Yet they were not satisfied. At the conference they requested the right to terminate colonial participation in the German and Belgian treaties.43

---

41Ibid.
42Ibid.
initial reaction was one of shock and displeasure. Joseph Chamberlain answered for the government:

... It should be borne in mind that that (foreign trade) is for us a most important question. Our trade with Germany and Belgium, is larger than our trade with all the Colonies combined. It is possible that if we denounced those treaties, Germany and Belgium would endeavour, I do not say whether they would succeed, but they might endeavour to retaliate, and for some time, at any rate, our commercial relations with these two countries might be disturbed. Therefore a step of that kind is one which can only be taken after the fullest consideration, and in deference to a very strong opinion both in this country and in the Colonies.44

It was obvious to colonial statesmen that unless they had something to offer London as an incentive they would never be allowed the privilege of separate withdrawal from Imperial commercial treaties. After some discussion, it was therefore decided to offer Great Britain a unilateral preference in return for the right of separate colonial withdrawal from the German and Belgian treaties. London accepted the offer and the privilege was extended.45

Although London did not intend the colonies' abrogation of the German and Belgian treaties to form the basis for precedent, separate colonial withdrawal was introduced as a principle only two years later. The Imperial Conferences of 1902 and 1907 upheld and even broadened the principle, and by 1907, arrangements had been made by Britain with practically all most-favored-nations permitting the separate withdrawal

of any Dominion from Imperial commercial treaties. Thus the Dominions received the right of entering into close commercial arrangements with a foreign state without having to extend the same treatment to several other states on the grounds of treaty rights.

The Dominions had won by 1907 practically full self-government in commercial affairs but there was one freedom they had not yet achieved. They were not yet able to negotiate their own agreements with foreign powers. Until 1907, all commercial treaties had been negotiated by British diplomats, Dominion representation being of an informal and advisory nature. Then in 1907, Sir Wilfrid Laurier asked that Canada be allowed to negotiate a treaty with France. Canadians were to do the actual negotiating with help from the accredited Imperial diplomatic staff. On July 4, Sir Edward Grey, secretary of state for foreign affairs, sent to Britain’s charge d'affaires at Paris a telegram which is one of the most important documents in the fiscal history of the Empire.

Although alluding to Ripon’s dispatch of 1895 as the basis for colonial voice in foreign trade agreements, he asserted:

I do not, however, think it is necessary to adhere in the present case to the strict letter of this regulation, the object of which was to secure that negotiations should not be entered into and carried through by a Colony unknown to and independently of

46 Keith, Dominion Home Rule, p. 33.
his Majesty's Government.47

Whereas Ripon had felt that colonial negotiations with foreign powers would lead to the dissolution of the Empire, Grey felt that it mattered little who negotiated the treaty as long as it were done through Imperial machinery:

The selection of the negotiator is primarily a matter of convenience, and in the present circumstances, it will obviously be more practical that the negotiations should be left to Sir W. Laurier and to the Canadian Minister of Finance, who will doubtless keep you informed of their progress.48

The British embassy was therefore to be kept informed of the progress of the negotiations and upon conclusion of an agreement the British minister was to sign along with the Canadians.49

As a result of Grey's decision, a Franco-Canadian treaty was signed on September 19, 1907.50 Only Canadian interests were involved, and the negotiations were so much a Canadian affair that at their conclusion the Canadian ministers reported only to the Ottawa cabinet.51 The 1907 treaty ends the chapter in colonial history which began at Montreal in 1848 with Canada's plea for direct representation in negotiations with the United States.

The Canadian victory of 1907 soon extended its scope.

48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Porrit, Fiscal and Diplomatic Freedom, p. 201.
Canada once again pressed for closer relations with the United States. Britain gave way and in May 1920, the House of Commons gave Canadians precisely what they had so long asked:

... His Majesty, on Advice of his Canadian ministers, shall appoint a Minister Plenipotentiary who will have charge of Canadian affairs and will at all times be the ordinary channel of communication with the United States Government in matters of purely Canadian concern, acting upon instructions from, and reporting direct to, the Canadian government. In the absence of the Ambassador, the Canadian Minister, will take charge of the whole embassy and of the representation of Imperial as well as Canadian interests. He will be accredited by His Majesty to the President with the necessary powers for the purposes. 52

By 1920, therefore, Canada had achieved almost complete diplomatic freedom, especially in relations with the United States.

In strictly commercial terms, no Dominion was bound in 1920 by any treaty to which she had not assented, and in negotiating general commercial treaties, the Imperial government consulted the Dominions in order to ascertain what special terms they desired. 53 If a Dominion wished independently to enter into commercial relations with a foreign power the Imperial government appointed Dominion representatives as plenipotentiaries. There were only two limits on Dominion freedom in negotiations: a Dominion was obligated to extend to the Empire every concession it made to a foreign

52Keith, British Dominions, p. 38.
53Keith, Dominion Home Rule, p. 33.
power, and every Dominion treaty had to be ratified by the Crown on advice from the Imperial government which acted on the request of the Dominions. The Dominions' commercial position by 1920 was enviable. As parts of the British Empire they were able to enjoy Imperial preference, the fruits of prestige connected with being a part of that large and prosperous Empire, and almost complete freedom to regulate their own commercial affairs.

In conjunction with the colonial struggle for freedom in commercial relations with foreign powers went a movement for more consideration from Great Britain for the colonies as parts of the Empire. This was the movement for Imperial preference. Until 1846, the colonies had had no direct voice in determining preferences. They could petition the colonial office for better terms in existing tariffs, or petition to have new articles included in the preference list, but such petitions rarely got beyond the colonial office. The colonies had to accept what the British government wished to grant them and even then there was no guarantee of any degree of permanence.

The passage of the British Possessions Act of 1846 (see above, p. 155) was the first move in colonial emancipation from complete domination from London. The act gave the colonies some voice in their fiscal affairs and thus in the

\[54\]bid., p. 34.

\[55\]Porritt, Fiscal and Diplomatic Freedom p. 55.
matter of preference. But the colonies were not satisfied. They wanted an Imperial preference. Dominion statesmen continually extolled the values of preference in building a thriving Imperial trade. They consistently looked at the matter from a strictly Dominion point of view and seemingly failed to realize that although British trade was indispensable to Dominion prosperity, Dominion trade was only an insignificant fraction of Britain's giant world trade.

Because the idea of preferential trade with the mother country had long held a persistent fascination for Canada, she took the lead in the preference fight. But apart from allowing neighboring colonies to enter into preferential agreements with one another Britain continually opposed a system of tariff preference within the Empire on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the time-honored policy of free trade. Another difficulty arose in the matter of Imperial commercial agreements. Canada could not extend exclusive preference to Great Britain without extending a duty reduction to several foreign states included in Imperial most-favored-nation agreements. Therefore, with Canada unable and Britain unwilling to extend preference, a deadlock had been reached; it was a deadlock which could be broken only through the initiative of the colonies and to Canada fell through.

56 Ibid., p. 43.
57 Annet, British Preference in Canada, p. 22.
58 Ibid.
the leading role.

Very little agitation for preference existed in Canada until the 1870's when with the ascendancy of the Conservative and protectionist party came a new tariff in 1879. It was a clear statement of the "National Policy" (the protection of national industries by means of a high tariff) and was designed to select for a higher rate of duty those products manufactured in the country and to admit at a lower rate those which could not be made there. Protection was carefully aimed at foreign states and not at the United Kingdom. Since Canada and Britain did not manufacture the same products, the protectionist tariff worked almost as a preference in reducing the duties on goods not produced in Canada. Yet preferential trade with Britain was desired and the protectionist administration constantly pressed Britain for an understanding.

One attempt was made in 1885 when the Canadian prime minister took the opportunity at a banquet given him by the Empire Club in London to extend to Britain a proposal for preferential trade:

Commercially, British federation may be achieved on a basis of give and take. If you will give colonial produce such immunities as you give to foreign nations, I will commit myself to the expression of belief that the colonies will give British goods, and only British goods, preferential treatment.60


60 Annett, British Preference in Canada, p. 23.
Remaining loyal to the doctrine of free trade, Britain gave no consideration to Canada's proposal but far from discouraged, the Canadian parliament in 1891 adopted a resolution announcing that when British and Irish markets would admit Canadian products on more favorable terms than those then existing, Canada would reciprocate with a like reduction.61

The great incentive behind Canada's desire for preference was the attitude of the United States. Since the signature of the 1854 reciprocity treaty, Canada had received successive humiliating rebuffs whenever she had tried to improve trade relations with the United States and Canadians felt that reciprocity was looked upon in the United States as a means of annexing the Dominion. This feeling had much to do with the "National Policy" and the rise of the protectionist party in Canada.62 Besides it was felt that the United Kingdom and not the United States was Canada's natural market. Preference was "natural" in Canadian eyes. It would be advantageous for Canadian agriculture, forest products and minerals, while facing increased international competition for her own products, the United Kingdom should welcome special treatment in Canada. In addition the policy would encourage more emigration to Canada and in time increase the Canadian market for British goods. Finally, preference would serve to strengthen Dominion Imperial sentiment.

---

61Ibid., p. 24.
62Ibid.
Canadians maintained that the British Empire was self-sufficient and needed no trade with outside sources. An Imperial preference would therefore serve only to encourage trade within the Empire for the mutual prosperity of all its parts. 63

With increased self-confidence, Canadians became more and more desirous of Imperial preference. In fact there were many who felt that Britain would soon be forced to recognize the value of the Canadian market and that the best way to hasten that day of recognition would be for the Canadian government to initiate a preferential plan. This idea soon became popular in official circles. It was reasoned that because Britain had been generous in the past she would be generous in the future and it was therefore only proper that Canada should take the lead in extending preference. 64

As soon as Canada began to treat British goods preferentially, Belgium and Germany called attention to the fact that a British preference contravened the most-favored-nation clauses in their commercial treaties. 65 The Canadian government had no choice but to extend the preference to them, and in addition to France and Spain with whom treaties were also in effect. 66 The critics of preference quickly pointed out

---

63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., p. 31.
66 Ibid.
that this pyramiding effect had always been their chief complaint against preference.

It is possible that the preference idea would have been entirely discredited in Canada if Joseph Chamberlain, in the British colonial office, had not backed a unanimous request of the 1897 colonial conference for separate colonial withdrawal from most-favored-nation treaties. The British government finally acted to the satisfaction of Canada and the other colonies and in July 1897 separate withdrawal was enunciated as a principle by the British parliament.  

Dominion freedom to enter or withdraw from Imperial commercial treaties further heightened Canada's self-confidence and concomitantly added flame to her smoldering antagonism toward the United States. Canada felt that she was becoming a real power and that she owed her position to Britain:

Up to nearly the present time we have been more or less of a nuisance to the Empire; now we are beginning to get to the point where we add something to the prestige of the British Empire, to the point where, if necessary, we could send some men, some ships, or some money; we can be of some use to the Empire which has given us our liberties and all the traditions of our citizenship. When we get to that point what happens? The United States beckons from Washington; and we are asked, the first-time anybody beckons, to turn from the path that leads to the capitol of the Empire, and to turn to the path that leads to Washington, I say, so far as I am concerned--not for me.


68Porrut, Fiscal and Diplomatic Freedom, p. 28.
Canada was of course far from being unified in desiring preference. Her manufacturers continually maintained that while the principle of tariff preference for United Kingdom goods was admirable and while preference might serve as a link of empire protection against imports from the United Kingdom was as necessary to the prosperity and extension of manufacturing in Canada as protection against the United States, Germany, or France. Nevertheless, by 1900, most Canadians agreed that Canada was wise in extending preference to Britain. They hoped that the Imperial government would see the advantages and reciprocate. But in spite of good will toward the Empire, opposition grew. It was claimed that Canada’s one-sided preferential policy had put the Dominion in a bad bargaining position and that Canadian manufacturers had been sacrificed to flatter London.

As a consequence of persistent demands for reciprocal treatment, the Canadian government had determined by the time of the 1902 Colonial Conference to press Britain for tariff reductions on Canadian products. It was pointed out at the conference that as early as 1894 the colonies had worked out at Ottawa an intercolonial preferential trade, and had at the same time attempted to include Great Britain in the agreement, but that Britain would hear of nothing but free trade, an anathema to the Dominions. Dominion industries

69 Egerton, British Colonial Policy, p. 82.
70 Annett, British Preference in Canada, p. 35.
had been born and nourished under the protection of a tariff and could not exist without one.71

Chamberlain listened to both sides of the debate and then put forth his proposal. Why should there not be a preferential tariff between Britain and greater Britain, he asked? The colonial tariffs could be retained and preference could at the same time unify Imperial trade. His suggestion met with unanimous approval from the Dominion prime ministers and a resolution was drafted in which the Dominions promised to accord the United Kingdom a preference. Canada promised to increase her preference and all the other colonies present except Australia accepted preference in principle but refused to give definite figures.72 The resolution requested reciprocal British preference on Dominion goods. Every premier present supported the resolution until Chamberlain, pressed by Imperial officials, explained that any extension of a colonial preference by Britain must be accompanied by a halt in the development of certain new colonial industries. This, of course, no colony could stand and with agreement clearly impossible the preference issue (except in cases of government contracts) was dropped.73

Despite the rebuff at the conference, Canada honored her promise and raised her preference on British goods from


73 Ibid., p. 1181.
25 to 33 1/3 per cent. The Empire as a whole was determined to carry the day for preference whether or not Britain was willing. In 1903, New Zealand passed a tariff law giving substantial preference to Britain. Shortly afterwards, commercial agreements were negotiated between Australia and South Africa; and Canada and New Zealand granted each other preferences. 74 New Zealand officials pointed with pride to the fact that at last a substantial step had been taken in the direction of an Imperial customs union. British participation was all that remained to make the program complete.

The Dominions seemed unaware that they were asking British manufacturers to protect the Dominion market in Britain by high barriers against foreign materials, regardless of the fact that British manufacturers depended on cheap materials whether they came from the Dominions or from foreign states. Therefore it was apparent that a real Imperial customs union had little chance. 75

The preference cause suffered another severe blow in the British elections of 1906 when the preference party was defeated. Adherents of preference nevertheless continued their agitation and through their persistence the question was reopened in 1907. 76 Preference remained a popular

---

74 Wood, New Zealand in the World, p. 89.
75 Ibid., p. 90.
76 Hall, Empire to Commonwealth, p. 178.
cause in the Dominions and suffered under no such reaction as in Britain.

At the Colonial Conference of 1907, the lines on preference were as they had been in 1902, the Dominions for, and Britain against. With the Dominions industriously building a preferential system (started in 1903 by New Zealand), it was clear that preference would be a leading topic for the conference but this time it was Prime Minister Deakin of Australia who led the fight. Deakin opened the discussion with an eloquent and impassioned plea for preference, basing his remarks on the unity and strength of the Empire which he said was the real motive behind preference and not mere material gain.\footnote{Egerton, \textit{British Colonial Policy}, p. 80.} Deakin was alone in his rhapsody. Even Canada did not favor a preference unless Britain were to meet the Dominions half-way. Canada was determined not to reserve any part of her market for Britain and stated that she would produce for her own use and for foreign markets as well. As long as Britain treated her goods more favorably than those of other nations, Canada would return the favor, but her favors were to depend on Canadian judgment and convenience. She came to the conference prepared to treat Britain as she was treated by her.\footnote{Annett, \textit{British Preference in Canada}, p. 38.}

Because of the 1906 election, the British delegation came to the conference unalterably opposed to any scheme of
Imperial preference and offered as an alternative a scheme of Imperial free trade. But in view of Dominion reliance on the tariff, no free trade scheme could possibly meet with the conference's approval. Upon a motion by Laurier, the conference finally contented itself with a reaffirmation of the amended resolution of the 1902 conference which called for a declaration of faith in a program of a reciprocal preference whenever conditions appeared favorable. The British delegation accepted the resolution with the reservation that it would do nothing to change the existing fiscal system of the United Kingdom.

Because of British opposition to preference, nothing was accomplished toward Imperial co-operation from 1907 to 1911 when the Imperial Conference met once more. This time the preference question was largely ignored in favor of matters on which there was some chance of agreement. In lieu of any understanding, the conference set up a Dominion Royal Commission to investigate the possibility of promoting Dominion-British trade by means other than that of the tariff. The commission's recommendations, arrived at during wartime, came to practically nothing but in 1917 the Imperial War Cabinet adopted a resolution which proclaimed the ideal of "making the Empire independent of other

---

79 Ibid.
80 Hall, Empire to Commonwealth, p. 182.
countries in respect of food supplies, raw materials, and essential industries." The resolution further recommended special treatment by each part of the Empire for products from other Imperial units and the stimulation of emigration from the United Kingdom to the Dominions. It was obvious that the resolution was dominated by war conditions when the desirability to make the Empire independent in matters of food supplies, raw materials, and essential industries was apparent to all.

Not satisfied with simply resolving, the War Cabinet turned to methods for accomplishing Imperial economic independence. The creation of an Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau was approved and the use of trade commissioners to encourage British trade in the Dominions was recommended. Agreements as to patents and trade marks were reached, and it was proposed that after the war the whole question of how to pay its costs would be discussed.

That the war made all the difference in Britain's attitude toward preference is unquestionable. Britain recognized the value of Dominion wartime help and was anxious about the destination of Dominion products once the war was ended. The free trade element had lost ground during the

---

82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., p. 1198.
war. It was pointed out that in Australia (always strongly protectionist) protection had enabled her woolen mills, clothing factories, and boot workshops to equip British soldiers fighting in France.86

The temper of the British parliament in 1919 was definitely in favor of preference and a law based on the resolution of the Imperial War Cabinet became effective on September 1, 1919. The law gave preference to those goods "consigned from, and grown, produced or manufactured in the British Empire."87 The battle for preference had been won. Preferential rates one-third lower than the general rates were established and there resulted a substantial increase in Dominion imports into Britain, the most notable case being Canadian motors and motor parts.88

Once preference had stimulated Dominion-British trade, British interest in further increases became intensified and by 1921 new and more efficient methods for encouraging Imperial trade were being hunted. That British industry had benefited by Dominion preference was again and again emphasized in the British House of Commons during 1921.89

With both the Dominions and Britain eagerly working to increase Imperial trade, the question of foreign trade

---

86 Smith, Thirty Years, p. 68.
87 Fisk, Dominion of Canada, p. 94.
89 Hansard, ser. 5, (1921), Vol. 147, p. 1762.
momentarily dropped from much consideration in the Dominions and was not revived again until the 1923 Imperial Conference failed to give the Dominions what they believed to be an adequate preference. As a result, the Dominions stated their determination to seek foreign outlets for their goods. But this was after the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. At the time of the Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Washington Conference, preference was working to Dominion satisfaction.

The importance of the preference victory of 1919 lies in the fact that the three Dominions have been traditionally dependent upon British trade and upon the general economic well-being of Britain for their own welfare. Preference lowered tariff barriers both in the Dominions and in Britain allowing a freer and fuller trade to pass between the Dominions and their most important market. Canada's position was somewhat different from that of the other two because her economy was also tied with that of the United States but Canadians preferred Imperial trade and were happy with Imperial preference.

Historically the United States and the United Kingdom have been Canada's best customers. Even after her renunciation of the 1854 reciprocal trade treaty in 1866, the United States took 52 per cent of Canada's total exports with Britain taking another 34 per cent. At the same time, the

United States provided 56 per cent of Canadian imports and Britain 37 per cent. Therefore, in spite of rather unfavorable trade relations with the United States and a lack of preference in Britain, Canada's trade has depended upon those two nations for its success.

Because of its great reliance on these two nations, Canada's commercial policy has necessarily been directed toward improving her relations with them. During and after World War I, when Canada began to take her place as a great industrial nation, she began to search for more markets and significantly commenced her search in the other Dominions and dependencies of the Empire. When Britain finally passed a preference bill in 1919 Canada could look forward happily to increased Imperial trade under conditions more favorable than those she had previously experienced.

In spite of Imperial preference and stimulated British interest in Canadian trade, the United States became more and more important economically to Canada during the post-war years and in the fiscal year ending March 31, 1921 Canadian imports from the United States were more than fourfold those from Great Britain. It was obvious, therefore, that Canada would do nothing to insult the United States upon whom one of her most important phases of economic life largely

---

92 Ibid., p. 645.
93 Hansard, Ser. 5 (1921), Vol. 146, p. 7.
depended.

New Zealand and Australia were more dependent upon Britain for commercial help than was Canada. They had no great customer on their borders. Their only close customers were the "yellow" nations against whom fear and suspicion were manifested in the "yellow peril" idea and the "white" policies. Therefore trade between the South Pacific Dominions and the mother country was sought and was facilitated by the early establishment of regular lines of shipping and communications. Great Britain was their only secure and unrestricted market and in addition a source of much-needed capital.94

New Zealand's reliance on British trade has always been a cardinal principle in her commercial policy. In 1900 Britain took 77.6 per cent of her total exports and in 1925 79.8 per cent.95 Ever since the successful introduction of refrigeration for meat and dairy produce in the 1880's, New Zealand's prosperity has been bound to the prices ruling in the British market. Because New Zealand has depended heavily on the British market she has developed the production of goods needed by Britain, primarily pastoral products. In 1880, these products constituted 50 per cent of New Zealand's total exports and in 1914 86 per cent. The figure was still climbing in 1921 and by 1937 reached 94 per cent.96

94 Milner, New Zealand and the Far East, p. 4.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., p. 3.
Coupled with New Zealand's interest in British trade was a great financial interest. From early colonial days to post-World War I days, New Zealand borrowed freely in the London credit market for development purposes. Of a public debt in 1902 of £48,000,000, Britain had loaned about £44,000,000; and by 1920 British loans amounted to about £118,000,000 out of a debt of £130,000,000.97 There was no doubt in New Zealand that if she were to maintain any sort of financial stability it would be owing to British support. This economic fact formed a solid material basis for traditional Imperial sentiment in New Zealand and similar facts created the same sentiment (to a lesser degree) in Australia. It was sometimes true that close ties with Britain carried European depressions to the Dominions but these seemed unavoidable and in no way discouraged the Dominions from following Britain in commercial affairs. The loss of any other body of trade would have hurt the Dominions in 1920 but the loss of British trade and financial support would have doomed them to bankruptcy or at least to an unprecedented and prolonged depression.

Feeling the pressure of foreign competition, the British government made renewed efforts in 1921 to stimulate trade with the Dominions and promised that plans were being drafted which would be mutually helpful.98 In 1921, the

97Ibid., p. 4.

Dominions were enjoying preference and the British were vigorously pursuing an increased Dominion trading program. Canada was experiencing increased trade with the United States as well as with Britain. The fiscal situation looked encouraging in the Dominions but it was as true in 1920 as in 1902 that Dominion economic well-being depended primarily on Britain, and in Canada on the United States as well.

If the trade question were to have any effect on the renewal or non-renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it is clear that Dominion-Japanese trade must have been extremely valuable to the Dominion economy. Canada enjoyed a larger Japanese trade in 1921 than the other two Dominions. Her trade with Japan had started soon after 1868 and by 1871 Canada was importing considerable quantities of tea. By 1894, Canadian imports from Japan were valued at over $900,000 but her exports were small in comparison amounting to only a few thousand dollars annually.99

Although Canadian interest in Japanese trade increased, it was not until 1906 (when Canada adhered to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty of 1894) that Japanese trade was placed on equal footing in Canada with that of other nations. In China, the Open Door policy placed Canada on the same competitive footing as other nations, and Canada's future in Far Eastern trade appeared to be as promising as the most

99Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 211.
In contrast to Canadian optimism, actual growth in trade was nevertheless painfully slow. While Japanese trade increased fourfold from 1894 to 1914, the total in 1914 was only slightly in excess of $4,000,000. Contrary to predictions Orientals were not learning to eat wheat or beef and what increase in trade did occur resulted from the development of British Columbian metal mines which supplied materials for Japan's booming industrialization.101

After 1914, however, the Japanese trade grew with surprising rapidity. Although much of the growth must be laid to World War I which took European traders and products off of the market the increase was phenomenal.102 From the standpoint of world commerce, the post-war years saw Canada advance from an insignificant factor in Asia to a nation with a firm foothold in the Eastern trade. In 1913, the Dominion supplied but 0.3 per cent of the total imports of Japan and China but by 1929 she supplied about 3 per cent. In 1914, United States' trade with China was forty times that of Canada but in 1929 much larger American trade was only ten times as great.103

In spite of its great increase, Canadian-Japanese trade in 1920 did not compare with Canadian-British nor

100Ibid., p. 218.
101Ibid., p. 219.
102Glazebrook, Canadian External Relations, p. 77.
103Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient, p. 223.
Canadian-American trade. Canadian exports to the United States in 1920 constituted 38.96 per cent of her total while her exports to Britain totalled 38.57 per cent. Canada therefore exported 77.53 per cent of her total export trade to the United States and Britain and only 22.47 per cent to all other nations combined. With imports the story was even more one-sided. Here the United States became the dominant factor with Canada receiving 75.28 per cent of all her imports from her southern neighbor. Great Britain supplied another 11.84 per cent while all other nations only 12.88 per cent.\(^{104}\) Although Canada's trade with Japan was growing, it had not reached in 1920 a size which would make it assume a position of crucial importance. And further, it was scarcely worth the danger involved in insulting the United States through renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Australian trade with Japan never reached a volume equal to Canada's. Australia's export trade with Japan was tied up with Japan's industrial progress because Australian pastoral products came more and more in demand as Japanese industry grew. But Australia could not meet competition from the United States and Canada in these products largely because of her fear of Japan.\(^{105}\) Responsible leaders in Australia had long realized the damaging effect of anti-Japanese sentiment on Austral-Japanese trade and through educational

\(^{104}\)Fisk, *Dominion of Canada*, p. 98.

\(^{105}\)Woodsworth, *Canada and the Orient*, p. 219.
agencies had attempted to bring about a fuller cultural contact between the two countries holding that an increased knowledge of Australia by Japanese and vice versa would bring about an easing of the conditions under which commercial and diplomatic relations between the two would be handled.\textsuperscript{106}

But it was obvious by 1920, that the efforts of educational institutions had not been able to counteract the influence of newspaper propaganda and prejudices of long standing remained powerful.\textsuperscript{107} Hence the general ignorance and fear of Japan persisted in Australia, and suspicion of any real Japanese progress made satisfactory commercial (or for that matter, any other) negotiations extremely difficult. Austral-Japanese trade therefore remained a small item when compared to Austral-British trade.

New Zealand's pre-World War I trade with Japan never attained sizeable proportions\textsuperscript{108} and therefore little thought was given to it by New Zealand officials. New Zealand relied even more heavily on the British market than did Australia. More significant was Japan's rapidly expanding export trade which local manufacturers thought would undercut their markets especially in textiles. Both manufacturers and laborers felt their positions threatened by the Japanese hold on the market and were antagonistic to production based

\textsuperscript{106}Ross, Australia and the East, p. 192.

\textsuperscript{107}Ibid., p. 195.

\textsuperscript{108}Milner, New Zealand and the Far East, p. 16.
on the "sweated labor" of Japanese workers. During World War I the Empire's war effort consumed most everything New Zealand could produce for export and such was the case in the years directly after the war. It was not until the late 1920's, when she found Japan a good customer for her wool that New Zealand began to consider Japan as a valuable market. This followed the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Each of the Dominions traded with Japan but for none was Japanese trade a dominant feature of their economic life. Japanese trade with each expanded slowly not reaching anything of sizeable proportions (with the possible exception of Canada) until the middle or late 1920's, after the discontinuance of the alliance.

During post-World War I years, Japan was not only a customer to the Dominions and Britain but also a competitor and was often considered a greater factor in the latter category. Japan was a late-comer to the international commercial picture and not until about 1886 did her commerce become world-wide. Until then, it had been limited almost exclusively to Britain, the United States, China, France and Germany. But it was not long before Japanese industrialization began to show signs of the rapid growth so amazing to the western world. Industrialization necessarily meant a

109 Ibid., p. 19.
110 Ibid., p. 20.
shift in Japan's needs and in her export products. The greatest resulting change was reduced importing from Britain and a consequent expansion in those Asiatic markets in need of Japan's cheap manufactured products. From 1880 to 1900, the increase ranged from four to sixteen fold.

With Japan exchanging manufactured goods for raw materials, and with Japan's geographic location and racial affinity, it is no wonder that western nations soon learned that they had encountered a formidable rival in the Chinese market. After 1900, Japanese trade moved more and more toward the eastern shores of continental Asia namely to Russian Asia, Korea, China and India. Her principal imports were foodstuffs, cotton, and other textile raw materials which Asiatic nations could furnish her more cheaply than could Britain and her Dominions. By 1913, China alone accounted for 15 per cent of Japan's imports and India replaced Britain as the dominant figure in Japanese-British Empire trade.

Such is a survey of Japanese trade before the European disaster of 1914. The salient features were: first, Japan depended primarily for economic life on her exports and these were directed first to Asia only secondarily to North America and thirdly to Europe. Second, Japan was a maritime

\footnote{Hattori, The Foreign Commerce of Japan Since the Restoration, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Vol. XIII, Baltimore, 1904, p. 72.}

\footnote{Ibid., p. 74.}

\footnote{Pooley, Japan's Foreign Policies, p. 174.}
power whose ocean shipping was largely dependent on purchases from abroad and whose ship building program was on a sound but nevertheless limited basis. In short, pre-war Japan was economically sound but relatively insignificant in international trade.\textsuperscript{114}

What was it then that turned a supposed "yellow peril" before the war into a real one after it? Primarily it was the war. The war gave Japan special opportunities in the Far East and after its conclusion Japanese competition for the Indian trade was far keener than before. Japan supplanted Germany in the cheap trade of bottles, trinkets, and knickknacks of all sorts while Japanese textile industries provided an increasing market for Indian dyes. In return, Japan flooded India with textiles especially cotton goods of a cheap variety. Japan followed her trade with the development of Japanese business houses, Japanese banks, and Japanese trade commissions all of which were resented by British commercial interests in India. By 1921, Japanese imports into India were larger than those of any other foreign country and were second only to those of the whole of the British Empire.\textsuperscript{115}

Such competition did little to improve British-Japanese relations. At Singapore and Malaya the feeling was even more bitter than in India. During World War I, Japanese

\textsuperscript{114}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 182.

\textsuperscript{115}\textit{Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance}, p. 69.
trade in the Straits Settlements had more than doubled. Well might British officials in Malaya wire London in 1921:

Our shipping interests in the Far East are threatened to a very great degree. Japanese ship-building is reaching a point that it may before long become the most serious world competitor with our own. 116

It was not only British possessions in Asia which felt Japanese commercial pressure after the war. Even British producers protested against the dumping of Japanese goods. A member of the House of Commons bluntly told the House in March, 1919 he realized that, "Japan is one of our Allies, but we cannot allow our trade to be ruined by the cheap labour of Japan." 117 British concern went beyond Japanese goods reaching her own shores. Japanese trade had expanded geographically during the war and in 1919 British businessmen complained that the Japanese had captured many of their South American markets. 118

All parts of the Empire complained that Japanese business was so closely protected by the government that it could not be subjected to severe methods of competition without political complications. It was therefore only natural in view of the close connection between Japanese business and national policies that economic circumstances should have a political bearing when the question of renewal of the

---

116 Ibid., p. 70.
Anglo-Japanese Alliance should arise. It was almost certain that any arrangement would have economic consequences in the regulation of commerce and navigation. When the alliance first came up in 1902, Japan had only military strength with which to bargain; in 1921 she had economic strength as well.

At the 1921 Imperial Conference, these considerations faced Dominion prime ministers: although their trade with Japan had greatly increased since 1902, the Dominions still relied chiefly on the United Kingdom and the United States for their commercial well-being. They had achieved a large degree of freedom to deal independently with foreign nations in matters of commerce, and they had acquired Imperial preference. The question which they must have considered was whether a renewal of the alliance and its consequent limitation of their freedom to deal harshly in matters of immigration and with Japanese competition in foreign markets was worth the possibility of an increased trade with Japan.

In strongly opposing the alliance at the 1921 conference, Canada did not mention Japanese trade nor did Australia and New Zealand in recommending the alliance's renewal. That the trade question was not mentioned in any of the released material of the 1921 conference would indicate that it did not enter to any serious degree in the Dominion consideration of the alliance. Japanese trade continued to increase after 1921 and became important to all three Dominions in the late 1920's. But when the value of trade with Japan was balanced
against the alliance's disadvantages in other respects, Dominion evaluation must have been too little—and in retrospect, too late.
CHAPTER VI

IMPERIAL DEFENSE--DISARMAMENT THE ANSWER
EXCEPT FOR CANADA

While matters of immigration and trade had a more or less indirect effect on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Imperial defense had a more direct influence. The alliance was a military alliance, its terms providing for Japanese aid in defending Britain's Pacific Empire if Britain should be attacked. If the Dominion prime ministers were not concerned over the effect of the alliance upon trade and immigration, they were concerned lest its abrogation should remove one of their best defenses in the Pacific. There were, of course, other considerations such as the attitude and power of the United States but the central fact remained. If the alliance were abrogated the Empire would lose an ally in the Pacific. In terms of defense, therefore, was Japan's value as an ally worth the alliance's inconveniences in other respects? If so, was the retention of Britain's Japanese ally the soundest policy for the Empire's defense in the Pacific?

As the Washington Conference opened in 1921, the Dominions were faced with defense problems differing fundamentally from those of 1902. While Russia was no longer a
danger to Dominion Pacific security, the tremendous naval
growth of Japan and the United States constituted a new and
greater danger. In addition to international developments,
changes had occurred within the Empire. Dominion responsi-
bility in self-defense had increased to the extent that the
Dominions were expected to be much more self-sufficient in
1921 than in 1902. These facts posed complicated problems
for Dominion delegates to the Washington Conference, and the
complications were compounded because renewal or non-renewal
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance could affect each problem.

From the Empire's earliest days, the Imperial system
occasioned unique defense problems for the colonies because
they were entangled in any British war. They were placed in
jeopardy through no actions of their own. This fact led to
constant friction between Britain and her colonies which
thought that the chief danger of war lay in their connection
with the Empire. British statesmen, on the other hand, con-
tended that it was because of the colonies that Britain
herself might be involved.¹ Nevertheless, both recognized
the need for adequate colonial defense and efforts at pro-
viding it were made on both sides.

Canada provides a good example of the early practice
of Imperial defense. Not long after the American Revolution,
Britain recalled her regular troops and by 1840 Canadians

¹The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol.
VII, pt. 1, p. 527.
began to demand that the vacuum left by their departure be filled with locally organized militias. Within a short time the paper strength of these organizations became respectable but as fighting units they were virtually useless. A Toronto unit drilled in the woods to avoid the jeers of the crowd, each man using a separate path to get to the rendezvous.² One Canadian official in 1855 described the militia in such a manner as to leave little doubt as to its efficiency:

By the returns of 1855 the militia of Nova Scotia, on paper, includes 57,855 men, of whom 1435 are commissioned officers. How many of these can get a squadron in the field, it were vain to conjecture. None of these has had a squadron to set for 20 years. Some of them are 'old fogies', fighting the battle of life with rheumatism, gout, asthma, dropsy, and other such like enemies, they are worse than Sepoys or Caffirs, or Zouaves or Yank riflemen a good deal. . . .³

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the defenses of British North America therefore consisted of the royal navy, a militia (in name only), and a residue of Imperial troops. A few fortifications had been constructed after the War of 1812, but these were ineffective to say the least, and because of the agreement of 1817, neither the United States nor Canada kept forces on the Great Lakes. These were therefore open to the passage of troops. In addition to the rest of Canada's weaknesses was the potential military

²Glazebrook, Canadian External Relations, p. 53.
³Ibid.
menace posed by the rapidly growing might of the United States. By 1850, it was questionable whether the Dominion could be defended against an American attack and if any hope lingered it was shattered by the advent of the great Union army born in the American Civil War.  

Canadians recognized their insecurity and asked London for help but Prime Minister Gladstone reflected London opinion with the statement that Canadians should defend themselves. Even the British House of Commons refused to stir itself and on March 4, 1862, resolved:

... that this House, while it fully recognized the claims of all portions of the British Empire on Imperial aid against perils arising from the consequences of Imperial policy, is of the opinion that Colonies exercising the rights of self-government ought to undertake the main responsibility of providing for their own internal order and security, and ought to assist in their own external defence.

With no, or at best little help to be found in London, Canada was forced to rely on her own resources. Because it was apparent that she could not defend herself against the United States, and because an attack from any other power was only a remote possibility, Canada abandoned any serious effort at self-defense.

For the Australian and New Zealand colonies the defense question appeared in a different light. They had no powerful neighbors although their geographic isolation

---

4 Ibid., p. 56.

caused them much anxiety. It was apparent to even the most jingoistic colonist that defense against a European naval power would be impossible and that their distance from Britain rendered questionable effectiveness of British aid in case of an Asiatic attack. The colonies therefore asked Britain in September, 1870 to define their status in case of war:

The colonial government has made all the preparation in its power for the suppression of internal disturbance; but much more would be required to enable it to co-operate with the Imperial Government if it should be assailed by an enemy of Great Britain. . . . Ministers would also respectfully beg. . . explicit information as to what protection will be afforded in case of Great Britain becoming involved in war with any power capable of attacking the colony, and also to what extent the colony would be expected to co-operate.6

In addition to the above request, the New Zealand government sent to London a long memorandum in which it admitted that the colonies could be plunged into war through decisions of the Imperial government in which the colonies had no voice. New Zealand therefore insisted that the colonies should be entitled to one of two types of treatment: either the Imperial government should supply them with adequate defenses, or in case of war, should inform the enemy that the colonies were to be treated as neutrals by both parties.7

The British colonial office replied by asking the


7Ibid., p. 217.
colonies if they actually expected a British enemy to respect colonial neutrality? Also, it asked, could the colony expect the British people to be content, under such conditions, to remain responsible for injuries done the colony in peace time? New Zealand quickly protested that she had no desire to remain neutral but that if Britain deemed it easier to declare the colony a neutral rather than defend it the colony would accept that position. Colonial officials pointed out that the imminent probability of war with Russia was viewed with great alarm especially since there was scarcely any British naval protection in Australian waters and Russian ships were known to be in the vicinity.

Australian colonies also feared the Russians especially since Britain (following Gladstone's policy of colonial self-defense) had withdrawn the last of her troops from the colonies in 1870. Australians complained about the position in which they found themselves. They were liable to be involved in British wars and for reasons of distance could not look for adequate protection from the mother country. They suggested, therefore, that the larger colonies be given the status of sovereign states so that they could remain neutral in a British war. Or, if they wished to take sides, their entry would be more the spectacular since it would be

voluntary. Although the colonial suggestion had used the word "sovereign" there was no thought of disowning the sovereignty of the crown; rather the aim was to secure a recognized neutrality through independent colonial negotiations with foreign powers. The matter died in infancy because, outside of a few radicals, colonial officials thought the proposal too extreme. Responsible leaders felt that concern over the weak quality of British protection had been greatly exaggerated and that in the last analysis the British navy was the best possible protection for the colonies.

The question of naval defense in 1877 brought out a fundamental difference between the policies of Australia and New Zealand which was deep-seated and became more and more accentuated in the face of Australian pressure for a navy of her own. Admiralty officials pointed out that separate navies would never be as efficient as a single navy to which all the colonies contributed but Australia maintained (especially after confederation) that her national dignity would never permit her to pay tribute even to a mother country. This became an unanswerable argument in Australian eyes.

11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Wood, New Zealand in the World, p. 78.
New Zealand publicly disassociated herself from the Australian policy. When the matter was brought up in her parliament in 1902, most speakers fought for larger contributions to the royal navy and the very arguments which stung Australians to demand a navy of their own were used in New Zealand to encourage larger payments. "If we are loyal subjects of the Empire," said one member, "if we have a spark of independence in us, we should increase our contribution."

The naval question was taken up in some detail at the 1902 Colonial Conference where the British admiralty presented a long and detailed report in which it showed the immense importance of a concentrated force and emphasized the facility with which a unified fleet could be moved. Both facts, said the admiralty, pointed to the necessity of a single fleet under unified control. The admiralty memorandum explained that simply in protection of trade the colonies had a great interest in the British fleet but that they were not contributing their fair share to that fleet. In order to maintain a united fleet and at the same time encourage colonial participation, the admiralty agreed to keep a squadron in the west Pacific to be used within the boundaries of the Australasian, China and East India

\[\text{14}^{\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 79.}\]
\[\text{15}^{\text{Keith, Colonial Policy, Vol. II, p. 232.}}\]
\[\text{16}^{\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 234.}\]
stations. The cost of the fleet would be borne by Britain, Australia, and New Zealand on a ratio of one-half, five-twelfths, and one-twelfth respectively. The plan was not well received especially in Australia which strangled it in proposals and counter-proposals.17

Because a well defined program seemed impossible, British officials had to content themselves with colonial promises for larger naval contributions. Only Canada refused. The oldest and wealthiest Dominion continued impervious to hints from the colonial office and Sir Wilfrid Laurier asserted that Canada refused "to be drawn into the vortex of militarism."18 The most that could be obtained from Laurier was a promise that Canada would look into the naval question and only later decide what to do, if anything.19 The 1902 conference once again showed the reluctance of the colonies to extend themselves in the matter of general Imperial defense. Canada felt secure behind the Monroe Doctrine and New Zealand and Australia felt more at ease because the Anglo-Japanese Alliance gave them an ally in the Pacific. The Dominions were willing to contribute limited amounts because they realized that it would enhance their own security but they were not ready to embark upon a course of closer defensive unity.

17 Hall, Australia and England, p. 242.
18 Hall, Empire to Commonwealth, p. 148.
19 Ibid.
In the face of a rapidly changing international scene, however, and with the German naval menace becoming more and more real, New Zealand (once again the most faithful colony) offered in 1904 to pay for the immediate building of a first-class battleship. Also recognizing the German threat, Australia nevertheless maintained that security could best be attained by encouraging local naval development so that her people might become accustomed to the sea. She could therefore help the Empire with men as well as with ships. Australia's government proposed the building of a small Australian fleet to consist largely of a torpedo flotilla. New South Wales and Victoria, however, considered these proposals inadequate and promised to give Britain a dreadnought if the Commonwealth government refused to do so but Australia finally adopted New Zealand's position and the gift was made.20

Germany's naval expansion was not the only fear stirring defensive preparations in Australia and New Zealand. Both Dominions also looked with apprehension toward Japan. The Japanese navy had shown surprising strength in defeating Russia in 1905 and relations between Japan and the Dominions were under a slight strain owing to the immigration question. With Britain removing her Pacific fleet for duty in the North Sea, only the Anglo-Japanese Alliance stood between the Dominions and a possible attack by the Japanese navy.

20Egerton, British Colonial Policy, p. 94.
Because of increased Dominion concern with international affairs and because of a definite possibility of an international war, the move for closer unity in Imperial defense became more pronounced than ever before. Feeling in Britain was strikingly stated by Winston Churchill in 1906:

A self-governing colony is not entitled to say one day, hands off! no dictation in our internal affairs, and the next day to telegraph for the protection of a brigade of British infantry. 21

The need for unity was stressed at the Colonial Conference of 1907 where it was suggested that the general staff (which had recently been created in Great Britain) should become, as far as possible, an Imperial one. A common general staff would provide for a unified educational program for all staff officers and would serve to reduce friction among various Imperial forces. 22 A resolution calling for an Imperial general staff was finally adopted and a new era in Imperial defense began. A committee on defense reported in 1909 that progress had been made in all the self-governing Dominions. They were paying increased attention to military training and education and had recognised the importance of similarity of armament and organization. 23

In one direction, however, there was no progress. There had never been an official attempt in any of the Dominions to provide aid for other parts of the Empire. The

21 Ibid., p. 13.
22 Ibid., p. 104.
23 Ibid.
need for some means of furnishing mutual aid was felt strongly at the 1907 conference and the delegates expressed their concurrence in the proposition that, "... each part of the Empire is willing to make its preparations on such lines as will enable it, should it so desire, to take its share in the general defense of the Empire." The ultimate aim of the conference, said the British prime minister, was:

... a plan for so organizing the forces of the Crown wherever they are, that, while preserving the complete autonomy of each Dominion, should the Dominions desire to assist in the defence of the Empire in a real emergency their forces would be rapidly combined into one homogeneous imperial army.

While there was agreement in the matter of military forces, the naval issue presented the conference with a problem it could not solve. Great Britain once more made an effort to secure Dominion backing for an Imperial navy under unified control and a resolution to that effect was presented to the conference. New Zealand announced her approval by increasing her subsidy and her representatives emphasized the necessity of the navy being under unified control so that the most effective results for the defense of all parts of the Empire might be obtained. Canada and Australia, however, refused to follow New Zealand and Australia demanded a navy altogether Australian in cost and

\[24\text{Ibid.},\ p. 105.\]
\[25\text{Ibid.}\]
\[26\text{Ibid.},\ p. 30.\]
in political control both in war and in peace. Sir Wilfrid Laurier stated, without giving a reason, that he would not vote for the resolution, and since without unanimity the resolution would have been worthless, it was simply dropped. Naval unity remained one issue which could not be settled because of Australian and Canadian demands for locally controlled navies. Although set aside at the 1907 conference, the naval question could not be ignored for long. Germany's naval building program by 1909 had frightened the British government into laying keels for eight battleships. Cables in which the admiralty explained in detail the present state of naval affairs went to all parts of the Empire and caused much concern in the Dominions. New Zealand once again voluntarily offered assistance to the Empire. In March 1909, Joseph Ward put the case for further help in emphatic terms:

I propose that we should offer to the British government at least one and, if necessary two, first-class battleships, of the Dreadnought or latest types and that the offer should be on behalf of New Zealand at our own cost; the battleships to be controlled both in peace and war time absolutely by the British admiralty.

Ward stressed the importance of speed and said his cabinet would resign and carry the case to the people if immediate

---

28 Hall, *Empire to Commonwealth*, p. 149.
action were not taken.\textsuperscript{30} His appeal was heeded and a cable was sent offering a dreadnought. The governments of New South Wales and Victoria announced their desire to offer the admiralty further assistance but were spared the effort when, sensing the aroused interest, the admiralty called a naval conference in London.\textsuperscript{31}

This meeting was not an Imperial conference so Dominion prime ministers did not attend but were represented by cabinet officials. The proceedings were secret and only the results were made known. Australia promised to provide a fleet unit on her own responsibility, New Zealand promised to give an armored cruiser (in addition to the dreadnought), and Canada announced that she would start a small navy of her own. Not altogether pleased, the admiralty pressed for a unified fleet but Canada could not be persuaded, and feeling that Canadian action of any kind was progress, the admiralty acquiesced in Canada's plan.\textsuperscript{32}

The greatest achievement of the 1909 naval conference was its impact on Canada. Military preparations in Canada had been traditionally governed by two sets of factors: domestic development and foreign trade. Canada had experienced rapid economic expansion which had almost wholly absorbed her financial and human resources in giant schemes.

\textsuperscript{30}\textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{31}Hall, \textit{Empire to Commonwealth}, p. 195.

\textsuperscript{32}\textit{ibid.}
(such as the Canadian-Pacific Railway) to develop and exploit her great western provinces. What energy had not been used internally had been expended in her quest for foreign trade. Because she had felt secure from attack and because her trade lanes had been comfortably patrolled by the British navy, Canada had given little thought to matters of defense.  

The admiralty's revelations of 1909, however, shocked Canada into recognizing that the British navy might soon be replaced or at least challenged in those trade lanes by German cruisers. A resolution was introduced in Ottawa on March 29 which affirmed the view that British naval supremacy was essential to Imperial security (and to Canadian commerce) and that Canada should organize a naval service "in close relation to, and co-operation with, the Royal Navy." Also much alarmed, Sir Wilfrid Laurier adopted a principle recognizing the necessity that whenever:

... in the distant seas or the distant countries, a British ship had been removed, that ship should be replaced by a ship built, maintained and equipped and manned by the young nations concerned.  

A resolution was presented to this effect in 1910 but was defeated.

Nevertheless, the first effective naval legislation in Canadian history resulted in 1910 when the Ottawa parliament passed the Canadian Naval Service Act which contained

---

33 Glazebrook, Canadian External Relations, p.267.
35 Wingerton, British Colonial Policy, p. 100.
all the necessary provisions for developing as large a navy as Canada might need for almost any eventuality. Under the provisions of the act, cruisers were purchased and naval schools were established. A Canadian navy was under way. Immediately following the naval act, another was passed in which Canada reserved the right to control her new squadrons under certain conditions. This act provided that in an emergency the prime minister might place the fleet and its officers under the Crown for service in the Royal Navy. But if this were done, parliament must be called within fifteen days to approve or disapprove of the action. Parliament's decision would be final. Even Canada, the most reluctant of the Dominions, had by 1910 seen the need for Imperial cooperation in defense and had taken concrete action.

In 1911, another Imperial Conference considered the question of Imperial defense. The Dominions admitted that they should provide some assistance to the Imperial navy but in return they asked for a voice in controlling that navy. New Zealand's Sir Joseph Ward said that New Zealand was "content to make an unconditional annual contribution of money to the Imperial navy," and would make even larger contributions whenever able, but at the same time New

Zealand was as were all the other Dominions, "entitled to some voice—proportioned, it may be, to their size and contribution—in such a vital question as peace or war."³⁹

When asked to outline a method to make effective a Dominion voice, should Britain grant it, Ward suggested a council to include representatives from the Dominions to provide a uniform system of sea defenses.⁴⁰

British Prime Minister Asquith undertook to answer Ward and first informed the conference that he was not opposed to some Dominion voice in Imperial foreign policy, or in matters of war and peace, and that he had with him a document signed by 300 members of the British House of Commons which stated that:

We the undersigned Members of Parliament, representing various political parties, are of the opinion that the time has arrived to take practical steps to associate the oversea Dominions in a more practical manner with the conduct of Imperial affairs; if possible, by means of an established representative council of an advisory character in touch with public opinion throughout the Empire.⁴¹

A Dominion voice in Imperial affairs, said Asquith, was desirable but he definitely opposed an Imperial council. Foreign affairs were handled by the British cabinet which was responsible to the British parliament and any deviation from that form would be, he said, "absolutely fatal to our

---

³⁹Ibid.
⁴⁰Ibid., p. 264.
⁴¹Ibid., p. 301.
present system of responsible government."42

Ward's movement for an Imperial council failed but a great success in the naval program was registered when the conference adopted a detailed set of regulations called the Imperial Defence Naval Agreement of 1911. The agreement contained seventeen provisions dealing with all phases of naval activities and carefully regulating the relationship between Dominion and Imperial forces. The first provision, probably the most important, read: "The naval services and forces of the Dominions of Canada and Australia will be exclusively under the control of their respective governments."43

The provision's wording is somewhat misleading because the Australian and Canadian navies were still bound in many ways by British control. All Dominion ships were to "hoist at the stern the White ensign as the symbol of the authority of the Crown..."44 Whenever Australia or Canada desired to send ships to foreign ports they were to obtain permission from the Imperial government, and as long as the ships remained in a foreign port, Dominion officers were to obey the instructions received from the United Kingdom.45 Dominion navies were further limited by several other

42Ibid., p. 302.
43Ibid., p. 304.
44Ibid.
provisions which called for uniformity in training methods and in combined fleet exercises. Whenever the fleets combined the senior officer (who was always British) would be in command of all Dominion vessels joining the fleet.\textsuperscript{46}

The agreement was the first definitive statement of the role of Dominion navies in case of war. While it did not state that the navies would be turned over to the admiralty, the idea was there by implication, and it was explicitly stated that during war the British admiralty was to have supreme command.\textsuperscript{47}

In addition to the naval agreement, the 1911 conference produced one more important result. Although Ward failed to establish an Imperial council, he convinced the conference of the need for a Dominion voice in Imperial defense and the conference decided that one or more Dominion representatives should be invited to attend meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence but only "when questions of naval and military defense affecting the Overseas Dominions are under consideration."\textsuperscript{48} It was additionally proposed, and "accepted in principle," that defense committees should be established in each of the Dominions.\textsuperscript{49}

After 1911, the organization of Imperial defense lay,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{46}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 306.
  \item \textsuperscript{47}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 307.
  \item \textsuperscript{48}\textit{The Cambridge History of the British Empire}, Vol. VI, p. 720.
  \item \textsuperscript{49}\textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
for all practical purposes, with two bodies: the Imperial general staff and the committee of Imperial defense. Both were advisory bodies in which the Dominions were admitted as full members when the occasion required. Neither body had any authority in foreign policy and it was obvious that cooperation in foreign affairs had not kept pace with cooperation in military affairs. But it was just this arrangement which pleased the Dominions especially Canada which was afraid lest responsibility in foreign affairs should threaten Dominion autonomy.\(^50\) Early in 1912, however, official Canadian opinion underwent a change when the suspicious Laurier was replaced as prime minister by Sir Robert Borden who had a long record of striving for closer Imperial ties.

In the Dominion House of Commons on December 5, 1912, Borden made a lengthy speech which directed Canadian policy until the outbreak of war in 1914. Although in the past it had been possible for Britain to undertake the naval defense of the whole Empire, the vast naval programs of foreign powers have, he said, made Britain's task unbearable. The Dominions owed it to the "Mother land to make secure the common safety and the common heritage of all."\(^51\) Borden maintained, nevertheless, that along with sole responsibility for defense should go partial Dominion responsibility for foreign relations.\(^52\)

\(^{50}\)Glazebrook, *Canadian External Relations*, p. 289.
\(^{52}\)Ibid.
After stating his general position, Borden discussed naval conditions in 1912. He pointed out that only ten years previously the British navy had been dominant in every sea but that at present it was dominant nowhere except in the North Sea.\footnote{Ibid., p. 323.} It was therefore necessary for the Dominions to fill the gap by building their own ships. But Borden's idea of who should control the ships departed from previous Canadian policy:

These ships (which Canada is to build) will be at the disposal of his Majesty the King for the Common defence of the Empire. They will be maintained and controlled as part of the Royal Navy; and we have the assurance that if, at any time in the future, it should be the will of the Canadian people to establish a Canadian unit of the British Navy, these vessels can be recalled by the Canadian Government to form part of that Navy, in which case, of course, they would be maintained by Canada and not by Great Britain.\footnote{Ibid., p. 327.}

As long as Canada was to assume some responsibility for naval defense, she was entitled to some voice in foreign affairs, and Borden declared that the British government "would welcome the presence in London of a Canadian minister during the whole or a portion of each year."\footnote{Ibid., p. 335.} This minister would attend all meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defense and would be one of its permanent members. Borden was also promised that, "No important step in foreign policy would be undertaken without consultation with such a
representative of Canada."56

Having reached the conclusion that Canada did have a voice in Imperial foreign policy, Borden insisted that Canada owed responsibility in matters of Imperial defense and that her promised contribution under the 1911 naval act was:

... of a moderate and reasonable character... and I venture to submit my firm conviction that this assistance, freely tendered by the people of Canada through their parliament is due to their own self-respect.57

In order to implement the general pledge given at the Imperial Conference of 1911, Borden introduced a bill which called for the appropriation of $35,000,000 for the construction of three dreadnoughts to be built in Britain and to be placed at the service of the British admiralty. The ships might be recalled by Canada whenever she needed them.58

Opposition to Borden's bill was swift and powerful. Sir Wilfrid Laurier pointed to a statement by British Prime Minister Asquith in which the latter had said:

There never has been a moment and there is not one now when we have not been overwhelmingly superior in naval force against any combination which could possibly be expected against us.59

If such were the case, argued Laurier, there was certainly

56Ibid.
57Ibid., p. 333.
58Hall, Empire to Commonwealth, p. 153.
59Ibid., p. 154.
no need for any measurable Canadian help. Laurier held that
the admiralty had exaggerated the dangers, and although the
British margin in ships was not as large as it once had been,
it was still safe. Britain, he continued, was not without
allies on the continent and the French navy was not to be
overlooked. He conceded that the British navy was concen-
trated in the North Sea but felt that this was all the more
reason for keeping Dominion ships in Dominion waters.60

Borden nevertheless held his ground and a bill was
passed early in 1913 calling for the building of one complete
fleet unit. But the ships remained on paper and when war
broke out in 1914 Canada, so far as naval defense was con-
cerned, was helpless but for the British fleet to which she
had contributed practically nothing.61

After the conference of 1911, New Zealand continued
in her traditional pattern. On October 28, 1913, Prime
Minister Massey stated that he proposed to ask the New
Zealand parliament for money to build in Britain a modern
cruiser to be used for the protection of New Zealand's trade
routes. He suggested that the ship be placed under New
Zealand's administration but that it should pass automatic-
ally under British control in war time.62 There was mild
opposition to the plan and it was pointed out that despite

60 Ibid., p. 153.
VII, pt. 2, p. 221.
her record of generous contributions to the British navy New Zealand enjoyed almost no protection from the navy which was in the North Sea. There were also complaints that New Zealanders had been engaged by British officers to be trained for the British navy although New Zealand had no voice in the navy's operation. Self-respect, it was argued, would not tolerate the continuance of such high-handed methods. Nevertheless, at the outbreak of World War I New Zealand remained loyal to Britain and to the Empire.

Australia made a greater attempt at self-defense than any of the other Dominions. But she did so on lines distinctly her own. Australian armed forces, for the most part, consisted of school boys. Children enrolled as junior cadets and drilled several times a month. Between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five they were subject, under rules of compulsory service, to occasional drills as members of the Australian militia. They then entered the reserve unless service in the permanent forces appealed to them. The permanent force, however, amounted to little and was chiefly an instrument of coastal artillery.

Some use of Imperial officers was made in Australia's training program but these found conditions in Australia much different from those in Britain. There was little

---

63 Egerton, British Colonial Policy, p. 102.
64 Wood, New Zealand in the World, p. 95.
65 Hall, Empire to Commonwealth, p. 125.
military discipline and no amount of brow-beating could instill it. The average attendance at a routine drill amounted to about 50 per cent of those enrolled. The Imperial officers complained to the Australian government which, they found, was not concerned. One senator explained:

We ought not to pay too much attention to the opinion of the Imperial officers who have grown up in the army where routine and custom have been settled for generations and where discipline and force is destructive of originality and initiative.66

A greater advance was made in naval affairs. An Australian navy was a reality by 1913 and a building program outlined plans for the following three years. Naval bases and dockyards had been built and nearly 2,000 recruits had been inducted since 1911. By the outbreak of World War I a naval college was in operation.67 While Australia's military and naval establishments were in no way adequate for her defense they were, by the outbreak of war, much larger and more efficient than those of any other Dominion. Australia, however, continued to show reluctance in the matter of Imperial defense and felt that she should reserve her forces for her own use.

The diplomatic situation in Europe by early 1914 had become uncertain and Britain consequently felt more than average concern over the Empire's defense. On March 17, 1914, Winston Churchill (first lord of the admiralty)

66 Ibid., p. 126.
delivered to the House of Commons a long speech in which he reviewed the Imperial naval situation. Churchill concentrated on the Pacific and the safety of the Empire located there. The British navy, he said, adequately protected the Pacific Dominions and also protected Japan. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance insured the protection of Britain's Pacific Empire because British obligations under the alliance forced her to maintain a larger Pacific fleet than any other European power.68 Because Japan was a British ally, the Dominions had nothing to fear from her but should Britain and Japan become enemies there would be ample cause for Dominion alarm. In 1914, said Churchill, there was a strong bond between Japan and Britain outside of the alliance and that bond was the true protection of the Dominions. But, he said, "this bond depends entirely on the maintenance of British naval supremacy."69

The danger to British naval supremacy came not from Japan, according to Churchill, but from Europe. "The situation in the Pacific will be absolutely regulated by the decision in European waters."70 It would therefore behoove the Imperial navy to concentrate its strength in Europe and not to scatter it around the globe. The British navy was the Dominion's first line of defense as long as it remained

69Ibid., p. 352.
70Ibid., p. 353.
in European waters in sufficient strength to defeat all comers. Consequently, Churchill argued that the Dominions should exert every means to strengthen the Imperial navy rather than play with miniature ones of their own:

Two or three Australian and New Zealand Dreadnoughts, if brought into line in the decisive theatre, might turn the scale and make victory not merely certain but complete. The same two or three Dreadnoughts in Australian Waters would be useless the day after the defeat of the British Navy in home waters. Their existence would only serve to prolong the agony without altering the course of events.71

Aside from Canada, Churchill was pleased with Dominion naval efforts. He lauded Australian work and promised Imperial cooperation in every way possible. He felt that local navies built Dominion naval spirit and at the same time created personnel reserves essential to the full mobility of the Imperial fleet. He was pleased, moreover, with the arrangements worked out for Imperial use of the Commonwealth fleet in case of war. "It is," he said, "with the object of combining sound military principles with local aspirations that the design of the Imperial squadron has been conceived."72

Much progress had been made in the way of an Imperial navy by 1914. The 1911 conference, supplemented by Dominion legislation, had made an Imperial fleet a reality. Canada lagged behind but showed signs of life under Robert Borden.

71Ibid.
72Ibid., p. 354.
That Britain was satisfied for the most part was evident in Churchill's speech. He intimated, however, that more work was necessary. But before either plans or work could be begun, the smoldering keg of Europe exploded and the Empire went to war.

Whether or not the Dominions were automatically at war when Britain entered has never been definitely settled but their actions in 1914 clearly showed that they considered themselves at war. In Canada there had been for many years divergent views. From 1896 to 1911, Laurier never swerved from his claim (as voiced in 1900) that "in future Canada shall be at liberty to act or not to act, to interfere, or to do just as she pleases, and that she shall reserve to herself the right to judge whether or not there is cause for her to act." 73 As a member of the opposition in 1912, Laurier enumerated nine wars in which Britain had engaged since annexing Canada and proved that Canada had participated officially in only three. The consent of the Canadian government, he argued, was necessary before Canada would fight. 74 In view of Laurier's traditional attitude it is significant that even such an arch-isolationist should adopt the tone he adopted after August 4, 1914:

"It is our duty, more pressing upon us than other duties... to let Great Britain know, and to let the friends and foes of Great Britain know,

73 Soward, Canada in World Affairs, p. 20.
74 Hall, Empire to Commonwealth, p. 161.
that there is in Canada but one mind and one heart, and that all Canadians stand behind the mother country, conscious and proud that she has engaged in this war not for any selfish motive, for any purpose of aggrandisement, but to maintain untarnished the honour of her name, to fulfill her obligations and to save civilization from the unbridled lust of conquest and domination.75

Regardless of Dominion sentiment, it was clearly Canada's right to determine her own course in the war. By the declaration of war on August 4, 1914, the British government committed the whole Empire to war but the character and the extent of Canada's participation could be determined solely by the action of her government. In short, Canada voluntarily joined with Britain in waging war against the enemy. But such was the unity of sentiment throughout Canada that her government and parliament acted with a promptness and unanimity equal to that of the Imperial government.76

The Canadian pattern was followed in the other two Dominions. Australia had followed the course of events in Europe after 1910 with some misgivings but when war broke out all doubt vanished as to her willingness to share in its sacrifices and to cooperate effectively with Imperial forces. Australia considered herself involved. Prime Minister Fisher stated in October, 1914:

I ask the people of Australia. . . to steel themselves to the view that this matter may only

---

be just beginning. But whether we are just begin-
ing, or whether we are in the middle of it, or near-
ing the end, the policy of this government will be the same. . . . We shall pledge our last man and our last shilling to see this war brought to a successful close.77

The same spirit dominated New Zealand where there was never a question of holding aloof from the war. As early as 1913, New Zealand's minister of defense had conferred with the British war office on the kind of expeditionary force New Zealand was to provide in the event of war.78 The Dominions considered themselves members of the Empire and the Empire was at war. They immediately and wholeheartedly joined the Imperial war effort and contributed materially to its success.

While it is not necessary to describe in detail Dominion war activities, a glance at their contributions in man-power alone will suffice to show the extent of their loyalty to the Empire. Out of New Zealand's male population of 1,000,000, 117,175 enlisted and 100,444 went overseas. There were about 17,000 deaths and 58,000 casualties.79 Australian enlistments amounted to 416,809; 332,000 went overseas and 59,000 met death, with total casualties exceeding 318,000.80 Canadian enlistments were given as 590,572, of which 418,000 went overseas, and of whom 51,000 were

77 Egerton, British Colonial Policy, p. 56.
78 Wood, New Zealand in the World, p. 95.
80 Ibid., p. 987.
killed and nearly 150,000 wounded.81

One result of the united war effort was the achievement of a partial uniformity in Imperial arms and organization of armed forces. Canadian forces, for example, entered the war equipped with the Ross rifle which proved inferior to that used by British troops. It was not long until the Canadians switched to the British model thus simplifying the problem of supply. On the other hand, Canada fought for some control over her forces and asked Marshal Foch to keep Canadian troops together in all-Canadian units.82 Although the war had a unifying effect, it did not destroy Dominion desire for some independence in matters of defense.

The greatest evidence of Dominion independence and of Dominion desire for a voice in Imperial defense during the war was the Imperial War Cabinet which met in 1917 and 1918. The cabinet was a departure from precedent since it was given supreme authority for the prosecution of the war. Dominion representation in the cabinet illustrated the fact that the Dominions were not willing, even in the face of an emergency, to abandon their freedom in defense.

In war as in peace, the Dominions proved themselves willing to cooperate with Britain provided that in so doing they did not lose their hard-won responsible government and their share of representation in Imperial affairs. Their

81 Ibid., p. 983.
82 Ibid., p. 989.
war records removed all grounds for British doubts as to their Imperial loyalty. When faced with an emergency they contributed unanimously and voluntarily. The Empire was unified but it was also made up of self-governing entities which would not compromise their freedom under any circumstances.

The entire question of Dominion rights in defense was re-examined at war's end and it was concluded that the Imperial government was chiefly responsible for Imperial defense. Its rights to station troops wherever it deemed their presence necessary was incontestable and could not be overridden by any Dominion. It was conceded by the Imperial government, however, that in the maintenance of such forces no Dominion contribution could be required except, of course, as a matter of voluntary arrangement. On the other hand, the Imperial government possessed no control over troops raised in the Dominions for home defense, and the Dominions refused to consent to any arrangement with Britain to keep forces available for oversea expeditions. In Imperial military defense, therefore, it is obvious that while the Dominions possessed some rights the Imperial government bore the primary responsibility.

It was as true in 1918 as at any time in the past that in defensive arrangements the Dominions were dependencies of Great Britain. If Britain went to war the

---

83 Keith, *Dominion Home Rule*, p. 41.
84 Ibid., p. 42.
Dominions were at war, and when at war, they depended on Imperial forces for protection. Even when at peace, Imperial protection secured for them the opportunity for peaceful development free from foreign intervention. Nothing but Imperial protection and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (entirely a matter of Imperial responsibility) could have preserved Australia and New Zealand from becoming legitimate objects of aspiration for Japan, whose overcrowded population looked with undisguised envy at the scanty numbers of "whites" occupying enormous areas to the south.  

The conclusion of the war led to a Dominion expectation that a time of reduced expenditures for defense was to come. Especially in Canada the tendency to object to any expense for Imperial arms was pronounced. When proposals to increase Canada's permanent forces were introduced they were defeated and her defense organization remained as before the war: an active militia comprising a small permanent force with the annual training of a certain number of non-permanent militia. Feeling in New Zealand and Australia was much the same. The people were anxious to rid themselves of compulsory training and to reduce the size of the permanent forces. Dominion interest in Imperial defense, especially in Dominion contributions to London,

---

86 Ibid., p. 990.
87 Ibid., p. 991.
had definitely waned. They were still concerned with self-defense but they had sacrificed to save the Empire and now wanted to be freed from the military burden. If Dominion leaders could achieve reduced military expenditures at the Washington Conference, it would receive a hearty welcome in the Dominions.

Imperial relations were not the only considerations facing Dominion statesmen in preparing for the Washington Conference. There remained the question of the Pacific and of the power and disposition of the nations interested there. The first to be considered was Japan, especially in terms of her military and, more important, naval power.

Because of its splendid work during the Sino-Japanese War the navy became extremely popular in Japan and received generous treatment from the Diet. The intervention of the three European powers (France, Russia and Germany) at Shiminoseki resulted in further naval expansion and from 1895 to 1902 Japan spent £22,000,000 on ship-building. At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese navy mustered seventy-six warships as against the Russian fleet of eighty-six ships of a much larger average tonnage.\textsuperscript{88}

It is significant that when Japan's first building program ended in 1902 she had become an ally of Britain, the world's greatest naval power. Because of the alliance

\textsuperscript{88}Colonel A. M. Murray, \textit{Imperial Outposts From A Strategical and Commercial Aspect with Special Reference to the Japanese Alliance}, New York, 1907, p. 139.
some argued that Japan could cease building since she would be adequately protected by the British fleet. The general conviction was, however, that instead of justifying relaxation of efforts, the British alliance imposed the responsibility of more strenuous exertion both on sea and on land. If Japan hoped to continue a union so essential to the preservation of peace in the East, she must herself qualify as a valuable ally. Japan must have a navy equal to the combined Eastern squadrons of any two European powers (Britain excepted of course). This type of argument found fertile soil in the hearts of the super-patriotic Japanese and naval building continued.

In the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese fleet once again decisively defeated the enemy, and owing to the many ships captured from the Russians, the war's end found Japan's navy considerably more powerful than at its outbreak. Japanese naval interest did not end with the war and in fact naval building increased. Estimates for 1906 were three times those for 1905 and thereafter climbed steadily, the pace being accelerated during World War I. A memorandum governing naval policy was published in Tokyo in 1917 enunciating the "eight-eight" program which called for three

---


squadrons each consisting of eight battleships and eight battle-cruisers.92 The program's implementation entailed laying keels for two battleships per year for the following eight years, in addition to a larger number of light-cruisers, destroyers and submarines.93

In spite of their gigantic "eight-eight" program, the Japanese were anxious to know how they compared to other great naval powers. One member of the Diet asked if the 1920 program took cognisance of current expenditures in Britain and the United States. The admiralty replied:

Yes; it was not prepared until the extent of current naval expenditures by those two Powers was known to us. Any substantial additions which may be made by either of them would compel us to reconsider our own Budget.94

Another member asked if Japanese building were aimed at either the United States or Britain. The admiralty answered in the negative but pointed out that even with present plans Japan was only about one-half as strong in capital ships as the United States.95 The admiralty explained that Japan had cause to be alarmed by American actions:

America appears to think she is divinely appointed to rule the world with a big stick. What is the purpose of her colossal Navy if it is not to make her power supreme in every part of the Pacific? American statesmen profess an

---

92Ibid., p. 16.
95Ibid.
undying devotion to peace, and meanwhile they are building warships on a scale unparalleled in history. They preach the doctrine of racial equality and equal opportunity and yet refuse to admit educated Japanese immigrants to American citizenship. They disclaim all intention of meddling with foreign politics, and at the same time continue to bombard us with arrogant notes about our policy in Manchuria, Siberia and Sakhalien. In these circumstances America has only herself to blame if sober Japanese are beginning to suspect her of designs upon their country and its most cherished interests.96

Whatever may have been Japan's motives in diverting an abnormal percentage of her revenue to naval preparations, it is obvious that nothing less than a profound belief in the necessity of a powerful navy could have induced the people to sustain the crushing tax burden imposed on them. Japanese newspapers boasted that no patriotic Japanese would question admiralty policy and that no nation in the world besides Japan's ally Britain was so dependent on naval strength for her very existence. The navy was not an offensive weapon, claimed the admiralty, but a matter of Japan's survival.97

An over-all review of naval strength in the western Pacific shows that previous to the August 1919 arrival of the United States' Pacific fleet the Japanese had had almost complete naval control since 1905. Britain had been the greatest power prior to 1905, followed by Russia. But Russia's defeat in 1905 coupled with Britain's withdrawal

96 Ibid., p. 156.
97 Ibid., p. 19.
owing to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and to increasing German pressure in the North Sea left Japan supreme. It was obvious to all, of course, that at the end of World War I a great British fleet could be transferred to the Pacific and that it could probably regain its mastery but in 1920 the British fleet was not there and the Pacific was divided between the Japanese and Americans.

United States' interest in the Pacific was closely allied to her acquisition of the Philippine Islands in 1899 and for a time immediately thereafter the navy department considered dividing the fleet into two equal parts, one of which would remain permanently in the Pacific. There was, however, strong opposition to the plan, the most damaging criticism coming from the well-known naval expert Admiral Mahan:

When the Senate passed the recommendation to divide our battle fleet between our Atlantic and Pacific coasts, not four years had elapsed since the Russian Fleet had been destroyed by the Japanese, owing chiefly to its being divided between the Baltic and Asiatic coasts of Russia.98

In the absence of any significant American naval interest, the construction of a fleet large enough to meet Mahan's specifications was impossible. It was not until World War I had been raging for two years that public opinion in the United States could be persuaded to provide appropriations for an enlarged navy. Once the necessity was

98Ibid., p. 9.
realized, there was enthusiasm where there had been indifference, and in 1916 Congress passed a naval bill of unprecedented dimensions. After the United States entered the war, the bill underwent successive alterations, each enlarging its original provisions.99

During World War I, American interest was directed chiefly to the Atlantic Ocean but following the war the Pacific attracted considerable attention. It was immediately seen that Japan's rapid naval growth had made her supreme there. Consequently the 1909 plan for a division of the fleet was revived. Mahan's opposition to a division was once again raised but naval authorities believed that the opening of the Panama Canal and increased naval strength justified their decision. The navy department stated that, "The present strength of the Pacific Fleet, irrespective of subsequent reinforcements is such as to make it little if at all inferior to the only probable enemy."100 As a result, the stronger half of the American fleet (192 vessels, including eight battleships) was transferred to Pacific waters in August 1919.

It is obvious from even a superficial glance that the two great Pacific rivals were Japan and the United States and that the British Empire was in the middle of something containing many potential dangers. Should Japan and the

99Ibid., p. 9.
100Ibid., p. 21.
United States fight, the Empire, according to the letter of the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, would be obligated to aid Japan. Even if the Empire remained neutral, a Pacific war between the other two great powers might well endanger Imperial territories, since in a war neutrality often becomes an obstacle to a belligerent and is sometimes swept aside with few qualms. Because the London government feared a crisis in the Pacific, it appointed Lord Jellicoe in 1918 to consult the respective Dominion governments on the naval issue. His reports have not yet been fully published but available summaries indicate that he advocated the revival of a powerful Far Eastern fleet embracing vessels of the Royal navy, the East Indian Squadron, and the Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian navies. The fleet, he suggested, should use Singapore as a central station and consist of at least eight modern battleships, eight battle-cruisers, ten light-cruisers, forty destroyers and thirty-six submarines. The Dominions should contribute three-fifths of the fleet's maintenance costs. The report was completed by late 1920 and was due for consideration at the 1921 Imperial Conference.

Jellicoe's attempt to set up a definite system of cooperation in an Imperial Pacific navy was ill-timed. People in the Dominions as well as elsewhere were convinced that the war just won had been the war to end wars.

101 Ross, Australia and the East, p. 30.
Especially in Canada, there was general apathy toward any such grandiose plan and disarmament was the slogan of the day. Even those who recognized that a large navy was essential to the safety of the Empire felt that what was most needed was time in which to recover from the moral and economic ravages of the war. Only Australia and New Zealand, situated in the potential danger spot, were ready to respond in some measure to Jellicoe's call. Other portions of the Empire simply could not be aroused.\textsuperscript{102}

Along with Australia and New Zealand, Britain understood the need for adequate Pacific defenses. She could not allow any power to attain mastery over it nor could she allow two powers to fight for mastery.\textsuperscript{103} Britain also recognized that only through Dominion cooperation could a suitable defense be attained. A clear statement of the problem was made by Fleet Admiral Earl Beatty in a series of public addresses in London in the spring of 1920. The war, he said, had taught that the Dominions must form an integral part of the Imperial naval establishment.\textsuperscript{104}

In a statement to the Commons on February 15, 1921, Prime Minister Lloyd George restated the need for cooperation. He maintained that because of the increasing size of navies and because the need for ships in remote localities, the

\textsuperscript{102} Egerton, \textit{British Colonial Policy}, p. 110.

\textsuperscript{103} Bywater, \textit{Sea Power in the Pacific}, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 26.
burden was too much for "these small islands." He held high hopes that the coming Imperial conference would solve the problems:

I am looking forward to the problems to be discussed there. You have got to get co-ordination between Departments—efficiency and economy depend upon it—but you must also have co-operation between the whole of the parts of the Empire, so that this wonderful Empire, with its infinite variety of races, will be able to give as full an account of itself in the future as it has done in the past.

The long awaited Imperial conference in the summer of 1921 finally brought the problem of naval defense before the assembled prime ministers of the Empire and, as was expected, Hughes of Australia led the fight for a strong Pacific defense. World War I and the Panama Canal had shifted the naval stage from the Mediterranean and Atlantic to the Pacific. Therefore, "peace in the Pacific means peace for this Empire and for the World." He asserted that Pacific defense could best be attained by understandings with other naval powers but that in any case the need for adequate defense was necessary:

Naturally the amount of force necessary to ensure our safety in a world which has agreed to suspend naval construction, a world in which the three great Naval Powers have, for example, come to such an understanding as would have the force and effect of an alliance, would be much less than in a world which resounds with the clang of hammer beating into shape bigger and still bigger

---

107 *Cmd.* 1474, p. 21.
navies. That applies too, to the renewal or non-renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, but in any case we must have such naval defense as is necessary for our security.\textsuperscript{108}

If no disarmament arrangement could be worked out, Hughes favored a powerful defense and partial Dominion responsibility for that defense. He agreed that Britain had paid dearly for the victory won in World War I and that she could no longer bear the crushing load of sole responsibility for the Empire's safety. Since the Dominions had been given a voice in foreign affairs, they had incurred responsibility for a share in the defense of the Empire. Britain's share \textit{per capita} should be larger than that of the Dominions, Hughes said, because she was responsible for her Crown colonies and for India but the Dominion share should be based on a \textit{per capita} basis as well.\textsuperscript{109} Dominion contribution in Hughes' eyes was not a gift but a responsibility: "The Dominions could not exist if it were not for the British Navy. We must not forget this. We are a United Empire or we are nothing."\textsuperscript{110} Hughes obviously favored Dominion cooperation but only along distinctly Australian lines:

\begin{quote}
I need hardly say that I do not believe that the Dominion quota for naval defence should be expressed in terms of a money contribution, but in terms of Dominion Navies. . . .\textsuperscript{111}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{108}\textit{Cmd.}, 1474, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{109}\textit{Cmd.}, 1474, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{110}\textit{Cmd.}, 1474, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{111}\textit{Cmd.}, 1474, p. 25.
Several plenary meetings and several meetings of the prime ministers were devoted solely to a consideration of the naval problem and revealed, in spite of Hughes' impassioned tone, Dominion determination to do nothing substantial in the way of cost. The conference finally adopted a resolution stating:

That while recognizing the necessity of cooperation among the various portions of the Empire, to provide such Naval Defence as may prove to be essential for security, and while holding that equality with the naval strength of any other Power is a minimum standard for that purpose, this conference is of the opinion that the method and expense of such cooperation are matters for the final determination of the several Parliaments concerned and that any recommendations thereon should be deferred until after the coming Conference on Disarmament.112

As in the consideration of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Dominion statesmen postponed making final defense decisions before the meeting of the Washington Conference. It is significant that Australia and New Zealand, the only Dominions anxious about Imperial defense, advocated the alliance's renewal. The alliance, they felt, was one of the best means of preserving peace in the Far East and in addition provided them with a powerful Pacific ally. On the other hand it might involve them in an American-Japanese war. But they were convinced that Britain would never allow the Empire to be dragged into a war against the United States on behalf of Japan. Canada's geographic location and the Monroe

112Cmd., 1474, p. 9.
Doctrine protected her from a Japanese attack. Her only
danger lay in the possibility of involvement in an American-
Japanese war because of the alliance. In terms of defense,
therefore, Canada had everything to gain in a termination of
the alliance.

The Dominions' defensive position in the post-World
War I Pacific was probably more precarious than at any time
in their previous history. In 1902, Russia had been their
chief concern, but Russian naval power had never threatened
Britain's and was eliminated in 1905 through the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance. After 1905, Germany appeared as the
Empire's enemy. But the German menace was largely restricted
to Europe and only remotely affected Dominion security in
the Pacific. In 1921, the two great Pacific naval powers
were Japan and the United States. Each had powerful navies
in the Pacific and each was located nearer the Dominions
than was Britain. Either represented a greater threat to
Dominion security than had Russia or Germany at any time.

The Dominions had had little voice in their defense
problems in 1902 and had relied on Britain. Because Britain
had been able to dictate to the Dominions, she had also
shouldered almost sole responsibility for Dominion defense.
By 1921, the Dominions had won considerable freedom of action
to deal with their own defense but had also been obligated
to accept the accompanying responsibility. Even if the
Dominions had been willing in 1921 to exert real effort at
defense, it is doubtful if they could have defended themselves against either the United States or Japan. But the Dominions were not interested in armaments in 1921; they wanted disarmament. They were therefore practically defenseless.

The solution to their problem lay in disarmament. Disarmament would render improbable an attack from either of their two potential enemies. Disarmament would also minimize the importance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in terms of its effect on Dominion defense. A reduction of Japan's fleet would free Australia and New Zealand from the Japanese naval menace and thus remove their basic reason for advocating the alliance's renewal. Naval reduction would in addition make unlikely a Japanese-American war. Australia and New Zealand therefore looked to the Washington Conference and to disarmament as the solution of their defensive problems. If disarmament could be accomplished, their stand on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be almost neutral.

But this was not so with Canada. Prime Minister Meighen had made it clear that, even with disarmament, Canada would never consent to being involved in a Japanese alliance which under any circumstances could entangle her in a war with the United States. Canada not only opposed the renewal of the existing Anglo-Japanese Alliance but also the conclusion of a new bipartite military alliance with Japan.
CHAPTER VII

THE END OF THE ALLIANCE--CANADA PREVAILS

Accordingly, in pursuance of the proposal which has been made, and in the light of the gracious indication of its acceptance, the President invites the Government of Great Britain to participate in a conference on the subject of limitation of armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions will also be discussed, to be held in Washington on the 11th day of November, 1921.

With these words President Harding invited nine powers to attend a conference in Washington held avowedly to limit naval armaments but equally important to effect an agreement on Pacific affairs. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand came to the conference as parts of the British Empire delegation. They could not cast separate votes because they were not independent states and did not have accredited diplomatic staffs in the United States or in any other country. Their constitutional position was clear. They would be consulted by Britain's delegates and would have every opportunity to make their desires known.

But not so clear was the weight which Dominion views would carry with the British government. "Before the War," Lloyd George complained, "Downing Street was in charge of

1Putnam Weale, An Indiscreet Chronicle From the Pacific, New York, 1922, p. 133.
the Empire, but now the Empire is in charge of Downing Street."² The statement was impressive but incorrect. Despite their progress to international status via the League of Nations, the Dominions could conclude no treaty except under powers granted by the Crown on the advice of the Imperial government, and no treaty so concluded could become operative (except where specially provided) without formal ratification by the Crown.³ Even in international organizations where the Dominions enjoyed separate representation, the Empire traditionally worked in unison and on critical occasions the Imperial government often worked alone. The Dominions, for example, took no part in negotiating the treaty of peace with Turkey nor in the Locarno Agreement nor in the Guarantee of Poland.⁴ They had been promised the right of information and consultation, but that was all.

The Dominions were promised full information on all problems arising at the Washington Conference and were assured that they would be consulted but they were entitled to nothing more. Nevertheless, it was certain that Dominion opinions would be given more consideration at the conference than was indicated by strict interpretation of constitutional decisions. That the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been submitted to the Dominions for discussion at the Imperial

²Ibid., p. 89.
Conference in 1921 showed Britain's concern for Dominion feeling. In addition, the Dominions had learned in their struggles for responsible government, fiscal freedom, and freedom in defense and trade that they had but to insist and persist; the freedom they asked was almost always granted. If the Dominions would take a definite and persistent stand on the alliance issue, British actions would reflect Dominion views.

Three great problems had played a role in forming Dominion opinion toward the alliance: immigration, trade, and defense. It was clear that no Dominion would consent to its renewal if their freedom of action in solving immigration, trade, or defense problems were thereby impaired. The immigration issue had already been settled, or at least mitigated, in all three Dominions by the "Gentlemen's Agreements" but Meighen's remarks at the Imperial Conference of 1921 reflected Canada's refusal to consider the problem settled. Canada would not favor a renewal of the alliance if it could be construed to limit Canada's freedom to handle her immigration policies. On the other hand, neither Hughes nor Massey had indicated that immigration was a material factor in their advocating the alliance's renewal. Both Australia and New Zealand were apparently satisfied with the "Gentlemen's Agreements" and neither felt the alliance a threat to her autonomy.

The evaluation of the effect of the alliance on the trade of the three Dominions is largely a study in negative
evidence. In no available materials is there any mention of Dominion concern with trade problems in connection with the alliance. Because they were all included in Britain's commercial treaties with Japan, and because in none was trade with Japan sizeable enough to warrant insulting the United States by renewing an alliance hated in the United States, the Dominions apparently decided that Japanese trade constituted no important reason for either supporting or opposing the alliance.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a military alliance and therefore materially affected Dominion defense problems. Australia and New Zealand were primarily concerned. They were located in south-western Pacific waters within easy reach of a Japanese fleet stationed in Japan's mandated islands. Both consequently feared that termination of the alliance would free Japan from all restraints thus exposing them to Japanese naval power. Canada, on the other hand, recognized the impossibility of defending herself from the United States. Should the Anglo-Japanese Alliance involve the British Empire in a war against the United States, Canada's position was impossible; she would almost certainly be overrun by American troops. Naval disarmament promised to alleviate defense problems in all three Dominions. A disarmed Japan would hardly attack Australia or New Zealand nor would she start a war with the United States. If disarmament were accomplished, the effect of renewal or non-
renewal of the alliance on Dominion defensive security would therefore be minimized.

As the Washington Conference opened, it was apparent that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance did not vitally affect the immigration, trade, or defense problems in Australia and New Zealand and consequently their delegates would probably take no definite position on the alliance question but would allow Imperial policy to guide them in their decisions. Canada, on the other hand, would oppose renewing the alliance because it limited her freedom of action in matters of immigration and defense. Canada was the one Dominion with a definite position and was, moreover, ready to persist in defending it. If any Dominion were to be heard at Washington, it would therefore be Canada.

The ostensible object of the Washington Conference was to cut naval expenditures but many Americans were convinced that this could not be accomplished without Britain's terminating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. That British statesmen were definitely committed to the interpretation that Britain was not to be drawn into an American-Japanese war was not known in the United States, and in the meantime, the race for naval supremacy in the Pacific continued unabated. Consequently, 1921 seemed the time to press the issue of the alliance. It was absurd to believe that the Japanese desired the renewal of an alliance restricting to

5Hall, Empire to Commonwealth, p. 470.
them. As a result, none of Britain's arguments satisfied the United States, and Britain was forced to realize that however great her need for renewal there was even greater need to avoid an American war.  

Japan's 1921 foreign policy was realistically based on the fact that her actions depended not so much upon her own aims as upon what the western powers would allow her to do. It is understandable, therefore, that Japanese military men insisted on renewing an alliance which prevented, or at least hindered, foreign intervention in Japan's encroachments in China. By means of the alliance Japanese plans in China were assured of at least partial success. Both the United States and the Dominions felt that the alliance was closing the open door in China. Because the alliance was definitely connected with disarmament and with wider Pacific problems, it was assured of assuming, unofficially at least, an important position on the Washington Conference's agenda.

On December 26, 1920, the New York World opened a campaign for a disarmament conference. In May 1921, Congress asked for such a conference in a resolution introduced by Senator Borah (Idaho). On July 10, President Harding extended an informal proposal for a conference to be held in Washington and the State Department reported that the

7 Ibid., p. 122.
8 Ibid., p. 127.
suggestion had been approved by Britain, France, Japan, and Italy. Harding's proposal reached Britain during the 1921 Imperial Conference. The Dominion prime ministers felt that it opened a way to substitute a larger agreement for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. They therefore proposed a preliminary meeting to deal with Pacific affairs to be held in London prior to the Washington Conference. Dominion prime ministers would have a direct voice at this meeting. The American government, however, opposed a preliminary conference and the idea was abandoned in spite of Dominion protests. Nevertheless, pleased with the opportunity to include the United States in a Far Eastern settlement, the Empire welcomed the suggestion for a conference in Washington.

Japanese reaction to Harding's proposal was mixed. Immediately upon being approached, the Japanese cabinet met to ponder the suggestion. After a lengthy session it decided to accept the American proposal but at the same time to ask the Washington government to limit the scope and agenda of the "Pacific" part of the conference. Japanese diplomats welcomed a disarmament conference but they were determined that it should do nothing to damage Japan's

---

10 *Cmd.*, 1474, p. 5.
11 *Cmd.*, 1474, p. 6.
position in the Far East.

The status of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance at the opening of the Washington Conference has usually been called uncertain. It was not at all uncertain; the alliance was doomed. While discussing the possibilities for a naval treaty prior to the Washington Conference, Senator Lodge voiced American opinion: "The removal or the termination of the Japanese Alliance is necessary to the successful conclusion of the naval treaty." A memorandum by Secretary of State Hughes of November 11, 1921, recorded remarks by A. J. Balfour who concluded that the alliance should be discontinued in favor of a substitute, preferably a tripartite agreement among the United States, Britain and Japan. Britain was ready to discard the alliance and replace it with almost any other agreement if the latter included the United States.

By the opening of the Washington Conference the alliance had almost ceased to function. Although it had automatically been extended during the Imperial Conference of 1921, its military features had been emasculated by a joint declaration of Britain and Japan to the League of


14The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, Lord President of the Council, and British delegation leader at the Washington Conference.

Nations in July 1921:

They (Britain and Japan) hereby notify the League of Nations pending further action that they are agreed that if any situation arises whilst the Agreement remains in force in which the procedure prescribed by the terms of the Agreement is inconsistent with the procedure prescribed by the Covenant of the League, then the procedure prescribed by the said Covenant shall be adopted and shall prevail over that prescribed by the Agreement.16

Conscious of American dislike of the alliance and of Britain's eagerness to find a substitute for it, Japan had concurred in the above note. Japan realized that the alliance was doomed and that her job at Washington was to salvage whatever she could of its advantages.

Because the powers concerned agreed that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance could not be continued in its existing form, negotiations for a substitute were started prior to the Washington Conference. Handled by Balfour, Hughes and the Japanese, these negotiations were kept secret and it is impossible accurately to trace their history. But by the conference's beginning the alliance was certain to be terminated.17

The secret negotiations had proceeded to a point where a rough draft of what became the Four-Power Pact was brought to Washington from London. But before the British draft was presented to the conference, two important additions were made: the original draft omitted mention of the termination

17Ibid., p. 174.
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Britain wished to allow Japan the liberty of writing it. As a result, Japanese delegates wrote Article IV of the Four-Power Pact. The second addition was the inclusion of France as a signatory. France had sizeable interests in the Pacific and was anxious to increase her prestige. In addition the inclusion of France broadened the agreement and tended to save Japan from embarrassment at losing the alliance.

The Four-Power Pact was chronologically the first of the achievements of the conference. The agreement was reached on December 9, 1921 and announced by Senator Lodge on the 10th. Article IV stated:

This agreement shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the High Contracting Parties and shall take effect on the deposit of ratification, which shall take place at Washington, and thereupon the agreement between Great Britain and Japan, which was concluded at London on July 13, 1911, shall terminate.

Besides terminating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the agreement provided for a conference of the contracting parties in case difficulties arose among themselves with respect to their rights in relation to their "insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean."

---

Although there was little discussion of the agreement's general meaning, the phrase "insular possessions and insular dominions" raised some questions. Japan insisted that it be interpreted to exclude the main Japanese islands. Balfour sympathized with the Japanese position but explained that if Japan proper were excluded and Australia and New Zealand included, it would imply a subordinate position for these Dominions, a position he would have difficulty defending.° Dominon feelings were nevertheless pushed aside and on December 13, the following addition was attached to the Four-Power Pact:

The term "insular possessions and insular dominions" used in the aforesaid Treaty shall, in its application to Japan, include only Karafuto (or the Southern portion of the island of Sakhalin), Formosa and the Pescadores, and the islands under the Mandate of Japan.23

Balfour's position on this issue demonstrated that Dominion views influenced British actions at Washington but the final outcome is evidence that in the last analysis British policy prevailed.

News of the alliance's termination was received with varied reactions in the Dominions. Since there was no racial equality clause in the Four-Power Pact and no mention of freedom of immigration, it in no way threatened the "white" policies of Australia and New Zealand nor did it

22Ibid., p. 19.
23Ibid., p. 46.
threaten British Columbia with a new influx of Orientals. The "Gentlemen's Agreements" were still in force in all three Dominions and were generally satisfactory to all concerned. The Four-Power Pact did not mention trade and did not affect the existing commercial relations or agreements between Japan and the Empire and therefore caused no Dominion concern over the question of Japanese trade.

Dominion reaction was voiced primarily in terms of defense. Many Australians were glad to be rid of "Japanese entanglements" and to be free of an alliance which might lead to trouble with the United States but there were those who agreed with Premier Hughes in favoring the old alliance to the new pact with its "nebulous terms and lack of sanctions." Nevertheless, Australians generally believed that their security was protected by the 5-5-3 ratio and by the Four-Power Pact, and the years after 1921 saw a growing friendliness in Australian feeling toward Japan.

The Washington Conference satisfied to a large extent New Zealand's feeling of security. The Four-Power Pact guaranteed the status quo of island territories in the Pacific and the 5-5-3 ratio limited Japan's naval building. As long as none of the treaties restricted Britain's right to develop Singapore as a naval base, New Zealand and Australia were satisfied that the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

24Ross, Australia and the East, p. 35.
25Ibid., p. 36.
did not jeopardize their security. Canada was naturally pleased with the alliance's termination since it freed her from the possibility of entanglement in an American-Japanese war.

The fact that the Dominions were satisfied with the results of the Washington Conference indicated that their delegates concurred in the decisions made by the British delegation. But this fact does not measure the impact of Dominion opinion upon the formulation of those decisions. In the words of Sir John Salmond, New Zealand's delegate to the conference, the true significance of Dominion representation at the conference:

... is not that those Dominions have acquired for either international or constitutional purposes any form of independent status, but that they have now been given a voice in the management of the international relations of the British Empire as a single, undivided unity—relations which were formerly within the exclusive control of the Government of Great Britain.

While New Zealand and possibly Australia might have been content to subordinate their own desires to preserve the unity of the Empire at the Washington Conference, Canada was not willing to do so. Canada was determined that the alliance should be terminated and was equally determined to carry her point at Washington.

As early as February 14, 1921, Prime Minister Meighen

26 Milner, New Zealand in the Far East, p. 21.

communicated to the British government Canada's belief that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should not be renewed and suggested that the United States and Japan should be approached on the matter of a conference on Pacific affairs. A few months later he again explained Canada's opposition to the alliance in a memorandum dated May 4, 1921. Although he recognized that the present alliance was doomed, he feared any bipartite alliance with Japan:

Finally, there is this to be remembered. No treaty can be called a Treaty of Alliance unless it can be invoked against some one. Even if the new Treaty is so worded that it exempts Britain specifically and absolutely from participation in an American-Japanese struggle, it will have to apply against China if she throws in her lot with the United States. And thus sooner or later it would in effect bring Britain and the United States into collision with one another, first on Chinese soil and then by natural processes everywhere on the Pacific.

On June 29, 1921, Meighen circulated to the other Imperial prime ministers a confidential memorandum in which he openly opposed the alliance and threatened that if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were renewed it would not be binding in Canada "unless ratified by the Dominion parliament, and that in any case, military clauses were looked upon with extreme disfavour by his electorate."29

Canadian and American opposition to the alliance presented the British government with an important problem.

28 Weale, Indiscreet Chronicle, p. 58.
29 Ibid., p. 107.
Should it allow Japanese or Canadian-American views to dominate the renewal question? As it stood in 1921, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance represented the break-up of the Empire. Canada would not accept even a new alliance without separate ratification, and in view of Canadian feelings, ratification of any but a drastically changed alliance seemed out of the question. In peacetime Canada could be an interpreter between the United States and Britain because she could speak with the "political dialects of both nations." But in the event of a British war against America, caused by an unpopular Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Canada's behavior would be doubtful to say the least.

The history of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is the story of an international bipartite alliance disrupted by the attainment of political maturity of a Dominion within the British Empire and by general international developments. Japan and the United States had replaced Russia and France as Britain's chief rivals in the Pacific. The 1902 alliance had been used to eliminate Russia and had succeeded in doing so. But in 1921 Britain did not wish to use the alliance to eliminate the United States. Britain did not want to see the United States driven from the Pacific nor did she wish to fight with her best international friend.

The alliance had been renewed in 1905 and 1911 to free Britain from Pacific worries while she was almost

30Ibid., p. 60.
totally engaged in containing Germany in Europe and in the North Sea. But by 1921 Germany was no longer a menace and the only possible use for the alliance was action against the United States. By 1921 the alliance was obviously outdated and for British purposes was almost useless.

Intra Imperial conditions had changed as drastically during these twenty years as had international conditions. Australia had become a Dominion only two years before the alliance's first signature and was, in 1902, a political infant taking its first steps. New Zealand did not attain Dominion status until 1907, two years after the alliance's first renewal. Only Canada had attained some political maturity by 1902 but had little independence in foreign affairs. Not until 1911 were the Dominions able to entitle their conferences in London "Imperial" instead of "Colonial" and not until 1911 was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and reasons for it, explained to them. But in 1914 World War I necessitated a total Imperial war effort. The value of Dominion contributions to the victory enhanced their position with regard to foreign affairs. They sat on the Imperial War Cabinet which directed war policy for the entire Empire, participated in the Paris Peace Conference, signed the Versailles Treaty in their own names, and became charter members of the League of Nations.

In 1921 the British government submitted the question
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to them and for the first
time asked them to express their views toward it. The Domin­
ions had become members of the British Commonwealth of
Nations and were no longer mere colonies within a British
Empire. They had attained sufficient economic stability and
political experience to make their wishes felt. If Australia
and New Zealand were not instrumental in terminating the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it is because they felt insufficient
concern over it to question Britain's policy. Canada, on
the other hand, insisted upon termination and had attained
a position to make that insistence felt.

Nevertheless, the alliance question was, in the last
analysis, one for Britain's foreign office. Had the foreign
office demanded renewal, the alliance would have been renewed
regardless of Canadian pressure. But the alliance was not
renewed and therefore it is obvious that Britain chose to
avoid a possible loss of Canada and to retain the friendship
of the United States, even if it meant losing that of Japan.
In 1902, Japan had been Britain's most valuable friend in
the Pacific; in 1921 the United States and Canada assumed
that position and Britain therefore wrote the conclusion to
twenty years of history with the fourth article of the Four-
Power Pact: as this treaty comes into force, the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance comes to an end.
APPENDIX
THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN

Agreement relative to China and Corea,

January 30, 1902.

The governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace in the Extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Corea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties, having mutually recognised the independence of China and Corea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Corea, the High Contracting Parties recognise that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Corea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.

ARTICLE II

If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of

1 For original and revised drafts of the treaty texts as well as for the final texts, see Gooch and Temperley, British Documents on the Outbreak of the War, Vol. II, p. 89 ff., Vol. IV, p. 220 ff., and Vol. VIII, p. 503 ff.
their respective interests as above described, should become
involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting
Party will maintain a strict neutrality and use its
efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities
against its ally.

ARTICLE III

If, in the above event, any other Power or Powers
should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High
Contracting Party will come to its assistance, and will
conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agree-
ment with it.

ARTICLE IV

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of
them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate
arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the
interests above described.

ARTICLE V

Whenever, in opinion of either Great Britain or Japan,
the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two
Governments will communicate with one another fully and
frankly.

ARTICLE VI

The present Agreement shall come into effect
immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in
force for five years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should
have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said
five years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain
binding until the expiration of one year from the day on
which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have de-
nounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration
arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance,
shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorised by
their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement,
and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 30th of January,
1902.

(L.S.) Lansdowne, His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.

(L.S.) Hayashi, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten-
tiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at
the Court of St. James.
GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN

Agreement respecting the integrity of China, the general peace of eastern Asia and India, and the territorial rights and special interests of the parties in those regions,

August 12, 1905.

PREAMBLE

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing the Agreement concluded between them on the 30th of January, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following Articles, which have for their object:

(a.) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India.

(b.) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.

(c.) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions.

ARTICLE I

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

ARTICLE II

If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, whenever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers, either contracting party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.
ARTICLE III

Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Corea, Great Britain recognises the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Corea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.

ARTICLE IV

Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognises her rights to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.

ARTICLE V

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI

As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.

ARTICLE VII

The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by naval and military authorities of the contracting parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

ARTICLE VIII

The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VI, come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of
one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But, if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 12th day of August, 1905.

(L.S.) LANSDOWNE, His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

(L.S.) HAYASHI, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the Court of St. James.

GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN

Agreement respecting the integrity of China, the general peace of eastern Asia and India, and the territorial rights and special interests of the parties in those regions,

July 13, 1911.

PREAMBLE

The government of Japan and the government of Great Britain having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of August 12, 1905, and believing that the revision of that Agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the said Agreement, namely:

A. The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India.

B. The preservation of the common interests of all the Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.

C. The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and India and the defence of their special interests in those regions.
ARTICLE I

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Japan or Great Britain, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights and interests.

ARTICLE II

If by reason of an unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers, either of the High Contracting Parties should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its Ally and will conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE III

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into a separate agreement with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

Should either of the High Contracting Parties conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall impose on such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such an arbitration treaty is in force.

ARTICLE V

The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in circumstances entered into the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the military and naval authorities of the High Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and frankly upon all questions of mutual interests.

ARTICLE VI

The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration the intention of terminating it, it
shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the Alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until the peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement and have affixed their seals thereto. Done at London, July 13, 1911.

(L.S.) T. KATO, The Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the Court of St. James.

(L.S.) EDWARD GREY, H. B. M's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY MATERIALS

A. Documents:


The Canada Year Book 1920, Ottawa, 1921.

Conferences of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, The Dominions, and India, Summary of Proceedings and Documents, London, 1921.


The documents cited may be divided roughly into four groups. MacMurray's and Hertslet's treaty series and the Canada Year Book contain treaty texts and statistics respectively. Hertslet's volumes are especially detailed and include not only treaty texts but also British orders-in-council regulating and interpreting the use of the treaties. The conditions surrounding Dominion acceptance of the 1894 and 1911
Anglo-Japanese Trade Agreements are fully covered in the set.

In the second group are Gooch and Temperley's *British Documents* and the *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. Both of these collections contain not only texts of agreements but include documents recording the negotiations leading to those agreements. The *British Documents* are invaluable for a study of the origin of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the State Department papers are useful in dealing with the Washington Conference.

The parliamentary papers dealing with the 1921 Imperial Conference are the only available source on the proceedings of that conference. While they do not contain a comprehensive summary of the proceedings, they are valuable because they do provide a good insight into the opinions prevalent in the Dominions at the opening of the conference.

Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates* and the collections of Dominion speeches and documents by Keith contain records of parliamentary proceedings in both Britain and in her Dominions and records of opinions of Imperial leaders. Because the writer had no access to official Dominion sources, the Keith volumes were invaluable.

B. Memoirs:

**Eckardstein, Baron von, Ten Years at the Court of St. James, 1895-1905, Translated and edited by Professor George Young, London, 1921.**

**Grey, Viscount of Fallodon, K. G., Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916, New York, 1925.**

**Moore, Frederick, With Japan's Leaders An Intimate Record of Fourteen Years as American Diplomat to the Japanese Government Ending December 7, 1922, New York, 1922.**

**Reinsch, Paul S., An American Diplomat in China, New York, 1923.**

Baron von Eckardstein gives a detailed account of the Anglo-German negotiations of 1901 which while open to question because of Eckardstein's record of doubtful accuracy, provides a feeling of the difficulties involved during the German-British attempts to reach an effective agreement.

*Twenty-Five Years* by Grey takes the reader into the British foreign office and shows him the intricate maze of problems and decisions facing Britain's foreign
secretary every day of his career. The work serves to show how relatively little concerned was the foreign office with Dominion troubles or for that matter, with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The diplomacy of Europe took his time and effort.

The other memoirs listed deal only indirectly with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but Moore's With Japan's Leaders, even though written long after the termination of the alliance, provides the reader with a feeling for some of the problems with which Japanese diplomats have been faced regardless of period.

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Allin, Cephas Daniel, Australasian Preferential Tariffs and Imperial Free Trade, A Chapter in the Fiscal Emancipation of the Colonies, Minneapolis, 1929.


Dennett, Tyler, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, New York, 1925.


Graham, Gerald S., Canada A Short History, New York, 1950.


Hall, Walter Phelps, Empire to Commonwealth, New York, 1928.


Ishimaru, Lt. Cmdr., Total Japan Must Fight Britain, Translated by Instructor Capt. G. V. Hayment, New York, 1926.


McLeod, Sir Charles Cambell, and Adam W. Kirkaldy, The Trade Commerce and Shipping of the Empire, New York, 1924.


Morse, Hosea B. and Harley Farnsworth MacNair, Far Eastern International Relations, Boston, 1931.

The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, London, 1918, 3 vols.

Murray, Colonel A. M., Imperial Outposts From a Strategical and Commercial Aspect, With Special Reference to the Japanese Alliance, New York, 1907.


Reinsch, Paul S., World Politics At the End of the Nineteenth Century, As Influenced by the Oriental Situation, New


Weale, Putnam, (Bertram Lenox Simpson), *An Indiscreet Chronicle From the Pacific*, New York, 1922.


Woodsworth, Charles J., *Canada and the Orient A Study in International Relations*, Toronto, 1941.

The secondary works cited may be grouped in terms of subject matter and in terms of the use made of them in the preparation of this thesis. In the realm of general background Chung-fu Chang's *Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1893* study of the origin and general history of the alliance to 1914. Chang has a tendency to overstate and to paint issues in black and white. Another work of the same title by Alfred Dennis of the University of California is more carefully written although less inclusive. Dennis concentrates on the renewal question in 1921, and his chapter on the alliance and the Empire gave the writer the idea of this thesis.
Also of a general nature but in the European diplomatic sphere are the excellent works of G. P. Gooch. Studies in Modern History and Before the War Studies in Diplomacy present pre-World War I European diplomacy in all its intricacy and complexity. Probably the best single work on pre-war European diplomacy is William L. Langer's two-volume work entitled The Diplomacy of Imperialism. Langer has a graphic style and his ability to lay bare the core of a matter is devastating.

For an understanding of British pre-war diplomacy, the most encyclopedic and yet readable work is The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy in three volumes edited by Gooch and Masterson. It is the traditional standby for the beginning student of British diplomacy, and for good reason.

One cannot proceed far into Dominion constitutional history without meeting Arthur Berriedale Keith. He has written excellent works on all phases of Dominion history. Responsible Government in the Dominions (two volumes) is the most comprehensive of his studies and follows closely Dominion development from voiceless colonies to Dominion status and the rather full self-government concomitant with that term. War Government in the Dominions is a detailed study of the status of the Dominion governments in war time, and unlike many theoreticians, Keith bases his conclusions on Dominion practices rather than on constitutional theory. In addition to his more comprehensive studies, Keith has written many small and more specialized works on certain phases of Dominion government. Also masters in Commonwealth constitutional history are Lionel Curtis, (The Problem of Commonwealth) and F. L. W. Wood, whose Constitutional Development of Australia has become standard in its field.

Dealing more specially with Canadian-Far Eastern relations is Woodsworth's Canada and the Orient and Glazebrook's Canada's External Relations. Of the two Woodsworth is by far the more valuable. Written as a doctoral dissertation at the University of London, it is especially informative on the immigration question. Glazebrook covers almost the same ground but in less detail. His work, however, contains several significant statements on Canada's opinion on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

In Australian-Far Eastern relations I. Clunie Ross's Australia and the Far East Diplomatic and Trade Relations is the most comprehensive and yet uninspired source. Done in a scholarly style, it examines fairly, Austral-Japanese relations and lays the blame for many troubles on the Australian government rather than on the Japanese. Ian Milner gives an adequate account of New Zealand's relations with Japan in New Zealand's Interests and
Policies in the Far East.

Because this thesis is concerned primarily with Britain's Dominions, the Japanese side of the alliance question has not been fully treated. Nevertheless it cannot be ignored. Japan Must Fight Britain, written by Tota Ishimaru is an account of Anglo-Japanese relations told from a Japanese and a military point of view. It is openly biased, and in many respects contains more fancy than fact. Written in a definitely anti-Japanese vein, but from a Japanese perspective, is A. M. Pooley's Japan's Foreign Policies. Pooley spent considerable time in Japan and put great industry in collecting Japanese diplomatic sources. He is responsible for smuggling out of Japan, Baron Hayashi's Secret Memoirs. Pooley suggests that Japanese diplomacy is skilled in double-dealing but points out that it learned its trade from a careful examination of European chancellories. Providing an excellent description of Japanese diplomatic machinery and its relations with other branches of the Japanese government, Takeuchi's War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire, is the most objective of the works on Japan.

The Washington Conference has been the inspiration for countless studies and for purposes of this thesis, little effort was made to exhaust that bibliography. A routine coverage of the conference is made by Raymond Buell in his The Washington Conference and by Yamato Ichihashi in The Washington Conference and After. Buell's study is somewhat anti-Japanese, while Ichihashi's is, as would be expected, definitely pro-Japanese. A more spectacular study is An Indiscreet Chronicle from the Pacific by Putnam Weale, who spends less time with the actual conference proceedings and concentrates on conditions in the Pacific under consideration at the conference.

A number of highly specialized monographs whose content is indicated in their titles have been of considerable value in gathering detailed materials on matters of Dominion tariffs, trade, immigration and defense.