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WILSON AND CARRANZA: A REAPPRAISAL OF WOODROW WILSON'S MEXICAN POLICY

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Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States from 1913 to 1921, became deeply involved in the Mexican Revolution from the day of his inauguration. His policies directly influenced the course of Mexico's history during that era and for a generation thereafter. Mexico, the preeminent international concern of the Wilson administration until June, 1915, provided the President with an opportunity to export his brand of Progressivism. Wilson's self-righteous missionary zeal and his attempt to impose an ill-conceived policy collided with a fervent revolutionary nationalism. The outcome was predictable.
Despite the advice of his closest advisor, Colonel Edward M. House, his old schoolmate "honest and honorable Cleveland Dodge," experts in international law in the Department of State, and American investors with Mexican interests, Woodrow Wilson refused to recognize the provisional government of Victoriano Huerta. From the time of his inauguration in March of 1913 and throughout the remaining spring, pressures for recognition steadily increased. Huerta's assassination of Madero and overthrow of Mexico's constitutional government deeply offended Wilson's moral sensibilities and according to the then Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, the President clung tenaciously to the belief that "it would be wrong from every consideration to recognize the usurper." This signified an important departure from the long-standing policy of the United States to matter-of-factly extend recognition to whomever exercised power in Mexico City.

In the Cabinet meeting of May 23, 1913, the President and his aides made the final decision not to recognize Huerta. Wilson subsequently sent former governor of Minnesota, John Lind, to Mexico City with instructions to inform Huerta that recognition of any future government
True, the Revolutionists declare that they will take part in no election so long as Huerta remains . . . but . . . even that may be arranged. We could set negotiations going and probably bring about an armistice and a real election.7

Unfortunately, Wilson seriously overestimated the malleability of the Constitutionalists and underestimated Huerta's intransigence.

Wilson, through his agent John Lind threatened, consoled, and even tried "barefaced bribery" in an attempt to persuade Huerta to step down and agree not to stand for reelection.8 Huerta proved to be a tough and able adversary. For a time it seemed that Wilson's hopes for a peaceful resolution to the stalemate might be realized. Huerta's Secretary of Foreign Affairs notified Wilson through Lind that the Mexican Constitution prevented Huerta from succeeding himself and Huerta announced in September "his ardent desire to turn the government over to a constitutional successor."9

In October 1913, however, Huerta dashed all hopes for a peaceful settlement when he arrested and imprisoned his political opponents in the Mexican Congress. Wilson now found himself in accord with the militant Constitutional position. He had tried in every way possible to remove Huerta from power. As the diplomatist Howard F. Cline noted, "Wilson's difficulties are an eloquent rebuttal to those who think it is a simple matter to dislodge even a small-time Strong Man under optimum circumstances. Short of armed
invasion, a last resort, nothing worked." But Wilson learned that there were definite limits to moral suasion. Convinced that nothing could be accomplished by dealing with "a desperate brute like that traitor Huerta," Wilson decided to assist the rebel movement in forcefully ousting Huerta.

On November 1, Wilson dispatched an ultimatum threatening direct military intervention if Huerta failed to resign immediately. Huerta brazenly refused. Wilson's imprudent bluff proved counterproductive, lessening American credibility and temporarily rallying Mexican support for Huerta, "who now became (to his own surprise) a symbol of political independence in the face of Wilsonian pressures." Wilson's ominous threats—then vacillation—almost aborted the rebellion. By December of 1913, Huerta's position seemed impregnable.

Wilson must have pondered this curious turn of events. Huerta, who a few months before had been despised almost everywhere outside Mexico City, was now a hero. Wilson once again failed to grasp the nationalistic impulse that accompanied revolution. Anti-foreignism was perhaps the dominant theme of the revolution shared almost without exception by radicals, moderates and reactionaries, only Pancho Villa stands as a prominent exception.

Wilson moved on several fronts in the fall of 1913 and early winter of 1914. There is substantial evidence to
suggest that he seriously considered forming a military alliance with Carranza. Colonel House noted in his diary of October 30:

The President has in mind to declare war against Mexico. . . . He will first blockade the ports, thereby cutting off all revenue from the Mexican Government which will have a tendency to break down Huerta's resistance.

He has in mind also throwing a line across the southern part of Mexico, and perhaps another line just south of the Northern States. He plans to send troops to the Northern States, if they, the Constitutionalists consent, in order to protect the lives and property of foreign citizens. . . .

It is his purpose to send six battleships at once. . . . The President seems alert and unafraid. These plans were never revealed to Carranza, the "First Chief." Perhaps Wilson never seriously considered implementing them; but they do indicate the changing attitude of a frustrated President. Late in October, William Bayard Hale was sent to Arizona to confer with Carranza, who was at that time in Hermosillo forming a provisional Mexican government. He met with Carranza and his subordinates during the second week in November. Hale conveyed Wilson's plan to mold an interim government once Huerta was deposed. In addition, Hale tried to impress upon Carranza the necessity for safeguarding the lives and property of foreign nationals in Mexico in order to stifle the growing interventionist sentiment in the United States. In return, the United States would lift the arms embargo, thus allowing the revolutionaries to acquire badly needed arms.
Carranza denounced such putative interference in Mexico's internal affairs; the First Chief correctly perceived that if Wilson's conditions were met, it would be the President of the United States who would determine the course of the revolutionary movement in Mexico. The central point of contention between Wilson and Carranza was the insistence by the latter that the United States government not interfere. In most other matters of substance, they concurred. For example, the Constitutionalists, through Hale, assured the President of early elections. Hale reported:

Their answer to your question as to their intention to give the people an early opportunity to elect President and Congress at free and fair elections is an earnest affirmative and they further affirm that they will surrender the Government into the hands of those selected . . . even though persons selected were not preferred by them.17

Despite these assurances, Wilson ordered Hale home. He could not frighten Huerta out of office and the Constitutionalists would not defer to his judgment; so Woodrow Wilson adopted a policy of "watchful waiting."

By January of 1914, Wilson had gained a much clearer picture of the Constitutionalists and their cause. Luis Cabrera, Carranza's special agent in Washington, had opened an enlightening dialogue with the State Department. His objective, of course, was to persuade Washington to lift the arms embargo; simultaneously, he reassured Wilson via the State Department of Carranza's aims.18 Cabrera's dialogue
included extensive discussions into the nature of the reforms proposed by Carranza and the Constitutionalists.\textsuperscript{19} Probably for the first time, Wilson grasped some of the social and economic ramifications of the revolution. Within a few months, Wilson would publicly endorse what would have seemed unthinkable six months before—nothing less than social and economic revolution.

Wilson's heightened sensitivity toward the revolution and the virtual military stalemate that had developed in Mexico influenced his decision to lift the arms embargo on February 3, 1914. John Lind and other American agents advised Wilson that to gain the offensive, the Constitutionalists badly needed arms.\textsuperscript{20} Yet, the lifting of the arms embargo had little immediate effect on the military fortunes of the Constitutionalists. In late March, Lind advised that the United States directly intervene.\textsuperscript{21} Fortunately, Wilson realized that Lind's proposal to send the Marines into Mexico City might once again rekindle support for Huerta and certainly alienate the Constitutionalists over whom the President hoped to exert some influence.

On April 9, Huertista soldiers mistakenly arrested and detained some U.S. Naval personnel in Tampico. Although the sailors were quickly released with an apology by the Mexican commander, the incident provided a pretext for Wilson to order the occupation of the strategic port of Veracruz. Wilson, at first reluctant to take such an
adventurous step, probably was influenced by John Lind, recently returned from Mexico. Lind assured the President that the citizens of Veracruz would welcome liberation from the oppressive Huerta and no resistance to the occupation should be anticipated.\textsuperscript{22} The President apparently concluded that such limited intervention would not seriously antagonize Carranza since the major source of Huerta's revenues would be denied the First Chief. Too, Wilson probably anticipated (and in the future took advantage of) the political leverage afforded by the occupation.

The taking of Veracruz did not go as smoothly as anticipated and when the smoke cleared, there were nineteen Americans dead; the Mexican casualties exceeded three hundred. When the news reached Wilson, he was "appalled and unnerved."\textsuperscript{23} Huerta and Carranza in bellicose indignation demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Americans. A perplexed and downhearted President attempted to reassure the Constitutionalists that the United States had no intention of conducting a war against the Mexican people, but was merely seeking reparations from Huerta.\textsuperscript{24} The full impact of a failed policy now demanded reassessment.

The first indications that Veracruz had a telling effect on Wilson and his Mexican policy surfaced almost immediately when he accepted an offer of multilateral arbitration. The occupation of Veracruz caused considerable concern in Latin America. It appeared as if the United
States was once again engaging in "gunboat diplomacy."

Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (the A. B. C. powers) offered to mediate the dispute. Wilson had no desire to resolve anything with the Huerta regime, but accepted mediation in hopes of eliminating Huerta and avoiding further bloodshed. He so informed the mediators and added that the government displacing Huerta must prosecute "such reforms as will reasonably assure the ultimate removal of the present causes of discontent."

Later in the negotiations, Secretary of State Bryan forcefully reiterated Wilson's position:

> It would in our judgment be futile to set up a provisional authority which would be neutral. It must, to be successful, be actually, avowedly, and sincerely in favor of the necessary agrarian and political reforms, and it must be pledged to their immediate formulation, not merely requested to devote special attention" to them.

Predictably, Carranza refused to be bound by the negotiations. He could not tolerate outside intervention—even if it worked in his favor. Meanwhile, Wilson did everything in his power to see that the Latin American mediation effort concluded with Carranza and the Constitutionalists in power. Wilson refused to accept any other solution. Despite the fact that the mediators demanded and received acceptance of a strict arms embargo to all combatants in Mexico, Wilson, the great moralist, made sure that ammunition reached the rebels when they desperately needed it. While the mediators debated, the Constitutionalist armies pressed forward.
Although the essence of revolutionary nationalism eluded Wilson, by April he demonstrated an awareness of the underlying causes of the revolution. According to Wilson:

It is a curious thing that every demand for the establishment of order in Mexico takes into consideration, not order for the benefit of the people of Mexico, the great mass of the population, but order for the benefit of the old-time regime, for the aristocrats, for the vested interests, for the men who are responsible for this very condition of disorder. No one asks for the order because order will help the masses of the people to get a portion of their rights and their land; but all demand it so that the great owners of property, the overlords, the hidalgos, the men who have exploited that rich country for their own selfish purposes, shall be able to continue their process undisturbed by the protests of the people from whom their wealth and power have been obtained.  

The President went on to say, "My passion is for the submerged 85 percent of the people..." He attributed much of Mexico's problem to "the virtual enslavement of Mexico's peasantry." Although he did not say so, he was in effect embracing the concept of class war. There was no turning back the clock. As he put it, "I say to you that the old order is dead."  

Yet he persisted in his view that only the United States could "properly direct" the Mexicans "so that the new order which will have its foundation on human liberty and human rights, shall prevail."  In the spring of 1914, Wilson was at least abreast of Carranza in the revolutionary scheme of things.

Prior to the Veracruz intervention, Wilson's Mexican policy had been based on the naive assumption that Mexico's
problems could be solved by a new constitution and free elections. With a few "good men," Wilson felt that reform—New Freedom style—would, if implemented, redress the social and economic ills that plagued that nation. Fortunately, Wilson came to understand that the Mexican was not merely a Spanish speaking Anglo-Saxon and that fundamental differences did exist. Wilson's idealism resulted in an incoherent and unrealistic policy during his first year in office. Yet, with all its inconsistencies, this idealism allowed Wilson to ride the revolutionary tide and avoid the strong undertow of interventionist sentiment in the latter half of 1914 and 1915. As the summer of 1914 approached, Wilson confronted a new and unsettling problem—the disintegration of the Constitutionalist coalition which he now so avidly supported.

There was never any real doubt in Wilson's mind about who should lead the new revolutionary government. Of the three major revolutionary leaders, Villa, Zapata, and Carranza, only the latter met Wilson's standards. Villa and Zapata were excellent leaders and had more loyal followers than Carranza. Yet, neither was well-educated or refined. Their provincialism and radicalism could lead to unpredictable results.

On the other hand, Venustiano Carranza and Wilson shared a certain political symmetry—essentially bourgeois. Each viewed change as desirable and proper when accomplished in an orderly (constitutional) and democratic way. Carranza
lacked Wilson's intellectual depth. He was according to one historian, "bourgeois mediocrity incarnate." The First Chief was, however, a dedicated liberal in the vein of Gómez, Farías, Juárez, Lerdo and Madero. His primary objective was political reform; social and economic reform was necessary he felt, but not along the radical lines proposed by Villa and Zapata.32

In recent years an apparent consensus has evolved among historians which asserts that Wilson's Mexican policy drifted aimlessly through the revolution.33 This view, however, is applicable only to the first year and a half of his administration. By the summer of 1914, Wilson had embarked on a new and ambitious program to assure the ascension of Venustiano Carranza. Wilson's desire to "assist" Carranza directly conflicted with the nationalistic underpinnings of the revolutionary movement. While the resulting enmity between the two ebbed and flowed, Wilson continued to mold his policies to Carranza's advantage.

When Venustiano Carranza entered Mexico City on August 18, 1914, he faced the impossible task of maintaining the broad coalition that had swept Huerta from power. Already a de facto split had occurred between the revolution's two most powerful leaders, Villa and Carranza, which had been temporarily repaired with American assistance. The State Department was busy throughout the summer trying to abort an open breach. Villa—who openly distrusted the First
Chief—and Emiliano Zapata threatened new violence unless an acceptable compromise could be found. 34

Unfortunately, divisions in the ranks of the revolutionaries went far beyond personalities. Central to the problem was Carranza's Plan de Guadalupe. Its intent was political and basically consistent with the Constitution of 1857. For some months, Carranza had promised to move beyond mere political issues, and embrace social and economic reform. Now the time had come to define the specific nature of that reform and delineate measures to accomplish it. Carranza, the former hacendado, clung to an essentially moderate approach. Zapata and Villa rejected Carranza's position and resented his imposition of a virtual military dictatorship. By the early fall, it was evident that no compromise could avert renewed fighting. 35

Wilson, closely following events in Mexico during the summer of 1914, hoped that with Huerta out of the way, the revolutionaries might somehow iron out their differences amicably. Carranza's announced intention to establish a "revolutionary military rule" disturbed Wilson because it controverted assurances made to him by Carranza's representatives that his primary objective was to reestablish constitutional rule. Nevertheless, Wilson intimated that this did not necessarily preclude the possibility of recognition if Carranza acted moderately. 36 The United States supported the Convention of Aguascalientes in which the followers of
Zapata, Villa and Carranza attempted to reach some form of agreement. The attempt failed and threw the forces of the Constitutionalists (Carrancistas) and the Conventionists (Villistas and Zapatistas) once again into the field—this time on opposite sides. Officially, the United States adopted a position of neutrality.37

Legitimate grounds existed for the United States to extend de facto recognition to the Conventionist government in Mexico City.38 In addition to occupying the capital, they controlled most of the countryside. Ostensibly, they were more representative of the revolution, having been elected by a majority of delegates assembled at Aguascalientes; the Conventionist President, Eulalio Gutierrez, was a former Carrancista.

Then too, there were more pragmatic advantages for the Wilson Administration to assist the Conventionist government. In the United States, Villa, the most powerful Conventionist leader, engendered a great deal of popular support. Portrayed in the press as a kind of latter-day Robin Hood, his romantic image combined with his amiable attitude toward America and Americans making him a popular if not heroic figure. Carranza, on the other hand, had not been well-received. The American Catholic Church vehemently despised him because of his anti-clerical stand. More importantly, Villa had shown himself much more receptive to suggestions from the White House than the obstinate
Wilson must have been tempted to support someone over whom he could exert substantial influence.

Yet Wilson insisted on an official neutrality, a posture which could benefit only Carranza. While the major source of Villa's income (Chihuahua's beef) was forbidden entry into the United States for "sanitary reasons," Wilson turned over the revenue generating port of Veracruz to Carranza. At the same time, the United States government made no attempt to cut off the shipment of arms to the Constitutionalists albeit publicly urging compromise and decrying the destruction of life and property. Whether or not the United States intentionally bent its neutrality, its position decisively enhanced Carranza's ability to wage war while simultaneously diminishing that of his enemies.

For over six months, Mexico convulsed in unrelenting warfare. Wilson devoted his major efforts toward safeguarding the lives and property of Americans and other nationals caught in the midst of the fighting (he feared inflammatory acts might ignite public opinion in the United States to a degree he could not control). Thus, he expended enormous diplomatic energy securing assurances from both sides that they would respect foreign lives and property. Considering the extent of carnage and lack of central authority, Wilson's endeavors in this regard were remarkably successful. Until the chaos subsided somewhat, the United States could do little else.
Throughout the winter and early spring of 1915, the Constitutionalist armies slowly advanced northward, but neither Villa nor Carranza's key general, Obregón, could sustain a concerted military effort. Reports of anarchy and chaos continued to inundate the State Department.

In an obvious bid for recognition, Carranza issued a proclamation designed, in part, to reassure the President of his commitment to constitutional government. Once law and order were reestablished, the First Chief promised he would establish a democratic government, protect religious freedom and institute agrarian reform. In addition, he agreed to settle the question of foreign debt and scrupulously observe the property rights of foreign nationals.¹⁴¹

Carranza's proclamation pleased Wilson. "This is a very sensible document," he wrote Bryan, "though West's report . . . does not seem to afford much prospect of real control by Carranza."⁴² Duval West had been sent to Mexico by Wilson to assess the military and political situation there. From Wilson's point of view, the news was not good. West seriously misjudged the military posture of the Constitutionalist armies and reported that the possibility of decisive victory by either side was remote.⁴³ The President obviously had hoped that Carranza's prospects would be brighter. "It is disappointing of course," he remarked, "but what we wanted was the truth."⁴⁴ Wilson, deluded by West's report and believing Carranza's movement on the verge
of collapse, still refrained from seriously negotiating with the apparent victors. On April 19, through his Secretary of State, the President refused to receive a formal Conventionist delegation.

In addition to assuaging the American President, Carranza attempted to prod Wilson into recognition by exploiting racial tensions along the border. The full extent of the First Chief's involvement with the Plan of San Diego is still not entirely clear; undoubtedly, however, it was substantial. While his representatives disavowed any association with the escalation of border raids, Carranza secretly encouraged them. This chimerical endeavor to pressure Washington ultimately failed, but in the early summer of 1915, border strife reinforced the administration's perception that instability in Mexico continued unabated.45

The Constitutionalist forces failed to achieve any major victories between the time West filed his report and the President decided that some new initiative was needed.46 On June 2, Wilson issued a stern statement to the press in which he warned the factional leaders that they must somehow "accommodate their differences and unite" or the United States would be compelled to take some decisive action. Furthermore, Wilson threatened to end official neutrality and "support some man or group of men" if the revolutionaries could not solve their problems.47 Wilson must have realized
by now that the obstinate First Chief was unlikely to respond positively to this form of intimidation. Perhaps the President hoped to pressure Carranza's adversaries into a negotiated submission. This view seems tenable in light of Wilson's instructions to his Secretary of State on the same day. Wilson advised Bryan not to rule out the possibility of recognizing Carranza "if he should develop the necessary influence to bring order out of chaos." 48

The first week of June yielded indications of the emerging military ascendancy of the Constitutionalists. 49 Following his defeat at León de las Aldemases, Villa accepted Wilson's call for a negotiated settlement. The Conventionist leader, claiming he controlled the largest share of Mexico agreed to meet with Carranza and the other chiefs in order to avoid American intervention. Carranza, tasting victory, refused to reply (directly) to the Wilson initiative. Instead, he issued a manifesto calling on foreign powers to recognize his regime. 50 The First Chief once again was rejecting Wilson's assistance, or as Carranza perceived it—interference.

Partly because of West's report, and partly because of his experience with the ever changing situation in Mexico, the President continued to be cautious. While Villa exaggerated the extent of Conventionist control, vast areas of Mexico remained outside the hegemony of the Constitutionalists. Nonetheless, The New York Times correctly reported
the administration's apparent willingness to recognize Carranza if the Constitutionalists occupied the capital and demonstrated some ability to contain Villa.\textsuperscript{51}

On June 17, the President asked his new Secretary of State, Robert Lansing to convey to Carranza the possibility "that we might recognize him" if the First Chief would make some gesture of conciliation toward the other factions.\textsuperscript{52} Carranza refused the President's offer. Wilson, extremely disappointed at Carranza's continued intransigence, worried that there was little prospect of anything but continued fighting.\textsuperscript{53}

With this thought in mind, Wilson approved a proposal by the Secretary of State to join with the A. B. C. powers and attempted to "bring order out of chaos."\textsuperscript{54} Lansing suggested the United States present a plan to invite representatives of the various factions in Mexico to the conference table for the purpose of establishing a coalition government. Lansing maintained that the retirement of Carranza, Villa and Zapata was necessary if peace was to be achieved.\textsuperscript{55} Wilson approved the general thrust of the plan, but rejected as unrealistic the idea that each of the major leaders retire.\textsuperscript{56} The President intended to keep the door open for Carranza.

When the conference began, Lansing evidently failed to understand the President's predisposition toward Carranza.\textsuperscript{57} In the first meeting, Lansing argued the
senselessness of attempting to deal with Carranza as "he had no intention of surrendering his will to constitutional government." When he learned of Lansing's statement, the President admonished Lansing stating "Carranza will somehow have to be digested into the scheme and above all the object of the revolution will have to be in any event conserved." In another note, the President endorsed Carranza's decision to establish a temporary dictatorship. He wrote Lansing:

"It seems to me necessary that a provisional government essentially revolutionary in character should take action to institute reforms by decree before the full forms of the constitution are resumed. This was the original program of the revolution and seems to me probably an essential part of it."

The United States extended de facto recognition to the Constitutionalists in October. Thereafter, Wilson confronted a Mexican Chief of State unwilling to be directed by Washington. "It's a great pity," the President observed about Carranza, "that nothing can be done either with him or through him." Nonetheless, the President must have taken some comfort in the fact that the leader of the revolution adhered to a liberal, bourgeois social and political philosophy.

By his own standards, Wilson's policy was a success. He achieved his immediate goals. Huerta was gone and Carranza in power. Villa and Zapata now posed no real threat and a new constitution was being drafted.
Yet the legacy of Wilson's handling of the Mexican situation is not positive. It reinforced in Mexico and throughout Latin America the image of American imperialism and interference. Wilson's vacillation, confusion and ignorance prolonged Huerta's regime and led to increased losses of life and property. Finally, Wilson's singleminded support of Carranza and his brand of Constitutionalism may well have thwarted the revolution's true destiny and potential.
Footnotes


4. Ibid.


8. Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 146.

9. Ibid., p. 147.

10. Ibid.


12. U.S. National Archives, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929, State Department to American Embassy, November 1, 1913. 812.00/114439. Hereafter cited by author, recipient, date, decimal number, RG59, N.A.

13. Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 150.

14. Pancho Villa was a possible exception albeit decidedly anti-British.


17 William Hale to Secretary of State, November 17, 1913, 812.00/9789, R.G.59, N.A.


19 Ibid.

20 John Lind to Secretary of State, January 26, 1914, Wilson Papers. See also John Lind to Secretary of State, December 18, 19, 1913, 81200/10098 and 10269 respectively, R.G.59, N.A.

21 John Lind to Secretary of State, March 22, 1914, 812.00/1123; and April 1, 1914, 812.00/11313, R.G.95, N.A.


23 Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 160. See also Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor (Louisville, 1962), passim.

24 State Department to George C. Carothers, April 21, 1914, 812.00/11596.

25 Woodrow Wilson to Special Commissioners, n.d., Wilson Papers.

26 W. J. Bryan to Special Commissioners, May 27, 1914, Wilson Papers.

27 Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 161.

28 Ibid.


30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., p. 139.


Hill, Emissaries, pp. 206-207.


Silliman to Secretary of State, July 10, 1914, 812.00/12469. Wilson responded that "excesses of any kind" might destroy any possibility of recognition. Transmitted to W. J. Bryan to John R. Silliman, 812.00/21536.

Hill, Emissaries, p. 261, suggests that Wilson was personally reluctant to become further involved in "factional squabbles."

The documents fail to reveal Wilson’s attitude toward the Conventionist government clearly.


Manuel A. Machado, Jr., "The Mexican Revolution and the Destruction of the Mexican Cattle Industry," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LXXIX, No. 1, (July, 1975). Machado leaves little doubt that Wilson used beef as a means to regulate revolution. Technically, the U.S. merely abandoned Veracruz, not officially turning it over to the Constitutionalists. However, the United States had been negotiating with Carranza for weeks concerning U.S. evacuation. Thus, the U.S. merely tried to maintain the appearance of neutrality while in reality aiding Carranza. Robert E. Quirk in An Affair of Honor, (Louisville, 1962), details these negotiations and the importance of the port to Carranza.
Haley, Diplomacy, p. 158.


West to Bryan, April 26, 1915, 812.00/20721.

Woodrow Wilson to Bryan, April 26, 1915, ibid.


The Battles of Celaya and occupation of Guadalajara took place before West's report reached Washington.


Wilson to Bryan, June 2, 1915, 812.00/15133½, R.G.59, N.A.


Lansing instructed Silliman to present the President's position to Carranza. Robert Lansing to John R. Silliman, June 18, 1915, 812.00/15261a. For Wilson's instructions to Lansing, see Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, June, 1915, 812.00/15285, R.G.59, N.A.

Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, July 2, 1915, 812.00/15409½, R.G.59, N.A.

Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, June 22, 1915, 812.00/15338½, R.G.59, N.A.

Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, July 5, 1915, 812.00/15412½, R.G.59, N.A.

Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, July 8, 1915, 812.00/15412½, R.G.59, N.A.

This is not surprising, Wilson often bypassed the State Department. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, p. 23.
58 Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, August 10, 1915, 812.00/15864A, R.G. 59, N.A.

59 Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, August 11, 1915, 812.00/15753½, R.G. 59, N.A.

60 Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, August 8, 1915, 812.00/15752½, R.G. 59, N.A.

61 Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, August 31, 1915, 812.00/16017½, R.G. 59, N.A.
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