Dan Hall: We are in the archives of the Mansfield Library and we're talking with Bob Wolf today. The topic of discussion is going to be the BLM and the so-called "Sweet Swap." Arnie, would you?

Arnold Bolle: Yes, this is a major scandal in the State of Oregon involving the BLM and the land exchange with a man named Sweet in California, which led into all kinds of interesting ramifications and embarrassments and controversies, and you were in the middle of that, Bob.

Robert Wolf: Well, first I've got to differ with you on two of your opening statements. Mr. Sweet was a native of Oregon who lived in Coos Bay.

AB: Well, that was in California.

RW: No, as I will explain...but also, it wasn't near scandal because nothing ever happened. But let's go back to the beginning. When the Point Reyes Seashore Bill, which was proposed by the Kennedy Administration, was on its way through Congress to be enacted into law (Point Reyes being a harsh windswept section of the California coast just above San Francisco), it was viewed by the department as Park Service legislation. Point Reyes was all private land and, therefore, there was no reason for other agencies, such as the BLM, to be involved in, or comment on, or have any relationship to, the enactment of the legislation. I was working in the Congress at the time. I was with the Senate Interior Committee, but I did not work on the bill. Another person was handling park legislation.

But one of those little amendments that gets in got slipped in the House by the director of the Park Service, Conrad Worth, which permitted the exchange of private land within what would be the Point Reyes Seashore area for land that the BLM had in California, Nevada or Oregon. This was a very peculiar provision to include. In fact, this brings [me] back first before we go into the Sweet Swap, to Lee Metcalf.

In 1955 the timber industry sought to have authority when the Corps of Engineers took their land to exchange it for national forest land. This was legislation proposed in '54 and '55. One of the proponents of this idea was the J. Neils Lumber Company in Montana, which was expecting to have some of its land taken for a dam and flooding, and therefore wanted to be able to get national forest land. Lee Metcalf and John Saylor, who both served on the House Interior Committee, and the conservation organizations, decided this was a bad idea, and that it would lead to raids on the national forests and, when the bill was reported with that language in it, they led the fight on the House floor that killed that language, and established their position as the two key conservation congressmen in the House. If they did not support a proposition, it couldn't carry. That was the position that they held all the way through their careers from '54.
on in the House. So the very notion that any agency would seek to put such an authority in, everybody thought was dead. But Connie Worth got it slipped in the House bill. Nobody noticed it, and it was in law.

Well, there was some land in Point Reyes owned by this fellow by the name of Sweet. He first proposed to the BLM that it exchange that land for scattered BLM tracts in Northern California that had timber on them. Sweet was in the timber business to some extent. He wanted BLM land that was probably double in value to what his land was worth in Point Reyes. The Park Service had a fellow by the name of Tom Kornelis who handled land acquisition for them. He was a very active, dedicated employee who worked diligently at his task. It was the view of the people in the BLM (Neil Nelson was the state director for BLM) that the land that had been selected by Sweet was of far greater value than the land he was offering, and that he was undervaluing, in effect, the BLM land.

The way in which it worked was, [Tom] Kornelius [of the Park Service] would go to a BLM office and he'd get a list of vacant public domain land, and then he'd give it to Mr. Sweet and say, "Well, why don't you figure out how much it would take to equal the value of yours?" and then he would accept that, whatever it was, and the negotiations would start. That didn't mean the exchange was going to be for that amount of land. But they also had another one going in Nevada with another party that didn't produce the same controversy and didn't produce the same disparity in value issue.

Anyway, the BLM one with Sweet went rolling along for a couple of years through appeals and negotiations of which Sweet kept saying that the BLM was wrong [on the value of its California timberlands]. The BLM sent down to Oregon two of its key timber appraisers who carefully examined the BLM lands that Sweet [wanted] and concluded that their value was far in excess of the value Mr. Sweet said they had. They were even of greater value than the BLM appraisers in California said they were.

As this unfolded, BLM had changed directors from Karl Landstrom to Charles Stoddard, and BLM was positioning itself to close off many of the public land laws, being archaic and out of date, and was devising systems of land use classification and reaching decisions on retention of land. The California lands that were selected by Sweet quite frankly the BLM was willing to dispose of, but because of the value issue, they could not agree with Sweet on the value. Sweet appealed to Assistant Secretary Carver and Carver sustained the BLM position as to the value of the land, and so some two years plus of effort by Sweet was washed away when that exchange was canceled.

As far as BLM was concerned, that exchange was a closed issue and any dealing with Sweet was a closed issue. However, unbeknownst to BLM at the Washington level, Tom Kornelius had gone into the Coos Bay office of BLM and had gotten a list of public domain lands in that district. The situation in Oregon was different from that in California. The BLM lands in Oregon (public domain lands) were incorporated with the O and C and Coos Bay Wagon Road Lands (that’s Oregon and California vested railroad land grant and Coos Bay Wagon Road land grant). They were timberlands, and they were part of the allowable cut calculation, et cetera, and were managed on a unified basis. He gave this list to Sweet.
On the other end of the country, Stewart Udall had told Charles Stoddard that he wanted to see better cooperation by the BLM with the Park Service in their efforts to increase park inholdings, including Point Reyes. He had the distinct feeling that BLM was dragging its feet whenever the Park Service sought to use BLM land for an exchange, whether it was in the state or outside. I must say that Secretary Udall was exactly right. (laughs) But that was because BLM believed it should hold the land that it had. There was a big internal debate in BLM with one faction saying, "Scattered holdings should be kept, because they were scattered." It was like a theoretical insurance principle. If something happened to one tract it wouldn't affect another. Another group said that scattered land should be disposed of, either branch fulfilling the remaining grants to the states that were due them, or sold or legitimately disposed of.

Stoddard was faced with dealing with these internal dissensions. There was proceeding on a case by case basis to try to say, "I think here we've got to move ahead and respect the secretary's position and dispose of that land," or he would make the case that there was a valid reason for retention of the land by BLM. Kornelius presented this list to Sweet. Sweet did some exploring and put them all on a list that he wanted in exchange for his California land. It was a similar negotiating tactic. You list more than you expect. You list more than you expect. He knew from prior experience that he was going to have rough going. So the more he had listed (and so did Kornelius), the more BLM land they had listed, the more negotiation you could do to get rid of ones that BLM could object to and find, hopefully, some to genuinely equal the value of the Point Reyes property.

The BLM District Manager, Bud Vladimiroff, when Sweet brought his application in, rejected it out of hand. Sweet then got in touch with the Park Service and told Tom Kornelius that this had happened. Kornelius got in touch with the director of the Park Service, who then talked to the secretary (laughs) and the secretary told Stoddard, "You've got to go ahead and examine this. You can't just reject it without any basis, without any examination."

Stoddard talked to the state director, Russell Getty. Getty wanted to reject it out of hand also and Stoddard said, "We cannot do that; the secretary expects us to give these applications a fair and full review and accept them or reject them on their merits." There was another aspect of the situation that Stoddard did not know. The governor of Oregon, Mark Hatfield, now a Senator, had pending an application for the selection of the remaining in lieu lands due the state of Oregon and the state had selected some public domain lands, some of which were quite valuable and might even be of greater value than the lands the state lost. But that was beside the point—the way the law was written [he could get them]. But Getty had rejected those applications also. But the state had not appealed. So what Getty saw was not only the Sweet lands going, but the state selection which would involve something like (as I recall) 12,000 or 13,000 acres, and while it wouldn't be fatal, he didn't want to let go of anything.

Actually, if the state got their lands, they would have administered them under the State Forest Board, and they would have had the same basic kind of conservation management that the BLM would have given them. If Sweet got the lands he applied for, he would have cut them off and slicked them off, and that would have been it because they'd go ahead as private lands. So Stoddard was unaware of that. He directed his assistant director for lands, Irving Senzel, to send a memorandum to Getty telling him to proceed to examine these lands, and Senzel did.

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this but it was no big deal within the office. I don't even remember when it happened. There
was no need to consult me. I was assistant to the director. It wasn't a major policy matter. It
was simply carrying out the instructions of the secretary to examine something. It wasn't a
decision to dispose of the land.

But there was a third thing that was occurring, and that was that the previous director had
selected a Dr. George Shipman, of the University of Washington, to review the operations of
the BLM and suggest structural improvements and to confidentially, in his discussions with the
state directors, make an assessment of their relative effectiveness as to whether they should
be moved, et cetera. That started under Landstrom but was going forward when Stoddard
became director; it was well along. The associate director, Harold Hochmuth, was a strong
proponent of completing this review and Stoddard was interested in it too. Shipman had
recommended that virtually every state director be moved, and he had assessed them, and in
the case of Russ Getty in Oregon, had concluded that Getty was a first-class public
administrator but needed a change of setting—that he'd gotten stale in the job and had
recommended that [Getty] be moved for that reason. There were other state directors who
Shipman had thought were either bordering on incompetent or had reached that stage that he
suggested their early retirement was the best option. But Getty was not in that group; in fact,
to the contrary, he was viewed by Shipman as being very broad-gauged, well-intentioned
administrator.

On the other hand, Stoddard had found Getty difficult to get along with. Their personalities
clashed. He believed that Getty had strong ties to the timber industry. Getty had wanted
Stoddard to go to a private meeting up in the Cascades with a group of lumbermen at a lodge.
My recollection was that Stoddard thought that was a terrible idea. He had supported the
Advisory Board concept and the public meeting concept, and he didn't see that it would be
beneficial to go up to a lodge in the mountains and meet off the record with a handful of
lumbermen. He had thought up at that time at least six excuses as to why he couldn't do it
each time the invitation was proffered.

DH: At their expense, of course.

RW: Oh, yes. He has suggested, in fact, sending me, and I said no, I said, "I'm not the guy they
want to meet with. They want to meet with you, and if you're not going to go, you don't want
to send me. That would be counterproductive from your standpoint." At any rate, we had been
formulating in the Washington office as a result of the Shipman findings, some structural
changes, for instance, that would create the Boise Fire Center, it would create two service
centers in the BLM—one at Portland and one in Denver—and the transfer of state directors.
We had weighed returning to a regional structure and had decided that the political framework
and the general results would not warrant doing that, that we would stay with the state
structure—that that was a better arrangement from the standpoint of BLM. With the
exception of Washington, it was always going to stay under Oregon. There was no need to have
a separate Washington state office. In fact, we moved the Spokane office. We closed the land
office section of it ultimately.

We had formulated a position on the shift of state directors (and I was involved in the

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discussions with the other principal people on the staff), and we had taken the list of Assistant Secretary Carver and had gotten his okay. We were going to have all the state directors meet in Denver at a regular meeting, which BLM had, of its people to inform the various state directors of the changes that were going to occur. We had proposed to bring Russ Getty into Washington, D.C., to head the Division of Forestry, as I recall, and bring Neil Nelson, the state director of California, up to Oregon to be the state director there. Neil was a professional forester and worked for the Forest Service, had also worked at one point in his career for Senator Wellker (a rather conservative Idaho Republican). Neil was a first-rate state director, I must say, and certainly a person who, in my experience, would never have let his political views influence his professional positions and was a straight down the line first-rate public administrator.

Those were the selections and the others are not germane, but we went to Denver and for reasons I don't understand, Russ Getty was a day late getting there. The Sweet Swap wasn't something that the Washington office said anything further about since Irving Senzel had sent the memo to the state director approximately three or four weeks earlier. We really weren't thinking about it. It wasn't a national issue in any sense.

When Getty arrived, Harold Hochmuth and Stoddard and I went to lunch with him there in Denver, and before Stoddard could explain to Getty the move that he was proposing, Getty, sensing that [something] was going to happen, said there was something he wanted to discuss with the three of us in confidence. Stoddard said, "What is it?"

Getty said, "Well, I've been approached by the College of Forestry at Syracuse to become a professor of forestry. I have children who are college age and I have decided to accept that position, first, because I'd like to do it, and, secondly, because my children can go to Syracuse at a reduced cost. However,"—and he turned and looked at me because he knew I'd gone to Syracuse—"there's been a change in New York. The Board of Trustees of the College of Forestry are no longer the people who make the appointments. There's now a new Board of Regents in the state because all these state schools have been put under a Board of Regents and, while I've been advised that the trustees have approved my nomination, the regents have not acted on it. If there was any announcement that I was going there before they have acted, they might interpret that as a preemption of their position by the college and that would kill my move, and so I would appreciate your keeping it confidential. I expect to have results in a few weeks."

Stoddard agreed to keeping it confidential, explained that we had multiple moves in place, and then proposed to Getty that we still list him as coming to Washington to be the head of the Division of Forestry. Getty said he did not want his name on that list for that position if anything happened because there was no way that he or his wife and family would move to Washington. Stoddard said, "It doesn't matter because you're not coming. You're probably going to Syracuse." But Getty appeared adamant on that. My recollection is that we then juggled things around and listed him to be the state director of Montana because we were not going to move the BLM state director of Montana at the time, but we thought of some other alternative things we could do, and John Carver had wanted to have Harold Tisk be a state director—one of his assistants. BLM didn't want Harold (laughs) for reasons I don't recall, but

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some of the BLM people, Jim Beirne, the associate director for administration, and Hochmuth didn't think very highly of Harold Tisk.

We left it on that basis. After the lunch broke up, Stoddard said, "You know people at Syracuse. Call and find out if this is real."

I called Dr. Paul Graves, a senior faculty member in whose department Getty would be, asked him. I can recall rather distinctly, Paul said, "Yes, that's exactly the situation. Do you want us to withdraw his name?"

I said, "Heavens, no. Anybody who works for BLM is free to apply for any job they want, and if you want to hire them, we're not going to tell you not to do it. No," I said, "don't interpret my call as that. Just confidentially, we're making a number of changes, and Getty was going to be moved, and we need to know whether this is real. That's all I'm trying to find out."

He said, "Yes the decision will be reached in a few weeks."

Well, the state director meeting broke up, we all went back to our respective offices around the country, and about three days later stuff starts to erupt in Oregon with articles in the Oregonian claiming that the BLM is engaging in a secret land swap with Sweet and that several million dollars worth of BLM lands are going to be given to Sweet far greater than the value of the lands Mr. Sweet owns. There had been no valuation made by the BLM. This was simply an application in which the applicant (at the behest of the Park Service) listed a series of pieces of lands that he would like to acquire, and it listed his property that he would give up, and the issue of determining the equalization of the values and which parts, if any, should be transferred, had not even been addressed.

The thing deteriorated from there on out. The Oregon press carried these stories. The governor of Oregon, Hatfield, was fed information by the Western Forest Industries Association, who Getty had consulted with, and with the Western Forestry and Conservation Association (Harvey Glasscock's organization) and a couple of others, that the BLM was going to wreck the allowable cut in Coos Bay and give away several million dollars worth of real estate in the process. As I say, Stoddard did not care for Russell Getty, and they just didn't strike it off. I guess right from the first day that Stoddard became BLM director and they met, they didn't strike it off. Stoddard was furious because he suspected, I believe correctly, that Getty was leaking this stuff. He knew what had transpired in the meeting in Denver and that Getty was planning to leave the BLM, which made it even worse from his [standpoint].

The issue kept boiling up and over and over and erupting in the papers, and Stoddard exacerbated things by not only making public statements, not only about Getty but also about Governor Hatfield, saying that Hatfield was talking through his hat and other uncomplimentary things and embarrassing the secretary to no end in this, because the secretary was [not] enthusiastic about one of his agency directors assaulting the governor of a sovereign state and every effort that I was involved in. We called in Harry Hogan from the Solicitor's Office who came from Oregon to try to calm Stoddard down and apply some reason. None of us could get Stoddard to sit still and stop attacking these people. Finally, though, I convinced the secretary

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to call on GAO to make an investigation of the alleged swap. I said, “This is a no-win situation, but nothing has been done, so what we need is to have someone who could look at this thing and say, ‘Nothing has happened.”’

Later there was an Advisory Board meeting held out in Oregon at which Stoddard was grilled and roasted, condemned by the Advisory Board. Wayne Morse and Al Ullman were very concerned about it. Mrs. Neuburger took no [position].
RW: ...issue but also based on her husband's experience at Al Sarena, she knew that the merits of the case didn't mean much and the politics of the case were everything, and she saw this as Hatfield's effort to attack the administration and the timber industry effort to attack Stoddard. Ullman had close relationships with the timber people and was inclined toward believing that their position had merit. But this event hadn't occurred in his district. We discussed it with Congressman Bob Duncan, who represented the district, and he understood the situation, but he was disturbed because Stoddard kept pouring gasoline on this political fire and re-igniting it. Wayne Morse took the more pragmatic position. He said that he didn't really care how the darned thing came out. What he was going to do, he was going to attach a rider on a bill going through that prevented the exchange of any BLM lands in Oregon for Point Reyes Park. (laughs)

[Morse] said, "They never should have been in the law to begin with." He said, "I'd wipe them all out but I'm not going to aggravate the California and Nevada delegations. I'm just going to make sure there's never going to be any of these things in Oregon." He said, "The people of Oregon don't have to have the public timberlands used to build a park, and besides which, Sweet is a Republican." (laughs)

AB: How about Point Reyes? Was there ever any exchange or purchase or anything of that nature?

RW: The exchange never occurred. To this day, I don't know whether or how the Park Service acquired Mr. Sweet's land. They must have done it by cash. They sure as heck didn't do it by an exchange. The only other aside that I know than that is two. One is, I remember going up and talking to Assistant Secretary Carver about it, whom I'd known very well. When he worked for Frank Church I was on the Hill. We'd gone to Sweden together on a group that the Montana delegation had put together in '58. I told John, I said, "My Gosh, John, don't you think that we're experienced enough bureaucrats to be able to kill a Park Service exchange, to love it to death? Look what Neil Nelson did to the one down in California." I said, "There's no way that we're going to let that land go to Sweet. It's bad conservation. Let the Park Service use its money to buy that land."

Carver said, "Well, I'm not sure that everybody in BLM is that smart," but he agreed that the chances were good that that would happen.

The other thing was that at the University of Oregon there was a fellow who had been with the Association of Oregon Counties, Kenneth Tollenaar. Ken got a grant, I think from the Ford Foundation, to produce a paper that described the whole event, and to this day as far as I know, Tollenaar never has produced that. He sent me a draft at one stage. He's gone through the School of Public Administration at Syracuse and he never published the thing. The only other final personal note that I would add to it was Stoddard was convinced that Getty was paranoid. There were others at BLM who had that view. As I look back on it, I believe they were right. There are various degrees of paranoia. I think Getty had a non-dangerous case in the sense that he wasn't going to do anything violent to another person, not that type of paranoia. But he was certain that people were out to get him. Other BLM people who worked with Getty
in that period, whom I knew, told me that in terms of their relationships with him, they found him very difficult to deal with. The only other reinforcing thing I have (and I think we've discussed the Vale Project, in one of the earlier interviews) was that when that issue came up in '61, a mysterious editorial appeared in the Oregonian (mysterious as to source) that alleged that Wayne Morse wanted to have Getty removed as state director. I was intimately involved in the Vale issues and never, at any time, in any way, shape or form, did Wayne Morse want to have the state director removed. In fact, Morse's position was that the ranchers in that area had had significant success in earlier times having the district manager removed, and he was darned if he was going to let it happen again. When I went out to work on and resolve the conflicts in Vale, my instructions when I went out (because Morse arranged it with Clint Anderson) were to make sure that if the BLM employees were competent, they were not going to be removed and the way in which that was handled, Max Lieurance was the Vale district manager. I suspect that Russ Getty, using his paranoid martyr's complex, maliciously spread that rumor, which simply had no merit.

The Sweet Swap was an exchange that never occurred, but I do remember (unintelligible) reason for changing the law was that Sweet was a Republican.

DH: That's great. Well, I got (unintelligible).

RW: Dr. Bolle did make an effort to try to ameliorate a situation that couldn't be ameliorated.

AB: I was invited in because I had heard that the governor wanted to have him removed and that he was going to be sent to Montana. I was out there on some other business, so I went in and talked to the governor's office. Well, it turned out that the governor wasn't in but his assistant was. He really wasn't sure about it, but he said that there were reasons why this would be desirable but they didn't want to let it be known. And would I talk with Russ Getty and tell him that (unintelligible) Montana and that's where (unintelligible) the paranoid came on. He knew it was a plot to get him fired or something. He did go to Syracuse not long after that.

RW: Yes. There is one postscript to this that I think is useful. Stoddard managed to end his usefulness to Udall as BLM director because of the way he handled this. It's regrettable, but it was a fact of life. Shortly after that, Secretary Udall decided to replace Stoddard and he picked Boyd Rasmussen—

DH: Former regional forester [from Region I].

RW: —who was then deputy chief of the Forest Service for state/private forestry and former regional forester in Region I and a person with whom I had worked in Oregon. I knew him when he was a supervisor of the Siusla National Forest and I was working for BLM. He picked Boyd to be the director of the BLM. Boyd was a career professional forester. When Boyd came in, one of his jobs was to pick up the broken china that Stoddard had left behind and put it back together again. So there were two issues that we confronted. One was, Point Reyes was a dead issue—by then Morse had made sure of that—but there were the state selections. Boyd, then, resuscitated the state selections because the BLM, as a matter of policy under law, had to
accommodate these and other state selections if they were otherwise valid. The Oregon ones, while the state had selected very valuable lands, the law did not say he can't get valuable lands.

AB: Not at all.

RW: So we went ahead and, with a new state director, completed those selections and the state got those lands. In retrospect, Getty was frustrating, carrying out laws which, while one or another of us might not think they were good laws, were valid laws and were being used in a lawful, proper way to fulfill their purpose, and the state was absolutely entitled to receive these lands. Just because BLM thought they ought to be part of their allowable cut, it was no reason to hold on to them and deny the state its selections, and tell them they had to take some crummy land somewhere else that BLM had that has no value. When Boyd came in, the state selection was completed.

DH: I have a question for you. You mentioned that Stoddard was no longer useful to Udall as director of the BLM because of this incident. Can you elaborate on that point a little bit?

RW: To be an effective head of an agency, you can have differences with governors or senators or congressmen or the public, but Stoddard had gotten very emotional and intemperate about some of these things, unfortunately. That was what made him diminished in utility to the secretary. The secretary needs people around him who keep their feet on the ground and who have cool heads when issues come up.

John Carver, for instance, became undersecretary of Interior under Udall, and he approved some sale of lands that Interior held in Kentucky that had oil and gas under them. Senator Anderson became very distraught about this as did Secretary Udall. These were very valuable lands. That action by Carver led to the secretary arranging through the White House to have John Carver made a member of the Federal Power Commission, which was a lesser position, and Charles Luce, who was a Federal Power Commissioner, to become the undersecretary of Interior, which was a promotion, and announced them as a promotion for Carver, which it was not. (laughs) Carver knew it. It was a polite way of Udall saying, "I've lost confidence in you and you're lucky you're not being fired."

AB: Stoddard was not given another job.

RW: No.

AB: He was the head of the Resources Planning staff for Udall, and he was terrific in that one, I thought.

RW: Yes.

AB: Just inspiring and generating a real lot of new ideas. I had worked consulting for him there on the planning of the Upper Missouri River at the request of our Senators when the planning got under way and he wanted to (unintelligible) advising from Montana and the president at

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Montana State and I were the two selected. He was so busy over there that I was about the only one doing much. We planned the Upper Missouri River, the development of it, for various purposes, various Department of Interior agencies (unintelligible) and the Army Corps of Engineers. That place seemed to be sparkling with ideas—great people in there. Chuck didn't want to be head of BLM.

RW: No, he didn't. He kept saying, all the time while he was director, that it was a short-term job, a dead-end job that killed people politically. We were talking about Getty, but Stoddard was almost like a guy with a death wish, wanted the job to be shot out from under him. But Stoddard was a visionary, a guy with an idea a minute, and he was a terrible public administrator. He would outline the rough dimensions of an idea, then turn to his staff and say, "You know what I mean," and that would be it. But his staff didn't know what he meant. I had come down off the Hill to be assistant to the director. I had known Stoddard for quite a while but I didn't realize he had this significant shortcoming and Howard Hochmuth and I and Gene Zumwalt, who was the head of the Resource Staff and Irving Senzel, we were the people who had to try to make practical and translate into an action thing Stoddard's ideas. There were times when we didn't have the foggiest notion of what he really meant and nobody else did.

But he knew. He was not very good at communicating and he wasn't very good at sitting down and following through and nailing something down and saying, "This is the way I want to do it. This is how it'll work." He could get to the point and go on to something else. He was a very interesting but frustrating guy to work for. It's a really good case study in public administration because you had one kind of a guy running the agency and you had other people around in the agency and you had this communications problem.

AB: He needed...I'm not sure what he needed. (Unintelligible) planning staff (unintelligible) took care of the various housekeeping things.

RW: That was the disturbing thing about it. You could never get him to say, "These are the lines of authority and communication," so he had the agency marching off in three directions at once on an idea, on numerous things.

AB: (Unintelligible) resources planning staff. That's where they had to go.

RW: That's where he really deserved to be, in that kind of job.

AB: That thing just sort of folded after he left it.

RW: Yes. Stoddard made a lot of great contributions to resource conservation in his time, and I'm sure he was, for instance, a very effective member of the Board of the Wilderness Society, on which he served. But that's a different job than running an agency or a large organization day to day. Stoddard wasn't a guy for running a large organization day to day.

AB: He stepped on president of the Wilderness Society when Bill Turnage came on because they both agreed that they couldn't stand two hard-headed guys like that.
RW: I think that completes the Sweet Swap.

[End of Interview]