Heidegger and the sense of freedom: The formal and the substantive approach to freedom in light of the development of Heidegger's thought

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HEIDEGGER AND THE SENSE OF FREEDOM

The Formal and the Substantive Approach to Freedom
in Light of the Development of Heidegger's Thought

by

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Philosophical discussions of freedom are of two types: formal and substantive. Formal discussions seek to establish the conditions for the possibility of freedom while substantive discussions approach the issue from the perspective of experience. Formal discussions can be divided into two types: libertarian and deterministic. Formalism, though rigorous, ultimately fails to address our most crucial concerns with freedom. If discussions of freedom are to succeed, that is, if they are to illuminate the human condition, they must be guided by substantive concerns.

This thesis examines the strengths and weaknesses of formal libertarianism and determinism via a consideration of C.A. Campbell and J.J.C. Smart respectively. The work of Martin Heidegger provides the framework for the substantive discussion. The examination of Heidegger includes Being and Time, "On the Essence of Truth", "The Thing", and "The Question Concerning Technology". Of central interest is Heidegger's analysis of "things" and technology with respect to their bearing on the question of freedom.

Working within the framework of Heidegger's thought and responding to the failure of formalism, a conception of freedom is developed. Such a conception rests upon the human capacity to comprehend and respond to significant things and events. It is argued that technology, as Heidegger understands it, is a threat to this freedom.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The impetus for this thesis was my desire to culminate, rather than simply end, my work at the University of Montana. Accordingly, I wanted to draw together some of the issues and thinkers that have been decisive for me. Perhaps most importantly, I wanted to follow the directive of what I believe to be the heart of essential thought, the illumination of reality in its crucial dimensions. The question of freedom is paramount in this latter task because it invites us to consider the crucial features of human existence. I believe that if a discussion of freedom is to illuminate the experience of reality it must address the historical and cultural horizon within which it occurs. Thus, a discussion of freedom today must consider the technological character of our world. Martin Heidegger provides a useful framework for such a discussion. His central concern is the question of Being. Yet, as his work matured, "Being" came to be understood increasingly in terms of the presence of modern reality. Along his way Heidegger repeatedly encounters the question of freedom and in his latter work he explicitly discusses the nature of freedom within a technological setting. To fully appreciate the substantive force of Heidegger's discussion it is helpful to contrast it with purely formal discussions of freedom. C.A. Campbell and J.J.C. Smart are exemplars of this approach.

Discussions of freedom can be divided into two types: formal and substantive. Formally, one tries to establish the conditions for the possibility of freedom rather than examining our experience of freedom itself. Substantively, one considers freedom from the perspective of experience. Formal discussions of freedom are of two varieties: Libertarian and Deterministic. In sections 1 through 8 I explicate and
critique the formal approach. C.A. Campbell and J.J.C. Smart represent libertarianism and determinism respectively. Though I believe that determinism is the stronger of the two positions, as I shall argue, both suffer from the liability of formalism in general. Without the guidance from substantive concerns purely formal discussions remain aimless and disoriented. What is called for, then, is a discussion of freedom that is theoretically coherent but which goes beyond formal considerations. I begin this task, in section 9, by turning to the work of Martin Heidegger. Sections 9, 10, and 11 are devoted to Being and Time. Here in his early work one can see the ambiguity which arises from the disparity between his formal approach and his substantive concerns. Section 12, containing an examination of "On The Essence of Truth", marks the transition to his later, unambiguously substantive work. Following Heidegger's lead, in Section 13, I offer a substantive account of freedom. After accommodating several plausible criticisms to my position in Section 14, I turn to the question of freedom and technology in the remaining two sections. Here I argue that technology, as Heidegger understands it, poses a novel threat to man's freedom.
2.0 FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE APPROACHES TO FREEDOM

With the above introductory remarks behind us we can turn to the question of freedom itself. This question has held the attention of philosophers from the beginning of our tradition. Rarely does a thinker of note fail to grapple with at least some aspect of the question. However, grappling with the question of freedom is like wrestling with Proteus; our captive threatens to escape our grasp by constantly changing forms. The advice given to Menelaos, that he hold his questions until Proteus had ceased his transformations, serves us equally well. If our questioning of freedom is to be successful, that is, if it is to result in a better understanding of the human condition, we must first decide what form it is to take.

We can begin by establishing two types of questioning: formal and substantive. Formal discussions of freedom seek to establish the form as perimeter of freedom rather than investigating its content. Formally we try to delineate a framework within which our intuitions of freedom can be discussed. Typically, the framework is grounded in a consideration of the theoretical regularities of physics, logic, or psychology. If our intuitions of freedom are to be brought to precise theoretical conceptualization — as the pattern of formal thought directs — they must fall within the established framework. Borrowing Kant's terminology we can say that formal discussions seek the conditions for the possibility of freedom rather than examining freedom itself. Substantive discussions of freedom turn to the experiential substance of freedom rather than the form or, in other words, to the actuality of freedom rather than its possibility. The force of substantive considerations is derived from the analysis of experience. In such
discussions one is concerned with clarifying and supporting the experience of freedom or the lack thereof. Substantive discussions are ultimately grounded in a non-theoretical consideration of how we understand ourselves to be in the world.

Formal questioning of freedom can be divided into two central groups, Libertarianism and Determinism. The eighteenth century mathematician Laplace sketches the essence of Determinism in the following passage.

An intelligence knowing all the forces acting in nature at a given instant, as well as the momentary positions of all things in the universe, would be able to comprehend in one simple formula the motions of the largest bodies as well as the lightest atoms....To it nothing would be uncertain, the future as well as the past would be present to its eyes.[4]

Determinism's two central features are, belief in universally binding causality and the corollary of predictability (predictability in principle).[5] Libertarianism is best understood as a denial of Determinism. Libertarians hold that there is a class of events which cannot be traced to antecedents from which they follow, and which therefore cannot be predicted (even in principle) from knowledge of antecedent conditions. Such acts and only such acts are free.

In the following section I will examine arguments for both Libertarianism and Determinism. I believe that Determinism is the stronger theoretical position because it establishes the more coherent and forceful framework without, as many claim, sacrificing the notion of freedom. However, as we will see, the benefits of such a framework are actualized only through substantive considerations. Failing to turn to our experience of the human situation would result in our discussion running aground precisely where the formal discussions of freedom have
run aground since, perhaps, Lucretius. That is, even when coherent, they suffer from a loss of direction and focus. Considering the question of freedom from the perspective of experience reveals both why the formal (theoretical) discussions have failed to resolve the "problem" and why the issue continues to attract us.

3.0 LIBERTARIAN FORMALISM: C.A. CAMPBELL

C.A. Campbell, in *On Selfhood and Godhood*, offers a clear and concise account of formal Libertarianism.[6] He begins his discussion by considering the formulation of the problem of freedom. Campbell claims that careful formulation of the problem leads one a long way toward solving it. Specifically, he wants to distinguish the freedom which is central to the free-will problem from other conceptions of freedom. He believes that the significance of the free-will issue lies in the fact that the freedom with which it is concerned "is commonly recognized to be in some sense a precondition of moral responsibility."[7] Before determining whether or not this freedom exists we must clarify what it is.

Campbell isolates three features of this conception of freedom. First, freedom pertains to inner rather than overt actions.[8] Examining moral judgments Campbell finds that we are concerned with overt acts only insofar as they embody or reflect inner acts. Moral culpability is determined by examining the agent's intentions. There are plenty of cases where the overt action is deplorable but the inner action is not and *vice versa*. The deciding factor, according to Campbell, is whether or not the inner action reflects choice.[9]
Second, he argues that if a person is to be held morally responsible for an act he must be the "sole author" of it.[10] If we acknowledge determinants other than the person in question, how can we hold him responsible? He says:

It seems plain enough that if there are any other determinants of the act, external to the self, to that extent the act is not an act which the self determines, and to that extent not an act for which the self can be held morally responsible.[11]

One might wonder, given this strict definition of moral responsibility and the undeniably profound influence of heredity and the environment, whether we are ever morally responsible. Campbell agrees that it would be absurd to deny hereditary and environmental influence, yet he claims that if we are to retain the validity of moral responsibility we must believe that somewhere, beyond the reach of all determination, is something of which we are the sole author. Either we abandon the notion of moral responsibility, which, for Campbell, is as intuitively repugnant as it is pragmatically impossible, or we believe in and search for that of which we are the sole author.

Believing "sole authorship" to be a necessary condition of freedom, Campbell asks whether it is sufficient as well. He finds that it is not. The insufficiency appears when we consider acts of which we seem to be the sole author but which are of the sort that we would hesitate to call them free. Such an act would be one which follows necessarily from our "character" or "nature".[12] The truly free act must be free from not only external determinants (heredity, environment) but also from internal determinants (character, nature).
This leads to the third characteristic of freedom, the ability to "do otherwise". If an act is to be considered a free one, the agent responsible must be the sole author of it and he must have been able to do otherwise. Campbell's appeal to the apparently intuitive soundness of this claim does carry some weight. It seems sensible to say that if A could not have helped but to do x he was not acting freely. Campbell maintains that most philosophers agree that some sense of "could have done otherwise" is a necessary condition of moral responsibility. Typically, those philosophers who are wary of Libertarianism, yet who refuse to abandon the notion of moral responsibility, attempt to establish a hypothetical sense of "could have done otherwise". Campbell gives two examples: x could have done otherwise if he had chosen to and A could have done otherwise if he had been constituted or situated differently. Although Campbell claims to appreciate and, to an extent, sympathize with the motives underlying these interpretations, he rejects both on the grounds that neither fulfills the requirements of moral responsibility.

The first interpretation amounts to nothing more than the claim that A "could have done otherwise" if nothing prevented him from doing so. If A would have chosen x rather than y nothing would have prevented him from accomplishing x. This approach begs the central question of deliberations concerning moral responsibility. In such deliberations we are not so much concerned with whether or not A could have accomplished x but whether or not A could have chosen to do x.
The second interpretation similarly fails the requirements of moral responsibility. This interpretation claims that A "could have done otherwise" if A was constituted or situated differently. Campbell claims that this account, like the first, simply sidesteps the real issue. We are not concerned about how A could have acted given a different environment, education, temperament but how A, as he is, acted. The question is - could this person have acted differently?

Campbell argues that a coherent notion of moral responsibility requires us to understand "could have done otherwise" categorically. Summarizing what he considers to be the freedom necessary for moral responsibility he says,

It is that a man can be said to exercise free will in a morally significant sense only in so far as his chosen act is one of which he is the sole author, and only if - in the straightforward, categorical sense of the phrase - he 'could have chosen otherwise'.[13]

Now that Campbell has clarified the sense of freedom that concerns him he asks whether or not it is "reasonable to believe that man does in fact possess a free will of the kind specified..."[14] and if it is reasonable to believe that we possess free will, where is it to be located? Campbell believes that failing to address the latter question adequately has led both Libertarians and Determinists astray. Clearly, says Campbell, the freedom required for moral responsibility is a matter of volition. It is equally clear that freedom does not pertain to all volitions, indeed not even to all volitions commonly labeled "choices". He argues that Determinists typically fail to appreciate how relatively narrow the operating range of freedom really is.[15] Consequently, he believes that carefully locating freedom within volitional activity effectively "annuls...some of the more tiresome cliche's of Determinist
criticism". [16]

He attempts to locate freedom within volition by examining that "something" of which we are the sole author. Campbell asks us to consider why we believe it proper to make allowances for people whose environment and/or heredity is debilitating. [17] We do so, he claims, because we recognize that such a person will have to work harder to behave appropriately than will someone whose situation is less severe. Resisting temptation and doing what we should require the exertion of "moral effort". The amount of moral effort required by the situation varies from person to person and situation to situation. But, regardless of the person or the situation, "moral effort" is that something of which we are the sole author. Campbell says,

Here, and here alone, so far as I can see, in the act of deciding whether to put forth or withhold the moral effort required to resist temptation and rise to duty, is to be found an act which is free in the sense required for moral responsibility; an act of which the self is the sole author, and of which it is true to say that "it could be" (or, after the event, "could have been") "otherwise". [18]

Here Campbell makes his stand. The argument required to defend this position is two-fold: consideration of the evidence of our "inner experience" and countering several specific Deterministic criticisms.

4.0 CAMPBELL'S DEFENSE OF LIBERTARIANISM

Campbell begins his consideration of "inner experience" by appealing to our experience of "self-activity", particularly that activity present in moral decisions. [19] He distinguishes two categories of moral decisions. First, the situation wherein we have two or more courses of action and we must decide which course is most consistent with what we understand to be our duty. Second, the situation wherein
we know perfectly well what we should do but it is not what we want to do. This latter decision is between what we understand our duty to be and what "we most strongly desire".[20] The former situation is primarily an intellectual matter while the latter is wholly a moral issue; hence, Campbell believes that the latter decision is the heart of the moral life. Examining moral decisions of the latter sort reveals a unique kind of self-activity.

Campbell, considering an act of moral temptation, suggests that the agent experiences the decision as an expression of self-activity. We cannot deny that it is ourselves making the decision in such a situation. Moreover, he argues that the decision is not determined by our nature or character. Campbell defines "character" as "a relatively stable and systematic complex of emotive and cognitive dispositions". [21] A person's strongest desire results from the interaction between character and environment. Therefore, moral decision, understood as the decision whether or not to follow duty instead of our strongest desire, cannot be understood as "flowing from the character" because it opposes the character.[22] The self-activity expressed in moral decisions differs from ordinary self-activity in that it transcends the formed character of the self, whereas usually self-activity expresses the self's character.

Campbell is aware that this distinction leaves one with a somewhat schizoid understanding of the self and its activity. He argues that although the distinction between the self and its character appears absurd, we implicitly rely on it every time we make a moral decision; that is, every time we decide between what we believe to be our duty and what we most strongly desire to do. This brings Campbell to the second
part of his defense.

If we grant that the moral agent cannot disbelieve that he has free will, are there theoretical objections to this claim which would compel us to distrust the evidence of inner experience? In other words, are there reasons to believe that our experience of free will is illusory? Campbell maintains that insofar as his analysis of moral life is correct, we cannot help but believe that we have free will, even if we have been convinced by Determinist arguments. If Determinism is to carry the day, it must not only be theoretically sound it must also account for our experience of freedom. Libertarians, for their part, convinced by the soundness of their experience of free will must expose the errors of the Determinist's theoretical position.

Campbell maintains that the central arguments of Determinism are far from compelling. He begins his criticism of Determinism by ruling out several Deterministic approaches which no longer hold sway among philosophers. Of the arguments regarded as important by contemporary philosophers, Campbell distinguishes two forms; those from the notion of predictability and those which presuppose that an act of the self that does not express its character is meaningless.
The argument from predictability states that Libertarianism, if true, results in our having no rational basis for believing in the stability and order of our world. If man possesses free will why would we be surprised if our previously teetotalling mother suddenly went on a wild dipsomaniacal binge or "your friend whose taste for reading had hitherto been satisfied with the sporting column...should be discovered on a fine Saturday afternoon pouring over the works of Hegel?"[26] Of course we are indeed surprised when there is a sudden, radical change in a person's behavior. We are surprised because our world typically exhibits a high degree of stability. The argument from predictability attempts to capture the Libertarian in their own trap, by showing that their theory fails to meet their own criterion; the illumination of the world of experience.

In response to this criticism, Campbell reiterates that the location of freedom is within our volitional life. Freedom pertains only to the situation wherein we are confronted with having to decide whether or not to exert the moral energy needed to resist desire and follow duty. This situation, according to Campbell, is very rare, in fact it comprises only 1% of our lives. And it is only here that the question of freedom is pertinent. For the remaining 99% of our lives, character and environment determine our conduct. Hence, for the vast majority of situations Libertarianism presents no obstacle to successful prediction.

Even in the exceedingly rare cases of genuine moral decisions, the situation is not completely indeterminate. A moral decision, as Campbell has defined it, is always bounded by two things, duty and desire. The freedom claimed by Campbell is the freedom to decide
between these two options. Therefore, says Campbell, the often touted "freedom of caprice has no "habitat" in his theory."[27] Not only is the moral decision bounded by two options, the decision itself is compatible with probabilistic prediction. We are able to predict, given knowledge of the person and the situation, how much moral effort will be required and, consequently, how likely it is the desire will be resisted.

The argument from the supposed meaninglessness of Libertarianism holds that it is essentially unintelligible and results in the loss of moral responsibility. The libertarian conception of freedom is unintelligible because no reason can be given for it. Since there is no reason why one decides to exert or withhold moral effort, the act is meaningless. If a free act, though attributed to the self, has nothing to do with it, how can we hold the self morally responsible? Thus Libertarianism results in a loss of moral responsibility.

Campbell believes that this criticism calls for a clarification of "intelligibility". If "intelligibility" refers to the property of an act to be inferred from the knowledge of antecedent conditions then Libertarianism is certainly unintelligible. However, far from being a devastating critique of Libertarianism, this is merely a description of it. By assuming that Libertarians must explain freedom (locate it in a causal nexus), the requirement begs the very question at issue. The burden of proof in this regard lies with the Determinist not the Libertarian.

However, Campbell realizes that the critic usually has a second understanding of "intelligibility" in mind when he claims that Libertarianism is unintelligible. This second sense is the action's
capacity to have meaning attached to it. Typically, the critic assumes that unintelligibility in the first sense entails unintelligibility in second sense. Campbell agrees that if Libertarianism was shown to be unintelligible in the second sense it would certainly be "conclusively refuted".[28]

It is precisely this which cannot be proven. The critic, according to Campbell, has allowed himself to become misguided by accepting a "...fundamentally vicious assumption."[29] He has assumed that the only valid perspective with regard to the question of freedom is that of the external observer. If one accepts this assumption, Libertarianism is indeed meaningless. Considering that freedom pertains to inner acts Campbell asks whether or not the perspective of external observation is appropriate. He, of course, claims that it is not.

For the apprehension of subjective acts there is another standpoint available, that of inner experience, of the practical consciousness in its actual functioning. If our free will should turn out to be something from this standpoint, no more is required. And no more ought to be expected.[30]

From the perspective of inner experience we can see an alternative to claiming that either an act is located within a causal nexus (or, at least, could be so located in principle) or it is meaningless. Campbell calls this alternative "creative activity". It is creative activity which lies at the heart of freedom and which is determined neither by the environment nor the self.
5.0 CRITIQUE OF LIBERTARIANISM

Campbell's account is forceful and attractive yet I believe that it is ultimately incoherent. Given the endurance of the debate between Libertarians and Determinists I believe that one can safely assume that neither side possesses a compelling argument. In the absence of cogency one must settle for, as Plato would have it, the second best way to sail and seek the stronger of the two non-compelling positions. [31] This procedure has two steps; first, to show that in his effort to preserve what he understands to be moral responsibility, Campbell and, if the extension is permissible, all Libertarians, lose the coherence of their argument and second, to show that far from being destroyed, moral responsibility is clarified and supported by the adoption of a deterministic framework. In this section I address the first step, turning to the second in the following section.

Campbell's argument draws its strength and attractiveness from three closely related sources. First, and most generally, I believe that Campbell tacitly understands philosophy to be in the service of ends higher than itself. In this case the higher end is moral responsibility. Recognizing the centrality of moral responsibility in our lives and believing that freedom is a necessary condition of it, Campbell attempts to clarify and support a conception of freedom which secures moral responsibility. Understanding philosophy to be penultimate leads Campbell to remind the Determinist, confident in the power of his theory, that any theory if it is to be more than idle speculation, must illuminate the world around us. He is unwilling to forgo the world of experience in order to satisfy theoretical demands. His argument attempts to resurrect the Eleatic dilemma between theory
and experience. Although I believe the dilemma can be overcome, Campbell's insistence that theory illuminate rather than abandon the world of experience remains admirable.

This challenge is the wedge which splits Determinism into its Hard and Soft varieties. Soft, or more sympathetically, resourceful determinists agree with Campbell that ideals such as freedom, moral responsibility, dignity, and pride are a valuable part of our world and should not be abandoned wholesale on theoretical grounds. While resourceful determinism respects these traditional notions, it also calls for a rethinking of these ideals and standards in light of its theoretical considerations. Frithjof Bergmann, recognizing this need to rethink the notion of freedom, says:

The idea of freedom has been like a hood that kept the falcon of thought on the leather glove. For it gives the illusion that we have a goal, that it is known, that there is a framework and that all is fairly understood—and so the major questions are not even asked.[32]

Hard determinists, conversely, reject the claim that such ideals are valuable, arguing that these are merely ways of talking about the world which we now know to be mistaken. B.F. Skinner, for example, understands "freedom" and "dignity" to be prescientific ways of understanding ourselves and as such these terms have become impediments to the development of a rewarding society.[33] According to Hard Determinism what we most need to be free from is the conception of freedom itself.

Campbell's second source of appeal is his attentiveness to the ordinary experience of ourselves and our world. He invites us to consider the way we normally, pretheoretically, feel. I will discuss the weaknesses of this approach below, but here let me address its
strengths. Focusing on sensation gives Campbell's argument a sense of immediacy and accessibility which is alien to most formal discussions of freedom. By arguing for freedom from the perspective of sensation, Campbell attempts to provide it with the apparent indubitability of sensations. We can no more deny that certain acts are free, it seems, than we can that certain acts are painful. The reader finds himself nodding in agreement with Campbell's analysis before it is even fully understood. I believe, however, that the more we understand it the less we nod. In any case, Campbell's contemporaries were fortunate that philosophy and not sales captured his attention.

The two preceding sources of strength and appeal lead to the third; consideration of the undeniable, but oft denied, influence of heredity and environment. Consideration of our daily life requires that Campbell acknowledge the stable pattern which it exhibits. His argument for freedom is situated within an almost completely determined framework. His case is attractive because he seems to be able to give the determinist almost all he wants without losing a Libertarian conception of freedom. This allows him to retain a degree of social stability, predictability of behavior, and equitable judgments of moral responsibility within his theory. Thus, his argument appears more plausible than that of extreme Libertarians, Sartre for example, who reject determinism categorically.

Strong as the appeal of Campbell's position is, it proves to be a double edged sword. His willingness to acknowledge the largely deterministic context of daily life both supports and, ultimately, undermines his argument. The situation is ironic. The more coherent his position is the less it illuminates the lived-world and the more it
illuminates the lived-world the less coherent it becomes. Recognizing
the deterministic setting of our lives without carefully considering the
nature of the determination itself forces Campbell to retreat step by
step until he finally digs in at the level of Selfhood. Even at this
murky level he struggles under the weight of Determinism. If the free
act arises from the Self is it caused by the Self? If it is caused by
the Self can it be free? If it arises from the Self but is not caused
by the Self how is it related to the Self? Attempting to clarify the
relationship between freedom and the Self, Campbell posits a compound
Self. Although it is central to his argument Campbell fails to
explicate how this compound Self is to be understood.

Susan Anderson's article, "The Libertarian conception of Freedom",
helps to clarify Campbell's conception of Selfhood.[34] She points out
that as a dualist what matters most for Campbell is the location of the
Self. Following C.D. Broad she distinguishes two species of theories
concerning mental unity: center and non-center. Center theories rest
on the assumption that rather than simply being the aggregate of mental
experiences, the Self is the center within which mental experiences are
experienced. The center itself is never an object of experience. [35]
Non-center theories, as one might imagine, rest on the assumption that
the Self is simply the aggregate of mental experiences. Accordingly,
the Self is identical with its "formed character".

Campbell, adopting what we can now call a center theory, argues
that in addition to its character, formed by heredity and environment,
the Self contains another entity, which Anderson calls the "substantive
center".[36] It seems possible, to both Anderson and Campbell, that this
substantive center could initiate action that is capable of transcending
the Self's character. Such an act, while originating in the Self, would not be determined by it.

Even after Anderson's explication, the force of Campbell's argument remains unclear. He has certainly established a source of freedom which, by definition, escapes the deterministic nexus which surrounds it. Yet one can hardly help but believe that his best defense is that he occupies a position unworthy of attack. Rather than confronting the problem of determinism directly he simply shaves it back to another level of the Self. The challenge facing Campbell and, by extension, Libertarianism can be distilled into two questions. First, if Selfhood is to be identified with the Self's center rather than its formed character, where is the center to be located? Second, what is the relationship between the Self (however it may be defined) and its acts? The first question centers around the relationship between mind and body while the second centers around how acts acquire meaning.

Considering the first question we find that at the heart of Campbell's argument lies the notion of "inner experience".[37] If we turn our attention inward we become aware of a locus of consciousness, the Self. It is I who am writing this sentence, drinking this coffee, and thinking these thoughts. We are aware of the Self only by means of its activity; we never experience some "thing" which is the Self. Campbell distinguishes two forms of self activity: functional and creative. Functional activity is the ordinary activity of which we are normally oblivious: walking, breathing, and eating to name a few. Consideration of these activities reveals that it is indeed us who are doing them but, according to Campbell, they are largely a product of heredity and environment and, thus, cannot serve as freedom's locus.
Creative activity is present in the rare situations of "moral temptation" wherein we must choose whether or not to exert the "moral energy" necessary to resist desire and follow duty. Campbell argues that we cannot deny that we experience ourselves making a genuinely free choice in such a situation.

This experience of free choice is characterized by immediacy and indubitability. Campbell's argument now reveals a familiar shape, the privileged status of sensation. Freedom is understood as a sensation, consequently, we can no more deny that we are free than we can deny that we are in pain when struck. The evidence for freedom is that we feel free. Campbell, like all dualists, wants to distinguish sensations from concurrent physiological states. Sensation discourse and physiological discourse are not simply different ways of discussing the same phenomenon. This position suffers from three problems.

First, Campbell's appeal to sensation itself is problematic. Campbell insists that the experience of sensation qua sensation cannot be denied. This indubitability would hold for freedom as much as for pain. He also argues there is an ontological difference between sensation and concurrent brain states. His reason for holding them ontologically distinct is obvious. Reducing the feeling of free choice to brain activity obviates the possibility of indeterminacy - unless one is willing to argue the brain's physiological activity is essentially indeterminate. Except for the fact that he must do so to save his theory, what reason does Campbell have to claim that the difference between sensation and brain state is ontological rather than differing modes of discourse? Obviously, one can discuss any given thing in a variety of ways. My description of a bout of severe depression, the
lethargic anxiety and hopeless gloom which characterized my life, certainly differs from my physician's analysis and description in terms of lithium deficiency. To say that the physiological discourse is more truthful is surely as mistaken as denying the connection between my lithium and depression. I believe that Campbell is correct when he argues that the discourse of inner experience is more appropriate than that of external observation for a discussion of freedom, but for reasons different from his own. Regardless of the connection between brain states and sensation I believe that a description of pain, joy, love, or despair solely in physiological terms would fail to capture the richness of these experiences. If I want to express my despair in terms of experience, focusing on blood pressure, pulse rate, and lithium level alone would fail adequately to express my condition. Conversely, trying to understand despair physiologically in terms of Sartre's analysis of nausea would be equally fruitless.

Richard Rorty, in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, also argues that claiming the differences in discourse reflect ontological differences is unwarranted. He says,

As long as feeling painful is a property of a person or of brain-fibers, there seems no reason for the epistemic difference between reports of how things feel and reports of anything else to produce an ontological gap. But as soon as there is an ontological gap, we are no longer talking about states or properties but about distinct particulars, distinct subjects of predication...The neo-dualist is no longer talking about how people feel but about feelings as little self-subsistent entities, floating free of people in the way in which universals float free of its instantiations.[38]

The move from the indubitability of the feeling of free choice to the indubitability of freedom is as unwarranted as the move from the indubitability of the experience of pain to the indubitability of painfulness because both depend upon a dubious hypostatization of
individual properties.

Second, even if we accept the validity of securing freedom by appealing to the privileged status of sensation a problem remains. Campbell claims that freedom is experienced as free choice. The overwhelming majority of our choices, 99% of them according to Campbell, are not free because they are subject to the determination of heredity and environment. There is, nevertheless, that rare situation of genuine moral temptation wherein free choice is possible. In such a situation the choice that we make is experienced as freely made. From the perspective of inner experience, however, what is the difference between the way I feel when I choose Rainier over Budweiser and when I choose to obey duty rather than succumb to desire? Certainly there is a difference in degree but is there a difference in kind? I do not think so. Campbell must argue that my choice of Rainier was not free whereas my decision to stay home and write rather than go skiing was. From his own perspective, we see that while we usually feel absolutely unfettered deciding which beer to drink, deciding to obey duty is often experienced as confining. Campbell's response is that because the latter decision is contrary to desire (which is a product of our character) the decision is free. This distinction can be maintained on theoretical grounds perhaps but not from the perspective of how the choices "feel". From this perspective, Campbell cannot do what he must—distinguish the unfree choices of daily life from the free choices of moral decision making.
Third, Campbell's appeal to sensation leaves him in a position where Selfhood and freedom are forced to float above the contingencies of everyday life. Freedom is excluded from 99% of our lives and 100% of our bodies. Freedom, like the God of the Philosophers compared to the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, is reduced from occupying a vital part of our lives to a merely theoretical position: a necessary condition for moral responsibility. Although the separation of freedom from most of the lived world and the separation of the Self from the body is intended to secure both freedom and Selfhood, it results in their mutual emasculation.

Turning to the second question confronting Campbell, the relationship between the Self and its acts, we find other difficulties. He claims that Determinists responding to this question create a false dilemma. The dilemma is that "either the act follows necessarily upon precedent states or it is a mere matter of chance..."[39] In other words, if an act is to be meaningful it must be located within a causal order. Campbell believes that this dilemma is false and thus innocuous because a third alternative exists, creative activity. An act originating through the Self's creative activity is neither causally determined nor random. Rather than clarifying what he means by creative activity Campbell simply points to our experience of it. Consequently, he never discusses how a free act acquires meaning except to assure us that it is not through causality. He uses the determinist's dilemma to his advantage by considering only two possibilities: causality and chaos. Certainly acts or events can be meaningful without being subsumed to a strictly causal order. Few people today, after the discoveries of quantum mechanics and recent work in molecular biology,
believe that the world can be adequately explained in terms of linear causality. If this was all the Determinist had to go on, Campbell would certainly win the day. However, his conception of freedom excludes far more than strict causality. The inadequacy of Campbell's position is disclosed when, following his advice, we circumvent the dilemma. To do so, we do not need to add another alternative, we simply broaden the notion of causality to lawfulness.

To say that an event or act is meaningful it is necessary that (in principle) some reason, or reasons can be given for its occurrence. Understanding always occurs within a given context. Take, for example, the word "dog". Outside the context of the English language, which is in turn understood within the context of our world, "dog" has no meaning. To understand "dog" one must locate it within the appropriate context. Any given act or event may fit within a variety of contexts, or perhaps more simply put, any act or event can be understood from various perspectives. Consider my bout with depression. Depending upon who I turned to for assistance my situation would be understood in different ways. Turning to my physician would result in my depression being understood and treated scientifically. Roughly speaking scientific explanation proceeds by subsuming the event to be explained under a set of laws and special conditions so that we are able to deduce why the event had to have happened in the way that it did. To explain my depression scientifically would be to show how given the deficiency of lithium and given the body's reaction to this deficiency, the experience of depression necessarily results. If I turned to a friend the depression would be understood quite differently. From this perspective, my depression might be understood in terms of some failure
on my part, stress or anxiety. A psychoanalyst might approach my depression in a way similar to that of a friend but with a more systematic and interpretive method. Perhaps it would be discovered that the recent remembrance of a previously repressed experience has resulted in my depression. In former times my depression might have been understood in terms of demonic possession or alienation from the divine.

All three methods, disparate as they are, share the notion of lawfulness. Meaningful things do not just occur, they fit into the world in some way, in our case, scientifically, psychologically, or mythically. Campbell's conception of the free act not only excludes scientific or causal explanation; it excludes all others as well because no reason can be given for a free act. To ask why or how of a "free act" is simply inappropriate. In trivial matters, choosing which brand of beer to drink, for example, we are content to say that we "don't know why we chose as we did, we just did!". However, in matters of import, questions of moral responsibility, for example, we would never be satisfied with such a non-answer. If we, in principle, can give no response to the question of why we did something, how can we be held responsible for it? Thus, I believe that the Libertarian's "free" act is unintelligible in the second sense—no meaning can be attached to it.

Even if we accept Campbell's theoretical position the conception of freedom within it is plagued with problems. The first is that his description of moral decision making drives a wedge between desire and duty. His argument assumes both that one does not desire to do his duty and that the fulfillment of duty is independent from desire. Both assumptions are dubious. Certainly we often experience ourselves torn
between doing what we believe we should do and doing what we want to do. Moral dilemmas are indeed characterized by such conflict. In these situations we struggle to determine what in fact we should do or we struggle to find the wherewithal to do what we know we should. However, does it make sense to say that we can do other than what we most strongly desire? Is not our decision to follow duty dependent upon our desiring to follow duty? Campbell's distinction is sensible only if we understand "desire" and "duty" as they have been traditionally understood. "Desire" referring to the emotional, appetitive side of man, and "duty" referring to the intellectual, rational side of man. Campbell's definition of the free act gives this traditional distinction a new twist because his free man is neither governed by reason nor instinct; he is neither a Stoic nor a Hedonist. If he is anything Campbell's free man is an Underground man.[40] Every new situation insofar as it might influence or constrain him is a threat to his freedom. If Campbell had used Plato's analogy of the chariot to explicate his new use of this classic distinction, we would find it racing across the plain, guided by neither the horses nor the charioteer.

This leads us to the second problem: his reliance on choice. A choice must be distinguished from both randomness and coercion. Tripping over a crack in the sidewalk is no more a matter of choice than "deciding" to give your wallet to an armed thug. Choice also requires a fairly well delineated context. If the options are unclear, choosing one of them is impossible. The simplest context for a choice and the one adopted by Campbell is two clear alternatives: A and B. Campbell argues that a free choice of A or B is necessarily indeterminate. If
this is true, can we call it a choice? If we can, how is choice distinguished from randomness? Presumably because in choosing, we experience ourselves deliberating, weighing the options and finally choosing one or the other. But if this was the case our choice would be influenced by our deliberations and consequently would not be free. Thus, a free choice is one that is free from all influence, in other words, a random act. Campbell claims that moral responsibility requires free choice. If not, how could we hold someone responsible for his action? Yet, can we hold someone responsible for the consequence of a choice which he or she truly can give no reason for making? Even if we could, does such an act reflect our deepest concerns about human freedom? I think not.

The third difficulty is that Campbell's conception of freedom results in a disturbing paradox. According to Campbell humans, via the self's creative activity, are free. Yet this freedom can only be actualized through moral decisions. Moral decisions occur only in those situations wherein we are torn between duty and desire. Without these situations, which comprises only 1% of our lives, we would be unfree. Certainly we all know people who are slaves to their desire or duty. But does it make sense to say that a person who is naturally disposed toward obeying duty is less free than one who is constantly torn between duty and desire? Is a man who is constantly torn between honoring his marriage and having an affair more free than one who has come to live in harmony with his commitment? Far from characterizing a free life, Campbell's scenario depicts abject bondage.
The fourth, and final, difficulty is that Campbell's conception of freedom cannot be stated in such a way that it fits our most cogent description of physical reality, that offered by physics and chemistry. Clearly this inability alone does not constitute a refutation of libertarianism. Yet insofar as the Libertarian cannot offer an alternative description of reality which enjoys the cogency of modern science, he is forced to do one of two things. Either reject the description offered by science on the grounds that if it were true, freedom would be lost, or argue that free will does not fall under the purview of science and therefore is not threatened by it. The first response argues that x cannot be the case because x must not be the case. This is as invalid as it is fainthearted! The second response has more going for it than the first, but just barely. One can certainly escape the findings of natural science by claiming *de facto* that his position is extrascientific. Examples of this strategy abound: parapsychology, astrology, palm reading, tea leaf reading and so on *ad infinitum (ad nauseum).*[41] But the Libertarian, like the survivalist, is safe only as long as he remains in his own camp. When he ventures out and makes a statement about the way things are, confrontation with science is unavoidable. If the Libertarian remains in camp his account of freedom loses touch with the lived-world. Freedom, like Omarr's horoscope, simply does not much matter one way or the other.

In summary, I believe that Campbell's theory is incoherent and, moreover, regardless of its theoretical status, his conception of freedom fails to clarify and secure moral responsibility. Nevertheless, disproving Libertarianism does not, in itself, prove Determinism. Perhaps both theories are incoherent. To win the day the Determinist
must show that his theory is both logically coherent and complete. He must also show, if his theory is to be illuminating, that it is consistent with our best description of reality. The resourceful Determinist must finally show that Determinism is compatible with a belief in standards and values such as freedom, dignity and moral responsibility. J.J.C. Smart in "Free Will, Praise and Blame" attempts to show all three. [42]

6.0 DETERMINIST FORMALISM: J.J.C. SMART

Smart delineates two fruitful critiques of Libertarianism. The first, argues that Libertarianism cannot be stated consistently. The second, which he mentions but does not develop, argues that Libertarianism cannot be stated in such a way that it fits in with our most cogent and widely accepted description of physical reality, that offered by physics and chemistry. Since the latter critique has been discussed in the preceding section I will turn directly to Smart's analysis.

From the outset, Smart encounters a difficulty. If Libertarianism is self-contradictory, as he claims, and if any proposition whatever can be drawn from a contradiction, as logic guarantees, then it would seem that Libertarianism should result in a chaotic collection of conclusions. However, in actuality there is a fairly definite set of conclusions and attitudes that are widely shared by people professing to be Libertarians. The reason for this unexpected agreement is that the contradiction is not recognized by those who subscribe to the position. [43] Hence, even a metaphysical confusion can have significant practical results. Conversely, Smart claims that clearing up this metaphysical
confusion can result in equally important consequences. Smart wants to clarify the confusion first and then suggest what practical consequences might result.

Smart’s first task is to clarify the position that he wishes to attack. Turning to Campbell as a spokesman for Libertarianism, Smart claims that Libertarians understand a free act to be one which is neither determined nor produced by pure chance. Campbell’s conception of "creative activity" and his claim that free acts are instances of "contra-causal freedom" exemplify this position. Since "determined" and "pure chance" are rarely defined by Libertarians, Smart offers a definition for both, which he believes is acceptable to the Libertarian.

(D1). I shall state the view that there is "unbroken causal continuity" in the universe as follows. It is in principle possible to make a sufficiently precise determination of the state of a sufficiently wide region of the universe at time to, and sufficient laws of nature are in principle ascertainable to enable a superhuman calculator to be able to predict any event occurring within that region at an already given time t1.

(D2). I shall define the view that "pure chance" reigns to some extent within the universe as follows. There are some events that even a superhuman calculator could not predict, however precise his knowledge of however wide a region of the universe at some previous time.[44]

Campbell would claim that if D1 is an accurate description of the universe then moral responsibility is lost. Because for any given act in such a universe it could not be correctly stated that the act "could have been otherwise" according to Campbell, this inability absolves the agent from responsibility. It is equally clear that Campbell must reject D2. If an act occurs by "pure chance", how can one be responsible for it? Hence the Libertarian must insist on an alternative to both D1 and D2. Smart argues that the logic of the situation leaves
no room for such an alternative. Obviously, the persuasiveness of this analysis depends upon the acceptability of Smart's definitions. He is aware that some may contend with D1 and D2, but he is confident that the criticisms can be met, without having to establish a middle position, by simply adjusting the boundaries of D1 and D2. Thus, according to Smart, the Libertarian is caught between a rock and a hard place. Both of the only two positions available to him are unacceptable. He is left holding a logically incoherent theory with no place to go.

Smart now turns to his final task: showing that Determinism is compatible with the central intuitions and values of everyday life, specifically, praise and blame. Underlying our ordinary understanding of both praise and blame is the recognition of responsibility. Praising and blaming tacitly acknowledge that the person in question is responsible for the praiseworthy or blameworthy act. Campbell's insistence that one can be responsible for an act if and only if one could have done otherwise seems intuitively sound. If we could not have helped but do it, how can we be responsible for it?

Smart agrees with Campbell that the "could have done otherwise" is an essential ingredient of responsibility, but he does not believe that D1 excludes this. Yet, as a Determinist, he believes that for any act or event a set of necessary and sufficient conditions can (in principle) be given for its occurrence. If this is the case, how can we say that the act or event "could have been otherwise"? Suppose, he says, that one evening while you are washing the dishes a plate suddenly slips from your sudsy fingers and falls to the floor. Cringing, you watch the plate fall but, to your relief and surprise, it does not break. You are relieved because you know that the plate could have
broken. You are surprised because usually plates break when dropped to the floor.

I experienced a similar situation daily in the University cafeteria. Without fail, at least once a meal, someone would drop a glass. Usually they bounced three times and then broke on the fourth. However, occasionally, one would manage to come to a stop before it broke. Such occasions would bring us to our feet, clapping and cheering, as few others could. We cheered not only because we loved disturbances, but because the glass had beaten the odds, it could have broken, most do, but it did not.

If, however, the plate had been made of aluminum or the cup of plastic, we would have been neither relieved nor surprised when they did not break. We know, through our everyday handling of aluminum and plastic, or perhaps through an understanding of the properties of aluminum and plastic, that regardless of the circumstances (within a wide range) neither could have broken.[45] Thus we are not relieved and would be surprised only if they did break! What allows us to assert the "could have" or the "could have not" in each case?

Informally, we can say that Smart appeals to our understanding of what transformations plates are capable of undergoing. To say that a china plate can break is to say that breaking lies within the realm of the possible for plates whereas unaided flight, for example, does not. Accordingly we say that plates can break but they cannot fly.
Formally, possibility is discussed in terms of three frameworks: logical possibility, physical possibility, and empirical possibility. The three frameworks are related to each other by way of inclusion. Because logical possibility delimits the broadest area, both physical and empirical possibility are subsets of it. Empirical possibility is, in turn, a subset of physical possibility. Logical possibility is established by the rules of logic, physical possibility is established by the laws of physics, and empirical possibility is established by the frequently prevailing conditions. From the perspective of logical possibility, it is possible for the plate to vaporize the instant it leaves your fingers, but it is not possible for it to both vaporize and not vaporize. From the perspective of physical possibility both the plate breaking and not breaking are equally possible, but it is not possible for the plate to fall to the ceiling rather than to the floor. Depending on the prevailing conditions both the plate breaking and not breaking are equally possible. We can distinguish two scenarios. First, under normal handling there is no breakage. Second, in the situation where a plate is dropped, it either breaks or, given rare conditions, it does not. For an act or event actually to occur it must be logically, physically and empirically possible.

Returning to Smart, we can now say, that he uses "could have" and "could not have" depending upon what is logically and physically possible.

Thus such cases in which we either cannot or can use a law or a law-like proposition to rule out a certain possibility despite our uncertainty as to the precise initial conditions. Briefly: If could not have happened if there are laws or law-like propositions which rule out E. [46]
Campbell, of course, is concerned with freedom not plates. An analysis of things (plates, glasses) is unacceptable when applied to humans precisely because humans are free and plates are not. To say that Smith could have done otherwise is very different from saying that the plate could have broken. Campbell might well argue that Smart's analysis of "could have" fails to address the crucial issue. What concerns Campbell is whether, given exactly the same situation, Smith could have done otherwise. Campbell claims that because we are free we could have chosen A rather than B, even if the situation was duplicated. In other words, even a superhuman calculator with access to all of the relevant information will be unable to predict what Smith will do. This situation is characterized by what Campbell calls "genuinely open possibility". This situation is open in that there is more than one course of action, and this openness is genuine insofar as the agent is free to choose which course to follow.

Smart is quick to point out that this position is identical to D2. Campbell's free act cannot be distinguished from a random act. Furthermore, Smart claims that since he has shown that D1 does not exclude the ordinary meaning of "can" and "cannot" it follows that responsibility is also possible in the universe described by D1. He seems to have the best of both positions: the theoretical prowess of Determinism and the intuitive attraction of Libertarianism.

However, his use of "can" is misleading. It is clear that Smart believes that with sufficient information "can" is always replaceable by "will". The Determinist's use of "can" asserts two things. First, it is a statement of ignorance with respect to the prevailing conditions. Second, it is an estimation of the possibility and feasibility of the
action in question. Thus, using "can" rather than "will" reveals something about the extent of our knowledge but it reveals nothing about Smith's essential character. "Smith could have done otherwise" is no more significant than the "plate could have broken". Obviously this understanding of "can" is incompatible with Libertarianism. From Campbell's perspective, Dl does indeed rule out the possibility of correctly stating that Smith "could have done otherwise".

In order to explicate how responsibility is possible within the universe described by Dl, Smart considers a schoolboy, Tommy, who has failed to do his homework assignment. If Tommy was mentally retarded or suffered from some other debility which prevented him from completing the assignment no one would blame him. In this case, Tommy did not do his homework because he could not do it. He is not blamed because he is not responsible. If, however, Tommy failed to do his assignment because he spent the evening tree-climbing or watching television, we would blame him because he could have done it. There was nothing which prevented him from completing it. He is blamed because he is responsible. Ascribing responsibility to Tommy does not necessarily mean that his behavior was not determined by heredity and environment. It simply means that logically, physically and, given the necessary initial conditions, it is possible for Tommy to do his work. The china plate could have broken and Tommy could have done his work. Smart concludes that,

Threats and promises, punishments and rewards, the ascription of responsibility and the nonascription of responsibility, have therefore a clear pragmatic justification which is quite consistent with a whole-hearted belief in metaphysical determinism. Indeed it implies a belief that our actions are very largely determined: if everything anyone did depended only on pure chance (i.e. if it depended on nothing) then threats and punishments would be quite ineffective.[48]
Believing he has responsibility firmly in hand, Smart turns to the more difficult concepts of praise and blame.[49] He begins by distinguishing two ways in which we ordinarily use "praise". First, praise is the opposite of blame. We praise Tommy (second case) for doing his homework and blame him for failing to do so. Second, praise is used in such a way that its opposite is dispraise rather than blame. We praise an actor's skill, a model's features or an athlete's ability but we certainly would not blame them if they lacked these attributes. We might, however, dispraise them, declaring that the actor has no skill, the model is too short or the athlete has poor coordination. In this sense, praise and dispraise are simply ways to grade a person's skill, features or behavior. This grading has a primary and secondary function. [50] Primarily, it tells us what a certain person is like: skillful, beautiful, kind or unkind. Secondarily, it encourages or discourages people to act in a certain way. To praise honesty is to encourage others to be honest. To dispraise slothfulness is to discourage people from behaving like sloths. Smart distinguishes blame and dispraise on the basis of responsibility. He suggests,

that a clear-headed man will use the word "praise" just as before, and the word "blame" just like the previous "dispraise", with one proviso. That is that to praise (in this sense) or to blame a person for an action is not only to grade it (morally) but to imply that it is something for which the person is responsible, in the perfectly ordinary and nonmetaphysical sense of "responsibility" which we have analyzed earlier in this article.[51]

Nonetheless, the ordinary understanding of praise and blame is bound up with a belief in free will. Smart concludes his article by claiming that this unformulated and confused metaphysical belief often results in a tendency not to only blame others but to judge them as well. Rather than grading the person's behavior we condemn the person.
Judging another person implies both that we hold him ultimately responsible for his behavior, regardless of the situation, and, perhaps more subtly, we assume that we are in a morally superior position. Given the same situation we would have done otherwise. Smart hopes that the clarification of the Libertarian's metaphysical confusion and the subsequent abandonment of the position, will result in our being willing to blame but, because we are no longer able to justify it, less inclined to judge.

7.0 CRITIQUE OF DETERMINISM

Smart's analysis, while theoretically coherent and more forceful than Campbell's suffers from the fact that it relies upon standards of significance which are unacknowledged and without which his argument would be inconsequential. These standards are unacknowledged because they are a substantive rather than formal concern. In other words, standards of significance arise from the situation in question rather than the theory being employed. Thus, Smart's failure to acknowledge (or recognize) his dependency on these substantive concerns is symptomatic of formal discussions in general. Were it not for implicit substantive material, formal discussions of freedom would fail to address the human condition fruitfully. This implicit dependency on substantive material can be seen more clearly if we reexamine Smart's analysis.

He uses two examples to illustrate his analysis of "can": the dropping of a plate, and Tommy's failure to complete his homework assignment. Although neither situation bowls you over with troubling and consequential implications, they reveal Smart's dependency on
standards of significance. The mundanity and familiarity of these situations tends to mask their problematic character. This, of course, is probably why Smart uses them.

Consider the dropped plate. Smart claims that we are relieved because, much to our surprise, the plate did not break. We feel fortunate because we know the plate could have broken. But what else could the plate have done? It could have landed on edge and rolled away, smashed your toe or dented your floor to name but a few. The point is that "could have" understood in terms of possibility alone is too inclusive to be helpful. An indefinitely large number of things are possible, but we are concerned with only a few. What restricts the set of possibilities to the few that matter? Our theory? Certainly this will not work because theories, like all formal systems, describe a possibility space, but they do not restrict it to the actual. Possibility was discussed above in terms of logical, physical and empirical possibility. Moving from logical to empirical we have a decreasing range of possibility. The last is a function of the frequently prevailing conditions. Although the range of possibilities described by empirical possibility is significantly more narrow than logical or physical possibility, it remains too wide. However, we are on the right track. Examining the empirically possible entails a consideration of the prevailing conditions. In any given situation certain conditions are outstanding - they prevail. It is these prevailing conditions which give shape to the situation, restricting the merely possible to the significantly possible.
Thus, Smart's example of the dropped plate is intelligible only because it presupposes the familiar context of the home; within this setting plates acquire a significance which is destroyed when they are broken. Accordingly, when the plate is dropped, breakage is the possibility that concerns us. His example of the antique china plate simply enriches the context. Whereas before the plate was valued because of its function in the household, now new conditions prevail: the historical, cultural and perhaps sentimental value of the plate. In both cases the context, rather than the theory, provides the criteria by which the range of possibility is restricted.

Turning to Smart's discussion of the negligent schoolboy, we find the same implicit reliance on contextual standards. Tommy fails to do his homework, and, since he could have done it, he is blameworthy. Certainly Tommy could have done his homework, but he could also have done any number of things: written a bestseller, set a world record in the high jump or murdered his family. The point is the same as before. The prevailing conditions restrict the possibilities to the ones that matter. Homework is an important task only with an educational setting. This setting is presupposed by Smart's analysis.

This reconsideration of Smart's analysis has shown that his theoretical position is weakened by its unacknowledged reliance upon criteria of significance which it does not justify. Without such criteria his position would be hopelessly vague and inconclusive because it would be incapable of focusing on those events which matter to us. Without this orientation provided by the imported substantive material, Smart's position would founder in a sea of possibilities. Turning to the more controversial section of his discussion, the analysis of praise
and blame, reveals another problem as well.

Smart's analysis is helpful because it suggests that praise and blame are fundamentally appeals to standards which claim our respect, love, or dread. We are struck by a person's beauty or skill, heartened by a display of loyalty, and appalled by the abuse of something we cherish. In each case our ascription of praise or blame entails an implicit reference to both standards (beauty, skill, loyalty) and the particular event or thing which embodies these standards. This conception of praise and blame obviously dovetails with determinism. However, a Libertarian could agree with Smart wholeheartedly.[54] Such a Libertarian would argue that we certainly appeal to standards in our ascription of praise of blame, but before we can appeal to them we must choose them. This choice, of course, is freely made. Once chosen the standards can be employed to help determine behavior. This seems to suggest that underlying Smart's resourceful determinism is libertarianism. Thus, Smart's account suffers from two problems. First, the orientation necessary for an illuminating conception of freedom is not provided by his theory. Second, his account seems to imply an underlying libertarianism.

From the preceding discussion of Campbell and Smart we see that purely formal discussions of freedom fail adequately to illuminate our experience of freedom and bondage. On the one hand, Libertarianism's appeal to our intuitions of freedom is attractive but it proves to be incoherent. On the other hand, Determinism is coherent and forceful, but without guidance from substantive material it becomes disoriented and aimless. What is called for is a discussion of freedom which is theoretically coherent but which moves beyond the strictly formal
8.0 THE EARLY HEIDEGGER'S PATH TO FREEDOM

I believe that Heidegger’s thought provides a helpful framework for this discussion. Although freedom is not his central concern, following his discussion of it through the course of his work is both helpful and, according to J.R. Richardson, warranted.

To be sure, the question of freedom is not the specifically Heideggerian question. Rather, as we all know, his question is the question of Being. But the Being-question itself brings Heidegger to grips with the notion of freedom time and again along the way, so that it is not a distortion for us to examine his thought under this aspect. [55]

The Heideggerian framework is helpful for two reasons. First, his early work (principally Being and Time) is characterized by both the radicality of its questioning and the ambiguity of its methodology. This ambiguity arises primarily from his reluctance to divorce himself from the transcendental (formal) approach of Western metaphysics. [56] In Being and Time, for example, he attempts to establish once and for all the ontological structure of human existence. Yet for most the lasting contribution of Being and Time has not been its transcendental ontology but its novel and penetrating analysis of ordinary, day to day existence. It is this latter approach, the substantive consideration of everyday existence, which characterizes his work after the Turn (Kehre) distinguishing Heidegger I from Heidegger II. [57] However, according to Heidegger both the necessity and direction of this Turn were inherent in Being and Time. Thus, following Heidegger’s discussion of freedom from Being and Time to his later work illuminates the tension between formal and substantive analysis while pointing the way toward its resolution.
Second, while Being and Time is a conglomeration of Libertarian and Deterministic elements his latter work has a decisive Deterministic character. Although Heidegger himself never explicitly adopts a Deterministic framework (for reasons to be discussed) his later work reveals both the way in which resourceful Determinism should proceed and the greatest threat facing freedom in the modern world - the technological domination of human existence.

In 1927 Heidegger published (with Husserl's assistance) the incomplete and previously rejected treatise Being and Time. [58] Though never completed, it has become one of the most influential works of contemporary philosophy. The central concern of Being and Time is the meaning of being. [59] According to Heidegger the source of this questioning is the experience of being's oblivion. [60] Consequently before we can understand his discussion of freedom we must clarify the nature of the question concerning the meaning of being and its function in Heidegger's thought. It is within this context that Heidegger considers the question of freedom.

He argues that the oblivion of being, its withdrawal from the center of our attention, is the inevitable result of western metaphysics. Consequently he attempts to rethink (rather than reject) metaphysics by uncovering where and why it went astray. The purpose of this rethinking is a recovery of what has been obscured through the development of our tradition, namely, the meaning of being. He traces the oblivion of being back to two essential elements of metaphysics. First, since Plato, being has been understood in terms of beings. Understood as the common denominator of all beings, being has been expressed in a variety of ways, for example, whatness, thatness and
substance. Heidegger argues that focusing on beings, which culminates in science (which understands beings as objects) and technology (which understands beings as resources), results in the oblivion of Being.[61]

Second, metaphysics failed to explicitly acknowledge the temporal/historical dimension of being. Since being, according to Heidegger, is essentially temporal, metaphysics inevitably failed adequately to comprehend it. He argues that all beings, insofar as they are, share presence. Existent things are either present before us or they are brought "before us" in reflection. Mt. Rainier and the pen in my hand share at least one thing, presence. This also holds true for things which no longer exist and those which have not yet existed. To the extent that they are at all, they are present to us in our reflections about them. Of course something is present only in relation to a particular observer or thinker at a particular time, the present. Thus, at the very heart of the question of Being lies the question of time. However, rather than carefully considering time, metaphysics simply posited it as a necessary condition of being.[62] What is called for, according to Heidegger, is an investigation of being within the horizon established by time.[63]

Being's temporality also has a historical dimension. All beings are present to us but our experience of the present is, in part, determined by its historical setting. Heidegger claims that particular conceptions of being and their historical setting mutually influence each other.

In the course of this history[Being's history] certain distinctive domains of Being have come into view and have served as the primary guides for subsequent problematics: the ego cogito of Descartes, the subject, the "I", reason, spirit, person.[64]
The point is that being's history is not completely determined by us. This is seen more clearly if we ask why certain historical concepts and events developed as they did. Why did the Greeks understand *moira* the way they did? Why did Medievals understand God the way they did? Why did it take so long for technology to take hold in Europe? In response to these questions we can point to individual thinkers, cultural movements and the like, but an inexplicable residue always remains.[65]

Ultimately, the question of why runs aground on the statement of that.

Accordingly, the question of being must be asked in terms of being rather than beings and within its temporal/historical horizon. This latter criterion requires that an examination of being must consider the historical context within which the question is raised. Consequently, *Being and Time* is an attempt to rethink being in response to the modern world.

Before we can rethink the question of being it must be raised anew. This presents a problem because our time is characterized by the oblivion of being. The question of being is no longer asked because we understand it to be the most universal, self-evident or undefinable of all terms.[66] The oblivion of being is that of the over-generalized, the familiar and the impenetrably opaque. Yet for Heidegger the oblivion of being is not simply null and void. Being is experienced but it is experienced as absent. "Absence", in its root meaning, says, to be-away (ab-esse)[67] What is absent is but not here and now. Take homesickness for example.[68] When homesick we long for what is not before us, home. Far from being forgotten in such a situation, home is remembered, that is, present in reflection, in a powerful way. To be homesick is to experience home and all that it means for us as absent,
as away. Thus, homesickness can decisively reveal home and our present situation. We come to see, perhaps more clearly than before, both what it means to have a home and what it means to be homeless. We may come to explicitly understand what we only tacitly and pre-reflectively understood before. Similarly, Heidegger argues that the experience of the oblivion of being illuminates our present situation and invites us to ask what "being" means.

Obviously, homesickness implies a prior experience of home and, likewise, experiencing the oblivion of being implies a prior acquaintance with being. In other words the questioning of being is fundamentally circular. But, Heidegger argues that rather than being vicious, this circularity is essential to the task of thinking.

Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought. So the meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way. As we have intimated, we always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being. Out of this understanding arise both the explicit question of meaning of Being and the tendency that leads us towards its conception. We do not know what "Being" means. But even if we ask, "What is 'Being'?"; we keep within an understanding of the 'is', though we are unable to fix conceptually what that 'is' signifies.[69]

He calls this circularity "hermeneutical circularity". At the heart of his notion of hermeneutics is the conviction that thinking, if it is to be essential, must attempt to respond to what has been given to it as thought provoking.[70]

9.0 THE THRUST OF THE QUESTION OF BEING

With this clarification of how we question being in mind we must still ask why we should question being. What is to be gained by returning to the quagmire of metaphysics? This is an important question
and one that is too often ignored by Heideggerians (although Heidegger himself was keenly aware of it). "Being", as Heidegger acknowledges, is to a large extent a "worn-out" word. It has, perhaps, the richest history of any philosophic term, but it has become for many of us either a buzz word which we uncritically bandy about or a sure sign of metaphysical claptrap. So why raise the being question? When we ask this question, we seek the function of "being" in Heidegger's thought. A simple answer to this question is confounded by the fact that Heidegger's use of "being" is highly ambiguous. As we shall see, the ambiguity of "being" reflects the ambiguity between Heidegger I and Heidegger II.

Heidegger repeatedly claims that ever since his encounter with Brentano's *On the Manifold Meaning of Being According to Aristotle* the question of being has guided his thought. Perhaps the first explicit acknowledgement of the centrality of being to his thought came when he attempted to assist Husserl in the writing of an article on Phenomenology for the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Heidegger's draft of the article, which was completely discarded by Husserl, claims that the primary concern of all philosophy is "being qua being". It is easy to see, given Husserl's understanding of phenomenology, wherein the question of existence is explicitly avoided (bracketed) and the ultimate concern is the Transcendental Ego; why he rejected Heidegger's contribution and claimed that Heidegger had failed to "grasp the whole meaning of the phenomenological reduction". It is more difficult to see what the actual significance of their disagreement is.
On the one hand their disagreement seems to be simply the result of two transcendentalists trying to outdo each other. Husserl claims that after the final reduction all that remains is the transcendental Ego. But, counters Heidegger, what sort of being does it exhibit? Their disagreement seen in this light is inconsequential because it is obviated by what they share; the belief that the transcendental philosophy is viable. "Being" mirrors the function of the Transcendental Ego, both are attempts to establish the broadest context within which philosophic inquiry can occur. By establishing such a context Husserl and Heidegger hoped to avoid unexamined presuppositions, thereby making their investigations "transparent" and certain.[76]

On the other hand, their disagreement reflects a radical difference between their respective approaches. Here, "being" reflects Heidegger's commitment to hermeneutics. Rather than trying to establish a framework which guarantees certainty, asking the meaning of being is an attempt to respond to the world around us. In this sense, "being" reflects a way of thinking more than an object of thought.

"Being" is an appropriate title for this enterprise because of its etymological connection with "existence". In the thinking that responds to being, the question of existence is paramount. "Being" is also appropriate because it attests to the unsurpassable givenness of reality. Behind Heidegger's appeal to "being" is the belief that ultimately we are not masters and possessors of our lives. Rather than asking why, thought must respond to that.[77] However, as previously noted, Heidegger was aware of the excess baggage that accompanied "being". Consequently, after the Turn he substituted various words for "being", including, seyn for sein, physis, aletheia, event and
world. [78] Constant throughout the substitutions is the attempt to open ourselves to those things and events which disclose and orient our world. It is this substantive rather than transcendental understanding of "being" which increasingly characterized his later work. J.D. Caputo offers a succinct account of this understanding of being in the following passage.

In fact his most illuminating accounts of what "Being" means, and hence of what he wants to retrieve, are to be found in those later essays which speak of the earth and the heavens, gods and mortals. Here as nowhere else it becomes plain that Being for him means the world in which mortals— in which man as homo, humus—dwell. World is the place of birth and death, growth and decline, joy and pain, of the movement of the seasons, of the mysterious rhythm of human time. It is the silence of that primordial rhythm which has been shattered by metaphysics—by the ontology whose natural outcome is technology— and which Heidegger in particular wants to restore. [79]

Thus the oblivion of being is the leveling of reality. The things and events which once disclosed and ordered our world no longer do so. And most importantly, they have not been replaced by new things and events which have the same power. It is within the context of this thought that we find Heidegger's discussion of freedom. With this clarification of the character and function of "being" in Heidegger's thought behind us we can return to his discussion of freedom in Being and Time.

10.0 THE EXPLICATION OF HUMAN BEING

In Being and Time Heidegger proposes to reawaken and reformulate the questioning of being indirectly. He proceeds by examining the being of the creature that is unique among all others because for it alone is being an issue. This creature is man.
Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it...It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.

In keeping with the transcendentalism of *Being and Time* Heidegger's approach to man's being is by way of disclosing its fundamental ontological structure, its existentiale. The existentiale has three structural elements: Facticity, Existentiality, and Fallenness. The question of man's freedom, just what "freedom" means and whether or not it accurately describes the human condition, obviously falls under the purview of this structure.

Traditionally, man has been understood in terms of some distinguishing essence. In philosophic circles this essence is usually Reason. Man is a, perhaps the, rational animal. Accordingly, an examination of man is primarily an examination of Reason. Heidegger, in a fresh and consequential move, declares that what is most striking about man is that he has no essence. Man is no-thing, not rational, not spiritual, not any-thing. This openness with respect to our existence is at once our great strength and our great weakness. On the one hand, having neither a definite niche nor a clearly defined essence reflects our capacity to comprehend the world as a whole and understand our place within it. Only for man is theoria, an articulated vision of the world's totality, possible. On the other hand, this openness reflects the fact that we are vulnerable, forever incomplete and susceptible to a profound insecurity.
This two-fold openness will be discussed in greater detail below, but let me make an additional comment here. We can discuss human "openness" in terms of transitivity and intransitivity. Borrowing from their grammatical meaning we can say that transitive openness has an object whereas intransitive openness does not. Transitive openness is directed toward the world at large. We are open to and thus able to respond to the world around us. Intransitive openness reflects the fact that we are no-thing; that what ourselves and our world means is part of a never finished, ongoing project. That is, our being is an issue for us.

With respect to man, therefore, we find that what characterizes him most profoundly is this open, questioning relationship with his existence. What we are cannot be divorced from where and how we are. Consequently, Heidegger's term for man is Dasein, literally, there-being. To say that man's being is Dasein is to say that in order to understand man we must first understand his world and the character of his existence within that world.

Whenever we come upon ourselves, so to speak, we find that we are already enworlded. We are in a particular place at a particular time, with a certain heritage, various beliefs, desires, moods, fears, involvements and commitments. Our understanding of Self and world is inextricably bound up with the objects, events and people around us. Since Heidegger believes that this aspect of human existence is a fact, one that we cannot get around, he calls it Facticity. Facticity is not an evaluative term. Rather it should be understood as a counter-term to the Cartesian ego. There is no I free from the world around us. Dasein is thus characterized by what Heidegger calls
Being-in-the-world.[87] The unification of these terms reflects the fact
that, for human being, they cannot be understood in isolation. Of
course everything that exists is in the world in some sense. What is
unique about Dasein's enworldment?

Heidegger clarifies this by contrasting the way in which Dasein is
in the world with the way in which water is in a glass. The
relationship between the water and the glass is one of containment. The
sides of the glass contain the water, preventing it from flowing away.
Containment is fundamentally a spatial relationship; the water is
within the glass. Obviously, man is not simply in the world as water is
in a glass. We are certainly related spatially to the world around us;
I am upon my chair, before my desk, in my office and above the ground.
However, the important difference between man's existence and water's
containment is that for man spatiality is a relationship which is
abstracted from a prior and richer one.

Originally and typically man is involved with the world in an
exceedingly rich and complex way. The world is not simply a collection
of neutral objects to which we attach meaning. Rather, things matter to
us, we are involved with them and concerned about them. It is through
our concernful dealings with things that the world is disclosed as
meaningful. To clarify this Heidegger offers an analysis of tools.[88]
We understand a hammer, for example, not by cognitively analyzing it,
listing its features, discussing its properties, but by using it to
drive nails. Obviously, we can discuss the hammer's features without
using it. But this latter understanding, called knowing by Heidegger,
is founded upon the richer and original relationship of use. Using
"equipment" (Heidegger's term for the objects of everyday existence)
points to the context within which an individual object is meaningful. A hammer implicitly points to the context of construction, housing, and so on. Thus, we encounter equipment as the "means by which" something can be done "in order to" accomplish this or that "for the sake of" our various projects.[89] The ultimate "for the sake of which" is Dasein itself. In other words, what guides and shapes the relationships which form our world is ultimately Dasein's desires, plans, and projects. This brings us to another feature of Dasein's ontological structure, Existentiality.

Existentiality reflects the fact that Dasein understands itself and its world in terms of possibilities. Dasein is no-thing and its world is no niche. Consequently, who we are, what we consider possible and impossible, what we act upon and what we forgo are determined by our projects. The dream of becoming an astronaut, for example, shapes the child's understanding of what is possible and what steps are necessary to actualize these possibilities. Dasein's possibilities are accordingly projected into the future. Once projected these plans shape our present concerns. Hence, Dasein is characterized by not simply what it is, but by what it is coming to be.

The projection of possibilities, to which we then respond, is of course limited. Heidegger discusses two limitations; Facticity and Fallenness. Facticity limits possibility in that Dasein exists in a world where certain things are possible and others are not. Not only are certain things physically impossible but others are practically impossible, or at least highly improbable. My desire to become an internationally renowned pianist, while certainly a physical possibility, would encounter a vast number of obstacles in its path.
The point is that since our possibilities are projected into a world and not a vacuum, their actualization is not completely in our control.

The projection of possibilities is also limited by Fallenness. Fallenness, which is the final element in Dasein's ontological structure, is revealed through an analysis of Dasein's "everydayness"; the way in which Dasein is originally and typically. What Heidegger discovers is that originally and typically Dasein is inauthentic. Rather than disclosing its own possibilities, Dasein understands itself and its possibilities in terms of others, the anonymous They.

This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of 'the others', in such a way, indeed, that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this in conspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the 'they' is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] take pleasure; we read, see, and judge literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as they shrink back;...The 'they', which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness.

Everyday, inauthentic existence is characterized by averageness and disburdenment. The various possibilities of one's life are "leveled down" by the averageness of the they. No possibilities stand out as significant, unique or decisive.

In this averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be ventured, it keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore. Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. Overnight, everything that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been well known. Everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to be manipulated.

Dasein's fundamental ontological structure, consisting of Facticity, Existentiality, and Fallenness is unified in the concept of Care. "Care" not only serves as the unifying concept of the
three structural elements, but it also describes Dasein's existence. This latter function is somewhat obscured by translating "Sorge" with "care". "Sorge" bespeaks both what we ordinarily understand by "care", that is, an attitude or relation of concern and, more clearly than "care", a worrying about things.[95]

11.0 IMPLICATIONS OF EARLY HEIDEGGER

If man is fundamentally in-the-world and if this enworldment is characterized by care, how are we free? Obviously, Heidegger's position rules out the possibility of freedom understood as the radical separation from the contingencies of existence. Man's freedom, if it is to be found at all, will not be found floating above everyday reality.[96] Since man's essence, that which characterizes him most profoundly is, ironically, to have no essence but only a unique form of existence, freedom can not be understood as simply a property which we either possess or not. If man is free his freedom must be understood in terms of his involvement with the world. Thus, an extreme Libertarianism is ruled out from the start. However, the great majority of Libertarians are not concerned with transcending existence but with preserving the notion of free choice within existence.

It is not at all clear that Being and Time excludes this conception of freedom. In fact, as we shall see, Heidegger finds this conception attractive. Yet our free choice always encounters Facticity. Who we are and how we are can never be severed from our involvement with the world. This latter realization is obviously closer to Determinism than it is to Libertarianism. Thus, we see that Heidegger's position contains both Libertarian and Deterministic elements. Not surprisingly,
his conception of freedom is essentially ambiguous. But, as previously mentioned, the seeds of the resolution of this ambiguity are also contained in his analysis.

Formally, Heidegger discusses freedom from three perspectives, freedom-for possibility, freedom-for anxiety and freedom-for death. In his discussion of all three he attempts to show that freedom is not something accidental to man but is part of man's being. Ultimately the three approaches to freedom arrive at the same point, freedom-for authenticity. Discussing freedom-for death, for example, he says,

When, by anticipation, one becomes free for one's own death, one is liberated from one’s lostness in those possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon one; and one is liberated in such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand and choose among the factual possibilities lying ahead...[97]

and more specifically,

..by the anticipation of death is every accidental and 'provisional' possibility driven out...once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one—those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly-- and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate...[98]

It seems somewhat contrived to say that we are free-for death. How can a creature "born to die" be free for its inevitable death?[99] Usually death is understood as the last thing we do, so to speak, in our life. Death is somewhere out there, perhaps closer than we think, but nonetheless it remains a future event. However, man is capable of bringing the meaning of his death out of the future and into the present. To say that man is free-for death is to say that man has the capacity to live and not just die. like a mortal.[100] According to Heidegger, grasping our death as a defining characteristic of our
humanity allows us to see our life as a whole. Becoming free-for death liberates us from the oblivion of the present which characterizes inauthentic existence. Rather than filling our lives with meaningless tasks and understanding ourselves in terms of the standards of others, we come to see who we really are. Instead of fleeing in the face of our being, which is situated between the nothingness of before-birth and after-death, we come to understand ourselves in terms of the open finitude of our being. Thus, ultimately freedom-for death results in freedom-for authenticity. (Freedom-for possibility and freedom-for anxiety have essentially the same function.)

Heidegger, as we shall see, is extremely vague in his explication of authenticity. Though it seems inconceivable, he insists that "inauthentic" and "authentic" are descriptive rather than evaluative terms. An inauthentic life is no worse than an authentic one—it is merely different. We can distinguish, but not fully separate, two interpretations of "authenticity" within his formal discussion. First, it is an act or way of life characterized by the disclosure of one's own possibilities. Second, it is an act or way of life characterized by self-understanding and manifest significance. The former interpretation focuses on Dasein's Existentiality and the latter on its Facticity.

Heidegger discusses Existentiality in terms of possibility. Dasein understands itself and its world through the disclosure of possibilities. Yet originally and typically Dasein is Fallen. With respect to possibility this means that Dasein projects and responds to the possibilities of others rather than its own. However, Dasein is not completely enslaved to the inauthenticity of the They. Because it is capable of experiencing Anxiety and understanding its mortality, Dasein
is able to see itself as it truly is. That is, as a creature whose essence is existence and whose existence is an issue. Because Dasein never simply is, it must constantly choose what to become. When liberated from the bondage of the They, Dasein is faced with the choice of either remaining inauthentic or, accepting the responsibility of projecting its own possibilities, becoming authentic. Thus, our freedom is two-fold: the ability to escape the oblivion of inauthentic existence and the capacity to project possibilities that are determined by nothing but ourselves.

This conception of freedom is a familiar one, the Libertarian conception of free-choice.

Projection, or understanding, (Existentiality) then, is free like a decision is free; nothing prior to the decision — prior to projection — can limit that decision and so determine it. Nothing can limit that decision because prior to it nothing significant exists; projection itself decides what significance will be given to things.[101]

Because this interpretation of authenticity rests upon a Libertarian conception of freedom it is vulnerable to the same problems which plague Campbell's position.

Although both Heidegger and Campbell acknowledge the Deterministic character of daily existence, they believe that freedom consists in transcending this everyday determination.[102] Campbell discusses this transcendence in terms of "moral decisions" and Heidegger in terms of "authenticity". Both are led to posit the Self as the locus of freedom. As previously discussed in section 4, I believe that this turn to Selfhood is replete with difficulties. The end result is a Self which is isolated from everything outside itself, including its own, supposedly free, action.[103] Even if the turn to the Self could be
successfully negotiated two critical problems would remain. First, the notion of free choice, which underlies both "moral decisions" and "authenticity" is ultimately indistinguishable from randomness. Obviously neither Campbell nor Heidegger could accept randomness as a definition of freedom. Yet their positions offer no other choice. Second, their position cannot be stated in such a way that it is consistent with the findings of modern science. Although this alone does not refute their claims, it does remove them from a secure and fruitful position in the everyday world. Thus, in the final analysis, this interpretation of authenticity is undermined by a theoretically incoherent conception of freedom.

This brings us to the second interpretation of "authenticity" found in Being and Time. Whereas the first interpretation focused on Dasein's Existentiality, this interpretation focuses on Dasein's Facticity. "Facticity" reflects the fact that Dasein is always in-the-world. Consequently, we are never free from the determination of everyday reality. Of course, for Heidegger, this determination is a complex mixture of Dasein's projected possibilities, those of others, and the features of the physical world. The point is that all possibilities are thrown, that is, projected out of and into a particular world. Consequently, Dasein can never completely control either the projection or actualization of its possibilities. If this is the case, how can we become authentic?

Authenticity is not freedom-from everyday existence, but a certain type of everyday existence. Heidegger approaches this notion indirectly by contrasting it with what it is not; the life of the They. The life of the They is inauthentic not just because our possibilities are
disclosed and limited by others, but because it obscures and dissipates the significance and order of reality. Nothing stands out as decisive. Nothing provides our life with orientation. Rather than remaining open to those things and events which disclose and orient our world, we fill ourselves with petty concerns and frenzied activities. In other words, an inauthentic existence is characterized by the oblivion of Being.

However, Heidegger argues that man is not completely enslaved to inauthenticity. At least not yet. In his late work he comes to see this as the greatest danger facing mankind. Nonetheless, at this point, man remains capable of authenticity. This capability is fundamentally our ability to comprehend and respond to Being, or its absence. We are freed-from inauthentic existence insofar as we are able to respond to the world in its crucial dimensions. Thus, to say that Dasein is free-for authenticity is to say that we are capable of responding to, rather than choosing, the significance of our world. Accordingly, authenticity would be an act or event characterized by those things and events which concern us most deeply.

This interpretation of authenticity and the conception of freedom upon which it rests are obviously consonant with resourceful Determinism. Freedom is not rejected out of hand but it is understood as responding rather than choosing and it is fully located within a deterministic nexus. Because of this, it shares both the strengths and weakness of Determinism discussed in section 6. Like Smart's position, this second interpretation of authenticity and freedom is theoretically coherent, avoids the randomness of free choice, and can be stated in accordance with the findings of modern science. Also like Smart's position, Heidegger's account suffers from a lack of focus and
direction. Both Smart and Heidegger seem to assume that formalism is paramount in the discussion of freedom. Once the framework is erected everything else will fall into place. However, in both accounts, what focus they have is derived from imported substantive material. Heidegger's account of authenticity is powerful not because of its theoretical merits but because of its trenchant analysis of daily life. If we are to develop Heidegger's suggestive remarks about our ability to respond to eminent reality, we must turn to that eminence itself.

Hence, we see that Heidegger's formal discussion of freedom is fundamentally ambiguous, containing both Libertarian and Deterministic elements. Consequently, his position suffers not only from ambiguity but from the problems found in both Smart's and Campbell's positions as well. Nonetheless, his substantive analysis of everyday existence points the way that a fruitful discussion of freedom should go. Specifically, there are three helpful suggestions in his substantive discussion.

First, he suggests, correctly I think, that freedom should be understood as the capacity to respond to significance rather than the ability to freely choose. As we shall see, grounding freedom in responsibility rather than choice allows us both to fruitfully address our experience of freedom and to do so in a theoretically coherent way.

Second, he suggests that freedom is an achievement of, rather than a property of, the human species. This is not to say that freedom is a matter of will, something we set out to "achieve". "Achievement" should be understood in contradistinction with "property". If freedom is a property of man, as with Campbell for example, he is obviously not
involved with it. He, as a man, is born free. However, if freedom is an achievement, the individual is involved in his freedom. We can be more or less free. Implicit in the idea of a Liberal education, for example, is that it makes one more free. Accordingly, the responsibility underlying freedom is participatory in nature. We are involved, take part in, our freedom. Our implication in freedom can be both exhilarating and, as Heidegger and Sartre point out, dreadful.

Third, Heidegger suggests that certain ways of life are unfree. Usually, this claim is discussed in terms of civil liberties, economic conditions, and political systems. To a large extent this is the most important discussion of human freedom. One would have to be naive and callous to talk about "responding to significance" to a person who does not know when he will eat again, where he will sleep, and where he will find work. However, this lack of freedom is obvious and it receives plenty of discussion — if too little action. Heidegger suggests that there is another, more subtle, way in which man can be unfree. In his analysis of the They, which in his later work is understood as technological existence, we find a way of life that is apparently quite free but in actuality is profoundly unfree.[104]

It was not until his mature work, following the Turn, that Heidegger was able to flesh out these suggestions. As early as 1930, however, in an essay entitled "on the Essence of Truth", Heidegger takes an important step in his attempt to resolve the ambiguity of Being and Time.
12.0 TRUTH AND FREEDOM

The essay attempts to think the essence of truth. Accordingly, it is not concerned with this and that truth but with what all truths share. Usually we understand truth in terms of correspondence. True statements correspond to the way things actually are and true things are those which prove to be as we believed them to be. "The plane will be late" is true insofar as the plane really is late. Gold is truly gold and not just fools' gold when, after analysis, we find that it really is gold. This interpretation is so obvious and acceptable that it tends to obviate further questioning. Yet, according to Heidegger, this understanding of "truth", while correct, fails to be true. Correctness is merely accordance with the facts of the matter, while truth reveals the heart of the matter. Returning to the correspondence theory of truth Heidegger finds that prior to correspondence there must be disclosure. That is, before we can judge whether or not our statement accurately corresponds to the matter at hand, we must comprehend the matter at hand. He supports this claim by examining "Atheleia".

"Atheleia" is usually translated "truth". Literally, however, it means unconcealment, the disclosure of what was hidden. Elaborating the meaning of "aletheia" in a later essay he says,

Truth means today and has long meant the agreement or conformity of knowledge with fact. However, the fact must show itself to be fact if knowledge and the proposition that forms and expresses knowledge are to be able to conform to the fact; otherwise the fact cannot become binding on the proposition. How can fact show itself if it cannot itself stand forth out of concealedness, if it does not itself stand forth out of concealedness, if it does not itself stand in the unconcealed?[105]
At a glance this interpretation of the essence of truth strikes one as simply a platitude obfuscated by exotic terminology. It is quite obvious that "correspondence with the state of affairs" presupposes a state of affairs to which it corresponds. Can this be all that Heidegger has in mind? Yes and no. I believe that this is what he has in mind — but there is more here than meets the eye. Quite often what we presuppose, and fail to mention, is more revealing than what is said.\[106] The correspondence theory of truth presupposes a meaningful world, a context within which statements make sense. In other words, those of *Being and Time*, the notion of truth presupposes the fact that we are always and already in the world. Reality has always and already come to pass. Thus, truth is the disclosure of the givenness of reality and not simply a property of statements. Is then the disclosure of reality the essence of truth? One might think so, but there is a further step to be taken. To say that unconcealedness is the essence of truth presupposes our capacity to comprehend and respond to this disclosure. This capacity, according to Heidegger, is freedom.

Freedom is not merely what common sense is content to let pass under this name: the caprice, turning up occasionally in our choosing, of inclining in this or that direction. Freedom is not mere absence of constraint with respect to what we can or cannot do. Nor is it on the other hand mere readiness for what is required and necessary (as so somehow a being). Prior to all this ("negative" and "positive" freedom), freedom is engagement in the disclosure of beings as such.\[107]

Freedom, as the essence of truth, is our active involvement in the disclosure of reality. This conception of freedom, opaque as it is, signals a break with the discussion of freedom in *Being and Time*. There the discussion was confounded by the admixture of libertarian and deterministic elements. Here Heidegger clearly distinguishes the two and, furthermore, recognizing that the former results in capriciousness,
Yet his account fails to resolve the over-arching ambiguity of *Being and Time*, the disparity between its formal process and its substantive timidity. It is clear that in "On the Essence of Truth" Heidegger takes "essence" to mean "formal condition". Freedom is the essence of truth insofar as it is a necessary condition for it. Obviously, if we were not open to the disclosure of reality there would be no situation about which to make judgments. But this fails Heidegger's own standard; it is certainly correct but just as certainly it is untrue. That is, it fails to reach to the heart of our concern with truth and freedom.

The problem is that his account reveals too much. For any given situation an indefinite number of true statements can be made about it. The problem with truth is not finding a true statement but discriminating among them. What concerns us are those statements which are not just true but importantly true. Distinguishing between true and importantly true is not a matter of establishing formal conditions. Rather one must refer to standards of significance. A physician examining his patient, for example, is certainly interested in true statements about the patient's condition. But not all of the true statements concern him, not even most of them. Good diagnosis requires the ability to sift through the countless true statements discarding all but the relatively few which are importantly true. This process is guided by the physician's understanding of what is probably wrong. This first approximation of the problem establishes what will count as significant information. Accordingly the less the physician has to go on to begin with the more difficult the diagnosis will be.
Similarly, saying that freedom is not free-choice but "engagement in the disclosure of beings as such" may strengthen our theoretical position but it fails to address our deepest concerns with human freedom. It fails, like all purely formal discussions of freedom because it cannot distinguish between levels of significance. Freedom, formally understood as the "essence of truth", is a necessary condition for all acts, the most barbaric as well as the most noble. Merleau-Ponty could have easily been talking about Heidegger's, rather than Sartre's, conception of freedom when he said that freedom "is everywhere, but equally nowhere".\[108\]

Thus, "On the Essence of Truth" reflects an important step in Heidegger's discussion of freedom. For the first time he clearly disassociates himself from the libertarian notion of free-choice. It also brings, perhaps more clearly than Being and Time, the shortcomings of a purely formal account into the open.

After this essay Heidegger's work took a decisive turn toward substantive analysis. He repeatedly claims that it is the method and not the goal of his thinking that changed. The subject of his mature work remains the question of Being. But now, rather than trying to establish the conditions for the possibility of our experience of Being, he turns to our experience itself. This turn brings with it a vigor and clarity absent in his early formal work. But because he abandons the attempt to establish cogently the possibilities of experience, it also brings a degree of tentativeness. Unlike formal thought, substantive analysis can never provide cogent responses to the questions that guide it. In response to a letter from a young student, Heidegger says this about substantive thought:
To think "Being" means: to respond to the appeal of its presencing. The response stems from the appeal and releases itself toward that appeal. ...I can provide no credentials for what I have said...that would permit a convenient check in each case whether what I say agrees with "reality"... Everything here is the path of a responding that examines as it listens. Any path always risks going astray, leading astray. To follow such paths takes practice in going. Practice needs craft. Stay on the path, in genuine need, and learn the craft of thinking, unswerving, yet erring.[109]

In his mature work "Being" and "aletheia" are discussed from a substantive perspective. Rather than focusing on the conditions for the disclosure of all reality, he focuses on what is disclosed as decisive. Both "Being" and "aletheia" point to the fact that reality is always and already given. Our world is ordered in such a way that certain things and events stand out as significant while others do not.

To say that reality is given is not to say that it never changes, but that ultimately it is a matter of conditions rather than laws. The order of our world, what stands out and what does not, could be vastly different without contradicting the laws of physics. Consequently, our questioning of significance must finally come to rest with that rather than why. There are no laws of significance, though significance is thoroughly lawful. To say that reality is given is also to say that we do not create or fully control it. We find ourselves in a particular world wherein particular things are significant or not. Of course, as we shall see, this does not mean that we are not implicated in this significance, just that we do not create or fully control it. It is in acknowledgment of this condition that Odysseus says to Amphinomos:

Of mortal creatures, all that breathe and move, Earth bears none frailer than mankind... So I, too, in my time thought to be happy; but far and rash I ventured, counting on my own right arm, my father, and my kin; behold me now...No man should flout the law but keep in peace what gifts the gods may give.[110]
The etymology of "significance" provides initial access to the concept itself. Tracing "significance" through Middle English and Old French we come to its root in Latin, Signum, which means "a distinctive mark, figure or seal". Signum in turn is the suffixed form of sekw which means "to follow". Thus, we can say that significant things and events are those which we follow — those which claim and guide us. Further understanding of significance requires a turn to significant things themselves. Heidegger's essay "The Thing" is representative of this turn.

13.0 FREEDOM AND SIGNIFICANT THINGS

In "The Thing" Heidegger offers an analysis of the things which comprise his everyday world. He concentrates his analysis on one thing, a jug. What follows is an elaborate description of its properties and function. Rejecting the formal description of the jug in terms of its physical features alone he attempts to disclose the function of the jug in his everyday world. The jug is made from the earth's clay by a potter. Man and earth join in the creation of the jug. But the jug's character cannot be understood in isolation from the context in which it fits. The jug is a wine jug. Within its sides and the void between them it holds the wine. But, of course, a jug as opposed to a keg, holds only to give up, to pour. Thus, the jug holds the wine so that it may be served rather than holding it so that it may be aged, for example. The serving of wine in turn points to the context of meals and celebration. As mortals we need the sustenance provided by food and drink. Hence the wine poured from the jug quenches our thirst and enlivens our conviviality. But at times, wine is served not as a drink
but as a libation. Wine thus served bespeaks man's relationship to divinity. Heidegger concludes that the jug points to and gathers the four-fold: earth, sky, mortals and the divinities. [112] This gathering and focusing of things is what distinguishes them from the more numerous objects. He says,

Inconspicuously compliant is the thing; the jug and the bench, the footbridge and the plow. But tree and pond, too, brook and hill, are things, each in its own way. Things, each thinging from time to time in its own way, are heron and roe, deer, horse and bull. Things, each thinging and each staying in its own way, are mirror and clasp, book and picture, crown and cross. But things are also modest in number, compared with the measureless mass of men as living beings. Men alone, as mortals, by dwelling attain to the world as world. Only what conjoins itself out of world becomes a thing.[113]

Heidegger's analysis is both familiar and alien. It is alien insofar as the things he describes are peculiar to his agrarian and largely pre-technological setting. Yet his appeal to the significance of these things strikes a responsive chord within us. In his analysis we hear the echo of similar experiences in our own lives. But how do we best capture the kinship between our own experiences and Heidegger's analysis?

Returning to formalism and trying to establish the conditions for the possibility of significance fails because of the failure of formalism generally. The conditions for the possibility of significance circumscribes a possibility space, but that space accommodates insignificant and distracting or destructive things as well as significance. We must instead proceed by referring to vocables which point to the various generic features of significance. Such vocables are: "engagement", "contextuality", "focal", "eminent", and the "four-fold". These vocables, while helpful, can serve only as a bridge
between ourselves and the significant thing itself. Appealing to the
generic traits works only if they are enriched and invigorated by our
own experiences and recollections of the things themselves. This is
possible because the kinship between significant things is a part of
their givenness. Thus, our discussion of the generic features of
significance must remain sufficiently transparent to allow us to see
through them, what they preserve and anticipate.

The particularity of Heidegger's discussion invites us to examine
our own life to see whether or not "things" exist.[114] Surely most of
us have things which stand out as decisively significant. The place I
live, my family and friends, the ring which gathers and preserves my
marriage commitment, my vocation, all serve to focus and orient my life.
With respect to these "things" and the significance they embody, freedom
is not the ability to accept or reject them without causal constraint
but the capacity to comprehend and respond to them in their
significance. Am I free to abandon my wife, dishonor my family, fail my
friends? If I was not bound to these people and this way of life would
I call my condition freedom or destitution? I believe that it would be
the latter.

Turning to the etymology of "free" helps illuminate this sense of
freedom. The Welsh root of "free" is rhydad, which means to love.
Rhydad, in turn, can be traced back to the Sanskrit priya, meaning dear.
The root of priya, pri, is found in the Old Slavonic privatell and,
after some modification, in the Old English freon, both of which mean
friend. The Old German senses of "free" come from its having been
"applied as the distinctive epithet of those members of a household who
are connected by ties of kinship with the head, as opposed to the
slaves."[115] Hence, we see that originally freedom was more than the opposite condition of slavery. To be free, and not simply unconstrained, was to be bound by others in kinship, friendship, and love. Clearly it requires more than iron to enslave a man and more than its removal to free him.

Obviously, this is a substantive conception of freedom. As such no cogent argument can be given for it. Attempting to establish this conception as valid, prior to our experience of freedom would be to return to formal discussion. Yet the temptation to do so is great, especially when we are discussing something that concerns us. We would like to be able to nail down, once and for all, just what freedom means. However, as we have seen, the attempt to do so is rigorous but aimless. We must proceed, as Heidegger did, by turning to our experience itself to see whether or not our conception of freedom is adequate to it. Saint Exupery's discussion of his friend's desperate struggle to escape death in the Andes offers an opportunity to ground this notion of freedom in a concrete situation.

Guillaumet, like many of the early aviators, found himself caught in the grip of a violent storm. Fighting to retain control of his lurching plane, he searched in vain for an opening in the storm. Nowhere was escape possible. Finally, after hours of battling down drafts and dodging the mountains which reared up out of the clouds, his fuel supply was exhausted and he crash landed on a frozen lake. It was the dead of winter, high in the Andes.
After a week of looking for their friend, Exupery and his companions abandoned hope. No one, the locals assured them, could survive a single night, much less an entire week, out in the Andean winter. But survive he did and after more than a week he staggered, more dead than alive, into a mountain village. His first words to Exupery were "What I went through no animal would have gone through". After recovering from the worst of it and while he waited to see if he would lose the tools of his profession to frostbite, he told his tale.

For the first two days and two nights he was confined to the wreckage of his plane by the storm. When it finally abated he began to walk out. He was not to stop walking for the next five days and four nights. He knew that to stop in that weather was to die. Yet, in extreme cold, after one becomes hypothermic, nothing feels better, warmer and more sensible than to lie down in the snow and give yourself to sleep. Longing to stop Guillaumet would say to himself,

If my wife still believes that I am alive, she must believe that I am on my feet. The boys all think I am on my feet. They have faith in me. And I am a skunk if I don't go on.

Finally, however, he could go no further. Defeated, he succumbed to the warmth of the frozen snow and sank into the oblivion of his pain. But even as he fell a thought came to him. He remembered that if his body was not recovered the insurance company would withhold payment of his policy for four years. He also knew that if he remained where he was the spring run-off would wash his body into a ravine where it would never be found. Managing to raise his head he spotted a rock, about fifty yards away, against which he could prop his body assuring its recovery in the spring. Knowing that failure meant that his wife would
be penniless for years, he gained his feet and took that decisive step which eventually carried him to safety.

Guillaumet's story could have easily been told from the perspective of human will. One suspects that a less humble man would have. In this case, an animal would not have survived because other animals are not blessed with human wills. It was sheer strength, courage and determination which saved Guillaumet. But Exupery believes that there was something more fundamental at work than will power.

If we were to talk to him about his courage, Guillaumet would shrug his shoulders...He knew that he was responsible for himself, for the mail, for the fulfillment of the hopes of his comrades. He was holding in his hands their sorrow and their joy. He was responsible for that new element which the living were constructing and in which he was a participant. Responsible, in as much as his work contributed to it, for the fate of those men.[118]

Responsibility, not willpower, is what saw Guillaumet through his ordeal. However, not Campbell's sense of responsibility, which requires that one "could have done otherwise", but the literal meaning of "responsibility"; the capacity to respond. Guillaumet was claimed by the significance of his comrades, his wife, and his profession. He was not free to choose whether or not he would respond to these claims, he was free insofar as he was equal to them. He was able to survive what no other animal would have, because as a human he was capable of comprehending and responding to the significance of reality. What is real, what determines us is not simply what is immediately present, the pain, and coldness, but a rich web of relationships, commitments, remembrance of past events and anticipation of future ones. To say that an animal would have failed to survive, is to say that an animal is not capable of attaining what saved Guillaumet -- a world rather than a
14.0 OBJECTIONS TO SUBSTANTIVE FREEDOM

In order to clear and prepare the ground for Heidegger's discussion of technology and freedom, we must consider and accommodate the obvious and plausible objections of the libertarian. There are three objections likely to be raised. First, this conception of freedom, while seemingly consistent with the extreme case of Guillaumet, is at odds with the apparent looseness of everyday reality. A viable conception of freedom should apply to both the frozen wasteland of the Andes and deciding which toothpaste to buy. Second, this conception of freedom is incompatible with those values and concepts that are traditionally associated with freedom: pride and guilt for example. Third, claiming that man is capable of responding to significance seems to reflect a latent libertarianism.

The apparent looseness of reality is best understood in three ways. First, everyday reality is usually characterized by entropic situations wherein nothing stands out as decisive. Standing before an array of toothpaste, for example, we feel as if we can freely choose which one to buy. The felt indeterminacy of this situation arises not from the absence of a causal nexus, but from the triviality of the decision. It just does not really matter which brand you pick. The situation is far removed from the central significance of one's life. As we move from the trivial to the decisive features of one's life, the apparent arbitrariness of our actions decreases.
Second, in those situations where we are claimed by something significant, there are usually various ways to respond to this claim. If the alternatives are equally significant, none will stand out as clearly the one to take. Hence, we weigh between them considering the advantages and disadvantages of each. This translation of the general guidance into specific action gives rise to the illusion that it is up to us to choose freely which course to follow.[120]

Third, some situations are characterized by conflicting claims. This conflict is often interpreted as indeterminacy. You and your family are sitting by the river, for example, when suddenly a child falls in and is swept toward a stretch of rapids. Perhaps you would immediately dive in to rescue the baby. But perhaps not. You might hesitate because you are not a strong swimmer and the swift water of the river frightens you. And what about your responsibility to your own child? In such a situation we experience ourselves as the locus of conflicting claims not the locus of causal indeterminacy. The conflict is resolved not when we freely choose one course of action but when one of several claims proves to be the strongest.

All three of these situations, which give rise to the apparent looseness of everyday life, are characterized by our ignorance of the precise nature of the determination involved. This ignorance, I believe, is not the result of some impenetrable core of reality that escapes understanding. Rather the ignorance is best understood as an intelligible ignorance. That is, we know why we do not fully understand the determination. Our ignorance stems from the immense complexity of even the simplest situation. Considering the complexity of just our own functioning, and our relative ignorance concerning it, it is easy to see
why we would not fully understand a situation involving other things, people, and their relationship. Accordingly, most of our claims concerning the determination of everyday reality must for now, and probably forever, be accompanied by the qualifying "in principle". However, this is plenty for determinism and way too much for libertarianism.

But, asks our critic, is not this conception of freedom compatible with the values and concepts that have traditionally accompanied the notion of freedom? How can "guilt" and "pride", for example, have any sense within a deterministic setting? These questions are important because a resourceful determinism must be able to illuminate, and not just reject, our ordinary experience of the world. It should be clear that this position does indeed rule out a certain notion of "guilt" and "pride". It excludes understanding them as the result of being solely responsible for an act. In this sense, one experiences guilt when the act in question is deplorable and pride when it is salutary. With respect to guilt, believing that you are solely responsible for an act is at odds with our understanding of the complexity of human action and, moreover, it is absolutely no help to the guilt ridden individual. With respect to pride, believing that you alone, by the strength of your own right arm is simply hubristic and, as such, it should be ruled out. It should be ruled out not only because of the arrogance that it entails, but also because it is a deluded sense of one's place in the world. [121] But if this notion of guilt is excluded, what remains?
Guilt, I believe, is best understood as failing the claim of significance. That is, the experience of being claimed but being unequal to it. One day while in a drugstore, for example, my wife, a friend, and I saw a man collapse in the back of the store. We rushed back and saw that he had obviously suffered a heart attack. Although my wife and I had both completed CPR training, we hesitated. Eventually, two pharmacists began to administer CPR. It was obvious, however, that they did not know what they were doing. Rather than stepping forward and taking over, we simply watched. We knew that we should step in, but we did not. Finally, after an agonizingly long wait the paramedics arrived. I would like to think that the gentleman survived, but I feel sure that he died.

To say that we suffered guilt would be an understatement. We knew that we failed to do what we were called upon to do. Yet, it was not the hopeless, inexplicable, and unhelpful guilt of absolute responsibility. The experience of failure served to strengthen our resolve in the future. It allowed us to see that our training was inadequate and that further preparation was needed. In other words our guilt helped prepare us to become equal to a similar situation. We understand, more clearly than before, why we failed and what can be done about it.

Pride, I believe, is best understood as the experience of oneself as the locus of a significant event coming to pass. As such, pride quickly shades into gratitude. I recall, for example, those particularly fine runs when I felt as if I could go on forever. The miles slipped by unobtrusively and I seemed to almost float along. On days like this you feel proud of your body, proud of the outcome of your
training and diligence, but also grateful for the fact that your body, training, and desire have converged so wonderfully. It does not take many of the bad days to convince you that good runs are not completely under our control.

Thus, I believe that we can make sense of "guilt" and "pride" in a deterministic setting. Furthermore, I believe that these notions of guilt and pride can help those who suffer from the hopeless anxiety of obsessive guilt and the self deception of overweening pride.

Finally, to say that man is free insofar as he is capable of comprehending and responding to the significance of reality seems to reflect a latent libertarianism. "Capability" seems to imply that we can choose whether or not to respond to significance. However, I believe that "capability" should be understood in terms of possibility and disposition rather than choice. Water, for example, is capable of existing as a liquid, solid, or gas. Obviously "capability" in this case does not refer to choice. Similarly, we say of a man being tried for murdering his family that he is capable of comprehending and respecting the rights of others and the dignity of life. With respect to freedom then, "capability" refers to the fact that it is possible for man to comprehend the significance of reality. Previously, this disposition was discussed in terms of aletheia and authenticity (second sense). This disposition appears to be unique to our species.

Yet it does not appear to be universal within our species. There are two ways in which man can be unfree. A person who is sufficiently brain- damaged, mentally retarded, or similarly impaired may lack the capacity to comprehend the significance of reality. Such a person would
be radically unfree. A person may possess this basic sense of freedom, however, and still be unfree. Such a person would be one who, while having the capacity to comprehend significance, fails to do so. Thus, we can distinguish two senses of freedom: basic and final. Basic freedom is the capacity to comprehend significance. Final freedom is not only the capacity to comprehend significance but the actual comprehension and responding to claims of final or ultimate significance. Basic freedom, therefore, is a necessary but not sufficient condition of final freedom. This lack of sufficiency can be approached from three directions.

First, basic freedom is the capacity for significance not the creation of significance. In other words, we are not the masters and possessors of the significance of our lives.

I recall, for example, a backpacking trip into the Mission Mountains. Thinking that we would find water along the way, I neglected to fill our water bottles at the trail head. Needless to say, no water was found. As the hours passed, and we continued to climb, the lack of water began to take effect; I recall dreading the direct sunlight of the exposed talus slopes and feeling the almost maddening expectation of water around every bend. While traversing the side of the ridge, we unexpectedly came upon a spring. At that instance, before even quenching our thirst, our discomfort receded and the world took on the sparkling qualities of the water itself.

Looking back, I realize that this moment proved to be decisive with regards to the rest of the trip. From this moment, we were aware of ourselves and our surroundings more immediately than before. Of course,
it will not do to say that all we need to do to insure the significance of backpacking trips is to leave the water bottles at home. No, I believe that in experiences such as these we come to realize that even with our ability to control the externalities of a given situation, what significance it may hold for us is more received than acquired.[122]

Second, as mentioned in section 10, one may exist under economic, political, or social conditions which effectively constrain or limit final freedom. In this sense, the distinction between basic and final freedom mirrors that between negative (freedom-from) and positive (freedom-for) freedom. Before one has reached a sufficiently high level of freedom-from constraints, freedom-for the various aspects of a fulfilling life is impossible.

Third, also mentioned in section 10, there is a way of life which, although it is free from the excessive constraints of the unfree life mentioned above, limits and threatens man's final freedom. Heidegger understood this way of life to be characterized by technology. Understanding technology, and its threat to freedom, occupied a central position in his mature thought.

15.0 HEIDEGGER'S ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGY

Initially, it seems absurd to say that technology threatens our final freedom. Just the opposite seems true. From as early as the seventeenth century, technology has been understood as a means to liberation, not bondage.[123] Technological progress is largely responsible for our liberation from the excessive constraints of toil, illiteracy, disease, and geographic confinement. We can fly around the
world, communicate with all parts of the globe, live practically anywhere we want, eat what we want...the list is endless. If there is a threat to freedom, it seems to be the lack rather than the presence of technology. How can technology threaten freedom?

Perhaps, the most common response to this question is that technology greatly increases the power of oppressive authority. The State becomes more and more powerful, controlling more and more of our lives. Technological advances in surveillance equipment, behavior modification techniques, automated means of production and the like make it easy for a populace to be ruled with an iron hand. Orwell's 1984 and Huxley's Brave New World exemplify this response to the question.

Certainly, there are important issues and questions raised by this approach. Yet, the threat to freedom they discuss does not so much arise from technology as it does from the inappropriate use of it. Technology merely increases the efficiency of the modern tyrant. Furthermore, many argue that technology provides the means by which such oppression can be avoided. Technology, so it is said, will allow for a more decentralized, democratic distribution of goods, services, and information. In this light, the oppression of technology appears to be a problem for technology to solve rather than a problem with technology itself.

Heidegger offers a more penetrating, but less straight-forward, response to this question. Heidegger's discussion of technology and freedom must always be understood in the context of his most central concern, the question of Being; the heart of which is "reflecting on what in our day is".[124] Accordingly, Heidegger's most explicit
discussions of technology, "The Question Concerning Technology" and "The Turning" are gathered with "The Thing" and "The Danger" in a presentation entitled "Insight into What Is".[125] He argues that the popular characterization of our time as "the technological age" is literally and profoundly correct. From this perspective, "technology" refers to more than just the aggregate of machines and instruments which surrounds us; it is the characteristic way in which we understand and take up with reality.

Technology, or in other words, our time, is characterized by a leveling of reality. Those things and events that stood as significant either no longer do so at all or their significance is muted and obscured. Thus, our final freedom is threatened insofar as there are fewer and fewer eminently significant things to respond to. This threat is the greatest when technology is functioning smoothly and amiably because then, unlike in the case of tyranny, the bondage is invisible and seductive.

The first step in recognizing technological bondage is recognizing technology for what it is. Heidegger pursues this in "the Question Concerning Technology". The difficulty with questioning technology is similar to that with questioning truth; the answer to both questions appears to be so obvious that the question never gets off the ground. Heidegger attempts to break up the compacted soil of the obvious so that genuine questioning may flourish. Accordingly, the essay has a radical, but undeveloped character.
He begins by clarifying his approach to the question. The essence of technology, he says, is nothing technological. Essentially, technology is neither a collection of instruments nor a means to an end. If we exclude both the instrumental and utilitarian conceptions, what are we left with? Heidegger questions technology from the perspective of the history of Being. Keeping in mind that for Heidegger "Being" refers to the presence of reality, the "history of Being" simply means that there are discernible periods wherein reality was experienced uniquely. (This was discussed in greater detail in section 7). Technology, as the characteristic way in which we understand reality is thus the latest epoch in the history of Being. Accordingly, before it is a means to an end, technology is a disclosure of reality.

The remainder of the essay is devoted to characterizing reality as it is disclosed by technology and to explicating man's relationship to this disclosure. The first task is a clarification of the essence of technology, and the second is a discussion of technological bondage and the possibility of freedom.

The disclosure of technology differs from its predecessors in that "the revealing [of reality] that rules in modern technology is a challenging which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such". In the technological era nature is revealed as a resource: as something to be used in the acquisition of something else. Nature is actively subsumed under the directive of technology.

In the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the orderly disposition of electrical energy, even the Rhine itself appears as something at our command. The hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine River as was the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for hundreds of years.
Rather the river is dammed up into the powerplant. What the river is now, namely, a water power supplier, derives from out of the essence of the power station.[128]

The Rhine, and all of nature, is understood in terms of its function as a resource. Reality, through the challenging revelation of technology is ordered to "stand by", to be on call for further ordering and use; thus, Heidegger argues, that reality comes to be understood as simply "standing-reserve".[129]

Standing-reserve is best understood in contrast with the character of things. In his analysis of things Heidegger discusses their significance in terms of their gathering and focusing power. The jug, embodied a rich context: the life of mortals, the presence of divinity, the earth, and the sky. That which is revealed as standing-reserve, by contrast, only reflects our intentions. The forest becomes timber, the soil becomes a mineral deposit, and workers become pieces of labor resource.[130] Resources, as available for our procurement, are incapable of standing over against us as objects (Gegenstand) in their own right. Everything comes to be understood according to one criterion, availability.

Thus, man is claimed by what Heidegger calls the Ge-stell, or framework.[131] "Ge-stell" is the unifying term for his conception of technology. Ge-stell, as the essence of technology, is the mode of disclosure which challenges man to reveal nature as standing reserve.

The danger of technology is that its mode of disclosing reality will come to obliterate all others.

"...Man, thus under way, is continually approaching the brink of the possibility of pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what is revealed in ordering, and of deriving all his standards on this basis. Where Enframing holds sway,
regulating and recurring of the standing-reserve mark all revealing. They no longer even let their own fundamental characteristic appear, namely, this revealing as such.[132]

16.0 FREEDOM IN A TECHNOLOGICAL SETTING

The obliteration of other modes of disclosure and the concomitant leveling of reality to the homogeneity of standing-reserve would result in the loss of our final freedom. Not because we are constrained by oppressors but rather, in the midst of our apparent omnipotence and unbounded liberty, there is nothing left to respond to. Nothing stands out in its significance and lays hold of us.

Not only does technology threaten our final freedom but we are not free to change it as well. Insofar as technology is an epoch of Being -- the characteristic way reality presences for us -- it is beyond human control. Heidegger repeatedly claims, in this essay and elsewhere, that this disclosure or any other, is not a matter of human willing or choice.[133] But, given all of this, Heidegger maintains that we are free in our relationship with technology.

Always the destining of revealing holds complete sway over man. But that destining is never a fate that compells. For man, becomes truly free only insofar as he belongs to the realm of destining and so becomes one who listens and hears and not one who is simply constrained to obey.[134]

How are we to understand this? Heidegger seems to be searching for a middle position between a strict determinism on the one hand and libertarianism on the other. We are not free to choose how reality will be disclosed, yet we are not merely constrained to obey. Our freedom, according to Heidegger, lies in our ability to "belong to the realm of destiny" and so become one who "listens and hears". He goes on to say
that technology harbors within its essence the "saving power".\[135\]

For the saving power lets man see and enter into the highest dignity of his essence. This dignity lies in keeping watch over the unconcealment — and with it, from the first, the concealment — of all coming to presence on this earth.\[136\]

What is the "saving power" within technology? Technology, is a mode of disclosure that is characterized by the levelling of all reality to the status of standing-reserve. The danger of technology, underlying the technical dangers of pollution, nuclear holocausts, and the like, is that technology will instantiate itself completely; driving out all other modes of disclosure and, thus, not appear as a way of disclosure itself. The saving power, then, is the fact that technology is a mode of disclosure and can be recognized as such. In other words, we can come to understand technology from the perspective of the history of Being and thus see it for what it is, a particular presencing of reality, unique from its predecessors. We can do this, because we, as humans, have the capacity to "belong to the realm of destiny", or as he put it in "On the Essence of Truth", engaging in "the disclosure of beings as such".\[137\] Thus, understanding technology to be a particular disclosure of reality opens us to the possibility of another, different disclosure of reality. that is, Heidegger holds out the hope that we may move past technology, into another, yet unknown epoch of Being.\[138\] This, of course, does not mean that technology, or a collection of instruments and machines, will somehow vanish off the face of the earth. Rather, the place occupied by technology, in its essence will be different. Other ways of revealing will flourish along side it. But, this possibility of change is out of our hands. We cannot bring this change about, but by understanding the essence of technology we can make room for it.
Through this we are not yet saved. But we are thereupon summoned to hope in the growing light of the saving power. How can this happen? Here and now and in little things, that we may foster the saving power in its increase. This includes holding always before our eyes the extreme danger.[139]

By attending to the little things, that surround us and gather our world in their significance, the saving power is nurtured. Technological disclosure of standing reserve is seen for what it is more clearly when contrasted with the disclosure of things in their significance. Likewise, and here is where Heidegger's hope lies, things stand out more clearly, that is, they are more significant, against a background of standing reserve.

Heidegger's analysis of technology helps clarify how our final freedom may be threatened and, perhaps, lost. Yet his account suffers from the ambiguous placement of freedom within technology. On the one hand, he strongly suggests that our experience of reality is determined out of the destiny of Being and is thus not a matter of will or choice. On the other hand, he appeals to human freedom and the human ability to respond to the "saving power". He certainly does not believe freedom is free-choice, yet he does not embrace determinism either. I believe that his position would be strengthened and clarified if it was explicitly placed within a deterministic setting.

Heidegger begins by arguing that reality comes to presence in different ways at different times. We can distinguish eras or epochs within which reality had a discernable character different from others. For example, we might distinguish classical Greece and medieval Europe along these lines. Within a given era, the significance of reality, what stood out and what did not, guided human interaction with it.
Heidegger's point is that the people of any given epoch do not choose how they will understand and take up with reality. In other words, Heidegger advocates a form of historical determinism.

Within our epoch technology reigns. Reality presences such that we are challenged to order it as standing-reserve. But, says Heidegger, we are still free. Our freedom is described as the capacity to comprehend the disclosure of reality. This is essentially the same conception of freedom that we encountered in "On the Essence of Truth". This freedom is best understood in terms of basic freedom. Basic freedom is the capacity to comprehend and respond to reality. In other words, man is capable of comprehending and responding to the determination of his life.

But, as Heidegger points out, this freedom alone is not enough to ward off the threat of total technological determination. Technology may continue to instantiate itself further and further until everything presences as standing-reserve and all other modes of disclosure are obscured. Such a situation would leave our basic freedom untouched but would completely destroy our final freedom.

Thus, the "saving power" does not arise from our basic freedom alone. It also requires that we have moments of final freedom. Without such moments, technological existence could not be recognized for what it is. Heidegger's appeal to the little, inconspicuous things of everyday life points to those moments of final freedom. Claimed by these things and events we are moved to make room for them in the center of our lives. The "saving power", then, consists in both our capacity of understanding the essence of technology and the claims of significant
things and events.

The uncertainty and openness that Heidegger portrays and we experience with respect to the destiny of technology indicate the transitional character of our time. Guided by significant things that stand out in a new light we are beginning to recognize and pass through technology. We know ourselves to be graced and empowered by these things, yet we are unable to comprehend and predict the details of the period of transition. We find ourselves immersed in a grave and fateful version of the looseness of life, whose trivial features were discussed in Section 14. This looseness is neither the experience of indeterminacy, of uncaused liberty, nor the feeling of being forced and constrained by a single set of factors the way hard determinism would have it. Rather we know ourselves to be graced and empowered by great things, and it is such grace and power, as well as the experience of having failed them, that will move one to write a thesis such as this. But here philosophizing appropriately gives way to poetizing.

The Lilies

Hunting them, a man must sweat, bear
the whine of a mosquito in his ear,
grow thirsty, tired, despair perhaps
of ever finding them, walk a long way.
He must give himself over to chance,
for they live beyond prediction.
He must give himself over to patience,
for they live beyond will. He must be led
along the hill as by a prayer.
If he finds them anywhere, he will find
a few, paired on their stalks,
at ease in the air as souls in bliss.
I found them here at first without hunting,
by grace, as all beauties are first found.
I have hunted and not found them here.
Found, unfound, they breathe their light
into the mind, year after year.[140]
Notes


2. See Albert Borgmann, "Formal and Substantive Considerations of Freedom and Determinism", unpublished.

3. Ibid., p. 1.


5. Ibid., p. 3.


7. Ibid., p. 159.

8. Ibid., p. 160.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., pp. 161, 162.

13. Ibid., p. 164.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 168.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p. 169.

21. Ibid., p. 150.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p. 170.

24. Ibid., p. 171.

25. Ibid., pp. 171, 172.
26. Ibid., p. 172.
27. Ibid., p. 174.
28. Ibid., p. 176.
29. Ibid., p. 176
30. Ibid.
35. Ibid., p. 395.
36. Ibid.
40. The narrator in Dostoevsky's *Notes from Underground* is a classic example of one who experiences everything, from reason to love, as a threat to his freedom.
42. J.J.C. Smart, "Free Will, Praise and Blame", in *Determinism, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility*.
43. Ibid., p. 197.
44. Ibid., p. 199.
45. Ibid., p. 204.
46. Ibid., pp. 204, 205.
47. Ibid., pp. 25, 26.
48. Ibid., p. 209.
50. Ibid., p. 211.
51. Ibid., p. 212.
53. Borgmann, p. 16.
54. Ibid., p. 17.
57. See W.J. Richardson, Heidegger - Through Phenomenology to Thought, (The Hague, 1974) pp. xvi - xxii for a discussion by Heidegger concerning this distinction.
60. Ibid., p. 208.
63. See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. John Macquarnie and Edward Robinson (New York, 1962) p. 39. All pagination will refer to the English text.
64. Ibid., p. 44.
65. See Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York, 1934) for an interesting discussion of how the emergence of technology exhibits this phenomenon.
67. American Heritage Dictionary


69. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 25.


72. Krell, "General Introduction: The Question of Being" in Basic Writings, pp. 3 - 5.


74. Ibid., p. 280.

75. Ibid., p. 281.

76. Husserl's initial confidence in Heidegger despite their disagreement seems to suggest that he understood their disagreement in this light.


79. Ibid.

80. Heidegger, Being and Time p. 32.

81. Ibid., p. 70.


83. Homer's Odyssey and the book of Job are classic discussions of this aspect of the human condition.

84. The concept of "emptiness" in the Zen tradition seems to me to be akin to this notion. See "A Cup of Tea" in Zen Flesh, Zen Bones, ed. Paul Reps (Anchor Books).

85. The notion of intransitive openness parallels Sartre's concept of "pour-soi".

86. Heidegger, Being and Time p. 82.
87. Ibid., pp. 78, 79.
88. Ibid., pp. 95 -- 107.
91. Ibid., pp. 149 -- 153.
92. Ibid., p. 164.
93. Ibid., p. 165.
94. Ibid., pp. 225 -- 244.
95. The two sides of "care" are more clearly seen in Goethe's *Faust*. As Heidegger mentions in the notes to *Being and Time*, his use of "care" was directly influenced by Goethe's.
96. Thus, Heidegger's position would rule out Sartre's conception of freedom.
98. Ibid., p. 384.
100. Again, Homer's *Odyssey* presents a classic discussion of this. With respect to mortality see Book V in particular.
102. cf. Richardson, "Heidegger and the Quest of Freedom".
103. This has been an oft-repeated criticism of Heidegger's early work. See, for example, Thomas Langdon, *The Meaning of Heidegger* (New York, 1959) p. 230.
104. For further discussion of the roots of Heidegger's conception of technology see Don Ihde, *Technics and Praxis* (Boston, 1979) pp. 103 -- 129.
106. Recognition of this fact was one of the driving forces behind Husserl's, and to an extent, Heidegger's emphasis on phenomenology.


111. American Heritage Dictionary


113. Ibid., p. 182.


115. Oxford English Dictionary


117. Ibid., p. 39.

118. Ibid., p. 43.


120. Ibid.

121. Once again, *The Odyssey* is illuminating with respect to the ways in which one can slip into hubris.


126. Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology" in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, p. 4


128. Ibid., p. 16.

129. Ibid., p. 17.
131. Ibid., p. 21.
132. Ibid., pp. 26 - 27.
133. cf. Martin Heidegger, "Only a God Can Save Us...", p. 56.
135. Ibid., p. 28.
136. Ibid., p. 32.
137. Martin Heidegger, "On The Essence of Truth", in Basic Writings, p. 128.
140. Wendell Berry, "The Lilies", in A Part (San Francisco, 1980) p. 16.
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