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Resignation of General Patrick Hurley

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Mr. Speaker:

Now that the resignation of General Patrick Hurley and the smoke generated by it has had a chance to settle I think it is time that we look at our foreign policy and see if we know what it is. On October 10th and 30th of this year I made two speeches in the House expressing my concern about our boys in China and the Far East and also about our country becoming involved in the Chinese internal situation. I also made the statement that I did not know that our policy in the Far East was. I still don't know.

My purpose in taking the Floor at this time is to present my views on the troubled situation confronting us. I will do so by presenting the facts as I see them and without becoming personal, calling names, or dragging herrings across anyone's path. There is nothing to be gained unless we do consider the present Chinese puzzle in this manner.

In the first place General Hurley is to be commended for the fine job he has done as our Ambassador to China during the actual war period against Japan. His orders--given to him by President Roosevelt--were precise, to the point, and as follows:

1. To keep China from collapsing
2. To unify, replenish and regroup Chinese military forces for the purpose of continuing the war and thereby saving American lives
3. To bring about the greatest possible degree of unity.

These three objectives were always kept in mind by General Hurley and we can be thankful that a man of his character and ability was on the job for us. I do not know how many Americans realized it at the time but during November and December 1944 China was so close to being out of the war that only luck kept her in. The only reason why Japan did not force China to quit last December was because she had overextended her lines with too few troops and too little in the way of supplies and matériel.
ourselves, to exert greater efforts and eventually, to contribute in some measure toward the shortening of the war. Lt. General Albert Wedemeyer did a great job as the China theater commander; Mr. Donald Nelson laid the ground work for a Chinese WPB; and General Hurley contributed untiringly of his efforts to promote good will between the U.S.S.R. and China and within China, to unity between the Central Government and Yenan.

There is no doubt, in my mind, that General Hurley had much to do with laying the ground work for the Soong-Stalin Treaty of last August which further strengthened the government of Chiang Kai-shek and which I think was a good agreement for both countries.

Since the surrender of Japan the situation in China has deteriorated to a great extent. Within a few days after Japan's collapse we sent in the First Marine Division to Taku and Tientsin and followed this by sending the Sixth Marine Division to Tsingtao and elsewhere in Shantung and also the Seventh United States Fleet under Admiral Daniel Barbey. Why all these elements were sent to north China was not made clear to the American public in the beginning and, as near as I can find out, they were acting under orders of the joint chiefs of staff and, I believe, without the knowledge, in the beginning, of the State Department. This indicates to me that liaison within the top reaches of the Government is not very close. It points up the need for such a top level relationship between the State, Navy, and War Departments which, incidentally, was one of my recommendations to President Roosevelt on my return from China last January. Later, as public questioning increased, it was stated that we were bound by our commitments to the Central Government of China to help disarm the Japs and that our forces would be withdrawn very shortly.

However, reports out of China stated that by January 1, 1946, only 6,000 of our soldiers would remain in that country - showing a good sized withdrawal of our
China theater personnel—but that 53,000 marines and undisclosed thousands of naval personnel would remain for an indefinite period of time. This did not stop the clamor for the withdrawal of our men but only increased suspicion that we intended to continue to intervene in what many of us consider to be purely a Chinese internal problem.

Then, on November 21, Secretary of State Byrnes issued a statement as follows:

The United States Government will keep armed forces in north China until it has carried out a pledge to the Japanese Government to effectuate the surrender of all Japanese troops in China and transport them to their homeland.

The question arises, Why was this statement made 3 months after Japan’s surrender? Furthermore, what was so secret about it that kept it from being made public immediately after it was agreed to? It appears to me that had the latter course been followed the American public would have accepted it, the reasons for our pursuing such a policy would have been understood and the present disquieting situation avoided. It must be understood that our China policy, until Japan’s surrender, was clear and above board. Our postwar policy, then, and our reason for sending marines and naval personnel into north China is to disarm Japanese troops there. The next question is, How many Japanese troops are there and how long will it take to disarm them. I have tried to find out the approximate number of armed Japanese but I find no agreement on the total. According to a letter from Tientsin to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch it is stated that:

General Ho Ying-chin, Commander in Chief of the Chinese Army, announced on October 30 that except for remnants at Hopei and Shantung, 90 percent of the Japanese troops have been disarmed in the Chinese theater.

In the New York Times of November 30 the following statement is made:

General Ho Ying-chin, Commander in Chief of Chinese field forces, said all Japanese forces in China had been disarmed with the exception of 100,000 in Hupsh and Shantung Provinces.

On December 7, the Chinese News Service, an agency of the Chinese Government, stated that:
General Ho Ying-chin, Commander in Chief of the Chinese Army, declared that of all the Japanese troops in China over 60 percent has been completely disarmed.

Later, in the same story, General Ho asserted "that this work - disarming of the Japanese - "will be completed within this month." In the Washington Post of November 29, General Hurley is quoted as saying there are still one to two million Japanese in China. Whether or not they are all armed is not stated. The same newspaper on November 25, said there were 300,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians in north China and on November 28 it carried another story which said there were 3,000,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians there. On November 27 I also found out from an authoritative personal source that there were 500,000 armed Japanese soldiers and 800,000 Japanese civilians there.

The Pathfinder, a national weekly, states in its issue of December 5 that Secretary of State Byrnes "estimated 300,000 Japanese soldiers and 30,000 of their civilians remain in north China." The United States News for December 7, states "The first task of General Marshall will be to aid in disarming the 1,000,000 Japanese who still are in China."

It is hard to reconcile all these figures and they exemplify, by their disparity, the confusion of mind which exists in this country. In my opinion, the number of Japanese soldiers who need to be disarmed numbers between 100,000 and 500,000. In line with our signed agreement with Japan on August 16, we have to keep our pledge to disarm these soldiers. I feel, though, that a definite date should be set whereby these soldiers should be disarmed and our boys on their way home. That they all should have been disarmed before this is obvious but our pledge must be kept. It is my understanding that we will not have anything to do with repatriating Japanese civilian personnel, so under these circumstances, the task of disarming Japan's soldiers should not take our 53,000 marines too long.

There has been a great deal said about communism in China, in our State Department, and Russia's position in China. These questions should all be considered in
the light of facts and not innuendoes. General Hurley in discussing the Communists in China stated there might be some among them who look to Moscow for guidance, but he thought most of them were just reformers—outs who wanted to be the ins.

"The only difference between Chinese Communists and Oklahoma Republicans," he said, "is that the Oklahoma Republicans are not armed."

There are other differences which should be noted such as the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has its own laws, currency, tax system, and government, and also that while the leaders like Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Chou En-lai, and others are Marxist Communists, the great mass of the people in the areas under their control are as General Hurley puts it, "reformers" in an agrarian sense.

In the matter of Russia and its position I should like to quote a news story on General Hurley's Press Club speech carried in the Washington Post issue of November 29, 1945:

Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, who thinks the American people deserve more information about foreign affairs, yesterday told the story of the 1944 conference with Marshal Stalin in the Kremlin. He said the interview convinced him that, in Stalin's opinion, the Chinese Communists were not Communists at all.

The position of both Marshal Stalin and Foreign Commissar Molotov, Hurley said, was that Russia was not supporting the Chinese Communist Party, that she would support the government and leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and that she desired more harmonious relations with China.

General Hurley said that when he reported all this to the Chinese leaders in Chungking, they could hardly believe it. Then T.V. Soong, China's Foreign Minister, went to Moscow and in August there was solemnized a 30-year treaty in which Russia agreed to support Chiang Kai-shek's government and agreed further to get out of Manchuria and recognize China's sovereignty there.

"In all justice to Stalin and Molotov", Hurley said, "I must state that not for one moment while I was in China did they ever break their word with me."

The Soong-Stalin treaty of August 14 certainly was a pledge of outright support to Chungking and was anything but welcomed by the Chinese Communists. According to the press, it would appear that the Russians in Manchuria are pursuing a double course of assisting the Chinese Communists and hindering the entry of Kuomintang troops. It is extremely hard to get a really accurate picture of affairs in Manchuria, but on the basis of late reports it seems to be shaping up as follows:

According to the Christian Science Monitor of November 29, the Russians are
withdrawing from Manchuria on schedule. About the Charges that the Russians are stripping the country of machinery and leaving the field to the Chinese Communists, this paper states the Russians are making no official answers. Whether these charges are true or not, I do not know, as Chungking itself has said nothing official concerning them.

The New York Times of November 30 makes the following statements:

The Moscow radio said tonight that Russia has "consented" to a Chinese request that it defer "for some time" withdrawal of Russian troops from Manchuria. The broadcast * * * said China had asked for the postponement because "the Chinese Government was encountering considerable difficulty in transferring troops to Manchuria owing to the presence of Chinese non-Government troops in some places."

The Russians, according to the broadcast, had planned the withdrawal of troops by December 12, in accordance with the Russian-Chinese treaty of August 14, by which Russia recognized China's sovereignty in Manchuria.

The radio reported the Chinese as saying that their Central Government "would not be able by that date (December 12) to transfer its troops and organize a civil administration in Manchuria, and said the Russian acceptance of the request was greeted with great satisfaction in China.

The Washington Post of December 2 carries the following statement:

Meanwhile, Chungking got a great lift from the official announcement of a new Soviet agreement under which the Russians will delay until January 3 their withdrawal from vital Manchuria.

This 1-month postponement will give the Chungking government time to send administrative personnel and troops into strategic cities of Manchuria ahead of Chinese Communists.

It would appear, therefore, on the basis of these press reports that the letter, if not the full spirit, of the Soong-Stalin treaty is being carried out in regard to Russian withdrawal from Manchuria.

In the matter of Communist sympathizers in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department I can only say on the basis of a short personal acquaintance during my mission to China for President Roosevelt last year with Messrs. George Atcheson, Arthur Ringwalt, Fulton Freeman, and others whom I met in the Embassy at Chungking that they are high type, conscientious, patriotic Americans. The implication that these men have fallen down in their responsibilities is an impression that I do not share, because their interests have first and foremost been in our country's behalf.
Personally, I have every confidence in them and until proved otherwise I am delighted that we can continue to have the use of their valuable and outstanding services in the State Department.

There has also been some adverse comment about our military leadership in China. Our Chinese theater commander, Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, has done an outstanding job there. We are extremely fortunate in having a man of his caliber and understanding in this particular spot. I know there has been some criticism of his activities in China’s post war situation, but I think it is only fair to state that he is acting under the orders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and not on his own responsibility.

It is interesting to note in this respect that on December 8 Gen. Douglas MacArthur, after a 2-day top secret Tokyo conference with Admiral Spruance, Pacific Fleet Commander; Vice Admiral Barbey, of the United States Seventh Fleet; and Gen. Wedemeyer announced that recommendations would be made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding "repatriation of Japanese troops in China and allocation of resources." I suppose the "resources" refers to the disposition of American troops and material in China. Is it possible that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been making our foreign policy in China and elsewhere rather than our own State Department?

General Wedemeyer has been criticized by certain elements in this country and in China because he has not replied to a communication received some weeks ago by General Chu Teh, commander in chief of the Chinese Communists which protested American intervention in China. His answer stated his position quite clearly when he said "By direction of my Government, I deal only with the Central Government of China. My Government does not recognize any other government in China." In this he is correct.

When questioned about the presence of a United States liaison group at Communist headquarters in Yanan which supposedly implied recognition of the Communist government he stated that the group was there when he came to China and that its job was to report on Japanese operations and facilitate the return of American fliers
forced down in Communist and Japanese held territory. He added that he had not removed the group with the end of the war because such a move "might be misinterpreted" by the Communists. Had General Wedemeyer been in favor of all-out intervention against the Communists he would not have adopted the sane and sound policy in this instance.

About the position of the United States in China we recognize only the Chungking Government of Chiang Kai-shek. This is the government recognized by Britain, the U.S.S.R. and every other country carrying on relations with the Chinese Republic and this should continue to be our policy. Through Ambassadors Gauss and Hurley and Generals Stilwell and Wedemeyer we have done our best to bring the Kuomintang and the Communists together. This we should continue to do but not through the device of armed intervention. To uphold Chiang and his government we are helping to disarm Japanese troops, we have transported Kuomintang troops by sea and air to Shantung, and we have sent in Marines to hold certain areas until Kuomintang troops could get there and take over.

Just who was directly responsible for all this I do not know for sure. Certainly no Ambassador had that much power and certainly General Wedemeyer was not acting on his own authority. The Secretary of State denied any knowledge of the use of Marines in North China in mid August so the only place where this authority could have come from would be the Joint Chiefs of Staff here in Washington. This, of course, brings our new Ambassador to China. Gen. George C. Marshall, into the picture. Somebody, somewhere, made a recommendation to Washington as to what our policy in China should be. General Marshall known- or can find out- who made the recommendation from the field. He known, I am sure, far more about the Chinese situation than many China experts and I feel he will look into this situation without fear or favor and will do his best, as always, for his country and his people.

He is well acquainted with Stilwell, Wedemeyer, and Hurley; he has an open mind, and he will not be swayed by friendship but by facts. Able, friendly, and with tremendous prestige he will serve us well.
The appointment of Gen. George C. Marshall as our new Ambassador to China is, in my opinion, the best possible choice this country could make. He has been given, not only the most difficult but also one of the most thankless jobs in the world. His appointment shows how important we consider China and how difficult of solution the Chinese problem is. His prestige, courage, and common sense will all be needed in the greatest degree. Perhaps the problem is not capable of solution; but if we have any one man who can unlock the key to the Chinese puzzle, that man is General Marshall.

The post of Ambassador to China not only holds the key to Sino-American relations but it also, in my opinion, holds a part of the answer to the question of Russo-American relations as well. It must be remembered that Manchuria, where the crux of the present situation seems to lie, was where World War II started in September 1931. Let us hope that this territory will not also mark the beginning of World War III.

I have great confidence that when General Marshall studies the situation in China he will make recommendations looking forward to the withdrawal of American troops by a definite date and that he will propose an American policy toward China based on good will, tolerance, and mutual understanding.

The American people must be kept more fully informed of our foreign policy so that they may know in what direction we are heading. The American congress, especially the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, must also be informed.

I have spoken on China primarily, but we should remember that the Chinese situation is tied to the rest of Asia. The ferment in China is being repeated in Indonesia, Indochina, Burma, India, Iran, Syria, and elsewhere. What we need is not so much a Chinese policy as an Asiatic policy, because fundamentally the issue is the same through that continent.
The real issue in China, in the minds of the American people, is intervention. We have two choices, either intervene all the way or get out by a definite date. If we do decide to intervene, which I pray we do not, we must be prepared to maintain armed forces in China for years to come because the present situation will not, of itself, be cleared up overnight.

We must act promptly to clarify our foreign policy so that we may know, as far as possible, just what is going on, why it is being done, and what we expect to accomplish. We must not develop an "iron curtain" of our own. We must continue to uphold America's traditional China policy of nonintervention in her internal affairs. The settlement between Chungking and Yenan is a diplomatic problem with which our troops in China should have no concern. Russia and the United States should offer its good diplomatic offices to stop the conflict, but we should not, under any circumstances, participate in it. We must not allow a situation to develop again, in China or elsewhere, where the force of public opinion becomes necessary to bring the true story into the open. There has been no need for secrecy in this instance, and the results achieved by our confusing postwar China policy should serve as a reminder to us that the truth and the truth only will satisfy the American public at home and the American boys who are being forced to do an unpleasant job in north China today.