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THE IRANIAN QUESTION  
BEFORE  
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, 1946  
by

Edward R. Brown  
B.A., University of Washington, 1950

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requirement for the degree of Mas-  
ter of Arts.

Montana State University

1951

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


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CHAPTER 1.  
INTERVENTION

1

Iran, commonly known as the "gateway to India," lies between India and East Asia on one hand and the Near East and the Western World on the other. It is a small state of 628,060 square miles and of approximately 15,000,000 people. Compared to modern progressive states of Europe and North America, it is socially and economically backward. But it has the richest oil field in existence and is the fourth largest oil producing country in the world.

Because Iran has this abundance of oil, it has become with the advent of the mechanical age a focal point of the policies of two interested great powers, Russia (now the Soviet Union) and Great Britain. But oil alone did not bring these two powers into Iran. Since the rise of Muscovite Russia, the Russian state has tried to obtain an outlet on an open sea, and the Russian advance to the south had as its objective the Persian Gulf. Commercial and economic interests along with military interests brought the Russian to Iran, or as it was then known, Persia. The Russian advance to the south also followed the policy of empire-building or natural expansion which brought the Russians into conflict with another empire-building people,

the British.

The British came to Persia first as a maritime power in the possession of a great Indian empire, the protection of which was a paramount British interest. It was the necessity to defend India from any power that might gain control of the weak Persian state that attracted Britain's attention to the Persian area. And in the course of their own imperial expansion, the British were not unaware of the possibility of exploiting Persia and developing there a British sphere of interest. A sharply contrasted rivalry between Russia and Great Britain developed in the nineteenth century in economic, commercial and political affairs. Their imperial interests collided in many places in Europe and Asia, and their rivalry in Persia was an integral part of the conflict.

With the dawn of a new century, however, the European and world situation had so altered that in 1907 a great change occurred in the relations of Russia and Great Britain over Persia.

One of the more important reasons for Russia's acquiescence to a rapprochement with Great Britain was the end of the League of Three Emperors (Russia, Germany, and Austria) in 1887 because of the Austro-Russian split over the Balkans and Germany's support of Austria in this area. The alliance between Germany and Russia continued for three

more years, but the unreliable character of the alliance forced Alexander III to seek other allies. This prepared the ground for a Franco-Russian understanding which eventually resulted in the Franco-Russian alliance of 1895. And after Russia's defeat in the Japanese war and the resulting weakening of Russia's military prestige in the East, Russo-British relations took on a more favorable character.

Great Britain, at the same time, also had important reasons for desiring a rapprochement with Russia. With the growth of German power in the Near East Great Britain came to fear Germany more than it did Russia. Finding itself alone and without friends in the Boer War, because of a policy of "Splendid Isolation," Great Britain in 1902 signed a treaty of alliance with Japan. In 1905 it entered into the Entente Cordiale with France and then sought friendship with France's ally, Russia.

Such being the state of affairs, the two powers reached an accord known as the Anglo-Russian, or the Grey-Iswolsky, agreement on August 31, 1907.<sup>1</sup> The agreement, signed in

1. W. Henry Cooke and Edith P. Stickney, Readings in European International Relations Since 1879, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1931, pp. 128-130.

See appendix, page 153 for complete text of treaty.

St. Petersburg by the British ambassador, Sir Arthur  
Nicolson,<sup>2</sup> and the Russian minister of foreign affairs,  
Alexander Iswolsky,<sup>3</sup> was composed of three sections relating  
to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet.

With reference to Persia, both Great Britain and  
Russia promised to respect the integrity and independence  
of Persia. Trade opportunities would be equal for all  
nations. After the statement of these two principles for  
the sake of appearances, Great Britain and Russia divided  
Persia into three zones: the northern portion to be under  
Russian influence, the southern portion to be in the British  
sphere of influence, and a neutral zone to be in the center  
between the two spheres of influence. The agreement also  
dealt with the Russian Discount and Loan Bank and the  
British Imperial Bank and set the policies they should follow

Generally speaking, this agreement was accepted in  
Europe as of being of great importance, because it sub-  
stituted friendly relations for better rivalry between the  
two great Asiatic powers. However, according to the Russian

2. Alexander P. Iswolsky, (1856-1919) entered the foreign  
office under Prince Gorchakov, and was appointed successively  
to diplomatic posts at Bucharest, Washington, the Vatican,  
Belgrade, Munich, Tokyo and Copenhagen. He was appointed  
minister for foreign affairs in 1906, and in 1910 was made  
Russian ambassador to Paris.

3. Sir Arthur Nicolson, (1849-1928) was a diplomatic ambassad  
to Madrid, 1904-06, and in St. Petersburg, 1906-10. He con-  
cluded negotiations leading to the Algeiras conference in  
1906, and the entente with France and Russia in 1907.



4

minister of finance, Count Witte, the older Russian statesmen were not happy about the agreement:

The agreement was a triumph of British diplomacy. It dealt chiefly with Persia. The Northern part of that country, which includes its most fertile and thickly populated sections, had from times immemorial been within our sphere of influence. With the conquest of the Southern parts of the Caucasus, formerly provinces of Persia and Turkey, the Northern part of Persia was naturally destined, so to speak, to become a part of the Russian Empire. To prepare that eventuality we sacrificed a great deal of our blood and treasure. The agreement set all these sacrifices at naught. According to it, Southern Persia was to be under the economic influence of Great Britain, while the North was left to us. As for Persia's central Government, it was to be controlled by Russia and Great Britain acting jointly. Since Tehran, the seat of the Central Government, is situated in the North this meant British influence in the North as well as in the South.<sup>5</sup>

The British seemed well satisfied with the agreement, because Great Britain was unprepared to maintain its position in Persia by either money or force, and the terms secured were in all probability as good as could be obtained. Since the agreement was made purely between Russia and Great Britain and ostensibly to arrange questions concerning their respective "interests," Persia had nothing to do with it, either directly or in any manner.

4. Count Sergius Witte, (1849-1915) became minister of ways of communication in 1892, and August the same year became minister of finance. In 1896 he became secretary of state, and in 1899 was actual privy councillor. He was responsible for the Portsmouth treaty in 1903.

5. Count Witte, The Memoirs of Count Witte, (Translated from the original Russian manuscript and edited by Abraham Yarmolinsky), Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Page, 1925, p.

While the Russians and the British promised faithfully to "respect the integrity and independence of Persia," this was not the case. The period between 1907 and World War I, in so far as Persia was concerned, was a period of continuous intervention on the part of both the British and the Russians. During World War I, Persia declared its neutrality, but was too weak to prevent Russian, British, and Turkish armies from violating its territory.

For all practical purposes, the treaty of 1907 lapsed ten years later, in 1917, when the Bolsheviki came to power in Russia and upset the former balance of interests in Persia. Great Britain poured troops into Persia, and its officials became virtual controllers of the country. British policy then centered around a new Anglo-Persian agreement in which Great Britain practically took the government of the Shah under its protection and established a British protectorate in fact if not in name. But this agreement came to naught when the Bolshevik landing at Enzeli in August 1919 undermined Persian confidence in British capacity to defend Persian interests.<sup>6</sup>

Because Bolshevik doctrines were contrary to the traditions and the religion of Persia, the attitude of the

6. M.M. McCarthy, Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Persia, The University of Buffalo Studies, Vol. IV., June 1925, Published under the direction of the committee of publications, of the Boswell Park Publication Fund, p. 64.

Persian government toward Bolshevism was hostile. However, Bolshevik policy as stated by Georghy Chicherin<sup>7</sup> (Soviet foreign minister) in an appeal to the workers and peasants of Persia was warmly received. He denounced the Anglo-Persian agreement and gave the Soviet Union's pledge that all the Tsarist treaties which had "enslaved" Persia were null and void. The Persian government was fully aware of the danger that Bolshevism presented, but it nevertheless wished to maintain good relations with Soviet authorities in order to play them off against the British. As a result of Soviet policy and of Persian aspirations, a treaty of friendship was signed between the two countries at Moscow on February 26, 1921, and ratifications were exchanged at Tehran on February 26, 1922.<sup>8</sup>

In this treaty of 1921, the Soviet government stated:

...desiring that the Persian people should be happy and independent and should be able to dispose freely of its patrimony, the Russian Republic declares the whole body of treaties and conventions concluded with Persia by the Tsarist Government, which crushed the rights of the Persian people, to be null and void.<sup>9</sup>

7. Georghy V. Chicherin, (1872-1936) was appointed peoples commissar for foreign affairs in March 1918. In 1922 he headed the Soviet delegation to the conference at Genoa. He conducted Soviet policy from 1918-30, having a longer tenure of office than any contemporary European foreign minister.

8. Compilation of Documents, prepared by the representative of Iran, for the convenient reference in the Consideration by the Security Council of the disputes between Iran and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, pp. 21-27. See appendix, page 155 for complete text of treaty.

9. Ibid., p. 21.

To this end, all loans to Persia were cancelled, and the property of the Bank of Persia was transferred to Persia. The Persian GOVERNMENT on its part promised not to hand over to any third state or its citizens the concessions surrendered by the Soviets. If a third party interfered in the internal affairs of Persia, the Soviets also reserved the right to intervene in Persian internal affairs. This treaty was to become an important factor in the events to follow thirty years later.

Again in 1927 the Soviet Union and Iran<sup>10</sup> felt the need for a treaty.<sup>11</sup> This treaty was one of security and neutrality and in part restated the obligations of the 1921 treaty. The Soviet Union promised not to interfere in Persian affairs unless a third party threatened Persian integrity, and the two contracting parties foreswore aggressive acts against the other. All issues between the two powers were to be settled peacefully. The treaty was to last for three years, to be renewed every year thereafter unless one of the parties gave notice of its denunciation.

## II

During the years that followed the signing of the security and neutrality treaty, Iran's foreign relations

10. In 1935, Risa Shah changed the official name of Persia to Iran.

11. Compilation of Documents, prepared by the representative of Iran, pp. 16-18.

were more or less uneventful. The Soviet Union was engaged in reconstruction, Germany had lost her position as a great power, and Nazism was not yet taken seriously. However, Iran did become involved in a dispute with Great Britain in 1930 over the concession of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, a concession that had been acquired in 1914 with the assistance of Winston Churchill.<sup>12</sup> The Iranian government threatened nationalization unless it received greater royalties from the Oil Company. Iran won its case and the concession was renewed under conditions very favorable for Iran.<sup>13</sup> In 1919, Iran became a member of the League of Nations, and in 1937 it was elected a non-permanent member of the League Council.

In 1941, however, Iran became involved in World War II, because the Allies could not tolerate things the way they were in Iran. Since the Iranian oil fields were so important for the British fleet, the pro-Nazi Shah could not be left on the throne. The country also had a strong German "fifth column," and the government did very little to discourage it. Because it needed Iran for a base to receive supplies from its allies, the Soviet Union declared that the presence of so many German agents threatened the exis-

12. Winston S. Churchill, (1874- ) had an army background and became an M.P. in 1900. He was first lord of the admiralty and minister for national defence. He has been leader of the conservative party since May 1945.

13. United Nations News, Vol. I., No. 5., May 1946, Woodrow Wilson Foundation, N.Y., p. 3.

tence of its "life line." Therefore, in August, 1941, the Russians occupied the northern provinces, and the British occupied the southern region. The Shah was deposed, and his son, Mohammed Riza Pahlevi,<sup>14</sup> was placed on the throne.

Iran did not become a battle field, as in World War I, nor was it expected to join in the military actions of the war. It was, however, obliged to co-operate fully with the Allies in every other way. In order to give full scope to this co-operation, in September, 1943, Iran declared war on Germany. As a consequence, all Germans who had not succeeded in leaving the country were arrested and taken either to Russia or to British India. On March 2, 1945, Iran declared war on Japan.

To confirm and to define the new situation, a "Tri-Partite Treaty of Alliance" was concluded in Tehran on January 29, 1942 among the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Iran.<sup>15</sup> In this agreement, unlike the 1907 agreement, Iran was accepted on an equal footing with the other contracting parties. Again as in the 1907 agreement, Great Britain and the Soviet Union undertook to "respect the

14. Mohammad Riza Pahlevi, (1919- ) was "valialid" (Crown Prince), heir apparent to the throne of Iran. He succeeded to the throne on the abdication of his father in 1941.

15. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1., Church House, Westminster, London, pp. 43-45. See Appendix, page 162 for complete text of Treaty.

territorial integrity, the sovereignty and political independence of Iran.<sup>16</sup> The Iranian government agreed to place transport and communication facilities at the disposal of the Allied powers. It was also specifically provided that "The assistance of the Iranian forces shall, however, be limited to the maintenance of internal security of Iranian territory.<sup>17</sup> The Allied powers could maintain armed forces on Iranian territory, and these forces and Iranian authorities were to co-operate in settling their difficulties.

An important part of the treaty (later to come before the United Nations Security Council) was Article 5, which required the forces of the Allied powers to be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than "six months after the cessation of hostilities" between the Allied powers and Germany and its associates.<sup>18</sup> The Allied powers were to consult with the Iranian government on all matters that pertained directly to Iran, and they were to safeguard the economic existence of the Iranian people against the privations and difficulties brought on by the war.

The same spirit was to be found in the text of the three-power declaration concerning Iran, made at the Tehran

16. Ibid., p. 44.

17. Ibid., p. 44.

18. Ibid., p. 45.

conference, December 1, 1943.<sup>19</sup> In this declaration the special economic difficulties that the war had caused for Iran were recognized, and the Big Three (U.S.A., U.S.S.R., and Great Britain) promised to give Iran all the economic assistance they could in light of the heavy demands made on them by the war. The pledge to guarantee the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter was restated.

### III

These expressions of non-intervention and good will were not carried out in practice, however, and the occupation caused unrest among the common people of Iran. Following the occupation, a bad harvest, and the occupying troops, especially the Russians who took over the available supply of food, caused a famine.<sup>20</sup> In addition, the Iranians had to contend with inflation and the disruption of transportation resulting from the presence of foreign troops. To complicate the situation, in October and November, 1944, the Soviets demanded oil concessions in Iran. The Soviets had been prospecting for oil before the war in northern Iran, particularly

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50. See Appendix, page 166 for complete text of treaty.

20. William S. Nass, *Iran*, Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1946, p. 226.



in Mazanderan, and after the occupation had begun, they began to drill in the occupied zone.<sup>21</sup> At the same time, American and British oil concerns were also demanding that the Iranian government give them oil concessions. On November 2, 1944; however, the Iranian government decided not to give any new oil concessions after the war. Four reasons were given for doing this:

First, the Iranian public opinion would consider any concession as having been granted under duress as long as foreign troops were in Iran; second, the economic condition of the world was not clear; third, the Washington oil conference had left the situation in doubt; and fourth, all reports from Iranian representatives abroad had urged that no concessions be granted during the occupation.<sup>22</sup>

Criticizing the Iranian government for its refusal to grant the oil concession, the Soviet Union alleged that the Iranian government favored the United States and Great Britain.<sup>23</sup> The Soviet government also questioned the presence of United States troops in Iran, since the United States had not been a party to the tri-partite agreement. This in spite of the fact that United States troops had been stationed in Iran to insure the delivery of goods to the Soviet Union. With the arrival of these American troops,

21. Ibid., p. 238.

22. New York Times, November 2, 1944.

23. Hass, Iran, p. 239.

Iran had become the only place in the world where the Big Three had troops in the same country. As early as November 1944, Iran was looked upon as a proving ground for the United Nations and as a test of Big Three unity in the postwar world.

But Big Three unity and Soviet-Iranian relations were weakened in November, 1945 when a rebellion occurred in the province of Azerbaijan, an Iranian province on the Soviet border and therefore open to Soviet influence. Before the outbreak of the rebellion, Soviet military and civil authorities in the northern provinces of Iran and particularly in Azerbaijan, had encouraged and supported turbulent elements in their opposition to the Tehran government.<sup>24</sup> Soviet occupation forces now openly hindered Iranian authorities from exercising their legitimate duties. A military occupation was also established in the northern provinces contrary to Article 4, paragraph 1, of the tri-partite treaty which stated that the presence of Allied forces on Iranian territory should not constitute a military occupation. Soviet authorities also encouraged an autonomy movement in Azerbaijan, and the Iranian government claimed that agents employed by Soviet authorities to carry out the autonomy movement and rebellion

24. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1., pp. 27-29.

were Soviet citizens of mixed origin who could pass as Azerbaijanians.

At the outbreak of the rebellion, the Iranian government dispatched reinforcements to Azerbaijan to help the small Iranian contingent of troops in the northern provinces, but these troops were stopped at Sherif-Abad (80 miles from Tehran) by Soviet army authorities and were not allowed to proceed to their destination.<sup>25</sup> The Soviet government explained that the Iranian troops were halted, because, if they were to proceed to Azerbaijan, there would have been much useless rioting and bloodshed.

The consequence of this intervention by Soviet troops was to place the rebels in a position successfully to intimidate the civilian population and the Iranian officials in Azerbaijan. All relations with the central government were severed, and the rebels proclaimed the autonomy of the districts under their control. They besieged the army garrisons stationed in different towns of Azerbaijan, forced them to surrender, and disarmed them. Government offices and railroads were captured, and an illegal government was established in Tabriz, capital of Azerbaijan, in defiance of the constitution of Iran and the central government. A legislative assembly was convened to which only official candidates of the rebels<sup>26</sup> were elected.

25. Ibid., p. 29.

26. Ibid., p. 29.

The Soviet Union at no time concealed its support of the insurgents. Propaganda supporting the insurgents flowed out of the Soviet Union. A Soviet consul attended, in his official capacity, the opening session of the insurgent assembly at Tabriz.

By diplomatic notes, the Iranian government appealed to both the United States and Great Britain to persuade the U.S.S.R. to end its intervention in Iran. Since the United States decided to support Iran's case, on November 24, 1945 its ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman,<sup>27</sup> delivered a note to the Soviet government concerning the situation in Iran.<sup>28</sup> In this note, it was stated that the Iranian government had informed the United States government that an armed uprising had taken place in areas of northern Iran where Soviet troops had been stationed and that Iranian troops had been stopped on their way to Azerbaijan. Consequently, the Iranian government could not carry out its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order on Iranian territory. To reprove the U.S.S.R. for its conduct

27. William Averell Harriman, (1891- ) was the president's special representative and minister to Great Britain, and headed the mission to Moscow in 1941. He was ambassador to the U.S.S.R., 1943-45.

28. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, Supplement, No. 1., pp. 53-55.

In this instance, the Tehran declaration was included to remind the Soviet Union of its pledges concerning Iran. If the Soviet authorities who had stopped the Iranian forces had acted without instructions, it was expected by the United States that the Soviet government would "issue them orders in keeping with the Tehran Declaration" and that the Iranian forces be allowed to pass.<sup>29</sup> In conclusion the note stated:

Nations such as Iran were encouraged at the United Nations Conference at San Francisco to place full trust in the friendly intentions and good will of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Government of the United States is confident that the Soviet Union and Great Britain are no less anxious than the United States, in dealing with nations such as Iran, to follow a line of action which will make it clear that the trust of these nations in the permanent members of the Security Council has not been misplaced. Similar proposals are being made to the British Government.<sup>30</sup>

On November 27, 1945, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr,<sup>31</sup> British ambassador to the U.S.S.R., handed Vyacheslav Molotov,<sup>32</sup>

29. Ibid., p. 54.

30. Ibid., p. 55.

31. Archibald Clark Kerr entered the diplomatic service in 1906, and was envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the Central American Republics, 1925-28: to Chile, 1928-30; to Sweden, 1931-35. He was ambassador to Baghdad, 1935-39; to China, 1939-42; to the U.S.S.R. 1942-45; and to the United States 1946-48. He was created Lord Inverchapel in 1946.

32. Vyacheslav M. Molotov (1890- ) was a member of the Bolshevik party and served in the communist revolutionary government in 1917. He has been secretary of the central committee of the communist party since 1921, and was minister of foreign affairs, 1939-46.

the Soviet minister for foreign affairs, a note that followed quite closely the note sent by the United States.<sup>33</sup>

The Soviet government replied to the United States note on November 29, 1945.<sup>34</sup> The note stated that according to information at the disposal of the Soviet government, the statement made in the United States note concerning the armed uprising in northern Iran did not correspond to the facts. These events had not constituted an armed uprising and were not directed against the Iranian government. On the contrary, it was evident that this was:

...a matter of aspirations with respect to the assurance of the democratic rights of the Azerbaijan population of northern Iran, which is seeking national autonomy within the limits of the Iranian State, and which has its own language, different from the Persian language.<sup>35</sup>

The note also stated that the "undesirable" incidents which had taken place had been caused by reactionary elements who were opposed to the extension of national rights to the population of northern Iran.

Emphatically denying the accusations made in the Soviet note, the Iranian government declared again that there was

33. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1., pp. 56-57.

34. Ibid., pp. 57-58.

35. Ibid., p. 57.

an armed uprising that amounted to rebellion. It denounced the Azerbaijan "Popular Assembly" as illegal.<sup>36</sup>

While this exchange of notes between the United States and British governments with the Soviet government had been proceeding, the Iranian government had sent the Soviet Union a number of communications protesting Soviet interference.<sup>37</sup> The communications dated November 17, 22, and 23, and December 1, 1945 are cited as examples.

A note from the Iranian foreign minister to the Soviet embassy in Tehran on November 17 cited a number of individual instances in which Soviet officials had interfered with Iranian internal affairs in the northern provinces.<sup>38</sup> The Soviet government was informed that orders had been given for the dispatch of the governor-general, governors, and other officials to their posts in the northern provinces, posts which hitherto had remained vacant because of Soviet interference. Troops were also being sent to re-establish order, and the Iranian government requested the Soviet government to allow these officials and troops to proceed to their destination.

36. Ibid., p. 36.

37. Ibid., pp. 43 and 61, for index to communications.

38. Ibid., p. 52.

On November 22, a note was sent by the Iranian ministry of foreign affairs to the Soviet embassy which informed the embassy that the Iranian troops mentioned in the note of November 17, had been stopped on their way to Tabriz from Tehran.<sup>39</sup> It was requested that the Soviet government telegraph instructions to Soviet military authorities that the troops be allowed to proceed. Again it was emphasized that only the early arrival of this force could restore order in Azerbaijan.

The Iranian government sent the Soviet embassy a note on November 23, and the request that telegraphic instruction should be issued to the Soviet military authorities to let the Iranian troops pass, was urgently renewed.<sup>40</sup> The assurances made by the Soviet government in the tri-partite treaty and the Tehran declaration were called to its attention

In replying to these Iranian communications, the Soviet embassy on November 26 denied the accusation that Soviet authorities were interfering in the internal affairs of Iran.<sup>41</sup> After reviewing in detail the charges contained in the Iranian

39. Ibid., p. 52.

40. Ibid., p. 53.

41. Ibid., pp. 55-56.



note of November 17, the Soviet government declared that no responsibility was attached to it for the absence of governors or other officials in the northern provinces. With regard to the dispatch of armed forces to Azerbaijan, the reason given for the holding up of the Iranian forces was that their arrival in this province would cause disturbances and bloodshed. The Soviets could not let this happen.

Since Soviet actions had constituted a breach of Iranian sovereignty and independence, the Iranian government countered that the arguments of the Soviet government were inadmissible. Therefore on November 26, the Iranian government addressed a note to the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, which stated that disturbances and disorders had occurred in parts of Azerbaijan and that the central government had lost touch with its officials and was unable to issue the necessary instructions to the authorities concerned. The Iranian government stated its willingness to examine any complaints which did not constitute acts of disobedience against the central government, but it hoped that the three governments would recognize the need of taking steps against the rebel elements. Attention was drawn to the fact that the question was of the utmost importance and

42. Ibid., p. 56.

urgency, and Iran asked that the power concerned (the U.S.S.R.) should give the necessary instructions to its authorities to relieve the situation.

On December 1, the Iranian government answered the Soviet note of November 26 referred to above.<sup>43</sup> It was asserted that the Iranian government did not wish to give further explanations concerning the charges of interference of Soviet officials in the past in the internal affairs of Iran, charges which the Soviet Union had said were unfounded. Hope was expressed that the intervention of Soviet authorities in the internal affairs of Iran would cease; in order to maintain public order and national security, Iranian forces must have full jurisdiction over Iranian territory.

Since it was unable to secure Soviet compliance with its requests, the Iranian government again sent a note to the governments of the Big Three.<sup>44</sup> It was noted that in view of the fact that the presence of foreign troops in Iran had caused dislocation in all the affairs of the country, it was essential that the question of putting an end to the situation should be discussed at the foreign ministers conference then being held in Moscow.

43. Ibid., pp. 58-60.

44. Ibid., p. 60.

Consequently, at this conference Ernst Bevin,<sup>45</sup> supported  
by James F. Byrnes,<sup>46</sup> made a proposal that a tri-partite  
commission for Iranian affairs, composed of the representatives  
of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union,  
be formed and invested with wide powers. According to the  
Information Bulletin put out by the U.S.S.R. embassy in  
the United States:

The Soviet Government, true to its policy  
of respecting the state independence of all  
countries, declined the proposal as one violating  
the sovereignty and national independence of Iran.  
In this case the Soviet Government acted in the  
spirit of the principles of democracy in relations  
between countries and nations big and small, which  
it consistently and steadfastly pursues in all  
its actions on the international scene.<sup>47</sup>

Since nothing came out of the foreign ministers con-  
ference in Moscow to help the Iranian government's case,  
on January 19, 1946 Iran submitted the question of inter-  
vention in its internal affairs to the Security Council  
would recommend that the Soviet government cease its inter-  
ference in the internal affairs of Iran, and also that it

45. Ernst Bevin, (1881-1951) was a member of the economic  
advisory council and various labor organizations. He was  
minister of labor and national service, 1940-45, and was  
chairman of the trades union congress in 1937. In 1945  
he was made secretary of state for foreign affairs, and  
in 1946 he was a delegate to the United Nations.

46. James F. Byrnes, (1879- ) was a member of congress,  
1911-25, and was a senator in 1931. From 1941-42 he was  
a associate justice of the U.S. supreme court, and in 1943  
was director of economic stabilisation. He was director  
of the office of war mobilisation, 1943-45, and was secretary  
of state, 1945-47. In 1946 he was a delegate to the United  
Nations.

would order its military and civil authorities in Iran to permit Iranian forces and officials to carry out their functions of maintaining law and order.

#### IV

Iran has become over the centuries an area of controversy for several great powers. The two powers mostly involved in furthering their policies at Persian (or Iranian) expense have been Russia (the Soviet Union) and Great Britain. But at times other powers have shown interest in the internal affairs of Iran, as evidenced by Germany before the two world wars and the United States in World War II. Whereas Imperial Russia and Great Britain were able to reach an agreement over their respective interests in Iran, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, except during World War II, have been unable to do so. This divergence of views between the Soviet Union and Great Britain has helped Iran to maintain its sovereignty and independence. When the two great powers were able to compromise their views, Iran lost its sovereignty and independence and could do nothing about it. This intervention by great powers has had a profound effect on Iranian foreign policy and has resulted in the playing

47. Information Bulletin, Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Vol. VI., No. 44., Washington D.C., May 11, 1946, p. 378.

off by Iran of one great power against the other. In this way only has it been able to keep some semblance of sovereignty and independence.

When an international organization was created after World War I, Iran, to settle its difficulties with the British over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and with the new Russian Republic, referred the disputes to the League of Nations. The League proved a help to Iran in its negotiations with its powerful neighbors, even though the solution of the disputes was found outside the League. Iran profited from League backing, because the League carried enough prestige to influence the decisions of the negotiations.

When both Great Britain and the Soviet Union considered that the situation in Iran warranted intervention in World War II, Iran's sovereignty was violated, and it was forced to agree to a treaty that gave the Allies almost everything they wanted. While the great powers were in agreement, Iran had no chance to protect its interests, but after the war, Iran again was able to play them off against each other. After its unsuccessful appeal to the Soviet Union to cease intervention in Iran's domestic affairs, Iran had to take its case to the international organization, the United Nations.

The U.S.S.R. had not lived up to its commitments made to Iran in the Soviet hour of need. When it was assured of

victory over Germany, the Soviet Union's attitude toward Iran changed. Its interference in the internal affairs of Iran led to a dispute that was to be the prelude to the "cold war" a tension that in turn was to characterize the split between the west and east. Fortunately for Iran, there was an international organization to which it could present its complaints and hope for a justifiable settlement.

## CHAPTER 2.

### THE BEVIN RESOLUTION

The Iranian question was introduced to the United Nations during the second meeting of the Security Council in London on January 25, 1946. Sayyid H. Taqizadeh,<sup>1</sup> head of the Iranian delegation, earlier had sent a letter on January 19, 1946 to Gladwyn Jebb,<sup>2</sup> executive secretary of the United Nations,<sup>3</sup> in which he complained of the interference of Soviet officials and armed forces in Iranian internal affairs. At that time, the Iranian government claimed that Iran unsuccessfully had tried to negotiate with the Soviet Union under the provisions of Article 33<sup>4</sup>

1. Sayyid H. Taqizadeh was born at Tabriz, Iran. He was minister to Great Britain, 1929-30 and minister to France, 1933-34. Again minister to Great Britain, 1941-44, he also became chairman of the Iranian delegation to the General Assembly in London, 1946.

2. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No. 1., Church House, Westminster, London, (17 January 1946 to 16 February 1946), p. 15.

3. Hubert Miles (Gladwyn) Jebb, (1900- ) entered diplomatic service in 1924, and was made acting councilor in the foreign office, 1941. In 1942 he became head of the reconstruction department, and in 1946 he became deputy to the assistant under-secretary of state and the United Nations advisor.

4. Article 33 of the United Nations Charter: "1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, recourse to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice. 2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

of the Charter. Now, because of the failure of the attempt to negotiate, Iran was submitting the dispute to the Security Council under Article 35, paragraph 1.<sup>5</sup>

Prior to the submission of the question to the Security Council, the Iranian letter had been circulated among the members of the Council. Therefore, the president, N.J.O. Makin of Australia,<sup>6</sup> felt that there was no need to read it, and since there were no comments from any of the members, the question was included on the agenda without delay.

At the beginning of the discussion, Andrei Y. Vyshinsky<sup>7</sup> (U.S.S.R.) wanted to know whether the inclusion of the question on the agenda had been for "consideration of the question or discussion as to whether it should come before the Council

5. Article 35, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter: "Any member of the United Nations may bring any dispute or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly."

6. Norman J.O. Makin, (1889- ) became speaker of the house of representatives, 1929-31, and was minister for navy and munitions, 1941-46. He was ambassador to the U.S.A., representative to the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Trusteeship Council, in 1946 for Australia.

7. Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, (1893- ) became a member of the Communist party in 1920, and a commissar for the deputy public-prosecutor and public prosecutor, 1935-39. He was vice-foreign minister in 1946 and was the chairman of the U.S.S.R. delegation to the General Assembly and a member of the Security Council.



at all?"<sup>8</sup> If it were only intended to discuss whether the question should be considered or not, he had no objection to its inclusion on the agenda. Even so, he was going to present to the Council, at the next meeting, reasons why the question should not be considered at all.

Because he believed that the Iranian question was put before the Council to embarrass the Soviet Union, Vyshinsky at this time counter-attacked by asking for the inclusion of the Greek question on the agenda to embarrass the United Kingdom. But, Bevin countered this move by claiming that he wanted everything "brought out into the open" where he could clear up any misunderstandings as to Britain's relations with Greece.<sup>9</sup> He also wanted the Iranian delegate to be given a chance to state his case at the Council table.

In agreeing fully with Bevin, Edward R. Stettinius<sup>10</sup> revealed the existence of an Anglo-American bloc that was soon to be an anti-Soviet bloc. Indeed, at the very beginning of the discussion over Iran, the split between east and west

8. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No. 1., p. 16.

9. Ibid., p. 17.

10. Edward R. Stettinius, (1900-1949) was chairman of the war resources board, 1939 and lend-lease administrator, 1941-43. He was secretary of state, 1944-45 and chairman of the U.S.A. delegation to Dumbarton Oaks, 1944 and UNCIO, 1945. In 1946 he was representative to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

became evident, and it progressively worsened as the dispute continued. The United States and the United Kingdom representatives from the first to the last of the dispute remained in complete accord.

After listening to the arguments just presented, Abdel Hamid Badawi Pasha, (Egypt)<sup>11</sup> formally moved to have the Iranian delegate seated at the Council table. And when Vyshinsky showed no opposition to the seating of the Iranian delegate, the Egyptian delegate's resolution was adopted without opposition.<sup>12</sup> The Iranian delegate was not seated in this meeting, however, because the members got involved in a debate over whether the Council could discuss a case after it had been heard, eventually deciding that the Council had the competence to decide the treatment to be accorded various matters when they came before it.<sup>13</sup> The president then adjourned the meeting.

11. Abdel Hamid Badawi Pasha, (1887- ) became legal advisor to the government, 1922-23, and was chief legal advisor, 1926-40. He was minister for foreign affairs, 1945-46 and was chairman of the Egyptian delegation to the UNCIO, 1945. In 1946 he was representative to the General Assembly and the Security Council and a judge on the International Court of Justice.

12. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No. 1., pp. 18-19.

13. Ibid., pp. 19-20.

Already it had been decided that each member would serve as president for one month, and they would assume the office alphabetically, beginning with the Australian representative. In this first meeting to hear the Iranian question, the pattern for later meetings was set. Issues would be decided when they arose; no comprehensive plan of conduct was to be worked out in advance. Already, too, the anti-Soviet bloc was forming, and the Soviet delegation from the beginning tried to prove that the Iranian case was false.

## II

The Iranian question was taken up again in the third meeting of the Security Council on January 28, 1946. After inquiring if the Council had any comment on the seating of the Iranian delegate, the president observed that the Iranian question was the first occasion on which the Security Council had been called upon to act under Chapter 6 of the Charter ("Pacific Settlement of Disputes"). Consequently, since the proceedings in this case were likely to serve as precedents for the future, the Council should act with care. To get under way, the president suggested that the Iranian argument be heard first and then the Soviet. At this point, Vyshinsky interrupted to say that the question could be discussed only in its procedural aspect, after which the Council accepted the president's proposal and sat back to

hear the Iranian case.

Taking considerable time to present his case, Taqizadeh examined the tri-partite treaty and the Tehran declaration, explaining in detail the manner in which the Soviet Union had violated its pledges by its recent actions in Iran. The Iranian delegate at the same time submitted a memorandum<sup>14</sup> in which the particulars of Soviet interference were restated in greater detail, and all the communications between Iran, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom were noted. His basic argument was that Iran had tried to negotiate with the Soviet government, but, in spite of all that the Iranian government had done, and for reasons unknown to the Iranian delegate, the Soviet government had refused to work for a settlement. He called attention to the Iranian note of December 1, 1945 in which the Iranian government had expressed satisfaction with a Soviet note that earlier had implied that interference by Soviet troops and authorities would cease. But in this same note, the Iranian government also had asked unsuccessfully for a Soviet guarantee of freedom of movement for Iranian officials and troops in Iran. In making his accusations, Taqizadeh carefully reminded the listeners that Iran at all times wanted friendly relations with its northern neighbor.

14. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1., Church House, Westminster, London, 1946, pp. 25-42.

Vyshinsky, in rebutting the Iranian argument, for the moment put aside the question of substance (the actual situation as it existed in Iran) and dealt only with the procedural aspects of the question.<sup>15</sup> Because they did not meet the conditions specified in the Charter, the questions raised by the Iranian delegate could not be discussed, so Vyshinsky argued. As he said, there were two main points in the procedural aspect: first, whether negotiations had taken place; and second, whether results had been achieved by negotiations. According to Vyshinsky, the Iranian delegate had refuted his own statement that no negotiations had taken place by admitting that not only had the Iranian government endeavored to negotiate with the Soviet government, but that such negotiations actually had taken place. It was Vyshinsky's contention that the Iranian government was satisfied with the results of the negotiations of November and December, 1945. As proof, he cited the Iranian note of December 1, 1945 already mentioned by the Iranian delegate.

Vyshinsky made much of the fact that the U.S.S.R. had the legal right to keep troops in Iran. This legal right had been obtained, of course, under the tri-partite treaty which gave the Soviet Union six months after the cessation of hostilities with Germany to withdraw its troops. But the six month period was not yet ended, since the Soviet Union

15. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.1., p. 39.

had set the terminal date six months after the end of the war with Japan rather than the war with Germany, as had been specified in the treaty. March 2, was the date given by the Soviet Union for the withdrawal of its troops.

While trying to conform the articles of Chapter 6 to his viewpoint, Vyshinsky got into the legality of the question. As concerned Article 33, bilateral negotiations had been and were then taking place, and the Council consequently could not call on the U.S.S.R. to take the steps provided for by the article. He denied that Article 34 was applicable to the question, since it related to a dispute or situation of quite a different order. Because the Iranian complaint needed no such recommendations as provided for in Article 36, paragraph 1,<sup>17</sup> it too did not fit the case. The only method for settling the Iranian question was bilateral negotiations between the disputants.

16. Article 34 of the United Nations Charter: "The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."

17. Article 36, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter: "The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment."

Vyshinsky also denied that Article 37, paragraph 1,<sup>18</sup> permitted the Iranian charges. This article envisaged a situation in which the parties to a dispute found themselves unable to reach an agreement. But, Vyshinsky averred, no such situation existed in the relations of the U.S.S.R. and Iran, and, consequently, there was no foundation for the application of this article to the Iranian complaints. Having decided that no part of Chapter 6 applied to the Iranian question, Vyshinsky concluded that the Council had no legal grounds for considering it.

The members by this time were tired of listening to the lengthy exposition by Taqizadeh and to the equally long Soviet tirade, and the president thereupon proposed the postponement of the discussion until the next meeting. Vyshinsky arguing the inexpediency of dividing the discussion into two parts by a postponement, was overruled<sup>19</sup> by the rest of the Council, and the meeting was adjourned. Discussion of the Iranian matter was postponed until January 30.

18. Article 37, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter: "Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council."

19. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No. 1., p. 44.

Both parties to the dispute had presented their views in this meeting, and, as can be seen disagreed as to whether negotiations had been concluded or not. Vyshinsky presented a good argument against keeping the question on the agenda with his interpretation of the articles under Chapter 6. At the same time, however, the Iranian delegate made a good case out of the tri-partite treaty, the Tehran declaration, and the alleged violations of these Soviet commitments by the Soviets themselves.

### III

Since the discussion of the Iranian question had been postponed until January 30, it did not come up again until the fifth meeting of the Council. Repeating the request of the Iranian delegate to make supplementary remarks to his statement of the third meeting, the president proposed that Taqizadeh be allowed to speak.<sup>20</sup> It should be remembered that since the Iranian delegate had no voice in the proceedings of the Council, he had to be invited especially at each meeting to sit at the Council table.

Having gained the floor, the Iranian delegate contested the Soviet viewpoint that, since there had been negotiations between the two parties, the Iranian complaint could not be brought to the attention of the Council. Facts from the Iranian memorandum of the third meeting again were presented

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., pp. 45-46.



as evidence that negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and Iran had failed. Moreover, the eagerness of the Iranian government to keep on good terms with the U.S.S.R. was demonstrated when Taqizadeh told how the Iranian prime minister, Ahmad Ghavam,<sup>21</sup> had even offered to go to Moscow in the hope of reaching a settlement. But the Soviet government had ignored the offer of direct negotiation in Moscow. No negotiations for the settlement of the dispute had taken place. "This also included the note of December 1, 1945 mentioned earlier).

Taqizadeh was very animated in maintaining that the dispute, having found a place on the agenda, under "no circumstances must it go out of the hands of the Council; it must be pursued." An Iranian proposal for dealing with the question was presented:

The Council should take this matter under its jurisdiction; negotiations should proceed under its aegis. Progress should be reported to the Council from time to time, and the results should be reported to it with in a reasonable lapse of time. In this way, we are ready to get into direct negotiations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but under no circumstances are we prepared to let the matter go out of the Council.<sup>22</sup>

21. Ahmad Ghavam, (1872- ) held various cabinet posts, 1910-23 and in 1946 was appointed premier, minister of interior, and minister of foreign affairs.

22. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No. 1., p. 49.

After Taqizadeh had finished his rebuttal, Vyshinsky<sup>23</sup> for the second time denounced the Iranian case. He attacked Taqizadeh's supplementary statement that there had been no direct negotiations. There must have been direct negotiations, he said, since there had to be a third person or state to have indirect negotiations, and there was no third person or state in this case. Anyway, it did not matter whether there had been direct or indirect negotiations, as long as there had been negotiations. Again commenting on the Iranian note of December 1, Vyshinsky asserted that the Iranian government had been satisfied with the result of the negotiations. The Iranian delegate was accused of deliberately confusing the situation, and moreover, the Iranians were not to be trusted. These were strong words, but the disparity in power between the two disputants made it possible for Vyshinsky to say almost any thing he wished about Iran or its delegates.

According to Vyshinsky, the presence of Soviet troops in Azerbaijan had nothing to do with the events that had occurred there. The rebellion was an internal Iranian matter, and the people of Azerbaijan were only trying to secure their rightful national autonomy. Since the movement did not constitute anything unusual in any democratic country, there was nothing particularly wrong with it.

23. Ibid., p. 49.

Interference with Iranian troops on their way to Azerbaijan was explained by Vyshinsky. By allowing Iranian troops to proceed, much bloodshed and a "useless massacre" would have resulted, and the Soviet troops could not have let that happen, of course. Moreover, the Iranian notes following the note of December 1, were sent only with the hope of taking advantage of the Moscow conference. Indeed, Vyshinsky argued, the motive of the notes was to advance the idea that all foreign troops should leave Iran. The Iranian proposal just made by Taqizadeh was not in keeping with the Soviet position. Vyshinsky vigorously opposed having the U.S.S.R. placed under some sort of special supervision. It was incompatible with its dignity as a member of the Security Council and "as incompatible with the dignity of the United Nations."<sup>24</sup>

Taking exception to the Soviet representative's last remarks, Taqizadeh replied that he had never admitted that there had been negotiations without results as provided for in Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Charter.

Before the president opened the matter to general discussion, the two divergent arguments can be summed up in a few words. The Iranian stand was that no negotiations had taken place and that Iran had every right under the relevant articles of the Charter to present its case to

24: Ibid., p. 53.

the Council and to expect judgment on it. The Soviet position was that negotiations had taken place and that the Iranian government had shown satisfaction over the negotiations in the December 1 note. Also the Iranian action in presenting the case to the Council was illegal, in that it did not fulfill the requirements of the articles under Chapter 6 of the Charter.

After the president had opened the question to discussion, Bevin started the debate by reading Article 4 of the tri-partite treaty, which stated that the occupation forces would not constitute a military occupation and that internal affairs of Iran would be left alone.<sup>25</sup> Because he understood that it was an Iranian domestic matter, Bevin was "a little perturbed" when he heard Vyshinsky say that it was the Soviet Union that had decided how many Iranian troops and police would be allowed in Azerbaijan. Gratitude was expressed for the Iranian co-operation received in the war. Since the United Kingdom delegate could understand and respect the tri-partite treaty, he could not understand why the Soviets either could or would not understand and respect it. The whole Soviet position looked like a "war of nerves" to Bevin. Because he felt that Iran should have the backing of the United Nations in its predicament and should not be left alone to face the Soviet

25. Ibid., pp. 54-55.

Union, his conclusion was that the question should be left on the agenda.

Stettinius expressed somewhat the same view as Bevin and made a suggestion to this effect:

Cannot the Council agree to permit the two parties to negotiate voluntarily and keep the Council informed until a mutually satisfactory solution is found in accordance with justice?<sup>26</sup>

Taking note that this was the first case brought before the Security Council and that it called for the greatest care on the part of the Council in dealing with it, Wellington Koo<sup>27</sup> (China) said the idea presented by the United States delegate was a good one.<sup>28</sup> Also the Soviet delegate should be congratulated for his assurances of good will. The French representative, Georges Bidault,<sup>29</sup> also argued that this

26. Ibid., p. 58.

27. V.K. Wellington Koo, (1888- ) became minister of foreign affairs in 1922, 1924, and 1931, and was prime minister in 1927. He was a member of the world court, 1922-23, and was also a delegate to the League of Nations Assembly and Council, 1932-39. In 1945 he was a representative to the UNCIO, and in 1946 to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

28. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.1., pp. 58-59.

29. Georges Bidault, (1899- ) was leader of the popular democratic party and was elected president of the national resistance council, 1943. He was twice minister of foreign affairs since 1944, and was once premier-president. He was a member of the council of foreign ministers, and was chairman of the French delegation to the UNCIO, 1945 and the General Assembly and Security Council, 1946.

case was important from the standpoint of precedent.<sup>30</sup>  
Because he adhered to the view that the parties to the dispute should be allowed to negotiate and that the Council retain the right to reconsider the question at any time if the negotiations failed, Bidault approved of the attitude of the anti-Soviet bloc.

A point of view differing from the last four now came to light when Zygmunt Modzelewski<sup>31</sup> (Poland) backed the Soviet representative's idea to have the parties settle the dispute by direct negotiation.<sup>32</sup> A divergence between the Soviet bloc and the anti-Soviet bloc can be noted from the way in which the members of the Council expressed their views. Poland usually followed the Soviet lead and usually was the only one on the Soviet side.

Elco H. van Kleffens<sup>33</sup> (Netherlands) made a proposal which he thought would meet the case.<sup>34</sup> It followed somewhat the Stettinius suggestion, in that while the parties

30. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.1., p. 59.

31. Zygmunt Modzelewski, (1900- ) was an officer in the Polish army in World War II, and was ambassador to the U.S.S.R. and was minister of foreign affairs, 1945. He was representative to the General Assembly and Security Council, 1946.

32. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.1., p. 60.

33. Elco H. van Kleffens, (1894- ) became a member of the secretariat of the League of Nations, 1919-21, and was in the ministry for foreign affairs, 1923-29. He was chief of the diplomatic section, 1929-39, and was minister without portfolio and Netherlands representative on the Security Council and Economic and Social Commission, 1946-47.

34. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.1., pp. 60-61.

would negotiate directly, the question would be kept on the agenda. Speaking not as the president of the Council, but as the representative of Australia, Makin agreed with the British, American, Chinese, French and Netherlands representatives, i.e., that the question should be kept on the agenda.

Bevin withed to hear the Netherlands delegate's proposal read in full, and van Kleffens complied. After he had heard what was proposed, Bevin suggested two amendments that negotiations should be resumed immediately, and that the parties should keep the Council informed of the results.<sup>36</sup> These suggestions were considered tantamount to a resolution, Although favourably impressed with Bevin's suggestions, Stettinius wanted it understood that the question would remain on the agenda. Bevin said that this was intended, and the two western allies as usual reached agreement; As he saw nothing different in the two proposals, van Kleffens withdrew his proposal for the British.

A different idea came into the discussion when Modzelewski suggested the substitution of another text for the last part of Bevin's resolution, to the effect that no time limit be placed on the disputants to report the progress of the negotiations taking place between them.<sup>37</sup> Bevin immediately

35. Ibid., pp. 61-62.

36. Ibid., p. 63.

37. Ibid., p. 65.

took exception and brought Article 35 into the discussion. If the Polish amendment were accepted, Bevin argued, it would mean that the Council had heard the question and had gotten rid of it without seeing that results had been achieved.

After being quiet for sometime, Vyshinsky now got back into the discussion. Since the question did not threaten world peace, it could not remain on the agenda.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, there were no grounds for Bevin's resolution, and it should be removed from the agenda. He also intimated that there was more to the British proposal than met the eye, i.e., that the British representative had some other reason than a desire to settle the dispute. Bevin denied the Soviet charge and was sure that if Vyshinsky looked at the matter "in a reasonable way and without suspicion," he could see the legality of the resolution.<sup>39</sup> The resolution was proposed, not out of any distrust of the Soviet government, but to fulfill the obligations imposed by the Charter.

Declaring that the question of leaving or of not leaving the matter on the agenda was merely a formality, Koo asserted that the Council had the power and the responsibility to investigate any question or situation which might affect world peace in general. Of this he was certain, he regarded

38. The Security Council can discuss only disputes or situations that threaten the maintenance of world peace.

39. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No. 1., p. 67.



the proposal that the question remain on the agenda as pure formality. If the negotiations were satisfactory, the Council would be only too happy to take the question off the agenda. If the negotiations were unsuccessful, one or the other party would be back to present its case, and the Council again would consider the question. With respect to the Iranian question, this seemed to be one of the most logical deductions yet presented that ascertained the Council's power and responsibility.

The President wished to know whether the Council felt like adjourning, but Vyshinsky wanted to know why the discussion should be interrupted again; he wanted to "take" a decision.<sup>40</sup> The debate continued, and the Iranian representative stated that Iran would negotiate only were the dispute to remain before the Council.<sup>41</sup> If the small nation's appeal were dismissed, the small nation's of the world would lose confidence in the Security Council.

Modzelewski made an accurate remark when he called attention to the fact that, if the members started referring to the various articles of the Charter, justification could be found for anything.<sup>42</sup> He wanted a vote taken on his amendment to Bevin's resolution, since he thought his amendment was the best submitted.

40. Ibid., p. 69.

41. Ibid., p. 69.

42. Ibid., pp. 69-70.

Before a vote could be taken on Modzelewski's amendment, Bevin read his resolution:

The Council,

Having heard the statements by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Iran in the course of its meetings of 28 and 30 January, and

Having taken cognizance of the documents presented by the Soviet and Iranian delegations and those referred to in the course of the oral debates;

Considering that both parties have affirmed their readiness to seek a solution of the matter at issue by negotiation; and that such negotiations will be resumed in the near future;

Requests the parties to inform the Council of any results achieved in such negotiations. The Council in the meanwhile retains the right at any time to request information on the progress of the negotiations.<sup>43</sup>

The president asked Modzelewski if he wished to proceed with his amendment. The Polish delegate replied in the affirmative and gave as his reason that he objected to the words in the third paragraph, "and that such negotiations will be resumed in the near future." He would accept the resolution if these words were deleted, because then his proposal and Bevin's would not diverge. After Bevin had maintained that Modzelewski had proposed nothing different, the situation was cleared up by Stettinius. Since he was the only one who had insisted on the words "remaining on the agenda," he was willing to accept Bevin's proposal

43. Ibid., p. 70.

with the understanding that the question would remain a continuing concern of the Council until a settlement had been reached. Hodzelewski said the misunderstanding was because of his poor English and withdrew his amendment. The resolution proposed by the representative of the United Kingdom was adopted unanimously, and the meeting was adjourned. 44

#### IV

With out taking time completely to organize itself or to adopt rules of procedure and general overall policies, the Security Council, at its second meeting, considered the Iranian question. It did not evade its responsibility as some observers had feared, and it showed the determination of the delegates to make a working organization out of the United Nations and to avoid, if possible, another world conflict.

The Iranian dispute showed quite clearly the growing rift between the Soviet and anti-Soviet blocs. When Poland, part of the Soviet satellite system, was the only nation to back the Soviet Union's proposals, the split became quite obvious. It seemed as if there were a personal antagonism between the United Kingdom representative, Bevin, and the Soviet representative, Vyshinsky. Since his resolution was adopted, Bevin emerged the victor in these particular

44. Ibid., p. 71.

meetings in his debate with Vyshinsky. Since the Soviet delegate, who at all times had claimed that it was illegal to include the question on the agenda, ended by not opposing the adoption of the resolution, the Devin resolution was adopted unanimously.

The American delegate, Stettinius, expressed himself very briefly and then only to back Devin. The main play of words was between the Soviet representative on one hand and the United Kingdom representative with support from the Chinese, French, Netherlands, American and the Iranian delegates on the other.

The United Kingdom resolution was passed amid hopes that the Iranian question would be settled by negotiation and could be forgotten. The question already had placed a strain on the new United Nations, and some observers felt that it was not important enough to jeopardize the future of the organization.

### CHAPTER 3.

#### THE SOVIET WALKOUT

##### I

The hopes and expectations of the members of the Security Council that they were through with the Iranian question were not fulfilled. The Security Council was no sooner settled in its new quarters at Hunter College, New York than the Iranian dispute confronted it again. The first meeting of the Security Council in its new quarters was on March 25, 1946, and the Iranian question came up on March 26.

A letter dated March 18, 1946 from the Iranian representative to the secretary-general and a indential copy to the president of the Council brought the question directly to the attention of the Security Council.<sup>1</sup> The Iranian government presented its case under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Charter, the same article it had used when first presenting its case. While the note mentioned new troubles that had developed since the adoption of the Bevin resolution, Soviet intervention in Iranian affairs and the presence of Soviet troops on Iranian soil were still the main Iranian complaints. The Iranian government maintained that it wished to remain an independent and sovereign state, and the immediate and just solution of the dispute by the Security

1. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 2., Hunter College, the Bronx, New York, pp. 43-44.

Council was of the greatest importance for the preservation of good relations with the U.S.S.R.

<sup>2</sup>  
Andrei Gromyko, representing the Soviet Union in place of Vyshinsky, said that the U.S.S.R. "placed a great amount of faith" in the Security Council as the chief organ for the maintenance of world peace and security.<sup>3</sup> After assuring the Council of Soviet belief in the United Nations and of Soviet disbelief in the domination of one country of another, Gromyko proceeded to attack the Iranian letter along the lines already set down by Vyshinsky. An understanding had been reached between the disputants: the evacuation of Soviet troops had begun, in particular, on March 24.<sup>4</sup> Stating that there was no reason for the inclusion of the "so called Iranian question" and that negotiations were continuing, the Soviet delegate made a proposal to the effect that the Iranian question not be placed on the agenda. The inclusion

2. Andrei Gromyko, (1909- ) became counselor to the embassy in Washington, 1939-43, and was deputy minister for foreign affairs, 1946. In 1945, he was acting chairman of the U.S.S.R. delegation to the UNCIO, and in 1946 he became a permanent representative to the United Nations.

3. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No. 2., Hunter College, New York, (25 March to 26 June, 1946), p. 10.

4. Ibid., p. 11.

of the question now would contradict the meaning and the spirit of the resolution previously adopted on January 30.

Byrnes, now representing the U.S.A., immediately took issue with the Soviet representative.<sup>5</sup> If there had been an understanding between the two disputants, why was there not a joint statement to that effect? It was intimated by Byrnes that all that was contemplated was the adoption of a agenda that would give the Iranian government an opportunity to present facts which in its opinion constituted a threat to international peace.

The solidarity of the anti-Soviet bloc was again proved as Sir Alexander Cadogan,<sup>6</sup> now representing the United Kingdom, endorsed what the United States representative had just stated. There were two aspects to the question according to Cadogan: (1) the resolution of January 30th (the Bevin resolution) permitting the Council to request information on the progress of negotiations between the disputants, and (2) the new information presented by the Iranian representative.

5. Ibid., pp. 13-15.

6. Sir Alexander George Montagu Cadogan, (1894- ) became a delegate to the League of Nations, and from 1938 to 1946 he was permanent under secretary of state for foreign affairs, and attended all the Big Three conferences in World War II. He was responsible for the 1st draft of the Atlantic Charter and was the chairman of the United Kingdom delegation at Lambarton Oaks, 1944. In 1945, he was a member of the United Kingdom delegation to the UNCTO, and to the General Assembly and the Security Council in 1946.

A third aspect also raised which Cadogan thought important, the question of confidence, "confidence that the sanctity of treaties will be respected."<sup>7</sup> He referred to the tripartite treaty in this respect and the Soviet violation of it.

Other representatives of the Council again gravitated to one bloc or another. The Australian delegate summarized the position of the anti-Soviet bloc when he said:

Now we ask ourselves two questions. First is the subject matter of this alleged dispute one which comes within the competence of the Council? The answer, to my mind, is yes. The second question is: has it been properly presented? The answer to that is also yes. In the original letter to the Secretary-General of 19 March, two parties to the dispute are named. One of those parties only has requested that this particular item should not be included in the agenda. We have no information, no evidence before us whatever.

Therefore the view of the Australian delegation is that<sup>8</sup> this question should be placed on the agenda.

<sup>9</sup>  
Hassan Pasha, now representing Egypt, agreed with the anti-Soviet bloc.

<sup>10</sup>  
Oscar Lange, (Poland) however, supported the Soviet

7. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.2., p. 15.

8. Ibid., p. 16.

9. Mahmoud Hassan Pasha, (1893- ) was educated in law. He was the first Egyptian minister to the Scandanavian countries, 1936-1938 and was minister to the U.S.A., 1938-. He was a representative to the UNCIO in 1945, and in 1946 to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

10. Oscar Lange, (1904- ) became a professor of economics, and taught in Poland and the U.S.A. He was ambassador to the U.S.A., 1945-47 and was representative to the Security Council, 1946.



bloo. He suggested that the Iranian complaint be deleted from the agenda of this particular meeting though he wanted the question kept on the agenda in the sense that the Council was bound to do so under the Bevin resolution. Lange interpreted the term "agenda" to mean the particular meeting in progress, and he therefore thought it proper to move the deletion of the question from the agenda of this particular meeting.<sup>11</sup> Van Kleffens thought that the Polish proposal was "quite complicated." All that had to be done was to apply Article 31 to the case. This article states that any member of the United Nations may participate in Security Council meetings without the right to vote, if its interests are affected. The other members, with the exception of the Polish delegate, took the anti-Soviet bloo's position on the inclusion of the question on the agenda.

Since the basic ideas of Articles 34 and 35 were to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that threatened world peace, Gromyko declared that the United States delegate's argument conflicted with the Charter.<sup>12</sup> The Iranian question did not meet this qualification. After

11. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.2., pp. 16-18.

12. Ibid., pp. 19-22.

attacking the speeches by Byrnes and Cadogan, the Soviet delegate said there was no doubt as to the truth of the Soviet statement on the results achieved during the course of the negotiations with Iran. To protect himself and to discredit the anti-Soviet bloc's arguments, Gromyko brought up the British stand in the Syrian-Lebanon case. The British in this case had "opposed any mention whatsoever of a time limit for the withdrawal of British forces from Syria and Lebanon."<sup>13</sup> Gromyko also intimated that the Iranian prime minister had no knowledge of the presentation of the question to the Council by Hussein Ala,<sup>14</sup> the Iranian ambassador to the United States.

Since it was well over an hour after 12 noon, the president now Quo Tai-Chi,<sup>15</sup> (China), proposed that the meeting be adjourned until the next afternoon, because the representatives of Egypt, Mexico, and the United States wished to speak. But on a proposal by Byrnes, the president called the next meeting for 3 p.m. the same afternoon.

13. Ibid., p. 21.

14 Hussein Ala, (1882- ) was chief of the cabinet of the ministry of foreign affairs, from 1906-17. He was a Persian delegate to Versailles peace conference, 1919-20, and was minister plenipotentiary to Spain, 1920. From 1921-24 he was chief envoy to the U.S.A., and was minister to France 1927-32, and a delegate to the League of Nations. He was Iranian ambassador to the U.S.A. in 1946.

15. Quo Tai-Chi, (1888- ) was a member of the Chinese delegation to the Paris peace conference, 1919 and to the League, 1932-38. He was minister of foreign affairs 1941-44, and was a representative to the General Assembly and the Security Council, 1946

As characteristic of the London meetings, the division of opinion between the east and west again came to light in the twenty-fifth meeting. The two blocs continued to oppose each other, and, as in London, the anti-Soviet bloc with the preponderance of the votes could have its own way in procedural matters. The Soviet representative, though ably stating his case (that he did not want the question included on the agenda) by questioning the legality of the Council's action under articles 34 and 35, was unable to influence the members of the anti-Soviet bloc.

## II

The twenty-sixth meeting was held according to Byrnes' wishes the same afternoon, and the discussion of the agenda again involved the Iranian question. The Egyptian representative was the first to speak. Dividing the problem into two parts he said, First, can the petition of the Iranian Government to this Council be received? Second, if so, may we ask about the facts and <sup>16</sup>not them." The Council had "put the cart before the horse," since it had been discussing the second part of the problem. He proposed that:

...the Council receive the complaint of the Iranian Government embodied in its several memoranda addressed to the Secretary-General and ask for an immediate vote on this question alone.<sup>17</sup>

16. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.2., pp. 22-23.

17. Ibid., p. 23.

Byrnes also thought that a vote should be taken on whether the question should be included on the agenda. Since the Soviet representative had made a proposal to delete the question from the agenda, he wanted a vote taken on it.<sup>18</sup> The representative of a small power, Francisco Castillo Najera,<sup>19</sup> (Mexico) brought up the small power's viewpoint. If the violation of the tri-partite treaty did not constitute a menace to international peace, "then all the small nations are at the mercy of the stronger ones."<sup>20</sup> Under no circumstances would he accept Gromyko's interpretation.

The question of procedure soon entered the discussion because Lange did not think that it was the proper procedure to vote on a motion to remove the Iranian question from the agenda. Henri Bonnet,<sup>21</sup> the French delegate, thought that the Council should adopt the agenda unanimously and postpone

18. Ibid., p. 23.

19. Francisco Castillo Najera, (1886- ) became minister to China, Belgium, Holland and France, 1922-25, and was ambassador to the U.S.A., 1935-45. He was foreign minister, 1945-46, and was representative to the UNCIO, 1945. In 1946 he was chairman of the Mexican delegation to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

20. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, no.2., p. 24.

21. Henri Bonnet, (1888- ) became a member of the League of Nations secretariat, first in the division of press information, and later as executive-secretary of the assistant secretary-general of the League, 1920-31. He was ambassador to the U.S.A. in 1944, and was a representative to the UNCIO in 1945 and to the Security Council in 1946.

discussion of the question until later.<sup>22</sup> This statement was the forerunner of a French proposal that later was to split the solidarity of the anti-Soviet bloc.

After Cadogan had commented on the point of procedure raised by the Polish representative, and Castillo Najera had stated that all that had to be done was to vote on item 4 of the agenda, i.e., the letters from the countries concerned, Gromyko again proceeded to argue the Soviet case.<sup>23</sup> He agreed with the French representative, because it was also his view not to discuss the Iranian question. He also wanted to know if his proposal would be voted on if it came after the vote on acceptance of item 4 of the agenda.

The debate over the agenda was beginning to get confused at this point. The Council spent a good deal of its time arguing over matters that seemed trivial, but it must be remembered that the Council then was establishing procedure to be used in later meetings, and the members wanted to get everything straightened out to their satisfaction.

The Polish and Soviet delegates disagreed on whether or not the Soviet proposal was an amendment or not. Deciding that the Soviet proposal was an amendment to item 4 of the agenda, the president proceeded to put it to a vote. The Soviet amendment was defeated by a vote of 9-2, and again

<sup>22</sup> Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.2., p. 24.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 25.

the anti-Soviet bloc had triumphed in a strictly procedural  
<sup>24</sup>  
matter.

Undaunted by this defeat, Gromyko now asked the Council to postpone discussion of the question until April 10. Postponement was necessary because important negotiations were then going on, and the Soviet Union needed until that date to submit the results to the Council. This was "...a minimum demand on the part of the Government of the U.S.S.R. and...  
<sup>25</sup>  
this demand is fully justified." After making more disparaging remarks about the Iranian government and its delegation, Gromyko formally proposed the postponement of the question until April 10, and he declared that were the proposal not adopted he could not take part in the discussion of the  
<sup>26</sup>  
question. The Council was not enlightened as to what he meant by not being prepared to take part in the discussion. Probably on the assumption that the Council would give into his demands, the Soviet representative in fact had threatened it. However, the Soviet assumption proved to be wrong.

Hassan Pasha again brought up the proposal he had made that morning, i.e., that the Council vote on the inclusion of the Iranian complaint. Agreeing with the Egyptian delegate's

24. Ibid., p. 27.

25. Ibid., p. 28.

26. Ibid., p. 30.

proposal, and thinking that the Iranian delegate should be heard concerning the April 10 postponement, Byrnes made the following statement:

Therefore if the representative of Egypt moves as a substitute for the motion of the representatives of the USSR that the representatives of the Iranian Government be permitted to participate in accordance with the Charter, I shall be happy to support that motion. If he does not wish to make the motion, then I will make the motion.<sup>27</sup>

Byrnes was determined to have a vote taken on whether the Iranian question should be included on the agenda, even to the point of ignoring the other proposals on the floor.

The Australian representative, Colonel William Hodgson,<sup>28</sup> now presented a completely different proposal. To postpone the case until written documents should be received from both the U.S.S.R. and Iran was the gist of his suggestion.<sup>29</sup> When the documents had been received, the Council should then fix a date for the investigation of the question by the Council itself. Although prepared to give favorable consideration

27. Ibid., p. 31.

28. Lieut. Colonel William R. Hodgson, (1892- ) had an army and diplomatic career. He was a representative to the UNCIO in 1945, and in 1946 was a member of the Australian delegation to the United Nations, and was Australian delegate to the Security Council the same year.

29. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No. 2., pp. 31-33.

to the Soviet request to postpone the question, Hodgson wanted it clearly understood that the question should remain on the agenda and that action would be taken when the written documents were received.

The Council now was faced with the dilemma of having three motions before it without adequate rules of procedure to guide it. The members were never more conscious of the lack of these procedural rules, and they were slow to set precedents that would be used in later cases.

While supporting the Egyptian proposal, Cadogan said that he could not understand why the Soviet representative needed this delay.<sup>30</sup> It would be better to hear the Iranian delegate in person than to receive written material, as the Australian representative had suggested. The Iranian delegate was sitting in the audience and was ready at any time to take his seat at the Council table to present the necessary evidence.

The Australian representative, however, was supported by Lange, because the Polish delegate in giving his support to Hodgson fulfilled the wishes of the Soviet Union.<sup>31</sup> Again attacking the Egyptian proposal, Gromyko said that it was contrary "to common sense." Castillo Najera here broke into

30. Ibid., pp. 33-34.

31. Ibid., p. 34.



the debate and made some rather pointed remarks about the Soviet and Polish representatives.<sup>32</sup> Gromyko had mentioned a statement made by the Iranian prime minister, Ghavam, in which Ghavam was supposed to have expressed hope that positive results would come out of the negotiations. But as Castillo Najera sarcastically noted, the Soviet delegate had received his information from the press, and the press as everyone knew was not always accurate. After noting Lange's statement that communications between Iran and the United States were poor and that therefore the Council should wait for information, Castillo Najera said that he wanted to hear the Iranian representative's personal opinion on this point.

The viewpoint of the small nations was pleaded by Eyrnes when he remarked that it was a "rather remarkable procedure" that the Iranian government should be permitted to present its case, but that its representative could not be heard. He imagined a case in which international peace was threatened and in which the Council would say, "Your representative may attend, but he may not present his case."<sup>33</sup> He warned that the small nations might lose faith in the United Nations, if

32. Ibid., pp. 35-36.

33. Ibid., p. 36.

the Iranian representative were not allowed to speak. Since there were six small powers on the Council, and since he needed seven affirmative votes<sup>34</sup> to pass the proposal he desired, Byrnes pleaded the small powers' cause.<sup>35</sup>

The debate now became more and more a personal and national struggle between Byrnes and Gromyko when the latter acidly answered Byrnes' statement.<sup>36</sup> If the question were being considered in its substantive rather than its procedural aspect, the Iranian delegate would have a right to sit at the Council table. At the moment, the question of whether the Iranian delegate should be permitted to make a statement on the postponement only confused things.

Van Kleffens attitude was that the Iranian delegate had a right to be seated under Article 31, and "that was that." Again Byrnes demanded a vote on the Egyptian proposal and asked:

If the representative of the USSR should say that he desired to postpone consideration until 1 January next year, would anyone say that would not vitally affect the Iranian Government and that it should not be permitted to make a statement.<sup>38</sup>

34. Article 27 of the United Nations Charter: "1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote, 2. Decisions on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members."

35. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No. 2., pp. 36-37.

36. Ibid., pp. 37-38.

37. Ibid., p. 38.

38. Ibid., p. 38.

Now the question of the three proposals came up. President Quo Tai-Chi was not quite clear just what to do. He determined the fact that there were two motions on the floor; one by the Soviet representative, and one by the Egyptian delegate. But the Australian motion puzzled him. He ruled that a vote should be taken in the order in which they had been presented: first the Soviet proposal, then the Egyptian proposal, and last the Australian proposal.<sup>39</sup> And after the Iranian representative had been heard, the Council then would be in a better position to consider the question of postponement. The president seemed quite sure that the Iranian delegate would be heard, and it was quite obvious at this point that the majority of the members were of the same opinion.

Wanting to make sure that his views were correctly understood, Hodgson declared that he had no objection at all to the seating of the Iranian delegate, but he wanted to get all the facts of the case.<sup>40</sup> Hassan Pasha after informing the Council that he was a judge, said that the Council was a tribunal and that the members of the Council were in fact judges.<sup>41</sup> They had every right to decide whether the

39. Ibid., pp. 38-39.

40. Ibid., pp. 39-40.

41. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

case should be postponed or not. He rejected the Australian viewpoint when he maintained that it was up to the tribunal to decide whether the evidence it would consider was to be oral or written.

By this time Lange was tired. He thought that it would be better to "attack the problem with clear minds" and suggested that the Council should adjourn until the next day. But the French representative proposed that the question of voting be referred to a sub-committee for a compromise solution. After agreeing with Bonnet, the president appointed a sub-committee made up of the representatives of the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and France.<sup>42</sup> The sub-committee was to report by 3 p.m. the following day on any progress it had made, and the proposal was adopted by 9 votes. The meeting was then adjourned.

After much fruitless argument over the inclusion of the Iranian question on the agenda and the seating of the Iranian delegate, the question was side-stepped for the moment with the appointment of the sub-committee. There seemed very little chance that the sub-committee would solve anything, since its members probably would keep their same views. When the Council was confronted with three motions at the same time, this sub-committee was established to try to work out a compromise solution, and to set forth

42. Ibid., pp. 42-43.

some method of procedure that could be followed in the future.

### III

The twenty-seventh meeting of the Security Council was held on March 27, 1946. It opened with the report of the sub-committee that nothing had been accomplished.<sup>43</sup> The Council, therefore, was in the same dilemma as at the end of the last meeting.

Lange said that he was sorry to hear that the sub-committee had failed. Now it was his idea to consider the Australian proposal second and the Egyptian proposal third.<sup>44</sup> If the Egyptian proposal were voted on first, the Australian proposal would be lost. His reasoning was not lost on the Council. If the Egyptian proposal were approved, the Iranian representative would be heard, and the Australian proposal, which Lange supported would not have a chance to be voted on. This was the beginning of a long and heated debate over which motion should be voted on first, but it was finally decided to vote as the president earlier had suggested. This debate typified the confusion and uncertainty in which the Council sometime found itself while trying to settle

43. Security Council Journal, First Year, No. 21, 2 April, 1946, p. 407.

44. Ibid., p. 408.

difficult questions of procedure.

The president, throughout the discussion argued in favor of the voting procedure that he had suggested. If the U.S.S.R. proposal were not adopted, the Egyptian proposal then would be voted on, and if it passed there would be no need for a vote on the Australian proposal.<sup>45</sup> The Australian representative disagreed. Hodgson asked the president to comply with the Polish request to put his proposal second in the voting.<sup>46</sup> The president, however, contended that the proposals were of equal importance and that they should be voted on in the order of their presentation. When the time came to vote, he would be glad to hear the views of the other members on this subject.

Not understanding what the Australian delegate meant, Hassan Pasha wanted to know whether the Iranian representative was to produce the documents (called for by Hodgson) in person or while absent. The Iranian delegate should not present the documents in person at the moment, was Hodgson's idea.<sup>47</sup> He realized that the Iranian representative was sitting in the audience with a prepared statement, but he wanted the facts submitted in writing. Then he and the other members could study them at leisure and get a clear picture

45. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.2., p. 45.

46. Ibid., pp. 45-46.

47. Ibid., pp. 46-47.

of just "what was what" before they took action on the case.

After expressing his "regret" over the failure of the sub-committee, of which he was a member and in which he had refused to compromise his position, Gromyko restated his position that negotiations were taking place and that an understanding had been reached. Evidence of this understating was the Soviet announcement that Soviet troops would be withdrawn. Gromyko had received his information from the official U.S.S.R. news agency in the United States, Tass, that Ghavam, the Iranian prime minister, had said that the question of Azerbaijan was relatively unimportant and could be solved as soon as an understaiding was reached concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In the light of these circumstances, it was "incomprehensible" that the members of the Council were unable to accept the "fully justified proposal of the USSR Government to postpone the discussion of the Iranian statement until April 10."<sup>48</sup>

With the remark that the United States delegation received its information, not from the newspapers, but directly from the Iranian government, Byrnes refuted the information presented by the Soviet delegation. His information contradicted Gromyko's statement in that the Iranian government formally had said no agreement had been reached.<sup>49</sup> It was not

48. Ibid., p. 49.

49. Ibid., pp. 49-51.

proper for the Council to act on a newspaper statement, while the official representative of Iran was sitting in the audience with an official statement in his possession.

Another method of voting was proposed by Byrnes.<sup>50</sup>

The Egyptian proposal should be voted on first, and if it were carried there would be no need for voting on the Soviet proposal. After the Iranian representative had been heard, if the Council desired, it could vote on the Australian proposal. This suggestion was entirely anti-Soviet, since it would allow for the adoption of the Australian proposal even were the Egyptian proposal to be adopted.

Van Kleffens agreed with Byrnes and asked Cromyko what his reasons were for wanting to postpone the discussion until April 10.<sup>51</sup> He would be "enlightened" if the Soviet representative would "elucidate" on the questions asked. An indirect reference to British troops on Egyptian soil was then made by Hassan Pasha, when he said, "We (the small nations) want the big powers to know that if an independent country does not want to have foreign troops stationed on its soil, the big powers should comply with that."<sup>52</sup> He was speaking of the Iranian situation at the time, but the remark

50. Security Council Journal, First Year, No.21, 2 April, 1946, pp. 412-413.

51. Ibid., p. 414.

52. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.2., p. 53.



was pertinent to British troops on Egyptian soil.

At this point the president closed the discussion by asking for a vote on Lange's proposal to place the Australian resolution in the voting order immediately following the U.S.S.R. proposal. Gromyko, however, ignored the president and addressed a "few remarks" to the Council members.<sup>53</sup> If Byrnes were so anxious to hear the opinion of the Iranian representative, why did he not see Ala outside the Council meetings. Moreover, the Iranian representative could express his opinion in private or could communicate with the secretary-general anytime he felt like it. Byrnes' real reason, Gromyko charged, for not agreeing with the Soviet position was because he wanted to discuss the substance of the question.

Gromyko was getting a little heated when he turned to the Netherlands representative. He answered the questions put to him as follows: that direct negotiations were taking place, and that an understanding had been reached for the withdrawal of Soviet troops in five or six weeks "providing that nothing unforeseen happens." It made no difference whether the understanding was verbal or written, so long as it had been reached. Again the Council was threatened that, if the discussion were not postponed, the U.S.S.R.

53. Ibid., pp. 53-55.

could not take further part in the discussion. The proposals should be voted on in the order they were presented. This, of course, suited Gromyko's purpose, since his proposal was the first presented.

The president again declared the discussion closed. This time he tried to put the U.S.S.R. proposal to a vote, but Gromyko again ignored him and attacked the procedure for closing discussions.<sup>54</sup> He wanted to know if the president could close the discussion without a decision from the members of the Council, as the president was trying to do. The president replied that he had no more speakers on his list, and Bonnet informed the president that he had no objection to the president's declaring the debate closed. But he wanted the right to speak in explanation of how he voted after the vote on the U.S.S.R. proposal was taken.<sup>55</sup> Byrnes wanted the same right.<sup>55</sup>

The U.S.S.R. proposal to postpone consideration of the Iranian question to April 10 was put to a vote by a show of hands, and was rejected by a vote of 9-2. Poland and the U.S.S.R. voted in favor. The anti-Soviet bloc with nine votes effectively defeated the Soviet bloc on this procedural matter. Immediately after the vote was recorded,

54. Ibid., p. 55.

55. Ibid., p. 56.

the president wanted to know the Council's view on whether to vote next on the Egyptian or Australian proposals. Byrnes and Hassan Fasha supported the view that the Egyptian proposal should be next, and Hodgson and Lange argued that the Australian proposal should be voted on before the Egyptian. The French representative was regretful that the Council could not agree unanimously on the procedural aspects of Articles 34 and 35. He would vote in favor of the Egyptian proposal, because, "although it does not include all that I have said, neither does it exclude it."<sup>56</sup>

Gromyko now carried out his intention to walk out. He and the other members of the Soviet delegation left the Council chamber after he had made the following statement:

For reasons which I explained clearly enough at yesterday's meeting of the Security Council and again at today's meeting, I am not in a position, as the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to take part in a discussion of the Iranian question after the rejection of my proposal. For these reasons I am unable to take part in the Council meetings and I am leaving the Council chamber.<sup>57</sup>

The Council took the departure of the Soviet delegation rather impassively, except for Byrnes who twisted around in his seat to watch the delegation leave. When Hodgson complained that he had two different texts of the Egyptian proposal, the discussion continued as if nothing had happened.

56. Ibid., p. 58.

57. Ibid., p. 58.

After apologizing for the delay in handing out the texts of his proposal, the Egyptian delegate stated his proposal again:

...(the Council) should ask the Iranian representative to come to the Council table to give his views on the question of postponement; then, if we think that postponement should not be granted, the Council can take such action as it deems fit, which will be to ask him to produce his documents concerning the substance of the matter.<sup>58</sup>

Byrnes now took advantage of his earlier reservation to speak following the vote on the Soviet proposal. He had been prompted to speak, he said, when Gromyko had accused him of wanting to get into the substance of the question.<sup>59</sup> The Soviet charge was denied. He called attention to the fact that it was he, Byrnes, who had moved to amend the Egyptian proposal to permit the Iranian delegate to be heard on the subject of postponement.

Before the president put the Egyptian proposal to a vote, he wanted to make sure that a decision could be taken in the absence of the U.S.S.R. representative. He understood that it was a purely procedural question and that a decision could be taken. Cadogan supported this view, and the Egyptian proposal was put to a vote. Again the

58. Ibid., p. 59.

59. Ibid., pp. 59-60.

vote was taken by a show of hands; there were eight votes in favor, and it was adopted.<sup>60</sup> The president then inquired if the Australian representative wanted a vote on his proposal, and Hodgson replied in the affirmative. Byrnes, however, maintained that the adoption of the Egyptian proposal ruled out the Australian proposal, but Hodgson declared that his proposal was entirely different from the Egyptian and should be voted on. After considerable debate, the president ruled that the Australian proposal was automatically dropped as a result of the adoption of the Egyptian proposal. That ended the discussion. At the president's invitation, Hussein Ala, the representative of Iran, took his place at the Council table.

#### IV

In its twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, and twenty-seventh meetings, the Security Council was called upon again to settle the dispute between Iran and the Soviet Union. As soon as discussion began on the Iranian question, the split between the anti-Soviet and Soviet blocs was again evident. Even when the Australian delegate opposed the rest of the anti-Soviet bloc, he did not advocate the Soviet solution for disposing of the question.

Under the leadership of Byrnes, the United States delegation took a much more active part in the discussion  
60. Ibid., p. 61.

than it previously had done. The principal antagonists were now Byrnes and Gromyko, whereas in the London meetings it had been Bevin and Vyshinsky. With the support of the other members, exclusive of Lange and Gromyko, the United States and United Kingdom delegates gave each other full support.

The question of procedure continued to plague the hearings of the Iranian charges. Fully conscious that they were setting precedents for future action, the members spent most of their time arguing procedural matters. They had no rules to guide them, and therefore they had to feel their way along as best they could.

The Council was also confronted with a new situation, i.e., the absence of one of its permanent members. This was the first time such a thing had happened. But the Security Council continued to discuss the Iranian question. After Gromyko walked out, the Council did not stop its work, nor did it show any sign of weakness. The continued discussion dealt with procedural problems, however, and, if the question had been in a substantive stage, it is doubtful whether the Council could have passed any resolutions or even continued discussion of the question. Had the absence of the Soviet representative been taken as a "veto" on a substantive matter the discussion of the question would have ceased.

Fortunately for Iran, for the United Nation, and for the anti-Soviet bloc, the question was procedural in nature. The Iranian representative, Hussein Ala, was seated at the Council table in spite of all that Gromyko had said and done to prevent it.

CHAPTER 4.

THE BYRNES RESOLUTION

I

After the Soviet representative's walkout in the twenty-seventh meeting, the president Quo Tai-Chi (China), invited Ala to take a place at the Council table. But when, because of the lateness of the hour, the president asked for an adjournment to 3 p.m. the next day, Byrnes replied that Ala then and there should be permitted to make his statement. The president accepted the United States delegate's view. Thus, with United States support, Ala presented his case, even at that late hour.

The Iranian representative said that is was "with emotion that I take my seat before the highest tribunal on earth, wherein lie the hopes and aspirations of mankind." After declaring that Iran firmly believed in the United Nations and expected that justice would be meted out by the Security Council, Ala said that he knew of no agreement between the disputants covering the matters listed in the Iranian complaint to the Security Council. He was also positive in stating that the Iranian prime minister particularly had requested him to emphasize that, "the bringing of a dispute by one

1. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No. 2., Hunter College, New York, (25 March to 26 June, 1946), p. 62.



Member of the United Nations before the Security Council should not be interpreted by other parties as an inimical act."<sup>2</sup> Presenting a report from the Iranian prime minister, Ala gave the Soviet proposals for settlement of the dispute: (1) that U.S.S.R. troops remain in some parts of Iran for an indefinite period; (2) that the Iranian government recognize the autonomy of Azerbaijan within certain limits; and (3) that a joint U.S.S.R.-Iranian stock company be formed with fifty-one per cent of the shares to be owned by the U.S.S.R. and forty-nine per cent by Iran.<sup>3</sup> The prime minister had rejected these demands, and negotiations were deadlocked.

The Soviet Union had offered to remove its troops from some of the northern provinces but would leave troops in the others "until the situation had been clarified."<sup>4</sup> After lodging a protest with the Soviet government in which he cited the pertinent articles of the tri-partite treaty, the Iranian prime minister had informed the Soviets that the British had withdrawn their troops in accordance with the treaty. He also said that the Soviet Union was contradicting itself, since it had said it intended to conform to the treaty but in practice had not done so. Ala had been instructed to

2. Ibid., p. 63.

3. Ibid., pp. 64-65.

4. Ibid., p. 65.

present the dispute to the Council for a decision in accordance with the powers and duties of the Council.

Byrnes interrupted at this point to request the Iranian delegate to limit himself to the question of postponement rather than go into the substance of the matter.<sup>5</sup> But Ala thought it necessary to present the above views. Byrnes again said that the Iranian representative should limit himself to the question of postponement, and the president agreed with him. Both Byrnes and the president seemed afraid that if the discussion got into the substance of the question, the absence of the Soviet representative could then have an effect of a "veto" on any action taken by the Council in respect to the question before it.

At this point, Lange reminded the Council that he had raised the same point as the United States representative and had been ignored. He hoped in the future that the smaller nations would be given more consideration.<sup>6</sup>

Since he opposed postponement and wanted to give the pertinent facts of the case, Ala said that he had to present his argument in a logical sequence. Otherwise the Council could not appreciate the Iranian position. As he

5. Ibid., p. 66.

6. Ibid., p. 67.

7.

did not want to suggest how the Iranian delegate should present his case, but thinking it would be helpful it he asked a few questions, Byrnes inquired whether Ala was authorized to agree to a postponement.<sup>7</sup> He also wanted to know if there had been any change in Ala's instructions since he had filed the matter, and wondered what Ala thought were the dangers involved in postponing the matter. Agreeing with Byrnes, Hassan Pasha, (Egypt), thought that the presentation of the Iranian viewpoint took too much time.

Having received no instructions to agree to a postponement, Ala enumerated his reasons opposing one: (1) that Iran was suffering from interference in its internal affairs; (2) that demands were being made upon Iran which were inconsistent with its sovereignty and territorial integrity; and (3) that the presence of foreign troops were a heavy burden on the people.<sup>8</sup> Since Iran would suffer still more were the matter postponed, he requested that the Council take up the matter immediately.

Lange then began what was to be a lengthy tête-à-tête<sup>9</sup> between himself and Ala in the meetings to come. Lange

7. Ibid., p. 67.

8. Ibid., pp. 68-69.

9. Ibid., p. 69.

inquired if Ala had received instructions to oppose a delay. After claiming that Ala had omitted a very important point, i.e., that Soviet troops were being withdrawn, Lange wanted to know if Ala had received any official instructions relative to the withdrawal of troops from Iran. The Polish representative quoted Gromyko's statement that the Iranian prime minister had acknowledged the fact that the U.S.S.R. troops were being withdrawn and that Ghavam did not want outside pressure to be exerted in the negotiations between the disputants. He wondered if the Iranian delegate could confirm the truth of the Soviet representative's statement.

Weary of listening to the various statements and arguments for a number of hours, Hassan Pasha asked if the hearing could be postponed until the next day. The president agreed to this suggestion and adjourned the meeting.

In this twenty-seventh meeting, the Council had seated the Iranian delegate after the Soviet walkout, and had gone on with the discussion of the question. Even so, it was all too noticeable that the members, especially the United States representative and the president, tried to prevent the discussion from getting into the substance of the Iranian question. Almost nothing was said about the Soviet absence and its effect on the Council.

II

The twenty-eighth meeting was not held, however, until March 29. Again the president invited the Iranian delegate to take his place at the Council table, and the tête-à-tête between Ala and Lange continued.

By saying that he had instructions that were broad enough to permit him to take such action as he deemed necessary to protect his country, Ala firmly rebutted Lange's suggestion that he had no instructions to oppose a delay.<sup>10</sup> In answer to Lange's second question, Ala definitely stated he had no information, official or otherwise, to corroborate the Soviet contention that Soviet troops were evacuating Iranian territory. Moreover, he did not believe that Ghavam had made any statement to the effect that outside pressure should not be brought to bear on the Soviet-Iranian negotiations.

Referring to the absence of the Soviet representative, Ala regretted that Gromyko was not present to "correct at first hand any misunderstanding on my part of the position of his Government."<sup>11</sup> Gromyko's remark that at the negotiations in Moscow between Iran and the Soviet Union, an essential phase of the negotiations, had been concluded was not true.

10. Ibid., pp. 71-72.

11. Ibid., p. 72.

Nothing had been settled, and at best Ala could only agree that there had been a "misunderstanding." The Iranian government wanted Soviet "assurances" (to accompany the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran) to be communicated to the Council, and these "assurances" must include a guarantee that the Soviet Union would not go back on its work in evacuating its troops.<sup>12</sup>

Because he was confused on one point, Hassan Pasha asked Ala what was the nature of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Iran. Ala replied that the Iranian constitution forbade the prime minister to "enter into any negotiations concerning the evacuation of the country; the withdrawal of the troops is in no way connected with any negotiations. The withdrawal of the troops must be unconditional."<sup>13</sup> It was true that the prime minister, with the consent of parliament, could enter into negotiations other than for the evacuation of troops. But the fourteenth parliament had expired, and the new parliament could not be elected until foreign troops were withdrawn.

On this point, Ala was seemingly inconsistent, since Ghavam had gone to Moscow for the express purpose of trying to settle the dispute by negotiations, and Iran in presenting

12. Ibid., p. 72.

13. Ibid., p. 73.

its case to the Council claimed to conform to Article 33, which stated that countries should try to settle their disputes by peaceful negotiation. Lange was quick to catch Ala in this inconsistency:

Now I read in the newspapers, and I think it is an established fact, that the Prime Minister of Iran was in Moscow, carrying out some negotiations or, if we must not use that term, conversations, while USSR troops still were on Iranian soil and I want to find out whether he broke the law and did negotiate or whether his purpose in going to Moscow was, for instance, merely to attend a 'vodka party'.<sup>14</sup>

Contradicting the Polish delegate, Ala argued that Ghavam had gone to Moscow in accordance with the January 30 resolution of the Security Council. The object of Ghavam's trip had been to request negotiations with the Soviet government concerning the dispute. The "vodka party" was explained this way:

He (Ghavam) was wined and dined and plenty of caviar also were served to him, but he stood firm for the independence of his country and the essential rights of Iran and he did not yield on a single point and maintained his attitude.<sup>15</sup>

When the president inquired if there were other questions, Ala wanted to know if he should retire from his place at the table, but the president allowed him to remain. Ala had stated his case clearly and with great vigor. Although

14. Ibid., p. 73.

15. Ibid., p. 74.

a frail birdlike person barely five feet tall, he ably defended his case, more or less successfully answered the questions put to him, and adroitly handled Lange's persistent heckling. Using the Bevin resolution as a shield, he cleared up the question of the prime minister's being able to negotiate with the U.S.S.R. However, he did not refer to the negotiations prior to the Bevin resolution, but he seemed to satisfy the members who questioned him.

Byrnes proposed at this point to postpone the discussion for a few days. He suggested that:

...the President of the Council request the secretary-General to endeavour to obtain from the USSR Government and the Iranian Government through their representatives and report to the Council at its meeting of Tuesday, 2 April, the existing status of negotiations between the two Governments, and particularly to ascertain from the representatives of the two Governments and report whether or not the reported withdrawal of troops is conditional upon the conclusion of agreements between the two Governments on other subjects.<sup>16</sup>

Byrnes superficially seemed to be following somewhat the earlier proposal of the Australian representative, but Byrnes's suggestion was made after the Iranian representative had been heard. Byrnes did not want the presence of Soviet troops in Iran to influence the Iranian government in its dealings with the Soviet Union, and even ~~the~~ recommended the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the withdrawal could not be done in a substantially shorter period of time than was given by the

16. Ibid., pp. 75-76.



the Soviet Union for its troop withdrawal. Byrnes not only wanted the U.S.S.R. to guarantee the evacuation of its troops, but also he tried to keep the Council away from considering the substantive aspects. In the latter case, Gromyko's "absence" might well constitute a "veto".

The long-silent Cadogan now endorsed the Byrnes proposal. However, he wanted to change Byrnes' wording from "USSR troops could not be withdrawn from Iran in a substantially shorter period" to "the withdrawal of all USSR troops would not be completed in a substantially shorter period of time."<sup>17</sup> Byrnes accepted the Cadogan "amendment," although he pointed out that he (Byrnes) had made no "resolution."<sup>18</sup>

Since the Byrnes suggestion was based on his own, Hodgson (Australia) quite naturally supported it. But he wanted a new time limit and suggested either April 3rd or 4th as the date for the two parties to reply.<sup>19</sup> Because he had supported the Australian proposal earlier, Lange (Poland) now supported the United States suggestion, and even went so far as to congratulate Byrnes for his resolution.<sup>20</sup> And after an "Alphonse-Gaston" parody between van Kleffens (Netherlands) and Byrnes over who had the floor, van Kleffens eventually got around

17. Ibid., p. 76.

18. Ibid., p. 76.

19. Ibid., pp. 76-77.

20. Ibid., p. 78.

to endorsing the Byrnes<sup>1</sup> suggestion, including the April 2 date.

Byrnes, in reply to Hodgson, Lange, and van Kleffens, took issue with the Polish and Australian representative's viewpoint on the date the reports were due. April 2 permitted plenty of time to get the information needed; in fact, "That will allow four days, ninety-six hours, between the adoption of this resolution and the time for the report."<sup>21</sup>

Castillo Najera (Mexico) supported the United States delegate's view on the date of April 2, but Bonnet (France) thought that April 3 would be better.<sup>22</sup> He also pointed out that the time in Eastern Europe was a day ahead of the time in New York, and that time would be needed to decipher messages, and so on. Countering this viewpoint, Byrnes remarked:

My good friend from France says that while 29 March here today, in Eastern Europe it is 30 March. Well, 96 hours from now, on 2 April, it will be 3 April in Moscow. So my friend get what he wants.<sup>23</sup>

The discussion had bogged down on a seemingly minor point. As everyone had to speak his mind, the delegates argued for sometime over an issue that could have been settled quickly by the president had proper rules of order existed. Even Lange, one of the worst offenders, declared that an

21. Ibid., p. 79.

22. Ibid., pp. 79-80.

23. Ibid., p. 80.

that an outside observer would think that all the Security Council talked about were dates. As for himself, he preferred the later date out of courtesy to a member who "unfortunately" was not present, a member who needed more time to prepare his case. Very earnestly Lange pleaded:

Now I understand that in court procedure-- and we have many eminent jurists here, such as the Secretary of State of the United States and the representative of Egypt--it is usually considered policy when the counsel of one of the parties required some time to prepare his brief, to give him that time.<sup>24</sup>

Perhaps flattered by the remark about his being an eminent jurist, Byrnes remarked that if more time were needed when the reports were due, he thought that it could be allowed.

<sup>25</sup>  
Pedro L. Velloso (Brazil), spoke up for the first time to congratulate Byrnes, to say that he had no preference about the date, and to show the United States that Brazil was on its side.<sup>26</sup> In contrast to Velloso, Hassan Pasha talked about a number of things before he got around to the main point. He chiefly complimented Byrnes for the

24. Ibid., p. 81.

25. Pedro Leao Velloso (1887-1947) was secretary to the Brazilian delegation to the Paris peace conference. He was secretary-general of the ministry of foreign affairs, 1941-44 and chairman of the Brazilian delegation to the UNCIO, 1945 and the General Assembly and the Security Council, 1946.

26. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No. 2., p. 81.

good humor of the meeting and because "he reconciled all the views which we have expressed and put them into the right words."<sup>27</sup> As for the point of the discourse (the date the reports were due), Hassan Pasha supported Bonnet's view. The president without further consulting the members, set April 3 as the date on which the information from the disputants was due on the assumption that the Byrnes suggestion had been unanimously endorsed.<sup>28</sup> But another confusing procedural issue was brought up by Castillo Najera who wanted the phrase "I suggest that" taken out of the paragraph that contained "I suggest that the president of the Security Council should request the Secretary-General to endeavour to obtain from the USSR Government..." Castillo Najera<sup>29</sup> asserted that Byrnes suggestion had become a resolution. The president then had to correct the idea that the suggestion had become a resolution. It had not. Since no vote had been taken on Byrnes' suggestion (even though it had been adopted unanimously) it therefore remained a suggestion and not a resolution.<sup>30</sup> The meeting was then adjourned by the

27. Ibid., p. 81.

28. Ibid., p. 82.

29. Ibid., p. 82.

30. Ibid., p. 82.

president.

Without being either a resolution or a proposal, the Byrnes suggestion had taken the force of law in requiring the two disputants to turn in reports by April 3. Here was something new in the Council's procedure, since formerly a "suggestion" or a "statement" had been either a "resolution" or a "proposal" before it was voted on. In this case, however, a "suggestion" served the purpose desired, and no argument was made against it.

### III

The twenty-ninth meeting of the Security Council was held on April 3, and in this meeting, as in the twenty-eighth, the representative of the Soviet Union was absent. At the meeting, the Council concerned itself with the reports received by the secretary-general from the parties concerned in the Iranian dispute. The president invited Ala to be seated and then read a letter from the secretary-general.<sup>31</sup>

The secretary-general informed the Council that he had sent letters to the Iranian and Soviet governments and had received replies in return. He enclosed a letter from Chavara stating that Ala had been and was now the accredited representative of Iran.<sup>32</sup> Gromyko's letter stated

31. Ibid., pp. 83-84.

32. Ibid., p. 84.

that negotiations had led to an understanding between Iran and the Soviet Union for the renewed withdrawal of troops on March 24. Gromyko reminded the Council that he had informed it of this agreement at the twenty-sixth meeting. Ala's letter dealt in a more complex fashion regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran. There had been and there could be no negotiations. Instead, Ala informed the Council, the Soviet government had presented the Iranian prime minister with three memoranda.<sup>33</sup> One declared that Soviet troops would be withdrawn over a five or six weeks period beginning March 24. No mention was made of any condition attached to the evacuation. The second memorandum dealt with the formation of a joint Iranian-U.S.S.R. oil company, and the third memorandum suggested an autonomous Azerbaijan. On condition that no unforeseen circumstances should occur, the Soviet ambassador to Iran had informed Ghavam orally that the Soviet Union would evacuate Iran and intimated that if agreement could be reached on the second and third memoranda, "there would be no further cause for anxiety and no unforeseen circumstances would take place."<sup>34</sup>

This latter statement had not been clarified by the Soviet government, but it seemed clear that the U.S.S.R. was

33. Ibid., pp. 85-86.

34. Ibid., p. 86.

delaying its evacuation of troops from Iran in the hope of inducing Iran to make concessions concerning oil and Azerbaijanian autonomy. Ghavam informed Ala that Azerbaijan was a domestic problem of the Iranian government, and the province was regulated by the Iranian constitution and the law of provincial councils.<sup>35</sup> The formation of an oil company would have to be submitted to the Iranian parliament for consideration. Meanwhile no understanding or agreement had been reached. But the Iranian government wanted an agreement, at least on the evacuation of Soviet troops, and Ala assured the Council:

In closing permit me to repeat that, in referring these disputes to the Council, the Iranian Government is animated by no feeling of hostility toward the USSR. It is our hope that the Council will find a just solution which will promote friendly relations in the future.<sup>36</sup>

Byrnes wanted to read the Soviet and Iranian reports, but he asked Ala what action should be taken by the Council with regard to the questions submitted by his government to the Council. Ala replied that if the Soviet Union would be willing to withdraw the condition concerning "unforeseen circumstances" noted in the withdrawal of troops and would give to the Council a guarantee that Soviet troops would be

35. Ibid., p. 86.

36. Ibid., p. 86.

withdrawn by May 6 at the latest, then Iran would not press the matter any further at this particular time.<sup>37</sup> Ala wanted the matter left on the agenda, however, because he had had experience with Soviet dealings before.

To give the Council members time to read the letters and reports, the president adjourned the meeting until the next day. This was one of the shortest meetings on the Iranian dispute and dealt mostly with the reading of the reports from the two disputants. The discussion of the reports would follow in the next meeting, after they had been read and analysed by the members.

#### IV

The thirtieth meeting of the Security Council opened at Hunter College on April 4, 1946. After the president had invited Ala to take his place at the Council table, Byrnes offered a draft resolution for the consideration of the Council. His was the most important single motion to be made since the re-submittence of the dispute to the Council. The complete text of the resolution reads:

The Security Council,

Taking note of the statements by the Iranian representative that the Iranian appeal to the Council arises from the presence of USSR troops in Iran and their continued presence there beyond the date stipulated for their withdrawal in the Tri-partite Treaty of 29 January 1942;

37. Ibid., p. 87.



Taking note of the replies dated 3 April of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Iranian Government pursuant to the request of the Secretary-General for information as to the state of the negotiations between the two Governments and as to whether the withdrawal of USSR troops from Iran is conditional upon agreement on other subjects;

And in particular taking note of and relying upon the assurances of the USSR Government:

That the withdrawal of USSR troops from Iran has already commenced;

That it is the intention of the USSR Government to proceed with the withdrawal of its troops as rapidly as possible;

That the USSR Government expects the withdrawal of all USSR troops from the whole of Iran to be completed within five or six weeks; and

That the proposals under negotiation between the Iranian Government and the USSR Government are not connected with the withdrawal of USSR troops;

Being solicitous to avoid any possibility of the presence of USSR troops in Iran being used to influence the course of the negotiations between the Governments of Iran and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and

Recognizing that the withdrawal of all USSR troops from the whole of Iran cannot be completed in a substantially shorter period of time than within which the USSR Government has declared it to be its intention to complete such withdrawal;

Resolves that the Council defer further proceedings of the Iranian appeal until 6 May, at which time the USSR Government and the Iranian Government are requested to report to the Council whether the withdrawal of all USSR troops from the whole of Iran has been completed and at which time the Council shall consider what, if any, further proceedings on the Iranian appeal are required;

Provided, however, that if in the meantime either the USSR Government or the Iranian Government or any member of the Security Council reports to the Secretary-General any developments which may retard or threaten to retard the prompt withdrawal of USSR troops from Iran, in accordance with the assurances of the USSR to the Council, the Secretary-General shall immediately call to the attention of the Council such reports, which shall be considered as the first item on the agenda.<sup>38</sup>

After congratulating the greatpowers in letting Iran state its case and in keeping the question on the agenda in case something went wrong with the negotiations, Hassan Pasha endorsed the resolution.<sup>39</sup> He commended the U.S.S.R. for complying with the decision of the Security Council by submitting its report on April 3. Velloso (Brazil) agreed with Byrnes' proposal, and he complimented the Council for doing its duty in hearing the case and inviting the Iranian representative to sit with the Council.<sup>40</sup> In supporting the resolution, Cadogan went along with the last two members. He thought that were the resolution adopted, the Council would be taking the first step towards a peaceable and amicable settlement of the dispute.<sup>41</sup> Even the Polish

38. Ibid., pp. 88-89.

39. Ibid., p. 90.

40. Ibid., pp. 90-91.

41. Ibid., p. 91.

representative (Lange) agreed with the resolution.<sup>42</sup>

It soon became apparent that all the members wanted to say a few words about the resolution and about things in general. There was a feeling in the air, as when the Bevin resolution was adopted, that the Council soon would be done with the Iranian question, and that it had done its duty towards Iran.

Predicting that the Council was on the "right road" and it must keep on this road to achieve a lasting peace, Castillo Najera (Mexico) hoped that in the future all members of the Council, permanent or non-permanent, would unite in their efforts to secure the peaceful settlement of disputes.<sup>43</sup> Bonnet (France) supported the Byrnes proposal and observed that the Security Council not only had done its duty but also that the differences of opinion settled<sup>44</sup> by the Council were over matters of procedure.

Now was heard the first and only discordant note in this happy atmosphere. Hodgson (Australia) said that Australia stood for the principle that the Council should make no decision without a careful, orderly, and methodical examination of all the facts and information relating to the dispute, so as to enable the Council to act "as a high

42. Ibid., pp. 91-92.

43. Ibid., p. 92.

44. Ibid., pp. 92-93.

judicial tribunal would act."<sup>45</sup> Since it covered only the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iranian soil, and did not refer to the other evidences of Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Iran, Byrnes' resolution was a hasty one. The Council, indeed, had gone straight from discussing a procedural question of postponement to a final resolution without ever having decided to investigate the real dispute. Not at any time had the Council heard complete statements from either disputant. He brought the absence of the Soviet representative into his argument when he said:

We deprecate the fact that the representative of the USSR left the Council during discussions of procedural questions and before the facts or merits of the case were even discussed, thus prejudicing the work, the efficiency and the authority of the Council.<sup>46</sup>

Hodgson further contended that the arrangements made outside the Council had lowered the prestige and weakened the authority of the Council. He declared that he would abstain in any vote on the Byrnes resolution, and he reserved the right to call for a complete investigation if the circumstances warranted it at any time.<sup>47</sup> No one seriously contested Hodgson's argument, but it was apparent, however, that he

45. Ibid., p. 93.

46. Ibid., p. 95.

47. Ibid., p. 95.

approached the substantive aspect of the question and ignored the wishes of the big powers, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, to avoid entangling themselves, Iran, and the Security Council with the Soviet Union's use of the "veto." Both van Kleffens and Quo Tai-Chi appreciated the Hodgson position, but they thought that there was no use in dealing with difficulties which did not need to be discussed or solved and that executive meetings, i.e., private meetings held outside the Council, <sup>48</sup> helped to smooth things out. This was especially helpful in procedural matters, and nothing in the Charter prevented these meetings, nor did it say anything about all Council meetings being held in public.

A vote was now taken and the resolution passed with nine votes in favor and one abstention (Australia). <sup>49</sup> Ala expressed his thanks, but he wanted it understood, however, that the question should remain on the agenda and could <sup>50</sup> be brought up for consideration at any time.

V

In the twenty-seventh meeting, the Iranian representative, Ala, when seated at the Council table said much the same as his predecessor, Taqizadeh. The complaint was the

48. Ibid.; pp. 95-96.

49. Ibid.; p. 97.

50. Ibid.; pp. 97-99.

same: that Soviet troops were still in Iran, that Soviet intervention in Iranian affairs continued, and that no results had been achieved from attempted negotiations. On the other hand, with the U.S.S.R. representative absent from the Council, Lange the Polish delegate, presented the Soviet case. He followed the Soviet line that there had been negotiations between the disputants and that results had been achieved.

Ala was asked several times to limit his remarks to procedural matters and not involve the Council in a discussion of the substantive aspect of the question. Byrnes and Quo Tai-Chi were especially insistent about this because of their fear of a Soviet "veto" on a substantive issue.

Gromyko's absence was referred to only a few times, and, although Hodgson (Australia) once pointedly remarked about the absence, no one else took it up. However, when the Soviet delegate met the April 3 deadline, in conformance with the Council request, many observers were surprised, and it was hoped that the United Nations in the future might have even more control over the policies of a great power.

In assuming the leadership of the anti-Soviet bloc, Byrnes carried on much of the discussion and was the dominant personality in the Council's hearing of the Iranian dispute. In trying to meet the Soviet Union halfway by not rushing

the withdrawal of its troops, he avoided the substantive aspect of the question. During the meeting and after the adoption of the Byrnes resolution, optimism prevailed, since all that the Soviet representative had to do was to drop the phrase "unforeseen circumstances," and the Iranian delegate would be satisfied.

After expressing his appreciation for the adoption of his resolution, Byrnes referred to the committee of experts which then was drafting a set of rules for Council procedure. The Council must not become a "slave" to any particular method of accomplishing the objective of the Charter, i.e., the maintenance of world peace. He expressed the viewpoint of the Anglo-Saxon tradition of keeping fluid both written constitutions and written laws. The Soviet viewpoint on the other hand, was to be found in Gromyko's insistence on the strictest interpretation of the Charter as it was written, and not to have it changed by unwritten rules of practice or usage.

While the rest of the Council was content to leave negotiations to the parties concerned and was satisfied with the information the parties chose to report, Hodgson wanted to investigate very thoroughly the facts of the case. In spite of the arguments of the rest of the Council, the Australian delegate maintained his viewpoint throughout the discussions.

The Iranian representative realized that he would have to accept just about anything that the Council had to offer. Therefore he was pleased to see the majority of the Council support the Byrnes resolution and the question remain on the agenda. However, Byrnes' resolution touched on only one aspect of the Iranian complaint, troop evacuation, and not on Soviet intervention in Iranian internal affairs. In this respect the Council avoided the issue, as the Australian representative intimated. It was thought by some members that if the troops were withdrawn, intervention in internal affairs would cease. The Byrnes resolution was looked upon as perhaps the necessary step to settle the question and maintain world peace.



CHAPTER 5.

THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE IRANIAN COMPLAINT

1

The thirty-first meeting of the Security Council with Gromyko in attendance, was held at Hunter College on April 9, 1946. It was originally intended at this meeting only to draft provisional rules of procedure as revised by the Council's committee of experts, but after the adoption of these rules, the president, Quo Tai-Chi (China), brought up the Iranian question. After stating that there were two letters in his possession from the disputants in the Iranian case, the president remarked that he also had two communications from the Polish representative relative to the Spanish question.<sup>1</sup> Having presented the provisional rule of procedure that the Council had to have three days' notice before it could meet to discuss new communications, the president referred to the Council's emergency power and said that the Council could meet at any time.

Cadogan brought up rule 8 of the Security Council procedure:

The provisional agenda for a meeting shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to the representatives on the Security Council at least three days before the meeting, but in urgent circumstances it may be communicated<sup>2</sup> simultaneously with the notice of the meeting.

1. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, Supplement No.2., Hunter College, the Bronx, New York, pp. 46-47.

2. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.2., Hunter College, New York, (25 March 1946 to 26 June 1946), p. 108.

Since the Iranian question was still on the agenda, would the Council have to put the letters from the U.S.S.R. and Iran on the agenda formally, or would they already be on the agenda, was Cadogan's inquiry. The president thought that the Soviet and Iranian letters dealt with a matter already on the agenda but that the Polish letters were new material and would require three days' notice.<sup>3</sup>

After hearing Byrnes statement in which he said, "In response to the president's inquiry as to the pleasure of the Council regarding the time of the next meeting, I wish to make clear that I am prepared to speak for the United States on these subjects at any time, now, tomorrow, or three days from now," the president decided to hold the next meeting at 3 p.m. the next afternoon.<sup>4</sup>

Of the opinion that an emergency meeting should not be held unless it were really an emergency meeting, Bonnet (France) wanted the president's opinion as to the exact status of the meeting called for the next day. The president qualified himself by saying that the meeting was, "...not exactly an emergency meeting, but one on matters concerning urgent circumstances."<sup>5</sup> The president's first suggestion to

3. Ibid., p. 119.

4. Ibid., p. 120.

5. Ibid., p. 120.

have the secretary-general notify the Council when the next meeting would be was the most acceptable to Velloso (Brazil).<sup>6</sup> At this point, Cadogan pointed out that the Council had just now adopted rule 8 and within a few minutes had proceeded to break it.<sup>7</sup>

Taking a firm stand on his proposal to have the Iranian question discussed the next day, the president maintained that if the question were not discussed then it could not be until the next week, as circumstances forbade it. But he got little help in trying to decide a date for the next meeting, except, suprisingly enough, from Gromyko who said, "If the Security Council considers that Friday is a suitable day for the consideration of this question, I am prepared to agree; if the Council considers Saturday a suitable day, I am prepared to agree upon Saturday; if any other day is suggested, I am prepared to agree."<sup>8</sup> The Egyptian delegate suggested Saturday at 10 or 11 a.m., but the president, now more than a little piqued, ignored Hassan Pasha completely and said that the secretary-general<sup>9</sup> would notify the Council when the next meeting would be. He then adjourned the meeting.

6. Ibid., p. 120.

7. Ibid., p. 121.

8. Ibid., p. 121.

9. Ibid., p. 122.

The letters referred to by the president were from Gromyko (April 6) and Ala (April 9). Ala's letter merely consisted of an acknowledgment of the Soviet letter sent to Ala by the secretary-general. The situation in Iran remained the same, i.e., nothing had changed, and the negotiations had accomplished nothing new.<sup>10</sup>

In his letter to the president, Gromyko denounced as illegal the resolution of April 4 which gave Iran until May 6 to report on the progress of the situation.<sup>11</sup> Again citing Article 34, Gromyko flatly asserted that no threat to world peace existed and that an understanding had been reached regarding the withdrawal of troops. As he had done in the March 18 meeting, he again requested that the Iranian question be removed from the agenda. Although the Soviet letter was no more than a restatement of Soviet policy, it should be noted that the letter was dated April 6, four days before Gromyko said he would discuss the question. By bringing up the matter before the 10th, and during his absence from the Council, the Soviet delegate contradicted himself, since he had said that under no circumstances could he discuss the question before April 10.

The discussion over setting a date for the next meeting well demonstrated how the Council often found itself involved in prolonged and continual bickering over apparently trivial

10. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 2., pp. 46-47.

11. Ibid., pp. 46-47.

procedural problems. At the same time, however, it must be remembered that the Council was setting important precedents, precedents that would determine its procedure for years to come. Moreover, and most significantly, the debate in the thirty-first meeting, although apparently settling nothing, may well have changed the entire outcome of the Iranian dispute. For within a week, another Iranian letter was to explode like a bomb in the Security Council and outdate entirely the Gromyko and Ala letters mentioned in this meeting.

## II

The thirty-second meeting of the Security Council was not held until April 15 as the president had warned. The president immediately proceeded to read a letter from the Iranian representative which caused consternation among the Council members.<sup>12</sup> Ala wrote that his government had instructed him to make the following statement.

As a result of the signature of the agreement between the Iranian Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it has been agreed that the Red Army evacuate all Persian territory by 6 May 1946. The Iranian Government has no doubt that this agreement will be carried out, but at the same time has not the right to fix the course the Security Council should take.<sup>13</sup>

12. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No. 2., pp. 122-123.

13. Ibid., p. 123.

The Iranian representative included in his letter the text of a telegram he had received that morning:

In view of the fact that the USSR Ambassador had again today, 14 April, categorically reiterated that the unconditional evacuation of Iranian territory by the Red Army will be completed by 6 May 1946, it is necessary that you immediately inform the Security Council that the Iranian Government has complete trust in the word and pledge of the USSR Government and for this reason withdraws its complaint from the Security Council.<sup>14</sup>

This shocking statement set off a heated discussion that soon was to involve the question of the Security Council's right to control its own agenda, a statement by the secretary-general that questioned the Security Council's jurisdiction in the Iranian dispute, a second Soviet walkout, a momentary split between Poland and the U.S.S.R., an alignment of France with Poland and the Soviet Union, as well as bitter debate among the members.

As soon as the president finished, Gromyko, in an acid "I told you so" mood, condemned the Council for taking action on the Iranian case after the Soviet Union had told the Council that an agreement had been reached.<sup>15</sup> The U.S.S.R. could not disregard lightly the decision taken on April 4 during the absence of the Soviet delegation. Agreeing that the Council's action would have been justified were the

14. Ibid., p. 123.

15. Ibid., pp. 123-126.

situation in Iran a threat to world peace, Gromyko called the Council's attention to the "extremely important fact" that the Security Council could not take action on a dispute unless both parties concerned were heard. And Gromyko was not present when the resolution of April 4 was adopted. (Gromyko seemed to forget that he was a party of the dispute, that he had been heard often enough, and that his absence was entirely voluntary).

Questioning the legality of having the dispute on the agenda, as Vyshinsky had done before him Gromyko pointed out that the Soviet Union had so legitimate and substantial a case that even the Iranian government now had withdrawn its complaint. In positive words he asserted that the task of the Council now was to "note" the removal of the Iranian question from the agenda.<sup>16</sup> Everything else had been settled and all that remained to terminate the formal aspects of the Iranian complaint was to "note" its removal.

Although he was "naturally" pleased to learn of the agreement between the disputants, Stettinius, who had replaced Byrne in the Council, asserted that the April 4 action in the Council was legal and proper.<sup>17</sup> (He quoted

16. Ibid., p. 126.

17. Ibid., pp. 126-127.

Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter to support his argument).<sup>18</sup>  
Confronting Gromyko with the two reasons why the Council had acted as it did on April 4, Stettinius declared that the Council had accepted not only the assurances of the U.S.S.R. that it would withdraw its troops from Iran but also the willingness of the Iranian government to accept these assurances.

In direct opposition to Gromyko, Stettinius saw no reason why the Iranian question should be taken off the agenda until May 6 when the Iranian report was due as provided in the April 4 resolution. He hoped that on May 6, if the report from Iran were favorable, the question could be dropped from the Council agenda.<sup>19</sup> Stettinius suspected that Iran's sudden reversal resulted from pressure placed on the Iranian government by either Soviet authorities in Iran or by the continued presence of Soviet troops. He preferred a "wait and see" policy.

Van Kleffens also defended the Council action of April 4 and objected to dropping the Iranian case from the

18. Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter: "All Members in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter."

19. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No. 2., p. 127.



agenda.<sup>20</sup> Cadogan, too, by supporting the legality of the Council action, denied Gromyko's arguments for dropping the matter from the agenda. As usual, Cadogan backed the United States and again demonstrated the solidarity of<sup>21</sup> opinion between the two governments on this question.

Insisting that he would not agree to the removal of the question from the agenda until a report had been received from the Iranian representative on May 6, Hodgson maintained that the decision of the majority of the Council had been fully in line with the Charter. He also wondered what had happened to the first part of the original Iranian complaint, i.e., the interference of Soviet authorities in Iranian internal affairs. Since no mention had been made of this in the Iranian request for the removal of its complaint from the agenda, he wanted to know whether this also had been settled. He summed up the position of the members opposing the dropping of the question by saying:

Statements by one or another individual member of the Council do not absolve the Council from its duty to investigate and to decide ascertained facts.<sup>22</sup>

20. Ibid., pp. 127-128.

21. Ibid., pp. 128-130.

22. Ibid., p. 132.

While agreeing that the logical thing to do would be to drop the case from the agenda in the light of the present circumstances, Velloso (Brazil) thought another matter had to be considered that prevented this action.<sup>23</sup> This was whether the Council had control over its own agenda, or whether the parties to a dispute could remove cases from the Council at will. Arguing that the authority of the Council was at stake, Velloso contended that the Council could decide its own agenda, and he opposed the withdrawing of the question for that reason.

Thwarted in what seemed to be his moment of victory, Gromyko fought back vigorously. He pointed out again and again that both Iran and the Soviet Union wanted the matter dropped from the agenda, and the Council had no right to oppose this view.<sup>24</sup> The United States and the United Kingdom once had kept the question on the agenda because no agreement had been reached, and now that an agreement had been reached, they still opposed the deletion of the question from the agenda. Here, indeed, was the type of inconsistent attitude which could undermine the prestige of the Council. Gromyko also asserted that the Dutch and Australian attitudes

23. Ibid., pp. 132-133.

24. Ibid., pp. 133-134.

were incompatible with "the meaning and letter of the Charter of our Organization."<sup>25</sup>

There now appeared the first major split in the anti-Soviet bloc. Bonnet (France) wearied of two hours of "somewhat complicated discussions," proposed that the case be dropped and that the secretary-general report on any further developments, in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter.<sup>26</sup> The deletion of the question from the agenda would be the simplest and least complicated method of solving the discussion, and anyway the Council had fulfilled its commitments to Iran.

Agreeing with the French representative only to the extent of ending the discussion, Castillo Najera (Mexico) brought up his favorite point, i.e., that the small countries were reassured that a favorable impression upon public opinion the world over had been created by the Council's action on the Iranian case.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, he would vote for the maintenance of the April 4 resolution.

Lange wanted to be put on record as sharing the view that the Council action of April 4 was legal, and this he separated himself, on that issue, from Gromyko.<sup>28</sup> Even so,

25. Ibid., p. 134.

26. Article 99 of the United Nations Charter: "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."

27. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.2., pp. 136-137.

28. Ibid., p. 137.

in view of the circumstances, Lange thought that the question now should be dropped from the agenda. Since the Council would not renounce completely its jurisdiction over the question, the secretary-general could refer the matter to the Council at any time. Lange cited Article 33, whereby parties can settle their disputes peacefully outside the United Nations, and argued that the Council had no cause to interfere in the settlement and "create trouble between the two parties."<sup>29</sup> Lange upheld the doctrine that a country had the right to withdraw its case from the Security Council whenever it wished, and in this he followed the Soviet line.<sup>30</sup> But he would not admit that the Council action of April 4 was illegal, since he had voted for it. On this issue, he was in a difficult position. Had he condemned the action as illegal, as had Cromyko, he would have admitted supporting an illegal act and further demonstrated Poland's subjection to the Soviet Union.

After Lange had finished his outburst, Afifi Pasha,<sup>31</sup>

29. Ibid., pp. 138-139.

30. Ibid., p. 139.

31. Hafez Afifi Pasha, M.D. was a former member of the liberal constitutional party and political front in Egypt. He was ambassador to London and negotiated the treaty of alliance with the United Kingdom in 1936. He was former minister for foreign affairs and was representative to the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946.

now representing Egypt in place of Hassan Pasha, endorsed the views of the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Brazil, and Mexico.<sup>31</sup>

Gromyko, Stettinius and Cadogan now involved themselves in what almost amounted to a name-calling contest. Gromyko flatly asserted that Stettinius' proposal to keep the question on the agenda violated the Charter and infringed upon the sovereign rights of the United Nations members. He more than intimated that the United States and the United Kingdom did not wish to settle the differences between the U.S.S.R. and Iran, and he accused both Stettinius and Cadogan of using Iran as a "pawn" in the game of world politics.<sup>32</sup>

Tired of listening to approximately three hours of bickering, the president proposed adjournment. But Stettinius, angered by the Soviet tirade against himself and Cadogan, wanted to reply to Gromyko. In a rather disgusted and tired manner, he contended that he had not made any proposal in this particular afternoon; he merely had attempted to explain why the United States could not support the request put before the Council by the U.S.S.R. representative.<sup>33</sup>

31. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.2., p. 139.

32. Ibid., pp. 139-141.

33. Ibid., p. 141.

Gromyko was not let off so easily by Cadogan, who was fighting mad at the implication that the United States and the United Kingdom were not genuinely interested in settling the Iranian matter.<sup>34</sup> Gromyko was entirely wrong. At all times both the United States and the United Kingdom had worked to solve "this thing." The resolution of April 4 was such a solution. If the Soviet government had carried out the assurances given to the Council by the Soviet delegate, the Iranian question would not have come up again. After all, it was Gromyko who had brought up the question again in demanding that the Council rescind its own resolution. Had Gromyko left well enough alone, the Council would have heard nothing more about the Iranian question. The president abruptly adjourned the meeting before more replies or comments could be made.

In this thirty-second meeting a most important matter arose: whether or not the Security Council was master of its own agenda. In the opinion of the Soviet bloc, the state bringing the dispute to the Council at its own discretion, could withdraw at will its complaint. The anti-Soviet bloc argued that the Council had every right to regulate the development of a dispute brought before it. If the Council had the right to place a dispute on its agenda, it had an equal right to say where it should be removed from the agenda. Here was

34. Ibid., p. 141.

a constitutional question of great importance. Even though it can be assumed that had Stettinius and Cadogan wanted to remove the Iranian question from the agenda, they would have done so. It was fortunate for the Security Council that a majority of the members if even for practical reasons, opposed the Soviet viewpoint and thus sustained the autonomy of the new United Nations.

The thirty-second meeting also revealed a weakening in the solidarity of the two blocs. The French representative momentarily supported the Soviet position, even though Bonnet never accepted the Soviet reasoning behind that position. He wanted to dispense of the Iranian question in the most convenient manner possible, though he wanted assurances that it could be brought back to the Council under Article 99, if need be. Lange, too, departed though in a minor respect, from a party line laid down by Gromyko. He hardly could argue that the April 4 resolution was illegal, since he had voted for it. In spite of these two departures, the other members of the two blocs stood firm, and thus the alignment in the Security Council on the Iranian question was the U.S.S.R. (with Polish backing) versus the U.S.A. and Great Britain (with Egyptian, Dutch, Australian, Brazilian, Chinese, and Mexican backing).

Gromyko's attempt to humiliate the Council by forcing it to rescind its action of April 4 failed completely. Instead, the anti-Soviet bloc determined the course of action and Gromyko's hopes came to naught. The Iranian government's sudden reversal generally was regarded by the anti-Soviet nations merely as an expression of Soviet pressure on Ghavam. "Watch and wait" and no retreat became the anti-Soviet bloc's attitude. The U.S.S.R. would have to keep faith in withdrawing its troops from Iran.

The strong language, insults, and recriminations of the Council members in this meeting were abruptly ended by the president's adjournment. But the extreme divergence of views over whether the parties to a dispute could withdraw the dispute from the Council was to continue on into the next meeting and widen the cleavage between east and west.

### III

The thirty-third meeting of the Security Council met on April 16, 1946 to continue the discussion of the Iranian question. Bonnet, in the meanwhile, had drawn up a draft resolution and had had it circulated among the members.<sup>35</sup> The French delegate's draft resolution now read by the president of the Council, re-stated what Bonnet had said earlier. The secretary-general should collect information to complete the Security Council's report to the General

35. Ibid., pp. 142-143.



Assembly on the Iranian case, and the question then should be dropped from the Council agenda.

After reading Bonnet's draft resolution, the president reported on a memorandum from Trygve Lie,<sup>36</sup> the secretary-general of the United Nations.<sup>37</sup> Arguing that it was desirable for him to present his official viewpoint, Lie summarized the history of the Iranian case in so far as it applied to the articles of Chapter 6 of the Charter. He concluded that:

...following withdrawal by the Iranian representative, the question is automatically removed from the agenda, unless:

- (a) The Security Council votes an investigation under Article 34, or
- (b) A Member brings it up as a situation or dispute under Article 35, or
- (c) The Council proceeds under Article 36, paragraph 1, which would appear to require a preliminary finding that a dispute exists under Article 33, or that there is 'a situation of like nature'.<sup>38</sup>

Furthermore, Lie argued that since the Council had neither invoked Articles 34 and 35, paragraph 1 nor decided that a dispute existed under Article 33, "It may well be there is no way in which it can remain seized of the matter."<sup>39</sup>

36. Trygve H. Lie (1896- ) escaped to England with the Norwegian government in 1940 and was acting foreign minister for Norway ( in England), 1940-45. He evolved provisional measures that saved the Norwegian fleet for the Allies. In 1945 he was chairman of the Norwegian delegation to the UNCIO and chairman of the Norwegian delegation to the General Assembly, 1946. Also in 1946, he was elected secretary-general of the United Nations.

37. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.2., pp. 143-145.

38. Ibid., p. 144.

The secretary-general used his legal right as adviser to the Security Council to present his views. In doing so he added prestige to his office when, in a critical moment, he chose to make his power felt. But in questioning the legality of the Council's action in the thirty-second meeting, he directly sustained the Soviet position and weakened the anti-Soviet bloc in the Council.

After inquiring if it were agreeable to the rest of the Council, the president referred the Lie memorandum to the committee of experts for examination and report.<sup>40</sup> The committee's report should be made before Council action on the memorandum. Gromyko, naturally enough, supported the president. The others were silent. The president set April 18 for the report of the committee.

The Council then got to work on the adjourned business of the last meeting. Stettinius answered Gromyko's charges with accusations of his own.<sup>41</sup> Membership on the Council carried with it tremendous responsibilities, and Gromyko had not lived up to these responsibilities. On the other hand, both "Secretary of State Byrnes and I have scrupulously refrained from questioning the motives of any Member, and I shall therefore not pursue this aspect of the matter any further..."<sup>42</sup> Stettinius reiterated: that the Council action

40. Ibid., p. 145.

41. Ibid., pp. 145-146.

42. Ibid., p. 145.

of April 4 was legal; that it was unwise to drop the question from the agenda; that the continued presence of Soviet troops in Iran might have had something to do with the sudden reversal in Iranian opinion; and that the Iranian question could be disposed of under the resolution of May 6, if on that date, Iran had no more complaints.

Gromyko counter-attacked. He had "called things by their proper names, regardless of whether Mr. Stettinius agreed with me or not," he said.<sup>43</sup> Since both Byrnes and Stettinius earlier had opposed the removal of the Iranian question because no agreement had been reached, their "inconsistency and lack of logic" was demonstrated because, now that agreement had been reached, they still opposed dropping the question from the agenda.

Breaking into the Stettinius-Gromyko quarrel, the Netherlands delegate said that the issue, in its simplest terms, was: "Who is master of the Council's agenda...It is not the parties, but the Council that admits a question to the agenda; not the parties but the Council alone that can remove it."<sup>44</sup> Speaking as the representative of China, and not as president, Quo Tai-Chi supported the Netherlands view. But when, in his presidential capacity, he asked

43. Ibid., p. 147.

44. Ibid., p. 147.

for a vote on the Soviet proposal, both Lange and Bonnet raised a point of order arguing that the Council could not vote until it had received the report of the committee of experts.<sup>45</sup> Reluctantly, the president concurred and postponed the vote.

A bitter altercation then broke out between the president and Gromyko when Gromyko harshly condemned Quo Tai-Chi for disregarding the secretary-general's memorandum and his own (Quo tai-Chi's) earlier ruling<sup>46</sup> in sending the memorandum to the committee of experts. The president lamely defended himself by saying that he had forgotten about the memorandum, but he did recall that in the thirty-second meeting Gromyko had agreed to a vote. The meeting was then adjourned.

#### IV

In attempting to remove its complaint from the Council agenda, Iran brought up a completely new problem for the Council to solve: if the Security Council was to be master of its own agenda. If the states party to a dispute could withdraw their complaints at will, the prestige and power of the Council would be greatly undermined. An issue of precedent of great importance was thus raised. The members

45. Ibid., pp. 149-150.

46. Ibid., pp. 150-151.

of the Council, in taking sides on this question, adhered to the same general line as before the presentation of the new Iranian request. Those members (with the exception of France), who previously had voted to retain the question on the agenda, still wished to do so. The Council, therefore, was master of its own agenda. On the other hand, those who had voted against the inclusion of the Iranian complaint on the agenda, still wanted it removed. The Council, therefore, was not master of its own agenda. And though the issue remained undecided at the end of the thirty-third meeting, it was clear that the anti-Soviet bloc, opposed by only the U.S.S.R., France, and Poland, would write its view into the procedural law of the Council.

CHAPTER 6.  
THE INDEFINITE POSTPONEMENT  
OF THE IRANIAN QUESTION

4

The thirty-sixth meeting of the Security Council was held on April 23, 1946. Afifi Pasha (Egypt), the new president reminded the Council of the postponement of discussion on the Iranian question until the committee of experts had reached a decision and had submitted a report. The committee had submitted a report, but it had not reached a unanimous decision.<sup>1</sup> What was to be done now?

Gromyko started the discussion by trying to accommodate the secretary-general's memorandum to his own views. The committee's failure to reach a unanimous decision, he said, only relected the division in the Council. Because the memorandum was an impartial analysis of the legal aspects of the question, the Council could not now prevent Iran from withdrawing its complaint from the agenda. Had the Council acted under the various articles of Chapter 6, Iran could not remove its complaint. But the Council had not acted under the various articles of Chapter 6, (largely, it must be remembered because of Gromyko's implied threat of using the "veto" should the substantive aspect be considered),

1. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No. 2., Hunter College, New York, (25 March 1946 to 26 June 1946), p. 102.

2. Ibid., pp. 201-203.

Iranian dispute must be removed from the agenda. The contrary United States view was wrong, inconsistent and illogical.

Denying Gromyko's charges of inconsistency, Stettinius said that he was unable to agree with the conclusions of the secretary-general.<sup>3</sup> If these conclusions were accepted, they would seriously limit the Council's power. Since he understood that Bonnet's resolution (to remove the Iranian question from the agenda) was procedural in character and thus would reverse the resolution of April 4, Stettinius was definitely opposed to it.

Hodgson at this moment tried to apply one of the articles of Chapter 6 to the Iranian dispute. Since the situation was dangerous enough to warrant the Council's keeping the question on the agenda, he argued, Article 34 made the Security Council "the watchdog for the whole of the United Nations."<sup>4</sup> He had his doubts about the "agreement" referred to in the Iranian statement, and he wanted the question to be kept on the agenda.<sup>5</sup>

To defend his resolution in the face of Stettinius' attack, Bonnet reiterated his idea that the Council already had done its duty toward Iran. His resolution in no way

3. Ibid., pp. 203-206.

4. Ibid., pp. 204-206.

5. Ibid., p. 204.

limited the Council's powers over the Iranian question.<sup>6</sup>  
It merely recognized the conciliatory aspects of an agreement reached by bilateral negotiations. The United Nations stood for peace, and whether that peace were secured by Council action or negotiation was irrelevant.

Cadogan asserted that the Charter neither explicitly permitted a party to withdraw its complaint nor explicitly permitted the Council to control its own agenda. In direct opposition to Gromyko's conclusion that the lack of unanimity in the committee report was "regrettable," Cadogan thought that it was well that, on so abstract an issue, the technical committee had not laid down a general rule to govern the Council in all cases.<sup>7</sup> Common sense was necessary in interpreting the Charter. Two more divergent viewpoints (than those of Gromyko and Cadogan) could hardly be found, and once again revealed the disparity between the Anglo-Saxon and Russian interpretations of a written document.

While the Polish representative once again came out in support of the French resolution,<sup>8</sup> Rafael de la Colina<sup>9</sup>

6. Ibid., pp. 206-207.

7. Ibid., pp. 207-208.

8. Ibid., pp. 208-210.

9. Rafael de la Colina (1898- ) became a councilor to various cities in the United States and was minister councilor to the embassy in Washington D.C., and was minister in Washington D.C. in 1944. He was a representative to the council of organization of American states, Washington, 1948, deputy secretary general on the inter-American conference of problems of war and peace, and representative to the UNCIO, 1945 and to the General Assembly and Security Council, 1946.



(now representing Mexico), Cuo Tai-Chi, and Velloso supported the United States and British views.<sup>10</sup> Gromyko dropped his proposal to come to the support of the French resolution.<sup>11</sup> A vote was taken on the French resolution by a show of hands, and it was rejected by 8 to 3. France, Poland, and the U.S.S.R. voted in favor of the resolution.<sup>12</sup>

The second Soviet walkout now resulted from Gromyko's contention that, since the U.S.S.R. and Iran had reached an agreement and that Iran had withdrawn its appeal to the Security Council, the defeat of the French resolution violated the United Nations Charter. The U.S.S.R. delegate could take no part in future discussions of the Iranian question by the Council.<sup>13</sup> The meeting was then adjourned.

The highlight of the thirty-sixth meeting was the second Soviet walkout, but unlike his first walkout, Gromyko did not actually get up and leave the Council chamber. The meeting was so near adjournment that there was no need for this.

In spite of Iran's request to withdraw its appeal, Gromyko's endless remonstrances, sarcasms, and outbursts,

10. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.2., pp. 210-213.

11. Ibid., p. 213.

12. Ibid., p. 213.

13. Ibid., pp. 213-214.

Bonnet's split with the other anti-Soviet powers over his resolution to delete the question from the agenda, the anti-Soviet forces retained their control of procedural matters in the Council. (Any substantive matter, of course, was subject to Gromyko's "veto"). And with the defeat of the French resolution, the Security Council remained the master of its own agenda.

## II

The next meeting of the Security Council to discuss the Iranian question (the fortieth) was held at Hunter College on May 8, 1946. Gromyko was absent. The delay resulted from the Council's taking no action until it had received a letter from the Iranian representative on May 6 as provided for in the April 4 resolution.<sup>14</sup> Ala's letter categorically stated that Soviet troops already had been evacuated from the provinces of Khurasan, Gorgan, Mazanderan, and Gilan.<sup>15</sup> But this picture of Soviet co-operation was shattered when the Iranian letter stated that, in so far as the rest of Azerbaijan was concerned, the Iranian government could make no investigation because of Soviet interference. The Iranian government, it was true, had been informed by other sources that the evacuation of Soviet troops from

14. Ibid., pp. 246-247.

15. Ibid., p. 246.

Azerbaijan was underway, but these reports had not been verified by any Iranian official.

Stettinius' suspicions of Soviet intentions apparently had been justified, as had his leadership in keeping the question on the agenda. Because Gromyko had ignored the Council's request to submit a report by May 6 and because the Iranian government still complained of Soviet interference Stettinius submitted a prepared draft resolution. (He had written it in advance after having read the Iranian letter). It read:

The Security Council,

Having considered the statement made by the Iranian Government in its preliminary report of 6 May, submitted in compliance with the resolution of 4 April 1946, that it was not able as of 6 May to state whether the withdrawal of all USSR troops from the whole of Iran had been completed,

Resolves

To defer further proceedings on the Iranian matter in order that the Government of Iran may have time in which to ascertain through its official representatives whether all USSR troops have been withdrawn from the whole of Iran;

To request the Iranian Government to submit a complete report on the subject to the Security Council immediately upon the receipt of the information which will enable it so to do; and in case it is unable to obtain such information by 20 May, to report on that day such information as is available to it at that time; and

To consider immediately following the receipt from the Iranian Government of the report requested what further proceedings may be required.<sup>16</sup>

16. Ibid., pp. 247-248.

Paul Hasluck<sup>17</sup> (now representing Australia) had no objection to the Stettinius resolution "as far as it goes." Complaining that it ignored Gromyko's failure to send in a report (as required by the resolution of April 4), Hasluck was deeply worried by the second absence of the Soviet delegate.<sup>18</sup> Where did Gromyko stand, and did he claim "veto" rights?

Cadogan unmoved by Gromyko's absence, undertook to quiet Hasluck's fears. As long as a quorum was maintained in the Council, its work was unimpaired.<sup>19</sup> Since the resolution before the Council was a procedural one, van Kleffens maintained the Council had every legitimate right to vote on Stettinius' resolution in Gromyko's absence.<sup>20</sup>

A vote was taken on the Stettinius resolution, and it was adopted without objection.<sup>21</sup> The president then adjourned the meeting.

Although the fortieth meeting was the shortest held so far on the Iranian dispute, the Stettinius resolution

17. Paul Hasluck (1905- ) was director of the post-war section of the department of external affairs, 1941-44. He was director of the post-hostilities division after World War II, and in 1946 he was representative to the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Council.

18. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.2., pp. 248-250.

19. Ibid., p. 251.

20. Ibid., pp. 251-252.

21. Ibid., p. 252.

was passed and an important legal problem was considered: what was the Council to do about the absence of the Soviet member. Hasluck complained that the Council now had to "obtain from the absent member a clear idea of what he claims is the effect of his absence,"<sup>22</sup> and although it seemed to him that "the first step towards resolving this question"<sup>23</sup> was an effort along this line, the question was left undecided by the Council.

Three views came out of this absence of the U.S.S.R. representative. They are:

(1) In the practice of the Security Council absence of a member, even of a permanent member, does not prevent this body from adopting a resolution. Absence of a permanent member is considered to be equivalent to abstention from voting.

(2) While the question has thus arisen but one, it would appear, on the basis of the Council's action in the Iranian case, that an absence is regarded as having the same legal effect, so far as voting is concerned, as an abstention. It would thus appear that the absence of permanent member does not prevent the Security Council from taking a decision on substantive questions.

(3) In view of the case that on matters of substance the concurring votes of the permanent members is required, the Soviet Delegate by thus absenting himself caused a blanket veto over all substantive decisions which the Security Council have decided to take.<sup>24</sup>

22. Ibid., p. 250

23. Ibid., p. 250.

24. Leo Gross, Voting in the Security Council: Abstention from Voting and Abstention from Meetings, The Yale Law Journal, February, 1951, New Haven, Conn., The Yale Law Journal Inc.,

The anti-Soviet members accepted the first two views, while Gromyko adhering to a stricter interpretation of the Charter, accepted only the third view.

### III

The forty-third and last meeting on the Iranian question was held on May 22, 1946. Again the Soviet representative was absent. A. Parodi<sup>25</sup> (France) was the new president.

In the previous two days, the Iranian delegate had submitted two conflicting reports to the Council. On May 20, Ala had written that he had received no very precise information about the situation in his country and that the conditions laid down by the Security Council had not been fulfilled.<sup>26</sup> On May 21, however, he wrote that Soviet troops had evacuated Azerbaijan by May 6.<sup>27</sup> And Ghavam, the Iranian prime minister, had telegraphed to the president of the Council that Soviet troops had been withdrawn from Azerbaijan by May 6.<sup>28</sup> In view of the confused situation the president regretted

25. Alexandre Parodi (1901- ) became director-general of the French committee of national liberation and of the financial and social council of resistance in 1944. He was minister of labor, 1944-46 and president of the international labor conference, 1945, ambassador to Rome and delegate to the allied advisory council for Italy, 1945. He became a permanent member to the United Nations, 1946.

26. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, Supplement No.2., pp. 52-53.

27. Ibid., pp. 53-54.

28. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.2., p. 287.

The anti-Soviet members accepted the first two views, while Gromyko adhering to a stricter interpretation of the Charter, accepted only the third view.

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26. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, Supplement No.2., pp. 52-53.

27. Ibid., pp. 53-54.

28. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No.2., p. 287.

gretted the Iranian complaint in Ala's letter of May 20.

After welcoming Luis Padilla Nervo,<sup>29</sup> the new Mexican representative, Stettinius suggested that no action be taken on the Iranian question until the situation of conflicting reports had been cleared up.<sup>30</sup> But the question was not to be dropped from the agenda. Cadogan agreed with Stettinius but he described Ghavam's telegram as only an "interim report." He wanted an answer to "certain questions to elucidate further the attitude of the Government in Tehran."<sup>31</sup> First, did the territory referred to in the Iranian telegram include all the places formerly occupied by Soviet troops. Second, was the government in Tehran satisfied with the evacuation of the Soviet troops. Third, what steps had the Iranian investigating commission taken to verify the report that equipment and means of transport had been removed. Fourth, had any investigation been made of the reports to the Iranian government by the loyal Iranians in those provinces just evacuated. As it turned out, no one answered these questions directly, but Ala answered similar questions later put to him by Lange.

Lange expressed regret over the way in which the Council

29. Luis Padilla Nervo (1898- ) entered the diplomatic service in 1930 and was a representative to the League of Nations in 1937. In 1946, he was chairman of the delegation to the last assembly of the League in Geneva and a representative to the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

30. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No. 2., pp. 287-288.

31. Ibid., p. 289.



had handled the Iranian matter.<sup>32</sup> It was unfortunate that Bonnet's proposal had been defeated, and it was contrary to the "letter and spirit" of the Charter to retain the question on the agenda. Lange had looked up the places mentioned in the Iranian report, he said, and the places mentioned covered the whole of AZERBAIJAN. The only course open to the Council was the immediate deletion of the Iranian question from the agenda.

To straighten out the confusion caused by the conflicting Iranian reports, van Kleffens proposed to seat Ala at the Council table.<sup>33</sup> The proposal was adopted without discussion, and at the invitation of the president, Ala was seated. Van Kleffens asked Ala if the complaint relative to Soviet interference were before the Council again.

To Ala's knowledge, Iran's first complaint was still on the agenda.<sup>34</sup> He explained that the Iranian withdrawal of its dispute from the agenda concerned the second part only, *i.e.*, the evacuation of Soviet troops. The withdrawal had not included Iran's complaint about Soviet interference in Iran's domestic affairs. However, Soviet assurances had prompted Ghavam to withdraw the entire dispute on April 15.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 290.

33. *Ibid.*, pp 291-292.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

As for Ghavan's telegram, Ala thought it was inconclusive in that it did not clearly state that Soviet troops had been withdrawn from all of Azerbaijan. To clear up the confusion resulting from his conflicting reports, he reminded the Council that the May 20 report had been due on that day at the latest. However, on May 21, he had received this new information and had immediately sent it to the Council.

Lange now resumed his long-interrupted tête-à-tête with Ala. Lange wanted four questions answered.<sup>35</sup> First, had the Iranian government lost faith in the assurances of the U.S.S.R. Next he wanted to know if the government of Iran agreed with Byrnes' statement in which he said, "After all, the withdrawal of troops without condition is the only sane method of disposing of any question of interference in the government of Iran."<sup>36</sup> Third, did the Iranian government have other complaints in addition to the withdrawal of troops. Fourth, did Iran consider the U.S.S.R. as the only country interfering in the internal affairs of Iran.

Answering the Polish delegate question for question,<sup>37</sup> Ala went into a lengthy discussion of the first question.

35. Ibid., pp. 294-295.

36. Ibid., p. 294.

37. Ibid., p. 295.

The Iranian government had not lost confidence in the U.S.S.R., "we are continuing to hope," said Ala. Every sane Iranian wanted friendly relations with Iran's great northern neighbor. Again accusing Soviet authorities of encouraging the autonomy movement in Azerbaijan, Ala still was not sure that the Iranian case should be dropped from the agenda. As for the Eyrnes statement, Ala reminded Lange that the Council had accepted it earlier. It had been, and still was hoped that the withdrawal of Soviet troops would terminate Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Iran.

As for implication that other nations were interfering in Iran, Ala clearly and defiantly contended that the U.S.S.R. alone was intervening. Not only had the United States and the United Kingdom withdrawn their troops, but, as far as Ala knew, these two countries had never interfered in Iranian internal affairs. (He obviously meant since World War II, since the British for centuries, had interfered in one form or another, in Iran and Ala made no mention of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company). As for Lange's map reading, Ala said the names mentioned in Ghavam's telegram sounded as though they were in the western part of Azerbaijan, and Soviet troops might very well still be stationed in some of the smaller villages.

38  
38. Ibid., p. 297.

Lange thanked Ala for his answers but asked him to bear with him for a few minutes longer, "so that I may request elucidation on three more points which are connected with his answers."<sup>39</sup> First, if the central government had been unable to send a commission to Azerbaijan and, at the same time, had informed the Council that various places in Azerbaijan had been carefully investigated, Lange wanted to know whether these "investigations" had been conducted "from an aeroplane by telescope?" Second, who was right: the prime minister who declared that Soviet troops had been evacuated by May 6 or Ala who asserted that he was not quite sure that they had been evacuated. Third:

Does the withdrawal of the complaint made in the letter from the representative of Iran on 15 April hold or shall we interpret his action now as presenting us with a new complaint?<sup>40</sup>

While he did not want to interrupt the exchange of views going on between the Polish and Iranian delegates, Stettinius nevertheless wanted to make it clear that it would be a mistake to drop the Iranian case this particular morning. He suggested that the Iranian dispute be deferred until a later meeting to be called by the president.<sup>41</sup>

39. Ibid., pp. 297-298.

40. Ibid., p. 298.

41. Ibid., p. 298.

Hasluck (Australia) also called Lange's attention to the fact that the Iranian question was still on the agenda, and, while "...it is interesting to know whether or not the Iranian Government withdraws any statement in regard to this matter before the Council..."<sup>42</sup> the Council alone would decide whether the complaint would remain on the agenda. Somewhat offended, Lange replied that he wanted it understood "emphatically that the Government of Poland accepts all decisions arrived at by this Council."<sup>43</sup>

Ala got his chance to answer the last three questions after Lange had answered Hasluck's charges. As for the "aeroplane and telescope" the investigating commission had travelled in an airplane, a Soviet one, but as for using a "telescope or even a microscope," Ala knew nothing.<sup>44</sup> The Council alone had jurisdiction over whether the question would be dropped from the agenda, and it was true that the Iranian government had asked for the removal of the second part of the complaint, namely troop evacuation. It had done so under the impression that the Soviet government would honor its assurances. (Ala forgot that the Iranian statement of April 15 "ending" the dispute had not separated the complaint

42. Ibid., p. 299.

43. Ibid., p. 299.

44. Ibid., p. 299.

into two parts). Moreover, for Lange to understand the telegram completely, he had to read all of it. Not knowing at the moment just where his government stood, Ala assumed that the question should be kept on the agenda.<sup>45</sup>

After Fadillo Nervo suggested that the discussion be postponed to give the Council more time to examine the case,<sup>46</sup> Farodi (France) urged a compromise solution. Farodi asked the Council:

...to leave the question on the agenda for a short time on the understanding that if within a certain period (say eight or ten days) no information has been received which would conflict with that already in our possession, the question will automatically be dropped from the agenda.<sup>47</sup>

Although the French position was not too far removed from that of the anti-Soviet bloc, Cadogan was "very sorry" that he could not accept it.. Before the question was dropped from the agenda, he wanted the Iranian government to be completely satisfied.<sup>48</sup> Stettinius as usual agreed with Cadogan's remarks.<sup>49</sup>

When the president asked Fadillo Nervo if he had proposed any specific period of postponement, the latter replied

45. Ibid., p. 300.

46. Ibid., ppp. 300-301.

47. Ibid., p. 302.

48. Ibid., p. 303.

49. Ibid., p. 303.

that one or two days would suffice.<sup>50</sup> Both Hasluck and Lange disagreed with such a postponement, and Lange in turn suggested that the Council send a telegram to the Iranian prime minister, asking if he were fully satisfied with the withdrawal of Soviet troops.<sup>51</sup>

Taking exception to the proposed telegram, van Kleffens made his own motion:

May I move that adjourn the discussion of the Iranian question until a date in the near future, the Council to be called together at the request of any member.<sup>52</sup>

Padillo Nervo then withdrew his proposal to support van Kleffens. The president called for a vote on the Netherlands proposal, and it was adopted by 9 votes to 1 vote.<sup>53</sup> Lange cast the negative vote. A vote on the Polish proposal to send a telegram to the Iranian prime minister was rejected by 8 votes to 2.<sup>54</sup> The meeting was then adjourned.

#### IV

The forty-third meeting proved to be the last meeting in which the Security Council discussed the Iranian question. Although the Netherlands resolution provided for a meeting on the question at some later date it was never called.

50. Ibid., p. 303.

51. Ibid., p. 304.

52. Ibid., p. 304.

53. Ibid., p. 305.

54. Ibid., p. 305.

Again the Council postponed action and left the disputants to work out a compromise solution by themselves.

Van Kieffens' resolution followed the same line as the other earlier anti-Soviet proposals and resolutions, i.e., postpone action on the Iranian question while the U.S.S.R. and Iran negotiated. The French proposal automatically to drop the question after a specified period, however, did not suit the leaders of the anti-Soviet bloc, namely the United States and the United Kingdom.

Lange tried his best to carry out Gromyko's policy, and he was consistently pro-Soviet in his arguments. Gromyko's absence in itself led to some legal soul-searching by Hasluck, especially since Gromyko had ignored the Council resolution of April 4 to make a report to the Council. But the issue of "absence and veto" was never specifically settled. That the Council continued to discuss the Iranian question, however, implied that it was procedural in nature and that the Soviet absence did not constitute a "veto."

Some confusion was caused by Ala's conflicting reports. However, he removed the confusion by pointing out that he had obeyed the Council resolution of April 4 to communicate with the Council as soon as something new had appeared. Ala, indeed, reflected the eagerness of the Iranian government to remain on good terms with both the U.S.S.R. and the Council. When Gromyko sneered at the personal integrity of the Iranian



delegate, Ala replied with no personal remarks about Soviet integrity, except to say that he believed in it. At the same time, he followed the Council's requirements to the letter.

After Gromyko's walkout (he was present when other matters were considered) the discussions were much more amiable. And the anti-Soviet bloc again demonstrated its power over Council procedure when it adopted the van Kleffens resolution and rejected Lange's proposal.

The Council, by postponing the question "until a date in the near future," postponed it for good, and the question was to remain on the agenda indefinitely. As late as the summer of 1951, no move had been made to remove it from the agenda.

CHAPTER 7.

CONCLUSION

I

Through the centuries, Iran has had to play the part of a small power whose sovereignty and independence were limited by interested great powers, especially Russia (or the Soviet Union) and Great Britain. For various reasons (see Chapter 1), these powers had played power politics in Iran without any regard for Iran's welfare or benefit. In defense, Iran developed the policy of trying to play one great power off against the other and in this way maintained its independence.

This policy came to naught when in 1907 Russia and Great Britain reached an agreement to divide Iran (then Persia) into three spheres of influence. However, the defeat of Imperial Russia in World War I and the rise of the Bolsheviki to power upset the balance of power in the Near East, and Great Britain tried to make Iran a dependency in fact if not in name. But in 1921, Soviet Russia and Iran concluded a friendship agreement permitting the Soviet Union to intervene in Iran in the event of intervention by a third party.

In 1925, the old dynasty was overthrown by Riza Shah, an army officer who came to be called the Mustafa Kemal of Iran. His attempts to modernize the country and make it independent and progressive nation did not succeed, but

they did involve Iran in a dispute with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the British concession acquired in 1914. This dispute, and one earlier with the Soviets in 1919-20, brought Iran as a suppliant to the Council of the League of Nations. It is instructive to note briefly the similarity of the Iranian case in the United Nations with the Iranian cases in the League of Nations.

The first case that came before the League in 1920 was an Iranian complaint against Soviet Russia. White Russian forces under General Denikin were using Persia as a base of operations against Soviet Russia, which retaliated by bombing the Persian port of Enzeli on the Caspian Sea where White Russian troops were stationed. Upon the receipt of several letters from the Persian foreign minister, the League Council, on June 16, 1920, took up the matter. But, like the Security Council on January 30, 1946, it adopted a resolution to the effect that, "before taking action, it would be well to await the results of direct negotiations between parties."<sup>1</sup> The negotiations resulted in the 1921 treaty.

A second dispute involving Persia was brought before the League of Nations by the British government on December 14, 1932. At this time, the Persian government had cancelled

1. United Nations News, Vol. I., No. 5., May 1946, New York, Woodrow Wilson Foundation, p. 3.

the concession held by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The British government took up the oil company's case and protested the cancellation of the concession. In this case, too, the League Council deferred consideration of the question until negotiations were finally concluded by a new agreement, an agreement "considerably more favorable to Persia than the original concession."<sup>2</sup>

In the Security Council as in the League Council, the Iranian question was postponed again and again, and the disputes were left to settlement by direct negotiations. Even as it must be remembered that Iran's negotiating position was greatly strengthened by having its disputes on the agendas of the Councils. These international or world organizations, in spite of their obvious weaknesses, have proved their worth, at least to Iran.

When the Iranian government became involved in World War II, there followed the abdication of Riza Shah and the occupation of the country by British, Soviet and later American troops. After using Iran to protect an important supply route to the U.S.S.R., the British and American troops left the country at the end of the war. But the Soviet Union not only fostered an autonomy movement in Azerbaijan but all during the war and afterwards, interfered in the internal affairs of Iran. Confronted with what seemed to be an almost

2. Ibid., p. 4.

impossible situation after the failure of negotiating with the U.S.S.R. and the Moscow conference, and remembering its successes with League backing, the Iranian government referred the dispute to the new United Nations Security Council.

## II

In taking up the Iranian question in its second meeting, the Security Council was courageous in meeting head on a dispute that threatened to disturb world peace. In the actual working of the Security Council, every member felt that far more was at stake than the solution of one problem. Since the Iranian complaint was the first important case to come before it, the Security Council probed for techniques and principles that might be cited as precedents in future cases. Each member was clearly conscious that each separate step in the proceedings was of long-run significance.

The members of the Council tried to support their arguments by citing as evidence the relevant articles of the Charter and especially those articles in Chapter 6. To sustain their arguments, all members tried to interpret a procedure that soon involved the Security Council in a problem that has not yet been solved, i.e., whether the Council should adhere to a "broad" or a "strict" interpretation of the Charter. The Soviet representatives, in particular, insisted on a strict or literal interpretation. On the other hand, the

majority of the Council led by the United States and Great Britain, wanted the procedure of the Council kept flexible and fluid under a broad interpretation of the Charter.

The Council also encountered the difficulty for the first time, of the absence of a permanent member. Since it had to be decided whether the action taken by the Council were procedural or substantive, the Soviet walkout raised the question of whether the Council could take action on the Iranian case. Under Article 27, paragraph 2, the Council could take action on any procedural question with the affirmative vote of 7 of its members. However, under paragraph 3 of the same article, the Council had to have the concurring votes of the five permanent members on any question other than procedural, i.e., a substantive question. This is the "veto."

It was seemingly decided in the Iranian case that the action taken in the absence of the Soviet representative was of procedural nature and therefore not subject to a Soviet "blanket veto." It is pertinent to observe that as little mention as possible was made of the absence of the Soviet representative despite the fears of many observers that the new organization would break up over this question. The Council did not reprimand the Soviet representative in any way, officialy or otherwise. It was content to deal

with the question at hand, namely its competence to adopt procedural resolutions during the absence of the Soviet delegate.

Even though the Council never acted on, or even considered the substance of the Iranian question, Iran benefited greatly from being able to play off the anti-Soviet bloc against the Soviet bloc and to publicize its complaint in a world forum. . Iran, in fact, used the United Nations against the Soviet Union to protect its threatened independence and sovereignty, and the agreement reached with the U.S.S.R. (outside the Council) was shaped by the Council's threat to reconsider the question should that agreement be unsatisfactory to Iran. Without the Security Council's help an agreement would have been reached between the two disputants that would have been entirely favorable to the U.S.S.R. Perhaps Iran would have lost its sovereignty altogether. But Iran was able not only to re-establish its sovereignty over Azerbaijan in December, 1946 but also to reach a favorable settlement over oil concessions with the Soviet Union only because it had a place to take its grievances where it could hope for a fair hearing. While the Council seemed at times to be a debating society only, it performed in reality the duty of a international tribunal where a small power could present its case against a great power.

After the Netherlands proposal to "adjourn the discussion of the Iranian question until a date in the near future, the Council to be called together at the request of any member,"<sup>3</sup> only one more reference was made to the question in 1946. This was a letter from the Iranian ambassador to the United States to the secretary-general of the United Nations.<sup>4</sup> The letter was a report concerning the state of affairs in the province of Azerbaijan. It in part stated that the central government had not yet been able to re-establish its authority in Azerbaijan and that the Soviet ambassador had advised the central government not to try to send troops to this province. To preserve order in the general election of December 7, however, Iran would take the action necessary to maintain law and order throughout Iran. The Iranian government was glad of the decision of the Security Council to remain "seized" of the question.

By the end on December, 1946, the Iranian government was able to suppress the autonomy movement in Azerbaijan and the general election (supposed to take place in December) was held in January. The Iranian dispute was ended.

3. Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, No. 2., p. 304.

4. United Nations Yearbook, 1946-1947, Department of Public Information, Lake Success, New York, pp. 335-336.



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Document S/42 was the report of the committee of experts on the memorandum presented to the Security Council by the secretary-general. It is relevant to the Iranian question in that it explains how the committee tried and failed to reach a unanimous decision on the memorandum. Document S/1273, in a few paragraphs, gave a summary of the Iranian question before the Security Council. The Journal was a fairly valuable summary of the Security Council meetings. The basis for chapters 2-6 was provided by the Official Records, and they were accurate and detailed accounts of the action taken by the individual members of the Security Council in dealing with the Iranian question.

## B. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Compilation of Documents, prepared by the representative of Iran for convenient reference in the consideration by the Security Council of the disputes between Iran and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

These documents were useful in that they were composed of notes, letters, and treaties that formed the background and basis for the Iranian case before the Security Council. The 1921 friendship treaty and the 1927 security treaty between Iran and the Soviet Union were especially valuable since they were not included in the Official Records supplements.

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Cook, W. Henry, and Stickney, Edith P., Readings in European International Relations Since 1879, Harper and Brothers, Publishers, New York, 1931.

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Both of these books were pertinent in presenting first hand accounts of the problems and decisions preceding the Anglo-Russian rapprochement. Gooch and Temperly covered in great detail the methods used in arriving at the rapprochement, and their book was comprised chiefly of documents, notes, and letters between the individuals concerned with the rapprochement.

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Witte, Count Sergius, The Memoirs of Count Witte, (Translated from the original Russian manuscript and edited by Abraham Yarmolinsky), Doubleday and Page, Garden City, New York, 1925.

Eagleton was useful in that material from the United Nations Charter was obtained from his book. Groseclose gave a comprehensive summary of Iran from time immemorial to the present. Well written and interesting, it covered every aspect of the country, from political and economic conditions to pastoral livelihood and rug weaving. Hass' book, Iran, was a fairly well written book, except for a typographical error on the Tehran declaration. The book placed the declaration in 1944, when actually it was issued in 1943. Material from the United Nations Charter was also obtained from Hill, and his evaluation of the Charter was helpful in getting an understanding of it. Stieve gave an interesting background of Isvolsky's part in the 1907 rapprochement of Russia with Great Britain. However, most of the book is devoted to his part in the relations of Russia with France and other nations before and during World War I.

The United Nations Year Book gave a summary of the dispute and made reference to the December 5, 1946 letter from the Iranian ambassador in Washington D.C. to the secretary-general of the United Nations, the only source for the letter. Most of the biographical sketches found in the footnotes throughout the thesis were taken from this book. Vernadsky's books were useful for the 1921 friendship treaty between Iran and the U.S.S.R., while Witte provided a number of comments on the Anglo-Russian rapprochement in 1907.

#### B. PERIODICALS

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United Nations News, May, 1946, New York, Woodrow Wilson Foundation.

Gross, Leo, Voting in the Security Council: Abstention from Voting and Abstention from Meetings, Yale Law Journal, February, 1951, New Haven, Conn., The Yale Law Journal Inc.

The article by Coombs was almost too brief to be of value, but it had some pertinent information in it. Grant wrote on the history of Persia from the 6th century B.C. to the present, and in doing so, covered her subject briefly but accurately. Hindle predicted social revolution and also wrote a brief summary of the situation in Iran from 1907. The Information Bulletin presented a different viewpoint, since it was made up of republished Soviet newspaper articles from Pravda, Izvestia, Red Star and material from other Soviet periodicals. A very good summary of the Iranian dispute was given in International Organizations. The summary covered the progress of the Iranian question in its entirety, through the Security Council. An article by Supreme Court Justice Douglas, and several other articles concerning Iran were found in Life. Along with the pictures of the country and the people, the articles were interesting and informative. Newsweek covered in detail Gromyko's walkout and gave a picture of Byrnes' twisting around in his seat to watch Gromyko leave. Time carried a story about the Soviet walkout also but lacked the picture. The background for Iran in the League of Nations was derived from the United Nations News. A good summary of the effect of the absence of the Soviet delegate from the Security Council was given in The Yale Law Journal.

### C. NEWSPAPERS

The New York Times, November, 1944.

The New York Times was a good source for background material on the Iranian question.

**APPENDIX**

TEXT OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN  
RAPPROCHEMENT REGARDING PERSIA

1907

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations;

Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighborhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interests in the abovementioned provinces of Persia;

Have agreed on the following terms:--

I. Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, and Concessions of a political or commercial nature--such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.--beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.

II. Russia, or her part, engages not to seek for herself and not to support, in favour of Russian subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature--such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.--beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the British Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.

III. Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any Concession whatever to British subjects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles I and II.

Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant of Concession to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia.

All Concession existing at present in the regions indicated in Articles I and II are maintained.

IV. It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian customs, with the exception of those of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, revenues guaranteeing the amortization and the interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the "Banque d' Escompte et des Prêts de Perse" up to the date of the signature of the present Agreement, shall be devoted to the same purpose as in the past.

It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian customs of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those of the fisheries on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea and those of the Posts and Telegraphs; shall be devoted, as in the past, to the service of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Agreement.

V. In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortization or the payment of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the "Banque d' Escompte et des Prêts de Perse" and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Agreement, and in the event of the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the first-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article II of the present Agreement, or for Great Britain to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the second-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article I of the present Agreement, the British and Russian Governments undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the measures of control in question and to avoid all interference which would not be in conformity with the principles governing the present Agreement.



TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN IRAN AND THE RUSSIAN  
REPUBLIC, MOSCOW, FEBRUARY 26, 1921

(Ratifications exchanged at Teheran, February 26, 1922)

(Translation.)

The Persian Government, of the one part, and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, of the other part, desiring to establish relations of friendship and fraternity between the two nations, have decided to engage in negotiations for this purpose, and have therefore appointed the following Plenipotentiaries:

For Persia: Ala Gholi Khan Mochaverol-Mamalek, and  
For Russia: O.V. Chicherin and L.M. Karakhan,  
Who, after the verification of their respective powers, have agreed as follows:

Art. I. In order to confirm its declarations regarding Russian policy towards the Persian nation, which formed the subject of correspondence on the 14th January, 1918, and the 26th June, 1919, the R.S.F.S.R. formally affirms once again that it definitely renounces the tyrannical policy carried out by the colonising Governments of Russia which have been overthrown by the will of the WORKERS and peasants of Russia.

Inspired by this principle, and desiring that the Persian people should be happy and independent and should be able to dispose freely of its patrimony, the Russian Republic declares the whole body of treaties and conventions concluded with Persia by the Tsarist Government, which crushed the rights of the Persian people, to be null and void.

II. The R.S.F.S.R. expresses its reprobation of the policy of the Tsarist Governments of Russia, which, on the pretext of insuring the independence of the peoples of Asia, concluded, without the consent of the latter, treaties with European Powers, the sole object of which was to subjugate those peoples.

This criminal policy, which infringed upon the independence of the countries of Asia and which made the living nations of the East a prey to the cupidity and the tyranny of European robbers, is abandoned unconditionally by Federal Russia.

Federal Russia, therefore, in accordance with the principles laid down in Articles I and IV of this Treaty, declares its refusal to participate in any action which might destroy or weaken Persian sovereignty. It regards as null and void the whole body of treaties and conventions concluded by the former Russian Government with third parties in respect of Persia or to the detriment of that country

III. The two Contracting Powers agree to accept and respect the Russo-Persian frontiers, as drawn by the Frontier Commission in 1881.

At the same time, in view of the repugnance which the Russian Federal Government feels to enjoying the fruit of the policy of usurpation of the Tsarist Government, it renounces all claim to the Achouradeh Islands and to the other islands on the Astrabad Littoral, and restores to Persia the village of Firouzeh and the adjacent land ceded to Russia in virtue of the convention of the 28th May, 1893.

The Persian Government agrees for its part that the Russian Sarakhs, or "old" Sarakhs, and the land adjacent to the Sarakhs River, shall be retained by Russia.

The two High Contracting Parties shall have equal rights of usage of the Atrak River and the other frontier rivers and waterways. In order finally to solve the question of the waterways and all disputes concerning frontiers or territories, a Commission, composed of Russian and Persian representatives shall be appointed.

IV. In consideration of the fact that each nation has the right to determine freely its political destiny, each of the two Contracting Parties formally expressed its desire to abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of the other.

V. The two High Contracting Parties undertake--

1. To prohibit the formation or presence within their respective territories of any organizations or groups of persons, irrespective of the name by which they are known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against Persia or Russia, or against the allies of Russia.

They will likewise prohibit the formation of troops or armies within their respective territories with the aforementioned object.

2. Not to allow a third party or any organization, whatever it be called, which is hostile to the other Contracting Party, to import or to convey in transit across their countries material which can be used against the other Party.

3. To prevent by all means in their power the presence within their territories or within the territories of their allies of all armies or forces of a third party in cases in which the presence of such forces would be regarded as a menace to the frontiers, interests or safety of the other Contracting Party.

VI. If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such Power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a foreign Power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purposes of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defence. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed.

VII. The considerations set forth in Article VI have equal weight in the matter of the security of the Caspian Sea. The two High Contracting Parties therefore have agreed that Federal Russia shall have the right to require the Persian Government to send away foreign subjects, in the event of their taking advantage of their engagement in the Persian navy to undertake hostile action against Russia.

VIII. Federal Russia finally renounces the economic policy pursued in the East by the Tsarist Government, which consisted in lending money to the Persian Government, not with a view to the economic development of the country, but rather for purposes of political subjugation.

Federal Russia accordingly renounces its rights in respect of the loans granted to Persia by the Tsarist Governments. It regards the debts due to it as void, and will not require their repayment. Russia likewise renounces its claims to the resources of Persia which were specified as security for the loans in question.

IX. In view of the declaration by which it has repudiated the colonial and capitalist policy which occasioned so many misfortunes and was the cause of so much bloodshed, Federal Russia abandons the continuation of the economic undertakings of the Tsarist Government, the object of which was the economic subjugation of Persia. Federal Russia therefore cedes to the Persian Government the full ownership of all funds and of all real and other property which the Russian Discount Bank possesses on Persian territory, and likewise transfers to it all the assets and liabilities of that bank. The Persian Government nevertheless agrees that in the towns where it has

been decided the Russian Socialist Republic may establish consulates, and where buildings exist belonging to the Discount Bank, one of these buildings, to be chosen by the Russian Government, shall be placed at the disposal of the Russian Consulate, free of charge.

X. The Russian Federal Government, having abandoned the colonial policy, which consisted in the construction of roads and telegraph line more in order to obtain military influence in other countries than for the purpose of developing their civilizations, and being desirous of providing the Persian people with those means of communication indispensable for the independence and development of any nation, and also in order to compensate the Persian people as far as possible for the losses incurred by the sojourn in its territory of the Tsarist armies, cedes free of charge to the Persian Government the following Russian installations:

(a) The high-roads from Enzeli to Tehran, and from Kazvin to Hamadan, and all land and installations in connection with these roads.

(b) The railroad Djoulfa-Tauris-Sofian-Urmiya, with all installations, rolling-stock, and accessories.

(c) The landing-stages, warehouses, steamships, canals, and all means of transport of the lake of Urmia.

(d) All telegraph and telephone lines established in Persia by the Tsarist Governments, with all movable and immovable installations and dependencies.

(e) The port of Enzeli and the warehouses, with the electrical installation, and other buildings.

XI. In view of the fact that the Treaty of Turkomanчай concluded on the 10th February, 1828 (old style), between Persia and Russia, which forbids Persia, under the terms of Article 8, to have vessels in the waters of the Caspian Sea, is abrogated in accordance with the principles set forth in Article I of the present Treaty, the two High Contracting Parties shall enjoy equal rights of free navigation on that sea, under their own flags, as from the date of the signing of the present Treaty.

XII. The Russian Federal Government, having officially renounced all economic interests obtained by military preponderance, further declares that, apart from the concessions which form the subject of Articles IX and X, the other concessions obtained by force by the Tsarist Government and its subjects shall also be regarded as null and void.

In conformity therewith the Russian Federal Government restores, as from the date of the signing of the present Treaty, to the Persian Government as representing the Persian people, all the concessions in question, whether already being worked or not, together with all land taken over in virtue of those concessions.

Of the lands and properties situated in Persian and belonging to the former Tsarist Government, only the premises of the Russian Legation at Tehran and at Zerguendeh with all movable and immovable appurtenances, as well as all real and other property of the Consulates and Vice-Consulates shall be retained by Russia. Russia abandons, however, her right to administer the village of Zerguendeh, which was arrogated to itself by the former Tsarist Government.

XIII. The Persian Government, for its part, promised not to cede to a third Power, or to its subjects, the concessions and property restored to Persia by virtue of the present Treaty, and to maintain those rights for the Persian nation.

XIV. The Persian Government, recognising the importance of the Caspian fisheries for the food supply of Russia, promises to conclude with the Food Service of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic immediately upon the expiry of the legal period of these existing engagements, a contract relating to the fisheries, containing appropriate clauses. Furthermore, the Persian Government promises to examine, in agreement with the Government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, the means of at once conveying the produce of the fisheries to the Food Service of Soviet Russia pending the conclusion of the above contract.

XV. In accordance with the principle of liberty of conscience re-claimed by Soviet Russia, and with a desire to put an end, in Moslem countries, to religious propaganda, the real object of which was to exercise political influence over the masses and thus to satisfy the rapacity of the Tsarist Government, the Government of Soviet Russia declared that the religious settlements established in Persia by the former Tsarist Governments are abolished. Soviet Russia will take steps to prevent such missions from being sent to Persia in the future.

Soviet Russia cedes unconditionally to the nation represented by the Persian Government the lands, property and buildings belonging to the Orthodox Mission situated at Urmia, together with the other similar establishments. The Persian Government shall use these properties for the construction of schools and other institutions intended for educational purposes.

XVI. By virtue of the communication from Soviet Russia dated the 25th June, 1919, with reference to the abolition of consular jurisdictions, it is decided that Russian subjects in Persia and Persian subjects in Russia shall, as from the date of the present Treaty, be placed upon the same footing as the inhabitants of the towns in which they reside; they shall be subject to the laws of their country of residence, and shall submit their complaints to the local Courts.

XVII. Persian subjects in Russia and Russian subjects in Persia shall be exempt from military service and from all military taxation.

XVIII. Persian subjects in Russia and Russian subjects in Persia shall, as regards travel within the respective countries, enjoy the rights granted to the most favoured nations other than countries allied to them.

XIX. Within a short period after the signature of the present Treaty, the two High Contracting Parties shall resume commercial relations. The methods to be adopted for the organization of the import and export of goods, methods of payment, and the customs duties to be levied by the Persian Government on goods originating in Russia, shall be determined, under a commercial Convention, by a special Commission consisting of representatives of the two High Contracting Parties.

XX. Each of the two High Contracting Parties grants to the other the right of transit for the transport of goods passing through Persia or Russia and consigned to a third country.

The dues exacted in such cases shall not be higher than those levied on the goods of the most favoured nations other than countries allied to the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.

The conditions of these relations shall be fixed by a postal and telegraphic Convention.

XXII. In order to consolidate the good relations between the two neighbouring Powers and to facilitate the realisation of the friendly intentions of each country towards the other, each of the High Contracting Parties shall, immediately after the signature of the present Treaty, be represented in the capital of the other by a Plenipotentiary Representative, who shall enjoy the rights of extra-territoriality and other privileges to which diplomatic representatives are entitled by international law and usage and by the regulations and customs of the two countries.

XXIII. In order to develop their mutual relations, the two High Contracting Parties shall establish Consulates in places to be determined by common agreement.

The rights and duties of the Consuls shall be fixed by a special Agreement to be concluded without delay after the signature of the present Treaty. This Agreement shall conform to the provisions in force in the two countries with regard to consular establishments.

XXIV. This Treaty shall be ratified within a period of three months. The exchange of ratifications shall take place at Tahrán as soon as possible.

XXV. The present Treaty is drawn up in Russian and Persian. Both texts shall be regarded as originals and both shall be authentic.

XXVI. The present Treaty shall come into force immediately upon signature.

In faith whereof the undersigned have signed the present Treaty and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Moscow, February 26, 1921.

G. Chicherin  
L. Karakhan  
Mochaverol-Memalik

TRI-PARTITE TREATY OF ALLIANCE

His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah of Iran, on the one hand, and His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other;

Having in view the principles of the Atlantic Charter jointly agreed upon and announced to the world by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on 14 August 1941, and endorsed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 24 September 1941, with which His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah declares His complete agreement and from which He wishes to benefit on an equal basis with the other nations of the world, and

Being anxious to strengthen the bonds of friendship and mutual understanding between them, and

Considering that these objects will best be achieved by the conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance,

Have agreed to conclude a treaty for this purpose and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

For His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah of Iran:  
His Excellency Ali Soheily,  
Minister of Foreign Affairs;

For His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,  
Sir Reader William Bullard, KCMG, CIE,  
His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and  
Minister Plenipotentiary in Iran,

For the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;  
His Excellency Andrei Andfeyevich Smirnov,  
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Iran,



Who having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (Hereinafter referred to as the Allied Powers) jointly and severally undertake to respect the territorial integrity, the sovereignty and political independence of Iran.

ARTICLE II

An Alliance is established between His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah of Iran on the one hand, and the Allied Powers on the other.

ARTICLE III

- (1) The Allied Powers jointly and severally undertake to defend Iran by all means at their command from all aggression on the part of Germany or any other Power.
- (2) His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah undertakes:
  - a) To co-operate with the Allied Powers with all the means at his command and in every way possible in order that they may be able to fulfil the above undertaking. The assistance of the Iranian forces shall, however, be limited to the maintenance of internal security on Iranian territory.
  - b) To secure to the Allied Powers for the passage of troops or supplies from one Allied Power to the other, or for other similar purposes, the unrestricted right to use, maintain, guard, and in case of military necessity, control in any way that they may require, all the means of communication throughout Iran, including railways, roads, rivers, aerodromes, ports, pipelines and telephones, telegraph and wireless installations.
  - c) To furnish all possible assistance and facilities in obtaining material and recruiting labour for the purpose of the maintenance and the improvement of the means of communications referred to in paragraph b).
  - d) To establish and maintain in collaboration with the Allied Powers such measures of censorship control as they may require for all the means of communication referred to in paragraph b).
- (3) It is clearly understood that in the application of paragraphs (2) b), c) and d) of the present article, the Allied Powers will give full consideration to the essential needs of Iran.

ARTICLE IV

(1) The Allied Powers may maintain in Iranian territory land, sea and air forces in such number as they consider necessary. The location of such forces shall be decided in agreement with the Iranian Government so long as the strategic situation allows. All questions concerning the relation between the forces of the Allied Powers and the Iranian authorities shall be settled, so far as possible, in co-operation with the Iranian authorities in such a way as to safeguard the security of the said forces.

It is understood that the presence of these forces on Iranian territory does not constitute a military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations.

(2) A separate agreement or agreements shall be concluded as soon as possible after the entry into force of the present Treaty regarding any financial obligations to be borne by the Allied Powers under the provisions of the present article and of paragraphs (2) b), c) and d) of article 3 above, in such matters of local purchases, the hiring of buildings and plant, the employment of labour, transport charges, etc. A special agreement shall be concluded between the Allied Governments and the Imperial Iranian Government defining the conditions of any transfers to the Imperial Iranian Government after the war of buildings and other improvement effected by the Allied Powers on Iranian territory. These agreements shall also settle the immunities to be enjoyed by the Allied forces in Iran.

ARTICLE V

The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her Associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier.

The expression "Associates" of Germany means all other Powers which have engaged or may in future engage in hostilities against either of the Allied Powers.

ARTICLE VI

(1) The Allied Powers undertake in their relations with foreign countries not to adopt an attitude which is prejudicial to the territorial integrity, the sovereignty or the political independence of Iran, nor to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty. They undertake to consult the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah in all matters affecting the direct interests of Iran.

(2) His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah undertakes not to adopt in his relations with foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the Alliance, nor to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

The Allied Powers jointly undertake to use their best endeavours to safeguard the economic existence of the Iranian people against the privations and difficulties arising as a result of the present war. On the entry into force of the present Treaty, discussions shall be opened between the Government of Iran and the Governments of the Allied Powers as to the best possible methods of carrying out the above undertaking.

ARTICLE VIII

The provisions of the present Treaty are equally binding as bilateral obligations between His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah and each of the two other High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE IX

The present Treaty shall come into force on signature, and shall remain in force until the date fixed for the withdrawal of the forces of the Allied Powers from Iranian territory in accordance with article V.

In witness whereof, the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Tehran in triplicate in Persian, English and Russian, all being equally authentic, on the twenty ninth day of January one thousand nine hundred and forty two.

(signed) A. Soheily  
R. W. Bullard  
Andrei A. Smirnov

THE THREE-POWER DECLARATION CONCERNING

IRAN

ISSUED AT THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE

1 DECEMBER 1943

The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The three Governments realize that war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other Members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

(signed) Winston Churchill  
J.V. Stalin  
Franklin D. Roosevelt