Clow: Mr. Wolf, I would like to have you draw a point in your years of experience in (1) the area of timber policy, (2) the area of Native American use of timber, (3) how the Klamath tribe, their timber, government policy and termination movement of the 1950s got started, (4) the role the tribe played, (5) the role that Congress played, and (6) the role the timber companies played in the state of Oregon.

Wolf: I can give you my perceptions of the events. I was not originally intimately involved in the formulation and development of Indian policy. It happened that growing up, I lived next to the Onondaga Reservation in New York, which is a tribe that settled its reservation issues with a colony in New York, not with the federal government, so there was never any federal involvement; and I lived near the Salamancas in Southwestern New York, so I knew some Indians, and I had some feeling as to the Indian policy based upon peripheral knowledge growing up and living in central New York state.
I came West to work in Oregon as a forester in Eastern and Western Oregon, but not in Indian issues. I was on national forest and BLM lands, and I had some general knowledge of it, but I always recall my wife's enjoyment pointing out to Oregonians (who seemed to think that anybody who came from New York thought they were in the wild West where Indians might attack them) that there were more Indians in the state of New York than there were in the state of Oregon, and that she and I had lived next to two reservations, and she had lived next to three! [chuckle] So with that background I had some peripheral non-Indian understanding of Indians.

In 1955, I became involved with the Senate Interior Committee and the House Government Operations Committee in some joint hearings on federal timber sale policies. How I got involved in it was I was on the staff of the comptroller general, and his office had done a study of timber which was going to be the subject of an investigation by these two committees - investigative hearings. The comptroller general is an independent office of the government which reports to Congress and lends staff members to committees of Congress at their request to work on issues. That's why I was doing this. I was paid by the comptroller general, but working for the Congress.

The chief counsel for the Committee, and Senator Neuberger from Oregon, and other members were devising the way in which they were going to hold these hearings. Senator Neuberger, I had not known when I lived in Oregon. I knew of him but I hadn't known him, though my wife and his wife were acquainted because they were both in the League of Women Voters and that's how I got to know Dick Neuberger - through his wife. When Dick learned I was a forester and had worked in Oregon, he was quite interested. The issues that he wanted to go into that relate to this are the Klamath, the Warm Springs, and the Quinault Indians. Each
involved a different issue. The Klamaths were one of the tribes named for termination in the 83rd Congress, when that Congress (which was Republican-controlled) passed a policy directing the Secretary of Interior to terminate federal supervision over various tribes. The Warm Springs were not in that category. The Warm Springs had some other timber type problems, development problems, mill problems and so forth. The Quinaults had another set of problems because of the allotted nature of the reservation, and you know Dr. Alan McQuillan on the Montana Society and that long tortured history, so I don't need to discuss that. They're unrelated to termination.

Dick Neuberger was very much concerned that the termination policy was going to hurt the Klamaths who resided on the reservation, was going to hurt the Klamaths generally, and he knew there were Klamaths and Modocs who would receive some money depending upon the financial nature of what happened in termination. And it was going to hurt the State of Oregon. If the termination policy proceeded the way its architects perceived, the reservation would be sold off or parts of it would be allotted. In other words, an Indian would be able to take his proportion/share in land and timber or have it sold off, which would lead to fractionated ownerships and all kinds of problems. He was aware of the heirship dilemma, that some members of the tribe were 1/32 Klamath. Some were 1/16 Klamath and 1/16 Modoc. And we had this peculiar thing in our culture that if you're 1/32 Indian or 1/32 black, you're still black or Indian. The other 31/32 aren't counted [chuckle.]

The Klamath Reservation happened to be fortuitously situated because it contained some of the finest ponderosa pine stands in the United States. And unique among Indian-held reservations, it had been well managed. That was probably an accident because many other

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Indian timber holdings were badly managed. This one was well-managed, and so the forest was in good shape, able to produce revenues, perhaps not as much as some might want, but it was in good fiscal condition and seemed to be well run generally.

The Eisenhower administration supported the termination policy. The Democrats, when Dick Neuberger came to the Senate, had control of the Senate and the House. The Democrats opposed the termination policy, and Dick Neuberger stated, as one of his prime legislative goals, he would work toward reversing the policy of termination or mitigating it so that it didn't harm the Indians or the land. So that was the basis that we started on.

We had these hearings in 1955 on federal timber sale policy and one of the hearings was held in Klamath Falls. Neuberger was a good strategist and one of the things that's covered in here (and I'm looking at page 13 of the Committee Report) under the section "Special Indian Problems - Findings and Conclusions on the Klamath Reservation," and the joint committee finds the impact determination a federal responsibility under Public Law 587 of the 83rd Congress, "creates problems for both the Indians and the other people of the Klamath Basin that demand prompt affirmative action by the federal government." And it goes on then for a couple of pages to discuss what the situation is and that there's 745,000 acres of timber land in tribal ownership, and according to the testimony one of the management specialists appointed by the secretary, "If this bill is carried out as written, the last remaining pine timber, the finest stand remaining in the U.S. would practically be destroyed." And he goes on to describe why he feels that way, why the management specialist feels that way. And so this leads to the conclusion that

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the termination policy should be changed. As I have already told you, Dick Neuberger made up his mind pretty much to that to begin with, rightly or wrongly.

After those hearings in 1955, and the report was issued in early 1956, there were a couple of years of jockeying to try to devise an alternate solution. There were then additional special hearings held on termination, on changing of termination, held by the Interior Committee in Washington D.C., and in Oregon, and I participated in those hearings. Dick Neuberger had drafted a bill, which I'm sure you've seen, which would in effect convert the reservation to a national forest with the federal government buying it from the Indians at fair market value.

You were asking about attitudes. I recall one meeting that we had with Bureau of Indian Affairs officials. Dick Neuberger was in the meeting with Jim Gamble of the Committee staff (who unfortunately is now deceased, and so is Dick Neuberger), and myself, several people from BIA, and John Jones, who was then one of Dick Neuberger's administrative assistants. John had come out of the Army and gone to work for UNRA in Europe after World War II, and after the Indian Bureau people left, John turned to Dick and he said, "You know, Dick, this reminds me of my experience when I went to work for UNRA." Dick said, "What do you mean, John?" "Well," he said, "I concluded there were three classes of UNRA employees: the first one took the position that anything that could be done for the Jewish refugees should be done (that what Hitler had done was dastardly and terrible); the second class of UNRA employee was, 'Hitler should have killed them all,' and the third class of UNRA employee was, 'Thank God he didn't kill them all; they're my meal ticket and I'm not going to let go of them." And he said we had just met with the third class UNRA employee. As crude as it may sound, and bear in mind Senator Neuberger was
Jewish and John Jones was his administrative assistant, so this was being told in an anecdotal way to demonstrate that - and John Jones was a very sensitive person - that what he saw here was a conflict underneath. The Indian Bureau people were therefore opposed to termination, but they didn't have, in John's judgment, and in the judgment of many people, very effective policies for dealing with the dilemmas of their trust responsibility toward these people. Certainly there were external events that were also influencing this. I mention the Quinaults, and we had had some hearings involving the Quinault reservation. One involved a full colonel in the United States Army who was a Quinault Indian who was treated as an incompetent by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the sale of his timber on the reservation, and who thoroughly, and properly, resented it. And you can imagine what you would feel like if you were a fellow of this man's accomplishments when you went into the BIA and were treated as though you were a child by the person that you were dealing with. There was a lot of that type of friction. Dick Neuberger was aware of all this, you know.

The other thing was that we'd had these hearings on federal timber sale policy, which you might want to look at. The forest products industry, as a matter of policy, believed and argued that the reservation should be sold off at wholesale prices to the highest bidder. But since I say wholesale prices and highest bidder, I don't mean the highest price. This presented problems. We were talking about 750,000 acres. You get a heck of a discount on the value when you sell it in chunks. You also change the competitive structure. Now secretary of the Interior McKay, from Salem, Oregon, had these three management specialists that he had appointed under the termination act. Two were residents of Klamath Falls. None were Indian. One was a Cadillac...
dealer from Salem who had been Secretary McKay's campaign manager. The other two were from Klamath Falls; I can't remember all their names. Tom Waters was the one I remember most vividly from Klamath Falls who, in a meeting with Senator Neuberger, told them that Mr. Tudor, the then-undersecretary of Interior, had called him a communist and he expressed great indignation because he labeled himself as a black Republican who never thought he'd be in a room with a Democrat talking to him. [chuckle] And he wanted Dick Neuberger to know that he'd grown up in Klamath Falls, lived there all his life and was going to die in Klamath Falls, and as long as he lived there he was going to walk down the street with his head high, and this termination was a terrible disaster.

At any rate, it was a very interesting productive discussion that Dick told them that he would play it straight down the middle, politically, and what he wanted to do was to get a solution that was beneficial to all the parties, and he knew it wasn't going to be easy, and if the Department of Interior could be convinced to come up with an alternative bill, he'd look at it. But he wanted to be sure, it had to pass these tests - protect the Indians and the land. He said, "If it does that, you can count on me."

I should have dug out some stuff on the 1957 Congressional Record and I didn't, but the thing kind of churned along in '57. In '58 it started rolling. We had a meeting, Jim Gamble and I and Senator Neuberger met with Hatfield Chilson, the assistant secretary of the Interior, at which the Senator and the assistant secretary struck a deal on a bill as to the broad outlines of it - which would be federal purchase? But with an "ostensible" provision for sale to private parties, and that it would have in it a requirement that the land be managed under Forest Service control for...
sustained yield, which Senator Neuberger was convinced would cause the timber industry to avoid buying it. The federal government would then, after an appropriate period of theoretical effort to sell it, take title, paying the Indians an amount that would be determined by appraisers, stipulated in the act not to exceed so much. And that's the way we went at it.

From there on there was a series of hearings and rassling around, a lot of stuff on the surface. The two key tribal people were Boyd Jackson, as I recall, who was the titular leader of the tribe, and Wade Crawford. There was a suspicion that Wade Crawford had other interests beyond that of the welfare of his fellow Indians. I never tried to determine that; it was of no moment to me. But there was a feeling that Dick Neuberger had that Wade Crawford was getting ready to make himself rich at the expense of his fellow Indians. He led the fight for being able to sell off the reservation, get out from under the BIA, be free to do anything they wanted.

And so Crawford made a lot of noise, but his influence was small because of this innate suspicion about him. The guys in public office, if they think somebody is a crook, they won't tell him they think he's a crook, but they'll make sure. If they're an honest sort of person, that he doesn't have a chance to get his hands in the till. Crawford used to wonder why he got such warm receptions and such little results. [laughter]

At any rate, there was the situation of the one substantial group of the tribe that didn't live on the reservation, never had and didn't want to. They shared in the tribal receipts. There was another group that lived on the reservation, shared in tribal receipts, and also had some land, which had been allotted earlier. These were people who for one reason or another really didn't want to live there.
The general Indian view was one of dislike and distrust for the BIA. I don't want to leave the impression I consider that these people were childlike because I don't. But there is a stage in every child's life when they're around two and a half or three, they'll go running away from you. [They'll] get about 20 feet away from you and turn around and look at you to see if you're worried. If you're not, they'll run a little further until you worry. Then when you don't seem worried, they'll run right back. If you don't give a darn, they'll keep on going.

The Indians, generally speaking, would battle and cuss and flail the BIA until somebody said, "Well, now we're going to take it all the way." Because deep down inside they knew that they were getting, as lousy as they thought the services were, certain benefits, and a substantial number were uneasy about losing those benefits. But they're no different than anyone else in that regard. If you've got a tax break or any other thing, you know, you may spend half the morning cussing the state or federal government, but when they go to take something away from you, you're going to protest that it's unfair. So you had that sort of situation. As the hearing unfolded, one group wanted to get the BIA out of their hair and off their back and thought they were inefficient, incompetent and so forth, but they didn't want to give up certain benefits. That's how we worked around to the trustee arrangement whereby the First National Bank of Oregon, I recall, became the trustee, to operate the part of the reservation for those Indians who want to keep their land, and get the income from it on a regular basis.

In general, a significant number of the Indians were fairly conservative financially in the sense that they thought they would be better off with annual income than they would be with a lump sum. Contrary to the general non-Indian position that Indians are irresponsible, most of the
people that we saw, at least at the hearings, were pretty conservative solid financially; they didn't want to run high risks. So they looked at this trust arrangement as being a desirable thing. We provided for an election, so they could elect; they could get their money or they could go on the trust arrangement. So that gave them a free choice that they could make, and my recollection is that most of them took the trust arrangement.

The bill started to move through and the timber industry began a tremendous campaign in Oregon against the bill on the grounds that it wasn't going to permit the industry to buy the land at what they called a "fair" price. "Fair" has four letters, but in reality it had three: l.o.w. [chuckle] The industry declined to testify in various hearings, and they would send letters in complaining that they hadn't been heard and also complaining about what Dick Neuberger was doing to them.

Clow: What companies were involved?

Wolf: This was done through the National Lumber Manufacturers Association. They did it through their association, not through the specific companies. I never took the time or energy to find out who promoted this. There is some stuff in the Congressional Record with names of people on it, the people who were doing this, but Dick Neuberger's technique was to say they were "fronting" for others. He was a good strategist, you know. He wasn't going to attack them personally. They ought to be ashamed of themselves, letting themselves be used this way - that makes it awfully hard for them to maintain their posture on it. And he had the solid editorial
support of newspapers in Oregon, papers that had not supported him when he ran for office -
didn't support him on anything else - supported him on his Klamath legislation. Bob Chandler
and Bend, the people on the "Oregonian," "Roseburg News Review," et cetera, Klamath Falls
papers [supported him.]

Looking back on it and getting ready for this history, [I see] he did a remarkable, virtually
one-man orchestrated job of shifting the policy and getting done what, in the long run, in the end,
what he wanted to get done the way he wanted to get it done. And I think avoiding a lot of
catastrophe that would have occurred if termination had played itself out the way the Public Law
587 of the 83rd Congress would have had it go.

At any rate, the bill that we reported in the Senate (I say "we" because I was working as a
staff person on that) had a sustained yield provision in it. The bill that was reported in the House
did not. The timber industry prevailed with the House members. We went to conference on the
different bills and Senator Neuberger and Senator Anderson (a Democrat from New Mexico)
were going to chair the conference. Jim Gamble and I sat down to talk before the conference
about what they expected to achieve, and Senator Watkins, Arthur Watkins, a Republican from
Utah, was very supportive and sympathetic to Neuberger's position on this. Andersen said there
was just no way that we could give in to the House on this sustained yield thing. We talked
about the 1944 Sustained Yield Act that the Forest Service had, that there was language in the
law that used the term "sustained yield" and the House position was predicated on the fact that it
wasn't law. And it wasn't in one sense and it was in another. At any rate, Andersen said, "I think
that that's the weakness of the House position." He said, "I was the secretary of Agriculture,"

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"and I remember making a speech in Bend about sustained yield. Why don't we do this?" He said, "Bob, you bring the statute books over to the conference and I'll recall my experience as secretary, and then I'll ask you to dig out the law and ask if I've lost my memory, and I want you to struggle for two to three minutes to find the law and then you give it to me."

And so [when] we get in the conference; that's the last thing that's to be discussed. The House position is adamant. Andersen goes into this act, and he was a superb tactician himself, and actor. "I remember when I was a secretary of Agriculture, a law dealing with sustained yield. In fact, I remember making a speech in Bend, Oregon, I think in 1946." He turns to Neuberger. "There's a lot of timber ... oh yes, it was Bend where I did that. I talked about this law. It had been passed. This was something McNary passed, who was the guy who helped get this enacted." McNary was a ranking Republican out of Oregon, served for years in the Senate, was a highly regarded guy and helped write a lot of forest legislation. And then he turns to me and says, "Young man, you're a forester, aren't you," as though he'd never seen me before. "Yes."

"Am I losing my mind? Isn't there a law dealing with sustained yield?" I said, "I think so."

"You think so?" he said. "Look in that statute book. I know there's one." Then he turns back to the House members and talks about it across the table. Then he turns back to me and starts giving me hell again. Well, I'm fumbling, you know. "What do we pay you for?" [Wolf chuckles] He turns away. "Why do we have this fellow here if he doesn't even know the answer to a simple question?"

Finally, when they've just about got me beat to death, I give the statute book to Clinton Anderson, and I say, "Senator, was this what you were looking for?" "Ah, yes." And he turns and
gives me hell again! [laughter] He turns to the House members and says, "See, there's the law. The Sustained Yield ... Act of 1944."

[Start side 2]

... presented that to the House members and they agreed. That folded the conference because there was agreement on everything. And the Senate bills substantially prevailed, particularly on that key element.

Just on a personal note, after the conference, as I recall, Clair Eagle offered me a job in the House Interior Committee, saying that nobody should have to be abused the way I had been by Clint Anderson, and I told him it was really all right. [laughter]

But when we came out of the conference, Alf Nelson was there from the National Lumber Manufacturers Association. In those days conferences on bills and markups on bills were held in private session with no member of the public present. Nelson asked me what happened in the conference. It was over and therefore you could say what happened, and he could have asked one of the senators but he asked me, and I said, "The House agreed to the Senate version. He said, "In toto?" "Oh, yes," I said. "Absolutely." "And," he said, "you did it." I said, "Alf, (I knew the guy) I don't know whether I did it. You're giving me more credit than I deserve. Senator Andersen was very persuasive, and he had his facts." And so that was the way it went. You read the conference report. But the timber industry was very, very distraught about that from the standpoint of the national organization, because they'd put a lot of effort into defeating this.
Earl Wilcox, a forester was the key guy in the BIA who then had gone to work for the management specialists in developing the substitute situation and paving the way, if there was going to be management on part of the reservation - not that he would be the manager - but paving the way for effective management by those people who wished to stay in the trust arrangement, as well as for handling any sales that would occur, if they did occur. So Earl wound up, as I recall, being the trust manager, being employed by the bank, in the management of the lands for several years. I did not follow all the events on after that, but several years later the balance of the trust came over to the Winema National Forest, because those Indian owners decided that they wanted to terminate the trust arrangement, take their money and do something else with it.

Clow: Why was there that change with the tribes?

Wolf: I don't know. You see, by then I was doing other things. I was never involved in it. Either the BIA records or the bank records or Wilcox (who may still be alive), someone like that would have to tell you, because I did not follow it. I know it happened. The only other thing I can relate to you about the Klamath thing as we developed it, was when we held the hearings, for reasons that I could not understand and nobody else did, Wayne Morse came in and testified. There'd been an agreement on what the top amount would be that the Indians should be paid, and Wayne Morse came in and suggested it should be higher. Dick Neuberger got just mad as heck at me. I had briefed Morse on what was going on. He said to me, "Bob, how did you let Wayne
Morse do this?" Those were virtually his exact words. And I looked at him and (anybody who
knew Wayne Morse knew nobody could control him, not even God), I said, "I couldn't do
anything with Wayne Morse, Senator."

But he was visibly mad at me. It was a Thursday or so, as I recall. I was building a boat
at the time at home, and I was down in my garage where I was building this thing, working away,
when my wife told me there was a phone call for me. I was right in the midst of something and I
can still remember this because I went in and I picked up the phone and gruffly said, "Hello."
This voice on the other end said very nicely, "Bob, this is Dick Neuberger. I just called to
apologize for being abrupt the other day. I should have realized that nobody can control Wayne
Morse." And I always thought it was very nice of him to acknowledge that he had lost his temper
a little bit with me.

But it is true, nobody could control Wayne Morse. He would do some very odd things -
not maliciously; I don't know how these things would happen. But it was very disturbing at the
time to Neuberger because it tended to feed Wade Crawford's position that they should get more
money. What we'd had at that point, you see, rightly or wrongly, was an agreement with Interior,
an agreement with the management people, and an agreement with Boyd Jackson, that, as I
recall, $96 million represented an adequate price, a more than adequate price for the reservation.
Morse seemed to be upsetting that. It didn't change the outcome. The BIA went out of the
picture then.

You asked about the state. The governor was Bob Holmes. They didn't exert too much
influence one way or the other on the outcome. Holmes was a Democrat. He supported
Neuberger's general position. The question of social services, likely state burdens and so forth, was not a matter that got a great deal of concern. I don't think the state looked that far down the road as to whether this was going to add to their burdens. And I think the general feeling was that the route that was being taken would help the members of the tribe toward economic self-sufficiency. We were avoiding the kind of thing that there was concern about, that suddenly there'd be a big payout of money, which would be squandered, and then families would be in difficulty. The chances were very strong that these people would continue to get a reasonable annual income. There was certainly no view that the annual income from the pro rata distribution was sufficient to support someone without working. But most of the people were able-bodied and willing to work, et cetera, and could work, even though there was somewhat higher than average unemployment among the Klamaths. Their condition was not as difficult as that of some other tribes. And as I recall, the incidence of alcoholism among the Klamaths was reasonably low, more in line with the national norms than may be true on some other reservations. The Klamaths were not a people beset by the severe problems of rural poverty that affected other tribes who had gotten such a lousy deal in land where there was no income from it. [and] they were scraping along on a low-level livestock existence or something, where they got livestock loans and then they lost the cows. So I think that was the general view.

I did not get all that tightly involved in the Indian aspects of it. Jim Gamble handled that. That's not to say I didn't pick up some of it. My main role was in terms of the timber aspects, and that was where the external fireworks were, with the timber industry.
Clow: Do you recall what the per capita shares generally were for those Klamaths who selected to take the annual income from the forest that they put into trust management [rather than just share the] annual income? It wasn't enough to live completely on, was it?

Wolf: I'm sure there's some stuff in the hearings and I didn't look it up. But there were the projections, and the projections were often guesses, and the price of timber and so forth would have affected it. But I don't recall exactly. The thing I do recall was that they weren't going to be able to sit home and clip their coupons as it were. This wasn't going to make a bunch of John D. Rockefellers out of the Klamaths; it was going to supplemental income. And [for] those who owned land on the reservations already, in allotments (some of them had active, going, well-managed farms and ranch operations), this was a supplemental income situation, not the principle income of these people. In fact, if there was any defect to Indian policy, it was the theory that the receipts from a reservation that was selected without any planning as to quality of land or resources, the quantity alone would automatically create financial self-sufficiency for a changing population.

One of the other big battles at this time was who was an enrolled member. You had to have a certain amount of certified Indian lineage, and so that was another battle that was fought.

Clow: Where was Wade Crawford in the enrollment battle? Was he affected by it, do you remember? Was he of mixed blood?
Wolf: These guys were fully enrolled; there was no question as to their membership. As I recall, the BIA had to, in effect, make a sort of a broadcast search to see if there were any people who were as little as 1/32 Klamath, who were eligible to participate. It was kind of like searching for the heirs of a family whose members had long since scattered. And I think one of the more troublesome aspects of Indian policy is this fractionation-heirship problem, which we never had really carefully addressed. As people married and diluted their lineage, at what point do you cease being a member of that tribe in reality? What you find is that people are 1/16 or 1/32 Indian and didn't look like they were Indian - weren't Indian to anyone except the Bureau of Indian Affairs, from whom they got something, sort of like the not-so-old Negro "passing." These people didn't give a damn about being Indian except on certain days. That didn't mean they weren't proud of their Indian heritage, but they just simply were not [Indians.] They were 31/32 something else.

Clow: You mentioned the per capita claims as supplemental income. Once the legislation was passed and termination began, did the Klamaths who didn't have their own farms and ranches get employment in the timber industry? What kind of work did the Klamaths find?

Wolf: Well, it didn't change their employment status, really, because the tribal land retained its unit status. The BIA had been selling timber. When it went over to the Winema National Forest, that continued. There were some Indian preference provisions in the Indian timber contracts where a buyer of Indian timber had to agree to hire Indian labor. I'd have to look in the

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act to see if we continued that. Chances are, we did. But, you know, that again has always been a subject of discussion. It's sort of like whether if you're a policeman in the city of Missoula, you have to live in Missoula. So this was an issue. If you're getting Indian timber, do you have to hire Indians? That's long been a tribal type position. The tribal members who like the idea to keep their lands in a trust status were the ones who had long been a part of the tribal governance and there are always some people who like to participate in these things. But it certainly changed the whole framework, because this was a major tribal reservation. To me the thing that was always surprising was what good shape the timber was in, considering the modest timber budgets that that reservation had.

Clow: Tribal land? Federal budgets going into timber? Do you want to comment on timber management?

Wolf: Yeah, I thought that we'd done some looking at the reservation. I had - not an intensive scientific study - but the cutting patterns and the regeneration looked like the property had been kept in reasonably good shape. It was capable of growing a fair amount of timber in a profitable way. That doesn't mean that the Indians were going to become millionaires from it, but the sustained yield policy, as distinct from a cutout policy, retained the capacity to produce revenue annually. The regeneration, much of which had been natural, which came from the selection cutting, had been generally pretty good, so the Klamath Reservation seemed to be well-managed. That was a plus.
Clow: Did they have their own sawmill?

Wolf: No. No, they didn't. The Warm Springs did. But the Klamaths didn't. They sold their timber to local firms. Weyerhaeuser bought a lot of their timber. I don't know whether the Weyerhaeuser records would indicate whether Weyerhaeuser was a prime sponsor of the "sell-it-off" approach. But as I recall, Weyerhaeuser testified at the hearing that they were not. I am inclined to think that what we really were seeing in this was a philosophical privatizing point of view coming out of the national office of the National Lumber Manufacturers' Association, more than the engineering of a specific individual who deep down inside felt that he could get his hands on some of that reservation at a low price. I'm not saying there weren't some people like that, but I think if I were to tag anyone with being the likely realtor, it would be Wade Crawford. Wade may or may not have had discussions with possible buyers.

Clow: Primarily smaller companies?

Wolf: I don't know whether it would be small or large, but (this may be unfair to Wade Crawford) they were more likely to be people like the current version of Albert Hakim. You better write down who Hakim was for future generations.
Clow: How many people, percentage-wise, of the Klamath, supported Wade Crawford's position?

Wolf: A minority.

Clow: A substantial minority?

Wolf: Not a substantial one. The tribal leadership, the official tribal leadership, seemed to have the respect of the people living on the reservation. The people who lived off the reservation, many of them lived in other states, really took no strong interest in this one way or another. They were sort of like somebody who heard that they might have a rich uncle who might not be rich, but he was ill. And if he died, somebody would read the will and there might be something in it. But they weren't going to worry about it because they hadn't heard much from the uncle anyway.

Clow: How much do you think Wade Crawford influenced Congress and the Senators with his strong position?

Wolf: He had a very, very substantial influence to make sure that he had none. Crawford had the ability to wear out his welcome quickly. In the Senate he got nowhere.

Clow: How different was Crawford's position from the other tribal leaders?
Wolf: Substantial. He wanted to sell it off, maximize the short-term return. Jackson and the others had never liked termination, weren't all that enthused about selling off the reservation. [They] thought that moving it over into a national forest, since they were going to get money they could put in the bank, was a good thing because it would keep the land pretty much the way they had seen it over their lifetime. They did not want to see that cut off. I wouldn't call them ecologists or environmentalists, but they sort of had some sentiment, you know, they'd lived there their lifetime. Some of them liked to hunt and fish, but all Indians don't like to hunt and fish; that isn't universal among Indians, just like all black people don't like to dance. What I'm saying is there was an environment that they lived in that had kept them there, that they found themselves comfortable in. Even if that was not the home ground of that tribe 100 years earlier, it was where they had lived and grown up, and so it was their home.

Just like you. If you were born in Missoula and raised in Missoula, it doesn't matter that your folks came from Atlanta, Georgia. Missoula's your home. So they viewed that as their home, and they liked the setting that they lived in. They were not required to stay there. A majority of the tribe had left, really, when you count up the total number.

Clow: Do you think the Klamath legislation as it finally became law was supported by most of the Klamaths?

Wolf: Yes.
Clow: Why is that?

Wolf: It gave them a choice between going into the trust and holding a proportion of the land or taking money through the sale of the reservation. And it kept the reservation intact as a visual thing. But again, you have to differentiate, I don't know what the Klamaths felt like that lived in Los Angeles or Chicago compared to those who lived in Klamath County, but I suspect that the ones who lived outside the environment looked at it like an uncle who's about to die and maybe I'll get something and maybe I won't. Just see what happens. Because, you see, they had really severed their emotional tie with that land. Many of them were gone, had been gone 10, 15, 20 years.

Clow: Do you think the Klamaths supported this program for one other reason and that it was a way to break the paternalistic tie with the BIA while still maintaining the trust of the forest and gaining the revenue, but now you eliminate that intermediary?

Wolf: I would suspect some of them felt that way, that that got them out of that relationship, but they also didn't want to get themselves totally out of it. Again, you've got shades of ambivalence, depending on who you would talk to and how close they were physically to living on the reservation. From my standpoint, when I use the word "Indian" I immediately want to qualify it. Because you're not dealing with a person in an Indian headdress living in a tepee on a
reservation. You're dealing with a whole wide range of people, none of whom live in tepees with headdresses and can be scattered everywhere from Portland, Maine, to Portland, Oregon, as well as living on the specific reservation, that was assigned to their tribe as a result of our Indian policies of the past. So you've almost got to break these people down into various groups.

Clow: How would you evaluate Klamath termination, [the] ... strengths and weaknesses, negative and positive? What was the good and bad about it?

Wolf: Overall, I think it was good. As I look at the alternatives that we could have tried, I can't think of a better one. The legislature provided these alternatives to the members of the tribe. It prevented the destruction of the resources, certainly well before the ecological era. But it provided that the land would continue to have conservative management and, even though national forest management might not be perfect, it's good land management.

Clow: The Klamath forest.

Wolf: Yes. On the Winema National Forest. And part of it became a wildlife refuge too, so overall, I think it came out well. But again, I can't envision an alternative approach that would have been measurably better. I may have some biases. If I were a person who believed in absolute privatization, the government getting out of business, I might [say] they should have sold the whole thing off as a block. But I think we maximized the Indians' financial situation,
gave those tribal members the greatest chance for the transition to be financially supportive than we would have under another alternative. Indian policy, as you know, has not been the most enlightened. I think James Watt has described it as "failed socialism." It has failed in many respects, I think, unfortunately. It's hard to account for why we have been so relatively unsuccessful in integrating the Indian, and at the same time, there's people who say, "Hell, why should we want to integrate him or why should the Indian want to be integrated?" Working in a lot of Indian issues, you see a lot of Indians rediscovering they're Indians who probably didn't have the foggiest notion. They're like me, my mother was Swedish and every now and then I pretend I'm Swedish.

Clow: So do I. I go to Midsummer's Eve Festival.

Wolf: And my wife is partly Irish from the 1840s, and my God, now she thinks she just got off the boat. But what I'm describing are what I consider some of the idiosyncrasies of a nation of immigrants, and Indians aren't the immigrants. But this is the flow from that background, and the idiosyncrasies of Indian policy certainly affected them. I was in New Zealand; you see this with Maori rights. It's just amazing, you talk to New Zealanders and it's like talking to a lot of people who have lived next to Indian reservations ... the Maoris are indolent; they're drunks. How do you know that?

[End Tape]