China and Her Problems, Military and-Political

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001
A. Background.

By mid-year of 1942 the area occupied by the Japanese had been extended to include all Burma. As the Japanese swept up from the south, English, Burmese, Kachins, Anglo-Indians, and a defeated army of British, Chinese, and a few Americans escaped as best they could into neighboring India. The Burma Road was closed, and with it the last supply route to the beleaguered Chinese.

The situation was critical. In Egypt the Germans were pounding at the gates of Alexandria, apparently preparing to strike to the east. Toward Burma, the formidable barrier of the uncivilized frontier beginning with the Patkai mountains proved itself a sturdy bulwark, for at that moment it was all that stood between the Japanese and India.

In 1943, all eyes turned to the Orient. The Chinese were barely able to carry on, and only the trickle of supplies which crossed the Hump by plane kept their heads above water. It was evident that the dominant mission in the Far East at that point was the reopening of a supply line to the Chinese.

The map of India took on new importance. An inadequate railroad wandered lazily up the Brahmaputra Valley to the furthest outpost of civilization in the northeast corner of Assam. Designed to service only the normal peacetime needs of the tea plantations in this part of India, the railroad terminated at Ledo, an insignificant native village surrounded by jungle-covered hills. This same village had been the end of the trail for those refugees from northern Burma who fled ahead of the Japs in 1942. From Ledo, so named by the Italians who first opened the coal mines in the adjacent hills, began to unwind the road which was to make famous the name of the obscure Indian village.

Beyond the railroad lay the unbroken barrier of the Patkai mountain range stretching out like a giant finger from the Himalayas. It forms both natural barrier to communication between Assam and Burma, and at the same time a boundary between these two countries which nevertheless has remained too wild to be clearly defined or explored. Running East and West across northern Burma, these mountains blanketed by a 200 foot deep impenetrable jungle served as home only to the uncivilized tribes of Naga head-hunters who are native to this portion of the world. From May through September, the warm monsoon winds which sweep north over the planes of Burma, deposit the terrifically heavy rainfall over the entire area through which a road was to be built by the United States Army Engineers.

The whole region in which operations were planned had the unsavory reputation of being the unhealthiest portion of the world. Veterans of the Philippines, Central America, and the South Pacific damned this country from Assam to the Hukawng as the worst jungle of them all. The Bengal Tiger, King Cobra, and blood-sucking leeches which infested it were far less dangerous than the unseen germs from which no part of this land was free and no man immune.

Staid Britishers dismissed the plan of a road as an impossibility. Professional soldiers had shaken their heads and said "no military vehicle will cross these mountains on its own power", and scoffed at the thought of trucks and tanks ever moving beyond the Ledo railhead. But during the final weeks of 1942 and the early part of 1943, plans for the project went on and the initial effort was begun.
The undertaking has no parallel in military history. It is a combination of building a major modern highway through virgin jungle-covered mountains and valleys, and at the same time having to fight a first rate, well-equipped enemy for the ground over which the road is to run. It departs from the usual strategic concepts in that the CONSTRUCTION phase (Services of Supply) is the primary objective; the FIGHTING (Combat) is secondary, to brush the enemy aside from the road route. Although by comparison with other theaters the number of men involved is not large, the whole enterprise, in manpower, materials, and objective, is on an unprecedented scale. Furthermore, the defending Jap was capable of being the superior force. The situation has not been simplified by the fact that, in the scheme of global warfare, this theater is both at the end of the longest line of communication in the world and not the highest on priorities.

The road is an ever-lengthening dragon with an insatiable appetite. Its mouth is at Ledo and its extending tail pushes through the hills and down into Burma. A triad of effort sustains it: (1) ENGINEER: to develop the base from which the dragon feeds and to see that the tail grows steadily in the right direction; (2) SUPPLY SERVICE: to feed the hungry animal rations and material; (3) MEDICAL: to conserve the effective manpower doing the job. On this same organization for CONSTRUCTION is superimposed the heavy burden of supplying and hospitalizing combat troops.

Inevitably, no one of these three essential services is able to secure all the personnel, equipment, supplies, or housing it considers necessary for the accomplishment of its mission. It has been a kaleidoscopic scene of mud, insufficient and over-taxed equipment, rain, malaria, disappointment, heat, language difficulties, jungle fighting, landslides, and homesickness. The work has gone forward by dint of a prodigious expenditure of sustained physical and emotional energy on the part of all concerned.

The mission is best viewed in its four main phases, during each of which the activities of the three essential services had to be readjusted to meet the changing needs. First, came the 100 mile drive through the Patkai mountains into the Hukawng Valley, climaxxed by the break-through to Shingbwiyang of the lead dozer on the 27th of December, 1943; second, the Valley Campaign which ended with the dry season; third, Myitkyina; and finally, "mopping up" and the junction of the Ledo and Burma Roads.

B. First Phase: "The Road to Shingbwiyang"

During the exodus from Burma in the face of Jap aggression, 30,000 refugees started up this narrow trail into India. Thousands died - of fever, hunger, exposure, exhaustion. Bit by bit, personal belongings were abandoned. Reliable observers estimated 20,000 persons perished on this 110 mile trail. Months later, as engineers pushed the road through the jungle, their skeletons seemed almost to pave the trail in places.

In its first 100 miles the Road covers seven summits of the Patkai Range. From the peak at Pangsaun Pass, four countries can be seen: China, Tibet, Burma, and India. From Heli's Gate to Pangsaun Pass, a distance of seven miles, the climb is straight up, with 220 hairpin curves in this stretch.

In contrast with the Ledo Road, the Burma Road is a narrow trace with a high crown of hard-layered rock. No rock of any structural value is available anywhere along the route of the Ledo Road. As a result the road is gravelled, the material being secured from rivers along the way. Minimum shoulder-to-shoulder width of the road in the mountains is 33 feet, while in the valleys it is a minimum of 49 feet. Although the Ledo Road was built with temporary bridges for combat expediency, its standards are those of a freight highway.
designed to carry more than 60,000 tons per month (an average of 8500 vehicles pass one Military Police post in a 24-hour period). It is a safe two-way road with a maximum of 10° grade. All temporary bridges have been replaced with modern steel structures, the latest design in military stream-crossing equipment being installed. Because of the tremendous rainfall along the route, prodigious culvert installations are required. For every mile of road, 10,000 feet of culvert have been installed.

The Ledo Road was first covered by advance survey parties that determined the best routes. Next the lead bulldozer blazed a path through the jungle. This was followed by clearing crews, who blasted the trees with tons of dynamite and pushed the debris aside. Next, leveling and grading was performed, culverts, drains, and ditches dug. Finally the road was installed with gravel, hauled from gravel points at rivers, sometimes many miles from the spot being covered. Lastly, the gravel was spread over the highway surface. Through the mountainous sections the road was built almost entirely with bulldozers. In the valleys, these same tractors were used to pull scrapers.

Work was begun in December of 1942 and continued through the winter in the hands of three battalions of colored American Engineers, together with a small number of other troops, but initial progress was slow. During the following March heavy rains began and work on the road was seriously impeded. Little advance was made because work crews were forced to concentrate on maintaining that portion of road already cut and to keep it open to traffic.

During the remainder of the 1943 monsoon season, all forward progress on the road was halted and the men battled against nature to hold the narrow ribbon of roadway. They widened the trace, installed culvert, graveled the road bed. The incessant rains continued. Dozers were lost over banks. Men were seeking wet all the time; not even their beds were dry. Equipment was buried by slides. By September, the toughest road job in the world had come to a standstill only 42 miles from the starting point, and all concerned were thoroughly discouraged. It was evident that new leadership was needed if the road was to go through.

In October 1943 Brigadier General Lewis A. Pick took over the job of building the Ledo Road and supplying General Stilwell's combat forces. He analyzed the situation, reorganized his forces, and promised Stilwell that the road to Shingwiyang would be open for traffic on New Years Day. On December 27 the primary objective of the Ledo Road was completed; the building of a road into Burma over which General Joseph W. Stilwell could bring men and equipment and supplies in his return march against the Japs. The road reached the village of Shingwiyang four days ahead of the scheduled deadline. This cut through the matted, malaria-ridden, jungle-covered mountains was outstanding in all the brilliant achievements by the Corps of Engineers.

The Patkai mountains are one of the foot-hill chains of the Himalayas. Peaks in the immediate vicinity of the road reach an elevation of about 6000 feet; the highest point on the road itself is about 4500 feet. The soil is clay with an insecure shale foundation; vegetation is a dense tangle of tropical hardwood, bamboo, and ferns. The valleys are steep and narrow, and the streams become torrents when rain falls in their water sheds. Population is thin, and the small villages cling to the tops of the hills. All native trails climb the slopes at steep grades and follow high saddles across the ridges. After two weeks on foot in this territory, an engineer Colonel, who had spent much of the last twenty years in Alaska, termed this the roughest country he had ever seen.
The First Phase comprised the extending of the road through the mountains until it entered the Hakawng Valley of Northern Burma at Shingbwiyang (mile 102). It was entirely construction. Combat was limited to minor patrol activity. During this phase, construction, supply, and evacuation were complicated by the fact that everything had to move over a single gravel road building through the mountains. By-passes were precluded. Mud, broken bridges, and landslides were chronic. The use of native porters, utilization of short cut trains for foot traffic, and air-dropping were purely supplementary.

Late in December 1943, Americans and Chinese were pouring into Shingbwiyang over the break-through trail, an air strip was in operation, and a hospital unit was receiving Chinese casualties. The lead bulldozer had plunged down Kahkye Hill and reached the valley on the 27th of December. The first leg of the race to China had been covered.

C. Second Phase: "The Valley Campaign"

On December 31, two bulldozers started cutting a new road south of Shingbwiyang through the Hakawng Valley to the Tanai River (Upper Chinwin). Because this was definitely a combat zone, guards from both the Chinese and American armies were out in front and on both flanks of the engineers. At Taipoa Ga, a company of American engineers constructed an airfield while being subjected to Jap artillery and sniper fire. The men worked on armor-plated equipment, took to slit trenches during a barrage, then went back to work. A number of men were wounded, but the field was completed in record time.

By February 1944 the lead bulldozer had advanced to Mile 134.5. At the end of May, the lead bulldozer was at Mile 190.4 (Warazup) where progress was halted by enemy action. Airfields at Shingbwiyang, Tingkawk Sakan, and Warazup were completed or under construction when the rains started. The end of May brought the monsoon in full strength. The rains, though later, were heavier than in 1943. In one two-day period at Tagep a rainfall of over 15 inches was recorded. At Shingbwiyang, total rainfall for the season was over the 150-inch mark.

Slides, washouts, cave-ins, and waist-deep mud in many places were encountered. All new road construction was halted and once more the engineer troops turned to maintenance work to hold the road against encroachments of the monsoon. There were black days, one after another. Six major bridges were swept away by flash floods during one 24-hour period. But never was the road blocked more than 96 hours, and great convoys of trucks rolled over the road into Burma all during the five-month-long rainy season.

The Japanese had to be pushed back to make way for the road. Tactically this required clearing the valley by a series of frontal pressures and flanking movements. There were several difficult river crossings. The Combat Command was comprised of two American-trained Chinese divisions. In later weeks Merrill's famous "Wormeaters" moved down the line. The Japs refused to withdraw and had to be pushed back by the sheer viciousness of repeated battles - Yupbang, Taipoa Ga, Maingkwan, Malabum, Shadzup.

Once in the flat lands, the road construction problems changed in character in three respects: (1) the old refugee trail ran across the valley through the principal villages. This was developed into a two-track combat road. Along it occurred the main action. It was the main supply line. (2) The Leda Road followed a different route along higher ground in an arc to the east and rejoined the old trail at the lower end of the valley. This eliminated the necessity of this section carrying freight until it was ready for traffic. It also permitted the use of by-passes, and basic work proceeded...
at several points simultaneously. The dense jungle growth resembled that of the hills, but the construction problem changed from sidehill cutting to raising the roadbed over marshy areas. (3) Flat land facilitated the building of air fields at vital locations. These were extensively utilized for movement of supplies and personnel, and as bases for fighters and bombers so that our air superiority could be maintained.

In April and May, the Chinese were fighting their way down out of the Hukawng and into the Mogaung Valleys, meeting increasingly stiff opposition. At the same time, a combat team of Americans and Chinese crossed eastward into the Irrawaddy Valley, and secretly moved toward the air field at Myitkyina.

The dry season was virtually over; the road was graveled to about mile 151; a final fifteen mile link to the advance sub-depot at Tingkawk was incomplete. Access by ground to the latter town was over the Old Combat Road, which joins the new road trace at this point, and which was becoming increasingly difficult to navigate due to rain. Construction of a pipeline had kept pace with the realization by now it was supplying fuel to Tingkawk. An improved gravel road ran twenty miles south to Warazup (mile 185), where a new airstrip was under construction. Fighting on the Mogaung front was only a few miles below, and the supply road was built right into the artillery emplacements.

D. Third Phase: "Myitkyina"

The beginning of the monsoon could reasonably be supposed to preface a general let-down in the intensity of the Allied advance; a period of quiet waiting and relaxation could be expected. Academically, it was impossible to supply the 50,000 troops so far forward of the railhead under such conditions. So reasoned the Japanese.

But Uncle Joe Stilwell turned to Brigadier General Lewis A. Pick, white-haired boss of Pick's Pike, whose problem also it was to keep the combat troops supplied. Gen continued operations in the valley be supported PLUS a surprise attack in force on Myitkyina - during the monsoon? It was a bold stroke and on General Pick's answer hinged the decision. He loaned Uncle Joe two of his Combat Engineer Battalions to assist in the attack and committed himself to support the operation.

The air field at Myitkyina was seized at the end of May. Surrounded by Jap territory, the Americans and Chinese clung desperately to their position; they depended entirely on air supply and air evacuation. June brought with it everywhere rainfall well above the average. The fighting continued vicious and without quarter, but by the third of August the town had fallen and the area was "mopped up". The advance was months ahead of schedule.

Meantime another force of Chinese, British, and some Americans pushed down the valley from Warazup through Kamzing and Mogaung to Shanhwa. This push was supported in part along a badly flooded road and by barge down the Mogaung River, but mainly by air. Eventually this force established contact with the Myitkyina troops, and the situation at the end of summer was well in hand.

Throughout the monsoon, the engineers were fighting to hold their own. The finished road stood up. Supply depots and medical installations were developed near the air fields at Shangwiyang, Tingkawk, Warazup, and Myitkyina. In spite of all the hardships, in spite of the rains, the campaign had been pushed and won.
E. Fourth Phase: "Road Junction"

With the coming of dry weather in October 1944, the ground forces again came into their own. The old road running through Kameng and Hegang to Myitkyina was rehabilitated and was carrying convoys in November. The new road trace is being pushed forward with incredible speed. Myitkyina is a great forward base with airfields, warehouses, and hospitals. With this support, combat has pushed down toward Aaths, Shamo, and beyond. Japanese forces have been almost completely routed.

THE PIPELINE

Integral in the project to supply China is the Pipeline. It was designed as a continuous system starting with a tanker unloading terminal at Calcutta; following the Brahmaputra Valley through Bengal and Assam; across the Tatkai Range into northern Burma; on into China with the eastern terminus at Kunming in Yunnan Province. The line parallels the Ledo Road from Assam to its junction with the Burma Road, then it will follow the latter into Kunming.

As the line progressed, completed portions furnished gasoline and high speed diesel fuel to the fighting and construction forces driving south. Later it was a vital factor in supplying aviation gasoline to the numerous newly constructed airfields along its route.

The line was divided into two sections: one section was a 6th line from Calcutta to Tinsukia, in northern Assam, approximately 750 miles, where it emptied into a large storage terminal. The other section consisted of two 4th lines starting at Tinsukia and ending at Kunming, China, approximately 1000 miles.

In the early fall of 1943 materials for the 4th lines began to arrive in the Ledo area, and in October General Pick gave the signal to begin construction. There were no trained pipeline personnel available, so Engineer General Service troops were pressed into service. Work started at Digboi, Assam, where motor gasoline and high speed diesel fuel could be obtained from the Assam Oil Company.

At first many difficulties were encountered and the untrained personnel made slow progress, but after a few weeks of practice these men were constructing pipeline like veterans and had completed 50 miles of the first 4th line before trained Engineer Petroleum Distribution Companies arrived to relieve them. On the second anniversary of Pearl Harbor the pipeline had delivered its first gasoline to Ledo, and the storage tanks at Mile 0, official starting line of the Ledo Road, were filled. The first section of the Tinsukia-Kunming line was in operation, greatly easing the burden of moving motor gasoline by truck or rail.

Many difficulties confronted the crews as they progressed. Although the line paralleled the Ledo Road as closely as possible, many times the right-of-way had to deviate from the road due to the terrain. In some cases bulldozer traces had to be cut down and around a mountain side in order to get pump equipment and pipe on the proposed site. In one instance, a whole pump station was dismantled and portered piece by piece four miles through the jungle and then reassembled on location. Numerous cable suspensions were constructed over the many chasms that had to be spanned. For one 20-mile section reaching up to fangsau pass, one-tenth of the line had to be supported by cables.

All this tended to slow down construction but by February 1944 the completed pipeline was supplying gasoline needs for the first 50 miles; by the end of March as far as Shing-mi-wiang (mile point 102).
Construction of the line moved on south towards Tingkawk Sakan. The monsoon season began with full force, and mud and water seriously hindered transportation of materials. Progress was slow and on some days only a few hundred feet of line were completed. However, by mid-summer high speed diesel, motor, and aviation gasoline were pouring through the line to Tingkawk.

Past Tingkawk the line was pushed on towards Warazup. Simultaneously work began at Warazup on a line to Nyitkyina, and from there another crew began a "meeting" line. Part of this would remain in place as a section of the permanent installation; the remainder isolated by a shorter route would be removed and re-used elsewhere when its job here had been completed.

On the section south of Warazup the old native roads had become impassable. Water was 4 or 5 feet deep along some of the proposed right-of-way. Material was hauled by truck as far as the roads would permit or dragged through by tractors. Then pipe rafts and pontoons with outboard motors were called into play to float the pipe where needed. Many times men had to wade waist deep in water to get the pipe strung; they then had to work all day in the same water to get it coupled together. Progress was difficult but four days before the October first target date the line was completed to Nyitkyina. The arrival of gasoline and diesel fuel through the pipeline released many cargo planes for other critically needed supplies.

The maximum output of the two 4" lines is nearly equal to the carrying capacity of 400 cargo trucks. In a 24-hour period they will deliver approximately 8000 barrels of fuel or 336,000 U. S. gallons.

At the present time motor gasoline, high speed diesel, and aviation gasoline are being dispensed at all required points between Ledo and Nyitkyina. One-third of the thousand-mile line was in operation by early December supplying the fuel for tanks, road graders, bulldozers, cargo trucks, jeeps, and cargo and combat planes.

Early in November an advance party for the China section of the line was flown over the Hump to Kunming to set up a Headquarters, and three Engineer Petroleum Distribution Companies followed soon afterwards. On December 1st, construction began in the China Theater. At the same time the line was moving south from Nyitkyina, on towards China, keeping pace with the Road. The Calcutta to Kunming pipeline will become a reality early in 1945.

Behind this feat, one of the epics of this war, lies an engineering achievement unsurpassed anywhere. While not an inch of the pipeline built has been damaged by enemy fire, work on more than one occasion proceeded under Japanese assault.

The vital urgency of the job was felt by all ranks who worked day and night under protection of sentries, throughout the monsoon when floods exceeded the protection of gum boots, and with malaria causing havoc among personnel. The work progressed amidst wild animals and snakes, many of which were killed, while leeches, unwelcome but tenacious companions, not to mention other "crawlers" of the jungle, were a pest. The Tenth USAF rendered invaluable aid, dropping rations, medical necessities and mail to inaccessible parties.

Three quarters of a million section pipes, each of 20 feet length, were brought from America. American labor employed received special training for three months in the States. This labor was supplemented in the first stage by over 7,000 coolies, supplied from tea garden labor and latterly by the Indian Pioneer Corps, 2,000 of whom were employed at one stage.
It is impossible to describe the day-to-day difficulties which had to be contended with, mainly in the matter of transport, in building the line. The pipe has been laid at an altitude of over 4,000 feet and will cross ranges of 8,500 feet in China. It has been suspended over rivers and laid under rivers. At some stages of the construction obstacles appeared insurmountable but were overcome, one by one. Every problem faced sharpened resources of solution.

When the full story is told and the stage-to-stage time table given, this construction will rank as one of the speediest engineering tasks known. Some idea can be obtained from the fact that it took from March to August 1944 to build the line to Assam. The line has fed successful operations in North Burma. Today it is serving oil requirements in Assam and Burma, filling thirsty planes, trucks, bulldozers and jeeps, not to mention thousands of cigarette lighters of GI’s.

The engineers feel that the worst part of their job is yet to come when the line will have to be taken over high mountains in China. But these sturdy, determined men of skill, who have overcome heart-breaking setbacks and virile weather, will see it through and enable precious fuel to be pumped to China in the common cause— to lick the Japanese as quickly and completely as possible.

MEDICAL SERVICE

Since neither construction nor combat can proceed without able-bodied men, the function of the Medical Department is to conserve manpower. This program has developed along several essential and interlocking lines of attack. These phases may be roughly grouped as: preservation of health by sanitary measures and malaria control, meticulous medical care to troops within their own units, hospitalization for more serious conditions which require specialized attention, and the handling of battle casualties, both American and Chinese. The integration of all these activities is no small project. The terrain, the torrential rains, the limited facilities, the difficult communications, and the shortage of personnel have been overcome by flexibility, ingenuity, and persistence.

This is the most highly malarious area in the world; dysentery is ever present in the native population; heat and humidity of the long monsoon sap energy and decrease efficiency; leeches penetrate leggings and socks to produce tropical ulcers—but all these have been combated by unflagging attention to control measures and the scientific application of sanitary discipline.

Initial medical care for the troops has presented problems which, during the past year, have resulted in shifting the emphasis from the unit surgeon as an implement of the organization to which he is assigned. Of necessity he has become increasingly the neighborhood doctor, wherever he may be. A new and informal administrative system has been developed to assist each medical officer along the road to provide integrated medical care, and sanitary supervision for the troops in his immediate zone, regardless of to whom they may belong. This system is reinforced by a chain of improvised dispensaries.

In the thirteen month period since active fighting began thousands of battle casualties have been treated in USAF hospitals. Many cases were handled under extremely difficult circumstances of housing, equipment, and transportation. Modern methods of treatment and the latent drugs (such as penicillin, plasma, and the sulfonamides) have been used side by side with
crude bamboo emergency splints, a home-made blood bank organization, and the use of rain water as intravenous fluid. The results have been most gratifying.

The difficulty of handling the wounded in jungle country, particularly in the summer months when ground communication is drastically curtailed, has resulted in increasing dependence on air evacuation. The last six months have been a striking example of the value of complete air superiority. Our unarmed supply transports shuttle all over northern Burma carrying reinforcements, rations, and ammunition, and returning with casualties and sick. In time, it was found to be both economical and efficient to rely on air evacuation. The tendency to locate hospitals with reference to major air fields resulted in an apparent heavy concentration of hospital beds towards the rear, two or three hundred miles from the fighting front. This meant, however, better built and better supplied hospitals. For the patients, it meant well organized and highly specialized treatment within a minimum of time after being wounded.

Liaison planes fly casualties back from isolated spots or from undeveloped strips. They are picked up at major fields by air ambulances or empty transports and distributed to the hospitals. This system at one period reportedly was handling one of the heaviest turnovers of air evacuation of any American theater. It has certainly resulted in an incalculable saving in man-hours of ambulance transportation, which is favorably reflected in casualty mortality and morbidity statistics.

In spite of the potential health hazards natural to the country, and the physical difficulties in getting the right team on the right spot in time, progress is always forward. The road troops receive the highest grade of medical care, and Chinese and American fighting men in this sector are getting surgical attention equal to any that can be provided throughout the world.

With the capture of Bhamo on December 16, 1944 and of Wanting, in China, by the C.S.F., the last two combat obstacles to completing the road were overcome. The Chinese First and Sixth Armies - American trained - under Generals Sun and Liao had done their job well and now the road can be rushed through to completion. Trucks, which we have had to ferry over the Hump will, before January is out, be traveling over the Ledo-Burma Road clear to Aunmy and, before Spring, we will be shipping in thousands of tons of needed materiel over the Road to China and our pipeline from Calcutta - the longest in the world - will be feeding the hungry tanks of the planes of the 14th Air Force. The completion of the Road and the Pipeline will mark an achievement that America can be proud of because the boys who built them and the girls - the nurses who looked after them - did their jobs under the most trying and difficult conditions anywhere in the world.
Resolved, That the Select Committee on Small Business is authorized to continue the investigation begun under authority of House Resolution 468 of the Eighty-seventh Congress for such purposes as said committee shall have the power and duty to conduct, and is authorized to conduct, such investigation, and such investigations as may be required, in accordance with the recommendations of the Select Committee on Small Business of the Eighty-seventh Congress.

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front seat, and this report is for him as well as the rest of the membership of the House.

Mr. Speaker, on yesterday I reluctantly relinquished my position on the Foreign Affairs Committee over committee assignments formerly held by my late colleague. I did so not because I am loath to go, but because I felt it would be the best thing to do in behalf of the interests of my State. I intend to continue to be as much interested in foreign affairs and winning the war as I was while I served on that committee.

There are a few things I would like to say before I get into the body of my report. First, I am neither a military expert nor a China expert. Second, this report is going to be candid and truthful.

I should like to say also that the Chinese people, as I found them and as I have always known them, are a people who are quite similar in many respects to those of us who live in this country. Of all the countries I traversed on this mission the Chinese is the only one in which I found everyone smiling. They are people who have courage and determination. You may rest assured that all will do all they can to help us bring this war to a successful conclusion, and they in turn can rest assured that we will help them and do all we can to help them achieve the place which is rightly theirs in the scheme of world affairs.

I would also like to say a good word for the Chinese costume. O. D. shows which have traveled to China, India, and the Burma theaters of war. This may seem out of place here, but you would be surprised at the way the morals of the boys and girls—because there are girls there, too—is lifted by some of these theatrical troopers. I should like to make special mention at this time of two troopers and one individual.

While I was there the so-called Jinx Finkenberg-Pat O'Brien troupe put on its show all over that theater. It was the first star troupe to make the complete circuit of the C. B. I. You heard all about Jinx Finkenberg and Pat O'Brien, but there are others in that group who are also entitled to a great deal of credit and certainly earned the gratitude of the folks out in that theater. They are Betty Yeaton, a dancer; Ruth Carrell and Jimmy Dodd, a song-and-dance team; and Harry Brown, pianist.

There is one other group I would like to mention. This troupe has no stars in the usual sense, but in the G. I. sense they are all stars. That is the little known U. S. O. Troop Troupe, which is made up of a group which has traversed North Africa, Italy, the Persian Gulf Command, the Middle East, and all of the C. B. I. It went overseas on September 3rd, according to the casualty reports, December 1, 1944. On occasions in China they even held lanterns for one another, because there were no lights, so that their audience could see the small formations of three, four, or five G. I.'s. Their names are as follows, and we should remember them well: Gene Emerald, M. C. and Sugarfoot, a negro who put on a cowboy act; Joseph Teryash, a magician; Delton Fcmm, accordionist.

There was another member of that group who had to leave it because of a serious illness.

The third individual in this category whom I would like to mention is Joe E. Brown, who did a grand job and who earned the affection and respect of all the folks in the C. B. I. area.

Mr. Speaker, I am putting before him this report for the consideration of the House a candid report of my findings as a result of my trip to China in November and December 1944. I have tried to look at China's problems realistically and sympathetically because I wanted to get the clearest possible picture. This is necessary if we are to understand our gallant ally, for not so would hamstrung the possibility of a sound peace in Asiatic-Pacific. Furthermore, because of the difficulties China has faced, and is facing, she needs the sympathy, forbearance, and active assistance of all the United Nations.

On arriving in India, I called on Maj. Gen. Frank Merrill at the headquarters of the I Corps Area in New Delhi, and had a long discussion with him concerning the situation in China. He said that the China Army was very good. If he was given enough to eat, the proper training, adequate matériel, and competent leadership. In his opinion, much of the criticism of the Chinese army could be laid to the incompetency of the field commanders. When asked about the Chinese Communist, he stated that, in his opinion, they were not allied to Moscow but were primarily a Chinese agrarian group interested in land and tax reforms.

He was well pleased with the fact that the British and Indians were now, after 2½ years of relative inactivity, going into the Burmese jungles after the Japanese and were doing a very good job. I noticed, also, on the daily statistics tonnage data, that something like 35,000 tons of supplies was anticipated being shipped over the hump for the month of November. Coming back from China in December, I checked this particular figure and found that actually 34,295 tons had been shipped, which was a remarkable achievement in itself.

In General Merrill's opinion, a seaport will have to be acquired on the China coast to be of real help to China and that, while the Ledo-Burma Road with its pipe line will be of considerable assistance, it will not be enough to picture decisively in the China theater.

General Pick stated that the Ledo-Burma Road would be responsible for a minimum of 60,000 tons a month when completed, although I must say that the Ledo-Burma Road as presently operated he had modified that particular estimate.

I visited the Twentieth General Hospital at Ledo, with an estimated capacity of 2,600 cases at one time and is manned by a staff of 156 American nurses, 80 doctors, and several hundred Medical Corps men. They have done a remarkable good job in this general hospital, as they have in all the hospitals along the road under the most difficult conditions and the most trying circumstances. The wards, generally speaking, have dirt floors, and the sides are made of bamboo and bessia cloth, while the roofs are thatched affairs. The buildings last from 9 months to a year and a half, and then new ones have to be built in their place.

In this particular hospital they have done a lot of work in connection with a type of disease known as scrub or puerperal typhus, for which our typhus shots are of no avail. The cure that the general hospital found most successful in combating this disease was the use of the waters.

By keeping the wards at a steady temperature, they have reduced the fatalities from 27 percent to less than 1 percent.

In visiting the 8 hospitals along the road, I found that the work being done in all was remarkable. I have seen one hospital which had no women nurses and one hospital at Tagap in the process of being activated which would have a colored and a white women nurses. From the experiences of over 400 American nurses along the road, I found that a great many of them been out there 1½ to 2 years and more, and the remarkable thing to me was how they had been able to sustain their morale and do the fine work they had been doing under the difficulties which were, and are, their daily lot.

I also found at Ledo that 100 silver rulers were being paid to natives for each bailed out American flyer brought in. Many of our flyers are forced down in the jungle, and have to spend 10 or 15 days or weeks, and many of them have never been found. The natives have been responsible for rescuing a great many and bringing them back to American headquarters.

On November 21 I left Ledo by jeep for my trip over the road, but before starting out I visited the plane-loading warehouses and saw how the Quartermaster Corps had developed a system of loading material in a very efficient manner and also a system of dropping stuff into the jungle with remarkably little loss. This particular area has had to use this type of method of transportation because of the other way of getting the stuff to our men, and they have dropped such things as galvanized barrels of water, motors, and devices, rations, medical supplies, ammunition, and so forth. Approximately 600 tons are shipped out daily by air from the Ledo fields, and a plane can be loaded out in a couple of minutes.

After leaving Ledo I stopped and visited the Fourteenth Evacuation Hos-
plut, the Three Hundred and Thirty-first, the Thirty-third, and the Forty-third Evacuation Hospital at Shinghwi-yang at the end of the Naga country and the town of the Hukawng Valley. The road so far, from Ledo to Shinghwi-yang, 102 miles, was a rough one, but all things considered a good road, wide, rough, with the last portion in the last mountain.

On November 22 I left Shinghwi-yang and on the road visited the military hospital station outside of Yingkaw, went through a lot of dense jungle, crossed a number of rivers on pontoon bridges, and observed the extremely good work being done by the engineer battalions, both the white and colored, all along the road. I also visited the aviation liaison field at Shadzup and from there went on to Warazap, where there are fighter and transport fields. The route from Warazap was through Kamaung to Mogang and from the most rugged ride I have ever undertaken. We averaged around 10 miles an hour for about 50 miles. I left Mogang on November 23 and took the next road of the enemy they faced. However, before I left Mogang, I had a chance to visit Gen. Liao Yio-hsiang and Col. Chien Cheves, an American liaison officer, Colonel Philipp. Gen. Liao Yio-hsiang, with his Sixth, and Lt. Gen. Sun Li-chen, of the First, were both doing a grand job to the south of the road and the reason that these two armies had the respect and confidence of the American military was because they were well fed, well trained, well equipped, and well led. It might be well to point out here that one of the chief complaints which I found along the road and in China was the lack of a definite rotation policy. The boys feel that they are the forgotten men at the end of the line. They resent the secondary status of their area in matters such as priorities and they are fearful of the let-down which will result at home when Germany is defeated. They do not want to be forgotten and they wish their folks could really be made to understand the importance of their work. We did not see any sign of defeat. The boys faced events, and the way our men bravely fought and well but with no crusading spirit. They got a job done and coming home. That is their war—-to come home to "Shaneri-la" or the "Old Country," as they refer to the United States, and to get out of the places they are in just as quickly as they can after the job is finished.

It is not our policy to fight in Burma except where necessary to protect the road. General Sulttan claimed that there were 250,000 Japanese in Burma against 6 or 7 divisions of Chinese, British, and American armies combined. The Japanese divisions that he was facing were greatly decimated as to personnel. On the British side, I found out later, had at least 13 additional divisions under their own command, in west Burma.

The busiest airfields in the world are at Myitkyina, Chiauba, and Kunming. The Myitkyina field is a marvel of efficiency. Indian pioneer troops do the unattended ground field work and we feed them. The British also clothe the troops of the First and Sixth Chinese Armies but our furnish them with arms, ammunition, and equipment. The Chinese liaison officers attached to the American airfield personnel are there to see that the food is evenly distributed all around. This is very important because otherwise some of the soldiers would have to do without and the result would be impaired efficiency, as is the case so often in China itself. At the Myitkyina Airfield, there have been as high as 264 transports loaded and unloaded in a day, in addition to fighter and liaison planes coming on and off the field. In one 13-hour stretch there were 586 landings and take-offs, and during October 1944, 196 transports landed per day.

On November 24, I visited Maj. Gen. Howard Davidson, commander of the Tenth Air Force at his headquarters and sat in on his daily conference. Later that afternoon I took off in a Billy Mitchell bomber to see Headquarters Col. Lieutenant-General, and Lt. Lieutenant Colonel Pinkney for Kunming. After leaving Myitkyina we went south to Bhamo and then east, and when we were an hour's flight or more to Kunming, I stayed with Gen. Claire Chenault. He expressed great confidence in the Chinese. He stated that the tactical situation looked bad due to the lack of our advanced airfields, but that the over-all picture was good as he had engaged 350,000 Japanese with his Fourteenth Air Force and he hoped to draw in 150,000 more. He notified me that he was still maintaining a number of American-operated airfields behind Japanese lines and that while it was a difficult proposition he was continuing to supply them all. In his opinion Japan is moving a great deal of her heavy industry to the Chinese mainland and he further stated that a Chinese landing is necessary if the war is to be brought to a successful conclusion in that country. He rates the Communists highly as fighters, and declares there is no connection between Russia, a conclusion which was borne out in my conversations throughout the rest of my stay in China. He is, however, sympathetic to Chiang Kai-shek in his dealings with the Communists and thinks he is the one man who symbolizes an aggressive China. He has nowhere near enough planes and neither does Chiang Kai-shek have enough supplies even though they have been promised them time and time again. There was no air cover in Kunming while I was there but the Japanese dropped their bombs at Chenching, 25 miles away. The next day I visited Maj. Gen. C. C. Cheves, the American liaison officer in the Chinese theater and he informed me that all the stuff coming into China is shipped to Calcutta and then from there to Kunming, where it is flown from planes for flights over the hump, and that in excess of 90 percent of the food and all building supplies are flown by the Chinese. He informed me that the generalissimo had just put him in charge of all internal transportation in China; that the Chinese Army is now being equipped—-from Ledo to Kunming over the Burma Road on January 22, 1945; and that the road would be opened for transportation—after Lendo to Kunming over the Burma Road by April 1, 1945, at the latest. It is my understanding that Generalissimo, since our first visit to him, has been told that the road is ready for S. O. S. for the Chinese armies soon and if such is the case, the problem of feeding and supplying the Chinese armies will be well handled.

I have been able to arrive at some conclusions on the basis of my few contacts to date. Under the present system, being conscripted into the Chinese Army is like receiving a death sentence because the soldier receives little training, food, and equipment. They are starved and poorly equipped because of graft at upper. The commanders hang on to much of the stuff they receive and then flood the black markets and enrich themselves. The administration of food supply on an equita-

ble basis is needed. The Chinese Army will not be able to fight as it should.

During my stay in China I noticed many conscripts but I did not think they were being handled very well. Many rich men's sons have bought themselves out of being conscripted into the Army for little as $500. It has been informed that $3000,000 CN will make one a regimental commander. Surely no sound type of solider can be created on this basis.

On November 26, I left Kunming for Chongking. When I started on this mission I thought the Chinese problem was supply, but now I feel that the most important factor is cooperation among the Chinese themselves and that this has been the case for some time. Conditions in China are really bad. Some people, for example, working for the Chinese Maritime Commission can work only one-half day because they cannot get enough to eat and many soldiers die of malnutrition.

Mrs. LL. S. J. Albert Wedemeyer, commander in chief of American forces in China, and was very favorably impressed by him. It is not for anyone to be put into "cold," but I feel that if any man can salvage anything out of this, that Wedemeyer will be the one. He recognizes the gravity of the situation. He is not fooling himself. He is not undermining the abilities of the Japanese, nor is he overestimating the fighting qualities of the Chinese. He wanted to get Gen. Chen Cheng as his field commander against the Japanese, but the generalissimo appointed Chen Cheng his Minister of War instead and gave Wedemeyer Gen. Ho Ying-chin as his field commander. While this did not look so good at the time, it very likely was a shrewd move, because Ho Ying-chin is the Kweichow war lord, and commander of the forces in the Kweichow province. Ho Ying-chin is now Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army and commander of the forces in Kweichow and Kansu Province.

In Chongking Maj. Gen. Pat Harkey informed me that the United States ob-

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All this for the purpose of carrying on the struggle and thereby saving American lives. There was some talk at that time that General Hurley would be appointed Ambassador to China. Later, when the news became definite, there was a feeling of relief on the part of all hands. No better man could be found for this important position. General Hurley tried, and is trying, to get the different elements in the country together so that a united China will result and a greater degree of cooperation brought about.

The Communists are a force to be reckoned with in China. They have approximately 9,000,000 people in the territories under their control and they seem to have evolved a system of government which is quite democratic, and they also are strong enough to have their authority recognized in the areas they rule. They make their own laws, collect their own taxes, and issue their own currency. The Central Government has somewhere around 300,000 troops in the Communist areas. The results of this war on the Communist and Central Government troops that could be used in fighting the Japanese are being used to blockade one another and consequently the gap left by China remains quite wide. The biggest single problem in the country today is this disparity within Chinese ranks. Our military and political representatives are doing all that they can to close this breach and to bring about greater cooperation among the Chinese. This is the crux of the whole Chinese picture, and much will depend on this gulf between these two elements being closed.

The Communists are well disciplined. They teach their young boys and girls how to use hand grenades. They have developed small cannons out of bored culs, which they set off by a fuse or a match lock. For armament they use captured Japanese guns, and when they do not have guns they use spears and clubs. Japanese steel helmets, telephones, and wires are other things which they have captured and used.

They have gone into villages which they captured, told the people they were spreading democracy, asked how many were in favor of reducing land taxes, interest rates, and so forth, which the Communists Army boys, and thus they are given a better economic standing. Then they form labor's societies of various kinds and in this way help to lift themselves out of the rut they have always been in. The Communists at this time took upon the United States as their great ally because they know that we are really fighting their enemy, the Japanese, and every time a L-29 flies over their territory, they sing the "American" and an assurance that we are their friends.

The Communist Party is the chief opposition group in China. They are not Communists in the sense that they do not believe in private property, but they have a strong program of agrarian reform. At present they get a great deal of propaganda and support from the peasants, today they try to cooperate with landlords or anyone else who will help them in their fight against Japan. They are more reformers than revolutionaries, and they are attacked by the problems most deep-seated in agricultural China—namely, high rents, taxes, and interest rates—and they have developed a political and a system of local democracy. They are organized effectively in the region under their control to carry on the war and to maintain their own standing. There is a theoretical agreement between them and Chiang Kai-shek, but such is not the case and the result is that they maintain their separate status militarily, economically, and politically.

The Chinese feel that they are too strong, that they will extend their influence wherever and whenever possible, and if allowed to continue unchecked, they might supersede the Kuomintang. While there have been incidents between the Kuomintang and the Communists there has probably been no civil war. We do not know all that has gone on between them, because of the rigid censorship which exists, but we do know that negotiations have been carried on looking to a settlement of their differences between the Kuomintang and the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek has made many trips to Chungking to discuss matters with the Central Government, and that at the present time a small amount of medical supplies from a Second American shipment has been sent to Yenan.

American influence has been to try to get the Kuomintang and the Communists to work together. This is important and necessary to prevent a possible civil war; to bring about as great a degree of unification as possible in the face of the rigid censorship which exists, but we do know that negotiations have been carried on looking to a settlement of their differences between the Kuomintang and the Communists. There is a bare possibility that the present crisis in China may be a means of bringing these two groups together.

On November 28, I visited several business men and friends in downtown Chungking in order to get their views on the present situation. It appeared to me that the Chinese business men had adopted a "wait and see" attitude. All depended on what would happen at Kweilin. If it stood, well and good; if it fell, the great retreat from Chungking would have been- In this date, the Chinese house has a leaky roof, and a shaky foundation. Whether or not that house can be put in order is a question mark.

I had a conference with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, son of Dr. Sun. He told me that there used to be a connection between Yenan and Russia, but since the dissolution of the Comintern it has disappeared. This is not a rise again as there is an idealistic bond between the two. Dr. Sun Fo said that the Generalissimo is now becoming more realistic in the hope that he will like to hear bad things, saying it was enemy propaganda and his subordinates, therefore, told him only for good things and consequently communications went from bad to worse. Dr. Sun Fo went out to find what was wrong and sent his two sons out to investigate the conscription policy. When they came back with their story of systematic and corruption he made a personal trip to the conscription center in Chungking, saw what they had told him was true, and called and court-martialed the administrator in charge. Sun Fo told me that about 100,000 of the two hundred and fifty thousand soldiers in troops under General Hu Tsunman in the Northwest area have been shifted to the Kweichow-Kwangsi front and that the old idea of the United States do the "job" attitude is changing. Sun Fo said that the generalissimo was the one man, in China, capable of bringing all elements together because of his ability and prestige.

On the basis of information which I have been able to get, I have come to the conclusion that both the Communists and the Kuomintang are more interested in preserving their respective parties at the present time, and that they have been in the war against Japan, each party is more interested in its own status because both feel that America will guarantee victory.

The Kuomintang is disliked more every day and this is due to fear of the army and the attitude of tax collectors; and is proved by the revolts of the peasantry, the party criticism by provincial leaders, and student revolts against conscription. It speaks democratically but acts dictatorially. The Kuomintang is afraid of the will of the people, has lost much of its popular support, and will not allow any of its power to be used in the way of agrarian reforms. However, the Kuomintang is still the party in China. It is like the leader in the general who has the franchise in the war against Japan. It has a powerful army. The Chinese leader in the general who has the support of America. On the other hand, the Communists have their elements of strength and weakness. Among their weak points is their spirit of sanctimoniousness. They look upon themselves as pious crusaders and dogooders. Their knowledge of the outside world is primitive; there are social distinctions among them, and they are totalitarian and dictatorial in their own way.

Their points of strength are they have a good military force, estimated at around 100,000 and there is more democracy in their territory than in the rest of China. Clearly the generalissimo on Thursday, November 30, and told him that the United States had sent over three of its very best men in General Hurley and (Wymoor and Donald Nelson. He answered that if they had been there a year ago the situation would be different now. I asked what was meant to look to the present and the future; that the United States had a great admiration for China and wanted to see her a part of the great power to make herself a bulwark for peace in the Orient.
When I saw the generalissimo again he asked me if I thought that China should hold at Kweiyang. When the generalissimo asked Donald Nelson, who was with me, he replied that between his first trip and this one, Nelson told him that he found less talk of post-war development and a greater concentration on the present needs of China.

On Saturday, December 2, I went to Chengu and saw the fields at which the Burmese recruited and serviced, going to and coming from Japan. The morale at Chengu is not too good, and the reason is the faulty rotation program. Among the bomber crews, morale is fairly good; among the fighters, it is fair; but in the supply units, it is poor. Furthermore, the rotation policy seems to work better for the officers than the enlisted men and it creates a bad situation.

In this area, $40,000 CN are paid to the Chinese bringing in grounded American flyers. This goes to pay for porters, and so forth. The guerrillas pick many of the grounded Americans up inside the Japanese lines and carry them out, but sometimes the process takes a matter of weeks. Then they notify a magistrate or police official who in turn notifies American headquarters, which in turn sends out a plane to pick them up.

I had a conference with T. V. Soong, Chiang Kai-shek's father, on December 8. He informed me that he and the generalissimo were in full accord and also that the Chinese soldiers, who were ill fed and ill cared for, is being attended to. T. V. Soong is probably the best known of China's leaders abroad. He does not have a large following in China but he has great personal prestige there and among Americans. He is modern in his outlook, understands China's needs, and now that he is Acting President of the Executive Yuan, he can, I believe, be depended upon to do his utmost to see that the necessary reforms are administered. Politically Dr. Soong informed me that the government was making at long last overtures toward the Communists. He was quite hopeful some solution could be worked out. He said China would have to unify internally to win the war and to have a strong position and a peace table. Economically, he admitted the situation in China was bad but one of his policies is going to keep inflation from spreading. He said that the generalissimo had too much to look after personally, that there were too many "yes men" around him, that bad news worried him, but that now the generalissimo was going to take a more active interest in military affairs and that he, T. V. Soong, would help him in administrative affairs.

On Sunday, December 10, the Chinese situation took a turn for the better with the Chinese. Although it must be admitted that this "victory" was due not to actual fighting, but to the withdrawal of the Japanese some time back and what has brought about because the Japs had evidently overestimated themselves and had pushed ahead too much too soon. In a way it has been confirmed that the Japanese are pulling up the rails of the railroads in western Kwangsi and transporting them to connect the Canton-Dong Dang in French Indo-China and which when completed will create an all-rail transportation link between Indo-China, the area of the south Manchukuo and Korea in the north.

I had a conference that same day with one of the generalissimo's closest advisers, and he informed me that the recent cabinet shake-up was demanded by groups in China long before it took place. The generalissimo refused to accede to these demands until he was ready to make the move, and then he wanted to make it appear that it was his own doing. This, of course, was a matter of face, and is a factor of great importance in comprehending the Chinese situation. This adviser realized the great need for food, training, and leadership in the Chinese Army, and he has made it a point to stress these lacks to Chiang Kai-shek from time to time. He made a report on the bad conditions in the army in Hunan and Kwangsi, sent a memorandum to the generalissimo to repair these areas, and confirmed what he had found. He stated that his report and the generalissimo's scheme are responsible for the removal of several cabinet members. He said, further, that the generalissimo could not consent to General Wedemeyer's plan to reorganize the Chinese in command before Kweiyang, because Chien as a general was in a better position to push needed reforms. I was further informed by this adviser that the generalissimo lacks confidence in the Communists, war lords, and intellectuals, and makes his decisions with these groups in mind. Later in the day I spent an hour with Mme. Sun Yat-sen, who said that the only solution to China's problem is a coalition government. She is not unfriendly toward the Communists but thinks that the generalissimo will not have anything to do with them. She further stated that China, to be a great power, must form such a government, and she thought that such a move would in reality strengthen the Kuomintang rather than weaken it. She made the statement that all factions of Chinese are "very much pleased with America's disinterested attitude" and that they realize that we have no ulterior motive in their country. Before leaving Mme. Sun Yat-sen, she told me that many people were very much worried and wanted to get out of Chungking, because they felt that the situation could not be saved.

On Monday, December 11, I saw Gen. Chen Cheng, Minister of War, and referred to him a Reuter's dispatch quoting certain Americans to the effect that we would land troops in China unless a miracle occurred. He termed the statements politics and said it was only helping the enemy. He was very confident of the situation and stated that he could be of much more use as War Minister than in the field in the way of command, as he puts it, "at the rear where it has to be done for those at the front who heed it." In other words, he has the authority now which he lacked in the field. We discussed the reforms needed in the Chinese Army, the Burma Road, and the present situation. He impressed me as a military leader untiring and well versed in his art, or know the reason why. Chen Cheng, according to all American military men, is his government's best appointment as War Minister was the best possible move that the generalissimo could make to bolster China's armies and bring war nearer. His belligerence is unquestioned and he is personally incorruptible. Among the many leading generals in China he stands out because of his devotion to his country, his word which is his bond, and his courage.

Later in the afternoon, I talked to Ambassador Hurley and he told me that the generalissimo had offered the Communists the following proposals:

First. Recognition as a legal party.
Second. Equipment of their armies on the basis of equality.
Third. Participation in the government.

The Communists would not accept these proposals because they feared their participation in the government would be too limited and their arms would be wiped out. They, therefore, turned down the generalissimo's three-point program.

That evening I spent an hour and a half with Mme. Sun Yat-sen, and at his request, gave him a frank recital of my findings. I pointed out the full extent of our help to him and emphasized that in an effort to assist China we have done everything humanly possible and some things which were thought impossible. To evaluate fully our assistance we should keep in mind the following points:

First. We have performed superhuman feats in getting material over the hump to aid in China's defense.
Second. We are doing a tremendous job in building the Ledo-Burma Road and its auxiliary pipe line.
Third. We have carried on operations in the Pacific which were all aimed at weakening China's—and our—enemy, Japan, and which must be included in any reckoning of assistance to our Asiatic ally.
Fourth. We have given China much in the way of financial aid through loans, credits, and such.
Fifth. We have tried to assist in a reorganization of the Chinese Army through developing training schools in this country and China, through detailed liaison personnel to the different armies; through better feeding methods; and through the activation of the Chinese-American composite wing of the Fourteenth Air Force.

We have done all within our means to assist China because we want to see her use everything she has to bring the war in the Far East to a successful conclusion. We want to see China a great power because we feel that she will be a decided factor in maintaining the peace in the Orient. We want to get out of China the most we could win. Last but most important, every move we have made and will make in China is dictated by one primary consideration and that is to save as many lives as possible. Everything else—everything—is predicated on this.
I told the generallissimo that he had had and would continue to have, our full support, but that he should make every necessary step to bring about the needed internal reforms in his civil, military, and economic administration, and I also made it clear our lack of any designs on China. I further stated that my opinion of the Chinese situation had changed from one wherein supplies to Chiang Kai-shek were essential to one wherein the need for cooperation among the Chinese people themselves. He replied by saying America did not understand a country in revolution and he compared today with its dissentient elements and the Kuomintang to the dissentient elements and the revolutionary soldiers of George Washington's time. He stated that he would continue to try for a settlement with the communists in a political way. I pointed out different possibilities to him and he asserted that he had considered them all. Americans, he continued, expect his government to make all the concessions. Why don't we try to get the Yenan group to make some? This sounds like a good suggestion.

Chiang Kai-shek is a dictator in name only. It is true that he is President of the People's and Commander-in-Chief of the army, but his power is limited because he has to recognize all factions within the Kuomintang—and some outside—with the result that he serves as a balance wheel and has to resort to compromise to keep a semblance of unity. No one would acknowledge this more quickly than Chiang himself. Though constantly subjected to pressures he has shown great skill in maintaining the stability of his government over the years he has been in office. He is a remarkable leader, and today he is the only man in China with sufficient prestige to carry through the war. He has had to be a politician primarily, a military leader secondarily. To maintain himself in power he has had to manipulate these groups as the occasions demanded. The results have been a hedge-podge of policies which the western mind finds hard to follow. The disincentives of this maneuvering have been manifested in many ways:

First, he has used something like 10 divisions to blockade the Communists has and thus lost the use of large numbers of troops to fight Japan.

Second, he has allowed Chinese military strength to deteriorate in other ways through his inability to mobilize China's resources; to conscript the college students and other able-bodied young men; to see that his troops received food and medical supplies.

Third, he has not checked hoarding; he has not stopped inflation; and he has allowed merchants and landlords to profiteer tremendously.

Fourth, he has failed to improve the condition of the peasants in regard to high rents and high rates of interest.

On the other hand, he is the one leader in China who has been under him. China has attained political freedom and the status of a great power. He is the one man who can make Chinese independence and unity a reality. His faults can be understood when the complexity of the Chinese puzzle is studied in detail, and when one compares them with the faults of the other leaders of the United Nations.

The seriousness of the situation in China has heightened the need for some reforms and he has applied himself to bringing order out of chaos. He has withdrawn some of his Communist objections from the northwest to the Kweichow-Kwangsi front; he has continued to carry on negotiations with Chou En-lai, the No. 3 Communist, with the hope, as he expressed it to me, "that a political settlement can be made". He has given his full support to the Chinese W. P. B. set up by Donald Nelson and administered by Wong Wen-hao; he has called for 100,000 volunteers from among the college students though he has not conscripted them; and he is seeing to it, under American help and supervision, that the Chinese administration is fed and that the Chinese conscripts are now being treated better.

He has expanded his cabinet and given the more democratic elements a chance to be represented and he has pledged his full support to the American team of Wedemeyer and C. W. Morgan. His intentions are good and he has shed some of his administrative burdens on T. V. Soong, now minister of the Executive Yuan, so that he can devote more of his time to strictly military affairs.

All these moves are in the right direction, but the question is, Has he gone far enough or does he intend to, and, is there still time? China used to be able to trade space for time, but now she has very little space and not much time. As I tried to impress on Chiang, the responsibility is now his as we have done everything we possibly could to assist him. If he holds we will get the stuff through to him; if he fails, all our efforts in Burma, over the hump, and the magnificent work of the Tenth and Twentieth Air Forces and the Twentieth Bomber Command will have been for naught.

We are committed to Chiang Kai-shek and we will help him to the best of our ability. The decision, though, rests not on our or the generallissimo's. He and he alone, can untangle the present situation, because on the basis of what he has done and in spite of some of the things he has done, he is China.

The American Government through General Wedemeyer, Ambassador Hurley, and Donald Nelson has been doing all in its power to bring the different groups in China together. This policy has been pursued not because we want to dictate in China but because we want the Chinese to cooperate with one another so that the full forces of their resources can be brought to bear against Japan. They realize that Chiang Kai-shek's position is a difficult one and that fears giving in to the Communists and its effect might have on him and his party. They think, though, that if the Chinese themselves can get together it would be to the best interests of China. If they do not get together the seeds of dissension will only continue to grow and the eventual harvest will be of such a nature as to make the Taiping Rebellion of the last century a minor revolution in comparison. It might even mean the intervention of a great power in the Chinese internal situation.

I should like to state, once again at this point, that the policy of the United States for China is one upon which motives are involved. In that country—and in that country only, so far as I know—our foreign policy is clear, clean, and definite. We are in China to help China and ourselves against a common enemy; we intend to get out of China just as soon as victory is won; and we, alone among the great nations, want China to be a world power, because we feel she will become the bastion of peace in Asia. The Chinese know all this and because of it they trust us implicitly.

I left Chungking on December 13, and I must say that my opposition to the Chinese alliance with Japan was in complete accord with the thought of the majority of the American civil, diplomatic, and military leaders. They want the Chinese to get together so that we can win the war in Asia, and they want to get the boys out of China just as soon as victory is assured. They believe that all of them is the saving of American lives. They do not care whether a man is a communist or not, just so he fights Japan and takes that much of the burden off our soldiers.

The weaknesses of the generalissimo's government are apparent, as I have tried to point out in this report. Its durability is a question which only Chiang Kai-shek himself can answer. It is my belief that they will do all that he can, according to his views, to bring about the necessary reforms and to achieve a degree of unity. It is his purpose, he informed me, to try and get democracy to the people as far as possible, and he intends to call a constitutional convention some time during 1945.

He has had, and will continue to have, a difficult problem on his hands. I feel we should give him every possible support, but only because he alone can do it. There is no other person in that country who has the prestige or his ability, and I say this in spite of the weaknesses in his government which I have called to your attention. In retrospect, he has been a great leader for China. No other country has ever fought so long with so little against such great odds. Furthermore, China is doubly important now because of the fact that Japanese heavy industry has been moving to the Chinese mainland since the Doolittle bombing of Tokyo, and this aids up to the war ending in China, which began in 1931—a grim picture to look forward to.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.

Mr. CURTIS. The gentleman has made a very interesting report and a very informative one. I was particularly interested in the comments on his visits to Gen. Louis A. Pack, who was the division engineer in the Missouri
Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. The gentleman opposite asks if I can answer what those elements will be and how far it is likely to go.

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Kentucky.

Mr. ROBINSON of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Kentucky.

Mr. ROBINSON of Kentucky. Some months ago we were informed—or perhaps the gentleman was present—by some of our Army leaders as to the armies of China. This important leader made the categorical statement that the Chinese armies had been and were now gone. Do they have real armies over there?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. I believe the gentleman quoted made a serious statement.

Mr. ROBINSON of Kentucky. Perhaps the gentleman heard the statement made that I have quoted here.

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. No; I did not, but I do want to emphasize the fact that the American military men in the China-Burma-India theater have great respect for the fighting qualities of the Chinese if they are led; if they are equipped and trained in the same way our own men are, and if they are capable led.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Montana has expired.

Mr. ROBINSON of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I seek unanimous consent that the gentleman be given an additional minute to develop that thought.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kentucky?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROBINSON of Kentucky. My question is, Do the Chinese now have what one would call a real army or armies, a fighting force?

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. If the gentleman will pardon me for going into some detail I will try to answer his question, for I should like to bring all the facts to his attention.

Mr. ROBINSON of Kentucky. I would like to have the information.

Mr. MANSFIELD of Montana. In Burma we have what are known as the First and Sixth Divisions which are made up of five divisions which are under the command of Lt. Gen. Dain I. Sultan. They were trained by the Americans at a camp at Ramgarh in India, and they have been remarkably good in the field because they have had the things given to them which we give our own divisions in China. On the other hand, where they have not had these opportunities they have not been able to perform as effectively. As running we have
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Montana has again expired.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

Mr. KNUTSON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the Appendix.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Dakota?

There was no objection.

(Mr. MARKHAM referred to appear in the Appendix.)

COMMITTEE ON WILDLIFE CONSERVATION

Mr. MITCHELL of Virginia, from the Committee on Rules, submitted the following privileged resolution (H. Res. 75), providing for the continuation of the Special Committee to Investigate the Conservation of Wildlife (Sept. No. 241), which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered printed:

Resolved, That the Special Committee to Investigate All Matters Pertaining to the Replacement and Conservation of Wildlife is authorized to continue the investigation begun under authority of House Resolution 237 of the Seventy-third Congress, continued under authority of House Resolution 44 of the Seventy-fourth Congress, House Resolution 11 of the Seventy-fifth Congress, House Resolution 109 of the Seventy-sixth Congress, House Resolution 49 of the Seventy-seventh Congress, and House Resolution 20 of the Seventy-eighth Congress, and for any purposes and shall have the same power and authority as that conferred upon it by House Resolution 237 of the Seventy-third Congress, and shall report to the House as soon as practicable, but not later than January 3, 1947, the results of its investigations, together with its recommendations, for necessary legislation.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

Mr. MONIETT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my own remarks in the Record and to include a statement entitled "Imperialism Is Indicted as a Cause of War."

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Dakota?

There was no objection.

(Mr. Markham referred to appear in the Appendix.)

SPECIAL ORDER

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under special order previously agreed to, the gentleman from California (Mr. Veenker) is recognized for 15 minutes.

PATENTS

Mr. VOORHIS of California. Mr. Speaker, at page A11 of the Record of yesterday there appear remarks by myself which cover about more than what I will say to the House today on the same subject. I had hoped to get time on yesterday to make this speech but, of course, due to the sad passing of our colleague the gentleman from Montana, Mr. O'Connor, we did not transact any other business. So I have asked for this time today because I feel that the matter contained in that speech in yesterday's Record is of such moment that I am justified in presenting it here when some Members may care to listen to what I have to say.

On December 18, 1943, I addressed the House on a bill which was then numbered H. R. 3874, the title to which was "An act to supplement existing laws against unlawful monopolies and monopolies, and for other purposes."

That bill has been reintroduced and is now numbered H. R. 1022.

This bill aims to provide that a patent holder may no longer enforce his patent if he is found in regular judicial proceedings to have violated his patent in restraint of trade and commerce. Very briefer, there are four main provisions in the bill.

First, it is proposed to authorize the United States to intervene in any Federal court proceeding involving infringement or the validity of patents. This is to assure representation of the public's interest so often disregarded in patent litigation and, after all, the most important single interest involved therein. In the second place, it would require registration of patent agreements, a proposal which has been advanced by both industry and Government agencies for a good many years. In the third place it would render unenforceable patents which are illegally used to restrain trade or commerce or to exclude competition. This, of course, is the heart of the bill. In the fourth place, it would permit determination of the validity of patents in antitrust proceedings.

In providing for the cancellation of a patent which has been employed as a part of an illegal conspiracy or monopoly, the bill will give assurance to the public that patents will be used for purposes within the constitutional grant, namely, for the promotion of science and the useful arts.

The Supreme Court in a recent decision has referred to the patent as a property right, but I wish to point out that after all it is a property right which has been granted by Government action and would not exist at all without this action. The necessity of action upon my bill is made immediately apparent by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Hartford-Empire Co. against United States, which was handed down a week ago on yesterday. This was a case where this company had gotten complete control of 600 patents and used them in a conspiracy to restrain trade. The entire glass-container industry is controlled through a gigantic patent pool. Only 2 results of this patent pool are to make consumers pay more for food products put up in glass jars and to prevent new companies from going into the glass-container industry.

There is no doubt whatsoever about the facts in the Hartford-Empire Co. case. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court, given by Justice Roberts, states:

'The district court found that invention of glass-making machinery had been discouraged, that competition in the manufacture and sale or licensing of such machinery had been suppressed, and that the system of restricted licensing had been employed to suppress competition in the use of patented glassware and to maintain prices of the manufactured product. The findings are full and adequate and are supported by evidence, much of it contemporary writings of corporate defendants of their officers and agents.'

The majority opinion continues as follows:

'...It is clear that, by cooperative arrangement of licensees, by conspiring corporations, over a period of years, regulated and suppressed competition in the use of glass-making machinery and employed its joint patent position to allocate fields of manufacture and to maintain prices of unpatented glassware.'

The first point I want to make, therefore, is that there is no question of doubt in the opinion of the majority of the Court that they had exceeded the law; that it was guilty of action in restraint of trade of the most flagrant sort. The High Court upheld completely the rulings of the district court in that regard.

The conspirators had a definite program to misuse patents—that is, to misuse public grants from the Federal Government. They stated that they had acquired these patents with the intention—and quote from a memorandum of policy from the files of this company itself which was published by the Temporary National Economic Committee:

'The block development of machinery which might be constructed, by others...and to secure patents on possible improvements of competing machines so as to "fence in" these and prevent their reaching an improved state.'

As Justice Black stated in his dissent:

'These patents were the motivating impetus in the campaign to subjugate the industry. Mr. Speaker, the Supreme Court found that Hartford-Empire had grossly violated the antitrust laws, and yet the majority of four judges—since three judges disqualified themselves and did not sit—felt that it did not have the power under the existing antitrust statutes to keep Hartford-Empire from granting in the future the 600 or more patents which it had acquired for the very purpose of using them in restraint of trade, in which way it had misused them.

This decision was handed down by four Justices of the Supreme Court: Justices Roberts, Stone, Frankfurter, and Reed. Three Justices did not sit: Justices Douglas, Jackson, and Murphy. Two Justices dissented: Justices Black and Rutledge. It was, therefore, a 4-to-2 decision.