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### China and Her Problems, Military and-Political

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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Feb 13 1945

## THE LEDO-BURMA ROAD

### A. Background.

By mid-year of 1942 the area occupied by the Japanese had been extended to include all Burma. As the Japanese swept up from the south, English, Burmese, Kachins, Anglo-Indians, and a defeated army of British, Chinese, and a few Americans escaped as best they could into neighboring India. The Burma Road was closed, and with it the last supply route to the beleaguered Chinese.

The situation was critical. In Egypt the Germans were pounding at the gates of Alexandria, apparently preparing to strike to the east. Toward Burma, the formidable barrier of the uncivilized frontier beginning with the Patkai mountains proved itself a sturdy bulwark, for at that moment it was all that stood between the Japanese and India.

In 1943, all eyes turned to the Orient. The Chinese were barely able to carry on, and only the trickle of supplies which crossed the Hump by plane kept their heads above water. It was evident that the dominant mission in the Far East at that point was the reopening of a supply line to the Chinese.

The map of India took on new importance. An inadequate railroad wandered lazily up the Bramaputra Valley to the furthest outpost of civilization in the northeast corner of Assam. Designed to service only the normal peacetime needs of the tea plantations in this part of India, the railroad terminated at Ledo, an insignificant native village surrounded by jungle-covered hills. This same village had been the end of the trail for those refugees from northern Burma who fled ahead of the Japs in 1942. From Ledo, so named by the Italians who first opened the coal mines in the adjacent hills, began to unwind the road which was to make famous the name of the obscure Indian village.

Beyond the railroad lay the unbroken barrier of the Patkai mountain range stretching out like a giant finger from the Himalayas. It forms both natural barrier to communication between Assam and Burma, and at the same time a boundary between these two countries which nevertheless has remained too wild to be clearly defined or explored. Running East and West across northern Burma, these mountains blanketed by a 200 foot deep impenetrable jungle served as home only to the uncivilized tribes of Naga head-hunters who are native to this portion of the world. From May through September, the warm monsoon winds which sweep north over the planes of Burma, deposit the terrifically heavy rainfall over the entire area through which a road was to be built by the United States Army Engineers.

The whole region in which operations were planned had the unsavory reputation of being the unhealthiest portion of the world. Veterans of the Philippines, Central America, and the South Pacific damned this country from Assam to the Hukawng as the worst jungle of them all. The Bengal Tiger, King Cobra, and blood-sucking leeches which infested it were far less dangerous than the unseen germs from which no part of this land was free and no man immune.

Staid Britishers dismissed the plan of a road as an impossibility. Professional soldiers had shaken their heads and said "no military vehicle will cross those mountains on its own power", and scoffed at the thought of trucks and tanks ever moving beyond the Ledo railhead. But during the final weeks of 1942 and the early part of 1943, plans for the project went on and the initial effort was begun.

The undertaking has no parallel in military history. It is a combination of building a major modern highway through virgin jungle-covered mountains and valleys, and at the same time having to fight a first rate, well-equipped enemy for the ground over which the road is to run. It departs from the usual strategic concepts in that the CONSTRUCTION phase (Services of Supply) is the primary objective; the FIGHTING (Combat) is secondary, to brush the enemy aside from the road route. Although by comparison with other theaters the number of men involved is not large, the whole enterprise, in manpower, materials, and objective, is on an unprecedented scale. Furthermore, the defending Jap was capable of being the superior force. The situation has not been simplified by the fact that, in the scheme of global warfare, this theater is both at the end of the longest line of communication in the world and not the highest on priorities.

The road is an ever-lengthening dragon with an insatiable appetite. Its mouth is at Ledo and its extending tail pushes through the hills and down into Burma. A triad of effort sustains it: (1) ENGINEER: to develop the base from which the dragon feeds and to see that the tail grows steadily in the right direction; (2) SUPPLY SERVICE: to feed the hungry animal rations and material; (3) MEDICAL: to conserve the effective manpower doing the job. On this same organization for CONSTRUCTION is superimposed the heavy burden of supplying and hospitalizing combat troops.

Inevitably, no one of these three essential services is able to secure all the personnel, equipment, supplies, or housing it considers necessary for the accomplishment of its mission. It has been a kaleidoscopic scene of mud, insufficient and over-taxed equipment, rain, malaria, disappointment, heat, language difficulties, jungle fighting, landslides, and homesickness. The work has gone forward by dint of a prodigious expenditure of sustained physical and emotional energy on the part of all concerned.

The mission is best viewed in its four main phases, during each of which the activities of the three essential services had to be readjusted to meet the changing needs. First, came the 100 mile drive through the Patkai mountains into the Hukawng Valley, climaxed by the break-through to Shingbwiayang of the lead dozer on the 27th of December, 1943; second, the Valley Campaign which ended with the dry season; third, Myitkyina; and finally, "mopping up" and the junction of the Ledo and Burma Roads.

#### B. First Phase: "The Road to Shingbwiayang"

During the exodus from Burma in the face of Jap aggression, 30,000 refugees started up this narrow trail into India. Thousands died - of fever, hunger, exposure, exhaustion. Bit by bit, personal belongings were abandoned. Reliable observers estimated 20,000 persons perished on this 110 mile trail. Months later, as engineers pushed the road through the jungle, their skeletons seemed almost to pave the trail in places.

In its first 100 miles the Road covers seven summits of the Patkai Range. From the peak at Pangsau Pass, four countries can be seen: China, Tibet, Burma, and India. From Hell's Gate to Pangsau Pass, a distance of seven miles, the climb is straight up, with 220 hairpin curves in this stretch.

In contrast with the Ledo Road, the Burma Road is a narrow trace with a high crown of hand-layed rock. No rock of any structural value is available anywhere along the route of the Ledo Road. As a result the road is graveled, the material being secured from rivers along the way. Minimum shoulder-to-shoulder width of the road in the mountains is 33 feet, while in the valleys it is a minimum of 49 feet. Although the Ledo Road was built with temporary bridges for combat expediency, its standards are those of a freight highway

designed to carry more than 60,000 tons per month (an average of 8500 vehicles pass one Military Police post in a 24-hour period). It is a safe two-way road with a maximum of 10% grade. All temporary bridges have been replaced with modern steel structures, the latest design in military stream-crossing equipment being installed. Because of the tremendous rainfall along the route, prodigious culvert installations are required. For every mile of road, 10,000 feet of culvert have been installed.

The Ledo Road was first covered by advance survey parties that determined the best routes. Next the lead bulldozer blazed a path through the jungle. This was followed by clearing crews, who blasted the trees with tons of dynamite and pushed the debris aside. Next, leveling and grading was performed, culverts, drains, and ditches dug. Finally the road was metalled with gravel, hauled from gravel points at rivers, sometimes many miles from the spot being covered. Lastly, the gravel was spread over the highway surface. Through the mountainous sections the road was built almost entirely with bulldozers. In the valleys, these same tractors were used to pull scrapers.

Work was begun in December of 1942 and continued through the winter in the hands of three battalions of colored American Engineers, together with a small number of other troops, but initial progress was slow. During the following March heavy rains began and work on the road was seriously impeded. Little advance was made because work crews were forced to concentrate on maintaining that portion of road already cut and to keep it open to traffic.

During the remainder of the 1943 monsoon season, all forward progress on the road was halted and the men battled against nature to hold the narrow ribbon of roadway. They widened the trace, installed culvert, graveled the road bed. The incessant rains continued. Dozers were lost over banks. Men were soaking wet all the time; not even their beds were dry. Equipment was buried by slides. By September, the toughest road job in the world had come to a standstill only 42 miles from the starting point, and all concerned were thoroughly discouraged. It was evident that new leadership was needed if the road was to go through.

In October 1943 Brigadier General Lewis A. Pick took over the job of building the Ledo Road and supplying General Stilwell's combat forces. He analyzed the situation, reorganized his forces, and promised Stilwell that the road to Shingbwiyang would be open for traffic on New Years Day. On December 27 the primary objective of the Ledo Road was completed; the building of a road into Burma over which General Joseph W. Stilwell could bring men and equipment and supplies in his return march against the Japs. The road reached the village of Shingbwiyang four days ahead of the scheduled deadline. This cut through the matted, malarious, jungle-covered mountains was outstanding in all the brilliant achievements by the Corps of Engineers.

The Patkai mountains are one of the foot-hill chains of the Himalayas. Peaks in the immediate vicinity of the road reach an elevation of about 6000 feet; the highest point on the road itself is about 4500 feet. The soil is clay with an insecure shale foundation; vegetation is a dense tangle of tropical hardwood, bamboo, and ferns. The valleys are steep and narrow, and the streams become torrents when rain falls in their water sheds. Population is thin, and the small villages cling to the tops of the hills. All native trails climb the slopes at steep grades and follow high saddles across the ridges. After two weeks on foot in this territory, an engineer Colonel, who had spent much of the last twenty years in Alaska, termed this the roughest country he had ever seen.

The First Phase comprised the extending of the road through the mountains until it entered the Hukawng Valley of Northern Burma at Shingbwi-yang (mile 102). It was entirely construction. Combat was limited to minor patrol activity. During this phase, construction, supply, and evacuation were complicated by the fact that everything had to move over a single gravel road building through the mountains. By-passes were precluded. Mud, broken bridges, and landslides were chronic. The use of native porters, utilization of short cut trails for foot traffic, and air-dropping were purely supplementary.

Late in December 1943, Americans and Chinese were pouring into Shingbwi-yang over the break-through trail, an air strip was in operation, and a hospital unit was receiving Chinese casualties. The lead bulldozer had plunged down Kabkye Hill and reached the valley on the 27th of December. The first leg of the race to China had been covered.

#### C. Second Phase: "The Valley Campaign"

On December 31, two bulldozers started cutting a new road south of Shingbwi-yang through the Hukawng Valley to the Tanai River (Upper Chindwin). Because this was definitely a combat zone, guards from both the Chinese and American armies were out in front and on both flanks of the engineers. At Taihpa Ga, a company of American engineers constructed an airfield while being subjected to Jap artillery and sniper fire. The men worked on armor-plated equipment, took to slit trenches during a barrage, then went back to work. A number of men were wounded, but the field was completed in record time.

By February 1944 the lead bulldozer had advanced to Mile 134.5. At the end of May, the lead bulldozer was at Mile 190.5 (Warazup) where progress was halted by enemy action. Air fields at Shingbwi-yang, Tingkaw Sakan, and Warazup were completed or under construction when the rains started. The end of May brought the monsoon in full strength. The rains, though later, were heavier than in 1943. In one two-day period at Tagap a rainfall of over 15 inches was recorded. At Shingbwi-yang, total rainfall for the season was over the 150-inch mark.

Slides, washouts, cave-ins, and waist-deep mud in many places were encountered. All new road construction was halted and once more the engineer troops turned to maintenance work to hold the road against encroachments of the monsoon. There were black days, one after another. Six major bridges were swept away by flash floods during one 24-hour period. But never was the road blocked more than 96 hours, and great convoys of trucks rolled over the road into Burma all during the five-month-long rainy season.

The Japanese had to be pushed back to make way for the road. Tactically this required clearing the valley by a series of frontal pressures and flanking movements. There were several difficult river crossings. The Combat Command was comprised of two American-trained Chinese divisions. In later weeks Merrill's famous "Marauders" moved down the line. The Japs refused to withdraw and had to be pushed back by the sheer viciousness of repeated battles - Yupbang, Taihpa Ga, Maingkwan, Malabum, Shadzup.

Once in the flat lands, the road construction problems changed in character in three respects: (1) the old refugee trail ran across the valley through the principal villages. This was developed into a two-track combat road. Along it occurred the main action. It was the main supply line. (2) The Ledo Road followed a different route along higher ground in an arc to the east and rejoined the old trail at the lower end of the valley. This eliminated the necessity of this section carrying freight until it was ready for traffic. It also permitted the use of by-passes, and basic work proceeded

at several points simultaneously. The dense jungle growth resembled that of the hills, but the construction problem changed from sidehill cutting to raising the roadbed over marshy areas. (3) Flat land facilitated the building of air fields at vital locations. These were extensively utilized for movement of supplies and personnel, and as bases for fighters and bombers so that our air superiority could be maintained.

In April and May, the Chinese were fighting their way down out of the Hukawng and into the Mogaung Valleys, meeting increasingly stiff opposition. At the same time, a combat team of Americans and Chinese crossed eastward into the Irrawaddy Valley, and secretly moved toward the air field at Myitkyina.

The dry season was virtually over; the road was graveled to about mile 151; a final fifteen mile link to the advance sub-depot at Tingkaw was incomplete. Access by ground to the latter town was over the old Combat Road, which joins the new road trace at this point, and which was becoming increasingly difficult to navigate due to rain. Construction of a pipeline had kept pace with the road and by now it was supplying fuel to Tingkaw. An improved gravel road ran twenty miles south to Warazup (mile 185), where a new air strip was under construction. Fighting on the Kamaing front was only a few miles below, and the supply road was built right into the artillery emplacements.

#### D. Third Phase: "Myitkyina"

The beginning of the monsoon could reasonably be supposed to preface a general let-down in the intensity of the Allied advance; a period of quiet waiting and relaxation could be expected. Academically, it was impossible to supply the 50,000 troops so far forward of the railhead under such conditions. So reasoned the Japanese.

But Uncle Joe Stilwell turned to Brigadier General Lewis A. Pick, white-haired boss of Pick's Pike, whose problem also it was to keep the combat troops supplied. Can continued operations in the valley be supported PLUS a surprise attack in force on Myitkyina - during the monsoon? It was a bold stroke and on General Pick's answer hinged the decision. He loaned Uncle Joe two of his Combat Engineer Battalions to assist in the attack and committed himself to support the operation.

The air field at Myitkyina was seized at the end of May. Surrounded by Jap territory, the Americans and Chinese clung desperately to their position; they depended entirely on air supply and air evacuation. June brought with it everywhere rainfall well above the average. The fighting continued vicious and without quarter, but by the third of August the town had fallen and the area was "mopped up". The advance was months ahead of schedule.

Meantime another force of Chinese, British, and some Americans pushed down the valley from Warazup through Kamaing and Mogaung to Sahmaw. This push was supported in part along a badly flooded road and by barge down the Mogaung River, but mainly by air. Eventually this force established contact with the Myitkyina troops, and the situation at the end of summer was well in hand.

Throughout the monsoon, the engineers were fighting to hold their own. The finished road stood up. Supply depots and medical installations were developed near the air fields at Shingbuiyang, Tingkaw, Warazup, and Myitkyina. In spite of all the hardships, in spite of the rains, the campaign had been pushed and won.

#### E. Fourth Phase: "Road Junction"

With the coming of dry weather in October 1944, the ground forces again came into their own. The old road running through Kamaing and Mogaung to Myitkyina was rehabilitated and was carrying convoys in November. The new road trace is being pushed forward with incredible speed. Myitkyina is a great forward base with airfields, warehouses, and hospitals. With this support, combat has pushed down toward Matha, Bhamo, and beyond. Japanese forces have been almost completely routed.

#### THE PIPELINE

Integral in the project to supply China is the Pipeline. It was designed as a continuous system starting with a tanker unloading terminal at Calcutta; following the Brahmaputra Valley through Bengal and Assam; across the Patkai Range into northern Burma; on into China with the eastern terminus at Kunming in Yunnan Province. The line parallels the Ledo Road from Assam to its junction with the Burma Road, then it will follow the latter into Kunming.

As the line progressed, completed portions furnished gasoline and high speed diesel fuel to the fighting and construction forces driving south. Later it was a vital factor in supplying aviation gasoline to the numerous newly constructed airfields along its route.

The line was divided into two sections: one section was a 6" line from Calcutta to Tinsukia, in northern Assam, approximately 750 miles, where it emptied into a large storage terminal. The other section consisted of two 4" lines starting at Tinsukia and ending at Kunming, China, approximately 1000 miles.

In the early Fall of 1943 materials for the 4" lines began to arrive in the Ledo area, and in October General Pick gave the signal to begin construction. There were no trained pipeline personnel available, so Engineer General Service troops were pressed into service. Work started at Dighoi, Assam, where motor gasoline and high speed diesel fuel could be obtained from the Assam Oil Company.

At first many difficulties were encountered and the untrained personnel made slow progress, but after a few weeks of practice these men were constructing pipeline like veterans and had completed 50 miles of the first 4" line before trained Engineer Petroleum Distribution Companies arrived to relieve them. On the second anniversary of Pearl Harbor the pipeline had delivered its first gasoline to Ledo, and the storage tanks at Mile 0, official starting line of the Ledo Road, were filled. The first section of the Tinsukia-Kunming line was in operation, greatly easing the burden of moving motor gasoline by truck or rail.

Many difficulties confronted the crews as they progressed. Although the line paralleled the Ledo Road as closely as possible, many times the right-of-way had to deviate from the road due to the terrain. In some cases bulldozer traces had to be cut down and around a mountain side in order to get pump equipment and pipe on the proposed site. In one instance, a whole pump station was dismantled and portered piece by piece four miles through the jungle and then reassembled on location. Numerous cable suspensions were constructed over the many chasms that had to be spanned. For one 20-mile section reaching up to Fangsau Pass, one-tenth of the line had to be supported by cables.

All this tended to slow down construction but by February 1944 the completed pipeline was supplying gasoline needs for the first 50 miles; by the end of March as far as Shingbuiyang (mile point 102).

Construction of the line moved on south towards Tingkaw Sakan. The monsoon season began with full force, and mud and water seriously hindered transportation of materials. Progress was slow and on some days only a few hundred feet of line were completed. However, by mid-summer high speed diesel, motor, and aviation gasoline were pouring through the line to Tingkaw.

Past Tingkaw the line was pushed on towards Warazup. Simultaneously work began at Warazup on a line to Myitkyina, and from there another crew began a "meeting" line. Part of this would remain in place as a section of the permanent installation; the remainder isolated by a shorter route would be removed and re-used elsewhere when its job here had been completed.

On the section south of Warazup the old native roads had become impassable. Water was 4 or 5 feet deep along some of the proposed right-of-way. Material was hauled by truck as far as the roads would permit or dragged through by tractors. Then pipe rafts and pontoons with outboard motors were called into play to float the pipe where needed. Many times men had to wade waist deep in water to get the pipe strung; they then had to work all day in the same water to get it coupled together. Progress was difficult but four days before the October first target date the line was completed to Myitkyina. The arrival of gasoline and diesel fuel through the pipeline released many cargo planes for other critically needed supplies.

The maximum output of the two 4" lines is nearly equal to the carrying capacity of 400 cargo trucks. In a 24-hour period they will deliver approximately 8000 barrels of fuel or 336,000 U. S. gallons.

At the present time motor gasoline, high speed diesel, and aviation gasoline are being dispensed at all required points between Ledo and Myitkyina. One-third of the thousand-mile line was in operation by early December supplying the fuel for tanks, road graders, bulldozers, cargo trucks, jeeps, and cargo and combat planes.

Early in November an advance party for the China section of the line was flown over the Hump to Yunnanyi to set up a Headquarters, and three Engineer Petroleum Distribution Companies followed soon afterwards. On December 1st, construction began in the China Theater. At the same time the line was moving south from Myitkyina, on towards China, keeping pace with the Road. The Calcutta to Kunming pipeline will become a reality early in 1945.

Behind this feat, one of the epics of this war, lies an engineering achievement unsurpassed anywhere. While not an inch of the pipeline built has been damaged by enemy fire, work on more than one occasion proceeded under Japanese assault.

The vital urgency of the job was felt by all ranks who worked day and night under protection of sentries, throughout the monsoon when floods exceeded the protection of gum boots, and with malaria causing havoc among personnel. The work progressed amidst wild animals and snakes, many of which were killed, while leeches, unwelcome but tenacious companions, not to mention other "crawlers" of the jungle, were a pest. The Tenth USAAF rendered valuable aid, dropping rations, medical necessities and mail to inaccessible parties.

Three quarters of a million section pipes, each of 20 feet length, were brought from America. American labor employed received special training for three months in the States. This labor was supplemented in the first stage by over 7,000 coolies, supplied from tea garden labor and latterly by the Indian Pioneer Corps, 2,000 of whom were employed at one stage.



It is impossible to describe the day-to-day difficulties which had to be contended with, mainly in the matter of transport, in building the line. The pipe has been laid at an altitude of over 4,000 feet and will cross ranges of 8,500 feet in China. It has been suspended over rivers and laid under rivers. At some stages of the construction obstacles appeared insuperable but were overcome, one by one. Every problem faced sharpened resources of solution.

When the full story is told and the stage-to-stage time table given, this construction will rank as one of the speediest engineering tasks known. Some idea can be obtained from the fact that it took from March to August 1944 to build the line to Assam. The line has fed successful operations in North Burma. Today it is serving oil requirements in Assam and Burma, filling thirsty planes, trucks, bulldozers and jeeps, not to mention thousands of cigarette lighters of GI's.

The engineers feel that the worst part of their job is yet to come when the line will have to be taken over high mountains in China. But these sturdy, determined men of skill, who have overcome heart-breaking setbacks and vile weather, will see it through and enable precious fuel to be pumped to China in the common cause - to lick the Japanese as quickly and completely as possible.

#### MEDICAL SERVICE

Since neither construction nor combat can proceed without able-bodied men, the function of the Medical Department is to conserve manpower. This program has developed along several essential and interlocking lines of attack. These phases may be roughly grouped as: preservation of health by sanitary measures and malaria control, meticulous medical care to troops within their own units, hospitalization for more serious conditions which require specialized attention, and the handling of battle casualties, both American and Chinese. The integration of all these activities is no small project. The terrain, the torrential rains, the limited facilities, the difficult communications, and the shortage of personnel have been overcome by flexibility, ingenuity, and persistence.

This is the most highly malarious area in the world; dysentery is ever present in the native population; heat and humidity of the long monsoon sap energy and decrease efficiency; leeches penetrate leggins and socks to produce tropical ulcers - but all these have been combatted by unflagging attention to control measures and the scientific application of sanitary discipline.

Initial medical care for the troops has presented problems which, during the past year, have resulted in shifting the emphasis from the unit surgeon as an implement of the organization to which he is assigned. Of necessity he has become increasingly the neighborhood doctor, wherever he may be. A new and informal administrative system has been developed to assist each medical officer along the road to provide integrated medical care, and sanitary supervision for the troops in his immediate zone, regardless of to whom they may belong. This system is reinforced by a chain of improvised dispensaries.

In the thirteen month period since active fighting began thousands of battle casualties have been treated in USAAF hospitals. Many cases were handled under extremely difficult circumstances of housing, equipment, and transportation. Modern methods of treatment and the latest drugs (such as penicillin, plasma, and the sulfanomides) have been used side by side with

crude bamboo emergency splints, a home-made blood bank organization, and the use of rain water as intravenous fluid. The results have been most gratifying.

The difficulty of handling the wounded in jungle country, particularly in the summer months when ground communication is drastically curtailed, has resulted in increasing dependence on air evacuation. The last six months have been a striking example of the value of complete air superiority. Our unarmed supply transports shuttle all over northern Burma carrying reinforcements, rations, and ammunition, and returning with casualties and sick. In time, it was found to be both economical and efficient to rely on air evacuation. The tendency to locate hospitals with reference to major air fields resulted in an apparent heavy concentration of hospital beds towards the rear, two or three hundred miles from the fighting front. This meant, however, better built and better supplied hospitals. For the patients, it meant well organized and highly specialized treatment within a minimum of time after being wounded.

Liaison planes fly casualties back from isolated spots or from undeveloped strips. They are picked up at major fields by air ambulances or empty transports and distributed to the hospitals. This system at one period reportedly was handling one of the heaviest turnovers of air evacuation of any American theater. It has certainly resulted in an incalculable saving in man-hours of ambulance transportation, which is favorably reflected in casualty mortality and morbidity statistics.

In spite of the potential health hazards natural to the country, and the physical difficulties in getting the right team on the right spot in time, progress is always forward. The road troops receive the highest grade of medical care, and Chinese and American fighting men in this sector are getting surgical attention equal to any that can be provided throughout the world.

With the capture of Bhamo on December 16, 1944 and of Wanting, in China, by the C.E.F., the last two combat obstacles to completing the road were overcome. The Chinese First and Sixth Armies - American trained - under Generals Sun and Liao had done their job well and now the road can be rushed through to completion. Trucks, which we have had to ferry over the Hump will, before January is out, be traveling over the Ledo-Burma Road clear to Kunming and, before Spring, we will be shipping in thousands of tons of needed materiel over the Road to China and our pipeline from Calcutta - the longest in the world - will be feeding the hungry tanks of the planes of the 14th Air Force. The completion of the Road and the Pipeline will mark an achievement that America can be proud of because the boys who built them and the girls - the nurses who looked after them - did their jobs under the most trying and difficult conditions anywhere in the world.

ferred to the House Calendar and ordered printed:

*Resolved*, That the Select Committee on Post-war Military Policy is authorized to continue the investigation begun under authority of House Resolution 465 of the Seventy-eighth Congress, and for such purposes said committee shall have the same power and authority as that conferred upon it by said House Resolution 465 of the Seventy-eighth Congress.

#### SELECT COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS

Mr. SABATH from the Committee on Rules, submitted the following privileged resolution (H. Res. 64), creating a select committee on small business of the House of Representatives, defining its powers and duties (Rept. No. 21) which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered printed:

*Resolved*, That there is hereby created a select committee to be composed of nine Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker, one of whom he shall designate as chairman. Any vacancy occurring in the membership of the committee shall be filled in the manner in which the original appointment was made.

The committee is authorized and directed to conduct a study and investigation of the problems of small business, existing, arising, or that may arise because of the war, with particular reference to (1) whether the potentialities of small business are being adequately developed and utilized, and, if not, what factors have hindered and are hindering such development and utilization; (2) whether adequate consideration is being given to the needs of small business engaged in nonwar activities, or engaged in the transition from nonwar activities to war activities; (3) whether small business is being treated fairly and the public welfare properly and justly served through the allotments of valuable materials in which there are shortages, in the granting of priorities or preferences in the use, sales, or purchase of said materials; and (4) the need for a sound program for the solution of the post-war problems of small business.

The committee shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) as soon as practicable during the present Congress the results of its investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems desirable.

For the purposes of this resolution the committee, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act during the present Congress at such times and places, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to employ such personnel, to borrow from Government departments and agencies such special assistants, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas shall be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any member designated by him, and shall be served by any person designated by such chairman or member. The chairman of the committee or any member thereof may administer oaths to witnesses.

#### COMMITTEE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS

Mr. SABATH, from the Committee on Rules, submitted the following privileged resolution (H. Con. Res. 18) establishing a Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress (Rept. No. 22), which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered printed:

*Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring)*, That there is hereby established a Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress (hereinafter referred to as the committee) to be composed of six Members of the Senate (not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party) to be appointed by the President of the Senate, and six Members of the House of Representatives (not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party) to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Vacancies in the membership of the committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members. No recommendation shall be made by the committee except upon a majority vote of the Members representing each House, taken separately.

Sec. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete study of the organization and operation of the Congress of the United States and shall recommend improvements in such organization and operation with a view toward strengthening the Congress, simplifying its operations, improving its relationships with other branches of the United States Government, and enabling it better to meet its responsibilities under the Constitution. This study shall include, but shall not be limited to, the organization and operation of each House of the Congress; the relationship between the two Houses; the relationships between the Congress and other branches of the Government; the employment and remuneration of officers and employees of the respective Houses, and officers and employees of the committees and Members of Congress; and the structure of, and the relationships between, the various standing, special, and select committees of the Congress: *Provided*, That nothing in this concurrent resolution shall be construed to authorize the committee to make any recommendations with respect to the time or manner of, or the parliamentary rules or procedure governing, the consideration of any matter on the floor of either House.

Sec. 3. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Seventy-ninth Congress, to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.

(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such experts, consultants, technicians, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary and advisable, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, for comparable duties. The committee may utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services as it deems necessary and is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and agencies of the Government.

(c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed \$15,000, shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the chairman.

(d) The committee shall report from time to time to the Senate and the House of Representatives the results of its study, together

with its recommendations, the first report being made not later than April 1, 1945. If the Senate, the House of Representatives, or both, are in recess or have adjourned, the report shall be made to the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House of Representatives, or both, as the case may be.

#### AUTHORIZATION TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL SERVICE TO CONDUCT CERTAIN INVESTIGATIONS

Mr. SABATH, from the Committee on Rules, submitted the following privileged resolution (H. Res. 66), to authorize the Committee on the Civil Service to investigate various activities in the departments and agencies of the Government (Rept. No. 23), which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed:

*Resolved*, That the Committee on the Civil Service, acting as a whole or by subcommittee or subcommittees appointed by the chairman of said committee, is authorized and directed (a) to conduct thorough studies and investigation of the policies and practices relating to civilian employment in the departments and agencies of the Government, including Government-owned corporations; (b) to study and investigate the effect of such policies and practices upon the conduct of the war, with the view of determining whether such policies and practices are efficient and economical; (c) to determine the number of employees in each department or agency (including Government-owned corporations), whether such number of employees is necessary, and whether their skills are used to the best advantage; (d) all other matters relating to the recruiting and the efficient and economical use of the civilian employees; and (e) to make such inquiry as said Committee on the Civil Service may consider important or pertinent to any matter coming within the jurisdiction of said committee.

For the purposes of this resolution, the said committee or any subcommittee thereof is hereby authorized to sit and act during the present Congress at such times and places within the United States, whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses, and the production of such books or papers or documents or vouchers by subpoena or otherwise, and to take such testimony and records as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued over the signature of the chairman of the committee or subcommittee, or by any person designated by him, and shall be served by such person or persons as the chairman of the committee or subcommittee may designate. The chairman of the committee or subcommittee, or any member thereof, may administer oaths to witnesses.

That the said committee shall report to the House of Representatives during the present Congress the results of their studies, inquiries, and investigations with such recommendations for legislation or otherwise as the committee deems desirable.

#### CHINA AND HER PROBLEMS, MILITARY AND POLITICAL

The SPEAKER. Under the previous order of the House, the gentleman from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD) is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. Mr. Speaker, on last Thursday my late colleague, the Honorable James F. O'Connor, of Montana, asked that I be granted this time that I might have the opportunity of presenting to the House a report on my mission to China. Jim is not here today in person, but I still see him in the

front seat, and this report is for him as well as for the rest of the membership of the House.

Mr. Speaker, on yesterday I reluctantly relinquished my position on the Foreign Affairs Committee to take over the committee assignments formerly held by my late colleague. I did so, not because I am losing my interest in foreign affairs but because I felt it would be the best thing to do in behalf of the interests of my State. I intend to continue to be just as much interested in foreign affairs and winning the war now as I was while I served on that committee.

There are a few things I would like to say before I get into the body of my report. First, I am neither a military expert nor a China expert. Second, this report is going to be candid and truthful. I should like to say also that the Chinese people, as I found them and as I have always known them, are a people who are quite similar in many respects to those of us who live in this country. Of all the countries I traversed on this mission, the Chinese were the only ones who were smiling. They are people who have courage and determination. You may rest assured they will do all they can to help us bring this war to a successful conclusion, and they in turn can rest assured that we will help them and do all we can to see that they achieve the place which is rightly theirs in the scheme of world affairs.

I would also like to say a good word for some of the U. S. O. shows which have traveled to China, India, and the Burma theaters of war. This may seem out of place here, but you would be surprised at the way the morale of the boys and girls—because there are girls there, too—is lifted by some of these theatrical troupes. I should like to make special mention at this time of two troupes and one individual.

While I was there the so-called Jinx Falkenberg-Pat O'Brien troupe put on its show all over that theater. It was the first star troupe to make the complete coverage of the C. B. I. You have all heard of Jinx Falkenberg and Pat O'Brien, but there are others in that group who are also entitled to a great deal of consideration and certainly have earned the gratitude of the folks out in that theater. They are Betty Yeaton, a dancer; Ruth Carrell and Jimmy Dodd, a song-and-guitar team; and Harry Brown, pianist.

There is one other group I would like to mention. This group has no stars in the usual sense, but in the G. I. sense they are all stars. That is the little known U. S. O. 99 Troupe, which is made up of a group which has traversed North Africa, Italy, the Persian Gulf Command, the Middle East, and all of the C. B. I. It went overseas on September 1, 1943, and returned to this country on December 1, 1944. On occasions in China they even held lanterns for one another, because there were no lights, so that their acts could be put on before small audiences of three, four, or five G. I.'s. Their names are as follows, and we should remember them well: Gene Emerald, M. C. and comic; Jack Cavanaugh, who put on a cowboy act; Joseph Tershay, a magician; Basil Fomcen, accordionist.

There was still another member of that group, Count Cutelli, who had to leave it because of a serious illness.

The third individual in this category whom I would like to mention is Joe E. Brown, who did a grand job and who earned the affection and respect of all the folks in the C. B. I. area.

Mr. Speaker, I am presenting herewith for the consideration of the House a candid report of my findings as a result of my mission to China in November and December 1944. I have tried to look at China's problems realistically and sympathetically because I wanted to get the clearest possible picture. This is necessary if we are to understand our gallant ally, for not to do so would hamstring the possibility of a sound peace in Asia and the Pacific. Furthermore, because of the difficulties China has faced, and is facing, she needs the sympathy, forbearance, and active assistance of all the United Nations.

On arriving in India, I called on Maj. Gen. Frank Merrill at the headquarters of the India-Burma theater in New Delhi and had a long discussion with him concerning the situation in China. He said that the Chinese soldier was very good, if he was given enough to eat, the proper training, adequate matériel, and competent leadership. In his opinion, much of the difficulties of the Chinese armies could be laid to the incompetency of the field commands. When asked about the Chinese Communists, he stated that, in his opinion, they were not allied to Moscow but were primarily a Chinese agrarian group interested in land and tax reforms.

He was well pleased with the fact that the British and Indians were now, after 2½ years of relative inactivity, going into the Burmese jungles after the Japanese and were doing a very good job. I noticed, also, on the daily statistics tonnage data, that something like 35,000 tons of supplies was anticipated being shipped over the hump for the month of November. Coming back from China in December, I checked this particular figure and found that actually 34,929 tons had been shipped, which was a remarkable achievement in itself.

In General Merrill's opinion, a seaport will have to be acquired on the China coast to be of real help to China and that, while the Ledo-Burma Road with its pipe line will be of considerable assistance, it will not be enough to figure decisively in the China theater.

General Merrill invited me to make the trip over the Ledo-Burma Road from Ledo, in Assam, to Myitkyina, in Burma, which I accepted with alacrity, because I felt that it would give me a good insight in the procedure and policy adopted by the United States in that particular part of the world and, at the same time, give me an opportunity to talk to the G. I.'s along the way.

On Monday, November 20, I left for Ledo by plane and stopped at Halminar Hat, and from there went on to my destination where I met with General Pick, the engineer in charge of the building of the Ledo-Burma Road; Colonel Davis, his executive officer; Brig. Gen. Vernon Evans, chief of staff for the India-Burma theater, stationed in that vicinity.

General Pick stated that the Ledo-Burma Road would be capable of transporting a minimum of 60,000 tons a month when completed, although I must say that when I saw the general 3 weeks later he had modified that particular estimate.

I visited the Twentieth General Hospital at Ledo, which has had as many as 2,600 cases at one time and is manned by a staff of 156 American nurses, 30 doctors, and several hundred Medical Corps men. They have done a remarkably good job in this general hospital, as they have in all the hospitals along the road under the most difficult conditions and the most trying circumstances. The wards, generally speaking, have dirt floors, and the sides are made of bamboo and hessian cloth, while the roofs are thatched affairs. The buildings last from 9 months to a year and a half, and then new ones have to be built in their place.

In this particular hospital they have done a lot of work in connection with a type of disease known as scrub or mite typhus, for which our typhus shots are of no avail. The cure that the general hospital found most successful in combating this disease was the use of air conditioning. By keeping the wards at a steady temperature, they have reduced the fatalities from 27 percent to less than 1 percent.

In visiting the 8 hospitals along the road, I found that the work being done in all of them was outstanding. There was one hospital which had no women nurses and one hospital at Tagap in the process of being activated which would have a complete colored staff of doctors and nurses. From the experiences of over 400 American nurses along the road, I found that a great many of them had been out there 1½ to 2 years and more, and the remarkable thing to me was how they had been able to sustain their morale and do the fine work they had been doing under the difficulties which were, and are, their daily lot.

I also found at Ledo that 100 silver rupees were being paid to natives for each bailed out American flyer brought in. Many of our flyers are forced down in the jungles and have to live there for days and weeks, and many of them have never been found. The natives have been responsible for rescuing a great many and bringing them back to American headquarters.

On November 21 I left Ledo by jeep for my trip over the road, but before starting out I visited the plane-loading warehouses and saw how the Quartermaster Corps had developed a system of loading matériel in a very efficient manner and also a system of dropping stuff into the jungle with remarkably little loss. This particular area has had to use this type of transportation because there was no other way of getting the stuff to our men, and they have dropped such things as galvanized barrels of water, motors, and field guns, rations, medical supplies, ammunition, and so forth. Approximately 600 tons are shipped out daily by air from the Ledo fields, and a plane can be loaded on an average of 17 minutes.

After leaving Ledo I stopped and visited the Fourteenth Evacuation Hos-

pital, the Three Hundred and Thirty-fifth Hospital at Tagap, and the Seventy-third Evacuation Hospital at Shingbwi-yang at the end of the Naga country and the beginning of the Hukawng Valley. The road so far, from Ledo to Shingbwi-yang, 162 miles, was a rough one, but all things considered a good road, wide, rocky, and proven in the last monsoon.

On November 22 I left Shingbwi-yang and on the road visited the medical battalion station outside of Tingkaw, went through a lot of dense jungle, crossed a number of rivers on pontoon bridges, and observed the extremely good work being done by the engineer battalions, both white and colored, all along the road. I also visited the aviation liaison field at Shadazap and from there went on to Warazap, where there are fighter and transport fields. The route from Warazap was through Kamaing to Mogaung and this was the roughest ride I have ever undertaken. We averaged around 10 miles an hour for about 50 miles. I left Mogaung on November 23 and took the jeep train from there to Myitkyina. However, before I left Mogaung, I had a chance to visit Gen. Liao Yao-hsiang of the Chinese Sixth Army and his American liaison officer, Colonel Philipp. Gen. Liao Yao-hsiang, with his Sixth, and Lt. Gen. Sun Li-jen, of the First, were both doing a grand job to the south of the road and the reason that these two armies had the respect and confidence of the American military was because they were well fed, well trained, well equipped, and well led. It might be well to point out here that one of the chief complaints which I found along the road and in China was the lack of a definite rotation policy. The boys feel that they are the forgotten men at the end of the line. They resent the secondary status of their area in matters such as priorities and they are fearful of the let-down which will result at home when Germany is defeated. They do not want to be forgotten and they wish their folks could really be made to understand the viciousness of the enemy they face in the Far East and the amount of time it is going to take to defeat Japan. These boys are realists and they know what they are up against because they have learned the hard way. Our men fight bravely and well but not with any crusading spirit. They are interested in getting a dirty job done and coming home. That is their war aim—to come home to "Shangri-la" or the "Old Country," as they refer to the United States, and to get out of the places they are in just as quickly as they can after the job is finished.

It is not our policy to fight in Burma except where necessary to protect the road. General Sultan claimed that there were 250,000 Japanese in Burma against 6 or 7 divisions of Chinese, British, and American troops under his command. The Japanese divisions that he was facing were greatly decimated as to personnel and matériel. The British, I found out later, had at least 13 additional divisions under their own command, in west Burma.

The busiest airfields in the world are at Myitkyina, Chabua, and Kunming. The Myitkyina field is a marvel of effi-

ciency. Indian pioneer troops do the unloading. The British pay them and we feed them. The British also clothe the troops of the First and Sixth Chinese Armies but we furnish them with arms. When food is dropped, American liaison personnel attached to the Chinese armies are there to see that the food is evenly distributed to all concerned. This is very important because otherwise some of the soldiers would have to do without and the result would be impaired efficiency as is the case so often in China itself.

At the Myitkyina Airfield, there have been as high as 284 transports loaded and unloaded in a day, in addition to fighter and liaison planes coming on and off the field. In one 13-hour stretch there were 556 landings and take-offs, and during October 1944, 195 transports landed per day.

On November 24, I visited Maj. Gen. Howard Davidson, commander of the Tenth Air Force at his headquarters and sat in on his daily conference. Later that afternoon I took off in a Billy Mitchell bomber with Col. Rosy Grubb and Lieutenant Colonel Pinkney for Kunming. After leaving Myitkyina we went south to Bhamo and circled the town while American P-51 Thunderbolts came in low and dropped their bomb loads and made some good hits. Then we went over the hump at 14,000 feet to Kunming, where I stayed with Gen. Claire Chennault. He expressed great confidence in the Chinese. He stated that the tactical situation looked bad due to the loss of our advanced airfields, but that the over-all picture was good as he had engaged 350,000 Japanese with his Fourteenth Air Force and he hoped to draw in 150,000 more. He notified me that he was still maintaining a number of American-operated airfields behind the Japanese lines and that while it was a difficult proposition he was continuing to supply them all. In his opinion Japan is moving a great deal of her heavy industry on to the Chinese mainland and he further stated that a China landing is necessary if the war is to be brought to a successful conclusion in that country. He rates the Communists highly as fighters, and declares there is no connection between them and Russia, a conclusion which was borne out in my conversations during the rest of my stay in China. He is, however, sympathetic to Chiang Kai-shek in his dealings with the Communists and thinks he is the one man who symbolizes an aggressive China. He has nowhere near enough planes and neither does Chiang Kai-shek have enough supplies even though they have been promised them time and time again.

There was a three-ball alert in Kunming while I was there but the Japanese dropped their bombs at Chenking, 25 miles away. The next day I visited Maj. Gen. G. X. Cheves, the S. O. S. officer of the Chinese theater and he informed me that all the stuff coming into China is shipped to Calcutta and from there to Assam, where it is loaded in planes for flights over the hump, and that in excess of 90 percent of the food and all building supplies are furnished by the Chinese. He informed me that the generalissimo had just put him in charge of all

internal transportation in China; that he was going to run trucks—not transportation—from Ledo to Kunming over the Burma Road on January 22, 1945; and that the road would be opened for transporting supplies into China from Burma and India by April 1, 1945, at the latest. It is my understanding that General Cheves will be appointed Chief of S. O. S. for the Chinese armies soon and if such is the case, the problem of feeding and supplying the Chinese armies will be well handled.

I have been able to arrive at some conclusions on the basis of my few contacts to date. Under the present system, being conscripted into the Chinese Army is like receiving a death sentence because the soldier receives little training, food, and equipment. They are starved and poorly equipped because of graft up above. The commanders hang on to much of the stuff they receive and then flood the black markets and enrich themselves. The administration of food supply on an equitable basis is necessary or the Chinese Army will not be able to fight as it should.

During my stay in China I noticed many conscripts but I did not think they were being handled very well. Many rich men's sons have bought themselves out of being conscripted into the Army for as little as \$50,000 CN. I have been informed that \$500,000 CN will make one a regimental commander. Surely no sound type of soldiery can be created on this basis.

On November 26, I left Kunming for Chungking. When I started on this mission I thought that the Chinese problem was supply, but now I feel that the most important factor is cooperation among the Chinese themselves and that this has been the case for some time. Conditions in China are really bad. Some people, for example, working for the Chinese Maritime Commission can work only one-half day because they cannot get enough to eat and many soldiers die of malnutrition.

I met Maj. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, commander in chief of American forces in China, and was very favorably impressed by him. It is a tough situation for anyone to be put into "cold," but I feel that if any man can salvage anything out of this, that Wedemeyer will be the one. He recognizes the gravity of the situation. He is not fooling himself. He is not underestimating the abilities of the Japanese, nor is he overestimating the fighting qualities of the Chinese. He wanted to get Gen. Chen Cheng as his field commander against the Japanese, but the generalissimo appointed Chen Cheng his Minister of War instead and gave Wedemeyer Gen. Hoh Ying-chin as his field commander. While this did not look so good at the time, it very likely was a shrewd move, because Hoh Ying-chin is the Kweichow war lord, and consequently will fight harder to save his province. Hoh Ying-chin is now Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army and commander of the forces in Kweichow and Kwangsi.

In Chungking Maj. Gen. Pat Hurley informed me that the United States objectives were, first, to keep China from collapsing, and, second, to unify, repelish, and regroup Chinese military

for the purpose of carrying on the struggle and thereby saving American lives. There was some talk at that time that General Hurley would be appointed Ambassador, and later, when that news became definite, there was a feeling of relief on the part of all hands. No better choice could be made for this very important position. General Hurley tried, and is trying, to get the different elements in the country together so that a unified China will result and a greater degree of cooperation brought about.

The Communists are a force to be reckoned with in China. They have approximately 90,000,000 people in the territories under their control and they seem to have evolved a system of government which is quite democratic, and they also are strong enough to have their authority recognized in the areas they rule. They make their own laws, collect their own taxes, and issue their own paper money. The Central Government has somewhere around 300,000 troops in the Communist area and the result is that the Communist and Central Government troops that could be used in fighting the Japanese are being used to blockade one another, and consequently the rift in China remains quite wide. The biggest single problem in the country today is this disunity within China itself. Our military and diplomatic representatives are doing all that they can do to close this breach and to bring about greater cooperation among the Chinese. This is the crux of the whole Chinese picture, and much will depend on this gulf between these two elements being closed.

The Communists are well disciplined. They teach their young boys and girls how to use hand grenades. They have developed small cannons out of bored elms, which they set off by a fuze or a match lock. For armament they use captured Japanese guns, and when they do not have guns they use spears and clubs. Japanese steel helmets, telephones, and wires are other things which they have captured and used.

The Communists have gone into villages which they captured, told the people they were spreading democracy, asked how many were in favor of reducing land taxes, interest rates, and so forth, and then allowed them to vote. Young girls go in and propagandize the women, getting them to make rugs, blankets, and so forth, which the Communist Army buys, and thus they are given a better economic standing. Then they form ladies' societies of various kinds and in this way help to lift themselves out of the rut they have always been in. The Communists at this time look upon the United States as their great ally because they know that we are really fighting their enemy, the Japanese, and every time a B-29 flies over their territory, they know it is an assurance that we are their friends.

The Communist Party is the chief opposition group in China. They are not Communists in the sense that Russians are as their interests seem to focus on primarily agrarian reforms. Whereas they used to execute landlords and expropriate their estates to divide up among the peasants, today they try to

cooperate with landlords or anyone else who will help them in their fight against Japan. They are more reformers than revolutionaries and they have attacked the problems most deep-seated in agricultural China—namely, high rents, taxes, and interest rates—and they have developed cooperatives and a system of local democracy. They are organized effectively in the region under their control to carry on the war and to maintain their own standing. There is a theoretical agreement between them and Chiang Kai-shek wherein their armies—the Fourth and Eighth Route—are under Chungking, but such is not the case and the result is that they maintain their separate status militarily, economically, and politically. The Soviets send in no aid to them. Consequently they are dependent on their own resources and what they capture from the Japanese. The generalissimo looks askance at the Communists because he feels that they are too strong, that they will extend their influence wherever and whenever possible and, if allowed to continue unchecked, they might supersede the Kuomintang. While there have been incidents between the Kuomintang and the Communists there has probably been no civil war. We do not know all that has gone on between them because of the rigid censorship which exists, but we do know that negotiations have been carried on looking to a settlement of their differences; that Chou En-lai has made many trips to Chungking to discuss matters with the Central Government, and that at the present time a small amount of medical supplies—3 percent of a 20-ton American shipment—has been sent to Yen-an.

American influence has been to try to get the divergent elements in China together. This is important and necessary to prevent a possible civil war; to bring about as great a degree of unification as possible to carry on the war; and to help the Chinese to help themselves in settling their own internal problems. There is a bare possibility that the present crisis which confronts China may be a means of bringing these two groups together.

On November 28, I visited several businessmen and friends in downtown Chungking and tried to get their views on the present situation. It appeared to me that the Chinese businessmen had adopted a "wait and see" attitude. All depended on what would happen at Kweiwang. If it stood, well and good; if it fell, the great retreat from Chungking would begin. As of this date, China's house has a leaky roof, and a shaky foundation. Whether or not that house can be put in order is a question mark.

I had a conference with Dr. Sun Fo, son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who told me that there used to be a connection between Yen-an and Russia, but since the dissolution of the Comintern it has disappeared, although it might rise again as there is an idealistic bond between the two. Dr. Sun Fo said that the Generalissimo is now becoming more realistic; that previously he did not like to hear bad things, saying it was enemy

propaganda and his subordinates, therefore, told him only the good things and consequently conditions went from bad to worse. Finally, the generalissimo set out to find what was wrong and sent his two sons out to investigate the conscription policy. When they came back with their story of ill-treatment, graft, and corruption he made a personal trip to the conscription center in Chungking, and jailed and court-martialed the administrator in charge. Sun Fo told me that about 100,000 of the two hundred and fifty to three hundred thousand troops under General Hu Tsung-nan in the Northwest area have been shifted to the Kweichow-Kwangsi front and that the old "sit back and let the United States do the job" attitude is changing. Sun Fo said the generalissimo was the one man, in China, capable of bringing all elements together because of his ability and prestige.

On the basis of information which I have been able to gather, it appears to me that both the Communists and the Kuomintang are more interested in preserving their respective parties at the present time, and have been for the past 2 years, than they are in carrying on the war against Japan. Each party is more interested in its own status because both feel that America will guarantee victory.

The Kuomintang is disliked more every day and this is due to fear of the army and the attitude of tax collectors; and is proved by the revolts of the peasantry, the party criticism by provincial leaders, and student revolts against conscription. It speaks democratically but acts dictatorially. The Kuomintang is afraid of the will of the people, has lost much of its popular support, and will not allow any of its power to be used in the way of agrarian reforms. However, the Kuomintang is still the party in China. It has its leader in the generalissimo who has the franchise in the war against Japan. It has a powerful army. The middle class leans toward it and it still has the support of America. On the other hand, the Communists have their elements of strength and weakness. Among their weak points is their spirit of sanctimoniousness. They look upon themselves as pious crusaders and dogooders. Their knowledge of the outside world is primitive; there are social distinctions among them, and they are totalitarian and dictatorial in their own way. Their points of strength are they have a good military force, estimated at around 600,000 and there is more democracy in their territory than in the rest of China.

I saw the generalissimo on Thursday, November 30, and told him that the United States had sent over three of its very best men in Generals Hurley and Wedemeyer and Donald Nelson. He answered that if they had been there a year ago the situation would be different now. I said that we must forget the past and look to the present and the future; that the United States had a great admiration for China and wanted to see her a strong power so that she could make herself a bulwark for peace in the Orient.

When I saw the generalissimo again he expressed his belief that China would hold at Kwelyang. When the generalissimo asked Donald Nelson, who was with us, what differences he noted between his first trip and this one, Nelson told him that he found less talk of post-war development and a greater concentration on the present needs of China.

On Saturday, December 2, I went to Chengtu and saw the fields at which the B-29's were refueled and serviced, going to and coming from Japan. The morale at Chengtu is not too good, and the reason is the faulty rotation program. Among the bomber crews, morale is fairly good; among the fighters, it is fair; but in the supply units, it is poor. Furthermore, the rotation policy seems to work better for the officers than the enlisted men and it creates a bad situation.

In this area, \$40,000 CN are paid to the Chinese bringing in grounded American flyers. This goes to pay for porters, and so forth. The guerillas pick many of the grounded Americans up inside the Japanese lines and carry them out, and sometimes the process takes a matter of weeks. Then they notify a magistrate or some other official who in turn notifies American headquarters, which in turn sends out a plane to pick them up.

I had a conference with T. V. Soong, Chinese Foreign Minister, on Friday, December 8. He informed me that he and the generalissimo were in full accord and also that the condition of the Chinese soldiers, who were ill fed and ill cared for, is being attended to. T. V. Soong is probably the best known of China's leaders abroad. He does not have a large following in China but he has great personal prestige there and among Americans. He is modern in his outlook, understands China's needs, and now that he is Acting President of the Executive Yuan, he can, I believe, be depended upon to do his utmost to see that the necessary reforms are administered. Politically Dr. Soong informed me that the Government was making at long last overtures toward the Communists. He was quite hopeful some solution could be worked out. He said China would have to unify internally to win the war and to have a strong position at the peace table. Economically, he admitted the situation in China was bad but one of his policies is going to keep inflation from spreading. He said that the generalissimo had too much to look after personally, that there were too many "yes men" around him, that bad news worried him, but that now the generalissimo was going to take a more active interest in military affairs and that he, T. V. Soong, would help him in administrative affairs.

On Sunday, December 10, the Chinese situation took a turn for the better with the recapture of Tushan, although it must be admitted that this "victory" was due not to actual fighting, but to the withdrawal of the Japanese some time before. This was brought about because the Japs had evidently overextended themselves and had pushed ahead too rapidly. Furthermore, it has been confirmed that the Japanese are pulling up the rails of the railroads in western

Kwangsi and transporting them to complete the link between Nanning and Dong Dang in French Indochina and which when completed will create an all-rail transportation link between Indochina in the south Manchukuo and Korea in the north.

I had a conference that same day with one of the generalissimo's closest advisers, and he informed me that the recent cabinet shake-up was demanded by groups in China long before it took place. The generalissimo refused to accede to these demands until he was ready to make the move, and then he wanted to make it appear that it was his own doing. This, of course, was a matter of face, and is a factor of great importance in comprehending the Chinese situation. This adviser realized the great need for food, training, and leadership in the Chinese Army, and he has made it a point to stress these lacks to Chiang Kai-shek from time to time. He made a report on the bad conditions in the army in Hunan and Kwangsi, sent a memorandum to the generalissimo, who visited these areas and confirmed what he had found. He stated that his report and the Generalissimo's visit was in part responsible for the removal of several cabinet members. He said, further, that the Generalissimo could not consent to General Wedemeyer's placing Chen Chang in command before Kweiwang, because Chen as War Minister was in a better position to push needed army reforms. I was further informed by this adviser that the Generalissimo lacks confidence in the Communists, war lords, and intellectuals, and makes his decisions with these groups in mind. Later in the day I spent an hour with Mme. Sun Yat-sen, who said that the only solution to China's problem is a coalition government. She is not unfriendly toward the Communists, but thinks that the generalissimo will not have anything to do with them. She further stated that China, to be a great power, must form such a government, and she thought that such a move would in reality strengthen the Kuomintang rather than weaken it. She made the statement that all factions of Chinese are "very much pleased with America's disinterested attitude" and that they realize that we have no ulterior motive in their country. Before leaving Mme. Sun Yat-sen, she told me that many people were very much worried and wanted to get out of Chungking, because they felt that the situation could not be saved.

On Monday, December 11, I saw Gen. Chen Cheng, Minister of War, and referred to him a Reuter's dispatch quoting certain Americans to the effect that we would lose all our air fields in China unless a miracle occurred. He termed the statements politics and said it was only helping the enemy. He was very confident of China's ability to hold and he stated that he could be of much more use as War Minister than in the field in the way of executing reforms, as he puts it, "at the rear where it has to be done for those at the front who need it." In other words, he has the authority now which he lacked as a commander in the field. We discussed the reforms needed in the Chinese Army, the Burma Road, and the

present situation. He impressed me as a man who will do his job and do it well, or know the reason why. Chen Cheng, according to all American military men, is China's best soldier. His appointment as War Minister was the best possible move that the generalissimo could make to bolster China's armies and lagging war morale. His loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek is unquestioned and he is personally incorruptible. Among the many leading generals in China he stands out because of his devotion to his country, his word which is his bond, and his courage.

Later in the afternoon, I talked to Ambassador Hurley and he told me that the generalissimo had offered the Communists the following proposals:

First. Recognition as a legal party.  
Second. Equipment of their armies on the basis of equality.  
Third. Participation in the government.

The Communists would not accept these proposals because they feared their participation in the government would be very limited and their armies would be wiped out. They, therefore, turned down the generalissimo's three-point program.

That evening I saw the generalissimo for the third time and spent an hour and a half with him, and at his request, gave him a frank recital of my findings. I pointed out the full extent of our lend-lease support to him and emphasized that in an effort to assist China we have done everything humanly possible and some things which were thought impossible. To evaluate fully our assistance we should keep in mind the following points:

First. We have performed superhuman feats in getting material over the hump to aid in China's defense.

Second. We are doing a tremendous job in building the Ledo-Burma Road and its auxiliary pipe line.

Third. We have carried on operations in the Pacific which were all aimed at weakening China's—and our—enemy, Japan, and which must be included in any reckoning of assistance to our Asiatic ally.

Fourth. We have given China much in the way of financial aid through loans, credits, and so forth.

Fifth. We have tried to assist in a re-organization of the Chinese Army through developing training schools in this country and China; through detailing liaison personnel to the different armies; through better feeding methods; and through the activation of the Chinese-American composite wing of the Fourteenth Air Force.

We have done all within our means to assist China because we want to see her use everything she has to bring the war in the Far East to a successful conclusion. We want to see China a great power because we feel that as such she will be a decided factor in maintaining the peace in the Orient. We want to get out of China as soon as victory is won.

Last but not most important, every move we have made and will make in China is dictated by one primary consideration and that is to save as many American lives as possible. Everything else—everything—is predicated on this.

I told the generalissimo that he had had and would continue to have, our full support, but that he should take the necessary steps to bring about the needed internal reforms in his civil, military, and economic administration, and I also mentioned several times our lack of any designs on China. I further stated that my opinion of the Chinese situation had changed from one wherein supplies to China was most important to one which stressed the need of cooperation among the Chinese people themselves. He replied by saying America did not understand a country in revolution and he compared China today with its dissident elements and the Kuomintang to the dissident elements and the revolutionary soldiers of George Washington's time. He stated that he would continue to try for a settlement with the Communists in a political way. I pointed out different possibilities to him and he answered that he had considered them all. Americans, he continued, expect his government to make all the concessions. Why don't we try to get the Yen-an group to make some? This sounds like a good suggestion.

Chiang Kai-shek is a dictator in name only. It is true that he is President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the army, but his power is limited because he has to recognize all factions within the Kuomintang—and some outside—with the result that he serves as a balance wheel and has to resort to compromise to keep a semblance of unity. No one would acknowledge this more quickly than Chiang himself. Though constantly subject to pressures he has shown great skill in maintaining the stability of his government over the years he has been its head. He has been a remarkable leader, and today he is the one man in China with sufficient prestige to carry her through the war. He has had to be a politician primarily, a military leader secondarily. To maintain himself in power he has had to manipulate these groups as the occasions demanded. The results have been a hodge-podge of policies which the western mind finds hard to comprehend. The disastrous results of this maneuvering have been manifested in many ways:

First. He has used something like 16 divisions to blockade the Communists and has thus lost the use of large numbers of troops to fight Japan.

Second. He has allowed Chinese military strength to deteriorate in other ways through his inability to mobilize China's resources; to conscript the college students and the rich men's sons; to see that his troops received food and medical supplies.

Third. He has not checked hoarding; he has not stopped inflation; and has allowed merchants and landlords to profiteer tremendously.

Fourth. He has failed to improve the condition of the peasantry in regard to high rents and high rates of interest.

On the other hand, he is the one leader in China. It has been under him that China has attained political freedom and the status of a great power. He is the one man who can make Chinese independence and unity a reality. His faults

can be understood when the complexity of the Chinese puzzle are studied in detail, and they are no more uncommon than the faults of the other leaders of the United Nations.

The seriousness of the situation in China has brought home to him the need for some reforms and he has applied himself to bringing order out of chaos. He has withdrawn some of his Communist blockading divisions from the northwest to the Kweichow-Kwangsi front; he has continued to carry on negotiations with Chou En-lai, the No. 3 Communist, with the hope, as he expressed it to me, "that a political settlement can be made"; he has given his full support to the Chinese W. P. B. set up by Donald Nelson and administered by Wong Wen-hao; he has called for 100,000 volunteers from among the college students though he has not conscripted them; and he is seeing to it, under American help and supervision, that the Chinese soldier is now being fed and that the Chinese conscripts are now being treated better.

He has reorganized his cabinet and given the more democratic elements a chance to be represented and he has pledged his full support to the American team of Wedemeyer and Hurley. His intentions are good and he has shed some of his administrative burdens on T. V. Soong, now acting president of the Executive Yuan, so that he can devote more of his time to strictly military affairs.

All these moves are in the right direction, but the question is, Has he gone far enough or does he intend to, and, is there still time? China used to be able to trade space for time, but now she has very little space and not much time. As I tried to impress on Chiang, the responsibility is now his as we have done everything we possibly could do to assist him. If he holds we will get the stuff through to him; if he fails, all our efforts in Burma, over the hump, and the magnificent work of the Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces and the Twentieth Bomber Command will have been for naught.

We are committed to Chiang Kai-shek and we will help him to the best of our ability. The decision, though, rests not on our shoulders, but on the generalissimo's. He and he alone, can untangle the present situation, because on the basis of what he has done and in spite of some of the things he has done, he is China.

The American Government through General Wedemeyer, Ambassador Hurley, and Donald Nelson has been doing all in its power to bring the different groups in China together. This policy has been pursued not because we want to dictate in China's internal affairs but because we want the Chinese to cooperate with one another so that the full forces of their resources and manpower can be brought to bear against Japan. They realize that Chiang Kai-shek's position is a difficult one and that he fears giving in to the Communists because of the effect it might have on him and his party. They think, though, that if the Chinese themselves can get together it would be to the best interests of China. If they do

not get together the seeds of dissension will only continue to grow and the eventual harvest will be of such a nature as to make the Taiping Rebellion of the last century a minor revolution in comparison. It might even mean the intervention of a great power in the Chinese internal situation.

I should like to state, once again at this point, that the policy of the United States in China is one in which no ulterior motives are involved. In that country—and in that country only, so far as I know—our foreign policy is clear, clean, and definite. We are in China to help China and ourselves against a common enemy; we intend to get out of China just as soon as victory is won; and we, alone among the great nations, want China to be a world power, because we feel she will become the bastion of peace in Asia. The Chinese know all this and because of it they trust us implicitly.

I left Chungking on December 13, and I must say that my conclusions are in close accord with the thoughts of the majority of the American civil, diplomatic, and military officials there. They want the Chinese to get together so that we can win the war in Asia, and they want to get the boys out of China just as soon as victory is won. The main concern of all of them is the saving of American lives. They do not care whether a Chinese is an agrarian or not, just so he fights Japan and takes that much of the burden off our soldiers.

The weaknesses of the generalissimo's government are apparent, as I have tried to point out in this report—its durability a question which only Chiang Kai-shek himself can answer. It is my belief that he will do all that he can, according to his views, to bring about the necessary reforms and to achieve a degree of unity. It is his purpose, he informed me, to try and get democracy to the people as soon as possible, and he intends to call a constitutional convention some time during 1945.

He has had, and will continue to have, a difficult problem on his hands. I feel we should give him every possible support, because he alone can bring China together. There is no other person in that country who has the prestige or his ability, and I say this in spite of the weaknesses in his government which I have called to your attention. In retrospect, he has been a great leader for China. No other country has ever fought so long with so little against such great odds. Furthermore, China is doubly important now because of the fact that Japanese heavy industry has been moving to the Chinese mainland since the Doolittle bombing of Tokyo, and this adds up to the war ending in China, where it began in 1931—a grim picture to look forward to.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.

Mr. CURTIS. The gentleman has made a very interesting report and a very informative one. I was particularly interested in the comments on his visits to Gen. Louis A. Pick, who was the division engineer in the Missouri



River Basin, in which the gentleman, as well as a number of others of us are intensely interested, and also his visit with Gen. Al Wedemeyer, and his report of that conference. I would like to ask the gentleman this question: Is the opinion unanimous to the effect that the Communists of China have no connection with the Communists of Moscow?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. So far as I have been able to find out that opinion, at the present time, is held unanimously. Soviet Russia does send in a few supplies to China, but they do not go to the Communists in the northwest but to the Central Government in Chungking.

Mr. CURTIS. I believe you said there was an idealistic bond existing, however?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. Yes.

Mr. CURTIS. Our Government here in Washington has sent a number of representatives from time to time to China to insist that Chiang Kai-shek get together with the Communists. Do you know of any such emissaries being sent to the Communists of China to tell them to get together with Chiang?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will forgive me, I should like to make a correction in his statement, because, so far as I know, no emissaries have ever been sent from Washington to insist on a settlement.

Mr. CURTIS. Then they have been sent to urge them, have they not?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. Well, they might have urged them, but I do not know.

Mr. CURTIS. Have we sent any emissaries to the Communists urging that they get together and make some concessions to Chiang?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. I do not know. I do not believe, though, that we should interfere too much in the internal affairs of China. Consequently all of our dealings should be, and are, through Chungking and the generalissimo.

Mr. CURTIS. So far as you know we have not sent anybody to urge the Communists that they do that?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. So far as I know we have not sent anybody.

Mr. VOORHIS of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. I yield to my colleague from California.

Mr. VOORHIS of California. First of all, I want to thank the gentleman very much for one of the finest presentations that I have ever had the pleasure of listening to in the House since I have been a Member. I want to ask him two questions, both having to do with the question of democracy. The gentleman said in the course of his remarks there was more democracy in the sections of China controlled by the Communists than there is elsewhere. I wish you would explain a little what you mean by that, as to whether the gentleman speaks of a political democracy or whether the gentleman means the economic situation is more democratic, or just what? And then I wish the gentleman would follow that by telling us what he believes are the chances of the generalissimo suc-

ceeding in his effort to form a constitution with at least elements of democracy in it for China and whether he can inform us what those elements will be and how far it is likely to go.

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. The gentleman will pardon me if I miss some portions of those questions. I will try to answer them as best I can.

There is more democracy in the northwest area than in the area under the control of the Kuomintang. I mean by that that on certain specific occasions the people in that area have the right to express their wishes through a voting procedure, as I have tried to point out before. They have had the opportunity to declare themselves in favor of lowering of land rents, usurious rates of interest, and things of that sort. In Kuomintang China those reforms have not been pushed because in that area of China are found the landlords and the merchants who are in the ascendancy, and they are the ones who are in control. They are the ones who are making the money on the basis of these land rents, interest rates, and the like. Consequently, they do not want to change. It may be that Chiang Kai-shek would like to bring about a change economically in the case of the factors I have mentioned, but as he has to juggle so many different factions within his party at this time he finds it difficult. I think in time Chiang Kai-shek will succeed in spreading the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen so that all elements in China will have a greater degree of freedom. I believe furthermore that his statement made on New Year's Day to the effect that he was going to call what we could term a constitutional convention this year is a very good indication that he is determined to add to the reforms he has made in the last 3 or 4 months. He is a very intelligent and capable individual.

Mr. EDWIN ARTHUR HALL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. EDWIN ARTHUR HALL. In his very able address I notice the gentleman mentioned some of the American military leaders and their relationship to General Chiang. I did not happen to hear the gentleman say anything about the difference of opinion between General Chiang and General Stilwell. Did the gentleman happen to hear any reaction to that?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. For the gentleman's benefit, may I say that I did not leave this country until after General Stilwell was recalled and the matter was dropped. I tried to see the situation as impartially as I could, based on the facts that existed while I was there.

Mr. CANFIELD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. I yield. Mr. CANFIELD. I wish to compliment the gentleman on the statement he has just made. I know it is going to be very helpful to me in time to come. Does the gentleman know Dr. Hu Shih, former Chinese Ambassador to the United States?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. Not personally, although I know of him.

Mr. CANFIELD. I wonder if the gentleman knows whether Dr. Hu Shih has a position in the Government at this time.

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. As far as I know, Dr. Hu Shih does not have a position with the Government but is carrying on research work and can be found almost any time over in the Congressional Library.

Mr. CANFIELD. I know he has made a great contribution toward our better understanding of China.

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. He is a real diplomat.

Mr. ROBSION of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Kentucky.

Mr. ROBSION of Kentucky. Some months ago we were informed—or perhaps the gentleman was present—by some of our Army leaders as to the armies of China. This important leader made the categorical statement that the Chinese armies had been and were then nonexistent. Do they have real armies over there?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. I believe the gentleman quoted made a serious misstatement.

Mr. ROBSION of Kentucky. Perhaps the gentleman heard the statement made that I have quoted here.

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. No; I did not, but I do want to emphasize the fact that the American military men in the China-Burma-India theater have great respect for the fighting qualities of the Chinese if they are fed; if they are equipped and trained in the same way our own men are, and if they are capably led.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Montana has expired.

Mr. ROBSION of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman be given an additional minute to develop that thought.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kentucky?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROBSION of Kentucky. My question is, Do the Chinese now have what one would call a real army or armies, a fighting force?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. If the gentleman will pardon me for going into some detail I will try to answer his question, for I should like to bring all the facts I have to his attention.

Mr. ROBSION of Kentucky. I would like to have the information.

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. In Burma we have what are known as the First and Sixth Chinese Armies, made up of five divisions which are under the command of Lt. Gen. Dan I. Sultan. They were trained by the Americans at a base at Ramghar in India, and they have been remarkably good in the field because they have had the things given to them which we give to our own soldiers. In China, on the other hand, where they have not had these opportunities they have not been able to perform as effectively. At Kunming we have

a training school to which we bring Chinese officers. When they have completed their training they are sent into the field and the resulting effectiveness of the troops under their command is both notable and noticeable. I should like to add that this school, known as Little Fort Benning, is under the command of Brig. Gen. Frank Dorn, who has done a grand job in activating the Y Force in Yunnan and on the Salween.

Mr. ROBSION of Kentucky. My purpose is not to be critical, but those conditions are important and what those conditions are is what I want to find out.

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. I appreciate the gentleman's interest. The conditions have been very much improved.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Montana has again expired.

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

Mr. KNUTSON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the Record.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. MILLS). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Minnesota?

There was no objection.

[The matter referred to appears in the Appendix.]

#### COMMITTEE ON WILDLIFE CONSERVATION

Mr. SMITH of Virginia, from the Committee on Rules, submitted the following privileged resolution (H. Res. 75), providing for the continuation of the Special Committee to Investigate the Conservation of Wildlife (Rept. No. 24), which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered printed:

*Resolved*, That the Special Committee to Investigate All Matters Pertaining to the Replacement and Conservation of Wildlife is authorized to continue the investigation begun under authority of House Resolution 237 of the Seventy-third Congress, continued under authority of House Resolution 44 of the Seventy-fourth Congress, House Resolution 11 of the Seventy-fifth Congress, House Resolution 65 of the Seventy-sixth Congress, House Resolution 49 of the Seventy-seventh Congress, and House Resolution 20 of the Seventy-eighth Congress, and for such purposes said committee shall have the same power and authority as that conferred upon it by said House Resolution 237 of the Seventy-third Congress, and shall report to the House as soon as practicable, but not later than January 3, 1947, the results of its investigations, together with its recommendations, for necessary legislation.

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

Mr. MONDT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my own remarks in the Record and to include a statement entitled "Imperialism Is Indicted as a Cause of War."

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Dakota?

There was no objection.

[The matter referred to will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

#### SPECIAL ORDER

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under special order previously agreed to, the

gentleman from California [Mr. VOORHIS] is recognized for 15 minutes.

#### PATENTS

Mr. VOORHIS of California. Mr. Speaker, at page A418 of the Record of yesterday there appear remarks by myself which cover somewhat more than what I will say to the House today on the same subject. I had hoped to get time on yesterday to make this speech but, of course, due to the sad passing of our colleague the gentleman from Montana, Mr. O'CONNOR, we did not transact any other business. So I have asked for this time today because I feel that the matter contained in that speech in yesterday's Record is of such moment that I am justified in presenting it here when some Members may care to listen to what I have to say.

On December 18, 1943, I addressed the House on a bill which was then numbered H. R. 3874, the title to which was "An act to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes."

That bill has been reintroduced and is now numbered H. R. 97.

This bill aims to provide that a patent holder may no longer enforce his patent if he is found in regular judicial proceedings to have illegally used his patent in restraint of trade and commerce. Very briefly, there are four main provisions in the bill.

First, it would authorize the United States to intervene in any Federal court proceeding involving infringement or the validity of patents. This is to assure representation in the courts of the public interest so often disregarded in patent litigation and, after all, the most important single interest involved therein. In the second place, it would require registration of patent agreements, a proposal which has been advanced by both industry and Government agencies for a good many years. In the third place it would render unenforceable patents which are illegally used to restrain trade or commerce or to establish monopoly. This, of course, is the heart of the bill. In the fourth place, it would permit determination of the validity and scope of patents in antitrust proceedings.

In providing for the cancellation of a patent which has been employed as a part of an illegal conspiracy or monopoly, the bill will give assurance to the public that patents will be used for purposes within the constitutional grant, namely, for the promotion of science and the useful arts.

The Supreme Court in a recent decision has referred to the patent as a property right, but I wish to point out that after all it is a property right which has been granted by Government action and would not exist at all without this action.

The necessity for action upon my bill is made immediately apparent by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Hartford-Empire Co. against United States, which was handed down a week ago on yesterday. This was a case where this company had gotten complete control of 600 patents and used them in a conspiracy to restrain trade.

The entire glass-container industry is controlled through a gigantic patent pool. Only 2 results of this patent pool are to make consumers pay more for food products put up in glass jars and to prevent new companies from going into the glass-container industry.

There is no doubt whatsoever about the facts in the Hartford-Empire Co. case. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court, given by Justice Roberts, states:

The district court found that invention of glass-making machinery had been discouraged, that competition in the manufacture and sale or licensing of such machinery had been suppressed, and that the system of restricted licensing had been employed to suppress competition in the manufacture of unpatented glassware and to maintain prices of the manufactured product. The findings are full and adequate and are supported by evidence, much of it contemporary writings of corporate defendants of their officers and agents.

The majority opinion continues as follows:

It is clear that, by cooperative arrangements and binding agreements, the appellant corporations, over a period of years, regulated and suppressed competition in the use of glass-making machinery and employed their joint patent position to allocate fields of manufacture and to maintain prices of unpatented glassware.

The first point I want to make, therefore, is that there is no question of doubt in the opinion of the majority of the Court that this company had violated the law; that it was guilty of action in restraint of trade of the most flagrant sort. The High Court upheld completely the findings of the district court in that regard.

The conspirators had a definite program to misuse patents—that is, to misuse public grants from the Federal Government. They stated that they had acquired these patents with the intention—and I quote from a memorandum of policy from the files of this company itself which was published by the Temporary National Economic Committee:

To block the development of machines which might be constructed by others \* \* \* and to secure patents on possible improvements of competing machines so as to "fence in" these and prevent their reaching an improved state.

As Justice Black stated in his dissent: These patents were the major weapons in the campaign to subjugate the industry.

Mr. Speaker, the Supreme Court found that Hartford-Empire had grossly violated the antitrust laws, and yet the majority of four judges—since three judges disqualified themselves and did not sit—felt that it did not have the power under the existing antitrust statutes to keep Hartford-Empire from enforcing in the future the 600 or more patents which it had acquired for the very purpose of using them in restraint of trade, in which way it had so misused those 600 patents.

This decision was handed down by four Justices of the Supreme Court: Justices Roberts, Stone, Frankfurter, and Reed. Three Justices did not sit: Justices Douglas, Jackson, and Murphy. Two Justices dissented: Justices Black and Rutledge. It was, therefore, a 4-to-2 decision.