Stability of the Mexican one-party system

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STABILITY OF THE
MEXICAN ONE-PARTY SYSTEM

By

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CHAPTER I

POLITICAL PARTIES IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

Political parties play a prominent part in the functioning of democratic societies, for they act as one of the chief sources for the aggregation of the people's interests, organize elections, run candidates, provide for a peaceful transfer of political power and help to organize the formal government. Consequently, the importance of studying political parties is noted by many authorities. Avery Leiserson, for example, a generally recognized authority on political parties, states that parties provide a major link between the people and government, between separate formal agencies and government officials, and between official and non-official holders of power. He shows that parties cut across the study of the conventional processes of government: the administrative, electoral, legislative, executive, and, at times, the judicial.\(^1\) He concludes

that in order to acquire an understanding of democracy and its problems, one must first study political parties both in theory and action, for they are the criteria of democracy's popular sovereignty, majority rule, group consultation and minority rights.¹

Other authorities have also stressed the importance of political parties in the political life of societies. Sigmund Neumann, for example, states that:

It is through the nexus of political parties that the manifold character and dynamic life of the different continents can be constantly revealed.²

Political parties, he argues, must be seen in the settings of their own governmental systems, historical circumstances, national characteristics and institutional traditions.³ Consequently, parties in their organization, function and outlook vary from country to country. In addition, the party system evolves in different forms in various countries. Since political parties enjoy key positions in political systems, their evolution has attracted the attention of a number of political scientists.

In addition to Sigmund Neumann's book, Modern Political Parties, the study of parties has been accelerated

¹Ibid.


³Ibid., p. 4.
with the appearance of *Political Parties* by Maurice Duverger. Although these works are limited in the scope of their study and are viewed with dissidence by critical political scientists and the authors themselves, they nonetheless represent remarkable progress on this particular subject.  

Some general comments about the nature of various party systems are necessary before attention is directed to the Mexican scene. These brief comments concern the nature of two party systems, multi-party systems, and democratic one-party systems.

**The Nature of Two Party Systems**

Maurice Duverger, in discussing the origin of two party systems, suggests that political dualism is found in different sociological conceptions. He mentions that the revolutionary temperament can be contrasted with the conservative temperament. Even countries which appear to have many divisions often reveal basic dual tendencies. For example, he notes that Francoise Goguel had been able to demonstrate the dual conflict between order and movement was the underlying factor of the Third French Republic. The two-party system seems to be

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correspond to the nature of things, for there is generally a choice between alternatives. Most of the major conflicts of history were of a dual nature.

Throughout history all the great factional conflicts have been dualist: Armagnacs and Burgundians, Guelphs and Ghibellines, Catholics and Protestants, Girondins and Jacobins, Conservatives and Liberals, Bourgeois and Socialists, 'Western' and Communist.

Duverger argues that "the natural movement of societies tends towards the two-party system." But if dualism is natural, why has it not flourished except in Anglo-Saxon countries and their imitators? Duverger answers this question by suggesting that historical explanations can account for it, and if one wishes to determine the real origins of dual systems, he should investigate the circumstance in each country which determine the party system for the influences of national factors are considerable. However, one should not disregard major technical factors, such as the electoral systems. His conclusion is that the simple-majority, single-ballot system tends to favor the two party system.

An almost complete correlation is observable between the simple-majority single-ballot system and the two-party system: dualist countries use the simple-majority vote and simple-majority vote countries are dualist.

1 Ibid., p. 216.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 217.
E.E. Schattschneider concurs that the electoral system is a factor which directly influences the two-party system and states that since political parties center around elections, it would be strange indeed if the parties were not influenced by the nature of these elections.¹

V.O. Key also regards the institutional factor of elections as being one of the factors shaping the duality of American politics. He notes that the single-member district and plurality elections can encourage dual division. Key also stipulates, as does Neumann, that the winner-take-all election of the president exerts a centripetal influence upon the organization of the party and encourages dualism.² Key stresses, however, that no one specific factor can be attributed to the causation of party dualism.

The safest explanation is that several factors conspired toward the development of the American dual party pattern. These included the accidents of history that produced dual divisions on great issues at critical points in our history, the consequences of our institutional forms, the clustering of popular opinions around a point of central consensus rather than their bipolarization, and perhaps others.³

Neumann also stresses that historical developments can be conducive of two-party development. These precedents he lists as follows: social homogeneity, political continuity, an early sanction of responsible political parties striving for political control, and political parties oriented toward one elective office, such as the presidency of the United States, or the premiership of Britain.¹

The Nature and Evolution of the Multi-Party System

Duverger, as stated before, subscribes to the theory that the two-party system is natural. When this system is subject to modification by a party split or overlapping interests, he suggests a multi-party system can develop. Internal divisions result in a split when factions become exasperated and can no longer find a common base; this type of split often causes center parties to rise. Overlapping of interests, on the other hand, is caused by a number of different dualisms of opinion which, when combined, result in multi-partite division. The mutual independence of sets of antitheses is a factor which causes the multi-partism to rise. Duverger shows, for example, that a series of antitheses in politics, sociology, economics, race and religion can give rise to a multi-partite split.²

¹Neumann, op. cit., p. 402.
²Duverger, op. cit., pp. 229-233.
Gwendolen H. Carter and John H. Herz believe that what determines the development of a two-party or multi-party system is the degree of unity within a community. They also state that "multiparty systems obviously reflect divisions within the community, divisions in social structure, economic interest, racial composition or ideological preference."¹

Sigmund Neumann accounts for the rise of the multi-party systems by a historical interpretation.

Wherever fundamental cleavages in social structure evolve and continue to exist because of differences in nationalities, regions, religion, or class which are often fostered by outside influences like irredentist movements and revolutionary internationals; wherever political revolutions coincide with great social transformations, as in France, central and eastern Europe, and the Near and Far East; wherever a controlling elite, through the divide-and-rule device, prevents parties from fulfilling their genuinely political functions of presenting clear-cut policy alternatives, as in Bismarck's strategies, for example; wherever the political machinery of a state diffuses the electorate's division by numerous choices—wherever any or all of these complicating factors enter the national political scene, a multiparty system finds its raison d'être.²

Neumann maintains that often multiparty systems tend to be centrifugal.³ He attributes this to their inability to gain majorities in elections which in turn causes

²Neumann, op. cit., p. 402.
³Ibid.
multi-party systems to concentrate on the peripheral forces of special interest groups.¹

J.A. Corry and Henry J. Abraham support Neumann's theory and point out that in the French multi-party system many of the French political parties resemble interest groups.

The French multi-party organization provided direct representation in the legislature to the various interests through the elective process. Very often, the leaders of the French interest groups were themselves elected to public office as leaders of the political parties and thus directly represented a particular interest for which these parties might stand—or, indeed, of which they were often frankly composed, e.g. the aforementioned Poujadist party, whose sole aim was to perpetuate non-payment of taxes, or at least to make the tax-collector's life miserable.²

The Nature and Evolution of the Single Party Systems

The third and final form of party system to be discussed is the single party system. Although the idea of a single party system has often been equated with the idea of a totalitarian or dictatorial party, the proliferation of single-parties in democratic states leads many observers such as Duverger, Gabriel Almond, James Coleman, Gwendolen Carter and John Herz to the conclusion that non-authoritarian, one-party democracies can exist.

¹Ibid.

Examples of one-party democracies can be seen in the Congress Party of India, the Republican People's Party in Turkey, and the Party of Revolutionary Institutions in Mexico. Also democratic single-party systems exist in some African states.

Ruth Schachter, in her discussion of mass parties in West Africa, notes that these single-party systems created by African leaders spring from the egalitarian and liberating forces which we associate with democracy. She suggests that some of these mass parties encourage factors which can make possible the working of the machinery of democratic systems.¹

Robert Michel holds that there is a constant oligarchical tendency in social organizations. He remarks that this theory is applicable to political parties, for he believes that parties in their organization and operation are controlled by an elite group which rules without much limitation.² If this is true in political parties as he claims, there would be little room for democracy within a one party system, for a single party, controlled by an elite group, would not offer the opportunity for democracy within its ranks. If democracy were to exist, there would have to be competition between parties.


E.E. Schattschneider holds that all democratic systems are competitive and that democracy does not exist unless there are two or more parties which can nominate candidates and present alternative programs. The argument is countered, however, by Duverger, that this needed choice of alternatives is often found within the ranks of the single party, and that although pluralism may be prohibited or limited outside the single-party, pluralism can, with the formation of factions, be reborn within the party.

Gwendolen Carter and John Herz concur as to the possibility of intra-party democratic opposition:

The possibilities of criticism within the one-party democracy provide in themselves a type of opposition which should not be underestimated. The mass parties in the newly developing countries are far from monolithic. It is far more difficult to identify and classify the kind of opposition which operates, for example, within Felix Houphouet-Boigny's RDA (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain), which holds all the seats in the Ivory Coast, than it would be if the opposition were organized as a separate party--but its existence has been abundantly evidenced by changing policies. In other words, something very close to the interplay of government and opposition in mature democracies may take place within the one party of the new states, but only, of course, if opportunities for criticism are not stifled.

Duverger, op. cit., pp. 278-279.
Carter and Herz, op. cit., p. 118.
Again they note, "To have only one party . . . is not a dogma but an expedient. The objective is to mobilize the people voluntarily to work for the vastly important objective of national development." Rupert Emerson suggests, "The single party is an instrument to achieve the national solidarity which is otherwise conspicuous by its absence, and often it is the principal instrument available for that purpose."

Although practice does not always confirm the argument, in principle it can be argued that the single-party can enlist the qualified leaders and populace of a country for a unified attack upon national problems, and thus they can avoid the dispersion of effort and the factionalism that often results when powerful opposition parties are in existence. Although minor opposition parties are legally allowed, their existence does not challenge the monopoly of the dominant one-party systems.

Often the single party becomes identified with the government. All government organs, executive, administrative, legislative and judicial, link their objectives with those of the party. It is noted that party members permeate the

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1 Ibid., p. 117.


3 Ibid., p. 24.
machinery of government.

The representatives of the party, therefore, have seats everywhere, from the Councils of Ministers to the smallest local or special committees; from the Civil Service to the Trade Unions, Co-operatives, Cultural Associations, etc; unless the party assumes directly certain functions, for itself or for its ancillary organizations.1

Although single-party systems are generally centralized, they keep in contact with the mass through pyramidal, hierarchical structures. Within this structure, contact "is established not only upwards, in the direction 'people-leaders', but also downwards, in the direction 'leaders-people'."2

It has been noted that in emerging countries, single parties, symbolizing a nationalist movement and a struggle for independence, evolve and remain the dominant party. Gabriel A. Almond has classified such movements as dominant non-authoritarian parties and notes:

Most of the significant interest groups, associational and non-associational, have joined in the nationalist movement around a common program of national independence. In the period following emancipation the nationalist party continues as the greatly dominant party, opposed in elections by relatively small left-wing or traditionalist and particularist movements. This type of party system is a formally free one, but the possibility of a coherent loyal opposition is lacking.3

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1 Duverger, op. cit., p. 258.
2 Ibid.
These parties, evolving in a society which is changing, are subject to the influences of modernization such as urbanization and industrialization. V.O. Key regards certain aspects of modernization as factors which will eventually lead to its termination. He remarks that the consequences of the change from a rural to an urban society and the development of industry and trade in a heretofore agrarian type of society pose a threat to the continuance of the one-party political systems within the South. Key particularly notes the potential force of urbanization and labor and states, "As obstructions to urban political activity are overcome, a significant expansion of labor influence may be expected."¹

Robert J. Alexander notes, as does Key, the process of modernization. Alexander, in dealing with Latin American parties also sees them as a reflection of the basic economic changes but does not predict their downfall. Alexander remarks that the changes in industrialization, urbanization, and population are creating a new society which is besieged by new interest groups, organized urban workers, new industrialists, and even peasantry.² These elements are all


trying to seek their objectives through political activity. The political parties, mirroring these changes, are becoming instruments to assist these new interests in their struggle.¹

This process of modernization is taking place in Mexico as it has in other Latin American countries. Here the Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI), the dominant non-authoritarian party of Mexico, has controlled Mexican politics since its origin in 1929. Will this party, affected by modernization, evolve, as Key predicts for the one-party system of the South, into another type of party system or, on the other hand, will it follow Alexander's view and continue to persist as the dominant party? These questions will be explored throughout the thesis, but before an examination of the stability and instability of the PRI is presented, one must first become familiar with its evolution in Mexican society.

¹Ibid.
CHAPTER II

THE EVOLUTION OF THE MEXICAN ONE-PARTY SYSTEM

On September 1, 1928, in his State of Union Address, Plutarco Calles told the Mexican people that they should pass "from the historical condition of a 'country of a man' to the 'nation of institutions and laws.'"¹ And in March of 1929, the instrument which was to change Mexico into a nation of institutions and laws, the National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario, or PNR) assembled in convention.² Prior to the formation of the PNR, Mexico had undergone rule by dictatorship followed by a period of experimentation with multiple political parties.

After independence was achieved in 1822, Mexico experienced a period in which political parties were virtually non-existent, for rule by dictators was the accepted order. However, two elements, which could not

be termed political parties in the current sense of the word, existed. These movements were the Centralist, a conservative organization representing professionals, military and large landowners, and the Federalist, a liberal group representing the merchants, and the anticlerical and middle-class elements.¹ In 1908, President Porfirio Díaz opened the gate to the formation of parties, and factions within the conservative and liberal camps split into six parties: the Scientists, the Anti-Re-electionist Party, the Democratic Party, the Democratic Nationalist Party, the Pure Liberal Party, and the Re-electionist Party.²

These parties supported candidates for the presidential election of 1909. But when it was seen that a peaceful transfer of power could not be realized, a revolutionary movement begun by the intellectuals and supported by the middle class rose against the Díaz regime. This Revolution of 1910, the Mexicans feel, is a continuing revolution and will not be completed until its goals have been achieved. The chaos of the years immediately following the revolution left Mexico with little organized political activity.

²Brandenburg, op. cit., pp. 2-9.
Military factions which surrounded the revolutionary caudillos (bosses) were the main source of political action and effectiveness.¹

From 1917 to 1929, an experimental period of multiple political parties occurred. The Constitutional Liberal Party, the National Cooperative Party, the Mexican Labor Party, the National Agrarian Party, the Revolutionary Confederation, the Mexican Communist Party and many state political parties existed in this period.

Although the National Cooperative Party, the Mexican Labor Party, and the National Agrarian Party, emerged at times as influential parties, the period between 1917 and 1929 was one of instability in which parties vacillated in response to personal leaders and ambitions. During this time, Alvaro Obregon and Plutarco Calles were in control. Obregon held the presidency from 1920 to 1924 and was succeeded in 1924 by Calles. In 1927, the Mexican Constitution was amended to allow a former president to be re-elected but stipulated that a president could not succeed himself.²


Consequently, Obregón again ran successfully for the presidency, but was assassinated before taking office. During the reign of these caudillos, the political system was besieged with problems from within and from without. Within the revolutionary family, bitterly expressed opinions arose as to what direction the Revolution should take. Because of the vagueness and all-inclusiveness of the ideology of the Revolution, there was no definite consensus as to what objectives to seek. Outside the party, the anti-revolutionary factions, the Church, the Porfirian industrialists, the large landholders, the political machines of the South and the West, and the foreign interest posed a threat. Upon the assassination of president-elect Obregón in 1928, the political leaders at the national and state levels struggled for power and soon erstwhile revolutionaries were going against the government as were counter-revolutionary forces. To meet the crisis, President Calles called for the initiation of an all embracing revolutionary party.

(Calles) bound the regional and state political machines into a separate, formal, political organization. In turn its heads controlled the constitutionally prescribed organs of government--Executive, Judiciary, Legislature.

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1 Ibid.
2 Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 53.
3 Cline, op. cit., p. 198.
The state political machines relinquished their local name and formed under the political machine of the revolutionary party, the PNR. The states agreed to support a national slate of candidates which would be selected by the PNR's executive committee, Comite Ejecutivo Nacional (CEN). In return, they were given a share in national policy making and patronage. The national bureaucracy, the president's cabinet, and the legislature consisted solely of party members. The judicial branch, appointed by the legislature, was also a cog of the party.\(^1\)

This formation period of the party, which lasted until 1935, was called Personalismo. During this time Calles strove to maintain his own personal power by limiting the authority of the president of Mexico and by controlling the nation through the president of the PNR's Central Executive Committee. From 1930 until 1935, a hegemony of the CEN existed over the executive, and legislative branches of government and Calles dictated the manner in which the government should be operated through the CEN. The CEN carried out his orders to the extreme that it often overruled the presidents of Mexico.\(^2\)

Calles tried to stabilize the CEN's power by an attempt to initiate a six year plan for Mexican governmental

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 199.
\(^2\)Brandenburg, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 63-66.
progress. The CEN was to act as a reviewing board for this plan of government. The plan, placing as it would party and governmental power upon the president of the PNR, reduced Mexico's president to a figurehead.¹

The Six Year Plan of Calles was thwarted by the election of Lázaro Cárdenas to the Mexican presidency in 1934. Cárdenas, being a liberal and opposed to the conservative Calle's program, sought to initiate his own plan. Cárdenas received assurances from labor and agrarian leaders of their support, took care that all influential military personnel were on his side, and broke with Calles.² Thus, on June 1, 1935 the first phase of the PNR's history came to an end.

The second phase of the party, the period of Collectivism, began in 1935 and lasted until 1943. Cárdenas sought to integrate the labor forces into the PNR and to unify the agrarian forces. In 1935, Cárdenas adopted an "open-door policy" to be followed with regard to the agrarian organizations and labor. Membership in an established union or in an ejido, center of the communal land systems, presupposed the individual qualifications for party membership.³

In 1937 the Party of the Mexican Revolution took on a new organization, corporate structure and a new name, the

¹Ibid., p. 69.
²Ibid., p. 76.
³Ibid., p. 81.
Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (PRM). The PRM's structure was divided into four sectors, agriculture, labor, popular, and military. The basis of these was the local organization such as the labor union. These local organizations were grouped into statewide federations and the state federation represented the sectors in a nationwide sector organization.¹

Cárdenas, by uniting the most active interest groupings under the auspices of the party where they could be controlled by national-level sector organizations, centralized political control in the capital. A pyramidal structure was established with control emanating from the top rather than from the grass roots. This corporative nature obliterated the local political machines of the caudillos.²

It was during this period that the PRM became the 'official party,' for it became identified with the state. The president of the party's National Executive Committee met with the president's cabinet as a matter of course, and quite frequently the party actually initiated official actions. Starting with Cárdenas' administration, for example, Six-Year Plans for economic and social development were prepared by the PRM, 'with the government collaborating,' as one of the plans describes the process.

Cárdenas ended the duarchy of the party and government being run separately, and from this time they have become

¹ Scott, op. cit., pp. 131-132.
² Ibid., pp. 134-135.
³ Ibid., p. 136.
almost synonymous. There has been a broader inclusion of the people in the party's ranks, and the actual government has been representing more and more people.¹

"Institutionalism," phase three of the party's development, began in March of 1943 when the National Federation of Popular Organizations (CNOP) united with the CNC and the labor unions to select party candidates for federal, state, and municipal offices.²

President Avila Camacho, Cardenas' successor, demilitarized the party by abandoning the military sector and made changes in the party's operation by adding more representation from the lower middle classes. Membership within the party was put on a direct and individual basis; thus, the individual could enroll and escape the power of the bosses.³

Public dissatisfaction, owing to the fact that the PRM's functional organizations could not successfully incorporate the ever-increasing Mexican interests outside the member associations, led to a change in the name and structure of the party. In 1946 the PRM became the PRI, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, as it is still known. The corporate structure and political power of the sectors were temporarily terminated. Across the board primaries ended

¹Cline, op. cit., p. 324.
³Cline, op. cit., p. 325.
the sector designation of candidates and presidential nominations were no longer to be sector controlled but based on the selection of ten delegates in each election district.\(^1\) However, an internal party conflict arose, for the PRI sectors did not wish to relinquish their previous status, and it seemed that there was not enough loyalty to general principles to enable the party to function in a "give-and-take atmosphere of primary elections."\(^2\) Consequently, at a meeting in Cuernavaca in 1950, the reversion to the sector organization was undertaken. But the conditions which had originally required a change from the sector organizational structure could not be disregarded. Thus, the party made an attempt to integrate and satisfy these expanding interests by broadening and expanding the alternative means of access to the decision making process.\(^3\) More interest associations were brought into the PRI, especially through the Popular Sector, and attempts were made to implement governmental recognition of those interests which remained outside the official party structure.

Equally important, the consultative process whereby important factors in Mexico's society and economy which are not part of the sector organizations can participate in political decisions affecting their status has been institutionalized to a very great extent.\(^4\)

\(^{1}\)Scott, op. cit., pp. 140-141.

\(^{2}\)Ibid., p. 142.

\(^{3}\)Ibid., pp. 142-143.

\(^{4}\)Ibid.
The preceding pages have traced the evolution of Mexico's single party system from its period of personal control, through its stage of collectivism and finally to its current stage of an institutionalized party. How will this party evolve in the future? Will its dominance persist or will the one-party system be successfully challenged? What factors contribute to the stability and instability of this one-party dominance? These are the questions which will be explored in the ensuing chapters.
The PRI functions through a highly centralized hierarchical structure which extends from the national level, through the state level, to the local municipal level. Through its organization of committees and its three sectors, the farm, labor, and popular, the PRI presents an institutionalized party system which is able to reach out and envelop all strata of Mexican society. It is through this complex party machine that the PRI seeks to balance the interests of Mexico's pluralistic society.

At the national level, the party is organized through the National Assembly, the Gran Comisión and the Central Executive Committee (CEC).

The National Assembly, nominally the supreme organ of the party, meets every three years. This assembly examines the activities of the other party national organs, reviews national politics in the light of the
party's program and elects the Central Executive Committee. The National Assembly's membership of about 1,000 is evenly divided among the three sectors. The meetings of the National Assembly are controlled by sector and party leadership.¹

The Gran Comisión is the agency in which the supreme power of the PRI is vested between the sessions of the Assembly. The Gran Comisión's membership of thirty is equally divided among the sectors. It meets at the call of the Central Executive Committee, checks the annual report of the CEC, and reviews any sanctions which the Central Executive Committee may have imposed against party members.²

Despite the statutory prominence of the National Assembly, the most important organ of the PRI is the Central Executive Committee, for it is this committee which represents the PRI throughout the entire country.

Of the three, the Central Committee and its president are by far the most influential, partly because the party's statutes give them a high degree of strategic control over other party organs, partly because the Committee's membership represents functional interest associations which are the principal sources of political power, and partly because it is through this agency that the President of the Republic wields his concentrated authority.³

¹Ibid., p. 155.
²Ibid., p. 156.
³Ibid., p. 155.
The Central Committee's membership is comprised of representatives from the three sectors. There are seven members on the Central Committee: the President, the Secretary-General, the Secretary of Agrarian Activities, the Secretary of Labor Activities, and two secretaries, one from the Senate and the other from the Chamber of Deputies for political Activities. The Central Committee is able to reach and influence many factions to a great extent, for it controls the other functional organs of the party: it can reach out to the sectors; it directs the state and local committees; it advises the National Assembly on decisions; and it controls the nomination of officers.¹ The president of Mexico and the CEC approve internal nominating procedures for the PRI's candidates.² Who is to run for what office is decided within the ranks of the PRI, and is announced to the populace. Nominating conventions of the PRI are nothing more than rubber stamp approvals of the PRI selected candidates. The CEC is not completely a one-way organ, for it listens to the interest of the people expressed by representatives of the sectors, and they influence its decision making and selection of nominees. The CEC has

¹Ibid., pp. 156-157.
²Ibid., p. 161.
tried to aggregate and articulate the interest of the sectors and other factions, and has sought to further understanding among the president and his cabinet, national committees of labor, professional, commercial, industrial and small property groups.¹

The CEC's offices in Mexico City and at regional levels are crowded daily with political groups, functional groups, and ad hoc groups which exchange information, ideas and argue about how to seek their objectives.²

Often the CEC acts as an intermediary between the government and the people. An example of this is shown in the Arroyo de Lanzarote dam case. When small property owners, being deprived of what they considered their just share of the waters of the Arroyo de Lanzarote and suffering severe crop damages as the consequence, failed to receive a response to their request that the government make a decision as to the allocation of the waters, the CEC's Secretary of Agrarian Activities took the problem to the federal agency of Water Resources and gained an administrative ruling that provided for an equitable distribution of the water.³

²Ibid.
³Ibid.
The control of party activities from the national to the municipal level is controlled by the CEC. As Scott maintains, "In short, it is the apex of the hierarchical pyramid organization that controls the entire party."\(^1\)

In addition to judging the intra-party electoral procedures, the CEC also seeks to solve intra-party conflicts. Each of the CEC secretaries of labor, farm, and popular, being members of the sectors which correspond with their party office, are continually pressing the needs of their corresponding sectors and seeking to solve their problems. The two political secretaries find that it is their duty to discuss given projects of the executive branch with congressional members, officers of the party, governors, and leaders of the sectors.

The secretaries of political action have functioned through personal conversations to keep the views of the organized power groupings, groups of the executive branch, and congressional leaders from becoming so divergent as to create misunderstanding and ill will on any issue of political importance—whether it might be a legislative proposal or the result of some contested intra-party or constitutional elections.\(^2\)

Although Congress always seems united on all legislative measures, it is the job of the party political secretaries

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\(^1\) Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

to "secure a unanimity in fact which will constitute a real basis for the formal unanimity characterizing legislative approval of the measure."\(^1\) It is their duty to convince the various interests of the worthiness of the measure, and, if failing in this, to try to seek a compromise between the executive goals and those of the affected groups.\(^2\)

Below the national level are the Regional Committees. These committees function in the twenty-nine states of Mexico, its two territories, and the Federal District. Each Regional Committee has six members. Its structure is the same as the CEC, with the exception that it has one secretary for Political Activities, not two.\(^3\)

These Regional Committees have helped to link the government and the people together. They have provided alternate channels of communication when personality conflicts or minority interests have frustrated attempts to deal with the government through the regular interest groups and committees. The interpretation of popular selection with regard to the choice of candidates for municipal offices is another important function of the Regional Committees.\(^4\) The Regional

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 141.
\(^2\)Ibid.
\(^3\)Ibid., p. 159.
\(^4\)Padgett, op. cit., p. 1002.
Committees solve differences among the sectors, and between individuals in the party; they create local centers for political study; and, with the approval of the CEC, they call state-level nominating conventions.¹ The president of these committees has the same power as does the president of the CEC, only his is confined to the state level.

The Municipal Committee or District Committee, confined to the Federal District only, are the committees at the local level of government. There are five municipal committeemen, supposedly representative of the economic and social areas of which they serve, and these five elect a president and a secretary-general from among their own membership. These committees help to carry out the PRI's program at a local level and are responsible for keeping a list of party membership.²

With regard to party membership, the PRI views itself as a "national association of the progressive components of the Mexican population."³ Qualification for its

¹Scott, op. cit., p. 160.
²Ibid., p. 162.
³Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 130.
members are presented in a statutory provision:

Mexican citizens in full exercise of their political rights who apply for and obtain affiliation with the Party, respect its declaration of principles, publicly avow to comply with its statutes, programs, and resolutions, and who, besides observing good conduct, may not be minister of any cult, belong to any religious corporation or association whose principles, programs, or campaign tactics are in opposition to those of the Party, or to any other group organized for political purposes.¹

The PRI seeks to include the major organized interests of the country within its membership (with the exception of large business). These interests are organized into the three party sectors, farm, labor, and popular.²

These sector organizations are the heart of the PRI's power. Sector members fill party positions at the state and national levels and are seated on the CEC. The sectors pay most of the bills, acquire the votes, and turn out people for PRI rallies.³ PRI nominations to elective posts, usually synonymous with election, are given to the sector which is strongest in the district to be represented. The standard of strength is accorded by numbers. Consequently, this factor has caused the sector organizations to conduct their

¹Ibid., p. 131.
own recruiting campaigns, for the more members they acquire
the greater their bargaining power. This, in turn, has caused
an expansion of the proportion of the populace represented in
the decision making process. This representation by sector
strength has caused the Popular Sector to emerge as the dom-
inate sector, for excluding the farm and labor elements of
society, the Popular Sector can claim to represent virtually
the whole of Mexico.¹ However, the farm and labor sectors
possess considerable power and cannot be neglected in a
review of the sectors.

The Farm Sector came into existence in 1938 when the
National Campesino Confederation (CNC), the national farmers
organization, signed a pact of unity which "bestowed upon
a central organismo the power of liaison and national
representation."²

The CNC, the largest interest group in Mexico, is the
major associational group of the Farm Sector. It represents
2,332,914 ejido families and 150,000 sindicatos campesinos,
organized wage-laborers. The CNC remains dominant in the
Farm Sector, but another group, the Sociedad Agronomica,
comprised of professional agronomists and having a membership
of 10,000 was added in 1952.³

¹Needler, op. cit., pp. 309-311.
²Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 177.
³Scott, op. cit., p. 166.
The CNC extends from the national to the state levels. At the national level, the National Elective Committee of 14 members, the National Convention of 160 members, the Mexican Agronomers Society, and the League of Agrarian Communities and Campesino Unions of 32 members, preside over the CNC. At the state or regional level, the Regional Campesino Committees, totalling 512 persons, administer CNC control. And at the local level of the ejido, control is vested in the Ejido Commisariats and the Boards of Vigilance.¹

The close cooperation between the government and the CNC is notable. The party's national Secretary of Agrarian Action, a member of the CEC, receives instruction from the heads of the CNC and informs them of important CEC deliberations.² In the Federal District, and at state and local levels, CNC members serve on the party committees. The CNC structure, parallel to that of the party, permits the CNC close participation in the deliberations and elections of the PRI.³

Within the Labor Sector, the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM) represents 1,500,000 workers.

¹ Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 178.
² Ibid., p. 185.
³ Ibid., p. 186.
The CTM along with the Confederación Regional de Obreros Mexicanos (CROM), the Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT), the railroad workers, the mining and metal workers, the petroleum workers, and other independent unions form the Bloque de Unidad Obrera (BUO) and comprise eighty-five percent of the Labor Sector, with a total membership of 1,873,000. Within the Labor Sector is an opposing faction called the anti-BUO bloc. This bloc is commonly thought to be leftist oriented. It is headed by the Confederación Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos (CROC) which is supported by the Confederación Revolucionaria de Trabajadores (CRT), an electrical workers union, and other independent unions.  

The CTM's strength as the largest union in the Labor Sector can be observed by the fact that since the formation of the party, the PRI's national head of Labor Activities has been a CTM leader.  

The CTM's organization, based upon politico-territorial divisions of Mexico, allows it to participate directly in party activities, and it can be noted that CTM members are present in the internal elections of the official party. At the head of the labor hierarchy, the National Executive Committee of the Confederation, comprised of ten men, presides.  

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1Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-168.  
Subordinate to it are the 32 federaciones estatales, which embrace the states, territories, and the Federal District. Regional federations, (federaciones regionales) and local federations (federaciones municipales) complete the structure.¹

The Popular Sector headed by the National Confederation of Popular Organizations (CNOP) which differs from the other two sector's controlling organs, in that the CNOP is preeminently a political organ.² Since the Popular Sector represents practically all the interests of Mexican society which are not included in the farm and labor sectors, it is the largest sector with 6,621,000 members. And as mentioned previously, because of its numerical strength, it has become the sector with the greatest representation in the Senate and Federal Assembly. The CNOP contains within its ten divisions the Bureaucrats Union (FSTSE) which is favored by the government.³ In addition to this powerful interest group, the Popular Sector is divided into nine other sections: the cooperativists, small farmers, small industrialists, small merchants, professionals--intellectuals, youth groups, feminine groups, artisans, and diversified. The last one is a catch-all category designed to incorporate any new

¹Ibid., pp. 217-219.
²Ibid., p. 236.
³Scott, op. cit., p. 170.
interests or previously unaffiliated Mexicans. It may be noted that because of the Popular Sector's envelopment of the greater portion of Mexican interests, and the ever increasing number of interests which seek PRI affiliation, this Popular Sector will most likely continue to expand and grow in itself and in relation to the other two sectors.

From the preceding pages, it can be observed that the structural organization of the PRI has provided the party with a centralized, hierarchically structured, political machine. Through this machine, the PRI has set itself as a symbol of mutual interest and has sought to facilitate the flow of information and to reconcile the conflicting opinions among groups and leaders at all levels of government.¹

It is significant that the party has formed such a machine, for in essence it is within the interaction of this party machine and its dealings with the government that one finds democratic action and participation in Mexican politics. Neither the Congress nor the ballot have evolved as centers for political action, but it is in the intra-party struggles where the real contest occurs.

The predominant considerations in the architecture of Mexican "revolutionary" political institutions from the standpoint of opportunities for popular participation have focused primarily on the intergroup and ²

¹Padgett, "Mexico's One-Party System," p. 999.
interpersonal relationships linking the groups in government with the directive committees of the Party on the one hand and with the leadership of the organized "revolutionary" interest of functional groupings on the other.¹

Political action revolves around the executive office at national, state, and local levels, and party committees at the national, regional, and municipal levels.² It is within and among these institutions that the sector committees at the corresponding level must deal to secure their desires or to eradicate conflicts.

Such an arrangement has made it especially important that there be an opportunity on the part of the rank and file members of the associated 'revolutionary' groups to express choice with regard to committee leadership of the respective organizations. It has been these committees working closely with key personnel in government--especially with members of the executive branch and with the committees of the Party--who have made the decisions concerning candidates for succession to public office. And the same has been true of decision making in other diverse areas such as ejido credit, community schools, the expansion as well as improvement of administration of labor benefits and the procurement of low cost housing.³

The apex of the hierarchical structure at each level is the executive; at the local, he is the mayor, at the state, the governor, and at the nation, the president. At each level the executive acts as the great center to which the sectors and party committees can submit their measures: and problems

¹Ibid.
²Ibid., p. 262.
³Ibid., p. 261.
for approval and arbitration. Although executives at lower levels are increasingly making more and more decisions, they are nevertheless subject to intervention from the next higher level of government.

The ultimate power rests in the office of the president of Mexico; most often the major measures of legislation and the most pertinent problems are sent to his office. Since the interests of Mexico have been increasing, it is difficult for any one individual such as the president to handle all matters directly. Consequently, he has begun to allocate responsibility to others and to rely upon their advice in making his decisions. The eighteen line departments and many independent or semi-independent agencies perform such duties. The work of these is coordinated by the agency known as the Presidential Office (Secretaría de la Presidencia).\(^1\)

In addition to the Presidential Office, there has been a recent tendency for the president to organize consultative agencies. One such important agency has been the Council for Development and Coordination of National Production (Consejo de Fomento y Coordinación de la Producción Nacional). Its duty is to bring together the representatives of agriculture and industry to discuss their common difficulties and to recommend their solutions to the president. (Thus, it may be noted that rather than being a real part of the policy

\(^1\)Scott, op. cit., pp. 278-288.
making machinery of the presidency as the Presidential Office, these consultative agencies are auxiliary agencies in executive decision making.) Such consultative agencies are carried down to lower executive levels also.\textsuperscript{1} It is the executive and his office which in the end are left to formulate the important policy and to help the sectors to compromise and agree. However, the importance of the party committees, which work as the main intermediaries between the sectors and the executive and his office, must not be neglected.

The CEC, as the national party committee, has assumed the role as "chief arbiter throughout the entire range of intra-Party difficulties."\textsuperscript{2} The CEC has played a particularly important position in the settlement of intra-party electoral assemblies. The president of the CEC with the help of the CEC secretary general and the Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos (the CEC agency which is concerned with the validity of electoral assemblies decisions) has to resolve the rivalries among the sectors in the intra-party elections and to report to the president of Mexico the list of delegates which he believes to be qualified and entitled to receive the PRI nomination for Congress. The decision the CEC president submits to the president of Mexico is usually approved by the president of Mexico, for the CEC president is usually a trusted

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., pp. 289-291.

\textsuperscript{2}Padgett, "Popular Participation in the Mexican One-Party System", pp. 117-118.
friend of the Mexican president and provides a direct link between the hierarchy of the party and the summit of the executive branch.¹

The Regional Committees of the PRI serve as agencies to smooth over intra-party conflict at the state and local levels. And here too at intra-party election time, the regional president and his committee are most important in the process of selecting what candidates of the sector's are qualified for municipal offices. (It may be noted that the president of the regional party is usually a personal friend of the governor.)²
CHAPTER IV

PRI AND STABILITY

In addition to the organizational structure of the PRI, there are other factors which help to insure the continuance of the Mexican one-party system. The ensuing pages deal with these elements of stability.

PRI's Identification with the Government

There is extensive overlapping and interaction between the party and the government. The president of Mexico is simultaneously the head of the government and of the PRI. Government officials are active in the sectors of the PRI and are most often chosen from the ranks of the sectors. It may be of particular note to emphasize again that the civil servants of the government comprise an associational interest group within the Popular Sector of the PRI.

To the Mexican citizen, the PRI and the government are as one.¹ Because the party overlaps almost entirely with the formal agencies of government, it has acquired the name of

¹Scott, op. cit., p. 136.
the "official party." Scott noted:

Identification of the official party with the state became so confused in the minds of the party bosses that the Supreme Court was forced to remind them in one case that "the PRM is not a dependency of the federal executive power; . . . it does not constitute an official service . . . so its thirty per cent discount (on telephone service) cannot be enforced by legal means:"

As late as 1950, President Aleman issued an executive decree assigning "the property known as the ex-chapel of La Milagrosa in Guadalajara, Jalisco, to the service of the state, to install the offices of the PRI."

In order to understand to the fullest extent the party-government identity, the three main branches of the government, the executive, legislative, and judicial should be examined. Since the formation of the party, the president of Mexico has been a party member and has received overwhelming majorities in the elections. The following is a list of the per cent of the votes cast in the presidential elections for the PRI candidates: Pascual Ortiz Rubio, 93.56; Lázaro Cárdenas, 98; Avila Camacho, 93.1; Miguel Alemán, 80.1; Ruiz Cortines, 76.4; Lopea Mateos 90.4; and Díaz Ordaz 89.

The power of the office of the Mexican president has been strengthened by the tradition of authoritarianism, by a broad grant of constitutional powers, and by the president's position as head of the political machinery in Mexico. 

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid., p. 247.
Authoritarianism in Mexico, as in other Latin American countries, continues to play a significant role. This aspect of Spanish colonial influence is still felt; it is apparent that the president's power is similar to that of the royal colonial regimes.

A number of us who have seen peasant delegations waiting for the President of Mexico . . . have been struck by the fact that we were watching the General Indian Court of New Spain functioning today rather much as it must have when Antonio de Mendoza gave it informal existence or Luis de Velasco II gave it formal structure.¹

The authoritarian aspect of the presidency can be seen in the fact that no official figure at a local, state, or national level can remain in his position if he does not conform with the president's policy. Not only that, but the president's influence extends to the making or breaking of leaders of the Mexican interest groups.²

For labor and agrarian leaders, and even for the representatives of the growing business and manufacturing interests outside the PRI, his power to recognize strikes, to grant or refuse road or irrigation projects, to remit state and municipio debts to the national government, to apply or relax taxes or trade regulations, and all the other discretionary decisions he can render make the president master of their destinies.³

²Scott, op. cit., p. 259.
³Ibid., p. 261.
The systematization and formalization of the political machinery of the PRI plus the growth of functional interest associations outside the PRI's margins have called for a force to evolve which can synthesize and compromise these interests for effective articulation and aggregation.¹ This force has been the president of Mexico. But because of the broadening of the base of interests, the president relies on the aid of organizations which have evolved within the office of the presidency. These agencies have evolved primarily for their technical competence and political adaptability. Among these agencies are the following eighteen executive departments: Government, Foreign Affairs, Treasury, National Defense, Marine Affairs, Industry and Commerce, Agriculture and Animal Industry, Water Resources, Public Education, Health and Aid, Labor and Welfare, National Patrimony, Communications and Transport, Public Works, Presidency; and the three departamentos: Tourism, Agrarian and Colonization Affairs and Federal District.² And as mentioned, many independent and semi-independent agencies and the Office of the President have arisen which help manage government affairs and coordinate government activity.

However, in the end, it is the president with whom the responsibility lies. It is he who controls the basic

¹Ibid., p. 246.
²Ibid., p. 281.
operations of the office of the presidency and profoundly
influences the other branches of government. It is evident
that the president has used his constitutional grant to act
on legislative matters to the fullest extent. In fact, it is
said, "The Congress is itself but a creature of the President,
and all the extensive powers of that legislative body must be
subsumed under the executive branch."\(^1\)

The Congress has been termed as not more than a rubber
stamp of approval, for it receives bills which have already
been discussed, debated, and decided by the executive.
Privately sponsored bills are rare and have little chance of
being passed; only government inspired measures get the green
light in Congress.

The Congress is PRI controlled. The Senate, with but
one exception, is composed of partisans of the PRI. The
Chamber of Deputies, although allowing for the seating of
opposition candidates, is comprised mainly of party people.
Even with the new electoral laws providing for a proportional
representation system, the PRI in the 1964 Congress controlled
175 delegates compared to the 35 delegates of the three oppo-
sition parties.\(^2\) Although there is speculation that the

\(^1\)James L. Busey, *Latin America: Political Institutions

\(^2\)"Mexico," *Hispanic American Report*, XVII, No. 8
(October, 1964), 687.
increase of representatives of opposition parties might encourage debate in the Chambers, it is still generally held that these seats are but honorary bestowals and will not disrupt the rubber-stamp organ.

The President and the Senate, by a majority vote, select the members of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court chooses the judges at inferior levels; however, it is usually contended that the PRI and executive branch aid them in their selections.¹

The Mexican judges are subject to removal by a majority vote of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and upon recommendation of the president.²

It is generally held that the Mexican courts refrain from rendering judgments which would be contrary to PRI policy.

It is clear that the courts never take a position contrary to that of executive policy. No writs of amparo issue against actions by the President, by members of his official family, by leading members of the PRI; or against federal legislation which has been passed by the Congress.³

It is thus observed that the PRI can be identified with the major branches of the Mexican government, for the executive, legislative and judicial branches are managed and

²Ibid., p. 39.
³Ibid.
controlled by party affiliates. The official party has not only identified itself with the goals of the government but has managed to do the same with the ideals of the Mexican people, the goals of the Revolution of 1910.

The PRI and the Revolution

The Mexican nation of today identified itself with the Revolution of 1910. This revolutionary movement was begun by an intellectual element and supported by the middle class. It is difficult to define the Revolution in terms of strict ideology, for at the time it begun it had none. All of its leaders voiced different ideals and it was a combination of these that later became correlated with the goals of the Revolution. The ideas most associated with the Revolution are found in the Constitution of 1917; they are: effectual suffrage, agrarian reform, non-reelection of the president, anticlericalism, an exclusion of the Church from politics, improvement of the Indian class, and finally, the expulsion of the foreign imperialist from Mexico.¹

The PRI has managed to become so identified with the goals of the Revolution that a vote against it is similar to voting against the ideas of Mexican patriotism. Since 1929 when Calles gathered the diverse interests of the Revolution

into a single party, the party has been the guardian of the Revolution.

This Revolution still has values in Mexico, for it remains as a unifying force and has set broad outlines for the party's platform. It acts as a restraint against excesses of private development, keeps alive issues such as investment in the public sector, and land reform, and, finally, lays down the basic operating procedure for labor laws, secular education, social welfare, ejido reform and the principal of no re-election for the president.¹

The party has been adept in its ability to adapt the Revolution to changing circumstances.² This can be attributed, in large part, to the fact that the Revolution is not held to any rigid ideology. This adaptability has additional advantages since the lack of an orthodox political creed and the open nature of the party allows it to exist free from the spiritual aridity of a closed system and terrorism.³

The party and its identification with the Revolution have had an important psychological effect upon the Mexican people. In The Civic Culture, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba

¹Botsford, op. cit., p. 14
²Alexander, op. cit., p. 117.
conclude that pride in the Mexican nation is dependent to a considerable extent on the continuing symbolic identification with the Revolution. They found that the Mexican people have a great sense of political pride which can be traced to the Revolution; 65 per cent of those interviewed could name goals of the Revolution. Upon further questioning, 61 per cent stated that they felt the Revolution was continuing while only 25 per cent felt that its goals had been realized and 14 per cent felt that they had been forgotten.¹

The overwhelming success of the PRI in every election is the product of this seemingly mystical commitment to the Revolution. The party has been able to personify and define the Revolution. But in addition, it is noted that the PRI's success is also a product of fence-mending and political maneuvering.² This political maneuvering has been an attempt of the official party to achieve unanimity.

PRI and Unanimity

The PRI seeks to lessen the power of other political actors by embracing the political spectrum's center and by alloting to each faction within the party a definite area


in which it may "legitimately, though always within the majority--exert its pressure."1 It presents to the opposition the idea of, "Why fight us? Join us and continue your struggle within the majority, for only the majority has effective power."2

The party has sought to achieve this unanimity by broadening and making more democratic the basis of party membership, and has also tried to represent the interests of Mexico whether they are within the party's official ranks or are outside the PRI's membership.

PRI and Democracy

Foreign observers view the party as democratic in that the PRI is a "rambling coalition of social groups and political views, from right wing Catholic to Marxist socialist, and reflects reasonably accurately the forces and trends in the country."3

A democratizing process within the party can be observed by its broadening of representation within its ranks. The government has continued to represent progressively more and more people.4 The PRI has attempted to incorporate groups

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1Botsford, op. cit., p. 15.
4Cline, op. cit., p. 420.
into its sectors which heretofore had been politically apathetic or unable to be legally affiliated with parties and elections. Although the youth section of the PRI had grown to 78,000 members, in 1962 the party chairman, Alfonso Corona del Roral, urged more youth participation. Recruitment of membership is advocated and active programs for youth training are being carried on at the Centro de Orientación Política in Mexico City. Also, proposals are made for increasing the number of PRI sponsored centers for economic, political, and social studies.\(^1\) President Mateos made an effort to integrate the Indian, currently comprising about 15 per cent of Mexico's population, into Mexico's cultural and economic life. Through his efforts, Indian schools increased from 2,000 in 1958 to 3,900 in 1961.\(^2\) These examples of recruitment of more citizens into active Mexican society are but a small sample of the total Mexican scene. In transitional societies the ever increasing industrial and urban population, trying to gain access and seek their objectives through political activity, have influenced the make-up of political parties. That Mexico is in transition is apparent. Peasants from rural areas are flocking to cities and towns. Mexico, since 1900, has changed from


a country in which the rural population was 90 per cent to a
country in which the rural inhabitants make up 54 per cent of
the country's population. A United Nations survey predicts
that by 1980 Mexico will be even more urban with 62 per cent
of its population located in the cities.¹

Mexico City has added two million citizens to her
population since 1940 and the number of cities with over
100,000 people rose to nine in 1950.² This exodus from the
rural area has been caused by lack of land and employment and
by the promise of work in industrial centers. Although slums
and low living conditions have come with the mass migration
to the cities, the cities have been offering a new type of
life to the workers and have introduced them to the factors
of transition and modernization. As social mobilization
continues, people, becoming more dependent upon government
services and political decisions, often seek to articulate
their interests by increasing their political participation.³

The new way of life sets a higher value on
economic and social success, both of which may be
identified with political activity and certainly can
be increased by organization of and action through⁴

²Scott, op. cit., p. 48.
³Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political
Development," American Political Science Review, LV, No. 3
(September, 1961), 499.
⁴Scott, op. cit., p. 50.
special interest groups. Urbanization, therefore, is a vital ally of Westernization in making Mexicans aware of government and in broadening the base upon which Mexico's government rests.\(^1\)

By broadening its base of political participation, Mexico appears to become more democratic in its representation; yet there are other factors which also seem to show that Mexico is democratizing. As mentioned, the party has become institutionalized and through its machinery of committees and sectors it has been able to reach out and allow more and more participation from the grass roots elements. It is of crucial importance that the party offers democracy within its own ranks; this can be noted in the active competition among the sectors for legislative seats and government favor.\(^2\)

Professor Fitzgibbon, by the use of specialized techniques of IBM computers which provide ranking on composite scores, sought to measure the extent to which Latin American countries are democratic. In his questionnaires, he asked about freedom of speech, press, assembly, and the responsibility of the government to its citizens. Out of the total of twenty nations, Mexico rose from a rank of seventh in 1956 to fifth in 1960. And among nations with a noticeable amount of Indian background it rated first.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Ibid.


Another indication that Mexico is becoming more democratic is that the settlement of disputes is not accomplished by force but rather by administration and law-enforcement. A peaceful succession to leadership positions has evolved and a wider participation in policy formation is apparent.¹

Local and state political bosses (caciques) are becoming fewer as popular leaders of the people are replacing the imposed leaders of the past. Caudillismo is being replaced by the machinery of the political system; even the rule of the president is becoming less personal. The president of Mexico is not seen in the role of a charismatic leader, but rather in the role of a less personal, semiconstitutional, mechanistic leader who must integrate and synchronize the formal and informal machinery of government.² This change from personal power to power of the political party also resulted in a more peaceful transfer of office in elections. It is notable that there have been no armed attempts to resist election outcomes since General Saturino Cedillo's unsuccessful attempt in 1938.³ In the 1964 presidential elections there was no major uprising or demonstration and for the first time the opposition candidate formally conceded the election.⁴

¹Needler, op. cit., p. 308.
²Scott, op. cit., p. 246.
³Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, p. 165.
Attempts were made in the 1964 elections to reform the electoral process and offer some opportunity for minority parties to obtain Congressional representation. Minority parties gaining 2.5 per cent of the total vote are allowed 5 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and one additional seat for each 5 per cent over the first 2.5 per cent. As mentioned, this change resulted in the gain of 35 seats in the Chambers for the opposition.

In its quest for unanimity, the PRI has begun to guide its actions toward a more democratic system. It has sought a broader base for popular political participation and has begun to listen more to the grass roots element. It has allowed interplay and competition within the elements of the party. It has started to abandon personal rule and has tried to rely upon administration and law-enforcement. And finally, it has made an attempt to make elections more democratic.

Interests Within the PRI

The PRI has tried to incorporate the major interests of Mexico into its three party sectors, farm, labor and popular.

The inclusion of a Farm Sector within the party seemed justifiable for land reform was a major cry of the Revolution. Land reform has continued to remain high on the government's

priority list. Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917 stated that land belongs to the nation and that the nation continues to have jurisdiction over it. When monopolies came into existence, the Revolution designated the state to rectify them. Three reform approaches were presented; (1) return the lost communal holdings to the villages,(ejido), (2) give each family free private plots, and (3) maintain a mixture in which haciendas would be allowed to continue to exist but small plots of land would be given to the worker to supplement his earnings on the hacienda. Administrations have been irresolute as to what method they should use for agrarian reform; however, the three preceding approaches have generally constituted the bases for action.1

Mexican presidents from Cardenas through Mateos have attempted to satisfy the rural elements by distributing 48.3 million hectares of land among the farm peasant population. (It may be noted that in the Mateos Administration alone, 16 million hectares were distributed.) Yet in spite of these attempts to satisfy the rural elements, much dissatisfaction remains and lately invasions of landless peasants, paracaidistas, onto lands which they claim to be rightfully theirs, has taken place. This and other examples have made the party aware of the rural unrest. President

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1Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, pp. 209-213.
Diaz Ordaz, during his campaign and in his inaugural address, made it known that the agricultural sector would be a key concern of his administration. He recognized the signs of unrest in the rural areas as a threat to national equilibrium, and pledged himself to rectify these difficulties. Diaz noted that agrarian reform could not indefinitely satisfy the peasant's hope for lands because in regions where the land had been divided such land reform was impossible. He urged voluntary cooperation, proper functioning of rural groups through village communalism and rejected the concept of individualism. The party, in previous administrations, has realized as had Diaz Ordaz that land distribution is not the over-all solution for the agrarian problem and have offered a revised program for agricultural reform: (1) land must be distributed on a more rational base, (2) new resources should be created through irrigation and hydraulic projects, (3) areas heretofore unexploited should be open to colonization, (4) agricultural techniques must be modernized and be aided by technical assistance, and (5) production must be regenerated by providing the small and medium size owners with benefits similar to those enjoyed by the


2"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 8 (October, 1964), 497.
ejido and the small farmer.\(^1\)

To help the distribution of land on a more rational base, the Agrarian Code of 1949 was passed. This code rectified the problem of the distribution of economically unproductive small parcels of land (minifundia). It stipulated that a minimum of 10 hectares of land must constitute an ejido grant.\(^2\) Presidents Mateos and Ordaz have complied to this law in their distribution of land.

Since President Camacho's administration, Mexico has initiated large scale irrigation and hydroelectric projects. Such projects as Tepalcatepec and Papalopan have helped to bring the total of cultivated, irrigated lands in Mexico to 42 million acres. And hydroelectric installations such as Infiernillo and the Maipaso have bought Mexico's power system to around 6 million kilowatts.\(^3\)

In an effort to open unexploited areas to colonization, Lopez Mateos introduced the idea of distributing forest lands to the ejidatarios. Such projects in Durango, Guerrero, and Michoacan have proved most successful.\(^4\) In

\(^1\)Cline, *Mexico: Revolution to Evolution*, p. 213.
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 214.
\(^3\)New York Times, January 22, 1965, p. 54
addition, an attempt to relieve the heavily populated central plateau area by encouraging resettlement of farmers in the sparsely settled Quintana Roo was instigated by the government.¹

The government has tried to improve rural Mexico by introducing it to the elements of modernization and technical agrarianism. Efforts have been made to train students to help fill the need for agrarian technicians. One hundred training centers, which will educate 10,000 to 15,000 persons annually in new farming techniques, have been established.²

Attempts to introduce light industry into the rural area can be seen in the establishment of such projects as the $16 million cellulose industry in San Luis Potosi and the rope making industry in the Yucatan.³ Projects in industry and self-community projects have provided many new positions for the rural unemployed.

Credit to the ejidos is needed if the elements of technical agrarianism are to continue. However, elements of corruption have effected the Banco Agrario and the Banco Ejidal. To stop injustices in credit management,

³Ibid.
Diaz Ordaz has urged the formation of groups of peasants who would watch over credit operations.¹

Production of agricultural products has been aided greatly by larger agricultural holdings. The government has given special assurances of protection from paracaidistas' tactics to the larger landholders who were engaged in the raising of badly needed crops. To stimulate cattle-breeding, large landowners were also protected.²

Thus, it may be noted that in addition to the distribution of ejido lands, the Mexican government has embarked on the five point program previously described. By adopting such a program as this five point plan, the government has used modern methods and technical means to aid the agrarian workers. The party has also been aware of the urban workers who are continually evolving as a powerful force in Mexican society.

The Labor Sector, as the Farm Sector, has been a part of the party since its origin. Article 123 of the 1917 Constitution has been labor's revolutionary code or its Magna Carta, for by it the labor movement gained recognition. Since that time, labor although not a captive, has been dependent upon government to an extensive degree.

¹Ibid.
²Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, pp. 210-215.
In return for its recognition and acceptance by party and government, labor has had to acknowledge certain limitations: (1) it can not engage in all-out warfare against industry, and (2) it must not, in an effort to obtain better wages and conditions, exert full economic pressures against the government. The government weighs the claims of labor for better wages against such things as the national consideration of trade balances, export prices or the standard of domestic prices and decides from this whether labor is entitled to its request. The Minister of Labor is the chief consultant for labor in deciding wages or conditions, and the policy he imposes must be accepted.\(^1\)

Although labor is allowed to strike, the Minister of Labor determines the extent and range of the strikes. Lopez Mateos acknowledged labor's right to strike in the following statement: "Mexican laws uphold the workers' right to strike, and the men who govern Mexico respect, and will demand that others respect this right, when it is legitimately invoked."\(^2\) But Mateos added that the workers should strike inside the law and that demonstrations outside the law were betraying the working class.

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 226.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 227. citing, "The Labor Policy of Lopez Mateos' Administration in the Government of Mexico, a brief speech . . . July 29, 1959 (Mexico, 1959)."
Mexican labor disputes are mostly solved without serious or prolonged strikes. A period which exemplifies the conciliatory method was noted when Lopez Mateos, prior to his election as president in 1958, was Minister of Labor. At that time, 60,000 labor disputes were settled without a significant strike. But shortly after his resignation, a series of wild-cat strikes took place that continued on through the elections of 1958 and finally had to be subdued with forceful measures. Since that period, however, there have been no major demonstrations. Lopez Mateos as president could boast that from 1959-1960, out of a total of 1,437 threatened strikes only fourteen were consummated.

The government has aided labor by extending benefits of social security, unemployment compensation, old age and survivors insurance. It has also helped to set minimum wages, and has succeeded in getting labor a share of the profits of industry. An illustrative example of this is a recent law passed by Congress which introduced a new sharing plan that would permit workers to share in company profits. A national commission comprised of officials from labor, management and government would be established to decide the amount of

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1Taylor, op. cit., p. 726.
2Cline, loc cit.
3Brandenburg, op. cit., pp. 233-234.
profit which labor would be allowed to share. It was also the duty of this commission to exempt certain industries or companies from this profit sharing for a limited time. Organized labor regarded the new sharing plan as the fulfillment of a long awaited dream. The same Congress also initiated the labor reform which prohibited child labor under fourteen years of age.1

Within the Labor Sector, the CTM, by far the largest of the unions, has since 1941 shared its political spoils and offices with the lesser unions in the section. This benevolent attitude may, however, be nothing more than an attempt of the official party and the CTM to keep minor unions satisfied so they will not affiliate with opposition parties.2

The Popular Sector has surpassed the other two sectors, numerically and in political strength. This can be attributed to the fact that it is the Popular Sector which represents the middle class. Since 1940, this class, as a by-product of industrialization and urbanization, has risen to constitute about 20 per cent of the population.3 Authorities have observed that the class structure of Mexico is affected

2Brandenburg, op. cit., pp. 228-229.
by modernization. Class polarization is evident at the top with the aristocrats and at the bottom with the primitive Indian; however, it is the middle class that is in the process of transition. It is within this flexible, elastic, class structure of the middle class that the greatest amount of social mobilization is taking place.¹

Urban class stratification is more fluid and although there is a discernable distinction between the highest and lowest classes within the urban society, there is a vagueness as to where lines can be drawn in regards to the middle class.² Within this class there is greater opportunity for social mobility. It is this class which realizes the quest for more formalized organization that often gives rise to more voluntary groups. On the whole, these voluntary associations of society are supported by middle class persons who show a basic social stability and it is the middle class of society to which the urban region relies for leadership and stability.³

Urbanization has brought a tendency for the formation of voluntary groups.⁴ Floyd Dotson, in his study of Guadalajara,

¹Borah, op. cit., p. 388.
³Ibid., pp. 172-189.
found that appearance of voluntary organizations was correlated with the urban growth of the last fifty years and that there was in general a direct relationship between socioeconomic status and participation. Membership affiliation was most often seen in the upper and middle classes.

Consequently, it can be deduced from these studies that within transitional Mexico, a middle class is emerging. It is this class that is becoming active in Mexican society by forming voluntary associations and by rising to the fore to lead and stabilize the Mexican nation. Thus the importance of the inclusion of this middle class into the Popular Sector should not be overlooked.

The high degree of political activity of the Popular Sector's middle class provides a link among conflicting groups; it is necessary to the function of a complex, modern society. The middle class continues to advance because of its political initiative and ability compared to the general apathy found in the lower classes and the mass. The middle class is progressively growing in importance; cultural change, social mobilization and political recruitment will bring people from the mass into the middle class. The Popular Sector will correspondingly expand to be used as the main political

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mechanism of the small town and urban middle class to obtain their objectives and to manipulate the political process. It is stated that the middle-class is the core of the Popular Sector. Within the last few years, the Popular Sector has emerged as the most powerful of the three PRI sectors and has come to equate in political power the combined interests of the farm and labor sectors.¹

The Popular Sector has become politically powerful for numerous reasons. As previously mentioned, it has begun to represent the middle class which is at present constantly expanding in importance. It has, through numerical representation, exceeded the other sectors in almost every federal organization and has achieved a clear majority among party members in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies.² And finally, it has had within its ranks the government bureaucrat's union, the FSTSE. The advantageous position which this and the other middle class interest groups enjoy within the Popular Sector encourages them to support the status quo.

It may be of particular interest to note the benefits the FSTSE has received from the government. In the period of 1952-1958, over 300,000 government bureaucrats were given special advantages in the form of year-end bonuses, cost-of-living grants, and raises which totaled over 75 million

¹Scott, op. cit., pp. 82-83.
²Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 281.
dollars. In addition, low-cost housing, their own hospital and a 50 per cent rebate on drugs were provided.\(^1\) Scholarships, and trips abroad were also given to FSTSE members.\(^2\)

The CNOP, as the political organization of the Popular Sector, has been the most successful of the three sector organizations in obtaining its objectives for its middle class membership.

John J. Johnson observes that the Revolution has shifted from left of center to right of center and finally rests on dead center. He explains that these adjustments have been made with ease because of the steadying influence of Mexico's middle groups.\(^3\) Needler also notes the ascension of power of the Popular Sector and its middle class and has stated that this development has tended to reenforce the position of moderation which has been reflected in the actions of presidents Cortines and Mateos. The seats of the Popular Sector in Congress have been most often assigned to lawyers who continue to take a conservative stand in view of the middle of the road views of the middle class.\(^4\)

\(^1\) Scott, op. cit., p. 81.

\(^2\) Brandenburg, op. cit., pp. 279-280.

\(^3\) Scott, op. cit., p. 90.

Although the party has ridden the center line, it has in its intra-party relations, granted concessions to groups to the right and to the left in its quest for unanimity. As a whole, however, the extreme groups within the party have served as scouting parties which have helped to relate to the party the current strength and support that the left and right elements enjoy. The degree of support that these groups obtain from "public opinion" or uncommitted groups within the party aid the party in the determination of its course.¹

In Mexico PRI is the source of all political power; PRI, that conglomeration of rightists, leftists, business men, and union bosses riveted together by realpolitik. The President and crushing majorities of both houses of Congress are always members of the PRI. Thus, the real struggle between the Right and the Left goes on, more or less silently but none the less grimly, inside the PRI—not at the polls. What happens at the polls is a foregone conclusion, with minor modifications.²

**Interests Outside the PRI**

The party is aware not only of the dangerous pressures that exist within it but also of the external forces. Consequently the daily operation of government in Mexico involves a process of consultation, conciliation and compromise between the formal political structure of the PRI and the "outside" interests. The party has tried to embrace

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¹Botsford, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

these outside interests and has attempted to show them that their needs will be best served by submitting to the PRI.¹ This point was clarified in one of President Mateos' talks when he stated, "The minority as well as the majority has a right to its opinion, to discussion and to vote; but only the majority has the right to decide."² The party often seeks to absorb the opposition at the lower levels where disputes are local and can be resolved before discontent spreads or at the higher levels the opposition is given responsibility, responsabilizar, rather than excluded.³

Although opposition parties have a legal right to exist and can, with the approval of the Secretaría de Gobernación, register as a national party, they have not to date presented any serious challenge to the PRI. Generally, the PRI has been successful in absorbing or neutralizing such opposition parties. For example, in the 1964 presidential election, two out of the three legally recognized opposition parties supported the PRI presidential candidate.

The parties which were registered in the 1964 election, besides the PRI, were the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN),

²Botsford, loc. cit.
³Ibid.
the Partido Autentico de la Revolucion Mexicana (PARM), and the Partido Popular Socialist (PPS).

The Partido de Acción Nacional, a conservative, rightist party, is the strongest opposition to the PRI. Since its formation in 1939, the PAN has held the second highest position in elections. Large industrialists, businessmen, and pro-clerical elements comprise its membership. It has supported the Church in its campaign against communism. If in power, the PAN would rescind the anti-clerical provisions of the Constitution of 1917, favor private foreign capital over public foreign capital, and would replace the ejido, which it regards as inefficient, with large scale privately owned units.¹

In the 1958 elections, the PAN blamed the PRI for every conceivable ill and campaigned with vigor, but took an extremely pious Catholic stand which repelled many conservatives. This, plus the factor that many businessmen who were normally inclined to vote for PAN voted for the PRI, caused the PAN to lose much of its conservative support and made it clear that it could not secure power. (It was noted that in this 1958 elections businessmen, in many cases, voted for the PRI. Two reasons were attributed to this change: (1) the PRI had taken a rightward swing which attracted the interests of

¹"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVII, No. 9 (November, 1964), 691.
the conservatives and, (2) many men who had been revolutionaries and PRI supporters were now in influential positions in the business community.¹

In the 1964 presidential campaigns, the PAN existed as the only legally active opposition to the PRI. The PAN's presidential candidate, Jose Gonzalez Torres, did not make criticisms of the economic and political nature of the PRI regime but confined himself to broader themes such as anti-communism and a "fuller democracy."²

However, in the 1964 elections the PRI candidate, Díaz Ordaz was identified as a moderate, conservative and an anti-communist and again the PRI cut into the votes of the PAN for many conservatives, for the first time, cast their votes for a PRI candidate when they supported Díaz Ordaz. The nomination of Ordaz plus such party inclinations towards the right as handing Mexico's shipyard over to private business, refusing to let the telephone workers strike, deporting foreign leftists, suppression of domestic communism, estrangement from Cuba and close economic and diplomatic relations with the United States seemed to indicate that the Mexican political pendulum was swinging toward the right.³ Indicative

¹Taylor, op. cit., pp. 741-742.
²"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 4 (June, 1964), 302.
of the conservative leanings of Ordaz were the events of April 1965 when communist demonstrations in protest of the United States' policy toward Vietnam were broken up by the government. Following this, the Mexican Communist Party headquarters, and two other leftist organizations, the Popular Electoral Front, and the Independent Campesino Central's offices, were raided.¹

The 1964 election saw the rise of extra-legal rightist parties. The militant, reactionary, conservative groups the Frente Patriota de Mexico and the Unión Nacional Sinarquista appeared, but gained little strength except in the states of Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, Queretaro, Puebla and San Luis Potosi. Two new Christian Democratic parties appeared but were injured by an ideological split. The rightist Partido Democrático Cristiano requested annulment of the anticlerical parts of the 1917 Constitution and demanded that parents be allowed to educate their children as they wanted. The more liberal of the two parties, the Movimiento Social Demócrata Cristiano, really a pressure group rather than a party, rejected capitalism and communism, believing that they were materialistic, and called for society to organize along the line of Christian precepts.²

¹ New York Times, April 15, 1965, p. 16.
² "Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 8 (October, 1964), 691.
The PARM was created in 1954 by members of the PRI who were discontented with the policies of Aleman and Ruiz Cortines. This group, claiming to be supporting the true revolutionary ideals, has been ineffective by making little effort to organize, to strengthen its bargaining position or to enlarge its membership, and has become slightly more than an arm of the PRI. Although the PARM sponsored some congressional candidates; it supported Díaz Ordaz candidacy by casting 43,685 votes for him.\(^1\)

The PPS was formed in 1947 when communist labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano broke from the PRI. The PPS has been a leftist orientated party. It originally was comprised of a coalition of liberals, socialists, and communists. In the 1952 election with Toledano as its presidential candidate it made a notable showing, but since that time it has dwindled. Intraparty friction among its coalition, and in particular the argument between straight-line communists who wished to turn the PPS into an orthodox communist party and the moderate communists, such as Toledano who wanted to keep it more general, have caused the PPS to remain in a weak position.\(^2\) In 1958 the PPS backed Lopez Mateos as its choice for president and in 1964 Toledano told his members not to

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 688.

\(^2\)Scott, op. cit., pp. 189-192.
worry since "all will be well if we support Díaz Ordaz."\(^1\) It seems as though the PPS is a "fellow traveler with the PRI as well as with the Communists."\(^2\) To repay the PPS, the PRI rewarded it with patronage and direct subsidies.\(^3\)

Although the PPS did not receive the necessary 2.5 per cent of votes cast to gain seats under the new electoral code, leftists deputies helped it and the PARM to obtain congressional seats, ten for the PPS and five for the PARM. The PAN was granted twenty seats. The importance of these congressional seats was not in the political opportunity or access they presented to the opposition parties, but rather, they served as honorary bestowals and a mark of prestige.\(^4\) In the eyes of the PRI, they were a token of acknowledgement for the sake of preserving power in its quest for unanimity.

In an attempt to emphasize the unity of the nation and the reconciliation of the loyal opposition into the Revolutionary fold, the arrangements for the presentation of the speech were such that every group to accompany the President was composed of leaders from the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) Partido Acción Nacional.\(^5\)

\(^{1}\)"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 8 (October, 1964), 687.


\(^{3}\)Ibid.

\(^{4}\)"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 8 (October, 1964), 687.

\(^{5}\)"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVII, No. 9 (November, 1964), 782.
(PAN), and the Partido Autentico de la Revolucion Mexicana (PARM), as well as newly elected representatives from the official Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).

At this same time President Díaz Ordaz physically embraced Vicente Lombardo Toledano, head of the PPS and newly elected Deputy. Such a gesture could be viewed that the regime of Díaz Ordaz would strive to maintain good relations with the moderate left. Indications from the last few months of Mateos' administration suggested this.2 President Mateos' loose interpretation of the electoral reforms, his release from prison of communist artist David Alfaro Siqueiros; and his decision to vote against the recommendation of the OAS conference and continue diplomatic relations with Cuba seemed to be conciliatory measures towards the moderate left.3

Extra-legal leftist parties presented themselves in the 1964 elections. These parties, not being approved by the Secretaría de Gobernación, can not appear on the ballot, but do run write-in candidates. The Frente Electoral del Pueblo (FEP) and its peasant associate, the Central Campesino Independiente (CCI), the most aggressive and extreme of leftist intellectuals. The Communist Party of Mexico (PCM)

1Ibid.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
remained small with about 5,600 members and stayed aloof from local and national elections. Disturbances arose in the party between the Moscow elements and the militant element represented by two groups, the Trotskyists and the followers of the Chinese Communist line. The PCM realized that if it did not repress its militant sectors, it may well be strongly suppressed by the anti-communist Díaz Ordaz.¹

The preceding factors seem to confirm the belief that one of the lessons of the 1964 campaign was that the far left continues to be weakened by its division over tactical questions and by progressivism of government policies, and remains of small numerical significance.²

It appears that the official party, the PRI, is maintaining its middle of the road position, vacillating between the left and the right, yet at all times repelling extremist movements of either side. The legally recognized opposition parties of the 1964 elections were of a moderate nature and the PRI’s amending the electoral laws so they could obtain seats in Congress could be interpreted that the PRI’s goal is to incorporate all interests of Mexican society, even if they may be the opposing parties.³

¹"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 8 (October, 1964), 691.
²Needler, "Changing the Guard in Mexico," p. 28.
³Ibid.
One of the major groups that exists outside the ranks of the official party is the Roman Catholic Church. It is forbidden by the Constitution of 1917 to participate legally in politics, but in recent years, it has been regaining much of its pre-revolution prestige and has voiced its opinion on matters. This rejuvenation can be attributed to several factors. Mexico's people are 97 per cent Catholic and have a built-in prejudice for, not against, the Church. Several of Mexico's recent presidents have publically announced that they are believers. The Church has used its new freedom to agitate against communism and Castro and has served as a brake against the government's leftist orientation.

However, the greatest percentage of Catholics realize that the temporal power of the Church is secondary to that of the party. And the majority of the populace, even if a prelate advocated the joining of an opposition party, would not leave the PRI for:

The bulk of the population knows that an opposition party, in power, may give them nothing, while the PRI-nominated government has given much in the form of material benefits.¹

The government, although having the material advantage is, nevertheless, aware of the influence of the Church and has made concessions to pacify this main institutional interest group of Mexican society. In 1961, when it appeared that the Mexican government was unduly sympathetic with the

¹Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 291.
Left and Castro, the Church staged a series of demonstrations; this and other factors led to the Mexican government's issuance of the statement of incompatibility, which states that the communist doctrine is not compatible with the democratic ideology of Latin American states. Shortly after, a number of intellectual communist agitators were arrested, and as previously mentioned, there was a general campaign against the leftist extremes in Mexico. In June of 1965, the government arrested communist student demonstrators who were actively campaigning against the Church in anti-Catholic outbursts in Puebla. Police were posted at all Puebla Catholic schools to thwart any reprisal action by university students against the Church.\textsuperscript{1} The government has also attempted to gain Church support by a loose interpretation of the anti-clerical provisions of the Constitution of 1917. Clergy are allowed to appear in clerical dress; parochial schools can be maintained, and seminaries are permitted.

The role of the military has been reduced to the degree that it is no longer a major institutional interest group.

Mexico has been able to rid itself of the plague of militarism. A quarter-century ago no Latin American army was more political than the Mexican; today the armed forces are virtually out of politics.\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1}The Register, July 9, 1965, p. 1.

The military, coming from a public education and most often a middle class or lower class environment generally sympathizes with the PRI. It is observed that the current military wins its battles through legislation.¹ Six members of the military are active in the Chamber of Deputies; five are members of the Popular Sector and the other belongs to the Farm Sector. Ten senators, members of the Popular Sector, are military members. The chances of a military revolt are unlikely, since the career attitude of the officers, the troops' reservist nature, and the abolition of the practice of generals taking their troops with them upon transfer leave little opportunity for a revolt.² It can be noted that after the military sector was dropped from the PRI in 1943, most of its members affiliated with the Popular Sector, and have been incorporated into the PRI.

Although the party-government has been limited by its pledge to agrarianism, it has nevertheless sought in some measure to pacify the large landholders. The government, realizing that large scale and increased production of agricultural products is necessary for feeding the ever increasing population, has urged large-landholders to resume their large scale production. Tax concessions, credit and other incentives have encouraged owners to cultivate their

¹Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 295.
lands for the first time since the Cardenas administration.1

The newspapers of Mexico remain free and independent. Even though the government controls the allocation of newsprint, publishers feel they enjoy freedom of press and have not complained about the quantity of newsprint they have received. Extreme elements to the left and right are allowed to publish their own literature which often criticizes the government. And even conservative papers such as Mexico City's large daily El Excelsior publish editorials which criticize the government. The government controls newspapers only in the indirect sense that it is the foremost advertiser and has the financial ability frequently to buy large scale advertisements which promote government policies.2

The business and industrial groups exist outside the PRI structure. Urbanization, industrialization, population concentration, specialization, technology, specialized interests, accelerated developments in foreign commerce, and an optimistic attitude toward investment in Mexican economy have contributed to the rise and importance of trade associations in Mexico. Laws of 1936 and 1941 made it obligatory for industry and chambers of commerce to form into cámaras.3

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1Ibid., p. 303
2Ibid., p. 304.
These cámaras (federations) make it possible for the government ministries to deal with business collectively and affords government the opportunity to consult and learn the attitudes of business before legislation is introduced.¹

There are two main chambers, the Confederation of Industrial Chambers of Mexico (COCAMIN), and the Confederation of National Chambers of Commerce (CONCANCO).

The purpose of these chambers, according to law, is to resolve the special problems concerning business interests, to encourage the development of business in general and the several branches thereof in particular, and to institutionalize the inter-relations of business and government.²

The CONCAMIN was founded in 1917 and put under government control by Cardenas in 1937. The CONCAMIN aggregates the interest of its fifty-one chambers. The collective weight of these chambers represents virtually all major Mexican industry. The government consults CONCAMIN for the view of private industry on legislation, administrative regulations, and on state operated industries.³ By tax exemptions, a protectionist tariff, direct import control, credit, and subsidies the government has sought to aid

¹Brandenburg, "Mexico: Experiment in One Party Democracy," , p. 298.
²Brandenburg, "Organized Business in Mexico,", pp. 29-30.
³Ibid.
industry in Mexico. The CONCANACO, the Mexican Chamber of Commerce, has two hundred and fifty-four chambers. Besides conferring with the government, it articulates its interests through conferences on taxation, tariffs, and price controls.2

In addition to the CONCAMIN and the CONCANACO, there are private national trade and commercial groups. These groups seek access to government and articulate their interests through the presidential offices and commissions. Some of the more important are: the Bankers Association, the Mexican Association of Insurance, trade groups of mixed nationalities, specialized trade associations, small business interests and fraternal groups of business.3

It must be noted, however, that within the business groups of Mexico there is a distinct division between the old industrialists and the new group.

The old group is divided into three factions; (1) those who were important economic groups in Mexico before World War II, (2) those industrial groups which are connected with American capital, and (3) those small, local, handicraft industries. These older manufacturing firms find alliances in the larger business community of the leading commercial institutions and banks of Mexico. The old group welcomes

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3 Ibid., p. 42.
government intervention in measures such as tariffs but objects to comprehensive action by government in economics. It fears that government might take over private business interests and thus opposes a working alliance between government and business.¹

The new group, comprised of small manufacturing plant owners, came into existence during World War II. This group of nationalistic industrialists stepped in to fill the void of imports of consumer goods. The new group relies upon its own initiative for technical direction and uses Mexican capital for investment. It claims Mexico for the Mexicans and anticipates the time when Mexico is self-sufficient in the production of consumer goods. It has sought to mobilize Mexicans in the process of modernization by supplying them with the techniques of modernization, new wants and purchasing ability.²

The new group looks to the government for tariff, import and export protections. It believes that the industrialists and the government, with the cooperation of labor, should work together on a program for the industrialization of Mexico. It visualizes continuous contact and cooperation between government agencies and industrial groups and believes the mechanism for this program is the cámaras de

¹Mosk, op. cit., pp. 24-30.
²Cline, United States and Mexico, p. 335.
industria. "The point of view of the New Group can probably best be summed up by saying that they consider the government to be a necessary ally for the growing industries of Mexico."¹

Business in general support the status quo and "Mexican business prefers a stable nation and , accordingly, at least passively supports the PRI and actively supports the government."²

It is noted that the PRI has sought to absorb and adjust outside opposition parties, and interests. The balancing of diverse interests has been particularly evident in Mexican economics.

PRI and Mexican Economics

From 1940, the balanced approach has taken root in Mexican economics. Since that time, the middle class as guardians of the Revolution have related the progression of Revolutionary ideals to industrialism; they have placed emphasis on Mexico's industrialization to the extent that industry and agriculture have formed a partnership.³ "Fields, as well as factories, form part of the industrializing process, as Mexican policy-makers see it."⁴ The farms must provide the needed domestic market for goods;

¹Mosk, op. cit., pp. 29-30
³Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, p. 232.
⁴Ibid., p. 233.
they must raise raw materials for the factories, and they
must exist to feed the nation. In turn, industry helps the
agrarian element by purchasing their products, by providing
work for the displaced rural workers, and by producing modern
manufactured goods that will aid in the modernization of
rural areas.¹

Another co-partnership exists between government and
business. Government and business do not compete, but rather
cooperate. Government has the primary responsibility for
setting the economic stage and business supplements it.

Government does not plan industrialization, but
makes it possible by other developmental functions:
communications, irrigation, electrification,
priorities of tax exemptions for needed industries
(to attract private investment), flexible and
sympathetic tariff policies. Government and business
are partners, sharing the common goal of increased
production and productivity.²

Lopez Mateos confirmed this view in a speech before
the Confederación de Cámaras Industriales in which he
pointed out that multifarious fields were open to invest­
ment and urged private business to increase their invest­
ments; the activities of the public sector and the private
sector should be complementary and not competitive.³

Government plays an important part in Mexican economy.
It has almost absolute control over the establishment of

¹Ibid.
²Ibid.
³"Mexico," Hispanic American Review, XV, No. 3
(May, 1962), 206.
tariffs, fixation of import controls, money supply, subsidies, exemptions from taxes, and labor legislation. Besides directing the private sector, it has, through its public sector, acquired control of the largest fronts of credits, either by direct ownership or by owning the most shares in semi-autonomous agencies. Heavy government control is seen in industries that are basic to the economy, such as railroads, hydroelectric projects, petroleum, steel mills, airlines, and the manufacturing of automobiles. The technical and financial support has been channeled through the government's chief development corporation, National Financiera. National Financiera became important in 1941 when it began to sponsor projects to replace wartime shortages in industries such as iron, steel, caustic soda, rayon, yarn, and pulp. During the years 1946 to 1948, it became engaged in projects in iron, steel, textiles, pulp, and paper, cement, electric and chemical industries. But in 1950 its primary attention was upon the promotion of new industries: transportation and communications, electrical power and consolidation of established industries. National Financiera has sought to concentrate in areas where lack of capital has existed and has, thus, alleviated shortages which would have hampered the further development of industry.\(^1\) An example

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of National Financiera's aid can be seen in the sugar industry. After the war, when sugar imports were absorbing progressing amounts of foreign exchange, National Financiera invested heavily to add to the Mexican sugar industry's capacity.\(^1\) National Financiera's importance has increased for it is the only agency authorized for negotiating foreign loans, principally from the United States Export-Import Bank and the World Bank.\(^2\) National Financiera approaches its duties in a flexible manner. It may revamp a weak concern to make it pay. It may begin with a new project bringing together Mexican entrepreneurs, and foreign investment. Or it may use the approach of "mixed" companies in which Mexican capital, foreign capital and the government cooperate.\(^3\)

National Financiera advocates "free enterprise." Once its project becomes stable, it divests itself of its interests by selling its stock, replacing it with bonds or having a private third party gain an interest in the business. Mexico, because of its economic planning and direction, has experienced a steady climb upward in its economic system.

\(^1\)Ibid.
\(^2\)Cline, *The United States and Mexico*, p. 343.
\(^3\)Ibid., pp. 342-344.
Cline notes this in the following quote:

The imposing arrays of figures now pouring forth strengthen the inescapable conclusions that an economic revolution of major magnitude has been taking place for a decade and still is in full motion. . . . The salient fact is that the upward sweep of production curves, graphs of increased participation, carloadings, and all the other paraphernalia entailed in economic analysis add up to a slowly rising standard of living for the Mexican nation which even inflation and its own increasing numbers have not reversed.  

Since Mexico began to stress economic progress, it has achieved notable growth. Although private initiative played an important part, the unprecedented economic growth of Mexico between 1939 and 1950 was largely because of the policies and investment of the Federal Government.

The 1960's saw continued progress for Mexico. In 1962, Lopez Mateos set forth a three-year plan of economic development. This plan, requiring close cooperation between the government and private capital, sought, among other things, to accelerate the growth rate of the Gross National Product from 3.5 per cent (1961) to 6 per cent in 1962. Many felt that this was too optimistic a goal. However, the next few years saw a substantial increase in Gross National Product, a six per cent increase in 1963 and a seven per cent increase in real terms for 1964. The year 1964 also saw capita income

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1Ibid., p. 333.
rise 3 per cent.¹

The year 1964 was viewed as unusual, for even though it was a presidential election year the expected economic fall did not take place.² The economic rhythm did not become slower but increased. Investors did not wait to know the composition of the new cabinet but invested immediately. One observer remarked that this trend seemed to be "a bath in the Sea of Euphoria."³ The key word in evaluating the year of 1964 was confidence.⁴

Five reasons were attributed for the unprecedented election-year growth. The first reason was that President Lopez Mateos announced he would use government funds, if needed, to aid increased production. The second reason was that the administration carried out fiscal reforms, particularly in the tax structure. In 1958, there were 700,000 taxpayers in Mexico, but the 1964 fiscal reforms increased this number to 4.5 million. Tax collections were expected to reach 15,954 million pesos, an increase of 2,150 million pesos over 1963's total. It was thought that Mexico would

² This economic fall is not caused from uncertainty as to whom the new president will be, for he is always the PRI candidate, but rather because of the uncertainty as to what the new president's economic policies might be.
³ Ibid., p. 54.
⁴ Ibid.
impose a personal income tax in the near future and there were indications that a progressive rate would end Mexico's standing as a low-tax country for residents.¹ Tax reforms effective in 1965 provided for the inclusion of the decentralized agencies and government-owned enterprises.²

The general confidence in Mexican economy was the third reason for the economic growth of 1964. In that year, 1.4 million shares of stock were traded on the Mexico City stock exchange in the first four months. In 1963, a total of 1.6 million shares were sold for the entire year. In certain areas, high production resulted in job creation and the fostering of local business confidence. Mexico's National Mining Association finished planning the $75 million project which would convert San Luis Potosi into an immense industrial and mining complex. One of the most outstanding examples of confidence was the private Mexican firm, Mexican Longaria Enterprises, buying out a major United States company which was operating in Mexico.³

The fourth reason for the economic prosperity was that, owing to higher purchasing power caused by an increase in minimum wages and the profit-sharing law, consumers had more

¹"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 7 (September, 1964), 595.
³"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 7 (September, 1964), 595.
money to spend than before. Under the profit-sharing law employees who originally expected to receive $40 million now expected to receive double that amount.\(^1\) The government has taken particular note of this need for an increase in the consumer market. The president of the CEC, Corona de Roral, held that the government by its nationalization of minerals, railroads, petroleum, and electrical power had proved the PRI idea of "economic growth with social justice" by increasing the masses purchasing power.\(^2\)

The record of foreign loans, on the whole self-liquidating, provided the fifth reason for the optimistic economic picture. Private foreign investors invested around $1,500 million in Mexico in 1963. The United States' share comprised about $1,300 million of this. Many foreign firms sought Mexican companies which were willing to take in foreign capital.\(^3\) In addition to private foreign capital investment, there has been a noticeable increase in private investment by domestic firms.

The climate of confidence which prevails in Mexico, its political stability, the monetary and credit measures and government expenditure on infrastructural

\(^1\) *Ibid.*


\(^3\) "Mexico," *Hispanic American Report*, XVIII, No. 7 (September, 1964), 596.

programs have promoted a substantial increase in private investment and a greater flow of external savings, both private and public.¹

Private investment represented 54.2 per cent of total investment in 1963 and continued at a high level in 1964 placing emphasis in construction industry, cement, chemicals, steel, automobiles and machinery.²

The government has placed great importance upon the establishment of a firm basis for the development of a public works program. In 1962, it issued a directive to all department and government ministries requesting that they draw a national plan which would coordinate their actions. The governors of the states were also made aware of the new impetus in public planning and have joined in developing plans for industrialization, transportation, irrigation, and electrification. And in public works planning, the government has embarked upon a project to incorporate more of Mexico's population into the process and profits of modernization by spreading new industries throughout Mexico rather than concentrating them around the big cities. The government has also composed a list of 600 industrial products which it has urged private industry to manufacture, for it feels that these listed products are essential to further development.³

¹Ibid.
²Ibid.
Government shares in the general economic confidence. In 1964 its budget was 15 per cent higher than that of 1963 and the 1965 Federal budget totaled $1,428.3 million which was an increase of 11.9 per cent over 1964. It appears as if Mexican economy is expanding and the general feeling is that of confidence for the future.¹

PRI Stability

The preceding pages that dealt with the stability of the PRI seemed to conclude that the PRI is resting upon a firm base. They predict a bright future for the Mexican one party system and support the leaders' confidence in its continuance.

The PRI, by its own political machinery, can extend to the whole of Mexican society. Through its committee structure at the national, state, and local levels, and its sector organizations, the PRI is able to feel the pulse of the populace and provide them with an institutionalized structure through which they can participate in realizing their political, economic, and social objectives. Yet it must be noted that the centralized nature of this machinery also enables the party to maintain a firm control in the chain of command.

The party's identification with the government offers a second means through which it can communicate with and direct society. By its control of the executive, administrative, legislative, and judicial branches at all levels of

government, it is able to set the guide-lines of Mexican development and again exist as the main channel through which Mexican citizens strive to obtain their goals.

By its identification as the "official party" and the party of the Revolution, the PRI has become hallowed to the extent that a vote against the PRI is unpatriotic, for it is a vote against the ideals and goals of the Mexican Nation.

The party, since its formation in 1929, has maintained itself in an unchallengeable position. It has not only represented a majority, but a staggering majority. The PRI has been successful in organizing the main interests of farm, labor, and the middle class into its sector organizations and it has most often succeeded in incorporating major outside interests such as business groups and the Church, and even opposition parties into its deliberating process. It presents the idea that it is only within this majority that an interest group can succeed. This preceding idea seems analogous to the United States' two party system. Over a period of years no third party in the United States has been able to poll any sufficient amount of votes. The voters want to be on the side of the winner and it is evident that third parties have little chance of being the winner against the power of the established majority. And so it is in Mexico, for the opposition parties have little chance in being a winner against the established majority, the PRI, which has through the years increased its position of power in its attempt to establish stability and continuity.
CHAPTER V

PRI AND INSTABILITY

PRI's Identification with the Government

Although arguments have been extended as to the stability of the Mexican one-party system, elements of instability do exist and will be considered in this chapter.

The argument has been advanced that governmental and party control are being weakened by the decentralization of the governmental process. Decentralization can be especially noted in the role of the executive, because the president can no longer govern in detail but must allocate responsibility to other officials, for the demands of society, actuated by industrialization, have multiplied and require more specialized knowledge. Truly competent administrators are difficult to find, and, once appointed, their removal is unlikely. Thus these administrators, and also many elected officials, becoming more independent and acquiring broader areas of discretion, are forming political machines which could pose a potential threat to the party's control.¹

Dissatisfaction with government officials has been voiced by Mexicans. Because of the synonymous nature of the government and the party, the citizens' displeasure is a reflection on the PRI.

It has been noted that party members hold most government positions and that often leaders of the various sectors have prominent positions in the government department which corresponds to their sector. This process has been termed polyfunctionalism. Such polyfunctionalism often causes the leaders to lose loyalty to the organization which originally placed them in power and to use their new position to acquire personal gain. This has been particularly apparent in the Labor Sector. Union leaders have often lost view of the interests of their organization and have become tools of the government. The strikes of 1958 and 1959 may have shown dissatisfaction with the PRI controlled leadership.

The demands of the rank-and-file developed out of grievances which sprang from the realization that the party-union relationship has changed from union support of the party to party domination of the unions, by means of venal leaders. For years it has been so obvious that men become leaders of labor for personal profit and political power that it has been remarked openly throughout the country.

\[1\text{Taylor, op. cit., pp. 738-739.}\]
The party seems to be confronted by the fact that many members place self-interest above the collectivity. Frank Tannenbaum observes that "the decline in the personal integrity so essential to the new responsibilities thrown upon both government and private enterprise . . . is the greatest single moral failure of the Mexican Revolution."¹

A common saying in Mexico has been that corruption and bribery (mordida) have oiled the gears of the party. During the mid-twenties to the mid-forties, the three sectors were saturated with corruption. For example, labor circulated lists with the names of the labor officials and the sums expected by the officials if they were to settle a dispute.² Graft and corruption also played a part in the period from 1946 to 1952, the time of President Miguel Aleman.

The Alemán administration was noted for its grandiose economic activities. . . . It also became noted later by word of mouth and in the Mexico City newspapers for the corruption accompanying all of these projects, and for the very profitable economic strangleholds reputedly held by such men as Jorge Pasquel, with his oil distribution monopoly in the capital, . . . or Antonio Díaz Lombardo, who made a fortune in transport and by milking the Social Security Department.³

²Needler, "The Political Development of Mexico", p. 310.
³Scott, op. cit., p. 250.
Government agrarian institutions, the Banco Agrario, the Banco Ejidal, and the Departamento de Asuntos Agrarios y Colonización (DAAC) have allegedly been involved in corruption concerning the handling of financial grants to the ejidos and have been accused of unjust dealings in the distribution of land to the peasants. Often corrupt, minor politicians have held positions of authority in the agrarian institutions and have allowed large landholders to keep land which should be distributed to peasants. An illustrative example of such corruption could be seen in the case involving the DAAC and the peasants of Toluca, Mexico. In Toluca, lands had been granted the peasants since 1940, but a close friendship that existed between DAAC officials and the owners of the latifundios prevented the actual transfer of property. Since 1940, the Supreme Court has handed down decisions which favored the new ejidatarios, but threats of armed force by the DAAC dissuaded the peasants from taking over their land. Finally, in April, 1964, some peasants took possession of the Toluca land against the force of the DAAC.¹

Corruption has caused men to lose faith in the idea of the Revolution. Generals Barragan and Tevino, in 1954, dismayed with the loss of revolutionary honor and zeal, ¹

¹"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVII, No. 7 (September, 1964), 496.
particularly during the corrupt Aleman administration, broke from the PRI and formed the Partido Autentico de la Revolucion Mexicana (PARM), the party which claims to represent the true revolutionary goals. ¹

PRI and the Revolution

Other Mexicans, such as Emilo Portes Gil, David Siqueiros, and Marcantonio Diaz Infante, maintain that the party has neglected, betrayed and altered the goals of the Revolution for its own pragmatic approach.

Many maintain that the agrarian reform program, one of the main principles of the Revolution, has been plagued by graft and deception. Emilo Portes Gil, for example, notes that the benefits of the Revolution are not being distributed effectively throughout the entire population, and that thirty million live in misery while five million are privileged. ²

The charge of violating the 1917 Constitution was also levied by David Siqueiros. He was arrested in March, 1962 under the Law of Social Dissolution. ³ During his trial, he condemned the government's violation of the 1917 Constitution in regard to the division of power. He warned that the

¹Scott, op. cit., p. 187.
²"Bright Spot In The Hemisphere," U.S. News and World Report, LVI, No. 8 (February 24, 1964), 96-97.
³This law, passed in 1941, intended to apply to those persons obstructing government's aims, is vague and has often been interpreted by the State to apply to persons expressing disagreement with the regime's policies.
judiciary and legislative branches were controlled by the executive and warned that the future of democracy of Mexico was endangered by the development of an autocratic type of government.1

On April 17, 1962, the Zapata Movement, led by Marcantonio Diaz Infante, petitioned the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council for diplomatic recognition as the government of Mexico and for free elections within the next six months under U.N. supervision. Among the charges against the government were that it had continually withheld the freedoms expressed in the Constitution of 1917 and that it had deprived the Mexican people of effective suffrage, one of the original goals of the Revolution.2

Since the PRI can and does change the definition of the revolutionary goals, the Revolution has come to be what the regime says it is.3 An example of this can be seen in the PRI's identification of industrialization with the Revolution, for originally industrialization was not mentioned in the revolutionary objectives or in the Constitution of 1917. It could even be argued that the revolutionaries were fighting

1 "Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 3 (May, 1962), 205.
3 Taylor, op. cit., p. 731.
against the over-emphasis that Porfirio Díaz had placed upon industrialism and his neglect of agrarianism. It is paradoxical to note that now the pendulum seems to be swinging again toward industrialism and away from agrarianism.

Vernon mentions that although the president receives great majorities, his position is unsteady for there is no one revolutionary ideology that binds the many splinters together.¹ It was stated that "the universal allegiance of the leaders of the PRI to the Revolution has only slightly more substance than the asserted allegiance of the United States politician to the Founding Fathers."² Even though general goals such as equitable distribution of land and decent labor conditions are connected with the Revolution, wide areas are left to the manner, methods and timing for the fulfillment of the goals, for the interests of the PRI encompass little short of the 180 degree span of opinion which typifies European parliamentary structure.³ It is further noted that all of these splinters deserve some measure of access and accommodation if the dissension within the party is to be kept within tolerable limits. This question of whether the PRI can continue to represent the interests that are emerging in the pluralistic

¹Vernon, op. cit., p. 13.
³Ibid.
society is paramount in the consideration of the party's continuance.

PRI and the Pluralistic Society

Isaac Deutscher, in his discussion of the Russian one-party system, foresees the collapse of the monolithic party structure of Russia. He argues that the rising working class possesses a potential political power. He states that it has only been since the 1950's that the working class has been consolidated as a "modern social force, acquiring an urban industrial tradition, becoming aware of itself, and gaining confidence."\(^1\) Since this time, the working class has sought a new egalitarianism. Heretofore, they had found themselves only nominally equal since in their actual position they were subsidiary to the ruling groups, the intellectuals, the managerial class and the government bureaucrats. Even today, he sees the working class as being semiarticulate and limited to fragmentary and scattered manifestations. However, the workers' present and potential power is being noticed, and the government has tried to pacify them with reform legislation.\(^2\) Nevertheless, the working class continues to emerge as a growing threat to the existing political


\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 59-62.
system. V.O. Key also notes that the working class, along with the effects of urbanization, can lead to the disintegration of the one-party system.

Mexican society is experiencing modernization and is becoming more pluralistic. As Western economic and social conditions begin to operate even more effectively in Mexican culture, interest groups may become more competitive and complex to the point that the PRI machinery will not be able to satisfy them.¹

If this occurs, it probably will involve multiplication of the specialized interests participating in politics, together with a basic change in nature of membership in such interest groups, creating multiple political motivating forces not now present. Certainly the introduction of education, the expansion of social sophistication, and the spread of political awareness have accelerated the weakening of personalistic relationships and the growth of overlapping memberships in interest groups and associations which can and do find themselves in competition on given public policy issues.²

The question that arises is whether, as the general level of society rises, will the party be able to rise with it. "As professional politicians--and, in the wider sense, as leaven to an unpolitical mass--the PRI personnel are first rate; the question is whether they will be effective as executors and instruments of a parallel government in a modern society."³

¹Scott, op. cit., p. 31.
²Ibid.
³Botsford, op. cit., p. 16.
The PRI, as any group which broadens its interests, must be ready to deal with diverse interests. The inclusion of many interests may stimulate dissatisfaction among the diverse elements, and "the range of interest included may become so wide as to cause gratification of the policy proposals at one terminus of the spectrum to run counter to the aims and interests of groupings at the other." There are interests and pressures in the country that can no longer be denied, and if they are not placated, it may be possible that their dissatisfaction could bring about the disintegration of the current system. For example, it is observed that at present there is a great deal of unrest in the labor and agrarian sectors of the PRI. This unrest could be regarded as a rejection of the PRI's control over the sector organizations.

Interests Inside the PRI

If any single area were to be chosen as the most unstable spot in the PRI administration, the rural region would undoubtedly be it. The agrarian situation currently presents the gravest threat to party stability. The importance of the agrarian element is obvious; it comprises 50 per cent of the economically active population; a total of 60 per cent of Mexico's exports come from agriculture; and

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1 Padgett, "Popular Participation in the Mexican One-Party System", p. 270.
2 Taylor, op. cit., pp. 735-740.
internal farm production constitutes almost the sole source of Mexico's food. However, less than 22 per cent of the national income is distributed among the rural population.\textsuperscript{1} The overpopulated, under-employed rural segment exists, as a whole, in a setting of abject poverty with its rural slums and hunger for land. Recently, in 1958, the straits of the Farm Sector were illustrated with the demonstrations of the paracaidistas. The paracaidistas, rural peasants who illegitimately migrated and "squatted" upon large tracts of land, held that these estates (latifundios) were in excess of and in violation of the maximum land allotment of the agrarian reform rules.

These paracaidistas' demonstrations, the hunger marches, the alleged corruption of government agrarian institutions, and the uneven distribution of income have caused the rural sector to emerge explosively as the party's major problem.

The great unrest within the rural sector has become progressively noticeable in the past few years. The PRI leadership, aware of the seriousness of the demonstrations' implications, has begun to stress the agrarian sector as a primary target for social, economic and political reform. Yet violence still persists. A few examples from the period

\textsuperscript{1}"Mexico," 	extit{Hispanic American Report}, XVII, No. 6 (August, 1964), 495.
of 1962 to 1965 give an indication of the bitterness and strife that has taken place between the agrarians and the government.

In February, 1962, two paracaidistas uprisings took place. The most notable was led by Ruben Jaramillo who with 3,000 armed peasants occupied 30,000 hectares in the state of Morelos; they were dislodged by government troops.¹

May, 1962, was a month of instability and violence that began with the brutal murder of Ruben Jaramillo and his family. The nation was incensed with the atrocity, and the government was implicated in the crime. Near the machine-gun riddled bodies of the rural peasant leader and his family, empty cartridge shells were found that bore the mark of Fabrica Nacional de Municiones, the government munitions factory. Furthermore, Army Captain Jose Martines was positively identified as the leader of the military group which kidnapped the Jaramillo family from their home.² Also in May, some 15,000 peasants of the state of Coahuila, seeking an audience with the president, began a hunger march to Mexico City. These protestors marched in opposition to

²Ibid.
the policy of the government's La Forestal Company which had reduced the price of ixtle, a fiber for coarse rope, and had refused to pay back debts. The peasants were on the verge of starvation because of these two measures. The government arbitrator promised a government loan of 20 million pesos to La Forestal Company so that it could pay all its debts and raise the price of ixtle 25 per cent. In the same month, Jacinto Lopez, leader of the workers and peasants' Union General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico, (UGOCM) threatened to invade large estates unless the administration moved faster in resolving the land reform problem. Lopez, an experienced leader in such land invasions, had led a series of land expropriations in the states of Baja California, Sonora, Sinaloa, and Colima. The government warned him that it would not tolerate further demonstrations and stated that only the president could parcel out lands and redistribute the large estates. ¹

The following month 1,200 peasants from southern Sonora began a hunger march to Mexico City in a demand for a solution of agrarian problems in the northwestern states of Nayarit, Sinaloa, and Baja California. They protested that the government's agrarian agency Departamento de Asuntos y Colonización (DAAC) had denied land to more than 100,000

¹Ibid., pp. 397-398.
peasants, and that irrigation waters had been distributed unfairly by the government. The march was allegedly led by the PPS and the UGOCM, both leftist organizations.¹

Peasants from the village of El Huanal in the township of Nautila, Veracruz appeared in July, 1962 before the DAAC to protest the burning and destruction of their village and the slaughter of their livestock and pets by state troopers and police. This onslaught was supposedly provoked by two latifundio owners who sought to intimidate the villagers from seeking the division of their latifundios under the agrarian reform laws.²

Land invasions continued and by January, 1963, 5,000 squatters had been dislodged from lands in Durango and Chihuahua. An Independent Campesino Central (CCI) was formed.³ The CCI, a leftist organization, issued the ultimatum to the government to form an acceptable land program before May or face nationwide demonstrations.⁴

In June, 1964, the CCI instigated demonstrations which culminated in riots against the presidential candidate,

¹"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 6 (August, 1962), 494.
²"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 7 (September, 1962), 588.
Díaz Ordaz, and the land reform program. Letters came from
the states of Oaxaca, Michocan, Veracruz, Puebla, Jalisco,
and Guanajuato to tell of the confusion that existed in the
ejido communities. These epistles noted the corruption
existing in the management of the Banco Ejidal which was
run by minor politicians who often allowed provincial farmers
to hold land that should have been given to the peasants.¹

These rural peasants seemed to have no ideological
goals; rather, they were showing their discontent with the
government for its negligence with regard to the agrarian
society.

This small, hopeless, revolution was a manifestation
of their determination to have social and economic
change. It was their way of saying that they now want
more than promises from a one-party "democratic"
government.²

That the Farm Sector was being neglected had been
apparent in the past. Although the CNC is the largest mass
organization in Mexico, the ejiditarios and the small farmers
are by no means a paramount power in Mexico's political
process.³ In a 1950 chart breaking down the Mexican working
force into class and income per month, it was related that

¹"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVII, No. 7
(September, 1964), 496.

²William M. Barbreri, "Is All Progress?" America
LLVI, No. 47 (February 3, 1962), 581.

³Scott, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
85.92 per cent of the lower class Mexican workers received less than 300 pesos each month while the upper and middle class workers received between 300 and 1,000 a month.\(^1\) This uneven distribution is, perhaps, attributed to the political ineffectiveness of the agrarian and urban workers and their leaders who have not represented them properly.\(^2\)

In 1957, agriculture constituted 53.5 per cent of the economically active population while industry comprised 16.8 per cent. Yet in the distribution of income, agriculture received 22.9 per cent compared to industry with 34.5 per cent.\(^3\) Even in 1964 with the government's increased agrarian program, the agrarian sector, composing 50 per cent of the economically active population, received less than 22 per cent of the national income.\(^4\)

The Labor Sector has, according to Scott, received in comparison to agriculture a higher share of benefits than its numbers warrant; it has enjoyed a better standard of living; and has very nearly equated the Farm Sector on government councils. However, all has not been harmonious

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\(^1\)A peso at this time was equivalent to 12.5 U.S. Cents.

\(^2\)Scott, op. cit., pp. 90-91.

\(^3\)Stinyard, op. cit., p. 28.

\(^4\)"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVII, No. 6 (August, 1964), 495.
within the Labor Sector. Two major factions have emerged within the sector. The CTM and its supporters, comprising 85 per cent of the Labor Sector's membership make up the Bloque de Unidad Obrera (BUO). The BUO is opposed by leftist labor groups which are led by the Confederacion Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos (CROC). Although this anti-BUO labor element received a great deal of support from the Cortines' regime, it alienated the government with the 1958 and 1959 strikes.\textsuperscript{1} Owing to the greater strength of the CTM and the government crackdown on the leftist labor unions after the 1959 demonstrations, it does not seem at present that the left-right factionalism could lead to the Labor Sector's disintegration. But if the anti-BUO element could gain by recruitment and equalize the BUO in membership, a crisis could occur. In the meantime, however, this internecine struggle has handicapped the Labor Sector in its position for power.\textsuperscript{2}

In reference to the 1958 and 1959 strikes, it was held that they indicated that the laborer was tired of having to work for the Revolution with little compensation.

\textsuperscript{1}Scott, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 164-168.
\textsuperscript{2}Taylor, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 739.
"Nationalistic pride, never edible, becomes a bad condiment when overemployed."¹ Union demonstrations voiced the idea that government of the past few years had been conservative to the extreme of almost being anti-labor and the strikes served as warnings for the government to be more generous. As mentioned previously, the strikes were also interpreted as a rebellion of the rank and file of labor against their corrupt and PRI controlled labor leaders. The rebellious attitude of the unions was expressed in a union resolution in 1958 which was passed at a special congress session. This resolution held that public office would, in the future, be incompatible with union office and that the salaries of the union officers would be reduced.²

Both the labor and agrarian sectors have received relatively less than the Popular Sector. Although the government has sought to aid both with public works programs and long range plans, the peasants of the agrarian and labor sectors have not realized it. To them aid means direct and immediate rectification of their problems.

Ironically, the present instability that is seen within the Popular Sector exists because it is receiving too many benefits. The FSTSE, the government workers union, receives

¹Taylor, op. cit., p. 739.
²Ibid.
such a high proportion of elective officers and government support that some observers wonder whether the Popular Sector can remain intact with one of its ten branches receiving such extraordinary favors. The question also arises as to whether the Popular Sector's ten branches can continue to envelop the ever-expanding interests of a modern Mexico. It is this sector more than any other which must seek to incorporate the diverse groups of society.

Although some prognosticators forecast party instability because of the splits and divisions within the sectors, others believe that the greatest potential threat to party stability comes from the sectors' having, as independent units, the strength and the ability to break from the PRI and form opposition parties.

Can the PRI's virtual monopoly of Mexican politics survive? An examination of the alternative party organizations currently available indicates that there is no present choice to be made. Yet the sectors possess the initiative if they wish to exercise it. Labor, on the one hand, and the peasants and farmers, on the other, have gained strength . . . as the result of industrialization and population increase . . . No longer junior partners, they are the major props of the party . . . Further, both interest groups, incomplete though they are at the present time in terms of composition, are more experienced in the field of political action than most parallel groups which can be found in other countries.

1 Scott, op. cit., p. 170.

PRI and Outside Interests

Threats to party stability are not confined to the interests within the PRI but are frequently found in groups which remain outside the party's official ranks. Although leftist-provoked demonstrations occur and new left-wing groups continue to form, the left does not present a serious threat to PRI stability. It is, according to Graham, "orating and pamphleteering its way to oblivion."1 Karl Schmitt states, "Today, for the most part the Communists are talking to themselves, quarreling among themselves, and sometimes voting for themselves."2 The rightist orientated groups, however, being stronger and better organized, constitute a potentially greater threat to PRI power. Among the strongest of the rightist groups is the Church.

The Church persists as a vital institution in Mexico. Statistics indicate that 97 per cent of the Mexicans claim to be Catholic and that there are 9 archbishops, 34 bishops, 6,020 priests, 1,990 seminarists, and 18,560 religious sisters.3

The potential danger posed by the strength of organized Catholic groups is indicated by the following datum. In

\[1\text{Graham, op. cit., p. 110.}\]
\[2\text{Karl M. Schmitt, "Communism In Mexico Today," Western Political Science Quarterly (March, 1963), 112.}\]
\[3\text{Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, p. 177.}\]
a study of voluntary associations in the city of Guadalajara, it was found that Mexicans in their participation in voluntary associations, concentrated their membership in Church affiliated organizations. An illustrative example was that 81.7 per cent of women's membership was centered in Church groups.¹

In 1953, the Mexican Legion of Decency, the Knights of Columbus, and the Committee for Catholic Action conducted a campaign on national morality that culminated in an assembly in which forty-four Catholic organizations, (twenty-four secular orders, and twenty pious orders) with 4,530,743 members, were represented. This assembly made known the following statistics of Catholic membership divisions:²

I. Catholic Organizations
   A. Catholic Action (Acción Católica Mexicana)
      1. Mexican Catholic Feminine Union
         a) urban workers, teachers, and campesinos
         b) total membership of 198,052
      2. Union of Mexican Catholics
         a) total membership of 44,000
      3. Catholic Action of Mexican Youth
         a) total membership 18,000
      4. Mexican Catholic Feminine Youth
         a) women's organization between ages of fifteen and thirty-five
         b) total membership 88,221

¹Dotson, op. cit., pp. 380-381.
³Ibid., p. 292.
B. National Union of Heads of Families (Unión Nacional de Padres de Familia)
   a) total membership of 500,000
C. Knights of Columbus (Caballeros de Colón)
   a) total membership 3,500
D. Federation of Catholic Schools (Federación de Colegios Particulares)
   a) Federal District colleges and schools
   b) total number 112
E. Legion of Decency (Legión Mexicana de la Decencia)
   a) twenty-five members in each of the nation's thirty-two federative entities
F. National Association of Catholic Newspapers, Writers, Publishers, and Editors (ANPELEC)
   a) total membership of 425
G. National Work of the Good Press (Obra Nacional de la Buena Prensa)

These figures suggest why the more than 4.5 million Catholics, organized into expressive interest groups, cannot be a force ignored by the PRI. Seventy-five per cent of the population is continually receiving Catholic literature. The Good Press published, in 1953, an outstanding amount:
36,971,594 Catholic literature reviews; 208,030,509 information bulletins; 5,990,539 books and pamphlets; and 13,248,093 other publications. In addition, The Good Press publishes regularly two books, eight information bulletins, and thirteen reviews each month.

It is significant to note that the Church has used its organization and its press to fight leftist movements and communism. In the early 1960's the Unión Nacional de Padres de Familia and the Acción Católica Mexicana instigated

1Ibid., pp. 292-293.
2Ibid.
demonstrations against communism. In early 1961, mass demonstrations flared against Castro and approximately 12,000 people appeared before the Basilica to pray for Cuba.¹ The Church's hierarchy issued the July Declaration of Catholic Principles; this document warned against Communist Party membership, possession of communist literature or approval of communist action, and threatened excommunication to those who violated the Declaration.²

Catholic organizations have also challenged the government's federal education system. On February 2, 1962, 150,000 persons, sponsored by the Unión Nacional de Padres de Familia and other anti-communist groups, paraded in protest to the government's primary school compulsory text book program. The protestors claimed that the government was trying to indoctrinate students with the idea of state supremacy and separate the child from his family.³ Another rightist group, the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) supported the Church on the text book issue. The PAN has often seemed to be the Church's political appendage. PAN supporters are strong Catholics and have selected such a man as

¹ "Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XIV, No. 6 (August, 1961), 481.
² Graham, op. cit., p. 108.
José Gonzalez Torres, president of the Catholic lawyers association, for their presidential candidate in the 1964 campaign.¹

The PAN may be profiting from the extended tendency of Mexicans to regard it as the main opposition party. The PAN seems to be the focal point for what opposition there is to the PRI.² The PAN has benefited from the change in electoral rules; it now holds twenty seats in the Chamber. Many observers maintain that this representation in Congress may permit and lead to debating and discussion of bills and resolutions. Thus, this participation and strengthening of representation by opposition parties may be a factor that can lead to the eventual disintegration of the one party system.

Another rightist element which remains outside the party is business. The business and industrial groups, as mentioned previously, deal with government through the cámaras organizations. It is common, however, for businessmen to support other parties such as PAN. It is known that business groups often finance the publication of books, articles and pamphlets against specific government policies.³

Although the government receives the general support of the newer and more progressive business groups, the older

¹Ibid.
conservative business groups look askance at the government's active role in the promotion of industrialization. The conservatives feel that the government is exceeding its boundaries by interfering in private enterprise and view with fear the public sector's encroachment upon the private sector.

Government control of business has increased through legislation, decrees, licenses, and import control. In 1961, Mexico's economy experienced a state of stagnation. Private investors became reluctant to invest and a flight of capital, freezing of investments, decline in production, and accumulation of stock occurred as a result. The government intervened to the extent that in 1962 for the first time public investment equalled that of private investment. Although this government intervention seemed necessary, the government's economic policy was subjected to a great amount of criticism.¹

PRI and Mexican Economics

In 1962, at the annual meeting of the Asociación de Banqueros de Mexico, Heriberto Vidales, the president of the businessmen's Confederación de Cámaras de Comercio, said that the best way to attract private investment was to provide a propitious climate for capital. At this same meeting, Harold Linder, president of the Export-Import Bank, held that in spite of the government investments being

¹"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 4 (June, 1962), 305.
desirable it could inhibit the flow of private capital.\footnote{Ibid.}

Raymond Vernon viewed the stagnation of Mexican economy in the early sixties with concern and suggested that the uncertainty of a multiparty system may be preferable "to the paralysis of single party in search of unanimity."\footnote{Vernon, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 191.} It was felt that the past and present presidents of Mexico, by trying to sustain the appearance of unanimity, and by taking a middle of the road stand, had become fearful of taking a position that would offend either side, and consequently they had eased themselves into a political strait jacket. Vernon held that if the president were to take Mexican economics out of its present slump, he must become stronger and take steps that could lead to controversy. Vernon proposed the following solutions to the economic dilemma; (1) more public investment, (2) a revision of the domestic tax structure, (3) more private investment, and (4) more foreign investment.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 184-186.} (It can be noted that the Mexican government eventually used these measures.)

Although the Mexican economy came out of this stagnation period, problems still exist in the economic sector. Before businessmen can be persuaded to invest in the manufacturing of domestic products, a better domestic market has to be

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developed. At present two-thirds of the urban poor, the ejidal farmers and the small land owners must be considered as outside the market for modern products.¹

Price disparity and unequal distribution of income were considered reasons for economic stagnation and also were factors which resulted in the weak domestic market. In the last seven years, there has been a steady gain of the wealthy at the expense of the poor. In 1957, 4.9 per cent of the Mexican families received 36.6 per cent of the national income and by 1963, 4.8 per cent received 39.8 per cent of the income. In a meeting of the Convención Nacional de Centros Patronales, the Undersecretary of Industry and Commerce, Hugo B. Margain, asked the delegates to overcome the anemia of the internal market. He urged that employers strengthen the purchasing power of their workers by paying them better wages and developing a profit-sharing program.² By the end of 1964, both of these measures had been taken, yet a notable disparity remained in the distribution of incomes and the consequential weakness of the internal market continued.

PRI and Instability

Although the PRI's goal is to present a harmonious front, it can be observed that discordant factors continue

¹Ibid.
to persist and to challenge the one-party supremacy.

It has been suggested that the PRI political machine is hindered by decentralization resulting from an attempt to pacify the demands of a pluralistic society. Criticism has been aimed at the political machine for its failure to represent the people, for too often government officials, seeking personal gain, have been involved in graft and corruption, and have placed their own interests over that of the people and the nation.

The interest of the nation is supposedly coterminous with the goals of the Revolution, but many feel that the goals of the Revolution are merely changed and adjusted to meet the pragmatic requirements of the party. It is pointed out that the Revolution's Constitution of 1917 is adhered to nominally but not in actuality. Its stipulation for division of power among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches has gone unheeded, and charges have been made that effective suffrage has not been granted. Some feel that the vagueness of revolutionary goals and ideology has resulted in the PRI's trying to rule over splinter groups of diverse interests. The argument is extended from this that the party will not be able to maintain its monopolistic control in a modernizing and pluralistic society, for new and conflicting interests will continue to arise and will proliferate to the extent that no one source can satisfy and control them.
It is perceived by some that the disintegration of the party will come from within its own ranks by the breaking away of the sectors or by factionalism within the sectors. Even though minor disruptions are seen within the labor and popular sectors, no current danger from their rebellion seems apparent. But the turmoil, strife and struggle that is presently observable within the Farm Sector represents a formidable threat to party stability.

Outside the party, the greatest sources of agitation can be found in the rightist groups. The Catholic Church, nominally claimed to be the church of 97 per cent of the Mexican people, controls through its active organizations and press coverage a sizeable segment of society which it can mobilize to support its measures. The PAN, a rightist and pro-clerical party, has come to be considered as the major opposition party in Mexican politics. Since the electoral reform laws of 1964, it has acquired twenty seats in the Chamber of Deputies; this new access to representation in the legislative arena may lead to more active debate that could eventually culminate in organized and active opposition within the Congress to PRI policy. Economic stagnation in Mexico in the early sixties appeared as a failure of the party to adjust economic policy between the public and private investment. Even though this problem has been rectified at present, continued success depends on the precarious
balancing of business and government. The problem of unequal income distribution and a weak internal market also remains a major hurdle to Mexican economic stability.

Thus, it seems, that although the PRI reigns as a dominant one-party system, elements of dissatisfaction and potential challengers do exist and pose a threat to the continuance and stability of the Mexican one-party system.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Mexico has progressively become a democratic country and is noted for its political stability among Latin American countries. Since 1928 the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) has been the Mexican nation's guide along the road of advancement and modernization. The PRI provides the Mexican people with an institutionalized system through which they can channel their interests and seek their goals, for it acts as a means of mediation and communication between the people and government. The party has sought to substitute peaceful transference of power through elections, persuasion, and compromise, for rebellions, military uprisings and physical coercion which have so often typified the Latin American political arenas. The PRI, in seeking to represent the goals of the Revolution and the Mexican nation, has tried to incorporate the major interests of farm, labor, and the middle class, and in addition has also acted as a conciliator and a guide for those interest groups which have chosen to remain outside of its ranks.

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The PRI has managed for thirty-six years to be the dominant non-dictatorial party which has been flexible enough to obtain the over-whelming support from the Mexican populace and remained relatively unchallenged to continue its one party rule. It is the contention of this chapter that, judging from the party's past and present stability, the PRI will continue its monopoly of the Mexican political system. In this concluding chapter, a final analysis of the party will be made which will support this view.

The PRI, as a formally organized political agency, provides a systematized mechanism through which functional groupings may adjust their conflicts and seek their goals.

The strength and lasting influence of the revolutionary party results in no small measure from the high degree (for Mexico) of cohesion it has been able to achieve through the interrelated devices of this effective sector-party machinery and the activities of a party leader-president who can manipulate the party organization, the formal agencies of government, and the bureaucracies of both.

Whether they be inside or outside the party's ranks, the PRI has been most successful in representing and stabilizing Mexican interests. In its quest for unanimity, the party has walked a tightrope, taking care not to lean too far to the left nor too far to the right, and by this method of eclecticism, it has managed to represent both the progressive and conservative elements of society.

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1Scott, op. cit., p. 175.
The question may be raised as to whether the PRI can continue, in a modernizing, industrial, pluralistic society, to represent the ever-increasing diverse interests. Deutscher and Key in their general theory, that can be applied to one-party systems, think not, for they contend that urbanization and industrialization are elements resulting in the disintegration of the one-party system. Both note that expansion of politically cognizant labor groups can result in factionalism which will lead to the termination of the one-party system. Many Latin American authorities recognized the possibility of the Deutscher-Key theory being applicable to the one-party system of Mexico.

In contrast to this school of thought are such men as Betrand Raul and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Although their theory concerns the one-party states of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, it does have relevance in this study of the Mexican one-party system. Raul and Brzezinski contend that a modern technological and industrial society makes it possible for the one-party state to become more institutionalized, thus insuring the continuance of a more pervading and compact party system. Thus it is felt by some authorities that the PRI gains strength as Mexico undergoes the process of modernization for the PRI exists as the sole political agency which offers a permanent, institutionalized mechanism. Scott.
supports this view in the following quotation.

To put it another way, as their number and diversity grow, Mexico's proliferating functional interests feel a growing dependency upon those party mechanisms for adjusting their conflicts. It is neither the PRI itself nor any individual president, so much as the need for adjustment among the competing interests which both serve, that motivates interest associations to act within the official party or to accept its part in the decision-making process if they do not happen to belong to one of the three sectors.1

It is significant that the PRI, being aware of the expanding interests in society, has sought to envelop them within its sectors particularly through inclusion in the Popular Sector, essentially the sector of the middle class. The importance of the middle class must not go unnoticed; in Mexico it is the middle class which is now guiding the government and the Revolution. As Mexican society increasingly experiences the process of transition of modernization, more of its citizens are joining the ranks of the middle class. This middle class is seen by Scott, Needler, and Johnson as a factor which tends toward moderation and acts as a steadying influence in Mexican politics; the middle class, by its nature, tends towards conservatism and has supported the PRI middle-of-the-road position.

The Popular Sector, owing a great deal to its primarily middle class membership, has evolved into the strongest and the most politically active of the PRI's three sectors. It

1Scott, op. cit., p. 175.
is this sector which has exceeded the other two in congressional representation, and because of the Popular Sector's containing the FSTSE, the government bureaucrat's union, it has been the beneficiary of government favor. It thus seems that the Popular Sector, receiving governmental benefits, by its influence and numerical strength will continue to gain in power and in numbers and will most likely remain in the ranks of the official party.

The Labor Sector appears to be a secure and steady force within the party structure. No major strikes have occurred since the 1958-1959 series and Lopez Mateos, noted for his ability to deal with labor, was able to gain labor's support during his administration.

The government extended benefits of social security, old age insurance, and unemployment compensation to labor. Recently, in an attempt to make a more even distribution of income and to strengthen the laborers' purchasing powers, Congress passed a law that introduced a new sharing plan which would permit workers to share in company profits. Organized labor lauded the government for its action and regarded this plan as the fulfillment of a long awaited dream.

Although problems have risen within the Labor Sector when its leaders have failed to represent it, measures have been taken to prevent such a reoccurrence. The CTM and its BUO groups continue to stabilize and head the Labor Sector of
the PRI. From all signs, it seems as if Labor will continue to seek its objectives and solve its differences within the ranks of the PRI.

At present the greatest threat to the PRI's stability comes from the Farm Sector which is experiencing instability and strife. Overpopulation, unemployment, poverty, graft and corruption plague the Farm Sector and cause the rural region to rise in protest with hunger marches and paracaidistas' demonstrations. The Lopez and the Ordaz administrations, aware of the agrarian plight, have begun to emphasize agrarian reform.

The government has sought to aid the Farm Sector by establishing public works projects for irrigation and electrification, by educating the rural people to modern means of farm technology, by providing for a distribution of land on a more rational base, by opening unexploited areas to colonization, by seeking to rectify the unemployment problem by the introduction of light industry, by extension of credit to the ejidos, and by eradicating corruption in its agrarian institutions. Thus, it can be seen that the government is not being idle but is constructively trying to resolve the dilemma of the Farm Sector.

Nevertheless, extreme poverty persists, and peasants often unable to see the value of the long range projects of the government, continue to remain dissatisfied. It is
probable that at present this sector, or at least a
major part of it, could break from the ranks of the
official party. Yet if this sector did break away from
the PRI, there is little fear of it forming an opposition
party which could successfully challenge the PRI, for the
Farm Sector, since its origin, has been the least articu­
late of the three sector organizations. And the rural area,
although being continually exposed to modern techniques,
still remains relatively isolated from the major impacts
of modernization. Except for spontaneous eruptions, polit­
cical apathy and unawareness prevail among its members.

Consequently, it appears that although the Farm Sector
is unstable and offers the greatest threat to the PRI, its
threat is not grave enough to disrupt the basic stability
of the PRI. It seems as if the party machine has been suc­
cessful in securing the support of the labor and popular
sectors. Therefore, for the present and in the foreseeable
future, the PRI most likely will be able to escape any
serious internal disintegration within its sectors.

The party machine has stabilized its internal structure
by allowing democracy to function within its ranks. To date
neither the Congress nor elections have provided an arena
for political action. It is significant that the PRI has
established a stage for such action within its own ranks.
Here, through the interaction of sector representatives,
party committees, and government officials, intra-party elections are held and decided, decisions are formulated, and compromises are made.

The PRI is becoming more democratic in its general make up, for it has sought to reach out and allow increasing participation from the grass-roots elements. The people have more voice in their choice of representatives, and local and state political bosses are becoming a part of the past. Disputes are generally settled by administration and law-enforcement, and such incidents as the Jaramillo murder and the burning of El Huanal village are isolated from the general practice of Mexican law enforcement.

The Zapata Movement of 1962 protested that the Mexican people were being deprived of effective suffrage and it is generally admitted that the real power struggle exists in intra-party elections, not in the official Mexican elections. However, elections have begun to become more democratic. Opposition party candidates are allowed to campaign openly throughout Mexico. Elections have become more peaceful until in 1964 there was not a major uprising or demonstration; for the first time, the opposition candidate formally conceded the election. An effort was made in 1964 to reform the election laws to enable minority parties to have more opportunity for representation in Congress.

Because more popular participation is urged and increasing interests have arisen, it has been necessary
for responsibility, in decision making, to be allocated among officials at the various levels of government. This has not been a reversion toward the system of political bosses, for strong, central control continues to emanate from the president. No official figure can remain in his position if he is opposed to the president's policy, and the president still has the power to make or break leaders of the interest groups.

That there is considerable overlapping in government, party, and sector personnel has been noted. Imputations have been made that often this polyfunctionalism causes government officials to seek personal gain at the expense of their sector's interests. At times this has been true, but recently pressure upon sector officials, such as the strikes of 1958, and the newly passed labor resolution on labor officials which forbids them to hold a political position at the same time they are representing labor, seek to eradicate the corrupt system of old. It is important that, since the termination of the Aleman administration, Mexico has taken major strides in preventing graft and corruption in its politics.

Polyfunctionalism can, if it is used rightly, be advantageous. By choosing sector members to serve as party and government officials, men are chosen who are informed and are qualified to deal with the sectors' problems. The overlapping and interaction have also afforded all sides a more
direct means of communication than they would ordinarily have if there were no such integration.

The party's becoming identified with the government has helped to make it more stable in the minds of the people. The PRI has become the official political party of the government. And through the government the PRI has been able to control the executive, legislative, judicial and administrative branches of the nation for nearly forty years.

During this period the PRI has also identified itself with the Revolution. The Almond-Verba study concluded that the Revolution continues to have an important psychological effect upon the people. They found that pride in the Mexican nation was dependent to a considerable extent on the PRI's continuing symbolic identification with the Revolution. Of the Mexicans interviewed in this study, 65 per cent could name general goals of the Revolution. These goals, being broad and general, have remained as a national unifying force and have been the basis of the party's platform.

The party has been accused of amending the revolutionary goals to the extent that it has substituted its own pragmatic measure for the original value of the Revolution. It is to be pointed out that the revolutionary goals, from the beginning, were ambiguous. From its inception, the party has interpreted the goals to comply with the times. It has, by this flexibility and adaptability, kept the revolutionary
goals alive to act as a restraint against excesses of private investment, and to stimulate social, economic, and political justice among the Mexican citizenry.

Charges have been levied against the PRI that it has abandoned the ideals of the Revolution since many have felt that party and government officials have become too occupied with graft and personal gain to carry out the ideal of the Revolution. Even though corruption exists today (notable in the government agrarian institutions), the Mexican government, probably more than any other Latin American government, is rising above the tradition of mordida. Public officials such as Diaz Ordaz recognize corruption within the government and have taken measures to eradicate it.

The PRI's success in its quest for unanimity extends to circles outside the official party. For the party is generally able to convince outside interests that since the PRI has the undisputable majority, a minority interest can most easily achieve its goal through the PRI. An example of the convincing manner of the PRI could be noted in the 1964 presidential election when two of the three legally recognized opposition parties, (the PPS and the PARM) supported and voted for the PRI presidential candidate.

Other opposition parties such as the extra-legal rightist parties, the Frente Patriota de Mexico, the Unión Sinarquista, the Partido Demócratico Cristiano, and the Movimiento Social Democrática and the extra-legal leftist
parties, the Frente Electoral del Puebla, the Central Campesina and the Partido Comunista Mexicana offered nothing but weak and confused challenges.

The Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) helped to maintain its growing reputation as the main opposition party by being the only legally recognized party to run a presidential candidate in 1964. The PAN experienced a gain in its representation in Congress by acquiring 20 seats in the Chamber; this, many feel, could cause Congress to regain its constitutional position as a major branch of the Mexican government. If active debate took place in Congress, a new political arena would exist to which the interests of Mexico could take their requests and problems for settlement. At the moment, however, many hold that this is not likely to happen, for the PAN itself regards this new representation more as a honorary recognition rather than a means by which it could participate in active debate on the floor of the Congress.\(^1\) Since the PRI continues to hold such a staggering majority in Congress, it can be assumed that even with the new method of representation, it would be unlikely for the Congress to emerge as a governmental branch which engages in meaningful deliberation, for it appears as if legislation will continue to be decided upon before its presentation to Congress. If opposition

\(^1\)The writer has seen no reference to increased participation or engagement of opposition parties in Congressional debate since the new representation policy has been in effect.
parties did voice their complaints, the only utility in their doing so would be that at least the Congress could be used as a sounding board for the opposition.

The PAN has suffered from the PRI's swing toward the right, and the selection of the conservative Díaz Ordaz served as a blow to many areas of PAN support. Ordaz's moderate, conservative and anti-communist position cut into the PAN vote and caused many conservatives to bolt for the first time from PAN ranks to vote for a PRI candidate.

This recent rightist orientation of the PRI has placated the major rightist institutional organization, the Catholic Church. Although the Church, with its large membership, Catholic organizations, and press coverage, could muster enough strength to challenge PRI stability, it seems unlikely. For the present, the Church and government seem to have agreed on a peaceful co-existence. The government has attempted to gain Church support by a loose interpretation of the Constitution's anti-clerical provisions. The government has also become much more rightist and has joined the Church in its fight against communism. The Church, too, has acquiesced by becoming more liberal. The Papal Encyclical, *Mater et Magistra*, advocating social, economic and political justice for the laboring class, has become the twentieth century Bible of the Church in Mexico.

Another major rightist institution is the military. Most authorities concur, however, that the military presents
no threat to the Mexican government, and as a unit it is out of Mexican politics. It is contended that the military personnel, generally of middle-class background, tend to sympathize with the PRI. Further, it is noted that often military personnel become affiliated in the sectors, most often within the Popular Sector. Business and industrial groups have existed outside the PRI's organization. But through the special chambers, the CONCAMIN and the CONCANCO, the PRI has been able to institutionalize the interrelations of government and business. These cámaras are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy, and represent the major business interests of Mexico. In addition, private trade and commercial groups exist and seek their interests through the Presidential Office.

There is a division in the business community between the old group and the new group and disagreement is voiced by the two groups in relation to the amount of government investment that should be allowed. Although the two groups may differ on the degree of government investment, they both concur that government investment and protection is needed and wanted. Brandenburg's conclusion seems correct when he states that "Mexican business prefers a stable nation and accordingly at least passively supports the PRI and actively supports the government."¹

Government and business do not compete but cooperate. It is the duty of the Mexican government to set the economic stage and business must then supplement it. Through National Financiera, the government has invested capital in virgin fields and has sought to concentrate investment where lack of capital has existed. The government has also joined the mixed companies by investing along with private Mexican and foreign capital. The government has aided Mexico's private industries with its policies on tariffs, fixation of import controls, labor legislation, exemption from taxes and its extension of credit and subsidies.

Between the years of 1939 and 1950, an unprecedented growth was noted in the Mexican economy. Except for a brief stagnation period in the early 1960's, the Mexican economy has been increasing substantially. Particularly significant was the fact that in 1964 the Mexican economy did not experience the usual and expected economic fall which occurs during presidential election years. Rather, investment from private investors, domestic and foreign, increased. The cloak of confidence seemed to cover the Mexican economic scene in 1964. This confidence extended into 1965 with the government increasing the Federal budget 11.9 per cent over its 1964 budget. Yet it is to be noted that shortcomings are still evident in the uneven distribution of national income. However, it is held that such measures as revision of the tax structure and wage sharing laws will eventually help to solve this disparity
in distribution.

Thus, one could say that although problems are present in Mexican economics there is a general feeling of confidence and a belief that future prospects for investment and production are promising.

In conclusion, it appears as if the PRI will remain the dominant force in Mexican politics. The elements of stability have set a concrete base for the continuance of the PRI and have prevented the rise of any opposition capable of successfully challenging the one party system.

One of the most significant elements of stabilization has been the party’s own political machine. Through this machine, the PRI has provided an institutionalized mechanism through which the proliferating, functional interests of Mexico could channel their interests and seek their political, social and economic goals. In addition, this machine has provided the only arena where popular participation and political action could be found; for it is within the ranks of the party that the actual contests for power occur.

Equally important as the physical, mechanical structure of party organization has been the mental image of the PRI which has been instilled in the Mexican mind. The PRI has succeeded in identifying itself with the government, the Revolution, and consequently with the goals of the Mexican nation. The PRI has claimed to represent all major interests of Mexico. The party, in its quest for unanimity, has been
able to convince both major outside interest groups and opposition parties, as well as the sectors in its ranks, that they can best achieve their objectives by working with the government and party officials. Although it occasionally has placated extreme elements by its shifting to the far left and far right, the PRI has endeavored to balance the interests and maintain a moderate, middle of the road position. By its success in the balancing of such interests, the PRI has been allowed to govern as the unchallenged, dominating force of Mexican politics, and has been able to mold the Mexican nation into a socially, politically, and economically progressive country. It appears that at present and in the foreseeable future, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional will be given the mandate for continued leadership of Mexico.
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