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Mike Mansfield's Approach to U.S.-Western Europe Relations 1946-1971

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MIKE MANSFIELD'S APPROACH TO U.S.-WESTERN EUROPE
RELATIONS, 1946-1971

by

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This thesis examines Congressman and Senator Mike Mansfield's approach to the foreign policy of the United States in regard to Western Europe, particularly with respect to American forces stationed in Europe. Mansfield's views on foreign affairs grew out of his belief that the United States must act as a responsible world power, using its powers to help create a world order based on equanimity and consent of nations, not on interference and contrivance. Thus, after Mansfield was convinced that Western Europe had recovered from the devastation of World War Two, he devoted his attention to the creation of a world order which granted more responsibility to Western Europe. Mansfield was convinced that if Western Europe assumed a larger burden in world affairs and more of the responsibilities of securing peace, the world would be a better, safer place.

Ultimately, Mansfield measured the success or failure of U.S. foreign policy based upon Western Europe's role in world affairs. If Western Europe acted as a united force, the United States would avoid the bull in the china shop syndrome. Thus, Mansfield promoted U.S. policies which supported an integrated and independent Europe. Toward that end, he gently, and sometimes not so gently, pushed the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations to move in that direction.

The first part of this thesis examines the development of Mansfield's approach to U.S.-European relations; the second part explores Mansfield's response to the Berlin crises of the late 1950s and early 1960s; and the third part outlines Mansfield's effort to lobby those in charge of foreign policy to make some fundamental changes in the foreign policy of the United States.
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No, he did not solve all the problems, because often they were unsolvable. The point is that he always tried—and hard—and the larger point is, we always knew it.

-- K. Ross Toole
INTRODUCTION

Even before winning Montana's Western District Congressional seat in 1942, Mansfield, as a lecturer in history at the University of Montana, made a habit of meticulously studying and analyzing foreign affairs. He once wrote: "It has been said that the two great loves of my life are the University and the study of foreign affairs. I readily acknowledge a lasting liaison with the first and a deep absorption in the second."\(^{1}\) From his "deep absorption" in foreign affairs, whether as a hobby, as a teacher, or as a politician, he developed, for his day, a unique approach to U.S. foreign policy. This thesis analyzes Mansfield's approach to U.S. policy in Europe.

As a congressman, Mansfield met the challenges of the Cold War by effectively combining moralistic yearnings with the practical pursuit of national self-interest. Such an approach to foreign relations has made it impossible to categorize Mansfield's statesmanship in white or black; it would be misleading to label Mansfield's approach to foreign affairs simply as realpolitik, purely idealistic, partisan or isolationist. Mansfield would have had it no other way, for he believed labels and stereotypes impeded the success of a statesman. Rather, to Mansfield, a successful statesman and a successful foreign policy needed to be flexible. To ensure success in foreign affairs, he believed it necessary to have many options, to adapt policy to changing situations, and to search constantly for new solutions for old problems.
As a result of this approach to foreign affairs, some have considered Mansfield a maverick, outside of the mainstream, and have regarded his approach potentially detrimental to the security of the United States. On the other hand, others have argued that his real genius as a statesman lay in his maverick approach to foreign policy.

This thesis will stress the latter evaluation in its examination of Mansfield's approach to Western Europe and the United States' relations from 1946-1971. The task is complex due to the complexities of Mansfield's approach to and his extensive involvement in issues of foreign policy. Mansfield's attitudes are best demonstrated by his approach to U.S.-West European relations in view of the Cold War because of its centrality to U.S. foreign policies.

Mansfield's approach to U.S.-West European relations will be divided into three parts. The first part encompasses Mansfield's views on the United States' methods to ensure both world peace and its own security in the postwar period from 1946-1951. Mansfield's views on the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, military assistance to Western Europe and the United Nations will be explored in order to demonstrate Mansfield's perspective on the creation of a postwar order and the shaping of the future. Particular emphasis will be placed on Mansfield's analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each program or institution and his warnings about the potential shortfalls of U.S. Cold War policies.

The second part will outline his questioning whether established Cold War policies did in fact guarantee world peace and security for
the long term. By narrowly focusing on Mansfield's reaction to the East-West confrontation over Berlin from 1959 to 1962, it will show that Mansfield offered alternatives to American foreign policy in order to break the deadlock between East and West.

After Berlin, Mansfield continued to question whether the arms race, a large standing army (especially overseas), and a steady stream of military and economic aid to countries around the globe had provided for America's security. He worried that it taxed the resources of the United States. Because of that concern, he questioned the extent to which these Cold War policies secured Western security for the long term.

The third part of this thesis will explore Mansfield's attempt to turn the Senate's attention to American foreign policy. Specifically, it will examine the background of, and the debate in the Senate over, Mansfield's attempt to立法 the withdrawal of 150,000 U.S. troops in Western Europe.

It should be noted that Senator Mike Mansfield held a number of important posts during his twenty-four years in the Senate. The most respected and important job he held was Senate Majority Leader. He also cherished his seat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. While both positions gave him great influence on U.S. foreign policy, by no means did he have the power to formulate or to determine American foreign affairs. Indeed, Mansfield, conscious of the "advice and consent" clause in the Constitution, mindfully respected the executive branch's right to determine foreign policy. In fact, his whole career
is marked with advice and consent to five presidents. Never did he attempt to take control and actually formulate U.S. foreign policy.

This thesis will attempt to establish that Mansfield was a voice in the wilderness in regard to the direction of the foreign policy of the United States. Nevertheless, even against insurmountable forces, Mansfield worked unceasingly to infuse fairness into the foreign policy of the United States. He could not be satisfied with himself if he did not at least make the attempt.
CHAPTER ONE

THE FORMATION OF MIKE MANSFIELD'S APPROACH TO U.S.-WESTERN EUROPE RELATIONS, 1946-1959

The enormity of the task before all of them, after the wars in Europe and Asia ended in 1945, only slowly revealed itself. As it did so, it began to appear as just a bit less formidable than that described in the first chapter of Genesis.

-- Dean Acheson
Present at the Creation

Geography had been the United States' best ally during World War Two. The vast expanses of the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans had protected the United States from the physical destruction experienced in Europe and Asia. Emerging from the war with its industrial base stronger than any other country in the world, the United States occupied the position as the dominant world power. From its new status as the indisputable world power came many new responsibilities, of which the grandest responsibility was how to ensure peace and prosperity for all nations in the face of the destruction which World War Two had wrought on Europe and Asia.

Even Acheson's hyperbole could not exaggerate the problem. In fact, Acheson had not completed the analogy in Present at the Creation; for as God created man in his image, the United States resolved to create the new world order in its own image. The model consisted of free trade with free markets and free men.
It was a natural course, in part, because the creators believed the economic competition of the 1920s and 1930s was partly responsible for World War Two. Thus, the creators proposed that if economic competition were replaced by interdependency and cooperation, peace and prosperity would be secured. Moreover, American statesmen were products of the American tradition of equal opportunity in foreign trade and foreign investment. In 1767, American colonist Nathaniel Ames advised his fellow colonists that "trade and commerce" were "as necessary to a state as wings to a bird."\(^1\) President Truman said "large volume of soundly based international trade" was essential "to achieve prosperity for the United States, build a durable structure of world economy and attain our goal of world peace and security."\(^2\) From Ames to Truman, the simplistic notion of free trade as the natural pursuit of a nation had evolved into the notion that without free trade world peace and prosperity would be jeopardized.

Clearly, the U.S. stood to benefit economically from such a world order, but American statesmen pointed out those areas physically devastated by the war would equally benefit from democratic capitalism because the innate strengths of this world order stood on economic reciprocity. In such a system, trading nations would naturally agree to cooperate with each other in order to ensure that equilibrium in trade would be maintained. Thus, it would be impossible for one nation to dominate such a system. To guarantee that the system ran properly, however, international agencies were established, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and the
Export-Import Bank. The system, however, needed a push to get started, and the United States gave it the needed push through the implementation of the Marshall Plan.\(^3\)

Representative Mike Mansfield wholly agreed with the goals of the Truman administration's foreign policy in the immediate postwar period. In a speech in 1946 Mansfield reminded his audience that "the greatest damage to the free nations has been largely self-inflicted." He continued that two world wars had occurred because of "the disunity of the Western European regions." According to Mansfield, these wars "were attempted suicides on the part of Western Europe."\(^4\) The former history teacher pointed out that now the world was a more dangerous place because of the invention of nuclear weapons. A third world war would definitely be the last war fought on the earth. He declared that Europe had twice eviscerated itself; it could not be allowed a third attempt. Thus, to Mansfield, American action to help Europe recover from World War Two needed little debate.

Mansfield also worried about an environment in Europe in which the communist party could make momentous gains by probing "among the charred and smoking ruins."\(^5\) He believed that such gains could once again engulf Europe in war. Both concerns led Mansfield to agree with the Truman administration's decision to rescue Europe from economic privation.

The first distinct sign of Mansfield's approach to the Cold War surfaced over the role of the United Nations in world affairs. Mansfield believed once the United Nations became a viable organization it would
supersede the United States' role not only in European affairs, but also in world affairs. The Truman administration did not share this view. George Kennan, at the time head of the Policy Planning staff and chief responsible for devising foreign policy in the Truman administration, let it be known that he considered the United Nations an illusion, having little significance on world affairs. Kennan specifically blamed the United Nations' ineffectiveness on its slow parliamentary process and its lack of a police force to enforce its declaration. Kennan and the Truman administration considered the United Nations a paper tiger in a world which needed a real tiger.

The idea behind the United Nations—nations cooperating together to solve problems and maintain peace—captured Mansfield's imagination. He proposed to one audience that, through the United Nations, nations could "eventually find the peace all mankind craves." On another occasion, he said if the United Nations could establish credibility, "this generation may yet be able to title its chapter in history, not the 'Descent into Barbarism' but 'The Establishment of World Order.'" Mansfield also proclaimed that the United Nations would eventually administer "the financial needs of the world and . . . take the burden off the shoulders of the United States."

To gain a clearer understanding of Mansfield's foreign policy, his initial enthusiasm for the United Nations must not be lightly passed over, especially in the context of the Truman Doctrine. Mansfield found lamentable Truman's decision in March 1947 to send military aid to Greece and Turkey while bypassing the United Nations. He believed
the United Nations should have had an active role in solving the problems in Greece and Turkey.\textsuperscript{10}

Ultimately the Korean War, and the United Nations' role in the Korean War, diluted Mansfield's hope that the United Nations could be the eventual guarantor of world peace. In fact, by the spring of 1952, Mansfield had lost hope that the United Nations could establish and maintain a world order. On February 2, 1952 he admitted that the United Nations had been "oversold" to the American people.\textsuperscript{11}  Certainly he had had a part in overselling the United Nations to the American public but, because of his admiration for the idea behind the United Nations, Mansfield kept alive his hope for the United Nations as the institution to secure peace and prosperity.

At the same time Mansfield stressed the importance of the United Nations as the ideal institution he recognized the fact that the threat by the Soviet Union to the redevelopment of a liberal economic and political order in Western Europe meant that the United States had to take an active role in Western Europe's redevelopment. Thus, Mansfield eventually did support aid to Greece and Turkey because he believed: "If we [the United States] reject this legislation we give notice to the U.S.S.R. that we do not propose to do anything to stop or to interfere with its expansion policy."\textsuperscript{12}  However, while Mansfield voted for the bill which granted military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, he did so with hesitations. While he believed that if the United States refused to send aid to Greece and Turkey the communists might gain control, he also weighed the potential harmful implications
such an intervention might have. After all Mansfield was aware that never in the history of the United States had the United States intervened on such a scale proposed by the Greek-Turkish aid bill in a time of peace. Realizing this intervention might be setting some bad precedents, he wanted to be on record citing the inherent traps of such an initiative.  

Thus, on March 30, 1947, the Boston Herald paraphrased Mansfield to the effect that Mansfield thought American aid to Greece and Turkey could lead to an American type of imperialism and possibly create a precedent for repetition of such aid in a patchwork effort to dam the western world against a militant communism. Not yet meaning to be a Cassandra, Mansfield was merely analyzing all possible long-term effects of U.S. aid in Greece and Turkey.

He also wanted his fellow congressmen to realize that U.S. aid would be supporting two notoriously corrupt governments. From his own sources, which included a trip he had taken to Greece and Turkey, he knew corruption ran rampant throughout the dictatorships of Greece and Turkey. He warned that it would be naive for Congress to believe democracies in Greece and Turkey would flower out of U.S. aid, and he suggested that U.S. aid should be only given based on Greece and Turkey's progression toward democracy. He pointed out to his fellow colleagues that in Greece and Turkey the wealthiest did not pay any taxes. Why, he asked, should the United States support the governments of Greece and Turkey when the wealthiest citizens of Greece and Turkey were not doing their part to support the development of their own countries? Consequently, in his view, economic and military aid from
the United States would go to waste if Turkey and Greece remained politically and socially regressive.

Mansfield believed that, in part, the success of U.S. aid depended upon the nature of the government receiving the aid; it was senseless to give aid to governments whose actions made enemies among their own citizens. Accordingly, on April 21, 1947, he put forth in the House Foreign Affairs Committee an amendment he hoped to attach to the Greek-Turkish aid bill which stated that "any government furnished assistance under this Act [aid to Greece and Turkey] shall agree to undertake within six months after the enactment thereof a bona fide effort through taxation to support its own national reconstruction, rehabilitation, and economy."\(^\text{17}\) Mansfield commented U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey would be successful only if the United States "help[ed] these people to help themselves." The United States, he believed, would make a great mistake if it bore "the entire burden."\(^\text{18}\) Political concerns also provided a compelling reason for Mansfield's ambivalence on aid to Greece and Turkey. The majority of letters from Montana which poured into Mansfield's office adamantly opposed the United States sending aid to Turkey and Greece. Some of his constituents worried that the Truman administration was leading the country down the path to war with the Soviet Union; others railed against the United States protecting for the British what they could no longer protect for themselves. Some asserted U.S. aid only protected the assets of the rich in Greece and propped up corrupt governments. From Butte, Montana, came a letter signed by fifteen "miner's[sic] wives" who were "horrified at the idea
of spending our dollars, and, inevitably, our boys, to support monarchy anywhere in the world—the thought is wholly un-American." And they were "opposed to the idea of intervention on either side of a civil war in any other country." Feed the starving, yes"; the letter went on, "Butt in on any other country's internal affairs, no." And they believed the U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey would "nullify the United Nations." From Missoula, Montana, Mr. and Mrs. H. Colomb sent Mansfield a card which stated: "We strongly object to the plan of President Truman in sending military aid to Greece and the passing up of the U.N." From Billings, Montana, Horace E. Jones wrote: "Mr. Truman is trying to embark the US on an imperialistic course participating in the internal affairs of foreign nations, which is similar to the past conduct of France and England which the people of America have condemned for many years." Mr. Jones continued: "If we are going to successfully stop the spread of communism, it won't be by such outmoded tactics as power politics. It will be to cooperate with other democratic nations in the U.N. to help European nations to get on their feet economically, together with a long range program to increase world trade and world prosperity. . . . The only chance we have for permanent peace is to work with the U.N. and try to make it effective." Mansfield's amendment failed to make it out of committee, but he offered a second one to the Greek-Turkish aid bill which stated "nor shall any of the loans, credits or grants be used for the payment, allowance, and maintenance of any army foreign to that country." In explaining his reasons for offering this amendment, Mansfield, in his
laconic style of speech, stated before the House of Representatives that he did "not want to see American funds used for further maintenance of the British brigade in Greece," or for the support of "a mercenary Army." He reasoned Greek and Turkish communist insurgents would gain political clout from the presence of foreign armies. That amendment also failed to gain any support.

Last, Mansfield's participation in the implementation of the Marshall Plan also must be viewed in order to understand Mansfield's approach to U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. Unlike aid to Greece and Turkey, Mansfield never questioned U.S. aid to Western Europe. Responding to the queries of his constituents whether or not he intended to support the European Recovery Plan, Mansfield answered with a form letter which said: "I want you to know I am and have been in wholehearted accord with the idea of the European Recovery Plan as it applies to Europe. I feel this program is necessary from three points of view: (1) the humanitarian aspect; (2) the economic aspect, in that we hope it will bring about the rehabilitation of Europe; and (3) because of its importance from our own national security point of view." Mansfield recognized the humanitarian need for vast amounts of American aid to Europe from travels throughout Europe in September 1947 when he personally witnessed the food shortages and the economic stagnation across the continent. Upon his return from Europe, in a private meeting with President Truman, Mansfield conveyed to Truman Europe's immediate need of aid and urged the President to call a
special session of the Congress "to consider the Marshall proposal and any necessary stop-gap aid in the meantime."  

As evidence Mansfield considered the Marshall Plan absolutely essential to American security and world peace and prosperity. In 1951 he authored a report for the Congress entitled "A Survey of Political and Economic Developments During 1950 in Western Germany, Austria, Trieste, Italy, Spain and Portugal" in which he described the intent of the Marshall Plan. "It was designed," he wrote, "partly to achieve recovery and partly to block communist aggression in Europe."

"But," he continued, "fundamentally, a prime object was to eradicate a major cause of war." And that cause of war had been "the nations of Europe . . . engaged in a cutthroat competitive battle." According to the report, out of this battle came "trade barriers against their neighbors" and, conversely, Europe's ignorance of what was really in its interest: economic cooperation.  

Mansfield also commented, "If it were not for the Marshall Plan, in all likelihood all of Western Europe today would be Communist, and instead of spending the dollars we are on the European Recovery Program we would be isolated . . . without much in the way of friends."

Also, unlike Greece and Turkey, he believed that the majority of West European governments were not repressive but progressive. Mansfield therefore thought that U.S. aid to Europe could make an impact. He believed it would quickly turn Europe around economically and would pay itself off in the end as the United States would be guaranteed markets to sell products.
For all his support, however, Mansfield did fret that the Marshall Plan comprised too much, with its encompassing economic and military aid to Western Europe, continuation of military aid to Greece and Turkey, and provisions for military aid to China. It scattered U.S. aid around the world, which limited any effect and overextended the resources of the United States. On March 31, 1948, Mansfield commented that the Foreign Assistance Bill, which outlined the dispersal of foreign aid proposed under the Marshall Plan, was "a perplexing combination of economic and military assistance to countries scattered all over the world." He then introduced an amendment which cut all assistance to Greece, Turkey, and China. He believed it futile to combine economic assistance to Western Europe with military assistance to Turkey, Greece, and China. The problems of Western Europe, Greece, Turkey, and China, were very different, complex, and thus required separate hearings and separate appropriations. Mansfield admitted this would take time but argued the seriousness of each situation required that Congress not rush or send aid haphazardly. He warned the United States must be careful not to establish a precedent of sending aid around the world without reassurances the aid would be useful. Also, since the United States' "resources" were "limited," Americans would have "to decide—as during the war—where to place our emphasis and greatest effort." Of course to Mansfield the first priority was Western Europe. On the other hand, he clearly believed China was the antithesis of Europe; any U.S. aid sent would be a waste.

Mansfield had gained firsthand knowledge about China when Franklin Roosevelt sent him on a fact-finding trip to China in November of 1944.
From this trip Mansfield gained a good idea of the corruption which 
infiltrated all parts of Chiang Kai-shek's government. In part, 
because of this experience he lobbied against the United States sending 
any more aid to China. In March 1948 he told the House that from the 
end of World War Two the United States had sent to China $844,721,000 
in military aid, $907,107,000 "for relief, rehabilitation, and trade 
development, $4,155,000 for fiscal aid, and $30,350,000 for educational 
and philanthropic aid and even with all of this aid, Chiang's government 
had failed to record any measurable military victories, or political 
and economic improvements." He could see no reason to continue to 
contribute until Chiang instituted reform. 30

Three points stand out from Mansfield's reactions to Greek-Turkish 
aid and the Marshall Plan. First, Mansfield never considered the Soviet 
Union to be the primary threat to the security of Western Europe or, 
for that fact, to the security of the West. Mansfield's training in 
history, his years as a lecturer of history, and his study of foreign 
affairs may have been responsible for his position in regard to the 
Soviet Union. In a number of speeches he contended that West European 
nations had been the aggressors, not Russia. He pointed out that two 
world wars had been conceived in Europe and more specifically Western 
Europe. Mansfield's objective view on the Soviet Union allowed him to 
approach the problems of the Cold War in a way very different from many 
of his contemporaries.

Second, Mansfield's priority was to ensure the future of Europe, 
and especially Western Europe. Mansfield hesitated sending aid to
Greece and Turkey because he believed the aid would be wasted; however, Mansfield could not have shown more enthusiasm and support for sending aid to Western Europe. He believed with American aid and guidance, Western Europe could create an economic and political union similar to that of the United States. He reasoned such a union would reduce the drain on U.S. resources and would create a third power which would effectively counterbalance the bipolar world of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Third, Mansfield established a set of criteria by which to judge whether aid should be granted to a particular country. First, he asked whether the country in need of U.S. aid had a progressive form of government or would be willing to work toward such a type of government. Second, he asked if the country in need of aid had a significant value for Western security needs. For instance, in the case of China, he lobbied against sending more U.S. aid to Chiang because Mansfield considered China of little strategic value and because of Chiang's repeated failure to institute reform.

Thus, up to this point in Mansfield's political career, he advocated a well-balanced, objective approach to world problems, not allowing one concern to dominate his thinking. For a brief period in his life, however, that would change.

In 1950 and 1951 an apparent shift occurred in Mansfield's approach to world affairs. In his political speeches, he argued that the Soviet Union had become a primary threat to Western security. Two events may have caused this shift: the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in
June 1950 and Mansfield's decision in the fall of 1951 to challenge incumbent Republican Senator Zales Ecton.

Virtually all American leaders believed that the USSR masterminded North Korea's invasion of South Korea. They assumed North Korean leader Kim Il Sung was a mere puppet of Stalin. Thus, the real significance of the invasion of South Korea, according to the Truman administration, was Stalin's desire to see how the West would respond to such an attack, keeping with an eye toward the possibility of the Red Army invading Western Europe. Because of these assumptions, Secretary of State Dean Acheson assumed that if the United States allowed North Korea to attack South Korea unimpeded it would be only a matter of time before a large Red Army invaded Western Europe.31

Mansfield shared the Truman administration's belief that the Soviet Union intended to invade Western Europe. In July 1951, speaking before an audience in Butte, Montana, Mansfield said that the "North Korean aggression compelled the free world to revise its estimate of Soviet intention." In light of the Korean invasion, the Truman administration needed to "bolster western defenses and to fortify the morale of Western Europeans who dread an occupation by Red troops." Because of the massive Soviet army in Eastern Europe, Mansfield concurred with the Truman administration's decision to send four divisions of U.S. troops to join the two divisions already in Western Europe.32

Throughout 1951 Mansfield freely infused hard core Cold War rhetoric in his speeches. On one occasion he said initial aid to
Greece and Turkey, which he supported in 1947 with many reservations, "was the real beginning of our [the United States'] struggle to guard the Nation against the new tyranny looming on the horizon." The Marshall Plan had "prevented the Soviet Union from striking for world domination and precipitating a general war." This latter statement also reflected a previously unstated perspective on the Marshall Plan. And as a politician known for his reticence, it appeared out of character for Mansfield to refer to the Soviet Union as an enemy who was "ruthless" and willing to "stop at nothing."  

Although he had supported the Greek-Turkish aid bill and the Marshall Plan, in part because both would discourage any designs the Soviet Union had for Western Europe, he never previously paid so much heed to the Soviet Union as a threat to Western security.

Whatever his earlier attitudes in 1951 and 1952, the Cold War reached a new level of intensity; and Mansfield, an astute politician running for office, gauged the mood of the country. The Soviet Union's detonation of their first nuclear bomb in 1949 and the "loss" of China to the communists in the same year alarmed many Americans. The impact of the latter two events in the United States manifested itself in the initial popular support for the red-baiting tactics of Senator Joe McCarthy. 

These events dominated political debate as Mansfield decided to challenge incumbent Senator Zales Ecton. Shortly after entering the senatorial race, Mansfield found himself in the campaign of his political career. Senator Joe McCarthy, never a friend of Mansfield,
went so far as to send former communist Harvey Matusow out to Montana to spread rumors that Mike Mansfield sympathized with communist causes. As evidence of Mansfield's sympathy for the communist cause, Matusow cited the report on China Mansfield wrote after returning from China in November 1944. Mansfield had been very objective in his analysis of the political environment in China. He noted that the Chinese communists received popular support due, in part, to the corruption within Chiang's national government. He then stated that if Chiang started to implement serious reform, the communists would start to lose the support of the people. In fact, Mansfield pointed out that the agricultural reforms implemented in parts of China were the key to the communists' support among the Chinese people and that Chiang needed to implement agricultural reform in order to beat the Chinese communists at their own game. Roosevelt praised the report for its objectivity and clairvoyance. However, in 1952 with the Red Scare at its peak, objectivity and clairvoyance could be easily skewed and twisted about to demonstrate that Mike Mansfield was indeed a "communist sympathizer."36

His final campaign speech responded to the charge that he sympathized with the cause of the Chinese communists. In it he went out of his way to prove himself a true cold warrior, especially to voters of eastern Montana who were considered to be generally conservative in political outlook and who did not know Mansfield's political philosophy as well as voters from the western half of the state. In this speech he stressed how he had been attacked by Pravda
and Radio Moscow, how he "stood up under the abuse of Malik and Vishinsky" as a U.S. delegate to the United Nations, and how he had introduced a bill outlawing the communist party in the United States. He highlighted how he had voted for the McCarran Internal Security Act to keep undesirable aliens from entering the United States, and how he had voted for the Mundt—Nixon bill making communist organizations register with the United States government. He told his audience that he had worked to prevent "the Soviet army from overrunning Europe and the Middle East, Burma, India, Indo-China, and Japan and eventually, South America." And then he told the Montanans that to halt Soviet expansionism in its tracks, the American people must be willing to spend billions of dollars on American armed forces and America's allies. 37

In spite of the campaign rhetoric, Mansfield's approach to foreign affairs remained consistent in Congress. He refused to allow the tensions of the Cold War to dictate his actions in Congress in regard to foreign affairs. For instance, in the winter of 1951 President Truman recommended that four more U.S. divisions be sent to Western Europe in support of the two divisions already there. In response to this development, Mansfield declared that although there was strong "opposition" in the United States to the sending of four U.S. divisions to Western Europe in 1951, he would support the decision to send these troops because he believed these additional troops would give incentive to Western Europeans "to get down to business, integrate its economy, do away with custom barriers, work out a political union on the basis
of a United States of Europe, and furnish the divisions needed in the common defense which, in each instance and in the last analysis, is in its own defense as well as ours."  

To show how seriously Mansfield took European integration, Mansfield opposed an amendment in October 1931 which would have reduced U.S. economic and military assistance to Western Europe by $200,000,000 because he reasoned that the sooner industries in Western Europe vital to Western security—such as coal, steel, various armament industries—were operating at or near full capacity, the sooner the security of the West would be adequately enhanced. This would deny a Soviet threat and allow the United States to reduce its presence in Western Europe.  

Mansfield's participation in the debate in Congress in the winter of 1951 over sending four more U.S. divisions to Western Europe further illustrated the consistency in his approach to foreign policy apart from his politicking. While Representative James Richards spoke out against any reduction in military aid to Western Europe, Mansfield interrupted: "Our purpose is not to prolong this program but to bring it to an end and get the American troops out of Europe." To which Representative Richards responded, "We want to get American troops out of Europe, . . . and if you are going to get them out, you are going to have to put Europeans in a position to carry this load." And in the middle of Representative Walter Judd's argument for full funding of military aid to Western Europe, Mansfield asked Judd if cuts were made would that mean "instead of terminating this program [military assistance to Western Europe] in 1954, as we hope, and bringing about
the withdrawal of American troops, it will prolong the program?" Judd responded that assistance to Western Europe could possibly be prolonged if not fully funded. Less funding would definitely weaken the defense and security of Europe and the United States.41

But Representative Hoffman contested the logic of Judd's and Mansfield's statements. He questioned even if Congress did not cut military aid to Europe, "this program of sending our dollars and men to serve the interests of other nations is going to end."42 Representative Hoffman thought it nonsense to believe that American troops and American economic aid could be stopped just like that. He pointed out that a strong precedent of aiding Western Europe had already been established, one which would be difficult to end. However, at this point, Mansfield sincerely believed that with U.S. assistance, in a few years, strong Western European economies would deter Soviet aggression and eventually allow the discontinuation of U.S. aid. Thus, the determinant, to Mansfield, for the withdrawal of American troops from Western Europe would come when Western Europe's industries adequately recovered from the destruction of World War Two.

Thus, from 1950 to 1952, at least in terms of his campaign rhetoric, Mansfield cut the figure of a true cold warrior, which seemed to be a dramatic shift in Mansfield's approach to foreign policy. As one student said of Mansfield during these years: "Mansfield's greatest change in position [regarding U.S. foreign policy], when comparing the 1950s to the rest of his career, occurred in his view of Communism.... In the 1950s, Mansfield saw Communism as monolithic, dominated by
Moscow, and he favored the containment policy." But the question must be asked: To what degree was Mansfield a true cold warrior in the 1950s? Mansfield was an astute politician, and sensing the shift in the mood of the American public in regard to the Soviet Union, he too shifted. Thus Mansfield, out of political necessity, presented himself as a true cold warrior. However, Mansfield's appearance as a cold warrior was just that—an appearance. After examining his actions in Congress over the same period, a truer picture of Mansfield's approach to foreign affairs emerges. Simply, Mansfield was playing two roles: one as a politician working hard to beat an incumbent senator, and the other as a statesman concerned about the welfare of not only the United States but also other nations. Ultimately he would be both a successful politician and an indefatigable statesman. The campaign against Zales Ecton would be his last tightly contested election. He would easily win his next three contests, which allowed him to be more of a statesman and less of a politician under the gun.

When Mansfield returned to Washington in the fall of 1952 as a senator his reputation as an expert on foreign affairs earned him a seat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His first major speech on U.S. foreign policy as a senator in April 1953 marked the return, in full force, of Mansfield's true approach to foreign policy. In regard to Western Europe he asserted the United States "should continue to urge and to assist the Europeans towards economic integration. Beyond integration, the need is for trade not aid." "NATO build-up must go on," he continued, but the United States "should continue to urge and
to assist the Europeans towards economic integration." He considered the economic integration of Western Europe and trade, not unilateral aid, between Western Europe and the United States as essential to Western security.\textsuperscript{45}

By 1953 Mansfield also set out to change the role of American economic aid to Western Europe. Essentially, Mansfield believed the United States had done all it could do for Western Europe by 1953. To back up his point, Mansfield pointed out that foreign aid to Western Europe had reached the point of diminishing returns. In 1952, for the first time since the war, Western Europe's industrial production did not rise above the previous year's.\textsuperscript{46} He attributed this economic stagnation to the fact that West Europeans were becoming complacent about the status of their economy knowing that they could count on U.S. aid. Mansfield went on to insist that "one-way assistance over too long a period tended to separate rather than bring together the giver and receiver." To correct this situation Mansfield wanted an aid program "mutual in reality, not just in name."\textsuperscript{47} Strengthening trade between the United States and Western Europe presented the mechanism, to Mansfield, which would create a true mutual relationship to Western Europe and the United States.

While he understood that foreign aid to Western Europe would not be ended in 1953, Mansfield recommended that aid to Western Europe be administered by the Department of State or Department of Defense, instead of an independent agency. For Mansfield, who was always thinking about the taxpayer's pocketbook, an independent agency administering aid to Western Europe created costly duplication.
Failing to convince his fellow senators to dissolve the Mutual Security Agency (the agency responsible for administering aid to Western Europe) did not deter Mansfield from calling for the complete termination of economic and military aid to Western Europe a year later. He repeated the same arguments against aid to Western Europe made the previous year: aid to Western Europe had become cumbersome in the relationship between the United States and Western Europe; and instead of "helping out" it was hindering the economic development of Western Europe. "The time has come," he said in the spring of 1954, "to abolish the Foreign Operations Administration [the successor of the Mutual Security Agency] as an independent agency." This time he suggested, in very blunt terms, that indiscriminate aid to Western Europe put "proud, independent nations in the position of being eternal recipients of charity," and American aid put "lazy and ineffective governments in the position of not having to exert themselves on behalf of the people they are supposed to serve since they can count on support from this country." Further, the U.S. foreign aid program had created a bureaucratic monster, one which had shown great resilience to budget cuts leaving Mansfield with the impression that the longer Foreign Operations existed, the harder it would be to end it.

Events seemed to support Representative Hoffman's prediction that even after achieving the political and economic stability in Western Europe, U.S. aid to Western Europe would be difficult to stop. By 1954, even though the political and economic crises in Western Europe were largely over, U.S. foreign aid continued to flow to Western Europe.
The Mutual Security Act of 1951 named June 30, 1954 as its termination date. However, in the spring of 1954 the Eisenhower administration requested that the program be extended until June 30, 1958.

Mansfield's original support for economic and military aid to Western Europe depended, in part, on his impression that by 1954 Western Europe would be able to provide for its own defense. This extension was unacceptable to him. He worried that aid to Western Europe was becoming an end in itself. A "philosophy of continuous, unending foreign aid [was] becoming engrafted upon our government," he said. To bring appropriations for foreign aid under control, Mansfield recommended that if a country needed military or economic aid, then the Department of State should present "specific" military and economic aid packages to Congress. He advocated reestablishing the administration of aid through the State Department. 51

Mansfield continued to push for the economic and military integration of Western Europe in the hope of ending the need for U.S. aid. Western Europe, he said, should develop "a pattern of progressive integration within the larger but looser unity of the North Atlantic Community," which, he believed, would result in a "steady growth" of peace and material progress. He believed that if Western Europe did not integrate, eventually war would be "inevitable" and possibly result in "the extinction of human life itself." As on many other occasions, Mansfield also pushed for Western Europe's unification out of his realization that the last two wars had been "self-inflicted." Western Europe had been responsible for two world wars. Thus, Mansfield
perceived U.S. aid to be dangerous to the Western society because it allowed Western Europe to flounder in the pursuit of a united Western Europe.  

During the second session of the 84th Congress Mansfield presented to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a "Review of Foreign Policy." He labeled the sixth review "United States Policy and a Changing Europe." In his report he stated that economic assistance to Western Europe under the Marshall Plan, military containment in Western Europe, and the Point Four Plan were "bold, intelligent and effective policies at the time." They had done the job; they had rebuilt Western Europe and maintained the security of Western Europe and the United States. By 1956 a fast paced and ever-changing world needed a dynamic foreign policy to meet new challenges. Mansfield told his colleagues that "a foreign policy effective once is not a foreign policy effective forever. For three years we have lived on borrowed time in foreign relations. We have been carried along; we have been supported by the momentum of ideas and the strenuous efforts previously put forth."  

After reviewing U.S. foreign policy for the previous three years, he complained that innovation and flexibility essential to a successful foreign policy were lacking in the United States' approach to foreign affairs. He believed that policy-makers had "fallen into the erroneous assumption that dollars are the answer or a better Voice of America or more military aid, or this that or the other." Policy-makers failed to recognize that "situations elsewhere" were not "completely within our control." "There are times," he said, "to do less is better than to do
more." However, these limitations were "not an invitation to irresponsible drift, dodge or defeatism." He made it clear he did not want to make a political issue out of his analysis of foreign policy as it stood in 1956. How could he? The outdated policies he wanted changed had been developed and initiated by a Democratic administration, and many Democrats still advocated full support for them. Still, he felt that all branches of government dealing with foreign affairs should make a concerted effort to adapt to the world confronting the United States.

By the end of 1957 Mansfield's approach to foreign policy had fully developed. He had concluded that major adjustments were needed in foreign policies of the United States. While he advocated changes be made to the United States' foreign assistance program, he also believed the arms race of the Cold War presented too many opportunities to escalate into tragedy; it must be curtailed and he hoped to start the process by altering the United States' role in Western Europe. In fact, a year after suggesting that aid be discontinued to Western Europe, Mansfield delivered a speech in August of 1957 titled "A Foreign Policy for Peace" in which he suggested that no country could achieve "absolute security" because the perfect offensive or defensive weapon would never exist. Instead, there were "degrees of insecurity" which could be lowered through an "effective foreign policy." The best way to lower "degrees of insecurity," according to Mansfield, was through disarmament. He confessed this would happen only when U.S. foreign policy based itself less "on fear of the Russians" and more on
"the intelligence, the courage and steadfastness" of the American people.  

Thus, the issue of ending military and economic aid to Western Europe became a springboard to his ultimate goal—instituting a dramatic change in U.S. foreign policy. On a very practical level, ending U.S. aid to Western Europe would result in the reduction of U.S. financial burdens. He also hoped that ending U.S. aid to Western Europe would force the Europeans to integrate themselves into a viable third power which would act as a balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. More important still, Mansfield hoped that a reduction in U.S. economic and military aid to Western Europe might act as a catalyst for mutual disarmament by reducing the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Mansfield continued to speak out against the wasteful ways in which foreign aid was appropriated. Speaking before the Senate in 1959 he said much of U.S. foreign aid did not have any "specific objectives, specific yardsticks against which to measure cost in any rational fashion." Rather, he said, "We have only generalizations. The program is supposed to 'stop communism.' Where? How? When?" He continued, "The program is supposed to prime underdeveloped nations to the point of economic self-propulsion. Which nations? What point?" He believed U.S. aid could continue to be beneficial only if properly appropriated. Mansfield pointed out that delaying reform was resulting in rising pressure in the Senate, which, he believed, would result in someone reaching "for the meat-axe instead of a scalpel in dealing with foreign-aid appropriations."
The real problem, as Mansfield saw it, was the granting of military aid, which was the majority of foreign aid given out by the United States in 1959. Mansfield believed the United States gave billions of dollars in "grants and gifts" of military aid which, unlike the aid under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, was intended not to help countries become self-sustaining defensively. In fact, he did not see a clear goal in granting the majority of military aid. He proposed to change what he believed "the principal shortcomings" of foreign aid in 1951. He believed "the area of heavy and continuing gifts and grants of military aid which this year [1959] total $1.6 billion out of the total of $3.9 billion requested." He put military aid into two categories: "continuing grants" and "special assistance grants." Both types of military aid were, he said, "areas of decay in foreign aid." He said:

These [military grants and gifts over the last nine years] are the areas in which, over the years, a one-sided dependency has developed for which an end is not yet in sight. These are the areas in which the fissures of corruption have begun to appear. These are the areas of great waste and inefficiency. These are the areas of burgeoning hostility between the American people who must foot the bill and the peoples of the recipient nations who, sometimes, as distinct from their governments, see very little benefit from the hundreds of millions, the billions that have been poured into their lands. Thus, to bring legitimacy to U.S. foreign aid, Mansfield recommended that gifts and grants be substituted with loans, that advisors be sent to help the nations requesting aid to increase their productivity, and that the creation of an aid program including the participation of many
nations be created. Above all else, he insisted that all "give-away shall cease." If these practices did not change soon, Mansfield warned, ultimately "popular reaction" would take over, destroying the "good [aid] with the bad, the essential with the non-essential." He declared that would be even a greater tragedy.  

By 1961 Mansfield's critique of the American foreign aid program illustrated this issue went beyond politics. He had criticized the Eisenhower administration for not coming up with a new, innovative approach to foreign aid. Similarly, in 1961 on the Senate floor, he did not hesitate to criticize the Kennedy administration's lack of imagination on foreign aid; he called their policies "sporific," a "jumble of illusory expectations" and "not significantly different in substance from that of the previous year, despite the change in party shingles on the door of the Executive Branch." He continued to maintain that the aid program needed to be "recast" in order to "serve the interests of the nation more effectively." Although Mansfield did vote for the foreign aid package (he now was Majority Leader of the Senate), he did so with reservations. He worried about the colossus the military aid program had become. It seemed to have a mind of its own. Military aid, he said, should not be given just because a country requested it. Military aid should be appropriated corresponding to the United States' "defense needs." He charged that military aid had given birth to "the costly trappings of bureaucracy" in nations of little or no strategic importance for U.S. security. In short, military aid given out by the United States had become a behemoth, given to fifty
nations around the world, many of which also received "massive infusions of economic grants to support military establishments, built and sustained by military aid from the United States." He asked his colleagues,

Who in this body should not feel concern when in country after country, after years of this program since the Marshall Plan, grants of aid from this nation remain the critical factor in maintaining internal stability, and the end of this process is not yet in sight? Who in this body [the Senate] should not feel concern when hundreds of millions of aid goes to governments which have not met or are unwilling to meet honest tests of public acceptance in their own countries? Who in this body should not feel concern when the gap between the luxurious life of the few in and around governments and the poverty-stricken like of the millions in aid-receiving nations does not begin to close and, all too frequently, the beneficial impact of the bulk of our assistance is limited to the few?

In essence, the heart of the problem was "that foreign aid must change or in the end it may still produce catastrophic consequences for this nation." Mansfield was reacting to a change of policy in granting foreign aid which Nicholas Eberstadt in his book, Foreign Aid and American Purpose, called "the most fateful departure from previously enunciated principles of foreign aid." The departure, according to Eberstadt, had occurred during the Eisenhower years. Between 1949 and 1953 "military grants and political aid for beleaguered but friendly regimes had accounted for scarcely a sixth of our foreign aid: between 1953 and 1961 they made up over half our bequests." Certainly, nations like Greece, Turkey, Thailand, Iran, the Philippines, and Taiwan had
benefited from such assistance, as each nation moved toward political stability. However, the first principles of granting aid as set forth by the Marshall Plan were being lost. Instead of granting aid to develop "the basic infrastructure so that governments of poor societies might better take advantage of the economic opportunities offered them by growing international markets," as had previously been the rule, aid was granted predominantly to buy political stability. This departure, begun by the Eisenhower administration and taken to a new height by the Kennedy administration, during which the distinction between development assistance and security assistance was completely lost, caused Mansfield to worry.

Mansfield had been a keen and worried observer of U.S. foreign policy as it developed in response to the Cold War. As a congressman he supported the Truman administration's plan to rebuild Western Europe, to meet the challenges of the Soviet Union and, in general, to secure peace and prosperity; but he never believed the U.S.-USSR confrontation should dominate U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, Mansfield saw weak points in the Truman administration's plan to secure peace and prosperity. First, the misappropriation of American foreign aid greatly worried Mansfield, and he spoke out against such misappropriations. Furthermore, Mansfield worried that the Truman Doctrine's open-ended commitment to aid nations throughout the world in their fight against communism would allow nations to blackmail the United States into giving unnecessary aid. Eventually, as U.S. grants and gifts of military aid outgrew economic assistance, at times given to undemocratic
nations with little or no strategic significance to the United States, Mansfield's fears were becoming realities. In fact, by 1953 Mansfield concluded that the Cold War was dominating U.S. foreign policy. Thus, he became a consistent critic of U.S. foreign policy.

By 1959 Mansfield decided to initiate serious debate in the Senate on the means and ends of U.S. foreign policy. He hoped that by highlighting past and present mistakes a better approach to foreign policy would be instituted. The crisis over Berlin, from 1959 to 1962, became Mansfield's issue with which to show the errors in U.S. foreign policy and hopefully find some sort of viable solutions.
Partition is the expedient of
tired statesmen.

-- Conor Cruise O'Brien

Divided between the allies after the defeat of the Nazis, Berlin became by 1948 the fulcrum of the Cold War. From 1948 to 1961 sporadic crises arose over Berlin as East and West confronted each other. By 1959 West Berlin symbolized the economic prosperity achieved by Western Europe in the postwar era, while East Berlin, economically stagnating, epitomized the economic backwardness of the communist block.¹

The crisis over Berlin from 1958 to 1961 first materialized when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev warned that the Soviet Union would recognize East Germany and turn over control to the East Germans' Western access routes to West Berlin. This meant that Western nations would have to negotiate with East Germany in order to gain access to West Berlin. However, since the United States, France and Britain did not recognize East Germany as a country, such an arrangement would naturally create problems. Khrushchev's strategy was to force the West to choose the lesser of the evils and withdraw from West Berlin.

Mansfield took great interest in the reunification of Germany. In a 1954 speech Mansfield proclaimed the failure of the last half century had been the "inability of modern Germany to find a stable place in the
common destiny of Western Europe." Although he supported the integration of West Germany into a West European alliance, unlike many of his contemporaries, he was optimistic about the reunification of Germany in the near future. In fact, Mansfield believed that there could be "little hope of stability in Europe" with a divided Germany. Only, he continued, with a "peaceful and independent Germany able to participate in the common development of Europe and to cooperate with free nations everywhere" could world peace be secured.

In response to the Berlin crisis, Mansfield wrote a letter to the New York Times in February 1959 suggesting that Berlin be reunified. He believed through a free election the majority of West Berliners and East Berliners would vote for a democratic government, in effect making Berlin a free, unified, democratic city. Eventually he hoped the same process would be used for the unification of West and East Germany.

He also proposed nine points that would ensure both East and West security needs if German unification came about. In the nine points he emphasized the West must not withdraw their "forces of freedom." Clearly, Mansfield did not wish to put the wrong impression in anyone's mind that the West was about to abandon West Berlin; rather he supported a resolution which supported the position of the Eisenhower administration to "stand fast at Berlin." Point two recommended that German leaders be given support to begin negotiations to unite public services and create one municipal government of East and West Berlin. Berlin already had a common subway system; if this was possible, then why not other public services and eventually one municipal government?
Mansfield hoped that municipal unification of East and West Berlin would be the catalyst to the "unification for all of Germany." He also called for the Secretary General of the United Nations to be "enlisted" in the negotiations to develop one Berlin government. Once unification had been achieved, the United Nations would replace all communist and allied forces in guaranteeing access routes to Berlin. Mansfield would "prefer to see the whole city of Berlin neutralized on an interim basis, under United Nations auspices . . . rather than to have East German agents of the Soviet Union stamping the permits of western allied transports to West Berlin."  

The Eisenhower administration's reaction to the Berlin crisis discouraged Mansfield. If the Soviet Union wished to withdraw their troops from Berlin, or East Germany, or Central Europe, the United States should make every effort to encourage the Soviet Union to do so. But, he stated, "Present [U.S.] policy says, in effect, that the Russians must stay in Berlin— in spirit, if not in body." And he went on to say:

I am fully aware that their [the Soviet Army] going may complicate our remaining in Berlin. We shall be face to face, then, with East Germans. They will be Communists, to be sure— but, nevertheless, Germans, not Russians. The allied forces may well be compelled, in the last analysis, to face them, if we mean to stay in Berlin at all costs.

Mansfield's point eight sought to appease the fears on the part of all Germany's neighbors to a unified Germany. If an acceptable plan of reunification to East and West materialized from the discussion by the two Germanies, the Soviet Union and the Western allies should
guarantee that Germany "is neither subjected to military pressure from its neighbors nor becomes a source of military pressures to its neighbors." Mansfield's point eight, in effect, recommended a protectorship over Germany by democratic and communist countries together, an idea which had little support in Congress at the time.\footnote{11}

The crisis over Berlin was, in Mansfield's opinion, just one of the many problems which had and continued to impede the establishment of "equitable, rational and evolving, conditions of peace."\footnote{12} Since the end of World War Two, crisis after crisis has threatened world peace, and in meeting these crises the United States has chosen what Mansfield termed a "patchwork" policy to uphold the "sagging roof of peace." Further, the efforts to uphold the "sagging roof of peace" had been very costly with no guarantee that "peace would endure for the next year, or even the next day." He asserted a policy of "patchwork" could not guarantee a safe world.\footnote{13}

Of course, there were those in the Senate who attacked Mansfield's proposal for a free and neutral Germany as a dangerous idea which did not take into account Cold War realities. Senator Jacob Javits refuted Mansfield's main points. In response to Mansfield's proposal that eventually all foreign armies should withdraw from Berlin making it a free city, Javits responded, Berlin as a free city would not last long. It would "speedily be incorporated into Communist Germany."\footnote{14} Once that happened, since "possession is more than nine-tenths of the law in terms of international affairs," concluded Javits, all of Berlin would be completely engulfed by the communists "unless we are prepared to go in with force."\footnote{15}
Mansfield and Javits also differed on which nations should organize the reunification of Germany. Mansfield proposed the Germans work out the problems of unification themselves, with limited advisory roles for England, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Javits believed negotiations must be solely between the allies, with a limited role for the two Germanies. To Javits, since the Soviet Union dominated East Germany's foreign policy, it made little sense for the two Germanies to negotiate unification. Javits also worried that as soon as the word was out that the United States had given its consent to allow East and West Germany to negotiate, it would send the message to the Soviet Union that the United States had given up protecting West Germany. Javits further argued that if the Soviet Union became infected with such an idea the Soviet Union would dictate the terms for unification of Germany.

Essentially, Senators Javits and Mansfield wanted the same result. Both men believed that a negotiated solution over Berlin between the United States and the Soviet Union could begin a thaw in the Cold War. However, they approached the question of German unification in two very different ways, which symbolized the differences in their approach to the making of foreign policy.

Mansfield asked Senator Javits how long would it be before the United States, the Soviet Union, England, and France sat down and seriously started to discuss German unification. In the next year, possibly the next ten, he asked. The State Department told Mansfield it might take ten years before serious negotiations would start between
the four powers on the question of Germany. Mansfield went on to say that the occupying powers had failed to initiate meaningful negotiations for fourteen years. Mansfield saw no benefits in waiting a decade for the four powers to settle their differences, and there was no guarantee that they would settle their differences in ten years and start serious negotiations on the question of German unification. Mansfield therefore decided "to try to find other ways or means of bringing this question to a head, so it can be settled—and settled in a way which will be beneficial to the interest of the free world and, in particular, of the German people." Because of the complexities which separated the allies, Mansfield proposed side-stepping them by allowing East Germans and West Germans to run the show. In fact this seemed to Mansfield as the natural solution because already talks on unification were taking place between the governments of West and East Berlin, albeit at lower levels in government. Although Mansfield could not prove it, he asserted high officials in the economic ministry of West Berlin had held discussions with their East German counterparts for some time on matters of unification. The evidence of the two Berlins working together toward Berlin unification led Mansfield to quote a former colleague in the House of Representatives, Representative Mike Mulroney, to the effect that "I am going to call 'em as I see 'em." Mansfield ended his reply to Senator Javits by saying that the impasse in Germany must be broken. He, for one, did not want to chance another ten years of hot and cold spells between the East and West over the issues of Berlin and Germany. He believed that "so long as
Germany remains partitioned, there will be no peace in Europe," and without peace in Europe, "there will be no peace in the world."\(^{19}\) Mansfield pressed these ideas, not because he thought that they would be implemented right away, but because they would spur debate over the question of the unification of Berlin and Germany throughout the United States. He wanted the United States "to do some thinking on the Berlin and German situations" before some event dictated the actions of the United States. He lamented that without a change in policy, events might lead policy as they had in Korea.\(^{20}\)

The Eisenhower administration skillfully managed to defuse the Berlin crisis by recommending that the one-time allies negotiate their differences over Berlin. But the Berlin crisis enforced in Mansfield's mind that there was a need for a reassessment of America's approach to world problems. Speaking before the 58th Session of the Inland Empire Education Association on April 8, 1960, Mansfield analyzed the state of United States foreign policy. As he did on other occasions, Mansfield told his audience that an effective foreign policy served "national needs in a complex world, a world of many nations and many needs, by methods other than those of the jungle."\(^{21}\) He warned the audience this was not an easy task; nor did he know of any easy solutions in meeting the challenges presented by a complex world, but the task could be made more difficult if those directly responsible for developing an effective foreign policy did not "see the world as it is." He said to the educational association that "We need to see it [the world situation] as it is now, before we can reasonably hope
to see it as we should like it to be." As for achieving world peace, he confided to his audience that peace would not be achieved by studying the applause meters or the comparative Hooper ratings of Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Eisenhower in India or France or wherever else they may visit ... Rather, it lies in the reduction of the fears which push nations and systems of nations towards military clash. It lies in a frank recognition of conflicting national interests and ideological hopes and, if they cannot be reconciled at this time, in turning them away from the channels which lead to the nuclear destruction of a recognizable civilization in the world.

In 1961 Khrushchev once again issued a missive to the United States, England, and France that the Soviet Union intended to turn over access routes to West Berlin to the East Germans. This time the problems of Berlin fell to a youthful, inexperienced, and untested Kennedy administration. Perceiving the inexperience of the Kennedy administration in foreign affairs, Khrushchev hoped to score an easy victory. However, Kennedy thought that by remaining firm against Khrushchev's demands he could prove his toughness. At the same time he could gain the confidence of the American people.

However, Mansfield's reaction to Khrushchev's ultimatum differed from Kennedy's. Mansfield considered that Berlin had been a nagging issue for too long. For fourteen years it had epitomized the inability of the United States and the Soviet Union to find a lasting solution for the German issue and world peace in general. Thus, Mansfield decided the time had arrived for him to offer a new approach to meet the security needs of Germans, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States. He did so in a speech he called "A Third Way On Berlin."
Before presenting his third way on Berlin, Mansfield made it perfectly clear that the West would not bend to Soviet pressures. As in 1959 he reiterated the United States would never shed its responsibility of guaranteeing freedom in West Berlin or a unified Berlin. In effect, the Western powers would not leave West Berlin until there were solid guarantees made by England, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union that Berlin would become and remain a "free city."\(^{25}\)

In fact, Mansfield told the Senate his view did not depend on "whether the Soviet Premier means what he says or does not mean what he says." Rather, he based his views on the changing situation in Western Europe and his perception of how the United States ought to respond to those changes for the common good of all. And he felt United States foreign policy was not meeting the challenges of the modern world. He questioned why present U.S. policy encouraged the Soviet Union to maintain troops in "the Western most point of penetration which they [the Soviet Union] reached in Europe in the wake of World War II." Further, he did not think the United States could safeguard most effectively [its] own interests or advance the interests of peace when we [the United States] insist upon remaining directly under a communist sword of Damocles, as is now the case in Berlin, if a rational alternative may be found to that position through diplomacy.\(^{26}\)

Perhaps the worst part of U.S. policy in regard to Berlin, according to Mansfield, was that it had not responded to the changes which had occurred in Germany and Europe since the end of World War Two. He told his colleagues he questioned the soundness of a policy
which made it possible for an "error or provocation on either side" to cause a nuclear war.\textsuperscript{27} Thus, Mansfield believed that it was absolutely crucial to find "a third way on Berlin." He believed the United States' "present position on Berlin, even unchallenged by the Soviet Union, leads only in a circle endlessly repeated as it continues to recede from the changing realities of Germany and Europe until it now promises to become at best irrelevant and at worst a stimulus to catastrophe." And for the United States to do nothing, to maintain "the status quo in Berlin, would prove the "inertia of Western leadership" and "the sterility of our [U.S.] diplomacy."\textsuperscript{28}

Mansfield's third way called for both West Berlin and East Berlin to become one free city. The Soviet Union desired West Berlin to become a free city but not East Berlin. Mansfield proposed that all of Berlin—East and West—become a free city. To guarantee that Berlin would not become an issue in the Cold War, the access routes to all of Berlin would be garrisoned by United Nations' peace-keeping forces. This would mean that both Western and Eastern troops would leave Berlin, starting the demilitarization of Central Europe. As previously stated in his nine points on Berlin given before Congress in February of 1959, Berlin's status as a free city would be guaranteed by NATO and the Warsaw pact countries. Finally, to give the West Germans and East Germans a point to start negotiations on for the complete unification of Germany, "Bonn and Pankow" would be responsible to assume any financial burdens which may come out of the arrangement as put forth by Mansfield.\textsuperscript{29}
As in 1959, Mansfield's speech "A Third Way On Berlin" generated intense criticism, especially from fellow senators. There were those who accused Mansfield of being the medium with which the Kennedy administration could test new ideas of U.S. foreign policy and measure the Senate's and the public's response.

Once again Senator Jacob Javits became the chief antagonist to Mansfield's ideas on Berlin. Javits pointed out that Mansfield, indeed, did have great influence as the Majority Leader of the Senate and that he was using that position to test Kennedy administration policies. Mansfield responded in kind that Senator Javits's assertions were unfounded. Mansfield questioned whether Javits seriously believed that "Bonn, London, Paris or even Moscow, are so ignorant of our system of government that they [West Germany, England, France, the USSR] do not recognize that a Senator is first of all a Senator and has certain obligations in that role distinct from those which he may play in the conduct of the Senate's business." He went on to state that the "President's prerogatives do not extend into this body." Furthermore, Mansfield pointed out that Javits's points on Berlin should be listened to in the United States and abroad "with just as much attention as the statement of the Senator from Montana or any other Senator."

Mansfield had once again to defend himself against those who believed he was advocating a unilateral withdrawal of Western forces from West Germany. This, he said, was not his intention. In fact, knowing this would be a strong point of criticism, he purposely stated in his speech on Berlin that Western troops would not leave without
certain guarantees. He did, however, question the purpose of Western troops in West Germany. He believed that, since a relatively small garrison of Western troops protected the city of West Berlin against superior numbers of the Warsaw pact troops, they were merely symbolic of the West's intention to defend Berlin at all costs. He believed a verbal commitment to defend Berlin was adequate for Europeans. Mansfield stressed he did not intend to renege on this guarantee. Mansfield contended that, in fact, he wanted to strengthen Western guarantees of defending all of Berlin as a free city.³²

To Javits, guarantees without the troops did not mean much, no matter how sincere. According to Javits, Western troops in West Germany would always ensure that the West would use all of its resources to protect West Berlin and Western Europe from an invasion by the Soviet Union.³³

Unlike Senator Javits, Mansfield had little faith that Germany would ever be reunified "by fiat of the United States, France, Great Britain and Soviet Russia as was expected 15 years ago." Years of animosities between East and West had made it almost impossible for the two sides to negotiate the unification of Berlin and Germany. Also, he was not even sure East and West wanted to see Germany unified; the status quo seemed to be working, and there was no need to upset it. Mansfield, on the other hand, adamantly believed Germany must be reunited. Unlike many of his fellow colleagues, he proclaimed that Berlin would some day again be the capital of a unified Germany. But this would happen only if the entire city of Berlin could be removed
"from the clashes of the cold war into which it has been driven by the events of the post-war years."34

Thus, Berlin marked a clear break between Mansfield's foreign policy and traditional Cold War policies. He could no longer accept the plan of militarization and maintaining the status quo as viable plans to safeguarding peace and prosperity.

Corresponding to the Berlin crisis, the United States economy had slipped into a recession. By 1960 there were economic signs indicating the United States economy was on the verge of a real economic crisis. One sign that concerned Mansfield was the amount of gold leaving the United States Treasury due to European nations trading their huge surplus of American dollars for gold. This outflow, Mansfield believed, reflected "the inner weaknesses" of the U.S. economy. He recommended that Congress and the executive branch examine the institutions which made the country economically competitive and to see if they needed any reforming. He looked around and saw a stagnant U.S. economy. The production of factories and farms fell way below former levels; U.S. education, especially science and engineering, was not competitive with other industrial nations. How long, Mansfield wondered, could this decay be allowed to go on before disaster struck?35

The economic crises of 1960 gave Mansfield the impetus to push for new approaches to guarantee the Western security which would save the United States billions of dollars. He recommended better uses for taxpayers' money than spending billions of dollars for the protection of Western Europe.36
While the U.S. economy showed little growth, those of Western Europe grew rapidly. This did not alarm Mansfield; rather it pleased him immensely. He took it as a personal success because as a Representative he had lobbied for full funding of foreign aid to Western Europe in order that Western Europe regain economic prosperity. Further, he had also continuously lobbied for the economic integration of Western Europe and now that too had become a reality with the creation of a common market. During a trip to Western Europe in 1960 Mansfield had noticed all of the signs of prosperous economics:

"copious availability of food and other consumer goods, general intensity of commercial and industrial activity, the dress of the people and the worsening of the traffic problems in the major European cities." 37

Now that Western Europe had recovered from economic devastation it had also become an economic competitor to the United States. Mansfield believed the changing economic relationship between Western Europe and the United States dictated adjustments in U.S.-West European relationships should be implemented. He said:

We might assume, for example, that the great economic progress of Western Europe might produce a steady development of more effective common approaches towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and towards all the issues involved in a common advance of freedom throughout the world. One might also assume the continuation and deepening of military cooperation under NATO, with the Europeans bearing an increased share of its cost in manpower and material, commensurate with the improvement in their economic situation. 38

In other words, he expected West Europeans, with continued prosperity, to provide more and more for their own security.
At one point in 1961 Mansfield scribbled a note which questioned the strategy behind U.S. foreign policy. First he noted that

the key question in evaluating any policy of the United States is to what do we think it leads? We ought to know, at least, what we hope to accomplish by any given policy. Once we have that then we can measure the prospect of achieving the objective in terms of experience, in ration of cost.39

The United States, he said, if prepare "to go on paying upwards (in an ever increasing line) $40+ billion for defense and somewhere in the neighborhood of $5 billion annually for foreign aid," the country should "concentrate on holding the line and minimize contact with the Soviet Union." However, he wondered, would the ever-increasing cost of containing the Soviet Union prove unbearable for the U.S. economy? After consideration, if the answer turned out yes, then other options must be found for maintaining the status quo. Mansfield stated that "If we are not satisfied to do the above [spend billions of dollars], then we have got to seek policies which seek to preserve the present geographical division of power by more astute diplomacy."40

As he had in 1951, Mansfield warned the Senate not to allow drift, stagnation, or sterility to creep into U.S. foreign policy; he implored the Senate to meet the foreign affairs challenges in front of it. Mansfield felt it necessary for the United States to decide whether the established policies of containment to counter Soviet expansionism made any sense in 1961. If they did not, debate in Congress should start outlining a new and more effective foreign policy.

By October 1962, with the friction between the Soviet Union and the United States increasing and most dramatically evident with the
Cuban Missile Crisis, American defense spending grew greatly. Mansfield thought U.S. foreign policy needed changing. The issue of U.S. military assistance—and included in this assistance was the stationing of U.S. troops in Western Europe—became the issue which Mansfield would use to make his point in regard to U.S. foreign policy.

In 1962, with the incentives of the gold drain, the reluctance of Western European nations to assume more of their own security burdens, the postwar recovery of Western European economies, and America's in Asia, Mansfield for the first time proposed ending all military assistance to Western Europe and the possible withdrawal of some U.S. ground forces in Western Europe. For Mansfield, withdrawing a number of U.S. troops in Western Europe presented the chance for a whole new phase in U.S. foreign policy, possibly one that would deescalate the Cold War. However, in 1962 there was little support in the United States for a unilateral withdrawal of any U.S. troops in Western Europe, and he never considered recommending the United States take such action in 1962. He did contend in a statement released on January 2, 1961 that due to the superior number of Soviet forces in Western Europe he made it clear that the U.S. divisions in Western Europe were purely symbolic and that two or three divisions could do the job as well as the six U.S. divisions already there. If the Soviet Union agreed to cut their force level proportionately to that of the United States, then the United States should agree to such an arrangement, for it was in the interests of both nations to do so. Such an agreement would reduce "tension in Europe." It would reduce the drain on the U.S. economy;
it would also allow the Soviet Union to reduce their cost of defense, which Mansfield believed they were eager to do. The West Europeans now had the financial resources to equip and support three divisions of their own. All in all, the mutual withdrawal of American and Soviet troops would benefit the United States, the Soviet Union, and Europe because, according to Mansfield, it "would be a rational step towards normalcy in Europe and peace. It would be a step benefiting all the nations involved and reflecting the improved stability, financially and otherwise, of Western Europe."  

Mansfield realized the fury of the Cold War throughout 1962 made it impossible for the United States and the Soviet Union to sit down and commence talks on mutual force reductions in Central Europe. Mansfield had little choice but to wait until the world political scene changed for the better or until the economic circumstances of the United States worsened. Both were right around the bend.

From 1963 to 1966, however, Mansfield served as Majority Leader of the Senate. The assassination of John Kennedy, a surge in domestic legislation which needed guidance through the Senate, and the start of the Vietnam war, all kept Mansfield very busy. Many of these very problems also convinced him that United States foreign policy needed drastic overhauling in order to meet new demands, and the start of this overhaul, he believed, should begin with a reduction of U.S. troops in Europe.

Two events in 1966 influenced Mansfield's decision to go ahead and offer a resolution which recommended the United States proceed with a
unilateral withdrawal of two to three divisions of troops in Western Europe. He would offer two more identical resolutions over the next three years. First, General de Gaulle withdrawing all French forces from NATO and then demanding that the NATO headquarters be moved to another country had a profound impact on Mansfield's actions. Second, Dwight Eisenhower's advocacy of a substantial reduction of U.S. troops in Western Europe probably had even a greater impact on Mansfield.  

Initially in 1966 there was substantial support in the Senate for a troop withdrawal. In fact the idea for the first resolution surfaced in a meeting of the Democratic Policy Committee. Senator Stuart Symington, who had just returned from a trip to Europe and was disillusioned by the West Europeans' attitudes toward NATO, recommended that such a resolution be drafted. The entire committee then agreed that something had to be done in light of the weakening economic status of the United States.  

Realizing that a substantial number of senators might back such a resolution, Mansfield went ahead and tested the water. In a letter to President Johnson, Mansfield informed Johnson that during the Democratic Policy Committee meeting on July 13, 1966 "one of the members present" questioned the size of the U.S. military contingent in Western Europe. "The matter," stated Mansfield, "was brought up as it related to gold outflow and balance of payment difficulties." The committee had come up with a list of points which mandated a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Western Europe. The purpose of the letter was for Mansfield to "communicate" to President Johnson the "unanimous" judgments of the committee, which were:
1. There should be a "substantial" reduction of U.S. forces stationed in Western Europe;

2. Unless tangible and significant steps are taken promptly in this direction by the Executive Branch, it should be anticipated that the Senate, by a type of resolution or in some other fashion, may be expected to try to stimulate a reduction of U.S. forces in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{46}

Ending the letter to President Johnson, Mansfield noted that "the expression of concern in the Committee was very pronounced, particularly as the question of troops in Europe involved in difficulties pertaining to gold outflow and balance of payments."\textsuperscript{47} Mansfield cited eight points in support of Resolution 300. First on his list was President Eisenhower's advocacy of a reduction in U.S. forces in Europe. The Democratic Policy Committee also believed that one or two U.S. divisions in Europe could be "as persuasive in indicating [the United States] resolve and intentions as five divisions." Furthermore, since European nations had not met their troop pledges to NATO, the United States had no incentive to remain "wedded" to its commitments. And, because the United States committed five divisions to the protection of Western Europe "in circumstances very different from those which prevail today," new economic and political relationships enabled the United States to withdraw many of its troops in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{48}

Shortly after the letter to President Johnson, Mansfield offered Resolution 300, which made clear the United States would continue to play an integral role in Western Europe's security, the "preservation of liberties," and "the maintenance of world peace."\textsuperscript{49} However, as this resolution made absolutely clear, the present circumstances
allowed the United States to withdraw some of its troops. Mansfield explained to his fellow colleagues that this resolution, if adhered to, would enhance the relationship between Western Europe and the United States. Western Europe, Mansfield hoped, would become more of a factor in world affairs. In August 1966, as in 1955 and in 1961, Mansfield declared Western Europe had recovered from the devastation of World War Two. All the economic indicators proved that Western Europe could provide its own defense, and yet Western Europe appeared unwilling to meet its military commitments to NATO. In fact, instead of increasing their support of NATO, West European NATO members had demonstrated their unwillingness to support NATO fully by reducing their conscription periods. According to Mansfield, the only nation which had fulfilled its share of supporting the NATO was the United States. This did not make much sense to Mansfield given that Western European countries had a more immediate security risk than the United States. In response to the intransigence of Western Europe, Mansfield hoped Resolution 300 would "advise" the President to reevaluate the need for so many American divisions in Western Europe, if the President saw fit, to withdraw two to three divisions from Western Europe, thus forcing the West Europeans to make up the loss of troops, or if they so chose not to do anything.

The Johnson administration did not look favorably upon this resolution. In fact, during a phone conversation with Senator Mansfield, Johnson "disapproved" of Resolution 300. Mansfield did not intend to force the Johnson administration to commit itself to a
given course. Rather, Mansfield was putting gentle pressure on the Johnson administration and the Senate, hoping that at least a troop withdrawal might be debated. 51

In December 1966 the Senate adjourned for Christmas vacation without debating or voting on Resolution 300. However, when the Senate reconvened in January 1967 Mansfield resurrected Resolution 300, changing only the number to Resolution 49. In the Senate the resolution picked up quick support thanks to the Vietnam war and a substantial trade imbalance between Western Europe and the United States, which flooded West European banks with dollars. However, Mansfield conveyed to the Senate "with or without a problem of balance of payments, with or without the immense requirements of Vietnam, the reduction of U.S. forces in Western Europe is justified on its own merits, as a long-overdue adjustment in U.S. policy with respect to Europe." He told the Senate that he "began an advocacy of this course long before we became immersed in the conflict in Vietnam or deeply concerned with the question of balance of payments." 52 Indeed, Mansfield's advocacy of a troop withdrawal began in 1951 when he gave his approval to the sending of four more divisions to Western Europe based on the impression that once economic recovery and political stability had been achieved in Western Europe most of the troops would be withdrawn. 53

In January of 1967 the Johnson administration wanted to draw as little attention as possible to Mansfield's resolution, for the United States, England, and West Germany were engaged in discussions over troop deployment, strategy, and arms purchases. In fact, the Johnson
administration had hoped to persuade Mansfield to hold off on Resolution 49. In response to the introduction of Resolution 49, Dick Moose, an assistant to Walt Rostow, suggested that some action should be taken "to avoid having the Resolution [49] debated and passed just as the Trilateral Talks are in the critical phase." One option, according to Moose, was to "go to Mansfield . . . and ask for time to act out a multilateral charade." Another option was "a quiet campaign to modify the Resolution and/or delay the hearings." "That's the most we can hope for," conceded Moose, for "defeat of the Resolution seems unlikely." Moose misjudged Mansfield, for it was exactly this stalling and compromising by the executive branch which infuriated Mansfield. In part, he had reintroduced the resolution to return U.S. forces in the hope of raising that issue during the tripartite talks. He meant to keep the pressure on the Johnson people negotiating the future direction of the Atlantic Alliance. To his amazement, however, the tripartite talks produced "interim decisions on our [United States'] part to maintain the status quo and postpone the hard decisions." It was "ironic," noted Mansfield, "that the principal decision of the recent tripartite Conference involves a new U.S. commitment to buy $35 million worth or[sic] arms and services from Great Britain in order to stave off the reduction in the British Army of the Rhine which London had previously announced it felt compelled to make." He could not believe it; it seemed as though the Johnson administration and a large segment of the Senate (42 Senators had co-sponsored Resolution 49) were heading
in different directions over the issue of U.S. troops in Europe.

Continuing his talk on the recent tripartite agreement, Mansfield told the Senate that the security of Western Europe could not be secured by "a magic number of U.S. troops." American soldiers, he said, do not automatically "underwrite our diplomacy and insure ultimate solutions of Europe's problems as we think they should be solved." In closing, Mansfield warned that for NATO to survive as an effective system of collective defense, NATO must "reflect the changing attitudes and preoccupations of all of its members." Previously, NATO had not responded to the changing attitudes of individual members. However, with frustration building within the Alliance, NATO had no choice. Mansfield cited France's unilateral decision in 1966 to withdraw its forces from NATO as a result of NATO's inability to meet the individual needs of member nations and the start of a dangerous precedent. De Gaulle's actions had sent a clear message that the Alliance needed to make some fundamental adjustments. "In short," Mansfield said, "this resolution calls upon those who remain shackled to an outdated policy based on a Europe as it was yesterday to face up to the fact that tomorrow will always seem to be a better time to take the action which is urgently required today." Continuing his lobbying for Resolution 49, Mansfield explained to an audience at the University of North Carolina how Western European nations had made unilateral adjustments to NATO. De Gaulle's France led the way, and Mansfield wondered why the United States had not followed suit. In fact, "the contrasts in performance," Mansfield
declared, between the United States and Western Europe had become an "embarrassment." It had moved the United States away from "the mainstream of European developments" and would eventually become "a source of friction on both sides."  

In the same speech he explained that his calls for the withdrawal of four divisions of troops from Western Europe did not indicate a revision to an isolationist policy, as many of the opponents to a reduction claimed. Mansfield proclaimed general terms like "isolationism" or "internationalism" had "lost their pertinence." He stated the meaning of labels, as used to describe the previous course of U.S. foreign policy, could not be used as standard labels today. More important than labels, to Mansfield, was that foreign policy be "timely and adjust[ed] to the bonafide interest of the nation and to the realities of the contemporary world."

Mansfield closed his speech with an unusual public attack upon the executive branch. He found it "difficult to acquiesce in Executive Branch fears for Western Europe's security which are obviously far greater than the fears of the Europeans themselves." He found a "lack of dignity in the lengths to which these fears have carried our [United States'] diplomacy." Further, he found that the United States had "begged, badgered and buttered Western Europe" to force West Europeans to make a greater contribution to their own defense, yet just the opposite had happened—West European NATO members had reduced the number of men in uniform.  

Mansfield did not like to go public with his criticism of any presidential administration. He believed he could make more of an
impact on a president through back channels rather than through the
use of the podium. However, the harshness of the speech given at North
Carolina and its frank discussion of the need for a troop withdrawal
clearly demonstrated that a rift had developed between Johnson and
Mansfield over the withdrawal of American forces.

A subcommittee began hearings on Resolution 49 on April 26. In
the meantime the Johnson administration announced that the United States
planned to redeploy 35,000 military personnel from West Germany to the
United States, beginning in April of 1968. The Johnson administration
also announced that West Germany had agreed to buy 500 million dollars
of U.S. Treasury bonds and to make public its commitment not to convert
its dollar reserves for gold. Most senators welcomed this news,
including Mansfield. In light of this announcement, support quickly
dwindled for Resolution 49.

When the hearing commenced, support continued to wane as the
diverse political personalities of Democratic Senators Fulbright from
Arkansas, Church from Idaho, Symington from Missouri, Jackson from
Washington, Sparkman from Alabama, Stennis from Mississippi, and
Republican Senators Aiken from Vermont, Hickenlooper and Miller from
Iowa, and Pearson from Kansas threatened the survival of the resolution.
Indeed, it appeared unlikely that the amendment would be voted out of
the subcommittee. Moreover, with West Germany agreeing to assume a
large part of the costs of stationing American troops in West Germany
and promising to redeploy 35,000 troops stationed from Western Europe,
support for the resolution quickly dissipated. As interest subsided
the subcommittee ceased hearing. The Johnson administration had scored a major victory, and Mansfield recorded just another of many defeats.

Although temporarily defused, the initiative for troop reduction was far from abandoned. Mansfield believed Johnson's initiative to redeploy troops represented just the start of bigger and better things, which he hoped would culminate in a major reduction of U.S. troops from Western Europe.

In spite of his continued interest, the year 1968 marked a lull in his drive for a troop reduction. His duties as Majority Leader, the presidential campaign, and the Vietnam war, left Mansfield little time to concentrate on sponsoring another resolution to reduce American forces in Western Europe. Furthermore, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet army on August 20, 1968 made it inopportune to push for any resolution which advocated the reduction of U.S. forces from Western Europe. Mansfield realized the Senate would not debate a troop withdrawal in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's actions in Eastern Europe. Personally, Mansfield believed NATO could not be expected to impede or deter the attack of one Warsaw pact nation against another; he therefore saw no reason not to debate the troops issue. Nevertheless, immediately after the invasion he stated that he would not continue to advocate a reduction of U.S. forces in Western Europe. He made this statement with "resignation and sadness" because "a reduction would have saved American taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars"; the balance of payment problems would have been mitigated; and a unilateral troop reduction would have improved the relationship between the United
States and Western Europe. However, Mansfield had not lost hope for a reduction in the near future. The United States, he asserted, should be planning for this day to come.66

In November 1968 Richard Nixon defeated Humbert Humphrey in the presidential election. Mansfield decided to hold off on another resolution while waiting to see in what direction the Nixon administration would steer U.S. foreign policy, especially in regard to Western Europe. It was not long, however, that Mansfield realized the Nixon administration's approach to Western Europe would differ little from that of the Johnson administration or, for that matter, from the Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations. Within a matter of months, Mansfield dusted off his proposal to withdraw a substantial number of American troops from Europe and prepared to make his move once again.

Mansfield had been preparing for the end of the honeymoon. In fact, while the Nixon administration appraised the direction of U.S. foreign policy during its first months in office, Mansfield was doing his homework—attempts to forecast the intentions of the Nixon administration in regard to foreign policy. On January 22, 1969, in a letter to Secretary of State William Rogers, Mansfield asked what the Department of State intended to do in the next round of negotiations on the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in West Germany. Apparently, even before Rogers had officially become Secretary of State, he had made promises at the November ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council that the United States would not withdraw any U.S. troops from Western Europe and had even agreed to commit more
U.S. resources to the defense of Western Europe. Mansfield wanted to know what promises had been made, and if the commitment had been made to send extra U.S. troops and aircraft to Western Europe. Mansfield never received a reply from Rogers. 67

After the Nixon administration's military policy in Western Europe became clear to him and because he believed that events in Czechoslovakia had sufficiently died down, Mansfield decided the time was propitious to submit his third resolution. In introducing Resolution 292, which was identical to Resolutions 49 and 300, Mansfield pointed out that of the 3.5 million Americans in the various branches of the U.S. military 1.2 million were stationed overseas. Mansfield argued that the 315,000 American troops in Western Europe and their 235,000 dependents constituted a tremendous drain on U.S. resources. Indeed, the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in West Germany had created a foreign exchange gap around $965 million per year. The United States and West Germany had agreed to ease this foreign exchange gap by West Germany purchasing military hardware from the United States, paying off Marshall Plan loans, and buying U.S. Treasury bonds. Still, these remedies neither solved the exchange problem nor did they fully satisfy Mansfield. 68

Just as Mansfield believed the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had failed to respond to changing realities so, too, he thought that the Nixon administration was not responding properly to new developments in foreign relations. He pointed out that the Soviet Union had reduced the number of their troops in Czechoslovakia because of the
problems that had arisen on the Soviet-Chinese border, and yet the United States remained intransigent in light of these developments. He brushed aside the relevance of the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia by stating the United States could not have stopped the invasion with "one or two divisions or, for that matter, seven or eight or 18 divisions, instead of four or five." Mansfield found it disconcerting that within NATO itself force reductions had been studied for "years," and yet little progress had been made toward coming up with a viable plan.  

He then remarked that both the Soviet Union and the United States together supported a million soldiers in Central Europe. To him such a situation symbolized the "anachronistic" nature of the two countries' policies pursued by the two countries. He finished his talk by saying, "the age of empire, the era of occupation, the period of the cold war and one-sided financial preeminence" were past. "The persistence of these vestiges in present policies involves, in my judgment, a wasteful and dangerous use of our available fiscal resources."  

On January 23, 1970 Mansfield believed a major victory had been achieved. During his State of the Union address President Nixon said that many of the Cold War policies were in today's world unnecessary and obsolete and needed changing. Mansfield was ecstatic. He had been waiting since 1954 for a president to make such a statement. Nixon appeared to be in agreement with Mansfield's predilections for a flexible, innovative approach to foreign policy. Nixon then expanded on what would later become known as the Nixon Doctrine. He told Congress:
Neither the defense nor the development of other nations can be exclusively or primarily an American undertaking. The nations of each part of the world should assume the primary responsibility for their own well-being; and they themselves should determine the terms of that well-being. To insist that other nations play a role is not a retreat from responsibility, but a sharing of responsibility. We shall be faithful to our treaty commitments but we shall reduce our involvement and our presence in other nations' affairs.

With the latter statement Mansfield fully agreed.

With Mansfield's euphoria was confusion because on January 20, 1970 Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson had given a speech before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations which sharply rebuked the merits of Resolution 292. Richardson asserted that those who wanted to withdraw a substantial number of U.S. forces from Western Europe believed NATO no longer had a valid function when in fact the present number of U.S. divisions in Western Europe had to be maintained to provide an effective flexible response. Richardson asserted that if a substantial number of U.S. troops were brought home no savings to the American taxpayer would occur due to the fact the troops would have to be stationed somewhere in the United States. Furthermore a unilateral withdrawal would rule out a negotiated settlement for the mutual withdrawal of troops from Central Europe. Finally, to allow the West German army to fill the void left by the withdrawal of U.S. forces would set a dangerous precedent, possibly creating instability in Europe.

On January 23 Mansfield contested all of Richardson's assertions
before the Senate. Responding to Richardson's main criticism that Resolution 292 would diminish or destroy the "strength, closeness, trust, realism and flexibility of NATO," Mansfield responded Western Europe, with its population of 250 million and a "tremendous industrial base," should be able to "organize an effective military coalition to defend themselves against 200 million Russians." Mansfield reiterated that the Europeans had become so comfortable with the "status quo" that they had become apathetic toward their own defense "distorting the relationship between Europe and the United States" which resulted in a drain on American resources.

While he disputed Richardson's points Mansfield praised Nixon's ground-breaking and provocative State of the Union message. He wondered which plan, Richardson's speech or Richard Nixon's State of the Union address, the Nixon administration intended to follow. In other words, he wanted to find out if the Nixon administration intended to maintain the military status quo in Western Europe or implement the Nixon Doctrine, which called for West European nations to share more of the defense burden and, Mansfield hoped, allow the United States to reduce its military presence in Western Europe. While he waited to see which course the Nixon administration would ultimately choose, Mansfield decided to put Resolution 292 on hold.

It seemed to Mansfield that the Nixon administration had made a final decision when on November 30, 1970 Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird agreed that the United States would maintain U.S. troop levels in Western Europe for at least eighteen months. In return for this
commitment by the United States the West European members of NATO agreed to spend a billion dollars more for NATO. This arrangement did not satisfy Mansfield for he considered this agreement to be another political palliative.  

In reaction to Melvin Laird's statement Mansfield stated that the NATO meeting of December 1970 was "a deep disappointment because of the firm pledge made by the executive branch of the U.S. government to maintain the present level of U.S. forces in Europe." He had hoped that the Nixon administration would begin "substantial reduction of American troops and dependents in Western Europe" starting some time after June 30, 1971. He had come to believe that the Nixon administration did not intend to apply the Nixon Doctrine to Western Europe. In the last two sentences of his statement Mansfield revealed that he no longer would be willing to compromise on this issue.

I intend to do all that I possibly can to try to bring about a substantial reduction of American troops and dependents in Europe. I think that the American people want to see such a reduction. And I think that a majority of the U.S. Senate wants to see such a reduction.

This time Mansfield was not about to let stalling tactics succeed. Mansfield figured that the Nixon administration had laid down the gauntlet; now it was time for him to react. Fifty-two senators co-sponsored Resolution 292 indicating to Mansfield there was strong support in the Senate for a reduction of U.S. troops. He believed that sincere debate not only on the potentialities of U.S. troops from Western Europe but also on the direction of U.S. foreign policy was desperately needed. He decided that the time had come to force the issue.
With his mind made up that U.S. foreign policy needed serious debate and hopefully adjustment, starting with the Berlin crisis in 1959, Mansfield charged forth inspiring lively debate in the Senate over American foreign policy. At first his actions and recommendations were mild. His thoughts on Berlin inspired others to respond and think about new solutions to old problems. After Berlin, Mansfield turned his attention toward the role of American troops in Western Europe. Once again he quietly nudged the Senate and the executive branch to take a close look at U.S. policy in Western Europe. However, increasingly Mansfield believed his mild gestures were not making an impact, especially on the executive branch. Finally, after all but being ignored by the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, Mansfield in 1971 decided the time was right to use heavy-handed tactics to bring the debate over U.S. foreign policy to the attention of the executive branch, the Senate, and the American people.
Ultimately, there was not one event but many over a seventeen-year period which impelled Mansfield on May 11, 1971 to attempt to legislate a withdrawal of 150,000 American soldiers from Western Europe by attaching an amendment to the Military Service Act. Certainly the decline in the value of the dollar resulting from the United States' large deficit in trade was the immediate cause, which in part resulted from the United States keeping troops in Western Europe. However, in introducing his amendment Mansfield listed all of his reasons to legislate a withdrawal of 150,000 troops from Western Europe: the West Europeans needed to commit more money and men for their own defense; the U.S. forces now in Western Europe merely acted as a tripwire and not a force which could hold its own against a Soviet Union conventional attack; Detente and Ostpolitik would never come about in the near future because the Soviet Union and the United States would not be able to settle their differences in a highly politicized world, so the United States should take the initiative toward deescalation of the Cold War by withdrawing some of its troops unilaterally. Finally, Mansfield was fed up with the stalling tactics of three presidential administrations on this issue. By attaching his amendment to the Military Service Act Mansfield had ensured that stalling on the part of the Nixon administration would be impossible, for the Military
Service Act was pivotal to providing money and men for the Vietnam war. 1

In attempting to determine what caused Mansfield to submit the Mansfield amendment, James Reston wrote that Mansfield's actions were mainly the accumulated frustrations of over twenty years. Mike is fed up with the war, with the cost of the military, with the failure of most of the European allies to hold up their end of the common defense burden, and with the inability of the Government to resolve any of these problems. . . . The recent European run on the dollar was too much for him, so he reached for his meat-ax.

Reston admitted that Mansfield's charges were "fair," but he also said the Senate was not about to "dismember the most effective American alliance of the century." Reston continued that "when old policies are not kept up to date and appeals for sensible review of force levels are ignored, odd things can happen in Washington." Reston noted that Mansfield had been an integral part of the generation which tried unsuccessfully to "encourage the formation of a strong and unified Europe which could act as an equal partner with the United States in a shared defense of a common civilization." That had never come about, however, and Reston knew why. "The Europeans," he wrote, "have preferred to enjoy their prosperity and national independence rather than pay the price of political union, and have counted on the United States for their security rather than on one another." 2

In defense of Mansfield Reston commented that Mansfield was not an "ill-tempered isolationist acting out of frustration and caprice." Rather, Mansfield's point was to force a reappraisal of policy in Europe. Reston noted that since Mansfield had been around
Washington, D.C. long enough to know "institutions don't move unless they are shoved," Mansfield meant to move them. In closing his article Reston wondered whether Mansfield's "gentle meat ax" might "do some good after all." It might "even revive some talk about building a sensible world order again, and no such large subject as that has been discussed around here since Lyndon Johnson discovered Vietnam."  

To the Nixon administration the introduction of the Mansfield amendment symbolized the start of a Vietnamization process in Western Europe, which the Nixon administration wished to quash. Mansfield hoped the Nixon Doctrine or Guam Doctrine would be applied to Western Europe; however, the Nixon administration never intended this course of action. In fact, all of the reports Nixon's National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, received indicated that U.S. conventional forces in Western Europe needed to be "enhanced, not reduced." Furthermore, the Nixon administration believed that any amendment touching on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would infringe on the President's powers over foreign policy. Senator Hugh Scott, a supporter of the Nixon administration's position, let it be known in the Senate that the Nixon administration would "not accept any alternative that would have the effect of Congress determining the foreign policy of the United States toward NATO." And the White House spokesman, Ronald Ziegler, asked if the administration would accept any compromises, Ziegler replied, "Absolutely not." 

The introduction of the Mansfield amendment caught the Nixon administration off guard. They realized the challenge presented to
the administration's power of formulating U.S. foreign policy and quickly organized an array of weapons to ensure the defeat of the amendment. President Nixon assigned Henry Kissinger the job of stopping the passage of amendment 6531.

Kissinger, too, perceived this amendment as a battle over the direction of U.S. foreign policy. In short, in Kissinger's and Nixon's minds this was an attack by the "liberal Establishment" upon the Nixon administration. This liberal Establishment according to Kissinger had "throughout the century ... extolled the importance of a strong Executive, and reversed itself and had pressed on the Congress its obligation to control tightly an allegedly power mad and war obsessed Administration."^8

In part Kissinger was correct. The Mansfield amendment was a check on what Mansfield believed had become during the Cold War unchecked powers of the executive branch in foreign affairs. But Kissinger had assumed too much by equating the Mansfield amendment with an attack by what Kissinger ambiguously termed the "liberal Establishment." Instead, Kissinger proclaimed that Mansfield's amendment derived from a man who was "at heart ... an isolationist." According to Kissinger the amendment grew out of a "coalition of frustration" on the part of Mansfield, "not based upon an adequate understanding and rational approach to the world as it stood in 1971."^9

Simply, Mansfield and Kissinger approached foreign affairs from different perspectives. Indeed, Mansfield and Kissinger, the figureheads of the two opposing sides over the Mansfield amendment, could
not have been more different in their approach to the implementation of foreign policy. Kissinger eagerly accepted the assignment to ensure the defeat of the Mansfield amendment because he believed a reduction of U.S. forces in Western Europe "would shake the very foundation of our postwar policy." That was exactly what Mansfield had in mind. To Mansfield a defunct, archaic foreign policy should have its foundations shaken.

Although not a frontal assault on the powers of the Nixon administration—as Kissinger and Nixon believed—and not a threat to the constitutional prerogatives of the presidency, Mansfield clearly intended to put the Nixon administration to the test. Mansfield wished to set the record straight as to the direction of U.S. foreign policy. Throughout its first three years in office the Nixon administration had sent out conflicting signals in regard to the direction of U.S. foreign policy. The Nixon Doctrine or Guam Doctrine, which proclaimed that the United States would no longer act as the world police force, had been instituted only in Southeast Asia. Moreover, Mansfield concluded that the United States was still playing the role as the world's policeman, which he appraised was contrary to the Guam Doctrine in its broadest interpretation. In fact since Nixon formally declared the Nixon Doctrine in January of 1971, various members of the Nixon cabinet had declared that the United States would not only maintain its role in world affairs through the auspices of the U.S. military but would increase that role by committing more U.S. forces overseas. Mansfield simply wanted to set the record straight. Which would it be?
Did the Nixon administration intend to reduce U.S. troops overseas, or did it intend to keep the current level of troops overseas and possibly even increase those levels?

In the Senate, John Stennis from Mississippi took charge of the opposition to the Mansfield amendment. Since Stennis, too, was caught off guard by the introduction of the Mansfield amendment, his immediate goal was to stall the vote on H.R. 6531, allowing the opposition to the Mansfield amendment to organize and build support. Stennis argued that since the Mansfield amendment dealt with an issue of such importance as the security of Western Europe and the United States, ample debate should be allowed. Mansfield agreed to a week's worth of debate on H.R. 6531 before bringing the amendment to a vote. 11

In response to Mansfield's amendment, Stennis indicated that he too would like to see an eventual reduction in U.S. troops "with more emphasis on quality rather than numbers," but, he believed, a reduction of U.S. troops at that time would send a sign to the Soviet Union that the United States in effect was abandoning Western Europe. That would destroy any hope for mutual reduction of troops in Europe. Stennis proposed that troop reduction should be mutual and proportional. A "meat ax approach," he said, did not constitute "sound policy." He agreed with Mansfield that West Europeans should do more for their own defense, but withdrawing 150,000 American troops would not work. Rather it would send a clear signal to West European members of NATO that the United States was no longer fully committed to Western security. The commitment of so many U.S. troops, according to Stennis,
gave West Europeans and especially West Germans a "great source of satisfaction and inspiration and encouragement to them so that they will not submit to blackmail and not go over to the other side and not give up." Stennis admitted that the Soviet-U.S. relationship had improved in the last year, but he warned the residues of the Czechoslovakia invasion were still being felt. Furthermore, Stennis argued that the withdrawal of 150,000 American troops from Western Europe would save the United States very little money because the troops would be stationed in the United States. As far as the balance-of-payment problems, U.S. forces in Western Europe were only one of many contributors to this problem. American industry investing heavily in Western Europe and American tourists spending billions of dollars vacationing in Western Europe, argued Stennis, contributed dramatically to the balance-of-payment problems. 12

Following Stennis, Senator Dominick of Colorado, a one-time supporter of Mansfield's resolutions, argued against H.R. 6531 as it stood because it was unconstitutional. Dominick stated it "substitute[d] the judgment of the Senate for the judgment of the President of the United States." Only the president of the United States should determine "what force levels need[ed] to be in what places in order to assure the defense of the American people." 13 Essentially, the arguments of Mansfield, Stennis, and Dominick for and against the amendment outlined the issues of the debate which would take place over the next five days in the Senate.

During the second day of debate on the Mansfield amendment certain
members of the Nixon administration, the press, and various scholars brushed aside the Mansfield amendment as a piece of legislation constructed by an isolationist or neo-isolationist. Both sides believed the vote would be close. During the initial stages of debate, each side did a rough survey of how the Senate would vote if the bill were brought to a vote immediately. Certainly the United States' financial situation and the start of Detente convinced many senators that the time was ripe for a more limited role by the United States in Western Europe; however, much of the initial support for the Mansfield amendment in the Senate grew out of Mansfield's reputation for integrity, prudence and knowledge, especially in foreign affairs. As James Reston wrote, Mansfield epitomized "a cool and sensible man, so when he tries to cut the American military forces in Europe in two it is obvious that something is wrong." Thus, those against the Mansfield amendment had to fight more than the merits of the amendment. They had to contend with Mansfield's achievements as a senator and with his expertise on foreign affairs.

To help combat Mansfield's reputation as a skilled statesman, the Nixon administration enlisted the support of men with reputations equal to that of Mansfield. Kissinger decided to mobilize the "old establishment." Brought together to influence uncommitted senators were Dean Acheson (Secretary of State in the Truman administration), John McCloy and Lucius Clay (former High Commissioners in Germany), George Ball and Nicholas Katzenbach (both former Under Secretary of State), Henry Cabot Lodge (former Ambassador to the United Nations), Cyrus Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense and future Secretary
of State in the Carter administration), Alfred Gruenter, Lauris Norstad, and Lyman Lemnitzer (all former Supreme Allied Commanders in Europe).

The group compiled a Who's Who of the Old Guard—men who were all "present at the creation." The chief creator himself, Dean Acheson, acted as the group's spokesman. After meeting with Nixon and Kissinger, the group met with the press. Acheson said it would be "assinine" and "sheer nonsense" to cut forces without a cut in Soviet forces. John McCloy commented it was "difficult to think of any single piece of legislation which embodies so many potentially disastrous consequences at this particular stage of history as this amendment to the draft act." Mansfield took all this in stride. Upon hearing about this list of notables he commented: "They are calling in all the old-timers, all the guys who formulated this policy 25 years ago. It just illustrates the generation gap in our policy."

During the second day of debate, Mansfield exclaimed he pursued the withdrawal of U.S. troops in Western Europe as a realist. The United States had to "face up to the realities of today and tomorrow," he said, "and update policies which may have been good 20 or 25 years ago." He contended that the United States would continue and should continue to be involved in world affairs; however, the United States could not be expected to expend its own resources for the welfare of all nations as it had so limitlessly done in the past. Limited resources meant that the United States could not be by itself the "world's policeman"; it could not patrol "all the parts of the world."
The United States had "neither the manpower nor the resources to stay on the course which we have pursued so assiduously since the end of the Second World War. It is about time that we awaken to the realities of today. It is long past the time when we should have loosened the shackles of the past," Mansfield declared to his fellow senators.  

Senator Gravel of Alaska supported Mansfield's latter argument. He stressed the importance of maintaining economic "resiliency" and "viability" of the United States for maintaining the defense and security of the United States. The senator from Alaska believed the security of the United States must be protected not only for the short term but for the long term. Economic stability would give the United States the "capacity to defend [itself] . . . not only today but in the future as well." He asked whether the United States would be defeating itself if it maintained a policy of defense that wasted U.S. resources in Western Europe in the short term while jeopardizing the long term. Gravel drew an analogy to the Civil War. The South had been known for its "able and trained leadership," leaving many to believe at the time that the North would be immediately overwhelmed by the military excellence of the average Confederate soldier. The North, on the other hand, had problems finding men to lead the Union army. But the North still overwhelmed and completely destroyed the South due to its "economic and long-term productive ability."  

Although Mansfield and his opponents were so far apart, so completely different in their views on what the U.S. role should be in world affairs, their reasoning for waging the battle could not have
been more similar. Each side viewed the opposition's views as backwards, out of touch with current events, and dangerous to the United States' security. Each side declared that one had only to look to the past follies of U.S. policies to know just what the consequences of the opposing side had in store. If the Senate passed this amendment, Kissinger, Stennis, and Dominick believed, the United States would be reverting back to isolationism, closely resembling that of the 1920s and 1930s, which allowed the rise of Hitler.

Mansfield responded that the Cold War foreign policy of the United States had served a useful purpose at one time. However, the problems with Cold War foreign policy, as Mansfield saw it, were innate: they had a very specific goal—containment of the Soviet Union. Obsessed with the Cold War, the statesmen who formulated and institutionalized Cold War policies had never realized the need to include some sort of mechanism that would allow these policies to react and change with world events. As for the charges of isolationism, Mansfield stated, "Nobody can be an isolationist any more." He continued,

May I say to my colleagues that the days of isolationism are gone and gone forever, because the world is too small and is still shrinking. Means of communication and transportation are speeding up day by day, week by week, month by month, and year by year. We are going to live with our neighbors on this whether we like it or not because we have no other choice. And even if one wanted to become an isolationist— and I do not— one could not do so.22

Many senators who had supported Mansfield's resolutions could not support the Mansfield amendment because they believed a mutual withdrawal of troops in Europe by both of the protagonists of the Cold War was
possible. Mansfield had given up on the idea of the Soviet Union and the United States agreeing to a mutual withdrawal of their troops from Central Europe. He did not believe that the past negotiations for mutual troop withdrawals had been done with serious intent. Rather, Mansfield considered the talks for mutual force reductions by the Johnson administration more as an effective palliative, designed to combat any support Mansfield gained for his resolutions in the late 1960s. He viewed the Soviet Union in a different context than many of his colleagues. In 1971 he did not consider the Soviet Union as the primary threat to Western security. Thus, Mansfield refused to accept the long-term implications of the status quo—a militarized, partitioned Germany and Europe—as reasonable. Instead he considered such an arrangement precarious and threatening to world peace.

Also, Mansfield believed that many statesmen in the United States, in Western Europe, and in the Soviet Union had come to regard American and Soviet troops as a permanent fixture in Central Europe. Mansfield found such a proposition unacceptable. He feared these troops would become security blankets, creating the false impression that without a large contingent of U.S. troops in Western Europe peace could not exist.

Thus, Mansfield did not worry that his amendment might destroy negotiations for a mutual withdrawal for in his mind the Soviet Union and the United States were more interested in keeping their troops in Central Europe. In fact Mansfield believed negotiations for mutual force reductions had lost all credibility. Therefore, he did
not expect the Nixon administration to be able to use the hope of mutual reductions as an effective weapon in combating his amendment. What Mansfield never expected was that Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Premier, would make the hope of mutual withdrawal again a factor in the debate. On May 14 Brezhnev announced that the Soviet Union stood ready to make reductions in their conventional forces in Central Europe if the United States would be willing to do the same. Brezhnev had made a similar statement on March 31, 1971 without creating much fanfare. Immediately the White House used Mr. Brezhnev's speech as ammunition to help defeat the Mansfield amendment. In light of Brezhnev's speech, support in the Senate once again grew for mutual force reduction talks.26

Because the Soviet Union provides little information which might explain Brezhnev's actions, it is hard to determine why Brezhnev showed renewed interest for mutual force reduction at the critical junction of debate in the Senate over the Mansfield amendment. Western sources will have to do for now. Henry Kissinger theorized that the Soviet Union, engaged in Ostpolitick negotiations, stuck to its plan of giving the impression that it was ready to "unlock the doors to a hopeful future." To Kissinger, the Soviet Union's actions illustrated "the inflexibility of the Soviets' cumbersome policymaking machinery . . . to stick to their game plan even when confronted with the Mansfield windfall.27

Phil Williams, author of The U.S. Senate and U.S. Troops In Europe, on the other hand, found Kissinger's reasoning too simplistic. Offering a different reason for Brezhnev's actions, Williams stated
that "it is equally plausible that Brezhnev not only had a clear notion of what was happening in Washington, but was sensitive to the possible consequences, and that far from providing opportunities to be exploited, the amendment posed problems to be preempted." "The status quo in Europe," continued Williams, "had many advantages for the Soviet union, and a substantial presence of American troops was an integral feature of the status quo." Williams asserted that the Soviet Union was equally if not more concerned with the possible rise in the strength of West Germany's military power in the face of a U.S. withdrawal. "To put it crudely," said Williams, "US troops in Europe helped contain West Germany as well as the Soviet Union." 28

Whatever Brezhnev's reasons, his statement instantly diminished support in the Senate for the Mansfield amendment. It made the amendment appear ill-timed. Senator Margaret Chase Smith, the Republican senator from Maine, probably spoke for a significant number of her colleagues in the Senate when she argued that although Mansfield was right in principle, the timing of his amendment could not have been more unfortunate. 29 Or, from another perspective, Brezhnev's speech could not have been more opportune, especially for the Nixon administration.

Not scorning "the enthusiasm which [had] suddenly been kindled for the negotiation of mutual troop reductions between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries," Mansfield did point out to his colleagues that ten years ago he had made a similar proposal without much fanfare. Mansfield praised President Nixon's "affirmative" response to Brezhnev's
proposal; however, Mansfield reiterated his belief that the United States should withdraw 150,000 troops regardless of what the Soviet Union said or did. Failure to do so would disregard the obsolescent nature of the deployment of U.S. troops in Western Europe. Moreover, delaying such action "resulted in a debilitating drain on the resources of this Nation and this Nation alone."\textsuperscript{30}

On the last day of debate Mansfield made an impassioned speech to convince his colleagues that the times demanded a change in U.S. foreign policy. He said that it often took "a sledge hammer to make an imprint," and he had hoped to do just that by putting forth the Mansfield amendment. The Senate needed a shock, according to Mansfield, because for eleven years he had been raising the troop withdrawal issue without any serious debate or action taking place on this issue. Mansfield declared that with the debate over this issue he had achieved the "minimum" of what he had set out to do. Also, the issue of troop withdrawal had been made loud and clear to the Nixon administration and to the members of NATO, but he was disappointed that there had been "no hint of an understanding from downtown or from overseas." Mansfield then continued by explaining what he had hoped to accomplish with the Mansfield amendment. By offering this amendment he had hoped to "move from the past into the present, and to look to the future. What I have tried to do is not to look over my shoulder in order to hang on to policies which were good two decades ago, and think that, despite the changing world, those policies are just as good and just." "To be sure," he said, "what was done in the past was relevant and productive,"
but he was absolutely certain that the time had come for the United States to free itself "from certain shackles" which had originally bound the United States "to policies and positions that [had since] lost their meaning." He hoped that the change he proposed would set the stage for a new relationship between Western Europe and the United States. Mansfield argued that change should not be feared but welcomed. A new foreign policy would strengthen the United States by freeing the U.S. "from certain shackles" which have bound the United States to policies and positions that had long lost their meaning. Thus, searching beyond the economic implications of U.S. troops in Western Europe, or the war in Vietnam, or even whether the president or Congress should decide foreign policy, Mansfield believed that a withdrawal of 150,000 U.S. troops from Western Europe would fundamentally change the United States' role in the world in a way that reflected contemporary world events.

In his final speech he brought up the point that as a Representative taking part, an admittedly small part, in the formation of Cold War policies, he clearly remembered supporting the decision by the Truman administration to increase the number of American divisions in Western Europe. He also recalled that he expected the American divisions to remain for "not very long; a few years." But at present, in the spring of 1971, Mansfield asserted that the United States faced "not only the possibility of an indeterminate stay of 525,000 U.S. military personnel and dependents, but maybe a permanent stay." To further convince his doubters that his actions did not grow out of isolationism, he asserted that he did not want to return to the
"'good old days.'" Instead realism was his goal. Indeed, the United
States had to maintain, in order for stability to continue, a role in
the world. Mansfield wanted the United States "to face up to the
responsibilities" which were the United States', "individually and
collectively." 33

According to Mansfield a reduction of half of the United States'
forces in Western Europe would trim U.S. troop levels in Western
Europe to "a contemporary perspective." Unlike 1951 Mansfield indicated
if West Europeans felt that the withdrawal of 150,000 troops from
Western Europe created a significant security problem, then they could
fill the gap with their own men and material.

Further, Mansfield stressed the point that the United States
foreign policy no longer reacted to the concept of a monolithic
communist bloc. In fact, China and Russia presented "the greatest
threat to each other's security." These significant changes, according
to Mansfield, had reduced the threats to world peace, Western Europe's
security, and the security of the United States; and he wondered why
the NATO forces levels remained the same as those twenty years before
when there had been a real risk. 34

He wanted "the European pocketbook to determine" how eagerly the
Europeans desired the presence of 300,000 American servicemen and
their 225,000 dependents. After observing the attempts by the Kennedy,
Johnson, and Nixon administrations to get West European members of NATO
to share a larger burden of their own defense, Mansfield believed
burden sharing a "pious hope." Mansfield's pessimism on these issues
was much stronger than many if not most of his colleagues.

Many proposals to implement a withdrawal of troops had surfaced during the debate over the Mansfield amendment, which indicated to Mansfield that many senators worried about U.S. policy in Western Europe. However, Mansfield noted that most of their proposals that had come out of this debate "asked for consultations and negotiations," which to Mansfield was a dead-end street for the time to negotiate had passed. Many new opportunities would be opened up through the unilateral withdrawal of 150,000 troops from Western Europe. Perhaps the most significant effect of a unilateral troop withdrawal by the United States would be the Soviet Union following the United States' lead. After all, Mansfield pointed out, "Moscow [had] a very great incentive indeed to reduce its Warsaw Pact forces and redeploy them eastward" (a reference to the Sino-Soviet confrontation which had erupted in 1969). He further believed a unilateral cut by the United States would have the same result as mutual reduction because eventually "Russia would be hard put to explain why it was necessary to retain such large forces to protect the satellites against a pruned-back NATO." As for the Soviets' fears of the emergence of a militarily stronger West Germany, Mansfield responded the Soviet Union need not worry. Mansfield believed "Bonn [had] no financial stomach for substantial military enlargement," and such thoughts "denied the growing preeminence of West Germany in the Common Market and its desire to retain its strong ties to the West and its eagerness for ties with the East."35

Continuing his speech, Mansfield hinted that political instability
in Eastern Europe motivated Brezhnev's proposals to start negotiations for mutual withdrawal of troops. Referring to Brezhnev's willingness to discuss a reduction of troops in Europe Mansfield suggested that "a Soviet leader this past weekend, worried about the prospect [of] satellite pressure . . . might well have sought to defer any action on United States troops strength by calling for long, drawn-out negotiations." Once again, Mansfield questioned the sincerity of both the East and West to work for a troop withdrawal. 36

Mansfield reiterated that he did not "seek the end of NATO." Nor would his amendment "compel the complete withdrawal of the United States from Europe." However, he did hope that through the adoption of his amendment U.S. foreign policy would be changed in order to meet the demands of an ever-changing world. As things stood, U.S. foreign policy made to meet the demands of another time no longer served a purpose. Mansfield warned that if adjustments in U.S. foreign policy were not made then the "vital—along with the superfluous, the antiquated, the irrelevant, and the redundant" could be lost. Mansfield reminded his colleagues of the circumstances which caused the United States to send troops over to Western Europe. He then asked them whether the same threats that created the need for six divisions in Western Europe still existed today. 37

In closing, he told his colleagues that he would not cajole or pressure them into voting for this amendment. He wanted his amendment to win on its merits or, for that fact, lose on its deficiencies. He believed that each senator should make up his own mind on this issue
and not be pressured by outside forces by voting one way or the other. But he did warn that if change did not come soon "as far as the Senate is concerned, nobody is going to take us to the cleaners. If we are taken in, we will be taken in by ourselves. We will have nobody to blame but ourselves. And, if we are, it will be too bad."  

On May 19, 1971 the Senate voted down the Mansfield amendment 36 to 61.
CONCLUSION

For a man known around Washington as being reticent and who effectively worked behind the scenes to get the job done, Mansfield's attempt to force the withdrawal of 150,000 troops in Western Europe by amending the Military Service Act appeared out of character. However, James Reston accurately pointed out that Mansfield's actions resulted from years of frustration regarding U.S. foreign policy. According to some scholars, Mansfield's frustrations over the direction of the foreign policy of the United States grew out of his unabashed isolationism. While not an isolationist, he did make a distinction between U.S. participation in world affairs and U.S. interference in the business of other nations. He became frustrated as he repeatedly failed to impress the difference on the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations and Congress. Mansfield spent much of his time as senator attempting to persuade those responsible for foreign policy to make some fundamental adjustments to U.S. foreign policy, which would allow more nations to play a larger role in world affairs and hopefully make the world a safer place.

From 1946 to 1952 Mansfield supported in Congress all U.S. foreign policy plans devised by the Truman administration, which Mansfield believed would guarantee world peace and prosperity. Thus, he voted for the military and economic aid packages to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, the Mutual Defense Act, the decision to send four
divisions of U.S. troops to Western Europe, and the Point Four Plan. Mansfield's participation in the debates in Congress over the latter programs clearly revealed Mansfield's view that Western Europe held the key to Western security and, ultimately, to peace and prosperity.

In 1953, Mansfield proudly recognized that Western Europe had largely recovered from the physical devastation of World War Two and had returned to its role as a player in world affairs. Although content with Western Europe's recovery, Mansfield believed the process of a new Western Europe had just begun. At first he patiently waited for Western Europe to become a third force in world affairs—a power equal to that of the United States and the Soviet Union. For Western Europe to become such a power, Mansfield recognized that Western Europe must form into an economic, political and defensive union. Through such an arrangement, Mansfield believed, stability in the world would be more secure because Western Europe might help diffuse the Cold War. When West Europeans stalled, when they argued over semantics on how integration should take place seemingly, at times, putting the whole process on hold, Mansfield's patience turned into frustration. In part the Mansfield amendment grew out of these frustrations.

Mansfield also took into account the United States' culpability in Western Europe's lackadaisical approach to integration. In 1953 he started to worry that those policies which had so efficiently guaranteed world order in the immediate postwar period were contributing to Western Europe's unenthusiastic posture toward union. For instance, the success of the Marshall Plan resulted because it had the realistic
goal of rehabilitating Western Europe. Mansfield supported such an approach to the granting of U.S. foreign aid not only to Western Europe, but around the globe. As a congressman he gave the impression that it was not in the United States' economic or security interest to aid a country without the goal that that country become economically self-sufficient. On the other hand, Mansfield had little patience for the misappropriation of American aid. In 1953, as a freshman senator on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mansfield started to criticize the United States' policy of aiding countries which had limited strategic value to the United States, which were politically repressive and economically stagnant. Furthermore, the final outcome of such policies, Mansfield believed, created more enemies for the United States than friends.

By the time he entered the Senate Mansfield had become convinced that U.S. foreign policy was becoming a hazard, in part, due to the manner in which the United States granted military and economic aid. Thus, because Western Europe had by 1953 adequately recovered economically and could for the most part maintain its own defense, Mansfield singled out the continuance of military and economic aid to Western Europe as the prime symbol of the United States' backward approach to foreign policy. Indeed, from 1953 to his retirement from the Senate, Mansfield could not understand the continuation of such policies in Western Europe or around the world. The giving or selling of arms throughout the world, sending military aid to countries which were politically repressive, maintaining 300,000 U.S. soldiers in
Western Europe, continuing what appeared to be a never-ending arms race, he argued, failed to guarantee world peace either for the immediate future or for the long term. He proposed that other ways be found to secure Western security and peace for the long term.

Starting in 1962 Mansfield tried to initiate a debate on the direction of U.S. foreign policy, with the hope of changing the approach to U.S. foreign policy. However, he met one stumbling block after another in his pursuit to see serious debate commence on the direction of United States foreign policy. Furthermore, as the intransigency of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations became apparent to Mansfield, he responded by raising the stakes.

Without a doubt, Mansfield had made his biggest push to spur debate on U.S. foreign policy with the introduction of the Mansfield amendment. With the United States' economy in a downturn, the burdens of the Vietnam war, and a growing rift between the Soviet Union and China, Mansfield believed the time was propitious for him to make his move. He did so by introducing the Mansfield amendment on May 11, 1971.

As he had hoped, the amendment initiated intense debate on the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy. One author had even speculated that Mansfield may have not wanted his amendment to be passed by the Senate; rather, he considered the introduction as more significant than its ultimate fate. Nonetheless, although he stated he had scored a slight victory just by initiating debate in the Senate over the direction of U.S. foreign policy, the Senate voted down his amendment,
sending a clear sign to him that change would not be forthcoming in the near future. It appeared all his years of working to bring about change had come to naught. In fact, in his remaining five years in the Senate he would never again push for a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Western Europe. After the defeat of his amendment he essentially admitted that he had lost the battle. But the war was not over.

On April 7, 1975, just over a year before his retirement from the Senate, Mansfield reiterated his belief that the Cold War policies which had dominated the foreign policy of the United States for almost thirty years had become anachronistic. Surveying the United States' intervention in Vietnam, Cambodia, parts of Latin America, and the presence of a substantial number of U.S. troops in Western Europe, Mansfield stated such situations were "the result of a foreign policy inaugurated six Presidents ago and carried on down to the present are now at our doorstep." He once again argued that America's foreign policy needed to be updated because such a revision would be not only in the interest of the United States, but also of the world. "It is time," Mansfield said, "that we base our foreign policy on the present rather than on the past, that we review and revise our defense arrangements all over the world, and that we do so in both areas on the basis of cooperation between the executive and legislative branches of government." He closed his speech by saying, "We can no longer live in the past, but must face up to the present and plan for the future." Throughout his career in Congress, Mansfield made a valiant effort to bring America's foreign policy out of the past, into the present, while planning for the future.
Introduction

1. Remarks of Senator Mike Mansfield, University of Montana Foundation Washington dinner (24 August 1967), Coll. 65, Series XXII, Container 76, 1, Mansfield Papers, K. Ross Toole Archives, Maureen and Mike Mansfield Library, University of Montana, Missoula.

Chapter One


3. Ibid., pp. 207-234.

4. Speech by Mansfield, Coll. 65, Series IV, Container 14, Mansfield Papers.


6. Ibid.


9. Speech by Mansfield, Coll. 65, Series IV, Container 18, Mansfield Papers.


13. Ibid.


16. Ibid.

17. Amendment by Mansfield found in Coll. 65, Series IV, Container 1, Mansfield Papers.

18. Ibid.

19. Correspondence, Coll. 65, Series IV, Container 1, Mansfield Papers.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.


25. Correspondence, Coll. 65, Series IV, Container 1, Mansfield Papers.


30. Ibid.


36. Ibid.


41. Ibid., 13023.

42. Ibid., 13028.


44. Years later Henry Matusow appeared at Senator Mansfield's office to offer his apologies for his actions in the 1952 campaign. Mansfield refused to see Matusow, stating: "There are some things that you can't apologize for." Associated Press news clipping (no date/identification), Scrapbooks, Series XXIV, Mansfield Papers.

45. Speech by Mansfield, Senate (30 June 1953), Coll. 65, Series XXI, Container 37, Mansfield Papers.

46. Ibid., 1.
47. Ibid., 4.
48. Ibid., 1.
49. Ibid., 3.
50. Ibid., 13.
51. Ibid., 14.
52. Ibid., 16.

53. Speech by Mansfield, Senate (28 June 1956), Coll. 65, Series XXI, Container 38, 5, Mansfield Papers.

54. Ibid., 5.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., 7.
57. Ibid.

58. Speech by Mansfield, Senate (15 May 1959), Coll. 65, Series XXI, Container 40, 3, Mansfield Papers.

59. Ibid., 4.
60. Ibid., 3.
61. Ibid., 7.
62. Ibid., 12.
63. Ibid.

64. Speech by Mansfield, Senate (24 April 1961), Coll. 65, Series XXI, Container 41, 4, Mansfield Papers.

65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., 11, 12.
67. Ibid., 11.
68. Ibid., 3.

Chapter Two


2. Speech by Mansfield, New York (8 December 1954), Coll. 65, Series XXI, Container 37, 1, Mansfield Papers.

3. Ibid.


5. Speech by Mansfield, New York (8 April 1959), Coll. 65, Series XXII, Container 75, 2, Mansfield Papers.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 5.

10. Ibid., 6.

11. Ibid.

12. Speech by Mansfield, Senate (22 June 1961), Coll. 65, Series XXII, Container 75, 1, Mansfield Papers.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid., 2725.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., 2724.

18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 5.
23. Ibid., 7.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 9.
29. Ibid.
30. Speech by Mansfield, Senate (22 June 1961), Coll. 65, Series XXI, Container 41, Mansfield Papers.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. For these ideas see Mansfield's speech, ibid.
35. Speech by Mansfield, Coll. 65, Series XXI, Container 45, 5, Mansfield Papers.
36. Ibid., 6.
37. Ibid.
38. Note written by Mansfield, no exact date (1961), Coll. 65, Series XXII, Container 40, Mansfield Papers.
39. Ibid.
40. Personal opinion of Mansfield, Coll. 65, Series XXIII, Container 42, Mansfield Papers.

42. Ibid., p. 137.


44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.


48. Statement of Mike Mansfield, Coll. 65, Series XXI, Container 41, Mansfield Papers.


50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Statement by Mike Mansfield, Coll. 65, Series XXI, Container 41, Mansfield Papers.

53. Figures of West European contributions to NATO found in Coll. 65, Series XXI, Container 41, Mansfield Papers.


55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.


58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., 5.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid., 9.
64. Ibid., 5.
66. Speech by Mansfield, Coll. 65, Series XXI, Container 44, Mansfield Papers.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
72. Speech by Mansfield, Coll. 65, Series XXI, Container 45, 3-9, Mansfield Papers.
73. Ibid., 10.
75. Speech by Mansfield, Coll. 65, Series XXI, Container 47, 1, Mansfield Papers.

**Chapter Three**

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 939.
10. Ibid., p. 941.
12. Ibid., 6681.
13. Ibid., 6694.
15. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 6812.
21. Ibid., 6871.
22. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 6679.
28. Williams, *The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe*, p. 188.
29. Ibid., p. 191.
30. Ibid.


33. Ibid., 6967.

34. Ibid., 7426.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., 7428.

Conclusion


SOURCES CONSULTED

Archival Source

The Mansfield Collection of papers in the K. Ross Toole Archives of the University of Montana's Maureen and Mike Mansfield Library contains a wealth of information on Mike Mansfield, especially Mansfield as senator. The thesis relied heavily on Series IV Foreign Affairs, Series XIII Foreign Affairs, Series XIX Personal, Series XXI Speeches, and Series XXII Leadership.

Presidential Papers

Lyndon Baines Johnson Archives contains a significant amount of material on Mike Mansfield. The White House Central File (WHCF) and the National Security File (NSF) were the two files which contained the documents and correspondence between Mansfield and the White House during the Johnson administration.

Books


Dissertations


**Thesis**


**Newspapers**


**Journal**