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Notes on Henry Bugbee's *The Inward Morning*

These notes are from a course on Bugbee's book: Philosophy 390, Problems in Philosophy: Henry Bugbee's *The Inward Morning*, Winter Quarter 1979.

I am grateful to the students who took the notes:

Greg Barringer
 Pat Burke
 John Crist
 Rae Horan
 Jim Maher
 Dave Strong
 John Wagner

I am equally grateful to the Staff of the Philosophy Department and to Rachel Smith in particular who in 2019 transcribed the notes, preserved in a mimeographed copy, to a PDF. The mimeographed version is now in the Albert Borgmann Archive of the Mansfield Library of the University of Montana. A copy is also available at ScholarWorks at the University of Montana.

I have checked the PDF against the mimeographed version and corrected obvious errors in either version. I have occasionally checked the PDF against *The Inward Morning*.

I have replaced the gendered language of 1979 with gender-inclusive language, and I have made the format consistent.

Underlined dates are those of *The Inward Morning*.

Albert Borgmann

John Wagner:

January 9, 1979

The theme of the book: Reality (focus and things in their own right) comes to us and graces us in its own right.

Reality "does not arrive as a plane does;" sometimes it finds expression in the mode of recollection. Sometimes we are inadequately prepared for its arrival.

Reality cannot be secured a priori, its appearance is spontaneous, it may withhold itself, it may be unrecognized, it may be recollected from memory. Reality can be earned but not steered.

Comments on Journal Form:

Positive Aspects: Journal Form allows the convergence of life and thought; this convergence is liberating. The language is telling, forceful, vivid. Language as the expression of this convergence.

Negative aspects: Frailty revealed, no place left to hide.

Three modes of discourse:

testimony: reality has come to pass ("good days")

struggle: one's being unequal to reality makes itself felt ("bad days")

reflection: making room for reality

Bugbee's Preface

p. 9 – the periodicity of life's work.

Perihodos, a coming around, a crux; one will either fulfill or default wherein one is held accountable for that which transpired, transpires, will transpire. Cf. Heidegger's *Kehre*, the turn. Note the emphasis on rhythm: A flowing freely, flow of both the work and the years.

p. 10 – the insight of meditations cannot be restrained. One must be open to them and allow them to depart, one doesn't possess them. The most experiential are meditative; recollection is the presence of reality.

"The present day – that is the dwelling of meditative thought." (Par. 2, p. 10)

Here lies the explanation of the Journal Form. Par. 3 suggests the ties between wonder and decision, liberty and liberality, ambiguity and finality.

January 11, 1979

p. 10 – ". . . finality proves to be the unifying theme of the work." In dealing with the abstractness of "finality," we can speak of the "abstract mode" of discourse. This mode allows us to connect up the concrete presence of reality with abstract philosophy. Relative to reality, the abstract mode is recollective and anticipatory; it allows one to philosophize without forcing meditation.

Reality is realized in "true decision," the appropriate response to reality.

Finality is exposed in the response, response occurs "in the vein of wonder," forming the will. True decision is a resolution, a decision not made but already decided. In this response to the decided, there arises freedom. A freedom of decisiveness, a calm.

Henry's example was the crisis that arises when a small ship must refuel in heavy seas. The apprehension moves into a commitment to "true decision" wherein the course necessary for success requires a closeness with finality. This may bespeak a certain kind of certainty. The resolution is a calm of true decision, final but not terminal. Henry referred to pp. 118-119 with regard to "true decision."

The spontaneousness of liberality in "true decision" negates the idea of indulgence, trying to make someone feel good.

P. 11: "Final word," the embodiment of the universal spoken in a unique way. The universal: *uni-vertete*, a turning into one; opposed to the use of universal as applying to all possible worlds and non-particular world. In this latter respect universal has come to be homeless, without referent. H. Bugbee echoes the etymological roots "turning back into one."

Noted was the prominence of the wilderness theme in the articulation of experience.

Tuesday, August 26, 1952

p. 33 – Philosophy and poetry must be built, standing on one's own ground. (Heidegger's "Building Dwelling Thinking." "The local is the only universal, upon that all art builds." The universal comes to be focused in the particular; the universal is grounded, similar to the connection Heidegger makes between the world and thing, cf. "Building Dwelling Thinking," in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 154: A bridge as a *locus* gives rise to space and to localities within space.

John Crist:

January 16, 1979

The session opened with a question regarding the previous lecture.

Greg noted a correlation between Henry's statement that "a final word . . . is never said once for all," (p. 11) and Augustine's point that God does not speak the world into existence once and for all.

A discussion of freedom and true decision ensued.

Ambiguity is tied to finality. Finality is a response to a decision (previously made). Who makes the decision?

Decision is the moment of the focus of finality. A decision is a response, not arbitrary in nature, rather a person responds to the advent of some force. Decision, however, is bound to freedom and there must be an element of freedom in all decision. The freedom is not exercised arbitrarily, but it is freedom as a result of a force that passes through humans – freedom is the capacity for the advent of reality. Humans are the privileged place for this reality.

True decision: "By finality I intend the meaning of reality as realized in true decision" (p. 10). Henry later says that in the case of the convict (p. 119) "To speak here of decision as 'true' would be redundant."

What is meant by true?

In analytic philosophy only a proposition is true. To speak of a true decision would be regarded as absurd and confusing. The inquiry of analytic philosophy into truth looks, e.g., at the conditions for truth to arise from the combination of elementary propositions (Symbolic Logic). If the question of the truth of the components is raised, truth is defined as the agreement of a proposition with a state of affairs. This way of looking at truth seems restricted in that it only looks at the conditions for truth.

We speak of philosophy as the 'search for truth.' We cannot mean truth merely in the sense of propositions that meet the truth conditions, rather we are searching for significant truth, truth that

matters. This is the notion of truth Henry means when he says, “By finality, I intend the meaning of reality as realized in true decision.”

Some philosophers treat reality in the same way they treat truth. In the attempt to get hold of the conditions of reality, reality itself escapes us. In attempting to get hold on the conditions of truth we get only indeterminate truth.

We must wrest truth from its indifference, and make it meaningful. We should find truth that is decisive, centers our lives. We must ask true questions – those that reveal decisive truth.

True decision and freedom: Decision that is authentic has a consonance with a person’s situation as the person participates in the world. We have the power to respond inasmuch as we realize our destiny. All the efforts of Faulkner’s old man were to acquit himself of his responsibility. If there is a flow to our destiny, we come to junctures of decisive resolution. In difficult matters we find ourselves becoming decided. The decisions come to fruition and we acknowledge them.

Libertarian reply: The libertarians are at pains to extoll human eminence. Only if they stress freedom as uncausedness (not subject to any constraint) can they show human eminence. We need not wail over lack of freedom in the sense of arbitrary decision making. Humans can take pride and joy in experiencing themselves as the locus for true decision. We are in the world, and things work on us in a provocative mode. We don’t work against experiences, but we are called upon by them to respond with what is called for. The things we respond to, because of a deep searching, lead to true decision. This is our decisive work. We are free indifferently in small things – matters of little consequence. As things become more important, we are less free (in the arbitrary mode) in our decisions. There is a gradation from indifference to eminence.

Tuesday, August 26, 1952

“Reflection is like tilling.”

Tilling as:

- a. preparation of ground for planting,
- b. plowing under, risking the submergence of something that should remain above ground.

How should we do philosophy as an activity?

Last paragraph (p. 34): Can be seen as the circumscription of concrete philosophy.

Sheltered philosophy is important for a time. We need not always be covering our tails, plugging all the holes. We need risk, adventure and openness in our philosophy.

Should the advice Henry presents be given to a young student doing philosophy?

Should the student be encouraged to “let it flow, write on, don’t give up when faced with miscarried thought.”

1. Jim suggested that one risks getting a flow of flowery emotion, rather than a philosophy of substance when a young student takes this advice literally.
2. It was suggested that Henry had assumed certain qualities in the student trying to do philosophy.
 1. They have a general background; they know how their thoughts stack up against what others have said; an apprenticeship of sorts has been served.

2. One takes responsibility for and has an honesty in one's work.

Wednesday, August 27

How should we philosophize against those we know we must differ from? We should steer a middle course, away from professional subservience, but yet avoid dismissing what we must differ from. Take the philosophical community seriously, but do not unthinkingly accept its standards.

Henry mentioned his suspicion that logicians get wrapped up in the security of logic, safe from the problems of logic in the context of philosophy as a whole.

Affinity of Philosophy with Certainty: Certainty has a derivative and a fundamental sense.

We do not escape certainty in philosophy. If we try to, we depend on a derivative or partial mode, even where it is fashionable to discover certainty in philosophy.

Certainty cannot be owned and those who would (scientific method) require certainty by the means they use to attain it. They move from certainty to a method. The results of their investigation may be wrong, but the means by which the results are obtained are beyond question. They are easy-going about certainty – not so with their method.

Positivist notion of certainty: “Perhaps the last thing we should demand of an interpretation of certainty is that it show how we are entitled to some credo, one-for-all, incontrovertibly” (p. 36). Certainty is not questioned for, but looked to as the base of sound action.

Is certainty objectless? Certainty is not merely an emotional state denoting an object- the object is deeper and wider than either an object or a state of affairs. Certainty is a moment of eminent consonance with the world. We can secure the object in derivative or partial certainty; that certainty obliterates the context from which the object has sprung.

The leaf on the pond (p. 45) focuses the world, but does not claim it.

Certainty is not:

- Objectless
- Ineffable – we aren't obliterated by reality.

The sense of things comes to the fore in decisive action. Certainty is akin to hope and faith. In despair or weakness we see the world as veiled – we are separated from it. There is an intimation of reality behind the veil, so we have hope. Certainty also seems to be objectless when reality is ready to overtake us, but is not yet visible. And this is faith.

Pat Burke:

January 18, 1979

The class began with a review of where we had gotten so far with the questions of certainty. It was again noted that there are two senses of certainty. One that is fundamental of which Henry speaks in *The Inward Morning* and one that is derivative which has been the primary concern of contemporary Anglo-American Philosophy. The derivative notion of certainty is concerned to explicate what one can be "certain of" or "certain that." This usually takes the form of inquiries into the "given" which would give us an "incontrovertible warrant for particular truth claims" (35).

In *The Inward Morning*, however, the fundamental sense of certainty is at issue. It is that certainty "which lies at the root of action that makes sense" (36). It "involves that simplicity which is true to being in a situation that is absolute and registered as such in depth" (37). Certainty in this sense can be said to be objectless, if by that we mean that it is not certainty concerning a specific, isolated object. But this certainty is not an emotional state of a subject. Rather, fundamental certainty arises out of our total involvement in the world.

At this juncture Henry pointed out certainty's kinship with faith and Tillich's observation that doubt is the dialectical correlation of faith. In the same vein as Tillich, Henry observed that certainty would require an open and actively questioning nature. This seriously paradoxical nature of fundamental certainty results from the fact that what comes to us in certainty is not something we can be said to possess.

Albert then compared the notion of certainty in *The Inward Morning* with Heidegger's concept of resoluteness in *Being and Time*. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger leaves open that which we are resolute towards. This he fills out in his later writings. In *The Inward Morning*, however, resoluteness and that towards which we are resolute are intertwined. This again shows how *Being and Time* is a young man's book in that it leaves many questions unanswered and how, in contrast, *The Inward Morning* is a mature book in that it tries to answer these questions.

We moved next to a discussion of Thursday August 8, in particular, the passage: "So far as we are sensitive to the absoluteness of our situation, we live in a dimension of meaning which is the depth of our experience—we live in eternity" (37). The sense of absoluteness in this passage must be understood as universal in the sense we discussed previously, i.e., universal as applying to this particular world, not to all possible worlds. The absoluteness spoken of here is not that which absolves us from our situation in its particularity. Rather, it is our being absolutely bound into the situation. The sense of eternity in question would then be related to a traditional scholastic one: the gathering of all Being in an instant. However, it would not be an atemporal eternity as is the scholastic one. (Henry suggested here that the temporal sense of eternity meant in this passage could also be discerned in Beethoven's last quartets.) One sense of eternity that would seem to be excluded entirely in this passage would be that of a future

life. Henry, however, suggested that perhaps this sense of eternity as a future life might be made intelligible if we reflected upon the Old Testament sense of being in a destinate situation. Eternity in this sense would be our involvement in a destinate situation with those who have come before and with those who are yet to come.

Fundamental certainty's kinship with Meister Eckhart's notion of disinterestedness or poverty of spirit was introduced as another way to clarify what we are trying to get at here. In particular, passages in Eckhart's Sermon where he discusses poverty of spirit as breaking through to our original uncreatedness seem to bear upon what is meant by certainty.

“A man must become truly poor and as free from his own creaturely will as he was when he was born . . . He alone has true spiritual poverty who wills nothing, knows nothing, desires nothing.”

Insofar as one attains spiritual poverty through abandonment of the will, one attains his original uncreatedness which is divine in nature. In uncreatedness a human is a partner of God and consonant with all of reality. In uncreatedness “there is no distinction of rank between a fly and an angel.” This uncreatedness is not mere homogeneity or unity but, rather, it is where we and all things exist as we essentially are.

Insofar as the uncreatedness is attained or recognized, God as the creator ceases to exist. He is no longer something apart from his creation. This point of Eckhart's can perhaps be understood if we consider that in wonder God would not be an object as he is in explanation. Insofar as we try to explain how God and the world come alive in wonder, we in some measure transcend our will and createdness. It is this attainment of uncreatedness and the consequent consonance with all of reality which is the recognition of the “absoluteness of our situation” that gives rise to the rock bottom certainty of which *The Inward Morning* speaks.

Tom observed the similarity between Eckhart's notion of disinterestedness and the Buddhist concern with the transcendence of desire. In order to transcend desire in the Eastern sense, it would seem necessary to return to our original uncreatedness. Our uncreatedness would be the point where we were free from desire because it would be the origin of desire.

Henry agreed that this would seem to be the case because insofar as we attain to uncreatedness, we are purged of all egoism or self-centeredness. He also noted that D.T. Suzuki recommended Eckhart as the best person to turn to in the Western tradition in order to begin to understand the Buddhist tradition.

Albert, here, noted the connection between the experience of ourselves as uncreated and the experience of our imperishability. That is, the experience that in human beings something is happening that will not pass. If this is a genuine experience, it would have an important bearing on our discussion of eternity. However, it needs to be pointed out that while this is a common experience in Christianity, the Greeks were not nearly so confident. This is shown in the agreement which the Athenians had to celebrate one another so that they would not die. In particular, Greek heroes were concerned to find poets who would sing their praises, to prevent them from falling into forgetfulness.

Henry pointed out that in the Gospel of St. John it is stated without qualification that “eternity is to know God.”

The discussion of August 28 was concluded by Albert with the remark that while he found Henry's discussion of eternity and living on congenial, he would still like to leave the issue open. In particular, the experience of incorruptibility still seemed to require further reflection.

We moved then to the entry of August 29 and its theme of wonder as the cause of philosophy. In this entry, it is noted that both Plato and Aristotle recognized wonder as the beginning of philosophy. Henry, however, is particularly concerned with the way in which Aristotle interprets wonder – possibly confusing it with curiosity. The passage in question is:

“For it is owing to their wonder that humans both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g., the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and of the stars, and about the genesis of the universe. And humans who are puzzled and wonder think themselves ignorant (where even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of wisdom, for the myth is composed of wonders); therefore since they philosophized in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know and not for any utilitarian end.” (Meta. 982^b 12-23)

Aristotle seems to be suggesting here that the wonder that marks the inception of philosophy is allayed by the knowledge concerning that which first caused us to wonder. It was noted though that other interpreters of Aristotle (Heidegger in *What is Philosophy?*) do not think that Aristotle here wishes to say that our initial wonder at reality is allayed by philosophical knowledge.

For Aristotle, however, there would be one thing that would be a source of incorrigible wonder – the unmoved mover. The contemplation of the unmoved mover is for Aristotle *Theoria* and is the highest to which humans can attain. If the beholding of the unmoved mover is to be the very sustenance of life, then it must be inexhaustible and incapable of being possessed, i.e., it is not something that we contemplate in order to understand. Thus for Aristotle *Theoria* and wonder are not the same, and they are the core of the good life. This is reflected in Aristotle's *Ethics* where all the practical virtues are secondary to *Theoria*. Only *Theoria* gives us the comprehensive view of the world, in light of which we might properly situate ourselves within the world. Only insofar as we attain *Theoria* do we become citizens of the world for Aristotle, and come to inherit our full humanity.

Aristotle's sense of becoming fully human through the attainment of *Theoria* seems to parallel Henry's notion of wonder at that which perseveres, which then deepens into certainty, this certainty being the ground of all action that makes sense.

We moved then to a discussion of August 30 and the nature of explanation. Albert began with Nicolaus of Cusa's discussion of explanation in *On Learned Ignorance* and in *The Defense of Learned Ignorance*. In these treatises, he makes the distinction between Intellect and Reason (however, with the opposite evaluation given these terms by Kant). Reason for Nicolaus is that which is that which is concerned to give discursive explanation in the sense Henry takes up with in this entry. Reason is digressive in that it goes on forever never taking in the whole. It discerns continually expanding pairs of opposites or contradictories with reference to that which is to be explained. The intellect however sees the coevidence of opposites and thus is able to know the whole.

It was noted that Nicolaus's descriptions of the intellect seem to be close to what Henry says of the final word in the Preface. The final word is not the mere correlative or contrary of another, i.e., it is not that which reason offers us in Nicolaus's terminology. Rather, it results from the operation of the intellect, i.e. it has to do with the coincidence of opposites and the discernment of the whole. Nicolaus speaks of contradictories whereas the final word is not the contrary of another.

Albert then gave us a short etymology of both digressive and discursive in order to obtain some suggestions as to what discursive explanation might be. The root *dis* meaning through, across or apart, and *currere*, meaning to run. It was noted that while they are etymological twins, in common usage discursive carries the positive connotation and digressive the negative. Generally, by discursive we mean doing things one at a time in an orderly fashion. Digression, however, usually connotes aimlessness or distraction.

Henry in this entry, however, speaks of discursive explanation as digressive without being aimless. In what sense then is discursive explanation perhaps fundamentally digressive? It is digressive in that it is dependent on both what is to be explained and a context. In particular, it is digressive in that it fails to reach to where things come to be present and thus fails to give expression to this presence. It is not expressive of that which holds one in wonder and renders one reflectively disposed.

This point was clarified by taking Carl Hempel's sense of explanation as a model of such discursive explanation. For Hempel, explanation is fundamentally the subsumption of a particular under a general law. The particular thing or event must first be cast into sentential force. Explanation then consists of bringing this sentential bit of reality under a scientific law. The particular thus comes to be primarily an instance of scientific laws. It is not, however, even a concrete instance but, rather, only the sentential slice in such an instance.

Although this type of explanation points out the steadiness and reliability of reality, it is dependent in at least two ways. First, the general scientific laws apply to all physically possible worlds. They say nothing about the particular world in which we live. Our particular world is only one of many possible worlds contained within the possibility space circumscribed by the laws. The peculiarity of our world only enters in when we first use the specific conditions which the laws then explain. Thus what makes the laws pertinent to our world must be brought to the laws. Secondly, there must be a context that draws our attention to what is worthy of explanation. If we thought solely in terms of the scientific laws, what we brought to the laws for explanation would be totally indifferent. We might as well study the physical properties of a randomly chosen cubic foot of space as we try to find a cure for cancer.

At this point it was noted that, for Hempel, only what is subsumable under laws is intelligible. This connection between intelligibility and lawfulness has been endorsed by other thinkers including Aristotle. However, for Aristotle, the laws under which the particulars are subsumed are themselves already a reflection of this particular world. They bespeak the presence of the actual world in which we live. Modern scientific laws, in contrast, are indifferently related to our world. They only give us the possibility conditions for the existence of particular types of entities.

We concluded at this point with the promise that we would take up with how the incompleteness of Hempelian explanation has come to show itself in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy.

Jim Maher:

January 23, 1979

Sunday, August 3

This is the last of six continuous entries developing the main theme of the book. The main point of this entry is to contrast the spirit of openness with its opposite condition, i.e. , contraction, rigidity, and deadness of spirit.

There are essentially two ways in which we can fail to be open:

1. Failure to be open is painful and frustrating. We realize we are not open and that we must struggle to be free and open for the advent of reality.
2. Failure to be open solidifies into a professional stance. The failure to be open to the advent of reality is as sure a mark of failure as are contradictions or inconsistencies. Philosophical practice in journal articles centers on the uncovering of inconsistencies and not on the failures of a rigid viewpoint. Dr. Borgmann commented on the fact that modern ethical systems are sometimes constructed and evaluated with consistency as the criterion for validity. The question of the foundation of rights is often not even raised. The further point was made that philosophical discourse in the U.S. is stunted because it is unable to raise the question as to whether a philosophical essay has been open or suffers from rigidity. This is because the charge of inconsistency can be made to stick, whereas deadness of spirit cannot be made to stick.

Dr. Birch commented that the only argument in philosophy is the ad hominem argument. He further stated that H.D. Thoreau was onto the deadness of spirit in American thought in that he stated that there is a difference between philosophers and professors of philosophy. Dr. Borgmann commented that the ad hominem argument should be directed to the person and the world which is shared. An appeal to a common world is necessary to show deadness of spirit.

Friday, September 5

This entry is an interlude. It is a summary and introduction to entries of September 7 through September 12.

This entry raises the problem of experience. Appeal is the essential factor in philosophical discourse based on experience, and intimacy is the crucial feature of discourse based on experience. The life of experience can flourish in intimacy. However, there is a breakdown in intimacy through much of experience.

In modern philosophy experience is thought of with a view towards securing objects.

Main argument of this entry: We talk about objects as being bits of reality. Any such example of an object can be challenged. This is embarrassing if our desire is to possess objects and have them assured. The attempt at possession of objects has not been totally successful if it can be challenged.

The motto of the early phenomenological movement was “Zu den Sachen selbst,” an attempt to secure the givenness of things. Dr. Bugbee commented that for Plato experience engenders wonder and reflection. Experience is not that which settles disputes. Dr. Borgmann commented that this is why the Dialogues often end in a myth. The myth is the central disclosure.

Main point: Reality escapes the possessive mode. We realize we can't possess objects, so we turn to what we can possess. D. Hume already restricts himself to possessing impressions. It is believed that assurance and possession can be gained by analyzing a thing down into its least parts, e.g. you have very little in sense data, but you are *assured* of that little bit. This reduction is to a more modest and less committed claim. However, the thing is lost.

In modern philosophy the futility of attempting to secure reality in these little 'bits' has come to the fore. These bits are still too highly charged, i.e. , unwarranted claims must be made. We cannot get away from ties to a larger world.

The idea of presuppositionless building blocks has been given up, except in scientific thought. Molecules and atoms are still assured and resorted to in science. There is a problem with this which is difficult to put one's finger on.

Possessiveness felt in philosophy must be taken seriously. It is indicative of a more general possessiveness in which we deal with our world. Heidegger states that possessiveness is part of our destiny. We are caught in its thrall. However, there is another kind of thinking which is open to the tides and flows of each day. Our first destiny is not inevitable. The second alternative is openness to things in their own right. Heidegger is *not* a determinist.

Dr. Bugbee commented that the insistent expectation of being confronted by reality is a possession of reality. If we try to make reality stand fast we lose it. Dr. Borgmann stated that possessiveness can creep into our experiences. We may posit that reality should be 'such and such' to meet our expectations. In this way we lose reality.

The last point in this entry makes the transition to a series of sketches in the next entry.

The contrast is drawn between objectivity and experience. Things are whittled down enough to be handed down in objectivity. This allows for progress in science and technology. However, experiences cannot be possessed or passed down, but must be regained and relearned.

Receiving a scientific heritage makes us feel powerful when we are really not.

Sunday, September 7 – Friday, September 12

Immersion and commitment are more than just figures of speech. They occur in the sketches.

The book itself (*The Inward Morning*) is concrete. In it reality comes to pass in memory. Memory is not here conceived of as a subjective psychological phenomenon. Memory is not selected by us, idiosyncratic and separate from reality.

There is a challenge to do justice to memory in light of subjective and psychological modes of understanding. Memory, far from being a subjective coloration of reality, is the place where truth of reality can flourish and come into the open. Memory is the capacity to take in reality and let it flourish. German 'bewahren' means to preserve, to keep. Root is 'wahr,' i.e., true. Memory is not just to keep, but to allow to attain its truth.

Dr. Bugbee commented that memory has initiative. One obeys the initiative more than one can wish to command it. Dr. Borgmann commented that memories, even if they are thought to reside in us, continue to live and grow even if we do not remember them explicitly. Remembrances have often grown when we go back to them.

First Sketch on Swamping : Swamping is seasonal, tied into the rhythm of the year. It is a senseless activity, not in that it is stupid or arbitrary, but in that it cannot be easily made sense of. It is not easily subsumed into wider categories. There is a certain scandalousness to swamping. There is a tone of relentless denial to the land. Trout season is ahead and the land is not alive with animals. The pervasive feeling is of 'not yet.'

What life there is heightens the senselessness of the scene. Wind is the one movement which is apt in this situation as it plays around in the emptiness. The pines are inane in their greenness, while the bare-limbed trees are consonant with the scene.

The beginning movements into the swamp are uncertain and probing. There is an awareness of unreliability. The dead and gray landscape invites in a forbidding manner. One first responds by probing and trying to stay dry. Slowly this gives way to immersion and commitment. There is no plan to get oneself wet. There is a gradual entry and being drawn into the swamp. The force of the invitation is brought home to one. It could not be otherwise. One is inevitably drawn into the swamp.

Dave Strong:

January 25, 1979

Tuesday's discussion began by referring back to Hempel's theory of explanation in order to show how the insufficiency of this theory which Henry exposes has been noted in analytic philosophy also. Wes Salmon bids us to consider a problem such as: Why is the flagpole 20 feet all? To give an explanation to this problem according to Hempel we need:

1. A set of laws with empirical significance
2. Special conditions
3. A conclusion following from these premises

So, first we find a formula relating the angle of a light source and the length of a shadow. Secondly, we measure the angle of the sun and the length of the shadow cast by the flagpole. Then after applying the formula to these special conditions we know why the flagpole is 20 feet tall. But, Salmon argues, is that really an explanation? A better explanation might be that a 25 foot pole was purchased and then set in the ground five feet. So in giving explanations there is a problem of relevance. It is not just a matter of subsuming particulars under laws; the subsumption must be relevant.

Achinstein argues that there are four or five ways to give an explanation to the question: Why did John Doe contract the flu in London, January 12th, 1978? The different explanations depend on what emphasis is put forward in the sentence, e.g., emphasizing flu or London. He argues that we cannot give an explanation without holding to a standard of relevance.

Although these philosophers pointed out the deficiency of Hempel's theory, like typical American philosophers, they did not pursue answers to the questions: What in the end crucially makes us insist on *this* explanation rather than *that*? And how does this insistence come from the world at large? As paradigms of relevant explanations, Henry cited Socrates's explanation in the *Crito* and *Phaedo* why he, Socrates, was to stay in prison and Guillaume's explanation in Saint Exupery's *Wind, Sand, and Stars* how he was able to overcome fatigue and cold.

To contrast the wilderness experience in "Swamping," John Crist told about his favorite cirque lake. The surroundings invite and hold you into it as in an amphitheater. It is life-giving; everywhere are signs of life and the fullness of the wilderness. It was felt that a kind of anticipation which demands grandeur would corrupt this place. This possessiveness is often exemplified by our checklist reports of wilderness experiences.

This example allows us to see the peculiar force of "Swamping." By its deadness, the landscape is stripped of all obvious attractiveness. The venturer is stripped of his reluctance, of keeping dry. He becomes immersed in simplicity. The point is the stark simplicity and honesty in this encounter. "There was no mistake about the gladness of being in the swamp."

This early sketch prefigures matters that come to the fore again at sea. (See pages around p. 180.) There the author feels the crazed enormity of the demands and the sting of craziness and wretchedness in the tasks. He feels put upon and indignant about this labor 'wanting in righteousness' (Virgil's *labor improbus*). Yet he is drawn into it and finally feels glad.

The first part of "Building a Dam" is a description of the setting. A small stream runs through a meadow, but not just through it – at one point the stream is marked by a ledge and old maple. The idle building is an innocent and genuine response to this place that stands out – the building heightens this natural feature. It is a response to this place, not an engineering exercise – they built the dam wrong. But by building it wrong they could capture the water as in a cupped hand; the dam embraces the water. They were not damming the stream to get it under their control. In the interplay between responding and play, the response deepens into work in earnest; the dam attained a considerable height.

Now it became an attraction for others. The builders felt they had to start giving reasons for why they were building the dam. Skating, fishing, swimming. But the reasons were only intended to deflect the inappropriate questions of the others' curiosity.

Yet they did feel a bit defensive, so they planted some fish. The fish take up residence in their own right and disclose the pool more fully. It was noted that the seeing of animals in nature often discloses the fertility and wildness of the land, and the features of the landscape in a unique way. And so the darting fish show the depths of the pool and hidden places under the ledge.

Nature takes kindly to the dam and accepts it. Wildflowers and grasses grow upon it. The fish belong to the pool. The builders commit themselves to the cool blur. Immersion is in the background. These relate back to the main themes of these sketches.

Now that there is a place in the landscape, the ultimate concentration of everything in simplicity can take place with the one leaf from the flaming maple in an instant touch upon the water. Here is the concentration of everything into one.

Finally, it never did serve a purpose in a way the curious people wanted.

Selections were read from “The Thinker as Poet” and “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” in *Poetry, Language, Thought*. In the latter essay, Heidegger, in a forceful way that sweeps up the world in all its variety, shows how it is all gathered into a bridge. He takes gigantic steps whereas building a dam is more innocent and muted. Therefore Heidegger’s account is older, so to speak; *The Inward Morning* lies between *Being and Time* and the later works of Heidegger.

Heidegger’s account is occidental in that he sees cultural things, such as bridges, as world-bearing things. The dam is also a work of culture, but it is reclaimed by nature; grass and wildflowers grow on it. So this is a very American account.

We covered the first of the two parts on “Rowing.” In contrast to “Swamping,” this account begins auspiciously with the words “first possessed me.” In this first part the integrity of competitive rowing is apparent and tempered by touches of irony. The young man is in the position of the lower class as he looks on with awe at the higher class: the classy racing shells, the varsity rowers with their high level of skill and refinement, the inexperience of the freshmen. There is the ‘clear’ standard of achievement, the ladder, and the subtle ways the coaches could foster an interest. This account is not to be taken with dead seriousness though. Rowing turned out to be something ‘more and other.’

Greg Barringer

January 30, 19

The class began with a recounting of what was said towards the end of the class on January 25 regarding the first part of the sketch on “Rowing,” i.e., up to the second paragraph beginning on page 47 (“But rowing turned out to be something else again . . .”). Noted first in connection with this first section was the “aura of elitism” which abounds in the sport as seen in the “classy shells,” the polished precision of the “master,” the hierarchical ladder of the organization from the varsity at the top to the beginners at the bottom. Implicit in this elitism is the honed edge of competition: the goals to be strived for, the reaching for a higher rung of the ladder, and the races themselves.

Noted next was the way in which this preliminary account of the sport is suspended between innocence and irony. The innocence is that of the author in the way he takes up with the awe-inspiring yet unquestioned integrity of the sport – as if it were the elaborate overt structure of the sport which calls one to rowing. The irony appears in certain phrases – and in each case, though there is no criticism, the irony seems to point to the existence of something more crucial, more focal. An example of this might be the last few lines of the last paragraph beginning on page 46 and ending page 47 wherein the beginners are told that at least two results from rowing are “good-fellowship and fine health.” The author writes: “Well, as it turned out, it wasn’t a bad bunch there . . . , and the case for health was plain enough. . . .” There is no critique of the claims, but yet there seems to be something missing: though the claims proved true enough, they still lack focality. The irony, then, acts as a pointer to something more focal.

“But rowing turned out to be something else again, something more and other than anyone pointed to or made prominent.” (p. 47) Heeding this, the class turned to the figure of John Schultz, “the awakener.” The man himself serves as a reminder that there is something other to rowing than the elaborate structure, being out of the “mainstream” of the hierarchy as he was the rigger and the sculling coach.

We turned to the events surrounding the race on the Schuylkill River in Philadelphia, when John Schultz and the author followed the race in the former’s car. The part of interest in this part of the sketch is when John S. and the author surged ahead of the race to a “chosen” spot: “When they come out from under that bridge . . . that’s where they need me!” (p. 49) The culmination of this event comes with the yell: “R-r-r-o-o-o-w!” The point in this exclamation was that John Schultz, and the yell, was to the rowers as was the dam to the creek and dam builders in the preceding sketch. As with the dam, the locality from which the yell was to emanate was already “chosen.” The yell, like the dam, gathered the efforts of the rowers into an inspired unison – into an ultimate commitment and immersion. But this call to commitment and immersion did not only affect the ones rowing. The author later tells John Schultz that it no longer mattered to him, though he was earlier despondent, that he was not in the race as a rower. John replied: “You was there.” (p.50)

Furthermore, this immersion was not limited to races proper. Here we turned to the account of the long practices. At the end of these practices John Schulz would greet the incoming rowers with similar exhortations, who, after rowing six long miles, more often than not resisted the call as if saying: “What more does he want!” “There were rare occasions, however, when those six miles would round out into an incorruptible song” (p. 51)

The point was then made that the “Rowing” sketch appears as a paradigm gatheredness, commitment, immersion. This was followed by such questions as: does such a claim belittle the significance of the sketch? Is rowing a school/preparation for life, or is it the center of life itself – and if so, how comes it to be thus? A discussion ensued in which rowing was compared and contrasted to working for “Social justice.” The later, on the face of it, seems to be far more serious and worthwhile than the former. But one must not forget that working for “social justice” is merely a means for a more fruitful, decisive, meaningful end; that is, rowing is a focality, a centrality, a gatheredness. One was not a practitioner of rowing with the intention of applying this practice to other aspects of life. One rows only to row. Yet the experience of rowing, as an end in itself, emanates – or radiates – through all experience.

With the closing remark that “Rowing,” the sketch, was a good account of gatheredness as it shows the one-rootedness of the disparate constituents (practices, races, work, play, competition, etc.) we moved to the next entry.

Tuesday, September 23

The preliminary point was that this entry is an account of the preceding sketches, an account in the abstract mode about the concrete events in the sketches.

Noted in the first paragraph of the entry was the notion that in immersion the immersed one comprehends himself as being absorbed in a “universal situation.” The absorption is not a narrowing down, a separation. Rather, it is broadening, far-reaching. Here, again, is the notion of the emanation or radiation of meaning as it dawns in immersion, absorption. “. . . it is as if one’s perception of everything distinct were engaged in alignment with a center from which one moves to greet each thing knowingly. There is a continuing passage from thing to thing in which a kind of sameness or continuity of meaning deepens . . .” (p. 52).

We then turned to examine that “center from which one moves” by way of focusing on three notions of “focus”: the first being etymological – *focus*, in Latin, means hearth; the second being an optical term – “focus” being that point at which light is gathered (as with a concave reflecting mirror); the third being a photographic term – “focus” being whence a perfect image ensues. Focus, then, can be construed as a place for possible gatherings (the hearth being the “meeting place” in a home), a bringing to one (as the focal point of a concave mirror), and a bringing to clearness (as with a camera). Thus with a central/focal experience, the meaning which dawns with that experience radiates into and imbues all other things with meaning – always referring back to that focus.

Rae Horan:

February 1, 1979

The crucial question concerning “Rowing:” “Is Rowing a school for life or life itself?” Mr. Borgmann posits that we should accept the claim that Rowing is life itself. He then raises a further more difficult question: “If we accept that Rowing is life itself, when and where does this happen?” We are reminded of Henry’s point, that meaning (often) comes through recollection and not (necessarily) on the occasion of physical happening.

A further question from Mr. Borgmann: When these reflections came to full flower was it September, 1952, or is it every time *The Inward Morning* is thoughtfully read and understood? The question is not particularly vexing for an idealist. Ideal meanings can be instantiated in space and time at any point. The idealist plugs into timelessness and ideal meaning. But this is at odds with the concrete nature of (experience and) meaning, and the particularity that is always stressed.

Mr. Borgmann locates the primacy of these meanings in the actual physical transaction. The experience lives on in memory, flourishes and develops, the meaning sometimes emerging anew in reflection.

Mr. Borgmann asks: “Where in time and space do we locate this focus?” It would be naïve to say on whatever day the students rowed; in that case Henry’s account would merely be a record of that meaning. If we are to believe that meaning only comes fully to the fore when we reflect, the meaning of rowing was only crudely and undevelopedly present when the students were rowing. If we accept this

we still have to ask if the meaning is in the writing – the actual moment that Henry wrote; the proofs, the drafts; the published work when people reflect on it?

Crist speaks of the difficulty of locating meaning in space and time. He speaks of cross-country skiing in a meadow and asks: “Is meaning in me, or out there and I am feeling it, or a combination of both?”

Mr. Borgmann answers that it is his inclination to locate the meaning in the meadow. The subject is the recipient. Once the subject is allowed as a contributor or author of meaning, subjectivism becomes inevitable. We can only invite people into our great experiences if we are convinced that “there is something out there.” This tends to take us towards a realistic (and concrete) account of meaning. Taken further, meaning is just reality – reality having spoken in its own right.

Friday, September 26 – Saturday, October 18

An account of the remainder of the first year, set off by the influence of professional concerns. The question of ethics engages the author’s mind and draws him away from the earlier fluency of the days and works. The author’s concerns are still tied to the theme of the emergence of reality, but now themes are dealt with in an abstract mode: the space between the primary experience of reality and the work of philosophers that pertains to such experience.

Empirical knowledge and technical skill, unlike experience, can be “possessed,” even though such knowledge and skill are arrived at through experience.

Mr. Borgmann makes an analogy between experiences that are basic for ethics, and experiences basic for empirical knowledge and skill on the one hand and performance and practice, seriousness and playfulness on the other.

Practice can be stopped and started over again. This is not something that can be done in performance or the notion of performance becomes absurd. In performance the chips are down – you stand or fall in your performance – it is serious.

Is it possible to be playful in ethical inquiry? Yes. There is always the positing of cases. The choosing and sustaining of possibilities. But Henry says that this is inappropriate to ethical inquiry: (pg. 54-55 *The Inward Morning*)

“Can we really fix in mind that of which we would improve our understanding in ethical inquiry? Suppose we would inquire into human well-being, for example. Can we command the experience with which such an inquiry might be concerned? Or have we only to remember, as we remember objects and processes, in order that experience may afford concrete purchase for reflective interpretation of well-being? But if the experiential meaning of well-being were thus at our disposal, should we not also be able to select and control experience so as to insure our well-being?”

Can we get ethical experience under control, as empirical knowledge can be controlled, applied, possessed?

In the way that practice cannot overtake performance, the reproductive sense of “What if this were the case” cannot overcome ethics. There is the possibility of reflecting in a playful mode about ethics. But this mode will never get us to the crucial point of ethics wherein *we are at stake in our actions*, and our actions count for something.

Henry makes obvious references to Kant with two terms: “categorical imperative” and “technical skill.” Kant: *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*. There are two kinds of imperatives. Categorical and hypothetical. Hypothetical imperatives are subdivided into technical rules (imperatives of skill), and pragmatic counsels (imperatives of prudence). Categorical imperatives deal strictly with ethics. Hypothetical imperatives have conditions attached. (e.g.: “If you want to split wood, sharpen your ax.” This is a technical rule.) Counsels of prudence all have the same conditions attached. (“If you want to be happy then budget your money.” “If you want to be happy, *then* eat in moderation.”)

Kant did not think one should base one’s ethical behavior on happiness because happiness can elude one. One could be bitterly disappointed and cease to behave ethically. Happiness is not what should be strived for, but the worthiness of being happy; in this way one cannot be disappointed – even if one is unhappy.

Ethical action cannot be tied to any condition: it (ethical action) has an absolutely demanding character (unconditional imperatives). This character is systematically held at bay when one participates in games, discussions, etc.

Henry would challenge Kant when he says that pure reason is independent of empirical reality. The categorical imperative is not a purely formal matter independent of material considerations but issue from the claim of reality. Mr. Borgmann finds this to be an appropriate rethinking of Kant’s insight.

Ethical action only has life and substance when there is flow in our lives – fluency, rhythm, when ethical action flows of its own accord then demands are placed upon us which are categorically imperative. We are true to the nature of ethics only when we step outside playfulness. The ethical quality of a person’s life is the specificity of that life. If a person is capable of articulating concrete experiences then that is what he should talk about. Speaking in the concrete mode is putting a claim on people: “Here is something I want you to take account of; it is control.”

If this talk (of concrete experience) is not articulate, it can become cloying, sentimental, pornographic, flatfooted, and it will offend the listener. The categorically imperative quality of our lives cannot always come to the fore because demands of discretion and style must be met. There is an abstract mode where the concrete is just thinly veiled, and one can be true to that. It is not necessary for everyone to speak of their youth or tell war stories, but the experience must be present behind the work as an outline.

Marcel’s notion of the ‘metatechnical’ is a step beyond techniques that allows one to take account of experience. (pg. 55, *The Inward Morning*)

“Action and reflection on the point of action are both *meta-technical*, over and above whatever technique may enter into them. And for convenience let us use a similar term, and say that they are both *meta-objective* in the sense that they move in a dimension of

meaning over which we cannot exercise the power of representation and control that obtains with respect to things in taking them as objects.”

This must not be taken to relieve one of the need for rational discussion. This is not the same as the annoying Eastern attitude that dismisses problems by saying that there is the “translogical,” etc. There is a particular style of thinking that goes through the technical and then realizes that that’s as far as one can go. There is a closely reasoned argument that shows us that to remain in the realm of argument is to stay in a limited realm.

The spontaneous arising of memory through involuntary recall speaks of the connection between memory and fidelity. In memory humans are able to gather time and the world – in seeing a person one has known for a long time we see that person in that person’s thirty-fifth year, but we also see the person as she or he grew out of the preceding twenty-five years. One is not looking at a time slice (as a physicist), but rather how the present has grown out of the past, how the past has been gathered and saved. Fidelity comes in here: to be true to a thing in its temporal extension.

Fidelity, like focus, is an antidote to distraction. Humans are open to the entire world. The world is open to the entire person. The person can range over the entire world and this can lead to distraction or aimless wandering. Humans can thus be scattered in a ways that an animal cannot. Animals always occupy a certain niche. Fidelity is the counter force to distraction and scatteredness. Distraction is being torn in all directions.

Sunday, September 28

The quotes “understand in order to believe,” and “Believe in order to understand,” are taken from Anselm of Canterbury, from the close of the first chapter of the *Proslogion*.

There is a horrible tradition in analytical philosophy: knowledge is true justified belief; this is consonant with ‘I understand so I can believe,’ resulting in knowledge.

“I seek understanding so I may be entitled to belief” – if this is reasonable, the converse must seem unreasonable. How can belief come prior to understanding?

John Wagner:

February 6, 1979

The entry of September 28 reflects on Anselm’s maxim “I believe in order to understand.” He explicitly says “unless I believed I should not understand.” The question arises: “How can we believe in something we don’t understand?” Western thought generally skirts this question in not reflecting on the concrete conditions which may underlie the activity of inquiry; in this way the object of inquiry is limited. I.A. Richards suggests that philosophy may not have a subject-matter of its own. And to be sure, profound experience is not a subject matter amenable to objective representation and deliberate control. Still reflection is answerable to the experience of humans; philosophical reflection is bound up with the idea of metaobjective and metatechnical) experience.

A parallel was noted between this point and the inaugural lecture of Heidegger which puts the matter thus: What is there left for philosophy when reality is divided up among the various sciences? Philosophy must reflect on nothing. (This is an extreme case of pedagogical exasperation.) Nothing is what encompasses and holds together the little fields of scientific inquiry; the fields are objective; the meta-objective concerns reflect on their foundations and coherence.

"I believe in order to understand" seems scandalous when we think of belief as an instrument as we normally do. We must avoid such an approach to belief, which is exemplified in Paschal's wager. We must remember, however, that Paschal also understands and urges the difference between the God of the philosophers (whose existence benefits can be calculated) and the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (who speaks to us in unforethinkable ways).

Anselm in his ontological argument was ambivalent between the two concepts of God. Gaunilon forced him to resolve the ambiguity, and Anselm did so in favor of interpretation of his argument as cogent, aiming at the God of the philosophers.

Monday, September 29

There is a difference between "believing in . . ." and "believing that . . ." What follows "believing that" is a clause representing a state of affairs; states of affairs are scientifically explainable, concrete things are not.

T. Birch wondered if we were not taking "believing that" too lightly, whether the task of philosophy is to look at "belief in" to make it "belief that." According to H. Bugbee "belief that" arises out of "belief in."

Albert noted that one has the right to ask about the nature of "belief in." One unable to articulate "belief in" in proposition of the form "belief that" would be guilty of obscurantism. Perhaps believing in is just a way of comprehending the infinity of "believes that" all at once. I "believe in" is the original founding sense of belief; "believes that" are the pieces, never able to surpass their foundation.

The entry goes on to say that belief is not our accomplishment but rather we come to be at issue in it. This insight is exposed to probing questions which let us feel the force of the closedness and misunderstandings we have to reckon with. Such a question might be: "Do you mean it all comes down to this?"

Such questions point up a superficial similarity between relativism or pluralism and Henry's position. Both direct us to the particularity of human lives. The relativist thence proceeds to argue that because of the particular variety of human situations there cannot be universal (i.e. invariably present and binding) standards, whereas Henry urges that universal (i.e. eminently true for this our world) meaning is met only in the individual situation.

The entry turns to Kant and his root belief in the priceless worth of individual persons, a profession of universality. A deficiency in his thought might be a lack of a grasp of individuality and its connection with universality.

On Socrates

Thursday, October 2

The entry recalls that Aristotle attributes to Socrates the inductive method. This way of seeing Socrates must be balanced with the way Plato characterized him through his mode of inquiry. The method of induction has surely improved, yet there was nothing outdated about Socrates' method of inquiry. The mode of Socratic inquiry is apparent in the principle: "The unexamined life is not worth living." But what about men who work with pick and shovel and whose work has been raised to vocation? This may lead us to consider "that the life of a person devoid of genuine vocation is not worth living." That vocation and reflective examination are connected is suggested by Plato's insights that excellence involved knowledge – and that no one knowingly pursues the worse course. But the knowledge here at issue is not a knowledge one responds to, a "calling." Knowledge would be to be equal to the call. Once a person is equal to the call that person will not stray from it. The end of the entry reflects on Socrates' death – he was peaceful knowing he was equal to the call.

Saturday, October 4

Socrates was claimed to be the wisest of humans; he challenged this claim, yet realized he was the wisest man, knowing that he knew nothing. Wisdom is not a knowledge, which can be acquired and thought to be a valuable possession. Wisdom is rather a disposition where we are equal to our calling.

Monday, October 6

Life should not be understood as a goal at which a person can arrive. In life, everything is always at issue in some way. We always stand on a frontier. We don't peer into the land beyond, making plans, however. In this lies the essential equality of all humans, each standing unsurpassably on their frontier.

John Crist

February 8, 1979

The book nears the end of the work of 1952. The entries echo the academic work of Henry in an ethics course he was teaching.

He reflects on Socrates' notion that wisdom is worth little. This in turn leads to a reflection on the nature of human equality.

What is the fundament of equality in our society? The answer to this question is usually brought up in terms of rights. It is said that we all have equal rights. In the abstract sense this is true. However a distinction must be made between the abstract right and the worth of a right; that is the ability to exercise the right. It is obvious that very few of us have the full worth of our rights, because we do not have full access to the things that would allow us to use our rights.

We are unequal.

1. Born inequalities—size, skill, intelligence.

2. Inequalities in our destinies—not being in the right place at the right time, being born into a poor family.

This is a force of reality that is not arbitrary. We do not simply shape the world to our liking. Sartre holds that we all start at ground zero and fully shape our lives. But most people remain in the class they were born to, those who make it big make it by luck. Yet they are extolled as paradigms which we all could follow. This myth of success is often concealed from us, although on occasion our errors do catch up with us (shade of Oedipus) and make themselves felt. Often one who succeeds believes she or he is the sole author of that person's greatness, and this is untrue; very much a modern error.

Kant was persuaded that happiness was not in our control (well-doing did not necessarily lead to well-being). But he accepted the right to happiness so firmly that he felt the want of happiness in this life to be the grounds for the existence of God as there had to be an ultimate reckoning.

If we are faithful to our deepest aspirations, happiness we achieve is not true happiness. Our deepest experiences are those in which we are graced by something greater than ourselves. We experience grace, but suffering as well. The experience of the advent of reality whether joyous or painful cannot be thought of as either:

1. our just desserts, or
2. a mere illusion.

The advent of reality is a force in itself.

In modern times we try to disburden ourselves of the force of fate by technology and planning. Prior to our modern spirit there was no chance of one being in a position to pull this off. One could only rid oneself of fate by withdrawal (Stoics, Epicureans).

Socrates stated "No harm comes to a good person." This seems somewhat ambiguous. He must mean that we can trust that there is a common root of well-doing and well-being, not that we have some immunity by our well-doing.

Freedom is everyone's capacity for destiny. There is something unsurpassable in each person's destiny. We cannot tell another what to do. Here is where we are radically equal.

This can be illustrated by the Old Testament prophets. They felt that it was beyond them to fulfill what was called for. Often they even feared for their lives. The callings are not easy and most often humans will not be reconciled by a happy ending; rather, by the realization that their lives were meaningful.

Wednesday, October 8

We must be forthright in accepting the givenness of a situation and be respectful to that givenness. We may conclude that the question of givenness must be begged; so let us be beggars and be equal to the givenness of a situation by respecting it in the spirit of prayer. We should accept the givenness of life as a gift.

Friday, October 10

Christmas in the wilderness, 1944. The ship is charted on the map, but it is secure *merely* by being so charted. The reality is the distance between the Philippines and the islands they had left. This denotes the abandonment of men in a situation. The response to the abandonment is a song. Note the similarity of the starkness here and that of the swamp. In each case out of the stark simplicity a response arose—a song or a celebration on the ship; or the experience of immersion in the swamp.

Saturday, October 11

Do not think of well-doing as a warrant against the trials of life. We are reminded of the ambiguity of our condition. This ambiguity is not the fickleness of fate, but the ability of ours to be destinate or to fail when faced with reality.

Sunday, October 12

If self-sufficiency were the ideal of the good life, it seems that it would be reproducible. But our relations would be reduced to ones of necessary dependence and independence. If we understand our destiny as communal, this will undercut the attempt to follow self-sufficiency as an ideal.

Wednesday, October 15

Socrates is talking with Cephalus who is quite old. Socrates inquires into his condition and the old man remarks with dignity, engendered from his situation as a man near the end of his life. He shows a confidence in the possibility of affirming his life. This is the sort of question that arises in middle age and becomes increasingly more urgent. For a young person the past is open for correction, but as our horizons close, the past rears its head. We might be tempted to throw this burden off, claiming life to be absurd, but Cephalus doesn't do this. He affirms his life.

The possibility of affirmation happens in our bearing witness to that which cannot play us false. These are the actions of our purest generosity and service (echoes page 10 of the Preface). They are the moments of our strength and our ability to help others in simplicity.

Friday, October 17

The thought on simplicity leads back to Meister Eckhart. Earth withdraws from heaven and released itself to the immovable ground. In doing so it calls forth heaven to embrace it and make it fruitful (human-God relationship).

In the still desert of which Eckhart speaks no one is at home. Similarly John Anderson says that the world is unknown. This is not accidental and would not cease to be so after charted. Rather, the world is essentially unknown, and to appreciate this is to appreciate its depth. "Our true home is wilderness, even the world of every day" (p. 76). Our true home is wilderness and our home is housed in wilderness.

"Love is such a matter of completion of presence from within ourselves" (p. 76). Reality calls for completion in and through humans. We tend to emphasize the role of humans as if we are the valuation of all things. We are claimed by the creatures, but also by the truth within (Augustine, Book 10). Many

people ask us to subordinate ourselves to wilderness. This is to ask too little. Nature calls on humans, and we are to complete it through ourselves.

Pat Burke

February 13, 1979

Saturday, October, 1959

We began with the last entry of 1952, Saturday October 18, and its reflections on Cephalus' statements in the *Republic*. Cephalus seems in these passages to affirm the possibility of looking back over one's life and accepting it as something given in trust. This re-search of one's life may yield the ground upon which one may stand in the present. However, it can only yield this ground, if we understand our position with respect to our life as one of trusteeship. If we attempt to command or secure our life we violate the terms of this trust. However, the possibility is always open to reaffirm our position as trustee. The ground then which we may discover in such a re-collection of our life is not something which we can secure as we secure the nature of objects through the application of method in the experimental mode of thought. Rather, this ground is discovered through 'experiential thought' that responds to things as they are given in depth. This 'experiential thought' is at the heart of true philosophical enquiry.

A short summary of what had transpired in the entries of 1952 was then given. It was noted that this book is not a composition but rather a record of fidelity to the rhythm of days and works. Its structure is analogous to a natural landscape, which while not the result of design or composition, still has its own shape and rhythm. Thus *The Inward Morning* should not be seen as just a stringing together of random reflections but as the articulation of a philosophical landscape.

The year began with intimations of the advent of reality. These were responded to in the abstract mode with a discussion of certainty and simplicity, which developed in to reflections on wonder and explanation. These themes were succeeded by the sketches of Swamping, Dam Building, and Rowing which focused them (and others developed later) in concrete experience. Swamping spoke of the immersion in the stark simplicity of reality. The dam building sketch showed an appropriate human responding to nature that gathered and founded a natural place. Rowing articulated the experience of sport that deepened into a collective enterprise, which gathered the individuals and the world, work and joy, into one. The sketches were then followed by abstract elucidations of some of the themes they gave rise to.

The remainder of the year is devoted to an echo of the academic work in Ethics. There are three main areas of concern in this work: The nature of ethical enquiry, the significance of Socrates' life, and the connection between well-being and well-doing. These reflections on ethics evidence a calmness and confidence that reflects the fact that they are supported by the people and institutions of academia.

This measured calmness and constraint serves as a contrast to the beginning of the New Year, where the guidance and support of the institutional activities are gone. The entry of July 8, 1953 begins with a

quote from Claudel expressive of the perplexity and anxiety that is felt by Henry as he attempts to engage in experiential thinking and writing, but finds himself becalmed and 'afloat upon a sea of possibilities.' The passage takes up with the problem of what it is to get in one's way through anxiety. As Marcel points out (*The Ego in Relation to Others*), in anxiety the ego feels itself thrust into the competitive situation because it is unsure of itself and seeks approval and support from others. However, the competitive situation is asphyxiating and poisons the atmosphere in which the ego tries to work. Anxiety is fundamentally a failure of the ego to come to terms with itself.

Henry noted that perhaps the situation in which he found himself here attests to that nothingness which is essential to the coming to presence of things of which Heidegger speaks in *What is Metaphysics*. Heidegger perhaps also articulated something similar in his exegesis of "Pain has turned the threshold to stone" (a line from the poem *A Winter Evening* by Georg Trakl—discussed in *On the Way to Language*). Perhaps pain as it is used here bespeaks the way in which things work on one so that one is at a loss as to the way to proceed.

In this entry the problem of attempting to engage in experiential thought in an unsympathetic philosophical climate is addressed. This style of thinking is in a difficult position because it cannot come to fruition in an adversary situation. It is not always producible on demand. There are several reasons why this is the case. The first and perhaps most critical reason is that our times have in general produced very little schooling in this type of thinking. Secondly, there is the difficulty that one feels one should resist producing it because it can give rise to a feeling of superiority, which is inimical to the spirit of such thought. Finally, experiential thought at its highest has something festive about it which cannot be continually produced. Thus experiential thought is always vulnerable to the challenge from the accepted mode of philosophy.

However, when the time is not right for experiential philosophy, one can speak in the abstract mode. This abstractness can take two forms. The first is that type of abstract thought which is continuous with the concrete mode because it is an elucidation of it. Abstract thought can also take the form of propaedeutic discourse which delimits the region of essential discourse from without by taking up with philosophical positions and showing how they are limited.

The entry of Thursday, July 8 takes up with the correlative themes of faith and reason in light of the guidance provided by the speaking of Meister Eckhart. Eckhart speaks like a reasonable man but one whose reasonableness is grounded in faith.

The proper relationship between faith and reason is the core of the extended recollection of the Indian boatman navigating the Rogue River. The river is barely navigable especially during low water but the boat provides the essential services of mail and transportation to the residents of the area and therefore must continually operate. (It was noted that the U.S. Postal Service today would not use such a boat. It would probably either use helicopters or channel the river.) In his navigation of this small boat on the river the Indian showed a remarkable communion with the river. This is particularly in evidence when he traverses the shallowest spots by allowing the wash of his boat to carry him through. It is a surprising, almost artistic maneuver that shows unusual insight into the situation in which he moves. (Henry here noted the Taoist sense of things implicit in such a maneuver. By relaxing you are overtaken from behind and lifted over what otherwise might shatter you.) It is such *apt* responses to the exigencies presented by the river that bring the river to articulation. The *unique* responses required by the navigation of the boat on the river bring about a fundamental disclosure of the river.

It was noted that we have in this account an interesting example of a machine bringing nature to articulation. The boat and its engines are congruent with reality. They do not overpower the river and cut one off from it. Henry noted the difference between this and his experience on the North Fork of the Salmon River, where professional guides are continually roaring up and down the river, oblivious to the river and the fishermen along its banks. Albert noted as the complement to this point, that there is a concealed danger often not observed with respect to machine technology. Instead of overpowering the river with machinery one could imagine the use of a hovercraft or something similar that would be completely quiet and unobtrusive. Such a boat would cut us off just as effectively from the river as the huge, overpowered boats of the professional guides.

How then does this recollection of the Rogue River bear upon the relationship between faith and reason? Faith is the fundamental familiarity with the river and its hidden rocks. It is the Indian boatman's entrustment of himself to the river and his moving with it. He does not close himself off to the situation and try to exercise control over it. Rather, he *opens* himself to the continuing exigencies that are presented by the river. It is only on the foundation of this basic communion with the river that he can do what is called for at each particular instant. Thus faith would be our fundamental attunement that brings us before reality and liberates us from being lost among things. It is only upon this basis that we may be able to speak and act reasonably on any particular occasion.

Towards the end of the entry Henry says: "I could wish for no more than to do justice to the instruction I have received from moving water" (p. 83). This prompted discussion on just what might be the instruction of moving water. Albert observed that in a river we have the concrete manifestation of rhythm and fluency. Moreover, a river is one of the most momentous and significant features of a landscape. It gives the natural landscape its major direction. It gathers the waters from throughout the watershed and eventually flows into the sea (an end which seems most appropriate). (The kinship between Norman Mclean's *A River Runs Through It* and *The Inward Morning*).

We then moved to a consideration of Friday, July 10. This entry departs from Picard's observation that natural sounds are the articulations of silence and that if they are not so understood, they degenerate into mere noises. Similarly, authentic human speech involves a silence within ourselves that partakes of this greater silence. In so far as our speech is not the issue of such silence, it loses its connection with reality and becomes mere noise. Meaning can only come out of an inexhaustible ground.

Henry finds the same point in Spinoza's *Ethics*. Spinoza makes a distinction between three levels of knowledge. The first is knowledge of vague and confused ideas. The second is knowledge of clear and distinct ideas. Finally, there is the third level of knowledge, which is achieved when we see the clear and distinct ideas as expressions of the divine nature. The second level of knowledge corresponds to our hearing of sounds as in themselves (abstractly) and not as the issue of silence. Knowledge of clear and distinct ideas is knowledge resulting from the representation of distinct things to ourselves and never reaches the ground from which all distinct things come forth.

The third level of knowledge is our concrete understanding of things (not representation) which sees them as grounded, not as one thing in another, but as sounds are in silence. Spinoza suggests that this concrete understanding of things is only consummated in effective action. Henry concludes the entry by reemphasizing this point. "The authenticity of our deeds is the basic condition of our concrete understanding of reality" (85). It was noted that with his interpretation of Spinoza, Henry has again shown us the living center and perhaps the focal experience of a very abstract philosopher.

We then moved to consider the entry of Saturday, July 11. The passage opens with a recollection of early morning fishing for steelhead on the Gualala River, when it is alive with fish. Albert pointed out that while steelhead have the kinship with the river characteristic of all fish that live in it, they however evidence a certain foreignness. Their unusual size, power and numbers speak of the far reaches of the river and of the open sea with all its power and fertility. They bring the seas home to one on the river. An analogous phenomenon is to be experienced here in Missoula in the summer, when on a hot and peaceful day the Clark Fork rushes through the valley. Its rolling waters speak to one of the run-off in the mountains which spring has only now reached.

Albert then offered some reflections, consonant with those of Henry's in this passage, upon what it might mean to fish for and to catch one of these steelhead. It was noted that fishing is a calling up from the depths which when successful makes the trout commit itself and stand out in the starkest way. In the moment of the catch, the trout is the focus as it leaps from the water – everything is gathered into this leaping trout. However, the landscape does not recede, but rather it lights up. In the moment of the catch reality is fundamentally disclosed to one. The fog of confusion and ambiguity lifts from the world, and the universe arises and comes into relief. As Henry says, "The very trees become eloquent where they stand" (87). It is like the lightning of Zeus (Heraclitus) that reveals the world in a flash. It is in this way that individuality and universality go hand in hand in experience.

In this entry we have the counterpart to the immersion in the stark simplicity of reality given in the sketch on "Swamping." Here we have reality in its full color and vitality. In fact the danger of our concentration being dissipated in the excitement with the fullness of reality is remarked in the passage. There are so many fish that it is difficult to concentrate one's attention on any particular fish. This danger of dispersal calls for a moment of recollection, so that one may "fish in one place, for one fish at a time" (86).

In the image of the leaping trout, this passage gives us the paradigm for what we mean when we speak of appearance, advent, or emergence. When we use such words we hearken back to a primal coming forth like that of the leaping trout. The birth of the individual in concrete experience, which through its gathering power simultaneously discloses the universal, gives us the true sense of individuality and universality. The entry concludes by observing that the typological construal of these terms, such as we have in Aristotle's *Categories* is a decayed and abstract version of their meaning as it is given to us concretely in experience.

Jim Maher

February 15, 1979

Saturday, July 11, 1953

We can begin with the conclusion of the entry of Saturday, July 11. There is a decay facing and threatening philosophy and all of us when we move from great experiences to everyday life. We have all had experiences in which reality is brought into focus, e.g., the leaping trout. This can be an experience of nature, art, companionship, solitude, etc. The danger is that we are often not true to these great experiences in our everyday life. Fidelity can decay, and when this happens the great experiences decay

into idyllic episodes. Dr. Bugbee commented that there is a need to clear ourselves of what has spoken in us. Dr. Borgmann stated that our faint-heartedness in speaking on behalf of great experiences is the result of a misinterpretation of our own self-importance. We need to remember that we are not the warrant for great things or experiences. One speaks up on behalf of something great.

Sunday, July 12

Dr. Bugbee begins the entry by reflecting that he is his own chief obstacle. This is not just any obstacle, but a crucial one. This perception is spoken of with pain. It leads to reflections on self-centeredness as being closed to truth. There is an intentional obscurity in self-deception. One's self-image is kept in obscurity. This obscurity works its way out in concrete life as a floating alibi. This may take the form of "I am the great . . .". One may claim to be a great poet or a great musician and be willing to shift categories and make different claims of greatness if there is a chance that one will be discovered in his delusion. This sort of existence can be seen in *The Secret Life of Walter Mitty*. Dr. Bugbee stated that self-deception is a danger inherent to those who engage in reflection. In reflection we seek our place in the world. There is often a shift from seeking one's self and one's place to pretenses about the self. We seem afraid to really discover the place that we seek. There is a social counterpart this. Our social conception of ourselves is often not what we are, but what we want to be. Modern society wants to be judged by the *means* which it gives to its members for their free time. This allows people to escape ultimate judgement.

Marcel said that the ego is often used as a means. If one succeeds and gains approval, one can take both of these results as signs of one's own superiority. In this way his self-deception continues unabated. Marcel also suggests a way out of this predicament. We should accept that the best part of our personality is given to us. We awaken to this in an attitude of "availability." We need to become available to this gift.

The concrete epistemological import of these reflections is that we must open ourselves in all manner of situations and trust in the great simplicities of life. The entry moves from the experience of pain to simplicity experienced in gratitude. In "The Thinker as Poet," in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, Heidegger moves in a different progression – from the splendor of the simple to the healing of pain.

Monday, July 13

The discussion began with reflections on the Chinese poem in the entry. In two strokes the poem gives us a landscape. There is an economy and wonderful matter-of-factness in brush paintings. Fulfillment is not a result of being swept off one's feet. It is to be filled with the matter-of-factness of things. Dr. Bugbee pointed out an objection to the necessary/contingent argument for the proof of the existence of God. If something exists eminently, then it is necessary. Things cannot be other than they are. This is made clear by Spinoza. The poem by Donald William does not bring forth the sense of the real as the Chinese poem does. A subject/object split is suggested in William's poem.

The discussion then turned to Hume on subjectivity and objectivity. There is a distorting interplay of internality and externality in Hume. Hume wants to determine what external reality is and then asks what internal reality is capable of. He withdraws into the subject to see what kind of external knowledge

is possible. Reality becomes impressions and ideas. The presence of ideas is not by itself the presence of reality. Causality is discovered to give connectedness to reality but cannot itself be discovered as a necessary reality. Causality is seen to be mere custom or habit. Custom and habit may be the buried-over fundament of what *The Inward Morning* calls faith, i.e. the basis on which reality is experienced. Reason is fickle and cannot be entrusted with causality. Custom and habit have something stable about them which reason lacks and for this reason can be entrusted with causality.

Dr. Borgmann commented that the breaking of bread is *the* central thing brought forcefully to one's attention in the *New Testament*. Christ points to the consistency of all that has gone on before on the road to Emmaus. But the disciples fail to accept it until they see Jesus in the breaking of bread. In early Christianity the breaking of bread holds the community together. It is not an accident that bread and wine are central to the *New Testament*. Christianity and nature come to the fore in the entry's reflections on the simple. Nature and Christianity do not need to be brought together since they are intimately connected at the center.

The discussion then turned to the relation of *The Inward Morning* to empiricism and idealism. The book never meets empiricism "head on." It takes empiricism and deepens it. It takes seriously the injunction "Be reasonable." Its response is not one of eccentricity. What enables us to be real is found in faith. The book should be located on the side of a deepened empiricism. *The Inward Morning* is a book at home in this country in trying to find its own way in dialogue with established philosophy. Idealists have always been viewed as exotics in this country, and the book is at home in this country in that it does not attempt to transcend established philosophy as idealism would. Descartes was an idealist in that the obtainable truths are all there in person. Experience is an incidental way in which we acquire the truths we are assured of. Empiricists also accepted that the truth could be had in an assured way, but the emphasis was different. The attempt to amalgamate empiricism and rationalism can take two tasks: The first is to design a system. To be a great reconciler of philosophical systems is largely a waste of time. The second way is to ask why we philosophize in the first place. We philosophize to be true to our greatest experiences and to make room for them. We need to ask how empiricism and rationalism influence the climate of our world such that our experiences deepen or wither away. Empiricism (the givenness of things) can turn into data analysis or gratitude for the gift of life. Rationalism can also be viewed in similar ways. It is important to see that it is a matter of utter indifference whether or not we can reconcile empiricism and rationalism, and we deceive ourselves in seeing this as important. Once one has a grounding in great experiences, one can be oriented towards these debates in a resourceful way. The session was concluded with the observation that the U.S. is a great country without great philosophy.

Dave Strong

February 20, 1979

Today we began a new approach to the journal because we are running out of time. So that we do not lose the continuity or thread of thought running through the entries, the first hour entailed giving a quick summary of each entry. I incorporate the later discussions of some of the entries together with the shorter summaries.

Tuesday, July 14

The major theme departs from Descartes' doubt and caution. Descartes cannot disavow a trustingness in reality upon which his doubt relies. However, a philosopher's trustingness in the reflective task does not allow the philosopher to conceive reality as consisting "only of the extension and further organization of our knowledge about it." In philosophy there is no progress, rather "our position is less akin to knowers and more akin to that of testifiers, witnesses." We lose this character of philosophy when we fall into misleading distinctions such as within and outside the mind. Sure, the object is outside me, but only as I am outside the object in the same way, and this is unilluminating. These misleading distinctions all yield ghosts: "disembodied knowers, trying to know their way into a hypothetical world," and then the ghostly world of phenomenalism. Henry said that with the disembodied knowers he was alluding to the chapter "The Ghost in the Machine" in Gilbert Ryle's *The Concept of Mind*.

Wednesday, July 15

The matter of testimony is continued in this entry. Kant, rather than being a mediator between Rationalism and Empiricism, is more fundamentally opposed to both because of their reportorial attitude. Albert agreed that this may have been closest to Kant's heart, but the interpretation of Kant which has been most historically consequential sees in Kant an effort to secure the conditions for the possibility of whatever might be. There is something reductive, impoverishing, and possessive of reality in this aspect of Kant.

The central theme for the next entry appears at the end of this one: A philosopher cannot leave himself and "his mode of involvement in reality out of account."

Friday, July 17

All speaking and theorizing is enworlded. Any and all speaking bespeaks a world. What is explicit in theorizing depends upon implicit being in the world. If one's implicit world is denied, one's explicit theorizing falls apart. But the implicit is something shy and vulnerable; it cannot come to the fore in adversary discourse.

Saturday, July 18

This entry shows forcefully how the flows of water and life are one. This unity allows us to explicate the relationship between reasonableness and faith.

Sunday, July 19

In C.I. Lewis's work reality is denatured in abstract thought. This abstraction can be overcome through critical spade work, that is, paying close attention to the work of someone like Lewis. This critical work may sleep in us for a time before bearing more concrete fruit with regard to the themes that genuinely concern us.

The account of the drive into Mexico is the counterpart to this critical spade work. Here the style is exploratory and tentative: a most sensitive extending oneself into reality. Things are grounded in being, a no-thing, a no-where. This no-thing is not a principle from which things are derived or produced,

rather it is a ground that frees them for what they *are*. Things are eternal in that they are eminently timely; not that they are timeless.

Later John Crist asked to have this account explicated further. This entry is most striking not for what it says but for its highly exploratory character. It strains to be sensitive, to follow an insight on the edge of reflective life, whereas most of the entries have undergone a kind of filtration. This exploratory strength brings with it its weakness – it can mislead by misspeaking some things. For example, we should not be led to believe that there is an a priori character to knowing things even before they are encountered. Things are born, emerge, come forth and our expectation is a letting them come forth as they are. In expectation we let things in their intrinsic importance stand out; we do not derive their importance.

In connection with this account, Henry suggested reading the entry on bells, Monday, November 2, 1953.

Monday, July 20

The theme of reflection here is the overcoming of the spirit of abstraction. Abstraction is fostered when we concentrate upon the “aboutness” of thinking and aspiring, and are forgetful of the “fromness” of our thinking. Only when we take into account the “fromness” of our thinking can we appreciate both the individual and universal as necessary. This appreciation is exemplified in the Greek notions of harmonious order, simplicity and necessity.

Tuesday, July 21

Understanding reality is not a systematic canvassing of all finite things. Nor are things derived from something else which is some thing. So when we think of the bond that holds everything together as “in another,” the scholastic *esse in alio*, we are not to think of it as some other thing. This central decisive thought, that “there is more to reality than meets the mind’s eye,” is nourished by moments of involuntary recall. It’s an important point that “the meaning of past experiences emerges as if having undergone filtration.” In involuntary recall, meaning becomes like pure spring water – cleansed and clarified. From this “one gains his bearings and stance as a human being.”

This discussion leads to the question of how things are centered which is the simple and difficult point of the book, “the importance of things is indeed intrinsic to them.” The dignity of things does not dissolve but opens up the question as to how a person is cognitive of the importance of things. The meaning of things, “the existence of things, the standing out of the distinct, can only make sense, as we stand forth ourselves, as we are made to stand forth.” The existence of things only comes home to us as we are equal to them in existing ourselves.

Later we discussed this point more. Henry pointed out that he chose “intrinsic” in contrast to “inherent.” “Inherent” has the connotation of there being a simple, unanalyzable property of things which inheres. The intuitionist philosophers, e.g. , G.E. Moore and W.D. Ross, often talk about these inherent non-natural properties such as the properties of good or right. But, Henry points out, there is no such thing as “objective values.” So the intrinsic importance of things must not be thought of as a property of them.

Albert pointed out an important consequence which follows from this distinction. When the intrinsic importance of something, say a river, overtakes us and we are equal to it, we know that it cannot play us false. It enters into all our relations with the world and we can put it to the test. Then the question arises: how can a scientific description of the river be related to our experience? A scientific account, employing the principles of physics and chemistry, is very tight, detailed and forceful. It leaves no gaps for anything else; the river is all molecules, atoms, and their properties. Well then, what has happened to the value of the river? If one adheres to a doctrine of inherent values one is brought up short; they either must deny the scientific account or say the value-properties are properties which science cannot discover. However if one takes the importance of things to be intrinsic then finding no gaps in the scientific account is not bothersome. To ask, "Is there nothing more to the river?," shows faintness of heart, a failure to be true to the river. What the questioner wants here is a warrant for saying the river has value. Allowing for this scientific account shows how the *The Inward Morning* allows for the convergence of very different modes of thought.

In this connection Henry brought up the story of Saint-Exupery's plane crash from *Wind, Sand, and Stars*. After struggling to find help in the desert, he finally ran out of strength and waited to die. Then he began to think of water and thought he did justice to it for the first time in his life. Here something as humble as water registered with authoritative power. Rather than just "a knowing" of it, he acknowledged the power and significance of it. Then, too, for the first time, "I discovered I was friend to myself, and had no enemies."

This led to a discussion of the spirit of renunciation, partly because Saint-Exupery exemplified it here. It was noted that in this entry Meister Eckhart is quoted as saying that we have only to be empty to be filled. Before renunciation, one is set upon accomplishing goals and has a full purview of matters at hand. But things start getting out of hand until one realizes there is no more one can do. Then one relaxes and accepts the situation. Henry alluded to *To Build a Fire*, and the Buddhist saying, "Living each day as if one were dead." Albert noted that in this time more than ever we need disciplined renunciation because we are always full but never filled. We are only half sick to our stomachs.

Henry said that renunciation can appear in almost the opposite form. Alcibiades in the *Symposium* says Socrates can eat or not eat, drink or not drink. Suzuki in the *Essence of Buddhism* says, "When hungry I eat. When tired I sleep." A person living in this spirit lives like one in primordial naturalness; only the person is self-conscious of what sustains the person.

Thursday, July 23

The same theme of humans' actions bound up with their understanding and appreciation of reality is taken up. Life and philosophy are not independent of one another. If one tries to suppress the center of one's life in the philosophy one writes then it is revealed and bespoken rather than spoken about. J.S. Mill in his philosophy makes the principle of utility fundamental and any fellow-feeling merely derivative, yet in his writings he discloses a deep affection for his fellow human beings. This is what Mill should acknowledge as really fundamental in his thought. J. Rawls likewise has a split between his theory and his heart.

Because life and philosophy are not independent, philosophical reflection cannot depend beyond the depth of our actions. We should not think one needs to act greatly and live adventurously in order to think greatly and adventurously. Kant and Descartes led quiet lives.

Friday, July 24

This entry begins with a note which reflects on the subliminal feeling in humans of the need for rain. The weather teaches us we are one even with plants. We both feel a relief and a rejoicing. In conjunction with the preceding entry it was noted that this is the kind of activity and sensitivity which is fruitful for philosophy, not necessarily great deeds. In everyone's time the endurance of pain and disappointments can be great in a sense.

Henry said Conrad's *Lord Jim* is a good example and exploration of the tension of one who feels himself called to do great deeds and yet does not think everyday existence counts.

Tom Birch suggested that only out of a background of experiencing great risks can we appreciate the gentle teachings of the weather.

Albert disagreed saying that in pretechnological times people were called to do great things and their actions enhanced the dignity of a person, but now deeds such as skiing down Everest or ballooning across the Atlantic are uncalled for, foolish, and do not enhance anyone's dignity. What is called for today is fidelity to tasks: to do it even if it could be escaped.

The entry moves to reflect upon the control of belief and attitude. The later Stoic Epictetus claims to have a technique for controlling belief and attitude. He sees that our caring attitude makes us vulnerable. Thus the caring attitude must be secured or it will undermine our efforts to keep reality at bay. But a concealment is revealed. Who am I when assuming a position of control? Where does the desire for control come from? Any attitude, even one where I assume control, can be shown to rest on some ground, be it firm or flimsy.

We are oriented towards things from the footing we have in being grounded. And our discovery and understanding of that ground is a matter of feeling.

Saturday, July 25

The clear, fresh day and Beethoven's Opus 135 make the author realize "that the readiness to receive is all." No gift can be given without a receiving. Receiving comes about in contemplation. Contemplation takes two forms:

1. perceptive or aesthetic (which are etymologically the same),
2. meditative, reflective or philosophic.

The two are closely related to the concrete and abstract modes of thought respectively.

The relationship seen between art and philosophy is very close to Heidegger's understanding and is very different from the usual view today. The issue of the practical importance of art is ignored in much of philosophy and aesthetics. In this entry it is held that art and philosophy are practical in that "they are kindred ways in which reality nurtures in us the soul of generosity" from which we are enabled to act.

In contemplation we learn of the sustaining ground in which we are rooted. How we are rooted in reality is a deep and dark question. We do not learn this by uprooting ourselves; trying to make such an inspection would destroy what we are interested in. An understanding of the ground is often inconspicuous. It sometimes occurs in sleep, “as when sleep restores us to simplicity.”

In sleeping, dreaming, and memory we have a profound contact with reality. We all share in the experience of sleep and it is from these kinds of experiences that philosophers should draw their reflections. It was said that to lose the sanctity of sleep is to lose a great part of human existence. And a life that in the evening does not restore us to sleep and simplicity cannot be a good life. How these experiences are translated into a physiology of sleep and memory are secondary though interesting problems; the person of science who investigates these areas must either be informed by philosophy or have a philosophic sense if the person’s investigations are not to be aimless and the conclusions ludicrous.

Greg Barringer

February 22, 1979

Sunday, July 26

This entry opens with the questions: “What may it mean not to have lived in vain? How is it possible to accept dying?” (p. 114). In any attempt to approach these questions, we are warned, rather advised, “. . . not suppose a case, but take the case that is . . .” (p. 114). Death confronts us as a case that is.

Aristotle asks: What is good for a human being? Bugbee says the more basic question is: what is a human being good for? The notion is what is fitting for a human to do – what is nonvain. Here, again, we are faced with the notion of vocation. (The Latin verb is *vocare*: to call. The noun, *vocatio*: the calling).

Monday, July 27

In this entry we are told that we must be open to experience speaking in the imperative. That is, we must be open to the instructions of things loved. We must ‘be ready’ to respond. This response, as we were told earlier, in “decision.” Decision is distinguished from insistence in that the former is affirmative in character, while the latter is assertive.

Also in this entry is a passage from Faulkner’s *Old Man*. In it, we are told, can be seen the convict’s move from insistence to decision.

Tuesday, July 28

What is sought for in this entry is a distinction – an affirmative “want” and an assertive “want” – a distinction which is lacking in Kant’s ethical thought.

The author also points out that the Stoics, and the Epicureans, had the acute insight that it is our attitude of caring that gets us into trouble – yet they fail to recognize that it is this same attitude that

gets us out of trouble. The notion for these thinkers was that attitudes are to be over-ridden – controlled.

The entry is a critique of this insistence. It closes with the image of the swimmer swimming with even strokes, weathering both the crests and the troughs with assurance.

Wednesday, July 29

The critique here is of those who take the undulations of the “sea” of attitudes at face value. These are the ones who would say that the crests, the ups, are to be strived for while the troughs, the downs, are to be avoided. The author, in this criticism, bespeaks a notion of purity of attitude, of being sustained equally by the troughs and the crests.

Thursday, July 30

The entry opens with an expression of doubt. The doubt springs from the fact that there is no firm, objective, grasp of experience. The complaint is that the preceding entries have been too assertive. The author quotes Marcel, who also warns of the danger of the “ringing hollow” of “existential philosophy,” due to the elusive character of experience. The author goes on to say that he would rather say “experiential” than “existential” philosophy – but adds that his notion of experience is different than that of the empiricists (cf. p. 125).

The question then becomes whether it is possible to have faith in humans while being faithless with respect to Reality. The answer given is that faith in humans is possible only if there is faith in Reality. The notion is that humans and Reality are inseparable, humans are part of Reality, humans are fundamentally conversant with Reality. This is contrasted with Sartre for whom the things of Reality are inane, absurd.

Friday, July 31

Again, we have more reflections on Sartre. Firstly, it is noted that “involvement” or “engagement” is a central theme in Sartre’s thought. Bugbee’s claim is that Sartre’s notion of “involvement” is asleep in respect to what “involvement” means. The problem is that Sartre has no counterpart for the involvement. Things, as stated above, are inane – and other persons appear as threats to each other’s integrity. The force of this seems to be estrangement, not involvement.

Secondly, the author reflects on Sartre’s notion of action. For Sartre, freedom resides in choice, which is met with the assumption of autonomy, the making of ourselves by ourselves. The problem arises in connection with necessity of action. Bugbee’s claim is that though Sartre rejects Formalism (“ . . . the placing of the necessity of action in formulated rules of action . . . ,” p. 127) he seems to have no other choice.

Lastly, Sartre locates “bad faith” in humanity. He shows what it is to lack good faith, or just faith. Bugbee’s point is that this admitted lack should be a “. . . threshold that opens out into the wilderness that is the reality of faith” (p. 128). The entry closes with recollections of the centrality of the wilderness theme.

Saturday, August 1

Opening the entry are remarks on Cezanne’s “Rock Landscape.” “The painting seems a paradigm of things truly perceived” (p. 129). The painting is an expression of the lived significance of things – it is not a photographic reproduction. It teaches respect and love of things. Yet, neither truly perceived things nor the intelligible response to things can be pocketed by the mind. “Only as we may be ripe for it in our entirety does it seem that reality may dawn on us concretely and anew” (p. 129). What is involved is “seeing with the eye of faith,” an intimacy with things.

Tuesday, August 4

This entry opens with a “phrase in the manner of Emerson: there is somewhat absolute in our experience” (p. 131). Noted here is the ephemeral condition of humans – the understanding of experience comes and goes, waxes and wanes. As Pindar notes, we are called upon daily anew. Also noted in class was the connection between the ephemeral condition of humans and the form of this book as a journal, complete with its good and bad days, and the flowing from day to day. *Panta rhei*.

John Wagner

March 1, 1979

Class began noting Henry’s doctoral dissertation – *The Sense and Conception of Being* as being indicative of the emergence of the kind of thought found in *The Inward Morning*, the latter bringing themes of the dissertation to clarity and maturity.

We first turned to the theme of necessity in the entry of Sunday, August 16 as it seems to emerge from the discussion on Hume, Spinoza, and Kant. These thinkers act as a sounding board for the reflections and discussion to ensue. It is an attempt to dig beneath their arguments to find a positive notion of necessity that is initially circumscribed. Their thought presents us with a difficulty to be confronted, wherein we might find our own notion of necessity buried. “All judging as activity implicitly presupposes the category of necessity, and it is the standpoint of an active being for whom *de jure* claims have fundamental force.” The question posed is: Can necessity have relevance in so far as we abstract from such a standpoint? No, necessity is found in the experience of critical situations, the force of necessity to respond is found in one piece: it must be an experiential category and “has no proper place in thinking abstractly about the course of events.”

In Spinoza we find this notion confirmed. Necessity springs from the indwelling cause of things to which we respond from within ourselves. Spinoza says: “Is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things?” Henry asks: Must we not discover the “indwelling” from within ourselves?

Hume takes the position of an observer, hence necessity evaporates. What enters decisively into the connection of events is to be realized and not merely observed. Henry feels necessary connection is to realize what happens and what must happen. Henry feels that the force that does survive in Hume's causality is not admitted into ethical considerations.

Tuesday, August 18

The entry acknowledges that Kant puts the greatest stress on active nonarbitrariness. That imperativeness, Henry feels, bespeaks "unconditional concern." An interlude in the entry shows that our concern must be all-encompassing; if confined to the ethical its real force is denied. The entry serves to recover the scholastic doctrine of the transcendentals, everything that is, is true, beautiful, and good. To experience things as beautiful is clearly a matter of experiential tutelage in unconditional concern. The transcendentals are so called because the good, true, and beautiful transcend the limits of the categories.

The entry argues that the unconditional concern in the beautiful rescues art from the innocuous and opens it to the vein of gratitude. Similarly, the ethical import of unconditional concern may restore us to the appreciation of a commitment in which truth is at stake. Heidegger preserves truth in this vein, reserving "truth" for eminent or decisive truth while conventional truth he calls "correctness." We can correspondingly distinguish between this relation in the notion of "declarative assent" and "active assent," the willingness to put oneself out. The problem is to show that there is a gradation between the two; that there is a fact-value split.

Wednesday, August 19

The entry returns to reflections on Kant. It is felt, to return to moral judgement, that Kant tacitly appeals to experience in grounding moral judgment. Finality and necessity are experiential ideas and therefore must be grounded in experience.

Necessity may be said to be responded to in "active assent." If a cogent procedure for obtaining assent could be set forth, only "declarative assent" could be exacted, which is not capable of the discovery of finality and necessity.

The root difficulty for Kant is to elucidate the categorical imperative and formulate a procedure in which it may be established. Kant tries to distill such a procedure. But the examples Kant gives in his reflections fall short of the dignity the matter requires. The true response to the categorical imperative lies in active assent, which is lost in following this procedural approach.

Friday, August 21 - Saturday, August 29

In the entries of the 21st and 27th, we find reflections on abstract and concrete discourse or experiences vs. characteristics (values). The 21st also speaks of the subtle idolatry, which is the gravest danger that the type of discourse found in *The Inward Morning* faces, not a danger from without (like skeptical colleagues) but from within.

The entry of August 22nd deals with the notion of religion as unsatisfiable hunger, counter-posing to this the notion of simplicity found in the entry of the 29th.

Friday, August 21

On subtle idolatry: The first part is devoted to and makes the point that things in their givenness call for respect. To specify conditions of respect in terms of personality severed from the presence of the givenness of things is mistaken. This understanding of "personality" leads to the idolatry of the self. Naturalism seems to escape idolatry by reducing the finite to the objective. Idealism subordinates the finite to the infinite. Once the World is impoverished in either of these two ways, the self becomes idolized. The result is sometimes a clutching of one by the other in search of meaning, as when one says: "I'll find my fulfillment in her." Humanity becomes abstracted from the world. The foreshortening of a thing to an object goes along with the idolatry of the self. Note this in relation to insistence as opposed to decision. Henry recalled the fishing experience where the "fishermen" watched a woman with "a pole" catch a ten pounder which "gave her the nod."

Sunday, August 23 -Tuesday, August 25

Here we find the theme of darkness and density, or the otherness of things.

Friday, August 28

A discussion on the theme of science and the fullness of experience.

Pat Burke:

March 8, 1979

Saturday, September 5 – Monday, October 5

The journal entries concerning life at sea were again the point of departure for the meeting. What strikes one most forcefully about these entries is the gift of life at sea which claims a man. (In contrast, there are few if any occasions today in which a claim of this sort is encountered.) The most striking case of such a claim of the life at sea is given in the entry of Saturday, September 5, which describes the experience of being called upon at night to steer a course in a difficult sea. The starkness of the claim of reality in "Swamping" is here heightened to a level of crazed enormity. In "Swamping" the awareness of the swamp gives way to the gladness of being in it. Similarly, in this entry, the inane enormity of the demands of life aboard the ship overtakes one and gets one out of this withholding and eventually beyond enduring to a position of continual adequation with the occurrent.

Henry, at this point, related to us his experience of putting to sea in a severe typhoon. The war was over and his ship had put into port in order to tear down one of its engines. The typhoon came upon them with little warning. The first indication they had of being in its path, was the bottom falling out of their barometer. Upon radioing headquarters, they were informed that every commanding officer was responsible for his own ship. Heeding Melville's warning that the real peril for a seafarer is the land, they put to sea with one engine out in an attempt to gain protection from the storm on the lee side of the island. However, by the time they were under way, the typhoon was upon them. There seemed to be no way out and no way which one could rely upon. The initial difficulty of making it through a 300 yard

wide channel in the barrier reef at the mouth of the harbor seemed insurmountable. They could neither take the waves dead ahead nor dead astern because the rudder and propellers would come out of the water and they would lose what little control they still had. All that they were able to do was to take each wave as it came and responding as best they could to it. After this storm, Henry said, the crew had the same look of innocence about them that was in the eyes of the young man who nearly drowned in the river. They had been washed clean by their total involvement with the storm.

Tom asked how the calm that descended upon the crew might be related to the notion of disinterested interest. Henry responded, that in such a situation as that encountered in the typhoon, one is empowered for a time so that one is not in bondage to his interest for survival: This empowerment is not a calling upon one's own resources but rather it seems that what is overpowering sponsors one and enables such action as it is necessary to take.

Albert asked us to consider the experience of serious illness or decease of a loved one and how such an experience provides intimations of what we are discussing here. In the illness of a child, for example, we have to act but we often feel anger or resentment over this unavoidable claim on us. However, if such a situation stretches us to the limits of our capability and breaks our resentment, we grow and can come to experience gratefully such greatness as we have been empowered to attain. There is of course the danger that our resentment will not be broken and that we will insist on our private rights. If such a position is maintained, we come to shape our lives in such a way that these challenges are either removed or are taken up by a technology that disburdens us of the task of being equal to them.

Henry noted here that there is an important difference between the crisis of illness and the challenges faced in the situation aboard ship. With the ship there was always something to tend; something that kept them occupied. The ritual of such tending to the ship lightened the burden of the overwhelming challenges they faced. Henry recollected one experience, however, that was similar to the crisis of illness. Their ship was anchored in a peaceful and supposedly safe harbor, when unexpectedly they were attacked by a suicide plane. They had no time to get underway and they had to just sit there as the plane came at them. Those who were manning the guns and firing at the plane were the lucky ones. However, those of the crew, like Henry, who could only watch and experience a strange sense of removal from the situation. As a result of this one man broke and attempted to jump overboard.

Albert noted that in the case of illness there is perhaps something that can be done. One can be *with* the person, and this is a kind of activity. Henry agreed and recalled the episode in Herzog's book *Annapurna* where Herzog is receiving excruciatingly painful injections in an attempt to restore his circulation after suffering severe frostbite. Herzog says that his climbing companion who held him during these injections was the only thing that made it possible for him to suffer the pain. (Henry also noted that Cavell's essays in *Must We Mean What We Say* on *King Lear* are relevant to what it means to be with another.)

Tom then brought up the question of whether there is a technological tendency today which tries to disburden us of the situations in which we can do nothing. And if there is, when and to what extent is such disburdenment legitimate. Henry noted that in the typhoon they would have been delighted to have had radar. However, the danger is that our reliance on technology will lock us into the attempt to always ward off things and that as a result we will become more and more dependent on such technologies that allow us to cope. In Jack London's *To Build a Fire*, it is only after the man realizes that he cannot build a fire and that he is surely going to die, that he is relieved of the mortality that makes him prisoner. Similarly, in so far as we come to always rely on technologies which allow us to overcome

the situation in which we are placed, we can never pass from interestedness to what might be the experiential heart of the notion of disinterested interest.

Albert remarked that in general the technological reaction to a challenge is to attempt to overcome it and hence not to respond to it as it presents itself to us. This reaction is, however, often appropriate, e.g., the application of technology in medicine. The real danger is in the tendency to universalize the technological approach and extend it to challenges which should not be taken up in this way. This is a radically new difficulty for human beings and calls for a profoundly different kind of courage if we are to face it. It is not the pretechnological courage that is required when we face adversity. Rather, the courage required of the technological person is the courage to be equal to one's experiences of simplicity.

The entry of Wednesday, September 16 speaks of such an experience of simplicity and intimates how it may center our lives. However, the experience of simplicity as it is embodied in the birds' song in this entry is endangered on all sides. The courage to be equal to such experiences must beware of at least two ever-present dangers. The first is that of ideology, whose promises are greater than those which can be made on behalf of simplicity, but which are ultimately empty. The appeal of ideology can make us forget that the highest authenticity we can attain to is that of being alive to the birds' song. Henry noted here that it is characteristic of liberal thought to be totally concerned with the ideal conditions pertinent to human fulfillment. This concern however leaves the world out of account and concentrates on persons in abstraction from the address and response situation. It, therefore, fails to see that a person does not originate this address. The fulfillment of the person as agent only comes about in response to things as they address us. The appeal of ideology can easily make us forget where, in fact, we already are and consequently also make us forget the question of how we might come to dwell there more fully. (Albert noted the relevance of the present situation at the university to what we were discussing. The claims of the schools of Business, Pharmacy and Forestry are taken as self-evidently justified: No one, however, addresses the issue of what happens when all of the forests are properly managed, all the pills correctly dispensed, etc. The claims of the Fine Arts would acquire greater force if one were to address this issue.)

The other danger to the courage of simplicity is the distraction which dissipates rather than overwhelms our courage. In the western world it is technology which preeminently provides this distraction. In addition to dissipating the courage of simplicity, this distraction can, also, veil the emptiness of ideological promises and make us more susceptible to them.

Beginning with the entry of Sunday, September 16, *The Inward Morning* is devoted to recollections of several of the shipmates on YMS 319. The entries first speak of the ship in general as one of hope and innocence, and then move to recollections of specific shipmates in their defining moments, where they act in accord with their character. The first of these shipmates is Chief Johnson who is given to us in two complementary defining moments. The first is when he is firing into a plane during an attack upon the ship. Although Johnson is no gunner (He is a bad shot and ruins the rifling of the gun by firing a whole drum of ammunition without a pause), he gathers everyone aboard into a great moment of accord and effort in his firing into the plane. (The parallel to John Schultz in "Rowing" was noted). This moment of engagement with the plane is disclosive of Johnson's "wholeheartedness," his being "where he was and not in the least degree anywhere else." (189) (It was noted that this episode is not meant to convey the impression that combat is the model of engagement. In fact, in this passage Henry concludes by saying that "At that moment I saw beyond the war." (189). The complementary recollection of Chief Johnson is that of him presiding at the long table in the galley without any airs whatsoever, his being just there.

And in this inconspicuous being just there, he is again a gathering presence as he was when he fired into the plane. Johnson focused the ship by the way in which he was peculiarly one with himself and with his world.

Henry remarked at this point that the YMS 319 was principally involved in seafaring and not in aggressive combat. Their primary duty was to remove navigational obstacles (mines) and to fend off attacks on vessels they were escorting. It was thus principally in the tending of the ship, in seafaring, that the crew came together. The ship was truly a “thing” for them in Heidegger’s sense. It focused and brought to a center the lives of the shipmates. It gathered a world.

The next sketch was of Chief Machinist Mate Hill, who tended the engines of the ship under unfavorable and trying conditions. He overcame these obstacles through his fidelity to his task and drew others into his concern for the continuous operation of the ship. His success in transferring his fidelity and concern to others was evidenced by the fact that he was able to move out of the setting without destroying it.

The entry then moves to consideration of Edwards and O’Leary. Both of these men exhibited a “steadfast, active intelligence,” but they were keyed in very different ways to their fellow shipmates. O’Leary was liked by all for his humor and openness, while Edwards could only express his capacity for joy and friendship thorough his work. Edwards is then recollected in the defining action of taking on fuel in high seas. It was Edwards’ task in such situations to hold the ship to course. On this particular occasion it seemed almost impossible for the ship to get close enough to take on fuel without smashing into the other ship or without parting the fuel lines. They, however, succeed in doing it through Edwards’ perfect attunement to the situation. Edwards did not withhold himself from the situation and try to overcome it through overpowering it. Nor did he just try to endure it. Neither of these would have been sufficient to hold a course in such a difficult sea. Rather, he opened himself to the situation and thus came to be both contained and sustained within it. He came to be in a perfectly responsive relationship with the occurrent which allowed him to steer the ship so that it came to “dance from sea to sea” (193).

We then returned to a consideration of O’Leary and Edwards with reference to how one could be fair to both in light of their differing personalities. Everyone on board ship was inclined to like O’Leary while most were indifferent to Edwards. How could one get underneath one’s prejudices and do justice to both men, while still allowing the variable of personality to come into play? That is, how could one respond appropriately to each of them? Henry noted that it has been his experience that as he comes to people on a level of candor, the strain of the relationship eases - even with those towards whom he is at least initially antipathetic. Albert suggested that in order to do justice to people you must meet them in their defining moments. If this is in fact the case then a procedural or formal conception of justice will always fail. (Henry noted that the New Testament never gives a definition of what a neighbor is, rather, it shows how a person could become your neighbor. Also, the parable of the workers in the vineyard in the New Testament was cited in reference to the question of a procedural definition of justice. It is offensive to those who come early, that those who come later in the day receive the same reward. Those who come early want a formula so that they will know in advance how much everyone will get. Similarly, in the Old Testament the constant temptation of the Israelites to become at ease in Zion is the temptation to construe adherence to the Mosaic Law as the sufficient condition for right action, i.e., the temptation to interpret the covenant as a contract.)

The entry of Monday, October 5 again addresses this problem of fairness with people. Should one attempt to get relations under control by being objective or by being subjective? In the objective

approach we withhold ourselves from the situation. We take the dual position of judge and participant. If we are objective with another, we extend such rights as we might claim, to the other. We treat the other abstractly, as an instance or case. Subjectivity, however, is just the mirror image of this. It is the submission of the self to the other. Neither way seems to be an authentic mode of being *with* another. They both leave out the possibility of the transfiguration of inclination that may obtain when we are truly with another.

The same theme was taken up in the entry of Tuesday, September 29 with reference to Utilitarianism and Pragmatism as examples of teleological ethics. Both philosophical positions see that which structures our ethical conduct as a goal extrinsic to action. But, if this is the case then obviously our relations with others must be guided by this goal. In so far as possible then we must get others under control so that we can achieve our end. When this happens we have reduced others to mere contingencies and we are no longer *with* them. (Henry noted that efforts at reform are always imperiled in this respect. They often degenerate into the attempt to control others so that one can attain the needed reform. The others come to be seen as merely obstacles to the realization of the end.)