1997

Interiority control and anarchy: Reading Anti-Oedipus politically

Matthew Tunno
The University of Montana

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INTERIORITY, CONTROL, AND ANARCHY: READING ANTI-OEDIPUS POLITICALLY

by

Matthew Tunno

B.A. Philosophy College of Wooster 1995

presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Master of Arts

University of Montana

Philosophy Department

1997

Approved by:

Chairperson

Dean, Graduate School

5-1-97
The twentieth century has witnessed the ideological and practical collapse of communism, a devastating intellectual attack upon metaphysical totalities (God, subject, history), and rapidly accelerating modes of scientific and technological advancement. Factories are closing down and trade unions becoming sterile while interglobal communication networks and new forms of transportation shrink and redefine the limits of our world. And with "floating" banks and virtual businesses constantly deterritorializing the economic configurations and movements of capital, questions concerning our existential condition seem to be asking after shadows, while questions concerning what we should do (how to politically and actively engage a shifting and unstable social field) emerge amidst the contemporary whirlwind of theory as impotent and hollow.

The position forwarded by some contemporary French intellectuals argues for "tactical" rather than strategic political engagement, fast-paced theory which locates malleable sites of repression or injustice and attempts to re-appropriate them in new ways, in other guises, before they are re-commodified and put back into the service of repression by "state-happy" machines animated by capitalist motors. In Foucault's words, they attempt to drop theoretical bombs. *Anti-Oedipus* is one such political experiment, and it takes for its axis the intersection of the "holy family" (Oedipus, the figurehead of the new order of repressive capitalism, Mommy-Daddy-Me) and the schizophrenic production process. This dynamic, which is made to serve the project of social reconfiguration whose motor is control, offers insight into the way in which desire comes to turn back upon itself, the way in which desire comes to desire its own repression.

By re-thinking Marxist and Freudian theories in such a way that militant existence and non-repressive social involvement can remain operable possibilities in a post-disciplinary "control" society, the authors of *Anti-Oedipus* mount a full-scale critique of "interiority"; repression begins within the inner moral sphere of the self, the rampant unwillingness to part with outmoded theories of resistance and modes of critique, the geographically stable conception of social space that we hold. Oedipus animates the sedimented thinking which is still entrenched with this myth of the interior. Oedipus fuels fascist tendencies, tendencies that need to be "flushed out" of the back rooms and hazy interiors onto the smooth surface of the social field. The goal of such a project is to make everything, first and foremost desire, a productive process.

I offer here fives ways of "thinking into and out of" this complicated text. I hope, through my focus upon a specific political project of the kind mentioned above, that this essay will shed much needed light upon the general project of restructuring political theory in accordance with newer, decentralized conceptions of interiorities, control, capital, and the socius.
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INTRODUCTION

The other night at about two thirty in the morning, I unchained myself from my computer, cooked a cup of Earl Grey tea, and sat down in front of the television to mindlessly absorb the all-night, all-news loop sequence on NBC. Three things caught my eye. The first segment described a new "floating" academic system; "students" from all over the world are now taking classes from Duke, the University of Maryland, the University of Florida, and many other institutions without setting foot on campus. In fact, these virtual students hold virtual office hours with virtual professors in virtual space; by spending enough time on line, one can now receive a doctorate without ever going to class. Students can pay for these hyperclasses by authorizing money transfers from trust funds, credit companies, or financial aid services over the internet, and even download and print up their diplomas at the end of the degree sequence. This process marks the intersection, in hyperspace, of flows of capital, the dispersion of academic institutions, flows of multi-media imagery, the thorough dissemination of centralized research centers; it reconfigures all aspects of a mentor/apprentice or teacher/student relationship, it makes education a business, removes "people" from "places", etc.

The second segment revealed the newest technology in television viewing. A rectangular screen, with literally millions of minuscule pixilated spaces, promising to produce
imagery sharper than the best 35 MM cameras. I was informed that I could experience vast and expansive terrains in what amounted to a nearly three-dimensional clarity. This “high-definition” television allows me to go places I have never dreamed of going, experience things I had never experienced, etc. The rectangular screen and digital THX sound system supposedly help to construct a viewing experience better than that offered up at the cinema. I can watch a nature video of Glacier National Park and see parts of the Park that I could never witness as clearly or as quickly as I can on this new contraption. Thus the space of a whole wilderness, the cinema, and the privatized sector of the family living room converge along an axis which is invested by technological market economy, scientific advancement, and virtual imaging. My living room, the cinema, a national park, the economy of information all being uprooted, deterritorialized, reorganized and improved at the site of the “high-definition” television.

The third segment described a new digital satellite information system. Conglomerates can now apparently bid upon everything from television sitcoms to sporting events to newscasts, and the highest bidder retains the rights to sell these programs to national networking “institutions” which never actually produce anything (they buy their only products, TV programs) and never actually sell anything (they serve only as a means of distribution for interglobal fiber-optic communication). There are entire businesses which
inhabit no physical spaces, produce no goods, employ no workers, and make no income. Once the satellites are in place and the fiber-optic networks installed, there is only a vast, complex and intersecting virtual machine which has the capacity to invest any point of the social field at any time and remains completely without "executive" supervision. At this point I turned the television off.

That all of this information regarding the rapid loss of technological, privatized, and social territory was delivered to me over the course of three one and a half minute sound-byte reports is not the concern. Nor was the feeling of nausea that overcame me spurred by some type of nostalgic reverie which caused me to pine for days of old, when all computers spoke Basic and going to the movies was still a profoundly exhilarating visual and aural experience. No, the real problem with such a rapid deterritorialization of commonly understood "spaces" (social spaces, private spaces, academic and research spaces, economic spaces, political spaces) is that theory cannot keep up. We cannot think about our world fast enough; it alters its agendas too quickly. Just when an engaging theory is proposed concerning wildlife habitat, or family values, or the positive and negative effects of television viewing on children, or our political policies regarding foreign nations, or salary caps for professional athletes, or the ethical ramifications of cloning, all of these practices are uprooted, presented to the populous with thousands of different slants via
newspapers and internet sites, network news programming and satellite broadcasts. We actually watched Operation Desert Storm happen; it was a digital war, just as the Simpson fiasco was a virtual trial; how could anything like the "truth" of such events ever surface?

It cannot, and we don't want it. What is needed is not the truth, but fast-paced theory and even faster action. All things that were understood as organized and located, such as the family, the penal institution, academia, people, places, and ideas have become malleable, shifting, flowing and intersecting. This is not necessarily a negative event; most of these institutions, as we shall see, are by their very nature dictatorial and oppressive. Yet while it is still to be determined what positive or negative or benign effects such shifts will generate, one thing is for sure: Theory, particularly political theory, must keep up, and to do so, it must become flexible and experimental. This essay will examine one particular attempt to "experiment" with social and political theory.

Deleuze speaks of "lines of flight" that lead outward, away, to resistance and revolution. He speaks of philosophy. He distinguishes between knowing and thinking. Knowledge is sedimented understanding; it is the standard discourse of the history of ideas. The history of philosophy is the curse and the cure, for it situates the bounds of thinking just as it provides the axis for all "lines of flight". Thinking is the
creation of new concepts, philosophy in its active form, lines leading elsewhere. This essay that I now write is composed of many of these lines, lines which I have chosen to lead "elsewhere". But I have cheated, for I have selected an "elsewhere" in advance, and this would be "rigging the game" according to Deleuze. None-the-less, I have chosen to follow philosophical, historical, conceptual and political lines in order to end up, of all places, at a book. I have followed at least five distinct lines (perhaps there are more) marked by five distinct chapters (there is one more) that lead to a text which offers nearly limitless alternative lines of flight. But I offer these lines, and an interpretation of the book (the axis upon which they converge) as a multiplicity of entrances, a set of distinct traces which lead, directly or indirectly, to a powerfully rich text. Five ways in, many ways out.

The first five chapters of this essay are roughly these five lines. Needless to say, they intersect, overlap, draw upon and betray each other. They elaborate very general vicissitudes which point toward particular facets of Anti-Oedipus. Whether these facets are simply concepts to be defined, histories to be unthreaded, political agendas which prefigure radical thinking, or analyses of the social / cultural percepts which theory must grapple with, they are discussed here only as points of entry, ways of approaching, reading, and thinking, "lines" to be followed and pondered.
Thus I offer up five ways to "enter" a text. The text is *Anti-Oedipus*, and in the final chapter of this essay I will offer an account of this text, as a means of putting closure on what might otherwise amount only to a conglomeration of lines.

The leveling force which *Anti-Oedipus* brings to bear upon psychoanalysis, contemporary politics, subjectivity, indeed everything and all that composes the "social" will certainly be its most important contribution to philosophy. The "social", described only in terms of contemporary capitalism, is dissected in *Anti-Oedipus*, and the dialectical tension between desire and Fascism (or better production and repression) is played out along the intersection of two interrelated lines: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.

The most immediate effect of the schizophrenic process, posited as universal producer, is to separate, in the authors' own words, desire from lack. This amounts to an attempt to scourge both philosophical theory and social and political practice of all forms of domesticating and repressive tendencies brought about and accelerated by "state-happy" mentalities. I will trace the origins and developments of what Deleuze and Guattari call "state-happy" thought, what Foucault calls domesticating thought, and what Nietzsche refers to as the "moralization of existence"; these concepts all have subtle, distinct connotations when examined in the light and context of each author, but what will be
discovered is that they are all symptoms of and reactions to a certain conception of subjectivity. This model of the subject equates desire with lack and attributes responsibility to the individual at the internal level; all of these thinkers realize that whatever is wrong with thinking originates with the binary model (interior/exterior) of the individual.

The problem is that this "individual", what Foucault refers to as "Man", cannot and indeed will not think itself through to active, challenging, and liberating theoretical vantage points; its lives its own history too well. "Man" is pensive and reflective, enamored by belief and systems; it is the representation of institutional machinery at work at the micro-social level. Leaving "Man" behind is the first task of schizo-analysis; for Deleuze and Guattari, Oedipus is the social staying power of Man. Oedipus is the figurehead which causes us to desire our own repression. And Oedipus is an economy; it is a myth, it is a psychological concept, but it is much more than this. For the authors of Anti-Oedipus, the economy of Oedipus is a production of a "deterritorializing" capitalism, a global machine which always and everywhere outstrips the limits of individualism while simultaneously re-orienting and re-channeling goals and agendas elsewhere.

Oedipus is very real, just as all idols are. Just as the factory and its dialectic of production served as a model for
the capitalism of the nineteenth century, Oedipus serves as the model for twentieth century capitalism. But Oedipus is not a "site", like the factory; it is not localizable or segmented, it is fluid and molecular. One leaves the factory and comes home to the family, or goes to the union club, or attends classes at a local university, or goes ice fishing on a lake. According to Deleuze and Guattari, one never leaves Oedipus. The capitalism that these authors are elaborating is no longer confined or restrained in any way to the production of goods or merchandise; Oedipus is the mass producer of all social bodies, and all social bodies are themselves transient, interchangeable, and fragmented. The central themes of Anti-Oedipus are discussed in my last section, The Anti-Oedipal Machine, and I have designed that chapter to be somewhat accessible on its own terms; thus it can be read at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end of the essay.

The site of the self is mapped, and this cartography is central to the arrangement of social spaces, political hierarchies, business ventures, etc. But Deleuze and Guattari understand this cartography in a very unique way; no longer are there plateaus and valleys and forests and oceans (the home, the factory, prison, family); rather all "territories" are usurped and borrowed. Instead of playing chess, where each model or "gamepiece" can move but only according to the strict rules of the striated space of the game, we are now surfing, and the trajectories which inform
our movements are themselves as vast, turbulent, and unpredictable as the ocean.

The final section of this essay will detail, as stated, some of the central tenets of *Anti-Oedipus*. It will serve as a reference guide of sorts. But the first five "lines" are of a different nature. Based upon the premise that theory must be equally deterritorialized and as plural and fragmented as contemporary culture, the authors of *Anti-Oedipus* have constructed a theoretical work which attempts such a project. What is missing is the traditional respect and rigor that is usually a prerequisite in informed, articulate philosophy. My work here is not so much an attempt to "fill in the gaps" that *Anti-Oedipus* leaves, but rather an experiment with modes of reading the text. Over the course of an interchange with many different concepts and thinkers, I have attempted to generate nothing more than ways of working with the grade of theory given over to us in the book. And although in the title of this paper I make specific reference to reading politically, this notion of politics is far too expansive to be compared with the likes of Strauss, Rawls, Mill, etc. For with Deleuze and Guattari, politics is the entire mode of existence and reading is always a political activity.

Nietzsche haunts the pages of *Anti-Oedipus* like a specter. As a critique of both Marx and Freud, the book serves as a deliriously unstable attempt to bring to fruition a model of critique fashioned by Nietzsche: A thorough revaluation of
our most deep-seated beliefs regarding ourselves and our organized world. What Nietzsche might term the "reactive" (and what Foucault might call "fascist") elements of both Marx and Freud are exorcised in *Anti-Oedipus* through a lightning-fast and intoxicating tour of the socius mounted and led by Nietzschean critique. The first two lines that I will follow in this essay originate from a Nietzschean axis. Line One orients Nietzsche as the progenitor of the psychoanalytic of guilty consciousness. Line Two follows the manifestations of this guilty interiority directly into the heart of psychoanalysis. Line One leads directly into Line Two, and therefore they should be read consecutively.

Line Three is an attempt to piece together, from out of the context of our immediate intellectual history, a very general theory of the social order which animates *Anti-Oedipus*. The notion of a control society is unlike any other theory of social organization ever advanced, and therefore it serves to come to terms with this picture of the socius in order to fully examine what the project of Anti-Oedipal thinking denotes. While most forms of alternative thinking which label themselves revolutionary operate with a model of the social field somewhat similar to what Foucault understands as a disciplinary society, Deleuze and Guattari are theorizing in another space, a space which is accelerated and malleable, much like the dissociative characteristics of "virtual" education or inanimate business.
Line Four treats of the "political" in an extremely explicit manner. It will be contended that strains of Marxism had to mutate into something rather close to traditional anarchy in order to compete with the rapid acceleration of alienating and decentralizing capitalist tendencies. But if anarchism is to be revolutionary, if it wants to have social import, it must forego two of its central tenets: human essentialism and its solely repressive view of power. We can pick up on something like an essence to the individual in a disciplinary society, and therefore we can also understand along with Marx the fundamentally repressive nature of such a social configuration. But control alters the schema and allows us to see, along with Foucault, that individuals are produced by social configurations as mechanisms of power; if individuals are produced by power, then power is not only suppressive but productive, and individuals are products, not essences. Thus anarchism must rethink its program if it wants to be active in the New World Order, and Deleuze and Guattari give us a version of anarchism which can do just this.

Within the context of a Nietzschean mode of critique, a theory of subjectivity which references itself over and against the conception of a society of control, and a working understanding of "deterritorializing" capitalism (understood as the entire productive surface of the social field) the possibilities for political theory indeed look skewed. Deleuze and Guattari draw upon the productive process of the schizophrenic not only to understand the increasingly
arbitrary technology of the modern socius, but also to stake a ground for a revolutionary political theory that is operable in light of the backdrop of a society of control. I will discuss the relevance of the schizophrenic process for social theory in light of a discussion of social “spaces” in the fifth section of this essay. “Space” is an all-encompassing locution; we use it to refer to outer space, virtual space, the inside of a building or institution, the locale that we presently inhabit, the measurable distance between two or more entities, etc. Deleuze and Guattari extol the need for a radically new conception of space, the space which both capitalism and schizophrenia create. To say that social space is inhabited is to conceive of the socius as striated and organized, mapped out and segmented off; effectively, it is to understand location in a way which allows for “viewing from a distance”, for desire to envision that which it does not have, to crave alterity. To say that social space is created is to posit desire as productive and to flush all repressive interiorities out onto the smooth, flowing space of the social field. I will begin a discussion of the schizophrenic process in Line Five and it will carry over into the conclusion of this essay.
In the Introduction to Jean-Francois Lyotard's *Libidinal Economy*, translator Iain Hamilton Grant eloquently states the most widely accepted and proto-reductionist response to a handful of essays which compose "a series of responses to the demise of Structuralism": "[A] somewhat naive anti-philosophical expressionism, an aestheticizing trend hung over from a renewed interest in Nietzsche prevalent in the late 1960s." Continuing: "It is further held to be the philosophical expression of the political situationism experienced throughout Europe during that same period, just as short-lived, and just as much a 'dead end' "\(^1\). These statements express, in cozy fashion, the method behind much of the contemporary philosophical madness: Contemporary continental philosophy is radical, anarchic, blindingly fast and sometimes altogether unintelligible. It says nothing, or when it does, it appears to be saying nothing of any interest. And for many, it was short-lived; even many of the current heavies in Parisian universities are opting for a sounder, liberalistic philosophical axiomatic.

Whether or not the relevance of the work begun by Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Irigaray, and Deleuze can be or has been properly assessed is not yet known; I will make a claim in this essay that at least the political and cultural facets of Deleuze's co-authored theoretical experiments with

activist/anti-psychiatrist Felix Guattari cannot be ignored by philosophy or any other discipline which seeks to make sense of contemporary mass culture and political ideology. What can be asserted with respect to Grant's assessment of the developmental and current state of contemporary non-Anglo-American thought is that its homage to Nietzsche is warranted. We cannot imagine the direction thinking took in the late 1960s and early 1970s in France without correctly assigning to Nietzsche the role of instigator.

This presents an entire field of problems, however, for literally everyone seems to have different Nietzsches. Nine out of ten books written on Nietzsche begin with the obligatory disclaimer regarding the manner in which one is to read Nietzsche, the ever-extending possibilities for new interpretations of his thought, the assertions regarding which schools of thought can claim him for their own (was he a philosopher, a poet, an historian, a psychologist, an exceptionally astute social critic, etc.?). Nietzsches pop up everywhere, and what is most intriguing about his appearances is that they are united by a proper name and little else. The difference, for example, between Heidegger and Foucault's Nietzsche is immense; as is that between the interpretations of Nietzsche offered by Alasdair MacIntyre, Walter Kaufmann, Karl Jaspers, Jacques Derrida, and Georges Bataille. A very specific Nietzsche, one which will be discussed in this chapter, will belong to this text, and he will be counted among the ranks of philosophy.
Heidegger's work on Nietzsche inaugurated the conceptual approaches to Nietzschean studies in the fields of phenomenology, existentialism, and ontology. In fact, Heidegger's four volume lecture series/research project on Nietzsche, which he introduced to the public nearly fifty years after Thus Spake Zarathustra was written, arguably marks the moment of Nietzsche's inception into philosophy; Heidegger made sure that we took Nietzsche seriously. In France, however, Nietzsche remained an implicit influence on phenomenological existentialism and Structuralism; thinkers like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Levi-Strauss all acknowledged their debt to Nietzsche, but rarely took him to task, offered interpretations of his work, or included him in their general projects. It was not until 1962, when Deleuze published his slim volume Nietzsche et la Philosophie, that the members of the French intellectual world began to acknowledge the far reaching implications of Nietzsche's thought for their respective enterprises.

The point is not that thinkers like Foucault and Derrida, who were already publishing work at this time, did not recognize their indebtedness to Nietzsche's thought; what Deleuze offered to French intellectuals was their first comprehensive, systematic, and explicitly respectful interpretation of the Nietzschean program. Deleuze's book has been widely overlooked by American scholars; even in circles where Nietzsche is well-preserved, Deleuze's work is attended to as a footnote to better known and more
constrained interpretations of Nietzsche's work. But one point must be made extremely clear: *Nietzsche et la Philosophie* is the work which made it possible for France to take Nietzsche seriously as a philosopher, because it is, for all of its ambiguity and extremely chewy discourse, the first offering in France of a systematization of Nietzsche's thought. The system Deleuze presents is intentionally loose and unstable, but Deleuze recognized that unless someone gave to Nietzsche a relationship with philosophical systems, it would be impossible for philosophers to look upon his work as philosophically meritorious. As it turns out, this effort by Deleuze to bring Nietzsche into the fold of philosophy spurred an aesthetic liberation from rigorous analysis and philosophic transcendentalism (these methods of inquiry were wrapped up in Structuralism at the time Deleuze's book came out) on all fronts.

It should not be surprising then that exactly ten years after his critical study on Nietzsche, Deleuze teamed up with Felix Guattari to write *Anti-Oedipus*, a text which marks for critics both the furthest extension of "radical post-structuralism" and one of the last great moments of an anarchic, irrational aesthetic expressionism. This book is remarkable for many reasons, and one of the most outstanding is that it offers to anyone interested in Nietzschean studies the opportunity to experience the true radicality of Nietzsche's thought as it can be played out among the orders of contemporary politics, culture, and psychoanalysis. Anti-
Oedipus is a Nietzschean undertaking; it owes more to Nietzsche than even Foucault does. But before discussing the intricacies of Anti-Oedipus, we need to examine the Nietzsche that it uses, manufactures, exploits; in short, the Nietzsche that it offers us.

Oedipus Rex is a Greek tragedy. Oedipus emerges on the historical scene as one of the primary myths of the first civilized society. And Nietzsche, aside from a few short essays, began his prolific writing career with a book on Greek tragedy.2 We tend to historicize ancient Greek culture as advanced both intellectually and socially, for out of the well-spring of culture that gave us Plato, Sophocles, Euripides and Aristotle also came an organized record of distinct social classes, a proto-democratic governing body and legislature, etc. (of course Egypt had developed, in a much earlier era, similarly complex social configurations; the point is not that Greece was primary but that it was of fundamental significance to Western Philosophy). Two elements of The Birth of Tragedy will be relevant to this discussion:

1. Nietzsche's psychological analysis of Greek gods and their functional purposes in society.
2. The figure of Dionysus as a necessary manifestation of delirium.

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1. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche describes the instantiation of the gods of Mount Olympus: "[T]here is nothing here that suggests asceticism, spirituality, or duty. We hear nothing but the accents of an exuberant, triumphant life in which all things, whether good or evil, are deified. And so the spectator may stand quite bewildered before this fantastic excess of life, asking himself by virtue of what magic potion these high-spirited men could have found life so enjoyable that, wherever they turned, their eyes beheld the smile of Helen, the ideal picture of their own existence, 'floating in sweet sensuality'".3 Superficially, it looks as if Nietzsche is granting to the Greeks an ability to appreciate all facets of life unconditionally; that they had no need of responsibility while at the same time thrived on disaster and fortune alike. Nietzsche recognizes, however, that something deeply integral to psychological well-being formed the roots of the "Olympian magic mountain": "It was in order to be able to live that the Greeks had to create these gods from a most profound need."4 It is here that Nietzsche begins to formulate the grounds for what will become his fundamental critique of guilty consciousness: Nietzsche recognizes that the uncertainty of life is indeed cause for celebration, but he also envisions the need to explain the tragic and the capacity man has for imposing blame upon himself.

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3 Ibid., p. 41.
4 Ibid., p. 42.
Guilt manifests itself in the Western historico-cultural domain in various forms: Adam is guilty of transgression in the Garden of Eden, thus mankind is forever guilty in the eyes of God; later, Paul and his cohorts place an unconquerable guilt upon humankind for the murder of Christ, the son of God; Nietzsche proposes that we as a people are guilty of the death of God, and asks us to consider the weight of our deed in light of our own potentiality to become gods ourselves; we repress the innate desires of the id, for they are shameful, unhealthy, animalistic, our whole unconscious is unconscionable, and thereby we understand our psychological malfunctions. One might even surmise that much of our recent intellectual effort (from Kierkegaard to Nietzsche to Heidegger to Sartre) has been constructed in the wake of “existential” guilt. And there are ever new events to hold oneself and one’s race accountable for: The Black Death, the Crusades, the Holocaust, Stalin’s Soviet onslaught in the Ukraine, urban poverty, the national debt. As a reflective people, we simply cannot avoid the capacity for becoming-guilty that necessarily emerges when we seek to locate the source of our ailments. Nietzsche notes that the Greeks used their gods in a peculiar fashion; they used them to relieve guilt.

Nietzsche contends that the Greek Gods served at least two interconnected purposes: First, these gods lived out the vibrant, adventurous lives that the Greek people could not. Men invented the immortal gods who could bear and even enjoy
the absurdity of their own existence. Thus the drama serves a cathartic purpose for the Greek citizen: He is privy to the irrational, intoxicated and fully liberated element of life, while he remains shielded from its full effects through the media of the structured lyrical or dramatic performance. Of course, we still see this trend today; in the movie houses, in novels, in the theatre, we lose ourselves in worlds of significance wherein we experience high adventure, tragic loss, perversions of all shapes and sizes without having to bear out the consequences of involving ourselves in destructive activities.

Second, the Greek Gods relieve a specific form of existential guilt. It is a fairly common anthropological assumption that the religion of a people can reveal a tremendous amount of information about their psychical well-being. It does not take a lot of mental footwork to recognize that using one's gods to relieve guilt is a psychologically healthier practice than using them to impose it.

Nietzsche takes careful note of the differences between the gods of antiquity and the Christian God. While many would contend that the Greeks cannot be held responsible for their paganistic tendencies and naive theology due to their "infantile" situatedness in the saga of developing humanity, Nietzsche wants something else from the Greeks than a precursor or a prolegomena to a future mode of thinking on the Divine. Nietzsche is a psychologist; his philology
reflects this tendency. Let us take, by way of contrast, the myth of Prometheus and the myth of Eden.

Prometheus, feeling pity for humanity, goes directly against the explicit orders of Zeus and brings fire to the ancient Greeks. One can hypothesize what this metaphorical fire really meant to the Greeks: It was none other than the word, knowledge of good and evil, life and death; at once it was the power to communicate and to revel in shameless desire, Prometheus brought them the *Logos*. And we recognize that his gift is empowering; this transgression of Prometheus gave power to the Greeks, allowed them to organize, civilize, and striate their territory. Now in possession of that which Zeus had strictly forbidden them, the Greek people are likened unto gods. And Prometheus is sentenced to live out his days strapped to a rock whereupon an eagle appears once daily to eat out his liver. He is to bear the iniquity of this deed. The true price of knowledge is to be paid only by him; Prometheus is guilty, not humanity.

The myth of Eden offers the psychological antithesis of the myth of Prometheus. Adam is seduced by Eve into eating of the Tree of Knowledge, the only tree in the Garden from which they are forbidden to taste fruit. The serpent tempts them; they fall. Once they obtain the word of God, the knowledge of good and evil, they are immediately embarrassed by their immodesty. They hide their nakedness from God, who seeks them out and exiles them from the Garden. Not only that, but
their heirs are doomed to live forever under the weight of inescapable guilt which such knowledge brings. Here it is all of humankind that bears the guilt which necessarily accompanies the acquisition of knowledge.

So it runs that both myths relay how humanity acquires the capacity to understand and contemplate its activities; the Greek myth removes the anxiety inherent in such an awakening, the Christian myth drills it into the very core of our existential state; Nietzsche was attuned to such differences and puzzled over a history which would not only accept but internalize its guilt, the Christian lineage, in a later work entitled On the Genealogy of Morals. Nietzsche's Judeo-Christian history of guilty consciousness marks, for all intensive purposes, the beginning of the psycho-analysis of repression, the birth of the realization that something is fundamentally wrong with the way we have come to organize and understand ourselves.

2. The figure of Dionysus, although a terrifying and menacing embodiment of the dark, delirious, and irrational in man, was deified and in fact recognized by the Greeks as an integral facet of the world that they inhabited. In the sublime, comic medium of Greek tragedy, the transgressions of all boundaries of the ego and the ethical were played out. Nietzsche recognizes the comfortable distance established between total peril and the audience as made manifest by the "Apollonian" format of the dramatic performance. There is a
need to explore, to recognize, to even enjoy the dark side of our souls, but it must be kept in check by a certain "pathos of distance". The chorus "dreams" the tragedy, which is presented on the stage as Dionysian reality. The audience dreams with the chorus; an insight is gained by experiencing the breakdowns of tragic figures, but this chaotic, excessive, even libidinal will (see, for example, Antigone) is still veiled by the distance of the dream and spectating.

When Freud uses dream life to uncover what will eventually be in his mature work the entire field of the unconscious, we are once again reminded that the dream provides a way in, a milieu where it is possible to elaborate the trappings of that which does not belong to either immediate experience or conscious reflection, the irrational Dionysian pagan play or the unconscious libido. While Nietzsche later abandons this viewpoint in favor of an aesthetic brought about by intensely lived artistic experience, it is important to note that here Nietzsche seems to be asserting that existence itself is justified through the filter of an Apollonian drama, but is in fact constructed by the schizophrenic paganism of the artist, Dionysius. Nietzsche saw the collective "dream of death" of an entire culture expressed in its dramatic sensibilities.

While Greek gods served to stave off the guilt imposed by the dialectical tension between the rational and the irrational (conscious life and uninhibited desire, Apollo and Dionysus),
the divine figure of Christianity, as touched on briefly above, intensifies this guilt and internalizes it. Nietzsche will later, in his work on morality, introduce the notions of active and reactive to characterize activities or "codes" of existence which exhibit psychologically healthy or psychologically damaging tendencies respectfully. When George Morgan describes Nietzsche's meditation on the "moralization of existence" ("[M]en mistook the sequences of guilt and punishment for those of cause and effect"\(^5\)), we sense he is very close to a central theme that will run throughout the course of this essay: the "internalization" of Man by man, the "individuation" and becoming-social that Freud describes, Foucault's analysis of the concept of Man as tool of power and axis of repression. Essentially, Nietzsche is asking Reich's elusive and infamous question: "What could cause the masses to desire their own repression?"

We recognize that Reich was speaking about Fascism, about a state of civilization so deplorable that it would elect an autocratic, genocidal, power-mongering institution such as the Third Reich as its fundamental organizing and controlling mechanism. But Nietzsche saw the seeds of Fascism in the "moralization of existence": Fascism as expressed and made manifest in the figurehead of the god of Christianity. Thus the concept of Fascism has a much larger scope than the governing form of the Fascist State: It will refer to all practices and modes of experience where lack is replaced or

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exploited by one form of power or another, from the internalization of the guilty consciousness and the birth of "Man" to the radically unsound hyper-structures of contemporary capitalism which create vicissitudes with the media, mass culture, education, etc., and which force feed the contemporary individual its desires. The analytic of internalized and inflicted psychological repression begins with Nietzsche, with the analysis of a form of consciousness that emerges as a result of a guilt-laden value system. Nietzsche is the catalyst for thinking about what looks to be an almost innate and certainly destructive tendency to internalize domesticating forms of power.

In an early essay entitled *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense*, Nietzsche begins to formulate his most devastating question: "What is the value of truth for life?" This question will come to inform all of his subsequent work on morality. Whatever truth is or may be, it should be noted that up until this point in the history of philosophy the value of truth had never been called into question. That is, every thinker from Plato to Hegel offers a conception of what truth is; it is Nietzsche who tries to tell us what it is worth.

Against Plato, who desires an "unchanging account of unchanging being", and in a somewhat dizzying spiral out of Kant, Nietzsche assures us that "[t]he 'thing in itself' (for that is what pure truth, without consequences, would be) is
quite incomprehensible to the creators of language and not at all worth aiming for."\(^6\) The role language plays in instituting the internal aspect of Man is another theme that will traverse the Nietzschean landscape; indeed, it must be noted that the entirety of the *Genealogy* is little more than a critique of ethical language. Of course, Kant already had told us that the "thing in itself" cannot be known, that the "true" state of reality is hidden from us and that the "phenomenal" world of experience is all we can hope for. But unlike Kant, Nietzsche will accede no possibility of distinction between reason and its objects; he only describes a reckless forgetfulness and a play of metaphor.

What he intends by this notion of forgetfulness is simply that our language draws us into deception, or better, attunes us to the deception that composes reality. It is only by forgetting that all frogs exist in different spaces and times and are of different shapes and sizes and move differently and so forth that we could ever come to understand the concept "frog". Thus the "truth" is gained by forgetting that we are false before ourselves. This may seem inconsequential until we recognize that here we have a definition of truth which stands in contradistinction to the Platonic Ideal: Rather than privileging the formal concept of "frog" and understanding each manifestation of the concept in reality (each actual frog) as an imperfect replica of such

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a concept, Nietzsche confronts us with the painful observation that concepts are nothing more than the implicit agreement to lie to and among ourselves. And this counters even Kant, who developed his entire systematic around the imposition of the faculties of reason upon reality, which for him was the precondition for anything at all like experience to take place. Long before the Logical Positivists declared that all deductive (i.e., a priori) truth is either contradictory or tautological, Nietzsche informs us of man that:

"If he does not wish to be satisfied with truth in the form of a tautology - that is, with empty shells - then he will forever buy illusions for truths. What is a word? The image of a nerve stimulus in sounds. But to infer from the nerve stimulus, a cause outside us, that is already the result of a false and unjustified application of the principle of reason..."\(^7\)

Nietzsche asks why we act honestly and champion truth. His answer is simply that we have internalized the concept of honesty as a highest goal; it has become a structural component of the way we define ourselves, our legislature, our social responsibilities. But a concept internalized becomes a concept immune to critique. On the Genealogy of Morals is Nietzsche's most profound discussion of the capacity for internalization.

We ask ourselves what internalization means. How does man gain the "capacity" to internalize morals, desires, an image and a dogma of himself? He must first understand that he

7 Ibid, p. 45.
has an interior; a soul, perhaps, something extra-physical. With this comes an odd sense of responsibility, of guilt, of the capability to remember and regret.

Nietzsche begins his polemic with a claim regarding the psychologists of his day: "These English psychologists - what do they really want? One always discovers them voluntarily or involuntarily at the same task, namely at dragging the partie honteuse [shame] of our inner world into the foreground and seeking the truly effective and directing agent, that which has been decisive in its evolution." The question "What does it want?" is the force and flow of Nietzschean critique. Nietzsche examines every event according to the intentions and wills involved; he is determined to know what each participant (being an individual, a locale, a political organization, a religious history, a text, etc.) wants; this is the crux of genealogy, and is the approach that, for Nietzsche, allows the surest access to underlying or implicit values. Nietzsche is in many ways the first structuralist. But his jibe at psychology rings through with truth; he saw that much of what he knew as modernity had adopted a certain crude model of the individual and that many of our practices (psychology, religion, legislature, discipline) presupposed an interiority of man, one which informs and causes his actions. The psychologist does not evaluate an action; he judges the

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distracted or disturbed individual who intentionally caused this action to occur. Nietzsche thinks that we are too comfortable with this model, the inner or animated element of man (his "true" self) as the purveyor and instigator of all activities. He therefore inquires into how it came to be the case that this "inner" depth was acquired.

Nietzsche again looks to the civilizations of antiquity, but this time he has a different agenda. The dichotomy of "good" and "bad", as manifest in Ancient Greece, is a distinction which, if eyed carefully, looks very foreign to modern man. In such a civilization, the power to judge was acquired by those who could physically claim it; that is, the concept of "good" and everything which came to be understood as such, was determined out of the distance between the aristocratic warrior class and the plebeian peasantry. The aristocrats had dominant political power, thus they had the correct values; this was not a correlation, simply a self-evident mode of life. The values of the warrior class were the "good" values; since these folks were jubilant, vain, and decadent, jubilance, vanity, and decadence came to be "high" values; whatever enhanced the sensation of life was "good". The concept of "goodness" owed its value to a class distinction; the values of the warrior aristocracy (luck, risk, danger, power, cunning, art, war) were all high values; those of the plebeians (humility, patience, meekness, piety) were, only by way of contradistinction, "bad" values, low-minded values.
Nietzsche contrasts this value system with one which develops as the result of an instantiation of the ascetic mentality, made manifest in the priestly class, whereby reaction and revenge work in tandem to subvert the dichotomy of "good" and "bad". Nietzsche does not intend for us to think that one develops as a result of the other, nor that there is some form of causal linkage which constitutes both as value systems; he intends only to point out the radically different origins which seem to surface when we approach various dominating mentalities. In all fairness, it should be pointed out that Nietzsche appears, throughout the text, to favor what he refers to as the "life-affirming" values of antiquity over the "slave morality" of the priestly class. Nietzsche does recognize, however, along with Kierkegaard, that once we have gained the capacity for moral depth, there is no going back; to attempt to do so would be beastly. And thus we are to read his interpretation of the evolution of the guilty consciousness as merely a stifling movement in the lineage of value systems.

Nietzsche attributes to the priestly class a certain cleverness which is actually closer to cunning (he admires Paul for being one of the shrewdest psychologists of all time). So the priestly mentality is clever; it forces regret and reflection upon the high-minded. A new model of life and existential purpose arises; no longer is the human cause one of life-affirmation and acquiring wealth, power, and prestige. Now the very values which once allowed one to rule
and live vigorously have become shameful and base, in fact "evil". "Good" itself has become "evil". A "doctrine of love" (behind which stands the figurehead of a judgmental God who favors patience, humility, piety, meekness, passivity, and peace) inverts the rules; man is given a soul which is accountable to a God who admonishes love and sanctity and humility. One may speculate that the Jews defeated the Romans by making them reflectively attentive to a moral "inner" sense. Once man is convinced that he has a soul, he can also become convinced that there is a judgable facet behind his every act and deed. While the lower classes are exploited or even abused, they acquire a smug sense of superiority from this doctrine of the soul.

What emerges is a reversal of values (the "high-minded" aristocratic values are now acts of evil by which all oppressors will be judged) and, more importantly, a depth to mankind:

"For the priests everything becomes dangerous, not only cures and remedies, but also arrogance, revenge, acuteness, profligacy, love, lust to rule, virtue, disease - but it is only fair to add that it was on the soil of this essentially dangerous form of human existence, the priestly form, that man first became an interesting animal, that only here did he acquire depth and become evil...One will have divined how easily the priestly mode of valuation can branch off from the knightly-aristocratic and then develop into its opposite; this is particularly likely when the priestly caste and the warrior caste are in jealous opposition to one another and are unwilling to come to terms. The knightly-aristocratic value judgements presupposed a powerful physicality, a flourishing, abundant, even overflowing health, together with that which serves to preserve it: war, adventure, hunting, dancing, war games, and in general all that involves vigorous, free, joyful activity...The truly great haters in world history have always been priests; likewise the most ingenuous haters: other kinds of spirit hardly come into
So we are brought to bear with a politically charged reversal of values, and indeed it works: we note that by the middle ages, the Roman Catholic Church had replaced the Holy Roman Empire as the world's most powerful institution. A priestly aristocracy had emerged to replace the warrior aristocracy; and it prevailed due to cunning. To borrow Nietzsche's metaphor, the bird of prey was made to feel bad for slaughtering the innocent lamb.

An important side note: Nietzsche feels that this reversion was a calculated manifestation of the will turning against life. The knightly-aristocratic values affirmed the physicality, the struggle, of existence. The new order of values, where human dignity, peace, passivity, dominate as proper values, represents a turning of the will against the physical towards the "spiritual", the "moral". Certainly, man becomes interesting, but he is irreparably altered to the point where reflection and repentance, benevolence and generosity can not now be scrutinized as dangerous or anti-human. These priestly values have actually become man; the inner sense, the capacity to do evil and to feel bad about it, slowly becomes inseparable from our political and social modes of existence.

Nietzsche intimates that the aforementioned reversal of values, born of ressentiment (the low-minded will turning
against life), grants to man the possibility for internalizing guilt. The soul is judged by God according to its purity, its goodness and its justness. Nietzsche notes that purity originated as a ritualistic, body oriented practice akin to that of physical cleanliness; with the sense of a spiritual interiority also comes an internalization of purity; man is now accountable for being spiritually pure. Once internal and external purity are equated, so also do we equate unjust acts and sexual frivolity with rotten meat and physical uncleanliness; as one is bad for the body, so the other is decadent for the soul.

This God which serves as a monitoring device for the moral sphere in man is the hyperbolic example of guilt-ridden consciousness. God is all-powerful, the word of law and the force of justice; when Jesus, the son of God, died for our sins, we were not saved by divine providence; we were infected with the most pervasive and unconquerable guilt that mankind has ever known. The son of God has to die to save us from our deplorable state of sinfulness, and we are suddenly aware that we are morally regrettable. Humanity is weak, unable to overcome its basest desires, and thus we require, for spiritual healing, the death of the highest power hitherto. This is the mark of repentance; we are invested with a sense of guilt upon which we can never make good, a permanent, unconquerable moral lack. The only thing that can fill our spiritual lacunae is the death of the holiest being conceivable. The ascetic mentality feels spiritually vacuous
and permanently guilty. Obviously, as we saw above with the Greeks, gods do not have to be the constant reminders of existential guilt; they do not need to serve only a profound neurosis. Nietzsche, in his most telling and acute recognition of cultural anxiety, notes that the priestly mentality and the moral sphere as monitored by the Christian God are symptoms of mental sickness in the Western mind. The social unconscious is neurotic.

In the final section of *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche touches upon the Protestant work ethic. He analyzes the industrious attitudes that emerged from dwelling in the shadow of a condition of guilt. We begin to believe that hard work and prosperity are in fact God's plan, ann Nietzsche notes that work in fact takes the mind far from its meditation upon life's seeming lack of purpose. He notes that like sheep, mindless ascetics gather into a herd and thereby acquire a diluted sense of strength. It sounds as though the stage is set for mercantilism and, eventually, capitalism. But to link the encroachment of capitalism to a very general discussion of a value-laden social framework is without question to underestimate the pervasiveness of the contemporary world order. I will touch upon the forces and connections that lend to the social sector the possibility for a worker based economic and political system in Line Three.

As a parting shot, it should be noted that until the time of
Constantine (roughly 300 A.D.), Christianity had no real purchase among the powerful. Between the time of Paul (who effectually paved the way for an intellectual revolt in morality) and Freud, the self became a privatized interiority. We know that Socrates talked of knowledge of the self as a virtuous and important acquisition; but he understood the self as inextricably linked to the activities and habits that it took up with. Although we rarely speak of God as judge anymore, we have little trouble making the analogical jump from the exterior legislation imposed by the figurehead of God to the internalization of the legislative machines monitored by the figurehead Man; our courtrooms fester with remnants of the priestly mentality ("Who is responsible for this illicit act?") and the legal system teams up with the psychologists in order to determine, according to "mental state", where and how guilt is to be ascertained ("Can she be held legally responsible for her actions? Is she sane or not?").

So it remains that while we do not pander to God any longer for forgiveness, nor pay indulgences to the church for sins committed, we still operate according to a certain hierarchical and bipolar model of the individual left over from the sickly mentality of the priestly class. We have not abandoned the notion that man's actions are the physical manifestations of his inner desire to act a certain way, his lack of self-restraint, etc.
It would be premature, however, to assume that we can mount a critique of capitalist culture and psycho-speak ideology from a few assumptions about shifting historical values. In section three of this essay, I will take up with Foucault and his analysis of modern institutions as a way of coming to terms with value-patterns in a social rubric inundated with accelerated technological advancements and barren of the assuredness provided by a super-terrestrial, authoritarian Deity. Both Foucault and Deleuze argue that certain scientific, legislative, and psychological patterns have allowed for a renunciation of the guilty consciousness attributable to an inner moral sphere but have simultaneously allowed it to be replaced by an infinitely more complicated and pervasive figurehead of Man; thus the plague of humanism (the belief that man holds in himself and his own innate goodness) will be addressed below in Lines Three and Four. But first, I should like to approach this "myth of the interior" from a more contemporary perspective, that of Freudian Psychoanalysis. Line Two outlines the connections between Nietzschean suggestions regarding the role of psychology in cultural repression and the explicit attack on psychoanalysis as a domesticating avatar of Fascism brought out in *Anti-Oedipus*. 
LINE TWO: CULTURAL OEDIPALIZATION

"I continue to hear messages in the environment...I’m angry over the fact that these messages seem to occur everywhere...I can only hope to respond imaginatively and appropriately to the significance contained herein...In the daytime I become someone else...Only as I wait for sleep do I perceive reality as a tangible presence. There is no substance in my waking life, no truth...I have been having thoughts I can’t decipher...Does this make my perception of reality more thorough? Is it significant that I wish to retain my private conception of reality?..."¹

Edward, a schizophrenic

Anti-Oedipal thought is a thinking outside, a thinking outside of belonging. Why must we think the subject? Why are we indebted to the history which presents, in direct and preceded mannerisms, our most intricate and inescapable distractions and problematics? It is not the over-coming of the Platonic Ideal which will at last grant philosophy its true place. For we have, always and everywhere, misplaced, displaced, and overturned the Platonic. We have no enemy in the history of thought; nor do we have a friend. It is thinking itself which has become null, domesticated. No one knows this more than Deleuze. We are in a position, at the end of the twentieth century, to once again begin again. We have never had an Objective; thought was never dialectical or progressive. The acceleration towards truth is a fantastical nightmare, a life-negating manifestation of the repression of desire. A culture of religious, political, and theoretical neuroses; thus we staple our blood-mark onto the organism of history. All possible avenues of acceleration, of speed and depth and cunning have been marked off and delineated; civil

thinking is stagnant. Nietzsche gives us away, the ultimate psychologist. A snide and sophisticated bastard he is, revealing the sated truth of modernity. We strive forward in our wretched and docile bliss, appeasing ourselves and our neurotic ends with over-production and easily inhabitable psycho-speak. The new god is upon us; let us pray that we not suffocate under the weight of his mediocrity.

That is what lies before us; wasteland, the visibility of the truant, the absent, the loss of possibility for thought. But escape is a myth; culture represses, owns, controls, formulates the there, the how, the when. We eat and breathe our own waste, only to expel and regurgitate the bile of humanity in a new and interesting form. We then proceed to feast again. Time has called us here, and we must pay heed; a new order is upon us, the call of thinking beckons; rancid passivity and appeals to authority be gone; the time of thinking is at hand. Stop. Listen. It can be heard and realized.

The attitude of the penitent: Who cares? A sour disposition is all that will penetrate the fog. We see the intoxication of the multiple. Not the Last Man; not even the Übermensch. We seek to lose our foundation, thereby we are saved. The history of philosophy has been an engagement with the history of philosophy. Thought comes neatly packaged and diametrically opposed to life; we suck our own blood, eat our own fat, and drink from the stagnant pool of our own
recesses. Thinking knows its bounds; how did this ever come to be the case?

It plays out as such: Nietzsche has done a fine thing in attempting to loose us from our repressed, prudish, eclectic cultural stigmas, and much of modern thought is gravely indebted to him for this. In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari ride Nietzsche through the bowels of psychoanalysis in order to exceed forms of domesticating fascism, to expose ours as a culture of repression and neurosis. They attribute much of our complex social dysfunction to the repression of elements of desire found in contemporary psychoanalytic thought; residuals of certain conceptions of the self which suppress and direct our thinking about ourselves are nothing more than stains on the psychoanalyst's couch.

One wants to extol the impact of the death of God upon modern man; what new existential roles are we to adopt in light of the absence of a foundation? In the process of becoming-Gods, are we in fact limited by residuals of moral and metaphysical values, what Deleuze, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, has christened "avatars of the dialectic"? The project of *Anti-Oedipus*, in fact the entirety of the work set forth by Deleuze and Guattari, might be assessed simply as an attempt to uncover any and all remaining embodiments of repressive, limiting thought in order to give them a proper burial.
What begins in Nietzsche and is to some extent realized with Deleuze is a new and unconventional means of construing the "self"; if the self is understood as multiplicities which participate always and everywhere in desiring-production, as Deleuze and Guattari assert, then we are at a point in history where it becomes possible to inaugurate, map and explore a selfless self. Not even; we are purely selfless; the site of the self is vacant. With the absence of any autonomous core, the self can only be employed through a radical phenomenology of desire, a very physical and liberated philosophy of will; this was Nietzsche's ephemeral dream.

But most importantly, we are now confronted with a new way of thinking desire: without the subject, it is not possible to situate desire as a lack. Desire can only be seen as a lack when it is repressed under totalizing categories such as "self", "sanity", "whole", "normal" and "ego"; it can only be seen as a lack once it has been molded into that which it is not. "I am me and not you, I am I and want you". This is the crux of the matter. Nietzsche's relentless attempts to free thinking from crushing guilt complexes and definitive individual categorizations are the footholds of Anti-Oedipal schizo-analysis; it is only through the rigorous deconstruction of all totalities (God, State, mommy, daddy, me) that desire can be seen for what it truly is: Expression and art, overflow and energy. This leads to a stark confrontation between psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis. The
Deleuzian/Guattarian conception of desire mimics and modulates Nietzsche's will; this will be the starting point, our plane of departure into the nebulous of anti-oedipal desire, an anti-metaphysic of will. As the will is tamed and forced to reflectively understand itself in constant reference to a "moral sphere" by an historically impotent priestly mentality, so desire is domesticated and instilled as a lack by the contemporary psychoanalytic church. We cannot imagine desire as productive, as anything but divested from its object.

In the Genealogy, Nietzsche plays shrink. The curtain rises, and the stage reveals a consciousness in chains, thought in bondage. We are guilty! There is no need to recite our crimes, but we shall, because it makes us feel better: we have executed the son of God, and we have done so because we ourselves are not worthy of his goodness. We had need of redemption, and this we achieved, though only at a price higher than any of us can afford. I do not want this guilt; thus speaks the agnostic (more on this point below). But there is good news: As a means of covering up this heinous crime, some of the more ingenious among us set out to murder Dad; thus we killed the son and the father. This last deed was a whopper; we have not yet begun to come to terms with it. The death of God reveals the absence of all sense of security; the "bare manifold" has never looked more bare. But the murder of God frees us from all forms of existential guilt...there is now no hierarchy, no stipulative rule for
the correct procession of human affairs: We are free. Let us set to paint the canvas in all the fantastical colors of springtime, let us ride our ideas into the sun, let us "give birth to a dancing star"...

Unfortunately, as we all-too-clearly realize, the impact of this superb, indeed superior, deed has not and perhaps will not be fully assessed. For Dad is not really dead; vanquished, perhaps, from the realm of intellectual theology, and even from a majority of our metaphysical models; but Dad is tricky, shifty, and he crops up again and again in forms that are hard to recognize, even harder to pinpoint for extermination; He forms the backbone of psychoanalysis, the crux of deontological ethics; he appears, strangely enough, as us, as what we think we are, as the "self"; he infiltrates the life-force and modifies thinking, he tames us, domesticates us, and makes us afraid of our own desires; as if our desires could belong to us in the first place. He is God, Dad, Oedipus, Me, State, Other, (your name here). Deleuze, speaking of the Dialectic and the insidious manner by which it creeps into twentieth century humanist thought, notes the "incapacity of this philosophy to end in anything but the ego, man, or phantasms of the human".2

"What a mistake it was to have ever said the id. Everywhere it is machines..."3 History of Moralization and

Dismoralization: Evolution of the antithesis ego/non-ego:
"It seems evident that the value of the single ego could lie
only in relating itself to the tremendous "non-ego", being
subject to it and existing for its sake". Proceeding on:
"[I]n what actions does man affirm himself most strongly?
Around these (sexuality, avarice, lust to rule, cruelty,
etc.) prohibition, hatred, and contempt were heaped: one
believed there were unselfish drives, one condemned all the
selfish ones, one demanded the unselfish".⁴ Both Nietzsche
and Deleuze acknowledge that the starting point of repression
is the subject. Without it, responsibility cannot be affixed
to action, "moral choice" cannot be a structure of
consciousness/unconsciousness, and there can quite literally
be no such thing as "repressed", "unhealthy", or otherwise
immoral desires, i.e. manifestations of the will. Thinking
stops abruptly at the inauguration of the subject; it breaks
down right at the border of the self. We ask how this could
be the case; the traditional paradox, roughly stated, is as
follows: The self (subject, individual) is the origin,
protector, and expressive vessel for thought; there is no
thought without the thinking self. Thus it is not possible,
probable, nor even theoretically practical to attempt to
"think" the subject away, to eliminate its dictatorial
status.

But in order to answer this tricky construction of the
"subject-as-thinker", we must do some backtracking. In On

The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche comments upon the abusive structure of the "moral self". Nietzsche notes how interesting man became once a soul was attributed to him; suddenly a man of depth, of great spiritual complexity; a man with the capacity to do evil, and a consciousness with the capacity to feel bad about it. The metaphysical tendency to deny the physical or phenomenal in lieu of a "higher" abstract Purity had struck at the core of our existence; the body, the physical, the will, was subjugated to the soul, thereby erecting a dialectical antithesis at the level of the individual from which we are still wont to escape. Here the reactive forces triumph, for the framework of reality experiences an inversion. Indeed the whole grid of knowledge shifts: "What do I need and how will I get it?" becomes "Are my actions in accordance with the Rule of Law?" and "What can I know absolutely?" The unchanging, absolute world of which we only experience "decadent" parts can be known by the eternal soul, for which our physical bodies are only fleshy containers. Our bodies will pass, our souls will move on; death is not for us. But it remains that we are indeed physical (therefore imperfect, decadent, weak, inferior). What saving grace is there for us, a civilization of failures; how are we to be redeemed when we fall victim to the temptations of the flesh, the beckonings of the earth?

The death of the most high, the eternally righteous; sent to lead us down the path to salvation, we murder him. His blood

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5 On the Genealogy of Morals, p. 33.
is substituted for our sins. We are indeed responsible at the moral level for all the sins we commit; our transgressions so evil that the holiest of holies, righteousness *par excellence*, must be slain by our own hands; and now out with the metaphors: We are washed in the blood (ugh!), redeemed by the lamb, saved by amazing grace and divine providence. We are so bad that we cannot be reconciled even to ourselves without sacrificing the epitome of goodness. Thus we are indebted, from the beginning. Existential guilt has never been more concrete: “The son of God was crucified so that your puny pathetic life could have some stitch of meaning”. The cries of the blasphemous: “I do not want the burden of the death of God on my soul!” It is an all-encompassing, permanent, unconquerable guilt, a debt of guilt which one can never make good on. For the goodness and purity of God is now evident, evident only in contrast to the weakness, banality, and degradation of humanity. Remember, Nietzsche notes that while Greek cultures used their Gods to relieve them of guilt (Homeric heroes blamed the gods for misfortune and gave themselves credit for all of their accomplishments, i.e. Odysseus), we have used ours to shower us with guilt; we are subject to the inferiority of the physical and the immorality of unhealthy desires, and the absolute goodness of our progenitor constantly reminds us of this, our heavy human penance (our penance for *being human*). As stated in Line One, using gods to relieve guilt rather than using them to install guilt is psychologically a healthier practice.
But the interiority attributed to the human self soon begins to crumble, and not long after the death of God. The creator and protector of the soul is absent; the “moral interior” of the self comes under fire. Yet while the notion of an eternal spiritual self loses its luster, the foundations of consciousness are strengthened. The psychological replaces the theological, for example. And it is no surprise that after existing for centuries in a state of constant existential neurosis, we might look for something to supplement or replace the confines of a guilty conscious, now without focus. As Foucault notably realizes, there is a little bit of fascism in all of us; the desire to be dominated, mandated, repressed. The cause of guilt removed, the guilt still remains. The question then becomes; “To what level of organization can I now commit my ‘existence’ in order to understand myself in a comfortable hierarchy?” The answer: Daddy, mommy, me; the triangle of repressed desire.6 Oedipus, the new God, awakens everywhere. And the level of the nuclear family is not the beginning or the end of oedipalization: it occurs everywhere, in all activity, the manifestations of unconscious desire here repressed, there contextualized, here expressed, there forbidden. “It is obvious that when traditional psychoanalysis explains that the instructor is the father, and that the colonel too is the father, and that the mother is nonetheless the father too, it reduces all of desire to a familial determination that no longer has anything to do with the social field actually

6 Anti-Oedipus, pp. 1-50.
invested by the libido." It is the lust for the mother, the hatred of the father which first informs structures of desire; everything becoming threat, everything becoming other, everything becoming father, becoming Oedipal... Deleuze and Guattari make no mistake: Desire does not first find its object in the form of the separate-mother, nor does it stake its opposition in the guise of the father; rather the figure of the always-already Oedipalized paranoiac father, the dictatorial oppressor, establishes the rules of play for desire: guilt is re-routed, re-organized; it shifts from a guilt of transcendental proportions to a guilt of unconscious/libidinal proportions, but the devastating effects remain.

Thus the morally accountable subject is theologically reproached for its spiritual inferiority, and the psychological atomistic subject is analytically reproached for harboring unmentionable and unacceptable desires. Once again the ascetic reactivist triumphs; our condition remains one of unconquerable guilt. What this really amounts to is a harnessing of the will, in Nietzsche's terms, or an Oedipalizing of desire, within the framework of Anti-Oedipus. We attribute the will to the subject, in order to encapsulate it, to give it visible and relatively static bounds, and evaluate the condition of "want" from the vantage point of this subject. When Nietzsche claims that there is no such thing as a "will", we take him to mean that there is no will

\(^7\) Ibid., p. 62.
for the illusory a-historical subject, there is no will which serves repression. The subject, as useful illusion, is convenient; it serves to locate and define us within a nexus of activities. But it has a dangerous capacity to overtake these subtle contextual bounds and stand forth as the final triumph of Absolutism. If we think of will as a particular element of the self, as that which originates and takes form within the self, then we are not thinking about will. Is it really the case that "I" control "my" will? Not at all; one will overtakes and dominates another; "I" am nothing but a convenient and locutionary residue of a conflict of wills.

Will is a transitional process, a life-dynamic, not a "within", not a manifestation of the "interior", of consciousness. Will is expressive, not repressive; it reaches out and promotes change; Nietzsche loves change. Change for change's sake, never for the utilitarian good and never for the betterment of the socius, simply for the sake of differentiation. There is never a thesis, an antithesis, or a synthesis, for each of these is many, multiple, a complexity of values, conditions, stimuli, etc. We never evolve, we are always becoming. Will never wants, it always exceeds. Will is the force of flux which abets becoming; and becoming is a chaotic tendency towards difference. Becoming is without end, without object. We don't "become older" or "become author" in the sense of a teleological fixed end; becoming is process, not product. What we were before is still ahead of us and what we will be is already gone; change
for change's sake. Our highest values are simply manifestations of will. Truth is "the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations."\(^8\)

Desire has traditional value as a lack; it seeks what it is not or does not have. Thus the first realization by the child that the mother is separate, detached, other, is accompanied by the desire to re-possess the mother/other, to once again be unified with her. Of course the father steps in here and re-affirms the element of difference, smashing the crux of identity into the subject-box. "I am I and not my mother"; only here, after this fundamental degree of separation, is desire given any credence; subject desires object. Desire can therefore only come after the fact, only come too late, and it is always perverse. Anti-Oedipus seeks a new formulation of desire, one which is not dependent upon the subject for context. "Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject unless there is repression".\(^9\) That the unconscious is not productive but expressive; that it only dabbles in representation, in expressing its own repressed tendencies; this is the meager and impotent picture of the unconscious given to us by the psychoanalyst. What would it mean to say that desire is productive, that it is a creative force? If desire first

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\(^8\) *The Will to Power*, Section 517.

establishes its object as other, and then determines that there is a capacity for union or rejoinder therewith, then desire is reactive. It reacts to oppositional stimuli. This is not the picture of desire we obtain when we vanquish the subject. Desire now becomes active, productive; it "plugs-in" everywhere, forming and breaking apart machines of desire-production.

Let us think about this another way. Nietzsche went mad; we should not make too much of this. Nietzsche does not care for truth; Is there an "I"? Lets say no; what new thoughts can we think, what can we now do? Encapsulating structures limit the flight of thinking, do not allow thinking to play, to progress, to create. Rather, boundaries for thought are erected at the site of the subject, of truth, of God, of history. Thinking occurs within the confines of such limiting structures, and yet we persuade ourselves that thinking is free, that it knows no bounds; we say things like: "Anything is logically possible, just not empirically provable". This is a gross subordination of thinking to its own creations; thought is confined to think the subject, to think in hierarchies and orders, to establish categories for understanding and divisions between objects. The self is related in such and such a way to the state, the apple is related in such and such a way to the tree, etc. We think only in terms of identity and difference, of unity of Being and separation of beings. We never have thought and now cannot think in multiplicities. Thought cannot be creative
because it knows its bounds, it cannot be artistic because it knows only the ancient medium of metaphysics.

But what does a psychological ordering give us? A standard. Yet another standard for evaluation. What some might call a healthy mentality can now be witnessed as a severe criterion for normalcy. The neurotic is so because of an early absence of affection; the neurotic is a lack. The obsessive is so because she has never compensated for her lack of a penis; the obsessive is a lack. The schizophrenic is so because...ah, wait. The schizophrenic is an enigma; there is no cause for such a severe dysfunction. Schizophrenia has not yet fully become an object of knowledge. It is a call for thinking which cannot yet be answered.

Yet we have already answered it; the answer is to Oedipalize. We know what "normal" is; we know that the schizo is not. Through the use of drugs and within the context of psychoanalysis we can attempt to "cure" him/her. Again the fixed subject rears its ugly head; there is a definitive mark (the mentally stable self, the "I" which understands itself as such) for which to aim. The human condition is one of certain forms of understanding and not of other forms. The schizophrenic is not merely different; we construe the schizo as sick at the basest level. There is no "I" for many schizophrenics; there are pluralities and variable "Is", shifting and slipping "Is" which transgress the boundaries of any limiting sphere. Thus the first task of the analyst is
to instill the "I", to fix identity. It is not the schizo who admits to a condition of abnormality (which hints at a condition of inferiority). Or rather, it may be the schizo who admits this condition, but only when the construction of identity fails, only after the shrink has confronted the schizo as other, as incapable of handling "reality". This brings up two points.

First, that this shrink no longer need be a licensed practitioner of psychology; the shrink-image is now internalized; we have little or no need of psychologists to confirm our idiosyncracies. We have internalized the formula, and are now perfectly capable of mentally policing ourselves. Thus we all know the basic problem of schizophrenia; there is no fixed "I" there. What we fail to account for is that there is no fixed "I" anywhere; we easily mask our own schizophrenia with tightly spun pronouns and traditional locutions. Non-schizophrenics create the only possible means of diagnosing schizophrenia.

Second, if a schizophrenic is incapable of handling reality, it is only a reality that he or she cannot work within. Nietzsche is the first to recognize that reality itself is a useful illusion, born of our deepest values and acquisitions of forms of knowledge. Contemporary schizophrenics cannot assimilate with contemporary reality; that is all. Schizophrenics cannot succeed at higher education because educational boundaries are determined within the horizon of
values which they do not possess. Schizophrenics cannot be integral members of the state because the state begins with the presupposition of the individual; it builds its order around the rights or duties or activities of the "subject"; the schizo has abandoned the subject, and with it the State.

Deleuze and Guattari advocate schizo-analysis; what is interesting about such an attempt to think outside is that the schizophrenic is granted a privileged position; the schizophrenic survives as hero. This point deserves to be considered. (For a detailed account of the importance of schizophrenia for Anti-Oedipal political theory, see Line Five. For an explication of the methodology of Anti-Oedipal thought, refer to the conclusion).

It is a madman who brings us the news of the death of God. It is the schizophrenic who brings us the news of the death of Oedipus. In both cases the voice of iconoclasm comes from without, has always already exceeded the perimeter. He who stands outside always gains the best perspective. The camel, lion and child overflow from the excesses of madness; not as separate entities, not as a succession of evolutionary metamorphoses, but all at once, as one, together. Production is the core activity of unrepressed desire. What is it that the schizophrenic will wants? What it is free for? This is what Anti-Oedipus is about, bottom line. Schizoanalysis would be a revolution of the psyche, a revolution which makes

10 The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 95-6.
possible entirely new spheres of thought and thought-production. For thought is a very material, realistic production process. Always extending its field, always flittering about construing and re-construing the world. Thinking does more than this; it invents the world, changes the world, makes worldliness possible.

So we accost psychoanalysis: "Your frantic Oedipalization of the whole psychical field has deftly bound the imagination; thinking can not create or employ or produce, it can only think the structure: again, thinking knows its bounds". What schizoanalysis seeks is to cast off the self; there is no self, no moral agent, no neurotic son or daughter, no illegitimate sexual tendencies, no Father. To lose the Father is to lose the self; to be free for production, for plugging-in.

In Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche recounts the Three Metamorphoses of the spirit. Becoming is a lived condition; it is the process of always and everywhere overcoming, never being sated, ever intoxicated and never patient. It is in fact the life condition of the overman. But becoming should never be confused with a teleological process, for it is precisely in this construction of the becoming process that Nietzsche falls prey to the reformist. Becoming is not a striving-for, but a revolutionary activity which despises any culmination. A flux. The camel is the

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11 Ibid., pp. 137-140.
burdened spirit; this stage is nothing new to any thinking person, indeed, it is the birthplace of philosophy. This stage is thoughtful and ruminative; it takes into account the existential situation from which it arises. The camel is the manifestation of dissatisfied oedipalization; its trudge into the dessert is heavily burdened by State-God-Mommy-Daddy-Me. It knows this burden all-too-well; for all of its friends are camels. And revolution is only successful when one knows one's enemies.

The lion wants to be a nomad but is not. A reckless revolutionary, he steps into the manifold with fire-red eyes and intent to do harm. The dragon cowers; “thou shalt” is overturned by “I will”. The lion speaks the sacred No; an entire history is shedded, renounced, discarded at the instant of this utterance. The lion says No to Oedipus, who shudders in disbelief; No to himself, to the abysmal membrane of consciousness shrouded in the iron bars of normalization; and No to the Father, who has inserted his erect monument into the state, into the church, into the family, into Mommy, into the very tenets of desire; all desire is beaten back by the Father's erection. To this acrid old fool the lion says No, and thereby sparks the revolution. Thereby he becomes free.

But this freedom is wildly incompetent; it does not know itself, it does not know its artifice. This freedom must be channeled into productive/creative energies; it is not enough
to be free-from; Nietzsche requires us to justify this freedom by taking advantage of all that it affords. Deleuze and Guattari would have us do the same. Are we free from Oedipus, free to adopt an even more sinister model of restraint, of repression? What will the self now become that it has lost itself? The death of God brought an onslaught of chaos, which was resolved by the instantiation of newer, more subtle, but equally benign deities. And it happened before most of us knew that God had died. We can pray the same does not happen with the collapse of Oedipus. The child steps up to the plate.

The child represents the creative Yes-saying, the limitless loss of stale tradition and festering values coupled with the loss of the self; an expressive force, free from all, free for all. The child can construct and work, can plug in everywhere and explore vast terrains. The child is naive; it lacks the necessity of constraint and is puzzled by the furious exaltations of all fellows. The child is the very possibility for revolution at the deepest level; the child is the paradigm for the loss of the individual, the loss of control and restraint; the child feeds on autonomy and shits personae; it turns us back upon ourselves in an arbitrary assault on the senses; the child must needs be institutionalized. The child is a madman. For only the madman and the child have been loosed from the history of repression so completely that a re-pression is not possible; only the schizophrenic and the naive child stand beyond
Oedipus, shirk Oedipus in all his insidious forms. Consequently it happens that children and lunatics are subjected to intentional Oedipalization; we force the stout Oedipus down the throat of the hapless schizo, frantically trying to re-associate identity, to organize all spheres of consciousness around the centralizing Oedipal shaft.

Edward only feels Oedipalized at night; "In the daytime I become someone else...Only as I wait for sleep do I perceive reality as a tangible presence. There is no substance in my waking life, no truth...". Edward does not want to "perceive reality as a tangible presence", or if he does it is only because he has been told for so long that he should. The schizophrenic sees no substance, no truth to waking life; waking life is a myriad of rich deceptions. Edward simply wants to play; he receives messages from outer space and from nature, from trees and rocks and birds and fish; always from the exterior, always from outside, never from within. Edward becomes someone else during the day; he walks into and out of personae, experiencing shifting reality in a very material, very real way. Yet he retains his own private conception of reality; why? Out of convenience, nothing more. "Also because its nice to talk like everybody else, to say the sun rises, when everybody knows its only a manner of speaking. To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I". 12

Nietzsche pleads with us to listen to the madman, to hear his words and reflect upon their importance. There is prophecy in madness, there is freedom in madness. Deleuze and Guattari are after this freedom, this child who playfully lurks behind the guise of insanity. Our society Oedipalizes the child and incarcerates the schizophrenic, for in the matrix where permission still matters, it cannot be permitted to step so far away from the center, or to go further and disregard the center altogether. Oedipalization is normalization, structured obedience to the state, fascism at the conscious level; thus the madman is a heretic, the child simple and useless. And there is little doubt that if the death of Oedipus is in any way as magnificent as the death of God, it will not be long before the footfalls of a new idol are heard just beyond the vale, the shadows of another immanent figure-head darkening the horizon. The lesson is there, and begging to be learned; let us be lunatics and children, let us not go gently under; let us go kicking and screaming and crying and laughing into the great beyond; beyond the Savior, beyond the Father, beyond state philosophy and metaphysical orders. Let us madly go where no man can go...beyond Man...beyond Oedipus.
It is imperative to note that the discussion of Nietzsche offered up should serve only as a way of historically orienting and elaborating the capacity for locating ourselves morally and socially, this depth, our interiority. What slips in and how it influences the whole of the socius will be the vector of this line; Nietzsche is useful only as a powerful way to open a discussion of the interiority of the self. We should also note that this interiority, for all thinkers involved, is nothing more than a tool of power. In the end, the major theoretical task will be to force this interiority out, to extinguish lack altogether, and to make everything productive.

The "structure" of the interior is in a state of flux; this is because it has no claim to ontological grounding and exists solely as convention; it remains a convenient and productive means of organizing people. I have suggested that one cannot become guilty unless one takes some stock in the gravity of the interior; the interior has to matter at the social level in order for it to serve its organizational function. With Nietzsche, the "capacity" for internalization is wrought out; this capacity is man's interiority. Man was somehow made to internalize guilt, and this guilty consciousness enabled a revolution in morality, historically speaking. We recognize the vacant site that the Divine once occupied and note that we still feel guilty; the judge is
gone, but the sentence remains. It will be suggested in this chapter, and throughout the rest of the essay, that the judge is certainly not gone, that whatever stands as the impetus for guilt continuously metamorphosizes into new, insidious, and interesting forms. And it is for this reason that simply uncovering the idol of the day and recognizing it as such will never be enough; the true militant recognizes that he cannot sit still, ever.

Before the topic of anarchy can be broached, we must assess why it is necessary in the first place. Anarchy is the absence of State; no rule, no law, no subservient subjects. The first anarchists saw in the State the same totalitarian and repressive tendencies that were represented in the figurehead of God; thus Bakunin asserts that “[i]f God really existed it would be necessary to abolish him.” The State really does exist; and we shall see that it cannot help but be repressive. But under State regimes, especially modern or capitalist state regimes, the enemy is decentralized and cannot be assessed as merely the “oppressor”; one of the fatal flaws of Marxism is that it organizes itself against an enemy that is all too easily delineated; it thinks it is fighting an organization, when it is really taking on the entire productive surface of the social field. In order to assess the differences, then, between the instantiations of God and government, we need an intermediary. The theories of political power elaborated by Deleuze and Foucault are of central interest to us here; they both understand power to be
utterly deterritorialized, and adopt a Nietzschean methodology to uncover its traces in all realms of the socius.

Negotiations, a series of articles and interviews by and with Deleuze, marks the most straightforward account of his political critique of repression. The book is framed by discussions of schizophrenia and politics; the first three pieces directly treat both volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia; the last two are the most concise statements Deleuze has given us regarding a political theory. Deleuze’s thought is inextricably linked to an awareness of Foucault’s work; it is for this reason that elements of both thinkers can and should be discussed simultaneously.

In his Letter to a Harsh Critic 1, Deleuze explains his relationship with the history of philosophy:

“'I belong to a generation, one of the last generations, that was more or less bludgeoned to death with the history of philosophy. The history of philosophy plays a patently repressive role in philosophy, it’s philosophy’s own version of the Oedipus complex: 'You can’t seriously consider saying what you yourself think until you’ve read this and that, and that on this, and this on that.' Many members of my generation never broke free of this; others did, by inventing their own particular methods and new rules, a new approach.”2

He continues on to describe this new approach, his own engagement with his immediate intellectual history, as a type of sodomizing creativity:

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2 Ibid., pps. 5-6.
"I suppose the main way I coped with it at the time was to see the history of philosophy as a sort of buggery or (it comes to the same thing) immaculate conception. I saw myself as taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous. It was really important for it to be his child, because the author had to actually say all I had him saying. But the child was bound to be monstrous, too, because it resulted from all sorts of shifting, slipping, dislocations, and hidden emissions that I really enjoyed."³

What Deleuze appreciates about Nietzsche, the grand inquisitor of the moral sphere, is that he has a strange capacity to bugger his own readership:

"It was Nietzsche, who I read only later, who extricated me from all this. Because you can't just deal with him in the same sort of way. He gets up to all sorts of things behind your back. He gives you a perverse taste - certainly something Marx or Freud never gave anyone - for saying simple things in your own way, in affects, intensities, experiences, experiments. It's a strange business, speaking for yourself, in your own name, because it doesn't at all come with seeing yourself as an ego or a person or a subject. Individuals find a real name for themselves, rather, only through the harshest exercise in depersonalization, by opening themselves up to the multiplicities everywhere within them, to the intensities running through them. A name as the direct awareness of such intensive multiplicity is the opposite of the depersonalization effected by the history of philosophy..."⁴

Deleuze means that the history of philosophy, as it represents and articulates a certain intellectual history of western culture, always already presents its own problems: It gives us both preconceived problems and the conceptual apparatus to work them through. Logic is highly idealistic; it organizes the field of philosophy systematically according to variant causes and effects, problems and solutions, etc. What needs to be addressed is the assertion that the history

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³ Ibid., p. 6.
⁴ Ibid., pps. 6-7.
of philosophy is philosophy's own Oedipus complex. How does a structural framework which serves to striate and organize social or theoretical space come to be understood as the operative force which produces that space? That is, how does the history of philosophy come to be the re-generative power for contemporary thinking, how does it come to be the case that the "structure" of Oedipus is mistakenly taken to be the progenitor of the social field of desire?

"We're not saying psychoanalysis invented the Oedipus complex. It gives people what they want, they bring their Oedipus complex along with them. Psychoanalysis simply turns the complex back on itself, oedipalizes transference, oedipalizes the complex itself on the couch, its mucky little kingdom. But whether in its domestic or analytic form, the Oedipus complex is basically an apparatus for repressing desiring machines, and in no sense a formation of the unconscious itself."  

Continuing:

"Foucault said psychoanalysis remains deaf to the voice of unreason. Indeed, it neuroticizes everything, and through this neuroticization contributes not only to producing neurotics whose treatment never ends but also psychotics in the form of anyone resisting oedipalization."  

Deleuze and Guattari assert that "a schizophrenic is someone who's been decoded, deterritorialized." They then shun all responsibility for their work or its implications: "As for being responsible or irresponsible, we don't recognize these notions, they're for policemen and courtroom psychiatrists."

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5 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari on Anti-Oedipus in Negotiations, p. 17.
6 Ibid., p. 18.
7 Ibid., p. 23.
8 Ibid., p. 24.
What is a "decoded" or "deterritorialized" individual? How does Oedipus become the model for the entirety of social orders, i.e., desire? How does thinking internalize its own linear rational history, how does the socius internalize Oedipus, and how does one discuss theory free from all responsibility? (That is, how can we say that the very notion of responsibility is limiting, controlling, repressive, in short the manifestation of "policemen and courtroom psychiatrists"?)

These questions will be worked out throughout the course of the rest of this essay. We have seen that man has the capacity to internalize conceptual orders and moral or ethical imperatives. We have further seen that this process of internalization writes the very code of what is internalized into the corpus of mankind; man understands himself according to what has become his "inner sphere". This sphere is protected in many ways from the realm of criticism; philosophy can work with it, but cannot systematically unravel it. What we are after is a way to understand internalization politically; how is it that Oedipus, that the history of philosophy, that social institutions and judiciary operations come to light as fundamentally repressive?

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault elaborates the history of punitive measures. His attention is captured not by the causal or linear links between forms of punishment over the
course of the last few centuries, but rather with the differences that emerge when history is cast in a genealogical light. What he uncovers are various orders of legislature and punishment, judicial tactics and prosecution techniques, which both shape and organize what will come to be known as "Man". This concept of Man is fading from the modern social order, according to both Foucault and Deleuze, and I will deal with that issue later. I want to elaborate only some of the central themes of *Discipline and Punish*; this text offers a developmental picture of individual political subjects internalizing social norms and codes. It will be shown that we already police ourselves and divine our own limitations and possibilities from the investment of politically charged disciplinary tactics and psychologically heirarchized orders which delineate the criteria for the contemporary individual.

Foucault analyzes an arbitrary assimilation of societal structures (including politico-punitive measures, psychological evaluations, and a host of other "normalizing" and categorizing methodologies), each driven by an underlying weave of power threads, that have infiltrated every micro-area of our existence, establishing the criteria by which we discern the contemporary "individual". The initial stages of this radical shift were characterized by the birth of ideological punitive measures and a categorical localizing of individuals within society. These changes marked the onset of the classical age. Foucault sees this development as one
particularly dangerous stage in the historical movements of power.

Foucault's book begins with a nightmarish depiction of a public execution. A regicide, after confessing to his crime and publicly asking both God and man for forgiveness, is literally torn to pieces upon a scaffold in front of an assembled audience. We cannot help but realize that what was commonplace practice three hundred years ago now manifests itself as an abomination of justice. At the order of the judge, the thief's hand was cut off, or the blasphemer executed. Power has shifted; we are subject to very different tactical disciplinary procedures now than we ever have been. Legislation is now not only less visible and sectionalized, it also appears in micro areas of our existence, as the way we govern and organize ourselves.

The punishment dealt out upon the scaffold was a politics of fear-tactics. Its effects were by no means far reaching, and it left many crimes unpunished. But its object was the crime; the judge measured and assessed the crime committed and extolled what he determined to be proper punishment upon the body of the condemned. Foucault claims that in such a setting, where the crime is looked upon as a direct offense upon the body of the sovereign, power is isolated, constricted; it is played out in one discourse and one alone. Power for Foucault is manifested in whatever social systems or institutions are dominant at any given time; it functions
under the guise of governmental order.

But we recognize that in a such a system where the sovereign occupies the physical and metaphorical site of the rule of law, the socius cannot achieve a complex order (for example, a bureaucracy). In order to ensure a further reaching control, power had to be dispersed; divisions had to be made. At this juncture, Foucault describes a web of power discourses which permeated society, all distinct but intertwining, within which the individual came to light as an ethical, responsible subject capable of judging himself or being judged by others over and against certain established normative criteria.

Foucault contends that the age of enlightenment brought about fundamental changes in the power relations which constituted the governing aspects of society. For instance, the incorporation of medical analyses of the criminal into judicial systems (i.e., a psychological profile) enabled the judge to judge the criminal rather than the crime itself, and punishment moved from a public exhibition of physical torture to an economic suspension of the rights of the prisoner via the prison sentence. Time tables were inaugurated to ensure strict adherence to rules in institutions such as the military and the educational system, while obedience and active allegiance to standards were rewarded with medals, privileged status in the class, etc. The insane, who had freely walked the streets in medieval society, were shipped
off to asylums, while the sick were removed from their families and treated in clinics. All of these instances represent for Foucault the dispersion of power into micro-areas of our lives. This type of dialectical ordering (sick/well, right/wrong, authority/individual, brave/cowardly) fosters a self-regulating imperative in the individual. It "makes each individual a case...(t)he case is no longer...a set of circumstances defining an act and capable of modifying the application of a rule; it is the individual as he may be described, judged, measured, compared with others, in his very individuality." 9. This is what Foucault understands as a "disciplinary" society; a social configuration in which the onset of particular political power-wielding machines, dispersed throughout societal institutions, creates the capacity for judgment of the individual using the criteria of a normative valuation.

The shift of emphasis upon the crime to emphasis upon the individual was an economic movement; if a judge assesses the character of the criminal and not merely his or her crime, this trend festers outside of the judicial establishment, or rather the judicial establishment extends outward into society, causing a regulative effect. Everyone now has the capacity to act as judges for themselves and others. The application of disciplinary measures within secured prisons, such as regulated time tables and a strict work regime, provided a means for the first time by which the criminal

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could be reformed as opposed to merely punished. This represents for Foucault a critical moment in the development of repressive measures; "the moment where it became understood that it was more efficient and profitable in terms of the economy of power to place people under surveillance than to subject them to some exemplary penalty." 10.

Foucault is of the opinion that society utilizes a popular scapegoat which allows for a retrospective reinstatement of certain functional ideals when the ostracized are juxtaposed to the normative. For example, in *Madness and Civilization* he addresses the fact that after the downsurge in occurrences of leprosy on the medieval Continent, there was a calculated grouping of the foolish, the criminally inclined, the hysterical, etc.; they were labeled and separated off from the boundaries of social order via institutions such as the asylum, the prison, the hospital; boundaries were drawn between the normal and the abnormal which established a kind of normative criteria. The disciplinary tactics of the modern prison represent a tighter grip in the development of the scapegoat politics. Not only do contemporary penal institutions confine the "criminally inclined" to institutions which safeguard society from them, they also create what are known as delinquents, thereby perpetuating the scapegoat class under the adopted label of reformation.

Foucault discusses the panoptic model of the prison as the

apex of the disciplinary institution. The division of the cells is such that each captive is simultaneously isolated and perpetually watched, giving them time to think out their predicament under the always and constant watchful eye of the unnamed superior. This model extends outward into all realms of society. For example, hospitals develop methods by which patients can be isolated in their own beds while constantly being looked after by nurse and doctors; roll call becomes commonplace to ensure that schoolchildren are present in the classroom.

And such practices have a way of ensuring their own continuation, for these structures follow the criminal out into the work force long after he is released in various ways. He has only associated with criminals while incarcerated, hence his only friends are of a delinquent mindset. Upon being arrested, a black mark goes on his permanent record, allowing for public access to knowledge of his criminal past and ensuring that he will not be elevated to the upper tiers of society. This type of forced categorization is a breeding ground for recidivism. It is in this way that our system perpetuates itself; it labels delinquents and keeps them organized and categorized as such.

We should be careful about ascribing a certain lineage to the development of punitive and disciplinary measures; Foucault wants to trace power, not historicize an economy of legislation. But at the same time, we recognize that the
shifts in the way society slates its internments occupy a unique and somewhat consequential dispersion of power throughout the entire social field. Initially, we have a system of judicial order where a large group of citizens are ruled by a single monarch, who embodies the function of government. Under this design, the means of judicial sovereignty meet at the scaffold; judges are appointed to assess criminal actions and to punish with due vengeance those accused of perpetrating said law in a public spectacle. This tyrannical form of rule cannot efficiently govern the entirety of the masses, however, and by pitting the governed populace directly against the sovereign, it provides the basis for revolutionary ideas and uprisings. "In these ceremonies...one sees the intersection of the excess of armed justice and the anger of the threatened people."11. This ultimately ineffective system hence gave way to subtler tactics, which amounted to an ideological model of surveillance.

This model was the first to utilize the idea, discussed in Line One, that there was indeed an individual lurking behind criminal actions, and the need for punishment without torture or public display arose. The ideological method brought about such novelties as roughly assembled policing units, and civilians began to discern a general over-arching surveillance which monitored them instead of their actions. This played itself out into a neurotic culture where the

11 *Discipline and Punish*, p. 73.
masses adopted the ideals of the rulers and slowly pinpointed methods by which they could utilize surveillance methods in a local fashion; the family and similar social structures began to govern themselves.

As repression became organized, institutions formed. The school, the hospital, the asylum, and the factory all benefited from these newly domesticated subjects. Within such institutions it was possible to extend the means of control present in the ideological method into micro-facets of the individual's life; by incorporating rigorous time tables, work ethics, and the strategic organization of utilized space into the common agenda, schools, hospitals, prisons, and factories realized a true upgrade in the economy of control. Each subject, operating under a learned disciplinary mentally, could be positioned in each of these institutions to attain his highest possibility for output and production, thereby rapidly enhancing technology, politics, and education. It is here that power is recognized as having its firmest hold upon the individual. But this disciplinary system could also be applied by the individual herself, not merely by the unseen eye of the supervisor, and power had to insure its investment. This came about through the evolution of normalizing criteria and the formation of groups of societal illegalities.

Standardized examinations are manifestations of the way in which cultural values codify certain norms. "Norms" should
be understood as criteria by which abilities and individual achievements can by measured. The appropriation of rank or status to those who perform exceptionally well in any given discipline, modeled after the military, ensures a "performance and reward" type mentality. In this way every individual has determinate criteria for establishing his or her own status in relation to the norm. At the same time, labels are affixed to those who perform in a non-satisfactory fashion with regards to the criteria, labels such as "delinquent", or in the school setting, "failure". This makes it possible for individuals to distinguish their own position in society. In this way, type-casts of certain people "prone" to illegal behavior are played out by those who do not fit the mold, and society finds use for the neat categorization of hooligans just as it had done with the more domesticated subjects.

It is important to note that the major element in all of the aforementioned models is primarily political. Foucault's objective is to expose the historical weave of power as a fundamental element of truth; better to expose this weave as our grounds for truth. "Power manifests itself in a discourse through which it arbitrarily and for its own purposes engages in the invention of truth."12 Since power is manifested strictly in the political (that is, in institutions and legislation, academies and courtrooms), Foucault's discussion of power technologies grants immediate and absolute primacy

to the role of politics and political theory within society; everything, truth not excluded, becomes part and parcel of a political machine.

Since government in general has its locus around control, in areas such as judicial practice, economical monitoring, and education and its offspring, it is not surprising that the vehicle of power is politics. If we concede with Foucault that political structures themselves are in the business of manufacturing efficient and domesticated individuals, then we forego any possibility of grounding ourselves with respect to absolute truth or structured existence. A shift in the domain of power will sufficiently re-route the social order along varying lines of judgment and responsibility. Indeed, what we consider in the present age to be the status of an individual (his academic aptitude, her ability to succeed at sporting events, etc.) represents for Foucault only an adherence to the rules of certain arbitrary discourses, which are at once molding and controlling subjectivities. Furthermore, the general validity of any such discourse remains unintelligible, for an adherence to the established rules of tantamount discourses (semantics, economy, science, etc.) will always manifest itself in the utilization of any criteria. It would seem, then, that we are subjugated victims to the rules of science and politics, language and economics, medicine and education. And all of these facets would represent the calculated assimilation of individuals into the service of power.
What we have come to terms with here is a model of a disciplinary society. This model is what much of political theory, particularly revolutionary political theory, takes as its conception of the social field. It is assumed that, regardless of how and when they are constituted, there are individual subjects in society, that they demand certain things (rights-speak), and that government is in place to ensure that order is preserved (that the political subjects are satisfied with the current state of affairs, and that no individuals or groups are infringing upon the rights of others in an unjustified fashion). Note also that revolutionary thinking appears only when a certain group of individuals envision their rights to be severely overlooked or trampled underfoot by the governing order, the State. This, of course, is where Marx set up his camp. But with Foucault’s analytic of the history of certain institutions, something is happening in a different sphere; “individuals” are not merely repressed by singular oppressive discourses or power substantiated institutions. Rather, the individual becomes a product of control. The subject who can police himself, who understands himself as a micro version of macro state mentality has internalized the entire apparatus of the State.

Thus power is not only a repressive force but a productive force. While it can be asserted that power is oppressive, and numerous examples of abusive usury of power are available, we note that power is also artistic, creative, and
in every way productive.

Power is the ultimate investor of the social field (the manipulating and organizing postulate which appropriates social apparatuses for its use: The factory, the school, the hospital, the prison are all sites of confinement within which power operates). Yet it is the force and flow of the socius as well, not only appropriating these institutions and modulating their capacities for repression but also acting as the productive pseudo-metaphysical underlying mechanism which constructs not only the political subject but also writes the discourses of sites of confinement. Is Foucault asserting that power constructs its own social models and malleable subjects so that it can turn around and repress whatever non-power-serving desires emanate from the social field? That is, does power create and repress its own subjects? There is a sense in Foucault's work that he thinks this might be the case. In describing the organization of power in penal system in the nineteenth century, Foucault states that "procedures were being elaborated for distributing individuals, fixing them in space, classifying them, extracting from them the maximum in time and forces, training their bodies, coding their continuous behavior, maintaining them in perfect visibility, forming around them an apparatus of observation, registration and recording, constituting on them a body of knowledge that is accumulated and centralized." From such talk we certainly get the sense

13 Discipline and Punish, p. 231.
that power constructs both repressed subject and oppressive social institutions. In his afterword to *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* by Hubert Dreyfuss and Paul Rabinow, Foucault describes his entire project: "My objective...has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects...[t]hus it is not power, but the subject, which is the general theme of my research."\(^\text{14}\)

The obvious paradox, one that cannot be avoided, is that any survey of power's movements, any analysis of power at all, must necessarily take shape within the field of play elaborated by power itself. If power inscribes the organization of the social field, and if then in turn the model of such an apparatus is internalized, becomes man's interiority, and thus allows for anything at all like a contemporary subject to emerge, how are we to know that all this clap-trap regarding repressive tendencies and sites of confinement isn't simply another product of power?

Deleuze and Foucault both answer this seeming contradiction by distinguishing between knowledge (which amounts to the matrix of discursive social practices that indoctrinate the social field with habitual locutions like law, school, self, parents, God, history, communication) and thought (which, in contradistinction to knowledge, is a "line of flight" that announces alternatives for action and existence that are

\(^{14}\text{Hubert Dreyfuss and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1983) pps. 208-9.}\)
unattainable under a disciplinary model of society). "The difference between thought and knowledge is that knowledge is a set of sedimented practices that devolve upon relations of force, while thought is the subversion of that sedimentation through the process of articulating the relations of force that constitute it."¹⁵ This does not mean that thought is an entirely liberating or fundamentally noble activity which always stands over and against sedimentary knowledge. Indeed, thought is simply the vehicle to "new set[s] of beliefs that in turn will become sedimented and in need of new thought."¹⁶

Take, for example, a project like Marx’s, which established itself upon the sedimented capitalistic practices of exchange and usury but attempted to think its way through to a new form of social and political activity free from the repressive aspects of a dichotomizing, rigid economic repressive structure. Variations on Communism and Socialism, once incorporated into the organism of the social field, become newly sedimentary practices which thought once again strives to outstrip. Marx organized his revolutionary philosophy around a reductionist economic theory (emancipation can only be thought in relation to a revolt against the existing structures of economic exchange in capitalist society). See Line Four for a discussion of strategic Marxist thought; here let me simply say that most

¹⁶ Ibid.
forms of Marxism, from Lenin to Althusser, operate by positing as a specific oppressive enemy the regime of capitalism. The body of Capital as it is dispersed unevenly throughout the realm of the socius serves as the locus of power and the fueling apparatus of repression.

But this apparatus cannot be strategically opposed, for it is, as we shall see, “deterritorialized”. Institutions of power are no longer merely separate, analyzable, structured organizations, as Marx thought (all oppression for Marx arises out of the economic tension between base and superstructure). They are transient, changing, indeed interconnecting. It cannot be feasible, using a realistic picture of the modern capitalist order, to imagine an “us against them” scenario. The organized and striated field of the whole social body, which is invested and fueled by wide market economies, institutional hierarchies and the like, is simply dissected semantically, and thereby the modern subject is constituted. We come to understand who we are, what sociological spaces we as individuals occupy, where and how we should act; in other words, we envision the whole social field as a massive, dilated body, a “body without organs”\textsuperscript{17}. It is anorganic because it is wholly smooth and without depth; the social field is the flat surface of desire.

Certain intensities (institutions, individuals, theories, etc.) appear in a sort of moldable plasticity upon this flat

\textsuperscript{17} For a treatment of the “body without organs”, which is a concept of central importance in \textit{Anti-Oedipus}, see my conclusion to this essay.
surface. Of course, the body of the socius allows for long transversal movements in multiple directions (as witnessed by the movement of another flat body, for example the bodies of capital or of religious faith, intersecting on the surface of the socius). We can envision, by employing such a model, a new form of social repression, inextricably linked to the movement of the body of capital and extremely more insidious in nature than that employed by a disciplinary society: We here begin to come to terms with the hyper-real authority of a Baudrillardesque “Disneyland” mentality, what Deleuze refers to as a control society.

In his *Postscript on Control Societies* 18, Deleuze offers a reading of Foucault which also lends insight into his own political theory. He distinguishes between three different organizations of the social field: the sovereign society, the disciplinary society, and the control society. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault charted the movements which disassembled sovereign society and recontextualized the social order according to “sites of confinement”, the model of organization for a disciplinary society.

Both thinkers set as a historical marker for the onset of the society of discipline the end of the classical age; the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are the representative time periods for such a social schemata. Deleuze describes disciplinary societies as such:

18 *Postscript on Control Societies* in *Negotiations*, pps. 177-182.
"They operate by organizing major sites of confinement. Individuals are always going from one closed site to another, each with its own laws: first of all the family, then the school ('you're not at home, you know'), then the barracks ('you're not at school, you know'), then the factory, the hospital from time to time, maybe prison, the model site of confinement...Foucault has thoroughly analyzed the ideal behind sites of confinement, clearly seen in the factory: bringing everything together, giving each thing its place, organizing time, setting up in this space-time a force of production greater than the sum of component forces." 19

What Deleuze is describing here is the model of the socius that we have traced in this chapter. But both Deleuze and Foucault contend that this disciplinary society, against which revolutionary thinking has mounted its attack for at least the past hundred years, has begun to give way. It is being effaced and supplanted by a new form of social organization. Deleuze calls this new form of capitalism "control". He claims that "[w]e're in the midst of a general breakdown of all sites of confinement - prisons, hospitals, factories, schools, the family. The family is an interior that's breaking down like all other interiors - educational, professional, and so on." 20 Interiority is fast becoming a myth, an antique. Everything is exterior, pushed outside, evident, transversal and productive. But if it is in fact the case that sites of confinement and discursive institutions are breaking down, logically political theory must alter its approach: Contemporary ideology can serve no function if it takes for its conception of the social field an outdated model.

19 Ibid., p. 177.
20 Ibid., p. 178.
Deleuze writes that "confinements are molds...while controls are a modulation."\textsuperscript{21} What he means by this is that a site such as a factory, where production occurs, has its own territory or geography. It is physically situated in a certain state or province, acquires its revenue from other localizable institutions (wholesalers and retailers) and generates specific product to which a certain value is affixed. These social territories which the factory and its products and revenues (as well as other territories such as family, nursery school, hospice shelters, department stores) occupy are the "sites" through which the disciplined citizen moves.

"Factories formed individuals into a body of men for the joint convenience of a management that could monitor each component in this mass, and trade unions that could mobilize mass resistance; but businesses are constantly introducing an inexorable rivalry presented as healthy competition, a wonderful motivation that sets individuals against one another and sets itself up in each of them, dividing each within himself."\textsuperscript{22}

Businesses are replacing factories as workplaces. We can go to school at home or in cyberspace; home health care, improved pharmaceuticals, and "community psychiatry" are ever extending the boundaries of hospitals and institutions. With ankle-bracelets, work release, suspended sentences and parole officers the panoptic model of reform and discipline is past history. And as these interiors, these closed sites, become ever extended across the surface of the social field, they intersect with one another at certain points, creating newly

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 179.
emerging control mechanisms. When Foucault describes the intersection of psychology and the judicial system in order to elaborate how a psychological profile ever became relevant to punitive institutions, we sense he is glimpsing ahead towards the emergence of control.

Production - the creation of a product by a mechanism (automaton, individual, assembly line) intended for that purpose - is now a Third World activity. Businesses are not sites of production; they buy production. As Deleuze puts it, they are "directed towards metaproduction." What we see is endless administration, a bureaucratic world-wide market. All the "closed sites" of disciplinary societies (factory, family, armed forces, school, church, asylum, prison) are split wide open and available for use via networking, technological advancements, media interventions, information technology, cybernetics, continuing education, training and advancement incentives, etc. We literally watch all sites of confinement opened up, laid bare, dissected and reconstructed in new and interesting forms on television every night at six. "Sites" are in motion; as Deleuze says, they modulate. They have no territory, they are floating, ungrounded, malleable, and subject to drift. They are deterritorialized. As modes of exchange shift toward a state of perpetual continuation (virtual spending), capital modifies itself.

"Money, perhaps, best expresses the difference between the two kinds of society, since discipline was always related to molded currencies containing gold as a numerical standard, whereas control is based on floating exchange rates, modulations depending on a code setting sample
percentages for various currencies...Disciplinary man produced energy in
discrete amounts, while control man undulates, moving among a continuous
range of different orbits. *Surfing* has taken over from all the old
sports ."23

Capitalism, which has previously been understood as an
economic ordering of the means of production, has mutated:

"Markets are won by taking control rather than by establishing a
discipline, by fixing rates rather than reducing costs, by transforming
products rather than by specializing production. Corruption here takes
on a new power....Marketing is now the instrument of social control and
produces the arrogant breed who are our masters. Control is short-term
and rapidly shifting, but at the same time continuous and unbounded,
whereas discipline was long-term, infinite, and discontinuous. A man is
no longer a man confined but a man in debt."24

If marketing (via telecommunications, complex networking
systems, demographic advertising which exploits every aspect
of our lifeworld from sexual drives to penchants for game-
show mentality trivia) is indeed the instrument for social
control, then business has, in a very literal sense, the
world at its fingertips.

"The key thing is that we're at the beginning of something new. In the
prison system: the attempt to find 'alternatives' to custody, at least
for minor offenses, and the use of electronic tagging to force offenders
to stay at home between certain hours. In the school system: forms of
continuous assessment, the impact of continuing education on schools,
and the related move away from any research in universities, 'business'
being brought into education at every level. In the hospital system:
the new medicine 'without doctors or patients' that identifies potential
cases and subjects at risk and is nothing to do with any progress
towards individualizing treatment, which is how its presented, but is
the substitution for individual or numbered bodies of coded 'dividual'
matter to be controlled. In the business system: new ways of
manipulating money, products, and men, no longer channeled through the
old factory system. This is a fairly limited range of examples, but
enough to convey what it means to talk of institutions breaking down:
the widespread progressive introduction of a new system of

23 Ibid., p. 180.
24 Ibid., p. 181.
Some of the most striking examples that I can think of concerning the onset of control strategies occur on university campuses. I was a student at a small college in Ohio where a series of rapes had occurred. Those students who lived on campus were given a general dormitory key and a key to their respective rooms. When this was deemed unsuitable for security purposes, an electronic system was installed. Students were issued bar coded cards which slid through a processing unit at the entrance to each dorm. Those students who lived in a certain dorm had cards that would open the doors at all times. Those who lived in other dorms had cards that would allow them to enter different dormitories until eleven o’clock at night, and then their access was restricted. Those who lived off campus had cards that would work for food in the mess hall if one purchased a meal plan package, but would allow no access to dormitories. All cards were meal plan cards, but it was possible to not pay for campus meals, in which case access to the cafeteria was restricted when the user swiped his card. There were various meal plans as well, such as the “week-day only” plan, which afforded a student access to the cafeteria Monday through Friday but not on Saturday and Sunday, or the “lunch and dinner plan”, which restricted the card holder from eating breakfast. Thus a digital configuration, read by a computer, served to regulate our eating habits and ensure that we stayed out of restricted areas.

25 Ibid., p. 182.
If we take this conception of a control society as the starting point for thinking about politics, old methodology and traditional logic are rendered impotent. I will explore throughout the rest of this essay some various suggestions regarding why revolutionary thinking is so difficult in relation to what Felix Guattari calls "Integrated Global Capitalism", and I will attempt to delineate some possible ways of thinking politically in such an accelerated environment. I will examine, in Line Five, the idea that the deterritorializing fluid movements of contemporary capitalism resemble in many ways the disjointed anti-logic of the schizophrenic process, and the specific relation between schizophrenia and capitalism that serves as the basis for a Deleuzoguattarian (to borrow from Ronald Bogue) politics.

If we maintain that specific territories of the state such as the university, the factory, the prison, etc. have in fact broken down or become mobilized and have mutated, we are not in any way viewing this as a shift toward an open, more liberated social sphere. If the subject has internalized and in fact become a micro-instantiation of the mechanisms of order and discipline, and if those mechanisms have gone south, then the interiority of the subject, which had for so long served as a tool of power, is now fractured, externalized and spread across the field of the socius as well. In fact all interiors (the interior of the factory, the closed space of academia, the autonomy of the self) are now being ripped out and laid bare upon the shifting surface
of the social field. But this is not to say that repression has ceased to occur at many levels, not the least of which is thinking. As suggested in Line Two, thinking knows its bounds, struggles under its own organization. When Deleuze christens the history of philosophy "philosophy's own Oedipus complex", he means that the history of philosophy operates as a neuroticizing and repressive force upon thinking. We need only look at Plato, Kant, Nietzsche to realize that philosophy wasn't always a pure research project. There are more footnotes in any ten page article in *Philosophy Today* than there are in the entirety of *The Critique of Pure Reason*.

But note that, even with a rapidly accelerated and deterritorialized social framework, capital still, perhaps more than ever, is the force and flow of market economy. We will see that in much the same way, Oedipus is the force and flow of libidinal (or "subjective") economy. Schizophrenia vanquishes Oedipus, and mimics and apes capitalism. And therefore it will be integral to the re-thinking of political philosophy that fuels *Anti-Oedipus*. 
Anarchism is a mixed bag. In the terminology of the layperson, it acquires an affectation of disorderliness at best and complete and total lawless debauchery at worst. Modern anarchism has origins in political theory; it began with the likes of Bakunin and Proudhon for whom Marxism simply wasn’t a viable political solution to the social problems inaugurated by an encroaching Capitalist framework in Europe in the mid 1800’s. Originally a radical branch of socialist thought, anarchy gained its autonomy when Bakunin was ousted from what was later to be known as the First International by Marx and his followers in 1872.

I will examine some key tenets of anarchist thought via the proliferation and eventual downslide of Marxist thought. I will briefly touch upon some pivotal moments in the history of Marxist ideology in order to trace the changes which bespoke revolutionary theory from Marx to the fall of the Berlin Wall. I will discuss anarchy and elaborate at least two central problems of anarchist thought that hinder its political potency in light of the encroachment of societies of control: the anarchist view that power is always suppressive, never productive, and the presupposition that human beings have an innate and benign essence which is corrupted by centralized power. And, finally, I will return to Foucault and Deleuze, because these thinkers offer a new vision for anarchist thinking which forgoes these two
problems.

Before I begin, however, I wish to make a few clarifying statements. Over the course of this essay I have begun to use the terms "capitalism" and the "socius" almost interchangeably. It should become apparent in this chapter why capitalism now no longer refers to a specifically economic state of affairs, but rather to the whole social field. One of the reasons that such terms have become interchangeable was discussed in the last chapter, and is directly caught up in the notion of a society of control. When all localizable social, economic, political, religious, disciplinary sites begin to break down and infinitely mutate and combine with each other, the geography of social life becomes virtual and malleable. Capitalism no longer refers simply to the economic conditions of a country just as the "social" no longer refers simply to the public sector of life. The divisions between public and private, just as the divisions between the social, the political, and the economic have broken down. As Deleuze states in his introduction to Jacques Donzelot's brilliant work The Policing of Families, "it is along the same line that the points of authoritarianism, the points of reform, the points of resistance and revolution come face to face around this new stake, 'the social'...in several, sometimes opposing, ways that invest and reorganize the family."¹ Thus all points of resistance and of authority meet to invest what will be

referred to as the social. The role that the familial model plays in this equation will be discussed below.

This concept of the social field is global. It refers not only to first world economies, but also to the goods and services which these economies appropriate and which make up the economies of third world orders. Thus the "social" and the locution which describes it, "capitalism", are global effects of the deterritorialization which reconfigures all lived space in a society of control.

Marxism understands itself to have an organized and easily delineated enemy: the economic substructure and the capitalists who appropriate it to repress the workers. But as we have seen, contemporary society is not so easily mapped. If we examine the history of Marxism, we find that it constantly and consistently re-mobilizes itself; this is due to the fact that it has never appropriately estimated the ever-extending nature of deterritorializing capitalism.

Todd May, in his work on post-structuralist anarchism, outlines what he calls the "failure of Marxism"\(^2\). I will examine a few of his key points here because such an event as the end of "Marxist Ideology" puts closure on nearly two centuries of revolutionary thought. A few things should be kept in mind. First, this discussion is not centered around Marx, but Marxism, and it proceeds in a way which certainly

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\(^2\) *The Political Philosophy of Post-Structuralist Anarchism*, pps. 17-44.
does no service to the tremendously rich political and intellectual history that Marx's works have fostered. This is because what is at issue here is not the failure of a specific program, but some general presuppositions about the nature of capital and the social that much of revolutionary thinking takes as its foothold. Second, one does not have to look far to notice that aspects of Marxist ideology, from the dialectical conception of history to the economic analysis of labor, still persist not only in academia, but in grass roots politics, third-world revolutions, etc. Thus what is referred to as the failure of Marxism should be taken to mean the end of a legacy of political practice with global import. Communist parties are mostly gone, socialist organizations occupy only the margins of the political sphere, and with the demise of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Marxist politics appear to be in their death throes.

May asks why this is the case. Versions or mutations of Marxism were implemented in many countries; why did none take permanent hold? The common answer, of course, is that Marxism has a global agenda in mind, and that it will always fail at the national level because of pressures from other non-sympathetic or Democratic economies. But May is after a different answer. He argues that Marxism, through all of its mutations, "kept reformulating itself in ways that edged ever closer to - but never entirely coincided with - the
perspective embraced by anarchism."³ In order to accurately assess the import of the work of Deleuze and Foucault, it will be necessary to explore first how Marxism began to model itself after anarchism, and second what facets of anarchist thought are viable and which are outmoded or impotent.

May reminds us that when Lenin set up the three defining truths of Marxist politics, he set the stage for all of twentieth century Marxism. These three truths are as follows: "[t]here can be only one struggle, there can be only one theory, there can be only one leadership."⁴ The singular struggle between the working class and capitalist oppression leads to a categorical analysis of theory: "either it helps the class struggle progress toward revolution or it helps the bourgeoisie forestall the possibility of revolution and thus maintain its domination."⁵

The singular leadership (a vanguard communist party) is the third component of Leninist strategy and assumes that the party is the one which both knows the "true interests" of the proletariat and is forwarded by advanced theory.

According to Lenin, the workers must be taught their true interests. He does not mean that they do not know what is good for them; he means that the pervasive and dominant repressive structure of the capitalist/worker dialectic has sufficiently shielded the working class from understanding

³ Ibid., p. 18.
⁴ Ibid., p. 20.
⁵ Ibid.
the thorough-going nature of their alienation and has kept them from knowing how to revolt. This they must be taught.

Based upon such a dialectic, power is seen as repressive and lies solely with the bourgeoisie, while the capacity for revolution is understood as active and lies solely with the proletariat. This capacity simply needs to be channeled, organized, and awakened by a vanguard party which recognizes one struggle, one theory, and which sees itself as the only true administration of economic justice.

Throughout the courses of Soviet Marxism, Western Marxism, Existentialist and Structuralist Marxism this dichotomy was not only accepted but pre-supposed. Indeed, the major project of the Critical Theorists was to assess why the working class had not recognized its revolutionary capabilities. According to May, the Critical Theorists identified a "cultural capitalism" as the major repressive force, thus they differ from Lenin in their assessment of the limits and pervasiveness of capitalist repression. However, "[f]or both, there is a single enemy: capitalism. While Lenin saw capitalism primarily in economic terms, the turn to 'cultural capitalism' by the Critical Theorists does not change the analysis of capitalism; it merely spreads it across the entire social space." The line from Lenin to Habermas is infested with subtle shifts and differing agendas, but what is important is that the central tenets of

the Leninist Dialectic (Capitalism is the enemy and utilizes repressive power; the working class is revolutionary and fundamentally alienated) remain. Indeed, what we see is a movement toward a conception of the social field which envisions it as thoroughly invested by repressive mechanisms, a conception that is shared by the anarchists.

But May traces another line of Marxist thought, one that can be seen somewhat nascently in the work of the Leninist thinker Louis Althusser, which appears in virgin form with Antonio Negri and the Italian autonomia movement, and which is most fully manifest in the political philosophy of Cornelius Castoriadis.

What Althusser offered was a looser Marxism which viewed theory as a "practice in a contingent historical context." This is important because it allows for multiple "true" theories regarding the social field, not simply one. While such a strategy of course associates its own theoretical hold with whichever struggle it wishes to support, it opens the door for what Guattari will later call "micropolitics". If several different accounts of the procession or evolution of repression are possible, then revolt can take place on several different fronts. It no longer remains the case that only "one struggle" can bring about true social change; multiple struggles are now sanctioned, and the social field

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7 Ibid., p. 35.
comes to be understood as multiple and fragmentary.\(^8\)

While remaining under a general Marxist framework ("Capitalism develops as the separation and mutual antagonism of the two classes; as the development proceeds, the antagonism deepens"\(^9\)), thinkers like Negri offer a theory of the "social factory", which insinuates that in a capitalist society, all social life "tends toward becoming a factory in which the capitalist requirement - the exploitation of surplus value - is most perfectly met."\(^{10}\) What is perhaps most important about a movement like autonomia is that it strove to break up the intense homogenization that capitalism generates. It did this not by way of a singular attack or total worker uprising, rather it attempted to recognize the diverse needs of all people, the multiplicity of interests which subsist in housewives, firemen, factory workers, etc. And the revolt was not intended to come from a vanguard party: "It must arise at the level of people's daily lives. What autonomia proposed was a refusal of all attempts to extract surplus value, whether that refusal involved work slowdowns, demands for wages by students and housewives, or

\(^8\) As sites of confinement begin to break down, causing the whole social field to appear as a melting pot of control, notions of the multiple and the fragmentary will play a pronounced role in political thinking. This seeming contradiction (the notion that all previously autonomous sites are now freely intersecting in an almost homogeneous space referred to as the socius contrasted with the assertion that political theory and practice can no longer be, as Lenin would have it, singular but must be multiple and diversified) vanishes when the distinction between the linguistic determination "capitalism" and its actual activities become apparent. True, the term capitalism, when linked to with the conception for a control society, appears to describe something global and perhaps even universal. We will see, in Line Five and in the conclusion below, that this is certainly not the case, and that deterritorializing capitalism causes the social field to not only consistently mutate but also to consistently fragment.

\(^9\) The Political Philosophy of Post-structuralist Anarchism, p. 36.

\(^{10}\) Ibid.
noncooperation with the rituals of capitalism. Capitalism would be subverted 'from below' or not at all.”

The general idea then is that the notion of representation at some type of governmental level is vanquished. There is no need for democracy, or vanguard communism, for each individual is understood as having the autonomy to assert his or her subjective interests directly. This notion is complicit with perhaps the central theme of anarchy. For his part, Castoriadis offered perhaps the closest variation of Marxism to anarchy: He replaced the definitively economic dichotomy of oppressed worker/oppressive capitalist with the infinitely more inclusive categorizations of director/executant. For Castoriadis, then, alienation is not the result of economic exploitation of the working class by capitalists, but rather the loss of self-management (self-government) at all levels of social interaction. Capitalism, while still the enemy, has with this newest strain of Marxism become so loose and shifting a term that it almost ceases to function, and the possibilities for revolution against both repression and political representation crop up everywhere across the social spectrum. Of course, while this theoretical move borders on anarchy, one would hesitate to continue to refer to it as Marxism.

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11 Ibid., p. 37.
12 Ibid., p. 43.
13 In Anti-Oedipus, it is suggested that we are now facing perhaps the most insidious form of representation, political or otherwise, in the figure of Oedipus. This notion was touched upon in Line Two and will come up again in the conclusion.
Thus while manifestations of Marxism in both theory and practice began to crumble, certain Marxist theoreticians began to approach some central anarchist themes. What is significant about this fact is that revolutionary theory (for which Marxism must be taken as the milestone) either collapses due to the infringing and tantalizing auspices of bureaucracy and democratic capitalism, or it retreats to a full scale theoretical annihilation of all governmental structures in order to keep its head above water. But perhaps the goals of anarchy (a totally liberated social sphere with no governmental intervention) were always nascent in the programs of Marxism. The ideals are sympatico to an extent; the difference lies in the strategic methodology employed to bring an end to State rule. Keep in mind that both Marxism and traditional anarchism are reactions to disciplinary societies. I will suggest that anarchy offers a better tactical approach but that it must alter its course in order to remain relevant in an era pre-configured by control.

Anarchy is actually considered a form of socialism. It differs from what has come to be known as "authoritarian socialism" on several key points. While Lenin and his successors saw power as emanating from one source (a monopolizing capitalist economic superstructure), the original anarchists (Bakunin and Proudhon, and later Kropotkin) extended power to all aspects of the social field. Government in all its insidious forms, no matter how minuscule, is responsible for not only all repression within
the social sector but also for contaminating and severely limiting individual possibilities. For the anarchists, the State is the source of power, power is everywhere and always suppressive, and both are the incubus for corrupting human essence and shackling subjective human liberty. "Bakunin sees the State as an 'abstraction devouring the life of the people', an 'immense cemetery where all the real aspirations and living forces of a country generously and blissfully allow themselves to be buried in the name of that abstraction.'"¹⁴

The State is the figurehead of what the anarchists call "centralization": a top-down procedure which both organizes and strengthens controlling hierarchies while repressing the generally benign will ("I want only to be left alone") of individuals within the populace. Thus the anarchist refuses all sorts of State fostered intervention, including, and perhaps especially, a "representative" vanguard party which teaches to the working class their interests. All forms of representation (of exchanging the will of one person or group for the multiple wills, interests, and desires of counties, towns, states) are reproached by the anarchist. We see the connections between anarchy and the Italian autonomia movement: All individuals are capable of directly asserting their subjective interests against State orders. "What motivates the critique of political representation is the idea that in giving people images of who they are and what

they desire, one wrests from them the ability to decide those matters for themselves." Revolt happens within tactical, intensely charged micropolitical resistances, not in widesweeping, singular struggles or by figurehead political parties claiming to represent the interests of all repressed parties within the social network.

What is lacking in anarchism is a cold, calculated logic, a "strategy". In Arthur Koestler's novel *Darkness at Noon*, we find the main character, Rubashov, struggling with the only important question for all communists: "How can my actions, even in the face of death, further the interests of the party?" Rubashov is slated to die for crimes against the party, and his single consideration is how to make his death an occasion which strengthens party interests. Revolution is simply not logical or programmatic for the anarchist. While Marx strategically operated within the orders of the First International, seeking a position of political superiority with which he could oversee the organization of the revolution, "Bakunin used his charismatic personality in traveling around to different groups in different counties,

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15 *The Political Philosophy of Post-Structuralist Anarchism*, p. 48.

16 It should be noted here that thinkers such as Habermas have suggested resistance strategies that might be confused with this position. Habermas seeks "points of resistance" which for him are synonymous with social milieus that have not yet been contaminated by the scourge of ever-extending capitalism. These spaces are supposed to be buttresses where resistance can stave off the encroachment of capitalist tendencies. But Habermas, in looking for these spaces, appears as a tired soldier, simply looking for a place to hide from the overpowering advances of the enemy. An anarchism like the one Deleuze forwards sees no such spaces, for the "social" is synonymous with contemporary capitalism. There are no spaces or "points of resistance" left "uncontaminated". Also, an understanding of power as productive as well as repressive allows the militant active choices for reform, resistance, even revolt everywhere across the surface of the social sphere, and not just, as Habermas would have it, safe places to hide.
more interested in roiling them to action than in determining the proper vehicle for that action. Bakunin felt that action would create its own proper vehicles."\textsuperscript{17}

Anarchists are humanists. As Daniel Guerin points out, "[t]he anarchist sets two sources of revolutionary energy against the constraints and hierarchies of authoritarian socialism: the individual and the spontaneity of the masses. Some anarchists are more individualistic than social, some more social than individualistic. However, one cannot conceive of a libertarian who is not an individualist."\textsuperscript{18} Deleuze, Guattari, and Foucault do in fact conceive an anarchism that is not individualistic. We will come to this later. In order to more clearly elaborate what the anarchist wants, we must take up with at least two angles of anarchist thinking: this notion of humanism at the core of anarchist theory and the anarchist conception of power.

First, anarchists understand human beings as essential, even-keeled organisms capable of structuring their own existence. Transgressions against oneself and others are thought to be the obvious reactions to dilemmas like poverty, overabundance of legislation (which leads to individual political impotence), etc. These problems stem directly from the aforementioned "centralization" of state power. With Leninists, we witness a "top-down" political theory, where

\textsuperscript{17} The Political Philosophy of Post-Structuralist Anarchism , p. 46
\textsuperscript{18} Anarchism , p. 27.
control of the state is to be seized by a vanguard representative party in order to eventually demolish state oppression. Anarchy, from the beginning, advocates a "bottom-up" political philosophy: rights begin and end with the self-decided interests of the individual. Anarchy seeks only to incite the masses to action: they already know what to do.

But because of this belief inherent in anarchism that the individual has a natural essence which is corrupted and then repressed by the state, the conception of power forwarded by traditional anarchy is thwarted. While the anarchists believe that power is indeed dispersed across the whole social field and that it emerges as "intersecting networks... rather than a hierarchy"\(^{19}\), power is still seen to be solely repressive, a function of the centralization of the State. They thus elaborate a conception of social space very similar to Foucault's analysis of disciplinary societies in *Discipline and Punish*. While no single source can be said to animate power (remember that for Bakunin the State is only an "abstraction"), all of the sites where power emerges are sites that serve repression. Power, for the anarchist, is always suppressive, never productive. This contradicts Foucault's contention that power *produces* individuals. And this notion provides an argument against the possibility of human beings ever having anything remotely resembling an "essence", benign or otherwise. If, as Foucault hints and

\(^{19}\) *The Political Philosophy of Post-Structuralist Anarchism*, p. 51.
Deleuze asserts, in disciplinary societies individuals are the composite sites which reflect small-scale representations of the domesticating organization of sites of confinement, then these thinkers directly contest two central themes of anarchy: First, power is not merely repressive, it is also productive. Second, there is no such thing as a localizable individual outside of the sets of practices and social organizations that produce that individual.

It is true that contemporary anarchists such as Murray Bookchin and Colin Ward recognize that power and its oppressive tendencies are decentralized, but the notion that power serves only repression and can only be resisted through a humanist theoretical reduction to the ontological level of the individual remains. What Foucault and Deleuze offer, and what composes the crux of *Anti-Oedipus*, is a model of power that is productive and a conception of the individual that is loose and unstable, "deterritorialized". "Just as power and oppression are decentralized, so must resistance be."\(^{20}\)

This brings our discussion to the notion of social space. According to Foucault, in a disciplinary society there are in fact "territories", sites of confinement, divisions within the sphere of the social that are separated and marked off. If we take this model as a starting point, power is understood as a flux of forces which "invests" pre-established social spaces. Lines of power converge at a

\(^{20}\) Ibid., p. 54.
"site" which is one territory in the broader social field. But when these territories (factory, bank, individual, school, family, hospital, college), which together compose what we understand as the social field, begin to break down and an unstable and modulating code of control infinitely divides and reconfigures social spaces, the entire geography of the social field is uprooted. Capitalism consistently deterritorializes localized sites and re-territorializes them in such a fashion that the concept of "space" becomes outmoded; there is no longer any social space to be invested by power; rather, the socius is the overflowing product of vicissitudes of modulating functions of control. I will directly address this absence of space, particularly with respect to the space of the individual, in Line Five. Deleuze and Guattari envision the schizophrenic process as "universal producer". They also attribute to schizophrenia the same deterritorializing capacities that capitalism utilizes. It is therefore no surprise that they use the schizophrenic process as a model for active political engagement of the social field.
What will be my concern here is the space which the schizophrenic inhabits. It is the space of hallucination, of dream, of psychic production; but it is of course much more than this. That the space of the schizo supplants, overthrows, replaces the space of lived bodily perception indicates a certain decentering, an entire calculus of the production of the real. To be more specific: it is in fact the case that the real is always produced, always instituted, by media machines and capitalist fragmentation; it is not far off to admit that desire, the very heart of subjectivity, is mass-produced within the contemporary order and installed sporadically, actually invested, within and as society. Under this rubric, the schizophrenic process is an investment of produced desire which complies entirely with the capitalist model while simultaneously and on all fronts operating outside the limits of capital. “The schizophrenic is more capitalist than the capitalist”. Schizophrenia is capitalism without the body of capital, without a marker, and therefore it is the antithesis of capitalism. We are getting far ahead of ourselves; for now we must at least consent that the schizophrenic experience is in fact a production, for we are not willing to admit that hallucinations, phantasms, paranoias approach the schizophrenic from without; they are produced, artificially constructed, by the unconscious machine. A break has occurred, and necessarily so. For the break between sanity and insanity is the break between
perception and hallucination, the break between reality (whatever assignment such a word implies) and fantasy. It is the break, to speak the discourse of nostalgia, between language and silence, between truth and folly, between science and absurdity. Schizophrenic space is always regarded from the frontier of more static, operable, fixed spaces. It will be our business herein to disengage this constricting paradigm; to do so we will locate schiz-flows within all spaces, we will conceive of schizophrenia not as (dis) order, but as a typal energy, erratically material and very much a part of the constitution of the "real".

The precise regional or psychoanalytic position that schizophrenic space occupies is of no concern to us here; we are interested, along with Merleau-Ponty, in the significance of such a lived space. In the Phenomenology of Perception, we are brought to bear with the lived phenomenal body. Indeed, we uncover a philosophy of the flesh which subtends all empirical and intellectualist accounts of the subject. We are introduced to the subjectless subject, the subject which cannot be a dissociate of its world, the subject for whom natural, cultural, indeed all physical or psychical objects are grafted onto and into the core of his very being. This lived phenomenal body invests the world with temporality and is in a magnetic flux with all of its perceptions. The body's gaze communes with the world, is developed in a nexus of call-and-response activity which Merleau-Ponty understands as perception. Indeed, his is a metaphysics of perception;
we are lived fleshy bodies, interrogated by and interrogating the world. We inhabit habitual space in which our activities make sense to us; I know what it is to be in the store, my wife sent me here, I came from our home, I am caught up in the act of shopping, and though my ankle is sprained and my great uncle is on trial for fraud, right now the green pepper is the object of my quest, for the chef's salad at home on my table will not be complete without it.

Thus it runs that perception looks upon the world not as an assortment of distributed objects, but as an *assemblage* of meaning. All "objects" exist only in contextual realities, and these contexts underlie the very possibility of perception, i.e., of seeing, understanding, living. Perception is the medium by which the subject and its world are unified, and reflexively how they are constituted. We are reminded that reflection takes place only after perception; that the body already has its bearings, is already geared into the world through its activities before any objective distinction can be made between who sees and what is seen.

Now, of course, this lived phenomenal body which belongs to perception is not distinct from the withdrawn, autonomous consciousness of intellectualist reflection. Merleau-Ponty goes to great lengths to show us that the process of perception reveals not only a correlation between motor response and intellectual assessment; it reveals the
indivisibility of the two. As we said above, this lived phenomenal body cannot be extracted from its experience of the world; such a removal establishes degrees of separation between consciousness, body, and world. The body belongs, with no remainder. We are confronted only with an inexhaustible multiplicity of phenomena, layers of transcendental significance. Without belaboring the point, suffice it to say that perception is the crux of Merleau-Ponty's philosophical vantage point. It is indeed curious, then, that he should oppose perception to hallucination in his discussion of Space.

Space is a pre-perceptive awareness; it is, according to Merleau-Ponty, a precondition for perception. It establishes the realm within which significance is invested. We understand that there must be a "here" to constitute any type of space; Nietzsche recognized early on that a non-perspectival vantage point is a "view from nowhere"; God's view in fact. It is a useless perspective, an hypothetical abstract which serves no purpose other than to entertain the metaphysicians. This "here", which is always the root of the subject, is not only a physical location; it belongs to the order of the bodily historical, to the order of meaning, and to the order of the temporal ek-stacy which perception always already is. "Here" refers not to geographical/scientific position but to existential space, to the lived significance and the ongoing activities in which we are subsumed and contextualized. Thus we rethink proximity and distance in
relation to existential space; I am physically very near to my philosophy professor at the U of M, relating to me the significance of classical paradoxes, and very far from my dear mother in Pennsylvania who is suffering a bout with dysentery. Existentially, my mother is right with me, for nary can I entertain the notion of Meno's paradox when I am worried sick over mum. And it is the case that I don't need to have my attention drawn to this fact; I am already thinking on my sick mother, whether I am explicitly conscious of thinking about it or not. While physical distance and existential space both have an immediate bearing upon my horizon of being, I am always caught up within existential spaces and rarely have occasion to ponder objective measurements or geographical proximities.

I understand myself as a mobile, situated, embodied self who entertains a primordial grasp on reality. While the retrospection involved in positing an objective world within which I dwell and which conditions my experience is distasteful to all but the stout absolutist, there must be something tangible, something true, about reality which is given over to me in perception and which allows for a certain contiguity of experience. A shared pre-articulate world, one which is not judged by its correlation with propositional truth values and which is inexhaustibly, wonderfully ambiguous, is given to us in perception, beckons us and commands our gaze. It is this horizontal space, this largely abstract but fundamental communion with the natural world, which grounds perception.
and which illuminates all of our related existential spaces. Space is, according to Merleau-Ponty, “neither an object, nor an act of unification on the subject’s part; it can neither be observed, since it is pre-supposed in every observation, nor seen to emerge from a constituting operation, since it is of its essence that it be already constituted.”¹ Space is the “positing of a level”, and by this we mean a level of illumination; it grants a possibility for perceiving and understanding. Underlying all conscious perceptions is a “system of anonymous ‘functions’ which draw every particular focus into a general project”; this “system” is none other than the lived, phenomenal, temporal, spatial body. This body is aware of itself; it possesses an image of itself, thus it stands in harmonious relation to its world, for it understands its own operations and simultaneously relates them causally to the functioning of the natural and cultural world. Space is always already there, always already saturated with significance. The body is the gathering of lived spaces, the guardian of significance. This significance is a tacit understanding, transcendent in the sense that it impregnates our activities with meaning; it is a recollection of our past aimed at our future; significance synthesizes and unifies thetic experience. We might call this fluid condition “sanity”.

It is the case that if one is blindfolded and set adrift in a pool of water at 98.6 degrees Fahrenheit, the body image

disintegrates. Such complete sensory depravation induces, in the average subject, a sensation that his organs are leaking out into the water, that the barriers of the flesh are no longer holding. This condition leads to a loss of sanity; everyone requires a body image. The body image is our style, our succinct awareness of the way the body is already in its spaces. Our body image is a prerequisite to our sharing in the world competently. We experience the world as if our body image has already been there in advance. The loss of this facticity does not affect psychical breakdown; it alters the psychical schemata. That is, what I refer to as my conscious history (the history that I know as my own past experiences, recollected in the present), is subtended by a bodily pre-history, which amounts to the understanding the body enjoys with the natural world. When this understanding is frustrated, my conscious history, i.e., my lived reality, is upended.

Space is the pre-condition for perception. It safeguards difference and distance, for these are the constituents of meaning. We have said that the lived, phenomenal body is essentially spatial; it is corporeal within physical space, it catches up with itself within temporal space, it acts within praxis space, it smolders within its moods. These spaces are never radically other than each other; what is given to us in our experience of the physical world tends to comply with our temporal, cultural, and activity spaces; for even the experience of what we consider objective space
relations is always already pregnant with existential meaning. Not only this, but they all maintain significance for us; they form the content of our experience by co-existing; it is not contradictory to say that I find myself within several spaces at once: I am a student on the campus, with my good friend, talking about something we did last Saturday, walking to a shop to buy supper. All of these things represent certain temporal, physical, or praxis spaces, all are significant to me and my current experience of the "present", and none are isolated or withdrawn from each other or from me. At the same time, none of them impose such a tremendous tenor of significance upon me that I am unable to alter my course of action or think of something else; they all "keep their distance". Thus these spaces form a comfortable arena, and I am a tacit inhabitor of spatiality. Perception is the dynamic which momentarily crystallizes experience into its relations of significance.

We have elaborated an account of reality which is fluid, intersubjective, and inexhaustible. We can now turn to Merleau-Ponty's account of schizophrenic space and hope to understand what exactly is revealed in this, the most fundamental of all breakdowns.

We have briefly examined the lived phenomenal body, the necessity of a spatial body image, the co-existence and blending of all lived spaces. And through this, the phenomenological subject of perception has emerged, stepping out of the spiraling fogs of textbook objectivity and
revealing to us his own primordial link with his world. But as phenomenology is a science of breakdowns, or rather since breakdown is the birthplace of phenomenological inquiry, it is only proper to approach spaces which do not quite fit the tidy package heretofore elaborated. Merleau-Ponty, after discussing spatial depth, spatial movement, and spatial orientation, approaches the complicated realms of dream space, mythic space, and schizophrenic space.

Merleau-Ponty contends that different spaces call up different subjects capable of living in them. The subject and the environment adapt to each other in order to facilitate peaceable dwelling. Dream space is a significant space; it really "contains its meaning". It is of course obvious that so-called "objective space", in the dream state, "settle[s] in a different theatre"; but this space, while carrying its own significance along with it, poses no real difficulty to the understanding. In the same way that I am with my mother in Pennsylvania and not present in the classroom, I am not lying in my bed, fast asleep, dreaming; I am immersed in a dream space, a space which maintains the same transcendental understanding and lived significance as any other. We encounter "a space peopled with phantasms, just as, in waking life, our dealings with the world which is offered to us condition a space peopled with realities." Both spaces precede, condition, and give meaning to

\[2\] Ibid., p. 250.
\[3\] Ibid., p. 284.
\[4\] Ibid., p. 285.
perception; their objective reality status is no concern of ours. All dream spaces resemble real spaces, and have a horizontal quality for experience just as real spaces; we are immersed within them, and they are endowed with significance for us. Dream space is existential space. Similarly, the space of myth poses no real detours; primitive peoples simply "do not overstep this existential space". They dwell in a world where objective calculations do not impose upon an existential understanding; whether we reside in the favor of the rain god or receive the precipitation from over-burdened cloud cover makes no difference; nor whether we go the way of the wind or turn right on Fairmont Avenue. The spaces are different, but each belongs to a mode of dwelling within which inter-subjective significance abounds.

But let us discuss psychotics. For it is in fact schizophrenic space which gives us pause. Schizophrenic space and the space of hallucination, according to Merleau-Ponty, are of a slightly different order. In "normal" or "average" experience,

[b]esides the physical and geometrical distance which stands between myself and all things, a 'lived' distance binds me to things which count and exist for me, and links them to each other. This distance measures the 'scope' of my life at every moment. Sometimes between myself and the events there is a certain amount of play...which insures that my freedom is preserved while the events do not cease to concern me.⁵

This is to say that the elements of my spaces do not bear upon me in such a way that I am surrounded, trapped, or

⁵ Ibid., p. 186.
imprisoned by them. We retain a certain amount of “breathing room” between ourselves and our involvements which ensures a compatible relationship. To take a few examples, when I find myself examining a photographer’s portfolio, I have an implicit understanding that I am looking at photographs; I understand that a photograph is a representation of a past event, that the portfolio is a composite of the work of a certain photographer, who maintains a certain relationship with myself. I recognize people or places in the photos and can read the contexts well enough to imagine what was not captured in the picture, what never came under the scrutiny of the lens. All this while turning pages, drinking coffee, and complimenting the photographer upon a job well done. I am involved in all of these activities, but they do not impose upon me in such a way that one of them overpowers the others; I am easily able to accommodate all such phenomena. Such is not the case with the schizophrenic.

Everyone has had the experience of being preoccupied. There are certain events or tasks or conditions which at certain times seem so overpowering and immense that one can think of little else. When these concerns start to get the best of us, we are labeled neurotic. When these concerns are not real but imagined, that is, when they are not simply overblown perceptions but imagined violations and hallucinations, or when significance is not singularly overbearing but infinitely and incoherently multiple, we are labeled psychotic. Here we enter the realm of schizophrenia.
Merleau-Ponty describes the space of schizophrenia as an imposition, the elimination of the comfortable distance between myself and my objects and activities. It is the "shrinkage of lived space" which crashes in upon the individual, an unbearable imposition of significance upon the subject. He calls this existential space of the schizophrenic "landscape space", referring to a certain case study in which the schizophrenic, out for a walk, is confronted by a landscape, interrogated unrelentingly by each object of perception. An ominous sky replaces the evening sky, perhaps bleeding trees and blissful rocks frolic about on the vibrating landscape. This space in which there is no comfortable separation between subject and involvements, which is the schizophrenic's "way of perceiving the world", invades physical space to such a degree that the real landscape is subverted and removed; the schizo is dissociated from the "objective world as the latter is presented to perception", and immersed in this private space. Here the schizophrenic dwells; we cannot wake him up, as we could the dreamer, in order to give him new perspective, a new space from which to reconsider the old. The schizophrenic is not drawn towards the world of objects; his gaze is not commanded by elements which have significance for him; the "impulse of existence towards things has lost its energy, because it appears to itself in all its contingency and because the world can no longer be taken for granted."6 The landscape before which he stands is incidental; schizophrenic space

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6 Ibid., p. 287.
overtakes and negates comfortable lived space.

The schizophrenic is trapped in an "illusory world" from which he cannot escape. His "play-room" has collapsed in upon itself, and he cannot enjoy a "virtual space", a comfortable space in relation to his body image. All of space becomes pregnant with meaning, all spaces are essentially filled. His own private, existential space intrudes upon him, and he can no longer inhabit the shared world. In a condition of sanity, one's existential spaces open out onto the shared world of experience, are in communion with it, and enjoy a relative harmony with "clear space". For Merleau-Ponty, the structure of space determines the limits of sanity and insanity; things retain their distance in reality. When we feel threatened, we can reconcile our unease with the shared world, which all of our spaces open onto. The schizophrenic does not have this luxury; he is not ekstatic out onto the world, he is imposed upon by the very structures of nature.

While Merleau-Ponty takes up the antipode of objective analysis, he admits of a certain "clear space" to which schizophrenic space occupies a relation. This is not the objective world which forms a foundation for the subject; this is the incarnate experience of spatiality which everyone necessarily experiences. This is the pre-reflective spatial and temporal ekstatic condition; Merleau-Ponty wants to gain this as a quasi-universal, applicable to all lived bodies.
He verifies this by examining case studies; schizophrenics are aware that what haunts them is not real, and can easily distinguish between an actual object and a hallucination. The fact that this is of no consequence to them is an important point, one which will be discussed below. For now, suffice it sum up: Hallucinatory conditions, like dreams and myths, take their bearing from real spaces, just as all spaces do. The notion of nearness to a sick family member miles away is not of a totally different order than the distance which separates two stone walls of a canyon, or the proximal vicinity which relates the subject-while-flyfishing to the same subject-while-jogging. Space is universal experience for Merleau-Ponty, and all experiences of space are fundamentally related to our existential, non-thetic, pre-objective and pre-articulate spatiality; we are spatial. Thus we are assured that while there is no proscription which will return to schizo his "comfortable space", at least the schizophrenic, as an incarnate lived body, resides in the spatial order.

Neither will Merleau-Ponty concede that hallucinations are indistinguishable from reality; those who hallucinate know that they are hallucinating. While the hallucination may possess tremendous weight for the afflicted individual, it remains of the order of a sensory or psychical disturbance and can always be distinguished from real, lived experience. The experiences of the schizophrenic are recognized as unreal.

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7 Ibid., pps. 334-345.
even by him; "there is no definite path leading from it to all the remaining experiences of the deluded subject, or the experiences of the sane."\(^8\) The hallucination is not a member of the "geographical world", where we find the stuff of knowledge or establish laws. It is, and remains, an "individual landscape", in which the victim is confronted and violated by the world; the communion is forced, unwarranted, and intrusive.

If it sounds strange that Merleau-Ponty must find recourse to the "geographical" world in order to understand the "individual landscape"\(^9\) of the schizophrenic, or that the space of dream, activity, hallucination or culture must necessarily be rooted, so to speak, in a pre-thetic, ambiguous, intersubjective clear space, it should. Although Merleau-Ponty does his best to avoid any type of totalizations, hierarchies, or other definitive statements about physical or metaphysical objectivity, he cannot grant that the space of the schizophrenic is as viable and all-encompassing a lived space as any other, nor can he simply chalk it up to relative differences; schizophrenic space must be of a certain order; it must be related, in a crucial and derivative way, to all discussions of space, or else the nasty business of relativism will taint the pages of the *Phenomenology*, re-writing arguments and frightening off the tepid reader of philosophy; logical inconsistency cannot be

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\(^8\) Ibid., p. 339.
\(^9\) Ibid., p. 341.
permitted, even when one is attempting to articulate the pre-logical. If one cannot find some shared spatiality, to which all are accommodated, then the analyticicians are given recourse to fall back upon the age old objection of relativism. Be that as it may, Merleau-Ponty evades wholly all objective positing, at least in-so-far as it is possible. This speaks in his favor; he paves the way for many modern studies of "abnormal" conditions by avoiding the objectifications so callously attributed to the afflicted (insane, pathological, the patient) and takes up with evaluations of relationships; not the doctor examining the schizo in the hospital, but a nexus of involvements from which many possible outcomes emerge.

Briefly, a recap:
1. The existential condition is a harmonious communion with the world; the subject is a composite of all of its spatial horizons, never an autonomous entity.
2. Perception is not the medium which relates subject to object, but rather the mystical link which insures all mutual interest and intersubjectivity. Phenomenologically speaking, the subject lives his world; he does not examine or analyze it.
3. Underlying perception is an implicit and necessary awareness of one's body image and the way it opens onto the perceptual horizon; we call this space and realize that it allows for all significant experience. Space is not a
measurable distance; it is the transcendental awareness of distance, motion, perspective, social complexes, etc.

4. We dwell spatially; in so doing, we find that our spaces are interconnected and inseparable; they are the latent forms of significance by way of which perception is open to the world. And although spaces form an interconnectedness and enable meaning, they retain their distance from us so that we are free to move among spaces, to shift spatialities, and to fluidly relate spaces within a "comfortable distance".

5. The schizophrenic process, according to Merleau-Ponty, is the collapse of this comfortable distance by intrusive space; schizophrenia is the annihilation of a "clear" or shared spatiality by an oppressive, internal, and subjective reconstruction of reality. The schizophrenic is therefore spatially understood, but this deficiency in the area of spatial structure inhibits the process of the habitual body towards its world. The world of common property is usurped by an imposing, private, hallucinatory world.

There is more, I believe, to the schizophrenic dynamic than has been hitherto elaborated in this discussion. It is the case, therefore, that we should examine this issue more closely, in order to understand what is meant when we refer to "schizophrenic space". Let us take up with this issue, and hopefully we will not lose sight of the scope and tenor of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology while doing so.

Schizophrenia is the tragic condition par excellence; the
afflicted is antisocial, incoherent, at times irrationally violent or eerily catatonic, paranoid, confused. We do not desire this condition, and most look upon it as an ailment, an illness which needs be cured or at least contained. Although it has no clear boundaries and can go by many other names, few would regard schizophrenia as anything but a disorder; as we have seen above, Merleau-Ponty does just this. The schizophrenic's experience of space is mutated and ominous; he cannot come to terms with his spatiality, cannot dwell in the shared spatial world where others have their activities; his space is that of the introverted illusion, not of the real. But I think the question should be posed in a different light, in another space: Rather than seek out the probable causes for dysfunctional behavior, we should understand better why this behavior is dysfunctional at all.

Schizophrenia is a modern affliction; while madmen have populated every ville and castle, every country and fairie tale in history, there is little resemblance between the madmen of the past and the contemporary schizophrenic. In fact, as has been effectively argued by Foucault (see Madness and Civilization), madness, like most of our other socially constituted labels and objectifications, shows up in different spaces, for different reasons, under different guises in every discourse, in every age. As elaborated in Line Three, Foucault further argues that madness, criminality, foolishness, and all other forms of illness or affliction are merely empty signifiers; they are invested
with meanings historically and as it suits the matrix of power structures. Whether we agree with this last point is unimportant, it is enough to say that in an age of psychoanalysis, rapidly advancing technology, complex scientific procedures, and accelerated capitalist deterritorialization, madness, like all other socially established frontiers, cannot possibly retain a constant meaning, one that would suit all the cases in history. To some extent, Merleau-Ponty recognizes this; he only discusses very recent experiments on schizophrenics, for schizophrenia belongs to the realm of modern psychology, is given voice only as an object of interest and inquiry. Only once consciousness has emerged as an object for scientific inquiry can anything remotely resembling contemporary schizophrenia come into being.

Now, before moving on, an important distinction must be made. The schizophrenic condition, as witnessed by the psychoanalyst (and everyone else, for we have all internalized the shrink's gaze), is of a different order than the schizophrenic process. The captured schizophrenic is not a representative of the schizophrenic process; by nailing Oedipus to the psychotic, we create an artificial schizophrenia. Merleau-Ponty examines only the condition, not the process. What this amounts to is the difference between a free man and a man in chains, for the incarcerated schizophrenic that we find behind the walls of the institution is a harnessed, constructed entity. The thrust
of psychology is the fervent and frantic Oedipalization of
all men; the subject emerges from a context in which the
father and the mother form the other points of a composite
triangle. The unconscious is formed through the process of
"coming into the social" that the child undergoes when he/she
realizes that he or she is other than mommy/daddy. The child
sees the penis and realizes that she lacks it, or he is
afraid that his will be severed. He wants to fuck mom and
kill dad, or she want to fuck dad and murder mom, but
gradually each accepts the repression of these natural but
antisocial desires. The subject is born. And it is the
case, as pointed out by Lacan and his contemporaries, that
the child does not have to see the actual penis but only
needs to "come into language" in order to be Oedipalized; for
language is the use of symbolism, and the central symbol is
the penis; it is the stout metaphor for all signification and
all order. The real is the symbolic, or rather, there is no
intimation of the real which is not symbolic.

Thus language, while separating the child from its nascent
state of union with mom, grants to the subject's world the
enigma of symbolism, which is the birthplace of desire. The
Other comes radically into view as other, as the necessary
distance which is the basis for communication; communication
is lack. This desiring-subject is of course the foundation
for psychology, so it should not surprise us that when
confronted by schizophrenia, the psychoanalyst would
immediately look for a disruptive phase in the maturation of
the psychological subject (for Lacan, the psychotic never comes to grips with phallic symbolism, what he calls "foreclosure", what amounts to the phallic never becoming symbolic, never finding its place in the symbolism of the real; the phallic then resides in hallucination or other infringements upon the real). Where did the Oedipal process break down? What can we now do to re-invest subjectivity into this thwarted schema? Of all the ambiguities surrounding schizophrenia, we can be sure of one constant; the schizophrenic condition is the absence of the ego. Thus the schizo is forced to comply to an order which is foreign to him, the already established, pre-given and necessary subject. This is the condition of schizophrenia that we read about in psychology texts; this is not the schizophrenic process.

But of course, it will be objected, schizophrenia in not born in the institution; schizophrenics are brought to psychoanalysts because they are schizophrenic, because they cannot function in their jobs, or in their family life. To this we should reply: The schizophrenic is easily recognizable precisely because he does not fit the mold. Psychoanalysis is not the abstract art of head-shrinking; it is a lived condition, it is the contemporary subject. We are all born of psychology to the extent that we are immersed in our own subjectivity; the contemporary subject is the Oedipalized subject, the consciousness aware of its own activity and capable of questioning its own motives; we are
able to pinpoint and isolate neurotic or psychotic behavior immediately; we readily accept our own individuality, models for our development, and proper social conduct. We are each one of us shrinks. And this is not the least bit surprising; society itself is neurotic, capitalism itself schizophrenic. The police state of the mind, awakened at the level of individual consciousness; we are ourselves trained psychological policemen.

It is for these reasons that we can make the distinction between the schizophrenic, who comes into being as the target of Oedipalization, and the schizophrenic process, which would represent a loss of all location and space, of all judgment and subjectivity. These are two very different orders; one is brought into being by nature of a forced impotence; the other represents foreign and dissociated thinking, a thinking which remains outside, a hyper-productivity. It should be asked what this thinking can do.

Capitalism is the art of production, the establishment of rules of exchange; not only exchange values of goods and products, but the exchange values of desires and territories, of sexual oddities and virtual spaces. And it is our capitalism, what some have termed "Late Capitalism", which we must relate to the schizophrenic condition.

Postmodernity witnesses the reckless decentering of all structures. Our cultural objects are simulacra; our desires
are written for us by advertisements, magazines, internets, televisions. While the products of capitalism used to be tangible goods, we now witness the reproduction of all things illusory, everything from company stocks to video tapes (the former represents imaginary money, the latter is the production and sale of an image). All areas of society are fragmented and dissociated; even the subject is fragmentary (we are not aware of our own desires until they are "revealed" to us by the media, psychology, culture, etc.; we become different selves in various situations; we cannot reconcile our conscious needs with our unconscious desires and with the social order). Advertisements make random associations which do not equate (drink Mountain Dew and experience treacherous free-falls off of mountain cliffs).

Many postmodern authors (Jameson, Baudrillard, etc.) have equated Late Capitalism with a psychotic or schizophrenic state. I do not think this comparison is unwarranted, for nowhere is there a tangible or transcendental subject, nowhere do we find grounded reality, and nowhere is anything autonomous; all discourses flow together in a disjointed association of arbitrary assessments.

This "society of the spectacle" (to borrow from DuBord) might be seen as the realm where illusory subjectivity is produced; the irony being that the process of production, which Marx understood to be synonymous with human nature, is now producing human nature, producing the subject who desires, producing desire itself, and establishing the hyper-arena in
which these events are played out. This all looks, hauntingly enough, like most descriptions of schizophrenic thought processes. For the real is synonymous with the symbol and the illusion, which are the hyperbolical composites of the desiring-subject. Our society is constantly re-writing subjects through the production of desires. The real is imagery, illusion, hallucination. And it does not maintain a comfortable distance; our own production always and everywhere reproduces us; it fragments subjectivities; there can be no "clear" space to which all of our fragmented capitalist spaces refer or relate. Capitalism produces the real, produces the desiring subject, and produces itself and all of its territories. Its immanence is legendary. Capitalism does not care for the real any more than the schizo; the schizo knows that his productions are not real, but their significance is all-encompassing; the modern subject, who is the waste product of capitalist production, may know that his desires are not his own, that his objects and spaces are always and everywhere fabricated; this has no bearing on his life, however, for the experience of the simulation is the ground floor of meaning; produced simulacra are significant reality.

The post-modern individual is the excess of so many decentered discourses; we can rest assured that the subject is missing. Capitalism and schizophrenia are inherently linked, but how so? Is one the origin of the other? This is not likely. It is as much a mistake to assume that
capitalism causes schizophrenia as to assume that schizophrenia is an Oedipal failure; schizophrenia surfaces as a contemporary affliction because it is so compatible with the capitalist mode of production. Just as material production was once the essence of capitalism, so the subject was once the essence of social life. It has become the case that capitalism frees production from material exchange, from concrete values. Now production assumes control of the organization of the socius, the complete construction and organization of the real. And the schizophrenic process removes the bodily/conscious/subjective restrictions which once structured the social self. Modern capitalism is a deterritorialization geared towards pure production in the form of reterritorialization, nothing else. Remember the examples offered in the Introduction: Academia, the teacher/student relationship, information technologies, individuals, wildlife refuges, etc. are all uprooted and reconfigured constantly with the onset of new connections of control like the virtual diploma or the "high-definition" television. And schizophrenia deterritorializes as well; there are no boundaries and no symbols; nothing means anything else (the cigar is never a penis); there is free play and multiplicity, infinite layers of chaotic significance. But schizophrenia is not exactly akin to capitalism; capitalism is self-serving and remains regional. This is to say, capitalism is concerned with a recording and re-ordering process which operates according to the logic of expansion and gain:
"Yet it would be a serious error to consider the capitalist flows and the schizophrenic flows as identical, under the general theme of a decoding of the flows of desire. Their affinity is great...We have seen that the relationship of schizophrenia to capitalism...should be examined at the deepest level of one and the same economy, one and the same production process."\textsuperscript{10}

The economical process is the same; the motivating orders are not. Here we see the nature of the difference between the capitalist and schizophrenic processes.

"The language of a banker, a general, an industrialist, a middle or high level manager, or a government minister is a perfectly schizophrenic language, but that functions only statistically within the flattening axiomatic of connections that puts it in the service of the capitalist order."\textsuperscript{11}

Capitalism employs the language and the structure of schizophrenia (it authorizes what Deleuze and Guattari call schiz-flows) in order to invest the whole of the social field with "limitless" pure production. Yet it is only a regional deterritorialization, for it re-establishes its own limits with respect to investment; it establishes entirely new boundaries with one hand where it deterritorializes with the other. Schizophrenia represents chaos with no remainder; not the limitless extension of boundaries, but the annihilation of boundaries. Schizophrenic thinking is full-scale theoretical anarchy.

Through the retardation process of the contemporary intelligentsia (psychoanalytic micro-state), schizophrenia is boxed, labeled and shipped. All of its productions become

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Anti-Oedipus}, p. 245.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 246.
reactive, never active. Its activities are constructed as expressions of anxiety and illusion. All of its behaviors stem from repression and are not expressive of excess; and, fundamentally, the core of desire, the Oedipal subject, is always a lack. Desire always lacks its object. The schizophrenic always lacks reality. Capitalism is schizophrenic, but only to the extent that schizophrenic flows (language, thought processes, technologies) multiply, divide and accelerate a certain metaphysical capital, the God of exchange and value. Schizophrenia threatens this regime, for it pushes capitalism too far. Capitalism puts schizo-processes in the service of capital; no, the worker no longer produces his own alienation (he no longer has that luxury); now there is only pure production, a constant re-writing of the socius. There is no possibility of alienation; there is no comfortable space. The schizophrenic process everywhere exceeds the capitalist order, thus it threatens social order from within and without. Schizophrenia is the limit of revolution; it is revolution not "for the sake of" (equal rights, governmental representation, etc.) but revolution qua revolution, chaos for the sake of chaos. This revolutionary aspect of schizophrenia has also been harnessed by capitalism; skinheads selling skateboards, gansta rap promoting Osh-Kosh jeans, hippies for Christ, whatever.

Merleau-Ponty approaches the issue of schizophrenia with the intention of granting it a certain space. This he does. But this space is simply a re-working of his theory of lived
phenomenal space; schizophrenic space has an imposing tendency; it suffocates the schizo with meaning but remains spatial. It simply supplants a more comfortable, clear space. It seems to be the case, however, that the problem is not so simple. For schizophrenic space is not the stuff of ill-formed Oedipal processes; it is not an isolated, individual, impositional micro-space. Neither is it the dilemma of the afflicted schizophrenic, who is in fact merely the deposit of so much schizophrenic energy. It is not the case that the schizophrenic simply cannot open onto a shared world, a world in which things "keep their distance". For this world is vacuous, is indeed, at the very core, hallucination itself. The clear world, the spatial realm which grants activities their significance, is the doctored illusion which is ritualistically invested with schizophrenic movements under the rubric of distribution of capital. The "shared world" is the world of Oedipus, where grafted subjectivities are force-fed marketable desires. We are all "aware" of our body image because control is only possible when limits are established; the subject is constructed as desiring-subject because subjectivity is the capacity to absorb desire, make it mean something else, and re-invest it with interest back into the body of capitalism.

Schizophrenia is not a regional space where intrusive illusions overstep the bounds of shared, pre-thetic experience. The schizophrenic patient is simply the subjectivization of the capitalist schema; instead of
passively receiving his illusions, he actively originates them; he is more efficient than the sane subject, but he is also infinitely more threatening. Capitalism, as the limit of every society, is reality. We witness nothing that is untouched and unchanged by its operations. Schiz-processes are the *modus operandi* of capitalism, the connective electrico-social generators of reality. The real is synonymous with the illusory, perception with hallucination. The lived phenomenal body is the constant restructuring of desires, and nothing more. Significance is not born of a pre-thetic synthesis, an orienting awareness of body/world. Significance is the product of illusion, the simulacra of the ideal subject, and variations thereof are the experimental adopted samples, the desiring-subjects.

But the myth of the real still dominates, for it is the perfect alibi for pure productive processes. "We are producing what you want! Technology affords us the luxury of being able to expand our world, broaden our horizons, give us larger scope and more fundamental access to all areas of reality!" We can fly across the Atlantic and marvel at the mystery of Stonehenge in just under three hours on the Concord. Unfortunately, we bring our history with us; we are witness only to what we want to witness; rather, to what we are informed that we want to witness. I can read in explicit detail the news coverage of Bosnia and be up to date on the death tolls, but no one is dying. We believe in the "real" just as, for so long, we believed in objective reality, and
before that God. Without substantial reference, we are absent, and no one but the schizophrenic can accept this fact. So we comfort ourselves with stories of people and places, of presidents and leaders, of conflict and slaughter and welfare and academics. We all know we share the same world, deep down, for how else could it be?

Merleau-Ponty’s description of schizophrenic space sounds a lot like contemporary capitalist space; a “landscape space” of illusion, pregnant with meaning and bearing its own significance within itself bears upon the “real” to such an extent that the “real” is insignificant, unrecognizable, usurped and discarded. The difference is that the schizophrenic knows his hallucinations are not real and also knows that this makes no difference. Meaning is bound up in existential illusion, not in any type of shared, intersubjective framework. Gunnar, an incarcerated schizophrenic, relays his struggle with reality:

“I attempt to structure the world all the time, simplify, generalize, find universal symbols, everything to keep a chaotic reign of terror at bay; but instead the chaotic pressure and tangled undergrowth of new interpretive possibilities increases. Fragmentation finally becomes so complete that any meaningful contact with the world outside becomes impossible.”

This quote accentuates a dilemma. The schizophrenic is bound and gagged by the totalitarianism of the real; the space of hallucination, of infinitely multiple meanings, of layers of arbitrary significance is relegated in society to occupy the

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realm of literature and film, of the joke world and the world of the mystical and magical; but one must draw the line between "reality" and these fictional or theoretical spaces. Gunnar is constructed to believe that the world is structured, that there are universal symbols, and since he recognizes none, his hyper-ekstatic condition of free-play and association becomes his own personal hell. He has been convinced that fragmentation is not 'real', is not of the social order. Thus he struggles to attach himself to the static world to which everyone else belongs. He is not compatible with the myth, and is therefore the object of investigation, a curious oddity, a modern Galileo.

Henri Michaux describes a schizophrenic table:

"[I]t was neither simple nor really complex, initially or intentionally complex, or constructed according to a complicated plan. Instead, it had been desimplified in the course of its carpentering... As it stood, it was a table of additions, much like certain schizophrenics' drawings, described as "overstuffed", and if finished it was only so in so far as there was no way of adding anything more to it, the table having become more and more an accumulation, less and less a table... It was not intended for any specific purpose, for anything one expects of a table. Heavy, cumbersome, it was virtually immovable. One didn't know how to handle it [mentally or physically]. Its top surface, the useful part of the table, having been gradually reduced, was disappearing, with so little relation to the clumsy framework that the thing did not strike one as a table, but as some freak piece of furniture, an unfamiliar instrument... for which there was no purpose. A dehumanized table, nothing cozy about it... A table which lent itself to no function, self-protective, denying itself to service and communication alike. There was something stunned about it, something petrified. Perhaps it suggested a stalled engine." 13

This fantastic table, viewed as an abomination of carpentry, is revelatory in certain definitive ways. It reveals

13 *Anti-Oedipus*, pps. 6-7.
something first about the production process of schizophrenia. There is no "space" in which such a table could function as table. It is nonsensical to the extent that it does not relate to a schema or framework where "table" has a certain significance or shared structure. Its "tableness" is removed; the significance attributable to the "tables" of experience gone with it. But this is not to say that it is lacking significance; for this table carries its own meaning within itself; it is its own meaning. There is no separation here between production and what is produced.\textsuperscript{14}

While we think of tables as produced for a reason and having a certain significant function, this table is its own reason and its own significant function. It is a capitalist table; its surface has no relation to its framework, its function has no relation to general tableness; it is pure production. And it does not represent the chaotic state of the artist, nor his inability to understand the meaning of objects; it is not the unconscious expression of a repressed desire, and it is not a useless dead end; it is product and producer and production, indistinguishable. It is consumption as production. The schizophrenic table works; just like a bubble gum dispenser that looks like a Maytag; the difference is that "schizos are not saleable"\textsuperscript{15}.

In conclusion, there is no such thing as schizophrenic space. To make the connection between schizo-flows and the

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 245.
fragmented contemporary social being, one has to look no further than the modern social order. Merleau-Ponty's analysis of schizophrenic space is insightful and lucid, but it reveals much more than the latency of the schizophrenic. Illusions are very much the *status quo*; it is not the case that the schizophrenic harbors any subjective or isolated "landscape space". The functional reality in which we dwell is a matrix of production/consumption simulations. If one wants to establish barriers between the sane and the schizophrenic, it might be possible to regard sanity as the condition which is wholly constituted from without. For the norm is the passive trade-off of a barrage of imagery for reality; schizophrenia is the active internalization of the contemporary process of production. The schizo cannot accept simulated reality as "shared space", for he knows the production process too well. He understands multiplicity and fragmentation, and becomes confused when language makes reference to the "geographical world"; for the schizophrenic, significance is not impositional, nor does it overtake the "real", it is simply divisible and tangential.

Sanity is the nascent state of insanity; it is the realm where desire is invested as subjectivity and then re-invested into the illusory realm of the socius as *lack*, the hollow subject who always wants more. The schizophrenic is the producer, production, and product of desire; he has no need for capitalism, for he has no territory and no objects, no location, biography, or geography; he will not be convinced
that he ever lacks.
CONCLUSION: THE ANTI-OEDIPAL MACHINE

Anti-Oedipus is a great book of fictions. It lies to its reader innocently enough; it captures its audience like a master storyteller. It "gets up to things behind your back." Anti-Oedipus makes use of "bodies without organs", desiring-machines, schiz-flows, intensities, deterritorializations and reterritorializations, Oedipalization, production, recording and immanence. It sees the paranoiac father everywhere, confuses words and things, and tries to inscribe, a la Kafka's In the Penal Colony, its codes on lived, fleshy bodies. It proposes a materialist psychiatry and offers the schizophrenic process as the universal producer / producing / product.

Many thinkers are content to dismiss the project of Anti-Oedipus outright in a simple paragraph. Others consider it a little gem of postmodernism, but quickly add that Guattari was the worst thing to happen to a lucid, sobering, and clear-headed thinker like Deleuze. The book is, in many

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1 "As for the psychic subject and its theories, this is the area colonized by the Deleuze-Guattari notion of the ideal schizophrenic - that psychic subject who 'perceives' by way of difference and differentiation alone, if that is conceivable; of course, the conceiving of it is the construction of an ideal which is, so to speak, the ethical - not to say the political - task proposed by their Anti-Oedipus." This is Fredric Jameson's sole treatment of the Anti-Oedipal project in a 438 page discourse on the nature of Post-Modernity (Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Durham: Duke University Press 1991 p. 345). Many have mimicked Jameson in their analyses of this book. Usually, the objections are either of an aesthetic nature (the book is simply intellectual masturbation or a strangely incoherent form of expressionism) or a retreat to the charge of idealism (the bane of all post-modernists) as demonstrated by Jameson. We shall see below that in no way is the schizophrenic process as articulated by Deleuze and Guattari a new ideal, a purely differential unity or some other such farce. As for the account of Anti-Oedipus which looks upon it as intellectual masturbation, we can only respond that at least something is produced, something is impregnated with meaning by this text, and so we recognized that someone's getting fucked.
places, needlessly complex. It uses and abuses far too much theory and far too many texts. What I propose to do here is to simply offer an interpretation of *Anti-Oedipus* that will clarify some of its central themes. In keeping with the general theme of this essay, I will attend specifically to the facets of the book which pertain immediately to political thinking.

Deleuze and Guattari begin with a “theory of connections”. They are informed by a very queer notion of production: production is a process which produces itself. Philip Goodchild distinguishes between autoproduction and antiproduction, and I think this is a good manner in which to understand the process of production being advanced in *Anti-Oedipus*.3

Everything is subject to and informed by some mode of relation (the daughter is related in a familial way to the grandmother, and mom is positioned in between; a car is

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3 “Autoproduction” is the process of pure production exhibited in schizophrenia. “Anti-production” is the moment that this production “breaks down”; production ceases its infernal dynamic and becomes static. The authors of *Anti-Oedipus* catch glimpses of autoproduction in the artwork of inmates at an asylum. A schizophrenic builds a “table” which he continually nails more wood onto. All the spaces become filled, become spaceless. “As it stood, it was a table of additions, much like schizophrenics’ drawings, described as overstuffed, and if finished it was only so far as there was no way of adding anything more to it...It was not intended for any specific purpose...” (*Anti-Oedipus*, p. 6.) It is not finished, or rather is finished only because no more connections could be made, and when the schizophrenic leaves this project he takes up with something else entirely. This process of pure production which is at once product, production, and producer is autoproduction, the self-perpetuating production process. Desire here produces itself. Something tangible like a factory, or ideal like Oedipus, is born of this process, but it becomes “fixed” and forces desire (that which produced it) back upon itself. This is “anti-production”, the “stalled engine”, the sedimented social structure which immediately checks desire, channeling and rerouting the productive tendencies of desire into a sole purpose or set of purposes.
related to the driver, gasoline, and the road; shit is related to the anus, the digestive system, its odor, the food it once was, etc.). But relation is understood by way of connections, and these connections are micro-divisible. For example, I am related to my stereo and the sound it generates, just as the component parts of the stereo (wiring, tubes, speakers, flows of electricity) are related to me and to each other. Ordinarily, we establish "levels" of relation which facilitate understanding (the table and the computer and the couch are distinct objects which co-exist in the living room; the living room, dining room, and bathroom are rooms which co-exist in the house; the house has very little to do with the atoms that compose the particles of fabric which form the black stitch that traverses the body of the couch, etc.). My organs are connected in a fundamental way which authorizes the delimitation of my physical body and allows me to fall under the category heading "human being".

These levels of relation and connection are symptoms, for the authors of Anti-Oedipus, of a secondary understanding of reality, of a sedimentary and rigid "Oedipalized" social order. The first thing that they do is to eliminate these levels at which connections and relations "make sense". Thus instead of an understanding of the body in which eating causes growth, the organs function together to animate corporeal being, the hand picks the nose, etc., they adopt a model of the whole sphere of social life which is immanent and within which any thing at any "level" can "plug-in"
(connect) to any other thing at any other level.

For example, my belly-button extends over a whole city street and animates the sound waves which re-route the revolution of Pluto around the Sun. In establishing this connection, I have taken note of a "desiring-machine", which is always already there yet is produced, on the spot, by itself and its connections. The capitalist says "What good is this machine; it can't be operated, contained, produced, sold, or even literally conceived of?". The psychoanalyst says "The belly button represents the severed connection with your mother at the hollow site of the umbilical cord; the revolution of Pluto is a huge, universal circle which represents the small circle which is your belly button which represents the severed connection with your mother." The schizophrenic just giggles, or weeps, or ignores the desiring-machine altogether. She is not obligated to "take notice".

For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is immanent within the social and constantly produces itself and its machines. The above example sounds silly, and of course it is. But all that Anti-Oedipus is doing here is exposing a very pragmatic attention that we pay to our world. The belly button-Pluto machine exists in a very real way, but it doesn't work; the listening-machine which is comprised of my ears, a compact disc, a stereo, and speakers exists in a very real way as well, and according to a contemporary code of social existence it works very well. Deleuze and Guattari want only
to draw our attention to the fact that somewhere, somehow it becomes possible to establish which desiring-machines (sets of connections) work and which do not. However this comes about (most are convinced that it has to do with scientific advancements, the laws of physics, practical governing codes which inform the way we dwell together socially), it is apparent that the process of establishing these levels of organization immediately striates and configures the sphere of desiring-production. An economy of desire is instituted which pre-configures social space and limits the ways human beings dwell. In Line Three it was elaborated how just such an economy actually writes the codes for what will be known as the individual. Of course, limitations are necessary, for we are pretty sure that thinking cannot think its way into infinite couplings, connections, and programatics. Authors like Deleuze and Guattari are aware that thinking cannot be truly unbounded; but they are also aware that it must open up upon itself if it wants to operate in the pacings and trappings set up by control. The contemporary order is the only one which will concern them, specifically the ordering process which is the integrated capitalistic social sector. What troubles Deleuze and Guattari is not the fact that limits exist but rather that the limits imposed by control society rewrite the desiring process: deterritorialization turns desire back upon itself and causes desire to desire its own repression, the continuance and acceleration of repression.
This establishing of levels which only permit certain connections, certain “assemblages” (body, mountain, telephone wire) to make sense is precisely the organic ordering which Deleuze and Guattari refer to. The infinite connections that are possible in the process of desiring-production compose the anorganic, the schizophrenic, universally productive motor. In a disciplinary society, institutions such as the individual, the family, and territorialized sites of confinement such as the school, the factory, and the asylum are permissible machines which have become “fixed” or sedimented and establish the lines of correct and incorrect activity. But desire is always productive, so it must run that desiring production has actually produced the mechanisms which repress the multitude of desiring-machines.

Before addressing this state of perpetual production, it should be noted that some fairly obvious contradictions have arisen. It seems first of all that the plurality of connections which are possible is a sort of undifferentiated, infinite, metaphysical well from which ordering processes draw whatever machines suit their purposes. Are Deleuze and Guattari drawing us a metaphysical map of the way in which the social comes about, or describing a hierarchy in which the schizophrenic core of desire (the undifferentiated, connective, anorganic body) comes to be tamed and “made social”? If so, what distinguishes them from Freud, who understood that the social relations of human life require that the excessive state of desire (the id) be contained and
harnessed by socio-psychological legislation? Not only that, but if they assert that the entire field of desire which is schizophrenic (any connection can be made at any time) is the first level, and that the organized socius represents a secondary ordering process, are they not establishing levels themselves?

These charges need to be addressed. In order to do so, we must look to the conception of the socius that Deleuze and Guattari are forwarding.

"All laws, rights, values and orders can be created and destroyed by society; none can stand outside as an origin or a goal. There can be no absolute distinctions or boundaries imposed upon society because these would need to be justified by some transcendent order...[D]esire, forming relations between heterogeneous terms, can cross all boundaries. Similarly, there are no pre-social instincts or drives, whether towards aggression or sexual activity, that transcend society. Indeed, the fixing of such drives is a corollary of the formation of a fixed order of society; the drive can only be formed as a desire for repetition of territorial representation. A fixed drive is formed as that which is prohibited and excluded from society. The drive only exists as a 'return of the repressed'; it is shaped by repression in the image of the repressing structure."\(^4\)

The fixed drives which serve psychoanalysis as a blueprint of the unconscious are stalled desiring-machines, moments of "anti-production" against which all productive capacities are judged and moderated. For the authors of \textit{Anti-Oedipus}, there is nothing outside of the social, nothing escapes coding.

"There is only desire and the social, and nothing else."\(^5\) It

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 74.
\(^5\) \textit{Anti-Oedipus}, p. 29.
is incorrect to say, along with Freud, that desire encounters the social or the "real" and thereby is repressed, repressed into citizenry and autonomy. This type of desire that Freud describes, the composite of drives which either want sex or aggression, is a desire already bound, already repressed. It is desire conceived as lack, and while it operates nearly everywhere within the social field, it has nothing in common with the productive capabilities of the desiring-machines.

Desire is production, the production process of the real. When Freud understands the drives of the id as unconscious desires which are repressed when they bump up against the tangible socius, he removes desire from its immanent position; desire inheres in and as the social field. Freud situates desire "outside" of the socius and "inside" the unconscious. Deleuze and Guattari understand the unconscious as the universal producer of the desiring-machines which compose social reality. One cannot "come into the social"; the socius is all that is the case.

We should be cautious here; it might sound as if the framework being offered is yet another idealist metaphysical model, a "stalled engine" itself. If any form of mental activity (consciousness, pre-consciousness, the unconscious) is said to "construct" its own reality, we are face to face with rationalist dogma. It is not the case that mental activity of any kind is at work here conjuring up the "real". Whatever desire is, whatever the productive unconscious is,
it has nothing to do with the rational, the self, the ego. In fact, this is precisely the conception of desire that *Anti-Oedipus* wants to abandon. Deleuze and Guattari admit that one of the most outstanding contributions psychoanalysis made was the discovery that desire is *productive*. But once the structural components of psychoanalysis are introduced into this productive process, desire can produce only fantasies, and once Oedipus makes himself known, even this fantasy-production becomes a production of sublevels of the ego.

Desire is not affiliated with the ego until repression is involved; Oedipus is the model of the ego which reverses the productive nature of desire and turns production into lack. If Oedipus is the model employed by psychoanalysis to "describe" the genesis of the ego, then this ego is a secondary function. It is born of Oedipalization. Within the social, Oedipus creates subjects. This does not mean that the organization of the ego brought about by Oedipus belongs to another "level" than the free-space of desiring-production; Oedipus is a connection, a social desiring-machine. As we have seen, the possible connections available in desiring-production are infinite and can always change; it would thus be impossible to pin down from this assertion regarding the multiplicitous and fragmentary nature of the
socius a "metaphysical" position. Oedipus is a desiring-machine that has stalled; the "ego" that it produces (the lacking ego) is a derivative and sedimented tool of repression.

But to respond more directly to the charge of Idealism, we need to elaborate what is meant by the locution "Oedipus". The tale of Oedipus the King is well known, and the manner in which the Oedipus complex prefigures the way that psychoanalysis operates is also generally understood. What Deleuze and Guattari are saying is precisely this: Oedipus has become that which it is not. The productive fantasy of the Oedipal triangle may very well be real (that is, there is no reason why desire could not organize itself around a lust for the mother and take active offense at the threat of the father). However, the account this offers of the "passage into selfhood" (which informs not only the psychoanalytic procedure but which has now infiltrated every aspect of the social sphere) is taken to be the model for desire.

When it is asserted that desire must organize itself around

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6 Recall in Line One the discussion of the two different "moral" codes elaborated by Nietzsche. It should be recognized that the "machines" that produced the Aristocratic values and the machines that produced the priestly mentality were of vastly different orders. We would not say that one "evolved" out of the other, nor would we attribute the "moralization of existence" to some type of higher understanding; the producing/product/producers were inherently different. There is nothing metaphysical to be found which "fuels" cultural shifts. This is why genealogy is a marvelous philosophical tool; by asking of any empirical assemblage "What does it want?", the genealogist seeks only after the connections which hold values, ideals, beliefs, etc. in place. Deleuze considers himself both a materialist and an empiricist. He is a materialist because the socius is physical; the process of production can be felt, seen, heard in every case. He is an empiricist because he writes only what he sees, his own production/recording process inscribes the observed couplings and connections that build and re-build politics, texts, shopping malls, etc.
that which it cannot have, then desire is given status only as reactive, as a lack, and a conception of the self arises which is the Oedipal self, the lacking self.

"The fact is, from the moment we are placed within the framework of Oedipus - from the moment we are measured in terms of Oedipus - the cards are stacked against us, and the only real relationship, that of production, has been done away with. The great discovery of psychoanalysis was that of the production of desire, of the productions of the unconscious. But once Oedipus entered the picture, this discovery was soon buried beneath a new brand of idealism: a classical theater was substituted for the unconscious as factory; representation was substituted for the units of production of the unconscious; and an unconscious which was capable of nothing but expressing itself - in myth, tragedy, dreams - was substituted for the productive unconscious."7

And now Oedipus bursts open upon the entire social surface. God, or the priest, or the moral (deontological ethics uses the locution "duty") is the paranoiac father8 who tells the desiring-believer that she cannot taste of forbidden pleasures, cannot enjoy intoxication, or fornicate, or be gluttonous, for something larger than herself (her soul, her conscious, the welfare of her society) is at stake. The State becomes the father who stands between the citizen and "his best interests", allowing him whatever falls within his rights here, forbidding him whatever does not there. The desiring-believer and the desiring-citizen are radically situated by the abstract father machines which repeatedly remind them that they lack certain possibilities; they are taught both what they want and that they cannot have it.

8 See Line Two for a treatment of the tyrannical figurehead of the Father.
Desire as an internalized Oedipalized desire forms the cement-like structure of the self or ego. This ego is the product of a neurotic desire; it is this neurotic manifestation of desire, and it is convinced that it is always situated, always limited, always lacking.

Capital is the most pernicious paranoiac father of all. Capital regenerates itself as it reminds everyone, everywhere that they are lacking. And it employs every machine available to continue this process of abuse and repression. It employs media machines to remind us that we don't have the best pair of basketball sneakers, the newest stereo system, the fastest car or the most attractive lover. It employs business machines to remind us that we could always be more productive, are never productive enough. It is the body of capital, the corporeal father which autoproduces itself within the society of control, that abuses neurotic lack to the point of lunacy. And most importantly, capital is the deterritorializing/reterritorializing father; it is everywhere, and it is everywhere constructing new connections, new machines which invest the social field and (re)produce capital.

*Anti-Oedipus* defines capitalism in terms of an absence of limits and an axiomatic:

"Concerning capitalism, we maintain that it both does and does not have an exterior limit: it has an exterior limit that is schizophrenia, that is, the absolute decoding of flows, but it functions only by pushing back and exorcising this limit. And it also has, yet does not have,
interior limits: it has interior limits under the specific conditions of capitalist production and circulation, that is, in capital itself, but it functions only by reproducing and widening these limits on an always vaster scale. The strength of capitalism indeed resides in the fact that its axiomatic is never saturated, that it is always capable of adding a new axiom to the previous ones. Capitalism defines a field of immanence and never ceases to fully occupy this field. But this deterritorialized field finds itself determined by an axiomatic, in contrast to the territorial field determined by primitive codes. Differential relations of such a nature as to be filled by surplus value; as absence of exterior limits that is 'filled' by the widening of internal limits; and the effusion of antiproduction within production so as to be filled by the absorption of surplus value - these constitute the three aspects of capitalism's immanent axiomatic.\(^9\)

When Anti-Oedipus opposes "primitive codes" to the capitalist axiomatic, it intends a much deeper division than we will go into here. Codes are the markings, for Deleuze and Guattari, which actually inscribe the body of the socius, which write the territories wherein we dwell. What is really being forwarded here is an attack upon the tyrannically repressive nature of all forms of signification (we sense the possibility here for a whole new philosophy of language). For the sake of brevity and to preserve the specifically political elements of this discussion, the scope of these claims should be limited.

In "carving up" the socius, codes have a way of facilitating an easily lived in social sphere. As described in Line Three, systems of codes assimilate to form the bodies of factories, schools, homes, prisons, militaries, public and private sectors where the model of discipline is employed and internalized. The axiomatic of capitalism, however, is not a codifying structure (it does not set up or work within

\(^9\) Anti-Oedipus, p. 250.
sedimentary complexes or "institutions"), rather it acts as a
deterritorializing agent for all of these sites. Capitalism
knows that control is more effective than discipline, because
it divides everything up and makes everything a mobile
commodity; it shatters the realms of private and public space
and throws all modes of production into a state of spaceless,
mobile synergy. Everything is filled.

Capitalism does not have to remind us that we lack; the
simple fact that three fourths of the world's population
lives below poverty level alerts us to that fact. But there
is a lack imposed upon desire by capitalism; we lack none
other than capital itself. We lack the father, we can never
have enough money. We crave the very mother of repression,
the body of capital, the deterritorializing, paranoiac
father. Here is Reich's answer: What could cause the masses
to desire their own repression? Capital, the force and flux
of repression, the instrument of internalized fascist
tendencies.

But more directly, how does Oedipus relate to capitalism?
That is, how does the accelerated Oedipal process from family
to ego to entire social sphere serve the agenda of
contemporary capitalism so profoundly that the two are nearly
indistinguishable?

Deleuze distinguishes between a logic of either/or and a
logic of both/and in reference to a concept that he borrows
from Gregory Bateson, the *double-bind*. The model of genealogical critique fashioned by Nietzsche is, according to Deleuze, an immanent critique. The will-to-power analyzes forces, can evaluate events, but only from within the context of those very forces and events, indeed as a force and an event. As thoroughly immanent critique, Deleuze sees Nietzschean critique as a way of thinking motivated by the paradoxical logic of an "inclusive disjunction."11

This means that critique as force remains active, because it is not separate from what it can do. Indeed, reaction, for Deleuze, constitutes the moment of a machine being forced back upon itself, made to choke on its own productive mechanisms; reactive forces "separate active force from what it can do."12 This is precisely where revolution stagnates. The moment that a vanguard organizes the masses into a revolutionary machine, it strips them of their potency; it channels chaotic revolutionary energy into a system of logical activities which organize themselves around a set of beliefs (We are oppressed and must change the conditions in which we live) and a *telos* (liberation, utopia, the end of capitalism). Likewise, the moment that psychoanalysis organizes the productive machines of the unconscious around the "ego" (the structure of Oedipus) the mode of operation for examination, process, problem, and cure is elaborated as

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11 See *Nietzsche and Philosophy* Section 2 (Active and Reactive, pps. 39-72) and Section 3 (Critique, pps. 73-110).

12 Ibid., p. 57.
well. The product or outcome of the psychoanalytic procedure (a “healthy”, normalized ego) is prefigured by the structurally rigid organization imposed by the Oedipal framework.

This is what Deleuze means by the double-bind. In thinking on revolution, communist strategy employs the logic of the either/or (either we remain oppressed by the upper classes or we wage full scale revolution). As does psychiatry: either the individual is neurotic or schizophrenic, healthy or sick; either she can be cured or she can not, etc.

If the double-bind, which is really a sort of tool used to describe the oppositional nature of all binary distinctions, can be appropriated within a paradoxical both/and framework (the inclusive disjunction), then theoretically revolution can happen at any moment of daily life or the schizophrenic can live out his days as an active social being.\(^\text{13}\)

Jeffrey Bell describes Gregory Bateson’s conception of the double-bind:

"Bateson argues that a double-bind consists of two injunctions. The first or primary injunction says that one must or must not do so and so; the second injunction is more general, or more ‘abstract’ and conflicts with the first. For example, a mother might tell her son not to do so

\(^{13}\) The movement of anti-psychiatry, a practice championed by David Cooper, Thomas Szasz, R.D. Laing and others was an attempt to incorporate the radical ego-loss exhibited by some schizophrenics into a sort of "anti-model" for dealing with the insane. Laing actually lived for years among a group of schizophrenics for whom he had established a commune, Kingsley Hall. Arguably, his attempt was a marginal success, if judged statistically in reference to how many of the inhabitants were actually "cured". Laing considered the project a failure, however, for the distinction between psychiatrist and patient could never fully be broached, and that was his primary task."
and so, but then might, by her more general behavior - i.e., gestures, intonation, or other non-verbal means of communicating - tell him not to submit to her prohibitions. Regardless of what the son does, therefore, he will be in the wrong.\footnote{Philosophizing the Double-Bind, p. 376.}

The logic of either/or might here end in paranoia, a constant brooding over the fact that neither choice is acceptable. Bateson suggests that one can live with a kind of specific attention to the double-bind, a "both/and" approach which is not caught up in the specifically exclusive mode of choosing one member of a binary pair or another. One can assimilate both possibilities and become creative; it is always possible to establish new connections, within the logic of the two injunctions, which lead elsewhere. Schizophrenics sometimes exhibit this type of reaction to double-bind situations.

Capitalism affixes a type of schizophrenic logic to the social order. For example, in the process of establishing ever new attractive connections, the mechanics of advertising attempt to ascertain how to manipulate the flows of desire which both influence and are effects of subjective Oedipalization. A commercial for a credit card company depicts Bob Dole attempting to write a check (a now outdated form of currency) in his hometown in Kansas after a homecoming parade put on in his honor. After the counter clerk asks him for three different forms of identification, Dole stares sullenly into the camera and proclaims: "I just can't win." \textit{Visa is everywhere you want to be.}
In another commercial for a candy bar, a fake "condition" is described in a deathly serious tone by "experts": People who eat this candy bar suddenly become catatonic, and wear a perpetual smile. It is suggested that these people are having orgasmic-type experiences which cause them to leave their corporeal bodies and party in alternate planes of existence aboard alien space vessels. As an advertisement, this commercial sells product. Yet it is almost indistinguishable from the descriptions of hallucinations given by schizophrenics.

Capitalism, as it constantly makes new connections and radically deterritorializes social spaces, always sets up new limits which redefine the channels through which desire flows. It leaves these limits behind almost instantaneously, as the schizophrenic leaves behind his table, or re-appropriates them for some other purpose. Thus its process is one of loosing fixed territories (the double bind, either/or), and re-establishing a myriad of alternatives (becoming-creative).

In trying to answer how Oedipus relates to capitalism, we need to keep this process in mind. Oedipus is the structure which locates and defines the contemporary subject. In many ways, it is an avatar of an outmoded disciplinary mentality. There is a "divisionary" principle in operation in disciplinary society, and the family is not excepted from this process. "[T]he institution of the family is regulated
The "institution" of the family is localizable, its territory marked, within a disciplinary social configuration. But within a nexus of control mechanics, sites of confinement branch out, pour over the social field and vastly expand their domains while mutating to encompass new milieus where they were previously inactive. The obvious example is the site of production, the factory, but the family also becomes deterritorialized. As noted above, the father is everywhere, the figurehead of Oedipus is no longer confined to a physical familial realm, but rather invests the entire social field. This familial structure, operating in all realms of the socius (business, the military, clinical institutions) is the pure representative of the repressive tyranny of signification.

"The best example of a purely signifying structure is the figure of Oedipus produced in Lacanian psychoanalysis...For Lacan, the unconscious is structured like a language; the triangular relationship of the family is translated into a symbolic structure devoid of imaginary content. The resolution of Oedipus means an internalization of its structure into desire, and an acceptance that desire will always lack something, the transcendental signified which restores it to reality. By investing itself in the search for the transcendental signified, desire lives out the Oedipus complex. The solution to this neurotic search is a regression from the signified to the structure: when desire embraces the oedipal structure as the law of society, it resolves and internalizes Oedipus. The resolved and internalized Oedipus can then function as the basis of both our participation in society and the way in which we think. This structural version of Oedipus is taken by Deleuze and

16 Recall the discussion in Line Three regarding sites of confinement, where Deleuze noted that in disciplinary societies the territories are plainly delineated. At school, the individual is told that he is not at home anymore and must act differently, in the workplace, he is told that he is not at school anymore, etc.
Guattari to be the prime agent of repression in our society."17

The operations that this structural family performs upon contemporary society are the very operations of control and repression; this extended and representational Oedipus separates the productive forces of desire from what they can do; the entire socius must be striated and divided to fit the Oedipal mold. For Lacan, this internalization of the Oedipal triangle marks the site of individuation, the birth of the desiring-ego. Deleuze and Guattari understand this model of the individual as the origin of all repressive capabilities. They see the struggle between desiring-machines and the "Oedipal-narcissistic machine" as having primary political importance.

"In order to understand the details of this struggle, it must be borne in mind that the family relentlessly operates on desiring-production. Inscribing itself into the recording process of desire, clutching at everything, the family performs a vast appropriation of the productive forces; it displaces and reorganizes in its own fashion the entirety of the connections and the hiatuses that characterize the machines of desire. It reorganizes them all along the lines of the universal castration that condition the family itself...but it also redistributes these breaks in accordance with its own laws and the requirements of social production. The inscription performed by the family follows the pattern of its triangle, by distinguishing what belongs to the family from what does not. It also cuts inwardly, along the lines of differentiation that form global persons: there's daddy, there's mommy, there you are, then there's your sister. Cut into the flow of milk here, it's your brother's turn, don't take a crap here, cut into the stream of shit over there. Retention is the primary function of the family: it is a matter of learning what elements of desiring-production the family is going to reject, what it is going to retain..."18

17 Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of Desire p. 89.
18 Anti-Oedipus, pps., 124-5.
The first thing that the schizo does is eradicate the ego; this is, for Deleuze and Guattari, the moment of revolution against the repressive structure of the "Holy Family". The figurehead of Oedipus is abandoned; and since Oedipus is the structural model of social organization, the family, the State, the self are also foregone. All structure is devastated by the purely differential element of couplings and connections, productive desiring-machines. And the schizo becomes a body without organs, a stalled engine.

In Line Three, a description of control was offered. This method of social organization ensures that subjects are referenced according to position, are allowed or denied access to everything from television programs to buildings to administrative positions by distributing a mode of control over the processes of gaining education, employment, status, or goods. The general model of the politically/economically situated subject is the oedipalized subject. This is the subject which can be dominated, the subject that knows that it lacks, that can be intoxicated, domesticated, controlled and compelled by the deterritorializing processes of contemporary capitalism. But capitalism can do little or nothing with the non-oedipalized or "schizophrenic" individual. The logic of capitalism and the logic of schizophrenia are very similar, and they "work" according to the same processes. The oedipalized subject is docile; he

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19 This notion of schizophrenic rebellion against ego-izing oedipalization was treated in Line Two.
20 The similarities between the logic of capitalism and the logic of schizophrenia were discussed in the last part of Line Five, Schizophrenic Spaces.
is controlled by the logic of either/or, and capitalism proffers all of the choices on a smorgasbord of social possibilities driven by the abuse of conceptual lack. Capitalism understands lack so well and exploits it so easily that the capitalist process and the lacking Oedipalized subject are forced into a synthetic unity which dialectically informs the entirety of social existence. The Oedipalized subject lives the perpetual "double-bind" in a passive state of political and economic impotence; he is outside the social and inside his own head; he lacks immanence; he is separated from what he can do.

Capitalism utilizes this lack-structure to erect a complex socius in which limits disappear and possibilities are dangled in front of the faces of executants like the proverbial carrot on a string. Buy a TV and experience China. Take a pay cut and work in a new sector, and be rewarded with an early retirement on seventy-five percent of your salary. Have virtual sex on line with a partner that you create yourself (masturbation par excellence ). Fly from New York to London on the Concord for a business meeting with Korean investors and be home for dinner with the family in Long Island by six. Capitalism schizophrenizes the socius by filling in all spaces with infinite connective possibilities. All spaces become virtual, all possibilities limitless.

In this accelerated framework, Oedipus lends stability to existence. The family is a supportive and comforting
institution; my senator is looking out for my needs in Washington; I know what I already possess and what I still need to obtain in order to succeed and thrive. This is the comfort of contemporary repression: The world is too large and at the same time too small; we want localizable fixed spaces which will grant to life a pace, a rate of progression, goals and dreams, etc. We like to have limited choices (either/or) and cannot think what it would be like to choose everything and create as well. Capitalism connects everywhere and creates new sites of connection for itself; it writes the blueprint for desire.

The oedipalized subject is produced and operated by the capitalist process; it is a subject which belongs to capitalist society, with no remainder. It is the subject that capitalism can own and control. But our society also produces schizophrenics:

"Our society produces schizos in the same way that it produces Prell shampoo or Ford cars, the only difference being that schizos are not salable. How then does one explain the fact that capitalist production is constantly arresting the schizophrenic process and transforming the subject of the process into a confined clinical entity, as though it saw in this process the image of its own death coming from within? Why does it make the schizophrenic into a sick person, not only nominally but in reality? Why does it confine its madmen and madwomen instead of seeing in them its heroes and heroines, its own fulfillment? And where it can no longer recognize the figure of a simple illness, why does it keep its artists and even its scientists under such close surveillance - as though they risked unleashing flows that would be dangerous for capitalist production and charged with a revolutionary potential, so long as these flows are not co-opted or absorbed by the laws of the market? Why does it form in turn a gigantic machine for social repression - psychic - repression, aimed at what nevertheless constitutes its own reality - the decoded flows?"21

21 Anti-Oedipus, p. 245.
What Deleuze and Guattari mean by decoded flows are the connections that outstrip the antiquated social order of societies of discipline: Sites of confinement operate according to a system of codes which both the capitalist and the schizophrenic processes decode, eroding the autonomy of the factory, the family, the church, the school. The pivotal question raised here is this: If the processes driven by capital and the schizophrenic processes are so similar in kind, why does society manufacture institutional schizophrenics, why does it fear its own logic, and why does it monitor so closely the movements and flows of those who participate in capitalist production processes (artists, scientists, etc.)?

"The answer...is that capitalism is indeed the limit of all societies, insofar as it brings about the decoding of flows that the other social formations coded and overcoded. But it is the relative limit of every society; it effects relative breaks, because it substitutes for the codes an extremely rigorous axiomatic that maintains the energy of the flows in a bound state on the body of capital as a socius that is deterriorialized, but also a socius that is even more pitiless than any other. Schizophrenia, on the contrary, is indeed the absolute limit that causes the flows to travel in a free state on a desocialized body without organs. Hence one can say that schizophrenia is the exterior limit of capitalism itself or the conclusion of its deepest tendency, but that capitalism only functions on condition that it inhabit this tendency, or that it push back or displace this limit, by substituting for its own immanent relative limits, which it continually reproduces on a widened scale. It axiomatizes on the one hand what it decodes with the other. Such is the way that one must reinterpret the Marxist law of the counteracting tendency. With the result that schizophrenia pervades the entire capitalist field from one end to the other. But for capitalism it is a question of binding the schizophrenic charges and energies into a world axiomatic that always opposes the revolutionary potential of decoded flows with new interior limits...The flows are decoded and axiomized by capitalism at the same time. Hence schizophrenia is not the identity of capitalism, but on the contrary its difference, its divergence, and its death. Monetary flows are perfectly
schizophrenic realities, but they exist and function only within the immanent axiomatic that exorcises and repels this reality. The language of a banker, a general, an industrialist, a middle or high-level manager, or a government minister is a perfectly schizophrenic language, but that functions only statistically within a flattening axiomatic of connections that puts it in the service of the capitalist order."22

The schizophrenic process is appropriated by capitalist machinery in a very strange way; its capacity to loosen all constricting parameters of social organization has immense benefits, and capitalism seizes upon these possibilities. But capitalism cannot be totally without form; it is schizophrenic only up until that point at which the perpetuation of its own economy is threatened, at which point it lays out new rules for the game which look, deceptively enough, like self-substantiating or pre-given social conditions, i.e., axiomatics. The social sphere is invested by a logic of connections which has no real limits, a schizophrenic logic. This logic is fast and incomprehensible, and it mutates quickly. Its differential element has the capability to foster full scale revolution or Integrated Global Capitalism.

The model of representation keeps the social field in check. Democracy is born of this tendency towards representation, as is Oedipus. Capital needs representation to ensure its own preservation. The decoding schizophrenic process serves capital only if it assures that new, more seductive, more

22 Ibid., pps. 245-6.
complex and valuable images are available for public consumption. The model of the consumer is fashioned by Oedipus, the ultimate signifier, representation par excellence. Thus the schizophrenic process employed by capitalism continuously reinvents itself by way of representational imaging; new models for desire become the axiomatics by which the normalized individual judges his or her capacity to perform, excel, compete. Oedipus is not static, save in that it operates according to an economy of lack. The lacking subject is the structural component of representation; capitalism feeds desire its own images.

Line Four makes explicit reference to the repressive structure of representative politics. According to the critical model put forth in *Anti-Oedipus*, any political agenda established on the premise that any one thing can operate in place of another is a politics which serves repression. But now it seems as if almost every condition save some type of pure schizophrenic state would be an avatar of fascistic tendencies; everything is born of lack and lacunae. Thus we are left with Lenin's question: "What is to be done?"

Even if we buy the central themes here elaborated, questions remain: what can we do, what is it good for, what does it want? *Anti-Oedipus* should not be approached with the question "Is it True?", for it has no response to this. The question then is, what can it do? Where can it prompt
change, how can it politically affect a control society? Does it speak to technology, science, or any form of progress? And on a meta-level, does it serve well as an experiment in theory which "keeps up" with the literally blinding speed of contemporary culture and politics?

We should meet these questions on the front where revolutionary thinking abandons Marxism. It is not the case that capital is here outlined as the form and function of social repression. Recall that power as it is appropriated in the social field by desiring-machines is purely productive. Deleuze and Guattari go as far as to say that any form of social "connection" is always productive. Even repression is produced. Repression is the result of Oedipalization, the stalled engine which is not abandoned as the schizo abandons his table, but which is clung to relentlessly by the neurotic socius, a socius that has internalized the will to its own repression.

_Anti-Oedipus_ draws a compelling picture of modern existence. In exploiting the lack-structure of the socius by deterritorializing social spaces and re-establishing virtual axiomatics, capitalism renders the schizophrenic impotent and applies its unique brand of control to the entire social surface. There are many places such a theory can go, much that it can do. Deleuze and Guattari modestly claim that they wanted only to separate the left from structural psychoanalysis, for this axis is where they noticed the
possibilities for a whole new order of fascism. Schizoanalysis can take down the dominant paradigm of structuralist psychoanalysis and serve as a shrewd watchdog for any leftist party (it certainly keeps left thinkers from straying too close to democracy, which is capitalism's mirror image on the global circuit). As a project which is committed to seeking out all forms of social repression, it is also a book of ethics, "the first book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time." Anti-Oedipus counters dialectics in its insistence that man and nature and God and State cannot be part of a larger synthesis, that all are machinated cogs working their own little machines in and about the socius. It carries Nietzsche into a new era of philosophy and revives an anarchist trend in radical politics based upon an active way to engage an extremely unstable social field.

"Desire never resists oppression, however local and tiny the resistance, without the challenge being communicated to the capitalist system as a whole, and playing its part in bursting it open." Saying no to Oedipus is the political vision; the methodology is yet to be elaborated. But theory needs radicals, because radicals keep the majoritarian order and all vanguards on their toes.

What does the process of Anti-Oedipalization require? It

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23 Michel Foucault Preface to Anti-Oedipus p. xiii.
requires speed and depth and cunning, for one thing. The possibility for action is lost on armchair political activists who really believe that things are bad and that change is possible; their effective engagement with the social sphere evaporates before their eyes when they step into the voting booth. They see the problems of the social sphere from well beyond it; they do not approach from within but from without.

The problem with political activism is that it has forgotten how well it knows its enemy. Capitalism is deterritorializing; it manufactures unheard of connections which move across the social field and become obsolete almost immediately. Oedipus, the site of all representation and keeper of the repressed ego, keeps us enthralled by such a process, causing us to forget our own deterritorializing machines. We forget the wildly schizophrenic elements which actually affect our own possibilities. We forget not that we can produce, but that we are production; this causes a rift in the surface of all productive capacities, a rift which causes the ego to cling with all of its might to the "really good things" that it produces. We forget to leave our productions behind; this would exceed the limit of capital, for even the immense production process of capitalism still grounds itself by establishing its own axioms, its own channels and rivulets of production. In the Prologue to Thus Spake Zarathrustra, Nietzsche reminds us that "one must have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star."
I say unto you: you still have chaos in yourselves. But can the schizophrenic be the new revolutionary?

The schizophrenic process does not offer a guide to political involvement; it only offers up a perspective, a unique perspective that has remained silent for quite a while. This perspective is not critical of capital from outside, from a beyond which all too easily delineates its opposition; rather schizophrenia is immanent within capitalism; the schizophrenic is more capitalist than the capitalist. And if this perspective offers up something useful, something which might provide active and essential force to the molar structure of culture and politics, then all the better. If it does not, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that it be thrown away:

"What matters is whether it works, and how it works, and who it works for. It's a machine too. It's not a matter of reading it over and over again, you have to do something else with it...We're not writing for people who think psychoanalysis is doing fine and see the unconscious for what it is. We're writing for people who think it's pretty dull and sad as it burbles on about Oedipus, castration, the death instinct, and so on. We're writing for unconsciousness that have had enough. We're looking for allies."

25 The Portable Nietzsche p. 129.
26 Gilles Deleuze Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari on Anti-Oedipus in Negotiations p. 22.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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1 Many of the texts which appear in the bibliography are fully cited in the footnotes to this essay. However, on occasion, throughout the course of my writing, I referred only tangentially to specific texts or argued for some vague generalizations regarding a theory or thinker. In these later instances, the texts referred to are not footnoted but only hinted at. This bibliography therefore includes both texts that are directly cited in the body of the essay and texts that are not cited specifically, but none-the-less played some integral role in the composition of the paper.


