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Bar Association - The Foreign Policy of U.S.

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The Foreign Policy of the United States

Mike Mansfield (D) Montana

Let me begin by pointing out that foreign policy is not a formula out of the laboratory of an alchemist. It is not a potion which is guaranteed to cure the ills of the nation and the world's ills in a single dose. There is nothing supernatural about foreign policy and none of us need to stand in awe of it. Foreign policy is made by human beings for human situations. What all of us need is to learn more about it--its problems, its possibilities and its limitations--because it has a very profound effect upon our lives. The more we know about it, the more we can do to bring it under rational democratic control.

Our foreign policy is simply the course of action which we take to safeguard the nation and guide its progress in a very imperfect and highly dangerous world. Because of the nature of the postwar world, the course we have taken since 1945 has involved a use of our resources on a greater scale than ever before in peacetime to influence developments in other parts of the world. The use of a prudent part of our resources in this fashion is not waste. It is not a callous disregard of our domestic needs in the interest of foreign powers. It is a sound investment in the security and well-being of this generation of Americans and the generations that will follow us. If we do not make this investment, the possibilities are multiplied that we shall waste resources many times greater in a third general war at some not too distant date.

There are two ways to live in freedom in an insecure world. One is to meet, every day, a segment of the international responsibilities that freedom entails, to make them a regular part of our lives. The other is to ignore these responsibilities until a new tyranny has set the world aflame, and, then, drop everything in a last minute effort to keep the fire from reaching our homes.
Under the leadership of the President, we have been trying to follow the first way. We have used and are using such resources—economic, technical, cultural and military—as we can spare, as a form of insurance to promote the cause of peace, freedom and progress, and to minimize, thereby, the possibility of the rise of aggressive tyranny to the point where it might be in a position to strike for world domination.

The resources which we have available for this international purpose are not unlimited. We can afford to use them only where there is reasonable expectation that they will accomplish the objective for which they are intended. In general, this will be in situations where the peoples and governments most directly involved are alive to the meaning and obligations of freedom and will shoulder these obligations if given a helping hand.

Whatever policy we pursue towards other nations, all of us—directly or indirectly—share responsibility for it. All of us gain, if it is the best possible course. All of us, as well as generations yet to come, will suffer very real losses if it is not.

You will note that I said the best possible course. In the life of each of us, there is usually a considerable gap between our hopes and our accomplishments, between the ideal and the actuality. The same thing is true in foreign policy. The world we live in is inhabited by men, not Gods, and the international situations in which we find ourselves usually reflect all of the shortcomings and imperfections to which mankind is heir.

In some instances, our foreign policy will follow a particular course to meet a given set of circumstances. In the light of all these circumstances it will seem like the best possible course and few, if any of us, will criticize it or raise any questions about it. Then, three or four years later, some who have an oversupply of the wisdom of hindsight and a special
aptitude for Monday-morning quarterbacking, will suddenly discover that the course that we took three or four years before was all wrong. Naturally, to exercise this kind of wisdom, one has to have a very short memory and a well-developed ability to transplant. One has to be able to forget all the circumstances that existed at the time the course was originally set, and to transplant that course into the circumstances that exist today.

All of us have some of this kind of wisdom. It is the kind of wisdom that makes us say to ourselves or our friends "if I had only bought a hundred head of cattle back in 1940, I would be in fine shape today because the price of beef is high in 1951." When we indulge our fancy in this way, of course, we have to forget that back in 1940 we didn't have the price of a hundred head of cattle; or if we had, we would not have been able to buy a ranch to graze them on. A little of this wisdom doesn't do us any damage. It is a harmless pastime when practiced by individuals. We think about "what might have been" for a few moments and then go about the very real business of living in the present. But in connection with foreign policy, if we keep at this Monday morning quarterbacking day in and day out, month in and month out, year in and year out, it occupies so much of our time and energy as a nation that we have very little left of either to deal with the pressing situations of the day. And some Americans are doing exactly that. The result is that the attention of all of us is deflected from the pressing problems of current international life. If you have felt confused about foreign policy, and who among us hasn't, you can explain much of that confusion by the constant harangue to which we are subjected to look backward, instead of around us and forward. It is a harangue that originates in the same kind of mentality that told us to look back at the "good old days" when we were trying to fight our way out of the depression in the thirties.
What you hear today is that everything would be all right with the nation and the world if only we hadn’t tried, during the war, to get along with the Russians; if only President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill hadn’t signed the Teheran and Yalta Agreements, and President Truman the Potsdam Agreement. What these Monday-morning quarterbacks conveniently forget, of course, is that if we hadn’t been fighting with some allies on our side in World War II we might still be locked in combat with Germany and Japan or have been destroyed by those countries. We might have had casualties of 5 million or 10 million or 25 million instead of the million or more than we suffered. What the Monday morning quarterbacks forget is that we got along with Russia and made those agreements at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam in order to shorten World War II and to make an attempt at establishing a basis for an enduring peace. Who among us, at the time, objected to these purposes? Of course circumstances have changed since 1945. Of course some of the decisions taken at these conferences are inapplicable in the present situation. This does not mean that the agreements at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam were the work of scoundrels or incompetents. Least of all does it mean that if these agreements had never been made the nation would be better off. That will be known only when the events of this century— all the events—are viewed in the perspective of history.

But Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam belong to a past era—the era of the rise of fascist totalitarianism and its defeat. Today, the primary threat to our nation, to peace, and to democratic progress stems from a new totalitarianism which has its core in Soviet imperialism. President Roosevelt at Yalta and President Truman at Potsdam both tried to prevent a development of this kind. Both sought, at the end of the greatest war, to put a stop to further wars and the threat of wars. They tried to avoid a split among the victors and to
bring together all of the nations of the world into the forward surge of mankind. Isn't that what all of us wanted in 1945? Was it wrong to make this attempt? I think that the ideal was well worth striving for and I think we should continue to strive for it.

Events since 1945, however, have clearly shown that the ideal of a world without the threat of war remains, as it long has been, one of the most elusive dreams of mankind. As a nation, we cannot lose ourselves in dreams of the future, just as we cannot take refuge in the "might-have-beens" of the past. We must continue to live with the realities of the present.

And the most significant of these realities is that there is once again loose in the world a nation bent upon world domination. To meet this new situation, the course of our foreign policy is being adjusted as rapidly as those who wring their hands over the past or who are lost in the future will permit.

By the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947, the aims of the Soviet Union had become quite clear. While this country had disarmed hastily, the Russians had continued to keep an enormous mass of soldiers in a state of readiness, and had embarked upon a program of ruthless expansion. They had not only compromised the independence of countries along their frontier, but international communism was eating its way into Western Europe via the roads of economic misery, social discontent and political instability. Greece and Turkey were under relentless communist pressure.

It does not take an expert in foreign affairs to see what a collapse in Western Europe and the Middle East at that time would have meant to the security of this nation and to the world.

The United States plus Western Europe plus their associated countries now have an annual production of steel and pig iron more than four times that of
the Soviet world; they produce three times as much coal and ten times as much petroleum. Move the resources of Western Europe and the associated countries to the Soviet side and the comparisons change drastically.

But beyond the naked fact of the balance of power, the nations which were about to collapse in late 1947 were the birthplace and cradle of Western civilization. The institutions under which we live, the hopes we cherish, the origins of most of our citizens, were rooted in those countries. All of them have contributed in some fashion to life as we know it. With a return to stability they could be expected to continue to contribute to the advance of civilization. We, then, to abandon them, in 1947, to a new barbarism?

We met this threat to the Western World with great unity of purpose. On March 12, 1947, the President proposed to Congress that the United States extend economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. Under the leadership of a great Republican Senator, the late Arthur Vandenberg, Congress passed the necessary legislation by an overwhelming bi-partisan vote. This measure—the Truman Doctrine—was the real beginning of our struggle to guard the nation against the new tyranny looming on the horizon. From this doctrine has sprung the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, economic and military assistance to countries in the Far and Near East and other significant actions of foreign policy. These are the programs which have so far prevented the Soviet Union from striking for world domination and precipitating a general war. They have had, until recently, wide bi-partisan support.

I need not review all the details of these programs, but I should like to survey briefly some of the progress which has been made in carrying them out. Just this month, at General Eisenhower's request, I had occasion to visit Europe and to observe this progress first-hand.
As of the first months of 1951 the basic aims of the Marshall Plan had been largely, although not completely, achieved. The communists in Western Europe had made every effort to sabotage the project, and they had failed. Industrial output had risen almost 40 percent above the level of 1938; trade and exchange difficulties had lessened considerably; and there were good prospects for continuing economic improvement.

The threat of political collapse, so acute in 1947, has been averted. Discontent, by no means, has disappeared—as the results of the recent election in Italy show—but the gloom of defeatism that hung over the region has lifted. Europeans dare to believe again in a future of freedom.

To protect these gains in Western Europe, a far-reaching security system has been established. The United Nations charter has provided the basis for this system. It explicitly recognizes the inherent and fundamental right of member states to defend themselves collectively against attack and provides for the formation of regional security arrangements. Under these provisions we had, in September 1947, already joined with the Latin American countries in establishing a system of mutual defense for the Western Hemisphere. After the passage of the Vandenberg Resolution by the Senate in June 1948, with its obvious reference to the North Atlantic Community, this country began to work out a plan of mutual defense with the Western European nations. On April 4, 1949, twelve nations—the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland and Portugal—signed the North Atlantic Treaty.

The purpose of this treaty is strictly defensive. It threatens no nation except a would-be aggressor. It operates primarily as a deterrent, serving formal notice that an attack upon any part of the Atlantic Community will be met with the united resistance of the whole. If the Russians ever
nourished the expectation that the ripened plum of a recovered Europe could be plucked with impunity, they now know differently.

The organization to carry out the obligations of this treaty is already in operation. Most of the military commanders have been appointed and the strategic plans are being placed in readiness. Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, we are trying to fill what General Eisenhower called "the great, the crying need (for) the impediments of armies, of navies, of air forces."

The sudden outbreak of the Korean aggression compelled the Free World to revise its estimate of Soviet intentions. We have speeded up the delivery of military supplies to Europe and increased our commitments in this respect. A decision has been made to include Western German contributions to the defense pool and consideration is being given to adding others from Spain.

In a further effort to bolster Western defenses and to fortify the morals of the Western Europeans who dread an occupation by Red troops, even though the Soviet Union might eventually be defeated, the United States recently decided to send four Army divisions to Western Germany in addition to the two already there. There was considerable opposition to this step in some quarters for several reasons, prominent among which was a fear that large American forces might be drawn into a land war against the vast populations commanded by the Soviet Union. Secretary of Defense Marshall, however, has made clear that the plan is for the Western Europeans to supply the bulk of the land armies needed for their defense.

That Soviet aggression can be deterred has been demonstrated over and over again. The record which has been achieved during the past five years has come from following a course of no appeasement, cooperation with free nations and devotion to peace. We have negotiated with the Russians—as in the case of Berlin—but we have not appeased. We have yielded to the wishes of our allies.
on some issues and they have yielded to ours on others. Here at home we have refused to retreat into a new isolationism and, at the same time, we have held in check those who think that a bomb dropped on Moscow will not only begin a war but end it.

What is the record of the past five years in brief? The Soviet Union has not dared to precipitate a general war; Yugoslavia has broken loose from the Moscow chains; Greece--the gateway to the Middle East--has been saved from destruction. Efforts of the communists to capture Western Europe by capitalizing on economic misery and social unrest have been thwarted by the European Recovery Plan. The menace of communist armed aggression has been counteracted by the North Atlantic defense program. The Berlin airlift was a dramatic demonstration of the manner in which western determination and technical ability can create a situation in which bonafide negotiations with the Russians became possible.

The record of our foreign policy in Europe is a record of accomplishment, written in spite of the dire predictions of a few in our midst who continue to ignore the responsibilities of the hour while they read and re-read the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam agreements.

Or if it is not these agreements, then it is the Far East that occupies them practically to the exclusion of the rest of the world. It is as though the sun of international events not only rises in the East but also sets in the East.

This is the region that has given rise to most of the conflict over our foreign policy. The typhoon now raging about Capital Hill in Washington originated in the vicinity of Formosa. Typhoon is one of the few words in the English language that is derived from the Chinese. It is taken from two Chinese characters -- "die" and "fung" which, together, mean "big wind." It is quite a typhoon -- this controversy over Far Eastern policy -- and, like most of the
storms that blow out of the China Sea, it is full of sound and fury.

This sound and fury, unfortunately, conceals a wide belt of calm — an area of substantial agreement upon which a stable Far Eastern policy can be conducted. There is, for example, practically no disagreement among responsible persons in the Government as to the fundamental facts of the Asian situation today. The Administration and qualified Members of Congress have long recognized them and General MacArthur, in his farewell address to both Houses, reviewed them.

In Asia, today, we are face-to-face with a transition of continental proportions. Events of the past few years have stirred half the population of the earth — more than a billion human beings — into a state of restless agitation.

These people differ widely in race, culture and outlook. In some ways, however, their lot has been the same. Over the centuries, most of them acquiesced in the rule of native tyrants or the control of foreigners. Most of them endured — seemingly without complaint — a life of ignorance, disease and incredible poverty. Billions were born, lived out a brief life span — usually under 30 years — and died. Millions were swept away in a stroke, by famine, flood or epidemic. These catastrophes were quickly forgotten in the struggle of the living to survive. Life went on — compelling and unchanging. This was the "changeless East."

But beneath the surface serenity of resignation, a ferment of discontent has been churning for decades, building up great pressures for social and political change. From time to time, there were warning signs, as for example, the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and the rioting and insurrections throughout Southern and Southeast Asia between the two wars.

Then came World War II and the surface calm gave way once and for all under its powerful impetus. Vast forces were released. From Korea to
Pakistan, from Mongolia to the Philippines -- tidal waves of unrest rolled over this immense area. Millions of people were caught up in the cross-currents, propelled by two fundamental drives -- a common determination to end foreign domination and to do something about the crushing poverty which, for centuries, had produced the cycle of birth, miserable life and early death.

The transition which is taking place in the Far East is not a gentle one. In many places, it already has engendered violence on a scale unprecedented in recent history. Millions have died as a direct or indirect result of the civil conflicts in China and Southeast Asia and in the religious strife that marked the partition of the Indian subcontinent. Millions more have been uprooted and are on the move. They are seeking new roots to sustain life and to give it meaning and direction.

These, then, are the facts of the Far East of 1951. Half the world is in transition, and often, in violent transition. This transition holds tremendous possibilities for good but it also carries the seeds of a potentially enormous evil.

If the new nations of the Far East can maintain their independence and the new governments can deal effectively with the accumulated problems of their people, there is every reason to believe that they will make a profound contribution to their own development, to the cause of peace and to the general advancement of mankind. If, on the other hand, they fall victims to a new imperialism -- whether it be of the type recently advanced by Japan or the more subtle type now emanating from the Soviet Union -- if this should occur, then the rest of the world, and we as a part of it, would be exposed to a grave danger.

There is a real prospect of this happening because in the confusion and frustrations of the hour, men often turn to the easy way out, the quick and unreasoned solution to their difficulties. Communism or other reactionary
movements, based on such slogans as "Asia for the Asians" offer very real
temptations, however delusive, to the hungry and discontented.

Some may wish that the facts in the Far East were otherwise. Some may
long for the old days of the "changeless East" and its "unspoiled charm," but
these cannot be recalled.

The fact is that we must conduct Far Eastern policy within the framework
of a "changing East" -- a rapidly, erratically and, frequently, violently
"changing East." To imagine that the situation is otherwise will lead us to
build a policy on sands of unreality and to court, thereby, its repeated
collapses.

But recognition of the facts of the situation in Asia is only one
prerequisite to sound policy. For the Far East is only a part of the larger
framework of foreign policy which is the globe itself. And Far Eastern policy,
if it is to serve the nation, must be viewed in that total perspective. We
cannot concentrate our attention exclusively on Asia. To do so, is to ignore
regions which, at this moment in history, are at least as vital.

In the Far East we can bring to bear a prudent part of the resources
which we have available for international purposes in an effort to influence
developments in the direction of peace, freedom and progress. We cannot deploy
all our resources to that area without leaving others, such as Europe and the
Middle East, dangerously exposed.

There are some situations in the Far East with which, by working construc-
tively with others, we can deal effectively. In these situations we should
act, and we are acting. But under no circumstances ought we to assume unilat-
eral responsibility for everything that happens in Asia or for the future of
that vast continent. Under no circumstances should we overcommit ourselves,
even in the name of an anti-communist crusade. Korea is not the only country
in the world that lives in the shadow of communist imperialism. Communism, itself, is not the first form of tyranny that has threatened the world, nor is it, necessarily, the last. The way to a world of freedom and international decency is long and difficult and we will do well to draw judiciously upon our strength as we move along it.

In general, that is what we have done in the Far East and that is what we are doing now. Mistakes have been made and others may be expected. Foreign policy is made by human beings and human beings make mistakes. As I have already pointed out, all of us contribute directly or indirectly to our foreign policy and we share responsibility for its success or failure.

I think, however, that we need not be ashamed of the course we have pursued in the Far East for five years. When it is viewed in its entirety, within the framework of the facts of Asia and the larger framework of the global situation -- the record is good. I go further and suggest that beneath the sound and fury of the present controversy, it will be found that most persons in this country -- regardless of party -- generally have supported and will continue to support that policy.

Let us examine this thesis against the record of our activity in the Far East since 1945.

In the Philippines we fulfilled promptly our long-standing pledge to grant independence to the islands. We kept our wartime promise to aid in reconstruction, providing for this purpose technical assistance, hundreds of millions of dollars of direct compensation to those who suffered losses, and surplus property of enormous value at a negligible price. In 1946, we also worked out mutual defense arrangements that are designed to safeguard the Philippines from a repetition of invasion as well as to enhance our own security.

As far as I can determine, there has been no serious opposition to any of
these measures in Congress or out of Congress. They have had wide bipartisan support. It is not over the Philippine policy, then, that the present controversy rages.

But in spite of our efforts and those of many conscientious Filipinos, the islands have not made the progress which might have been expected.

Last year there were alarming reports that the Philippines might go the way of China. The reasons advanced were much the same -- corruption in government, unfair economic advantage to a favored few at the expense of the many, and the growth in strength of a communist-led revolutionary group in the countryside.

What could we have done in these circumstances? Reverse the independence granted a few short years ago and reoccupy the islands? To illustrate the difficulty in such a course, I might point out that when we requested permission to post Marines as guards at our embassy in Manila because of the tense situation, the Philippine government hotly rejected the request as an affront to its sovereignty. But even if the course of reoccupation were feasible, the direct control of the Philippines would require an enormous allocation of our economic and military resources. What would be left for other areas? Are the American people willing to assume an increased tax burden and new casualty lists for this purpose?

A second alternative would be to abandon the islands to their fate and risk their falling into unfriendly hands. One consideration -- and there are others -- indicates how dangerous this course would be. We regard Formosa as vital to the security of the Pacific. How much more so are the Philippines!

Confronted with a set of facts of this kind, our Philippine policy has taken the only direction that is practical. We have not assumed primary responsibility for the political administration, the internal security or the
domestic economy of the Philippines. The Filipino people were demanding, in
effect, the right to deal with these problems themselves when they sought
independence. We conceded them that right when we set them free. These
problems, properly, are the primary responsibility of the Filipinos. Our role,
necessarily, is that of a neighbor who has had a long and close relationship
with the islands. In this role, we have increased our military assistance and
our technical aid to help them meet the present abnormal situation. The
President has gone a step further and has called upon the Philippine government
to undertake certain basic reforms as a condition for additional economic help.
The Filipinos have given evidence of a willingness to make the necessary
improvements and Congress is now considering a measure which will provide that
help.

We cannot be certain that this policy will succeed. There is no
assurance that as a result of it the Philippines will emerge as a progressive
and stable member of the Free World. In the planning and execution of foreign
policy, there are rarely certainties. The most that we can hope for is that we
have chosen the best possible course of action in the light of a given set of
circumstances. Many people have complained about the situation in the
Philippines but no one, so far as I am aware, has offered a policy approach
differing basically from the three I have suggested here. That is -- get in,
get out, or help out. The way we have chosen is neither the way of imperialism
which is to get in, nor the way of isolationism which is to get out. It is the
American way, which is to help out.

I have dwelt at length on the Philippines for it illustrates the complex
problems which confront our policy-makers elsewhere in the Far East. In
southern and southeast Asia we have also sought to deal with the facts of the
situation in the same way -- neither by getting in nor getting out, but by
helping out. We have cooperated with many friendly nations in this region.

In the case of Indonesia, we contributed through the United Nations, to its relatively peaceful transition from colonial status to independence. We are now attempting to bring about a similar transition in Indo-China in the face of a communist-led revolt. Throughout this vast area of southern and southeast Asia, we have in operation, today, programs of economic, technical and military assistance and cultural exchange. Only recently Congress passed legislation to make available grain for India in an effort to forestall a threatened famine.

These programs represent a judicious use of the resources which we are able to allocate to this region. They are gestures of sincere friendship, evidences of our willingness to help in deeds as well as words. They are, as all measures of this kind ought to be, a mixture of generosity and reasonable self-interest.

As in the Philippines, there is no assurance that all of them will accomplish the purposes for which they are intended. As in the Philippines, primary responsibility rests where it belongs -- with the peoples and governments of the various recipient nations.

Taken as a whole, policy in southern and southeast Asia has had overwhelming support in both Houses of Congress. This is another area of substantial bipartisan agreement that the present controversy conceals.

With respect to Japan, World War II projected us into a situation of primary responsibility. As the Power principally responsible for the Japanese defeat, we were compelled to occupy the vacuum which that defeat produced and to exercise the primary authority which that occupation entailed.

After V-J Day, policy for Japan, conceived and prepared by the State and Defense Departments under the President's direction was carried out by General
MacArthur until his replacement by General Ridgway as Supreme Commander. Most available reports indicate that the Occupation has been admirably conducted. The Japanese have made considerable progress in democratizing their social and political institutions and, with substantial American assistance, have done much to restore their battered economy. We are moving, now, towards a peace settlement with or without Soviet participation. Once a treaty has been signed, we hope that Japan will make a contribution to the maintenance of peace and orderly international progress. We will, then, get out of that country but still will be in a position to help out, if necessary, particularly with respect to defense against aggression from the mainland.

There have been scattered criticisms of our occupation of Japan under General MacArthur’s direction. Some have said that it was "too soft" and some that it was "too hard." The balance of informed opinion, however, has been favorable. Certainly, there has been little criticism of it in Congress by either party. In this case, too, the sound and fury of partisan criticism of Far Eastern policy has drowned out an extremely important area of agreement.

Having passed through a belt of calm encircling the Philippines, southern and southeast Asia and Japan, we come to China which is at the very core of the storm. I should like to state at the outset that I do not believe any reasonable person would have conducted China policy very much differently than it has been conducted since 1945. We have had three Secretaries of State since the end of World War II -- James Byrnes, General Marshall and Dean Acheson. All three were confronted with a given set of facts. All three approached these facts in substantially the same manner.

To make the point clearer, let us go back to V-J Day. At that time, we had air and naval power in the Western Pacific. We had a small force in China, mostly service troops. General MacArthur had advised General Wedemeyer who was
then in command in China that he could not spare additional men from his armies which were scheduled to serve in the Japanese occupation.

In China there were two major opposing military forces, one under the control of the Communists and the other under the control of the Nationalists. The Communists were spread all over the North China countryside ready to move immediately on the great Eastern cities and into Manchuria. If Civil War came, they had a decided positional advantage.

The Nationalist armies were in west and south China, far from the major strategic centers. They had an overwhelming superiority in numbers and equipment but because of China's incredibly poor transportation system, they could not get this superiority into position to make it effective.

In these circumstances we had to choose a course from among three alternatives -- the same three which we have faced all over Asia: to get in, to get out, or to help out. In this case, to get in would have meant stopping the impending civil war at whatever cost to ourselves, using our soldiers in whatever number required, and assuming full responsibility for restoring all of China to Chiang's rule. Would the Chinese people, whose suspicion of foreign interference in their internal affairs is traditional, have welcomed this move? Would we, ourselves, in 1945 have tolerated committing an unknown number of our men to China for an indefinite period? To get in, in this sense, even if desirable, was manifestly impracticable.

Could we have gotten out? We could have; but it would have meant leaving three million Japanese soldiers and civilians in China, since the National Government was incapable of handling their repatriation. It would have meant abandoning the Nationalist government which we recognized and had supported throughout the conflict without an opportunity to restore stability to war-torn China. Furthermore, the evidence we had, then, indicated that most of the
Chinese people still looked to this government for leadership in bringing all the factions together, in preventing civil war, and in reconstructing the country.

Therefore, we took the third alternative. We helped out -- not the Chinese Communist but the legal, National Government of China. We transported by sea and air 400 to 500 thousand of Chiang Kai-shek's troops over and around the communist forces. These troops went into key strategic sectors in east and north China. Fifty thousand American marines held such vital centers of communication as Peiping, Tientsin and Tsingtao to prevent their seizure by the Chinese communists.

Furthermore, we continued to supply the National Government with lend-lease aid for months after the conclusion of the war. By the end of 1945, we had delivered sufficient tonnage to equip 39 divisions of ground forces and an eight and one-third group air force.

In December 1945, Chiang Kai-shek held a numerical superiority over the communists of five to one. He had a monopoly of heavy equipment and mechanical transport and an unopposed air arm. He held the key communications centers. Yet by December 1948, exactly three years later, this preponderance of strength had been so dissipated that General Barr, head of our military advisory mission in China, was forced to conclude that without direct involvement of the United States with its combat forces, the defeat of the Nationalists on the mainland was inevitable.

What lies behind this amazing failure?

You will hear it blamed on General Marshall's attempt to mediate between the Nationalists and the Communists. The fact is that the Nationalists occupied more strategic military positions when General Marshall left China at the end of 1946 than when he arrived at the beginning of 1946. The fact is
that in mediating, General Marshall was following the established policy of the National Government. For years, Chiang had claimed that he was trying to settle the communist question by political methods and not by civil war.

You will hear that the failure came about because General Marshall tried to force the Nationalists to take Communists into the government. The fact is that Communists had been brought into the government by Chiang, himself, long before Marshall ever arrived in China. The fact is that not a single communist was added to that government as a result of General Marshall's mediation. The fact is that the Marshall Mission was welcomed by Chiang with open arms and he prevailed on General Marshall to remain as mediator when the latter wanted to withdraw.

If any prominent American in 1946 opposed Marshall's trip to China to mediate the Chinese conflict between the major opposing groups, he gave no public and, as far as I can determine, private expression of his disagreement.

In December 1945, General MacArthur, General Wedemeyer and Admiral Spruance sent the following message to Washington from the Far East before General Marshall's departure:

It is suggested that United States assistance to China be made available as a basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a unified democratic China.

In June 1951, Admiral Spruance says that the negotiations between the "major opposing groups" in this message meant between the Communists and Nationalists; General Wedemeyer first implied that it didn't and then that it did. General MacArthur, however, dissents and speaks of the Communists as "but a nebulous threat" at the time. You can understand some of the difficulties of conducting foreign policy when there is disagreement among three prominent military leaders as to who the "major opposing forces" in China were in 1945.
Another reason advanced for the Nationalist collapse on the mainland is the inadequacy of American aid. We are asked, in effect, to be ashamed of ourselves and to feel guilty for failing to be more generous towards Chiang Kai-shek.

But since V-J Day this country has extended military and economic aid valued at about two billion dollars to the Chinese Government. Two billion dollars of taxpayers money to Chiang Kai-shek. It is possible, of course, to argue the precise amount. Millions of words have been wasted in proving that it was closer to one billion or three billion. Can anyone honestly believe that one billion or two billion or five billion dollars more aid would have held the lid on the gigantic upheaval that has taken place in China these past five years? As it was, an enormous part of the military equipment given to Chiang wound up in the hands of the communists. In the communist victory parades during October 1949 in Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai and other cities, captured American arms and equipment streamed past the reviewing stands hour after hour. Where did this equipment come from? From Nationalist armies which surrendered or went over to the communists. Where is it now? A lot of it is in Korea—in the hands of our enemies. Yet, the Administration is scolded for not having done more of the same thing.

Can anyone honestly believe that more arms and a thousand American military advisors in place of the 500 that served Chiang would have saved the National Government on the mainland? Would additional aid have curbed that government's disastrous strategy? Would it have created a fighting morale? Would it have put an end to corruption and misrule?

The fact is that our help failed because there was missing in the Nationalist Government at that time, the will and ability to use our help effectively. We could not supply the will and if we had tried to supply the
ability, in all probability we would have had to get in completely.

Only since it has been confined to the island of Formosa has Chiang's Government begun to take the necessary measures to make itself truly responsive to the needs of the ordinary Chinese people. In these circumstances, there is some hope that the economic and military assistance which we are still supplying to the island of Formosa can prove effective. We are justified in continuing that aid, just as we are justified in continuing to recognize the National Government because it is becoming more representative of the real aspirations of the Chinese people as the Communist regime in Peking grows less representative. Since it emerged from the countryside, the latter has steadily drawn away from the people of China and their real interests. It has become more and more a tool of Russian foreign policy, permitting itself finally to be led into a course of tossing thousands of Chinese lives to senseless slaughter in the Korean aggression.

Despite the complexity of the Chinese situation, I believe that once the facts are fully appreciated, there will be little real disagreement on the part of most Americans that the course we followed in China was about the only reasonable one we could have followed. There was not too little American support for the National Government. If anything, in the light of known circumstances, there was too much.

The same is not true for Korea. In that country, on June 25, 1950, communist imperialism, for the first time since the end of World War II, resorted to the tactic of armed invasion. The issue immediately became larger than Korea. It became, in the final analysis, the issue of peace or general war.

The response of the Free World to this issue was immediate. On June 27th, the President ordered fleet and air units into action as the U. N. called upon
all nations to assist the victim of aggression. Americans gave their spontaneous and wholehearted support to the decision.

The objectives which we had in going into Korea, and which we still have, is to preserve the south Korean Republic; to stop and to punish the aggression against that Republic; to make clear to all would-be imperialists, as we failed to make clear to Japanese and Nazi imperialists in the thirties, that the force of tyranny will be met by the force of freedom; that there will be no cheap conquests of the weak by the strong; that the greater the aggression the greater will be the fearful retribution. By stopping a local aggression we hope to prevent a general war later; by fighting in Korea now we hope to save this land of ours from attack in the future.

When Captain James Jabara, the leading pilot of the United Nations in Korea, landed back in the United States, he was greeted first by a reporter from his home town of Wichita, Kansas. The reporter asked: "Why are we fighting in Korea?" Jabara answered: "So that we won't have to fight in Wichita."

These are the reasons we are in Korea. They are fine and decent and sensible reasons. Those who speak disparagingly or cynically of them prostitute the finest part of the American ideal—a willingness to sacrifices now so that our children and our children's children shall live their lives in a better and more satisfying world.

What we did not set out to do in Korea, what we were not required by any mandate of the United Nations to do, was to unify all of Korea by force. The task of unifying Korea, is a task for the Korean people themselves with whatever help may be given them by the United Nations. What we did not set out to do was to conquer Manchuria. What we did not set out to do was to carry Chiang Kai-shek back to the mainland on the shield of the United States. What we did not set out to do was to begin World War III.
We failed once to distinguish what we set out to do and what we did not set out to do in Korea. I trust that we shall not fail again. Last November, United Nations forces had scored the remarkable victory that carried them from practically a beach-head at Pusan back to the 38th parallel. At that point we had accomplished what we had set out to do. We had met the aggressors, punished them severely, and all but destroyed their armies. The security of our forces made it necessary to advance some distance beyond the 38th parallel.

When these forces had reached the narrow defensible neck of the Korean peninsula, some miles south of the Chinese border, I urged that we call a halt to the advance and try to create a buffer zone along the Chinese Manchurian and Korean frontier. But, apparently, in the mistaken belief that the Chinese Communists would not enter the war, that we could "end the war by Christmas" our troops were sent probing, in dangerously extended lines, towards the Chinese border.

The rest is too well known to you to bear extensive repeating. The Chinese Communists entered the conflict. We suffered a major defeat. Some of those who just a few weeks before had been most vociferous in urging our advance to the Chinese border now began to press for two alternatives--either the complete abandonment of Korea or the extension of the war all the way into Manchuria and beyond. This "get in or get out" extremism would have profited no one but our enemies.

To have abandoned Korea, at that moment, would have been to sacrifice the very purposes for which we entered the conflict. It would have meant laying not only all of Korea but all of the Far East open to new attacks by communist imperialism. To have extended the war to the Chinese mainland, on the other hand, would have meant an involvement--when considered in the light
of the critical situations elsewhere—far beyond our military capacity at the
time to support. The latter course could have had only two outcomes. If the
Soviet Union chose to back the Chinese Communists, it would have meant the
beginning of World War III. If, on the other hand, the Russians chose to stay
out, it would have meant a unilateral involvement of this country on the Chinese
mainland.

In the first case we would have had the very thing which, in our own
interests and in the interests of civilization, we are trying to prevent. In
the second case, we would have had what General Bradley so aptly termed "wrong
war, wrong place, wrong time, wrong enemy."

Suppose we gained this cheap and easy victory over the Chinese Communists
which some seemed to think possible by the use of our air and sea power and
Chiang's troops. What would we have gained except the continuing responsibility
of trying to keep the Generalissimo in power in a devastated China at untold
billions of dollars in costs.

And if we did not defeat the Chinese Communists easily, what then? We
would do as we have done in Korea, send ground forces in after sea and air
power had failed to bring an immediate victory. The vast maw of the Chinese
mainland can absorb millions of ground troops. We could tie up the bulk of our
military resources in a secondary arena of combat, leaving western Europe—the
real prize—and other vital areas bare to Soviet conquest. If World War III
must come, it will not be won or lost in South China.

We have to keep our eyes on the objective, and the place to do this at
the present time is in Korea. Under General Ridgway's command, the United
Nations have once again returned to a position roughly comparable to the one
held last December. Once again a moment of decision is at hand.

It is a moment to restate the aims of our foreign policy. That policy is
and must continue to be based on the principles of no appeasement and peace—not peace at any price, but peace as long as it is humanly and decently and honorably possible to strive for it. To achieve that peace we must be prepared to negotiate, provided the aggressors recognize the error of their ways and, provided, the negotiations lead to a settlement that achieves our purposes. Appeasement and negotiation are not the same things. To use means other than military to achieve reasonable international objectives is in keeping with our best traditions. We would do well to be wary of partisan tongues in this country that are quick to lick the label of appeasement on every non-military action we take. Such tongues could lead our foreign policy into repeated blind alleys and, ultimately, into chaos, unnecessary war or confused retreat.

As to specific policy based on these principles of no appeasement and peace, I believe the facts of the situation suggest that the wisest course in Korea at this time would be for the UN forces to remain in the vicinity of the 38th parallel so that the South Korean Republic can be reestablished in its own right. Beyond that, South Korean forces should be sent further northward to the vicinity of the 39th parallel so as to increase the defensive strength of South Korea and to establish a status quo that can be maintained. In my opinion this move will be a long step towards stopping Stalin's plans to involve us in all-out war in Asia; it will allow South Koreans, with UN help, to start rebuilding their country, and it will have accomplished our original purpose of making clear that aggression does not pay. South Korea should assume an increasingly active role in its own defense and we should seek greater military commitments for Korea from other UN members with a view to reducing the size of the American contingent.
Dear Mike

Thanks so much for letting me your excellent briefing policy @ work with Senator 

to you.

you are a good guy!

Hon. Mike Mansfield

date?
The Foreign Policy of the United States

Extension of Remarks of Hon. Mike Mansfield of Montana in the House of Representatives Tuesday, July 10, 1951

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There are two ways to live in freedom in an insecure world. One is to meet, every day, a segment of the international responsibilities that freedom entails, to make them a regular part of our lives. The other is to ignore these responsibilities until a new tyranny has set the world aflame, and, then, drop everything in a last minute effort to keep the fire from reaching our homes.

Under the leadership of the President, we have been trying to follow the first way. We have used and are using such resources—economic, technical, cultural, and military—as we can spare, as a form of insurance to promote the cause of peace, freedom, and progress, and to minimize, thereby, the possibility of the rise of aggressive tyranny to the point where it might be in a position to strike for world domination.

The resources which we have available for this international purpose are not unlimited. We can afford to use them only where there is reasonable expectation that they will accomplish the objective for which they are intended. In general, this will be in situations where the peoples and governments most directly involved are alive to the meaning and obligations of freedom and will shoulder these obligations if given a helping hand.

Whatever policy we pursue toward other nations, all of us—directly or indirectly—share responsibility for it. All of us gain, if it is the best possible course. All of us, as well as generations yet to come, will suffer very real losses if it is not.

You will note that I said the best possible course. In the life of each of us, there is usually a considerable gap between our hopes and our accomplishments, between the ideal and the actuality. The same thing is true in foreign policy. The world we live in is inhabited by men, not gods, and the international situations in which we find ourselves usually reflect all of the shortcomings and imperfections to which mankind is heir.

In some instances, our foreign policy will follow a particular course to meet a given set of circumstances. In the light of all
these circumstances it will seem like the best possible course and few, if any of us, will criticize it or raise any questions about it. Then, 3 or 4 years later, someone who has an oversupply of the wisdom of hindsight and a special aptitude for Monday-morning quarterbacking, will suddenly discover that the course that we took 3 or 4 years before was all wrong. Naturally, to exercise this kind of wisdom, one has to have a very short memory and a well-developed ability to transplant. One has to be able to forget all the circumstances that existed at the time the course was originally set, and to transplant that course into the circumstances that exist today.

All of us have some of this kind of wisdom. It is the kind of wisdom that makes us say to ourselves or our friends “If I had only bought a hundred head of cattle back in 1940, I would be in fine shape today because the price of beef is high in 1951.” When we indulge our fancy in this way, of course, we have to forget that back in 1940 we didn’t have the price of a hundred head of cattle; or if we had, we would not have been able to buy a ranch to graze them on. A little of this wisdom doesn’t do us any damage. It is a harmless pastime when practiced by individuals. We think about “what might have been” for a few moments and then go about the very real business of living in the present. But in connection with foreign policy, if we keep at this Monday morning quarterbacking day in and day out, month in and month out, year in and year out, it occupies so much of our time and energy as a Nation that we have very little left of either to deal with the pressing situations of the day. And some Americans are doing exactly that. The result is that the attention of all of us is deflected from the pressing problems of current international life. If you have felt confused about foreign policy, and who among us hasn’t, you can explain much of that confusion by the constant harangue to which we are subjected to look backward, instead of around us and forward. It is a harangue that originates in the same kind of mentality that told us to look back at the “good old days” when we were trying to fight our way out of the depression in the thirties.

What you hear today is that everything would be all right with the Nation and the world if only we hadn’t tried, during the war, to get along with the Russians; if only President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill hadn’t signed the Tehran and Yalta agreements, and President Truman the Potsdam agreement. What these Monday-morning quarterbacks conveniently forget is that if we hadn’t been fighting with some allies on our side in World War II we might still be locked in combat with Germany and Japan or have been destroyed by those countries. We might have had casualties of five million or ten million or twenty-five million instead of the million or more that we suffered. What the Monday morning quarterbacks forget is that we got along with Russian and made those agreements at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam in order to shorten World War II and to make an attempt at establishing a basis for an enduring peace. Who among us, at the time, objected to these purposes? Of course circumstances have changed since 1945. Of course some of the decisions taken at these conferences are inapplicable in the present situation. This does not mean that the agreements at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam were the work of scoundrels or incompetents. Least of all does it mean that if these agreements had never been made the Nation would be better off. That will be known only when the events of this century—all the events—are viewed in the perspective of history.

But Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam belong to a past era—the era of the rise of fascist totalitarianism and its defeat. Today, the primary threat to our Nation, to peace, and to democratic progress stems from a new totalitarianism which has its core in Soviet Imperialism. President Roosevelt at Yalta and President Truman at Potsdam both tried to prevent a development of this kind. Both sought, at the end of the greatest war, to put a stop to further wars and the threat of wars. They tried to avoid a split among
the victors and to bring together all of the nations of the world into the forward surge of mankind. Isn't that what all of us wanted in 1945? Was it wrong to make this attempt? I think that the ideal was well worth striving for and I think we should continue to strive for it.

Events since 1945, however, have clearly shown that the ideal of a world without the threat of war remains, as it long has been, one of the most elusive dreams of mankind. As a Nation, we cannot lose ourselves in dreams of the future, just as we cannot take refuge in the might-have-beens of the past. We must continue to live with the realities of the present.

And the most significant of these realities is that there is once again loose in the world a nation bent upon world domination. To meet this new situation, the course of our foreign policy is being adjusted as rapidly as those who wring their hands over the past or who are lost in the future will permit.

By the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947, the aims of the Soviet Union had become quite clear. While this country had disarmed hastily, the Russians had continued to keep an enormous mass of soldiers in a state of readiness, and had embarked upon a program of ruthless expansion. They had not only compromised the independence of countries along their frontier, but international communism was eating its way into Western Europe via the roads of economic misery, social discontent and political instability. Greece and Turkey were under relentless Communist pressure.

It does not take an expert in foreign affairs to see what a collapse in Western Europe and the Middle East at that time would have meant to the security of this Nation and to the world.

The United States plus Western Europe plus their associated countries now have an annual production of steel and pig iron more than 4 times that of the Soviet world; they produce 3 times as much coal and 10 times as much petroleum. Move the resources of Western Europe and the associated countries to the Soviet side and the comparisons change drastically.

But beyond the naked fact of the balance of power, the nations which were about to collapse in late 1947 were the birthplace and cradle of western civilization. The institutions under which we live, the hopes we cherish, the origins of most of our citizens, were rooted in those countries. All of them have contributed in some fashion to life as we know it. With a return to stability they could be expected to continue to contribute to the advance of civilization. Were we, then, to abandon them, in 1947, to a new barbarism?

We met this threat to the western world with great unity of purpose. On March 12, 1947, the President proposed to Congress that the United States extend economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. Under the leadership of a great Republican Senator, the late Arthur Vandenberg, Congress passed the necessary legislation by an overwhelming bipartisan vote. This measure—the Truman doctrine—was the real beginning of our struggle to guard the Nation against the new tyranny looming on the horizon. From this doctrine has sprung the Marshall plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, the mutual defense assistance program, economic and military assistance to countries in the Far and Near East and other significant actions of foreign policy. These are the programs which have so far prevented the Soviet Union from striking for world domination and precipitating a general war. They have had, until recently, wide bipartisan support.

I need not review all the details of these programs, but I should like to survey briefly some of the progress which has been made in carrying them out. Just this month, at General Eisenhower's request, I had occasion to visit Europe and to observe this progress first-hand.

As of the first months of 1951 the basic aims of the Marshall plan had been largely although not completely, achieved. The Communists in Western Europe had made every effort to sabotage the project, and they had failed. Industrial output had risen al-
most 40 percent above the level of 1938; trade
and exchange difficulties had lessened con-
siderably; and there were good prospects for
continuing economic improvement.

The threat of political collapse, so acute in
1947, has been averted. Discontent, by no
means, has disappeared—as the results of the
recent election in Italy show—but the gloom
of defeatism that hung over the region has
lifted. Europeans dare to believe again in
a future of freedom.

To protect these gains in Western Europe, a
far-reaching security system has been es-
established. The United Nations charter has
provided the basis for this system. It ex-
PLICITLY recognizes the inherent and funda-
mental right of member states to defend
themselves collectively against attack and
provides for the formation of regional securi-
ty arrangements. Under these provisions
we had, in September 1947, already joined
with the Latin American countries in estab-
lishing a system of mutual defense for the
Western Hemisphere. After the passage of
the Vandenbarg resolution by the Senate
in June 1948, with its obvious reference to the
North Atlantic community, this country
began to work out a plan of mutual defense
with the Western European nations. On
April 4, 1949, twelve nations—the United
States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Den-
mark, Norway, Iceland, and Portugal—signed
the North Atlantic Treaty.

The purpose of this treaty is strictly de-
fensive. It threatens no nation except a
would-be aggressor. It operates primarily as
a deterrent, serving formal notice that an
attack upon any part of the Atlantic com-
munity will be met with the united resis-
tance of the whole. If the Russians ever
nourished the expectation that the ripened
plum of a recovered Europe could be plucked
with impunity, they now know differently.

The organization to carry out the obliga-
tions of this treaty is already in operation.
Most of the military commanders have been
appointed and the strategic plans are being
placed in readiness. Under the Mutual De-
fense Assistance Act, we are trying to fill
what General Eisenhower called the great,
the crying need (for) the impedimenta of
armies, of navies, of air forces.

The sudden outbreak of the Korean aggres-
sion compelled the free world to revise its
estimate of Soviet intentions. We have
speeded up the delivery of military supplies
to Europe and increased our commitments
in this respect. A decision has been made to
include Western German contributions to the
defense pool and consideration is being given
to adding others from Spain.

In a further effort to bolster western de-
fenses and to fortify the morale of the west-
ern Europeans who dread an occupation by
Red troops, even though the Soviet Union
might eventually be defeated, the United
States recently decided to send four Army
divisions to Western Germany in addition to
the two already there. There was consider-
able opposition to this step in some quar-
ters for several reasons, prominent among
which was a fear that large American
forces might be drawn into a land war against
the vast populations commanded by the Soviet
Union. Secretary of Defense Marshall, how-
ever, has made clear that the plan is for the
Western Europeans to supply the bulk of the
land armies needed for their defense.

That Soviet aggression can be deterred has
been demonstrated over and over again. The
record which has been achieved during the
past 5 years has come from following a course
of no appeasement, cooperation with free
nations, and devotion to peace. We have
negotiated with the Russians—as in the case
of Berlin—but we have not appeased. We
have yielded to the wishes of our Allies on
some issues and they have yielded to ours
on others. Here at home we have refused
to retreat into a new isolationism and, at
the same time, we have held in check those
who think that a bomb dropped on Moscow
will not only begin a war but end it.

What is the record of the past 5 years in
brief? The Soviet Union has not dared to
precipitate a general war; Yugoslavia has
broken loose from the Moscow chains;
Greece—the gateway to the Middle East—
has been saved from destruction. Efforts
In Asia, today, we are face-to-face with a transition of continental proportions. Events of the past few years have stirred half the population of the earth—more than a billion human beings—into a state of restless agitation.

These people differ widely in race, culture, and outlook. In some ways, however, their lot has been the same. Over the centuries, most of them acquiesced in the rule of native tyrants or the control of foreigners. Most of them endured—seemingly without complaint—a life of ignorance, disease and incredible poverty. Billions were born, lived out a brief life span—usually under 30 years—and died. Millions were swept away in a stroke, by famine, flood or epidemic. These catastrophes were quickly forgotten in the struggle of the living to survive. Life went on—compelling and unchanging. This was the "Changeless East."

But beneath the surface serenity of resignation, a ferment of discontent has been churning for decades, building up great pressures for social and political change. From time to time, there were warning signs, as for example, the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and the rioting and insurrections throughout southern and southeastern Asia between the two wars.

Then came World War II and the surface calm gave way once and for all under its powerful impetus. Vast forces were released. From Korea to Pakistan, from Mongolia to the Philippines—tidal waves of unrest rolled over this immense area. Millions of people were caught up in the cross-currents, propelled by two fundamental drives—a common determination to end foreign domination and to do something about the crushing poverty which, for centuries, had produced the cycle of birth, miserable life and early death.

The transition which is taking place in the Far East is not a gentle one. In many places, it already has engendered violence on a scale unprecedented in recent history. Millions have died as a direct or indirect result of the civil conflicts in China and southeast Asia.

of the Communists to capture Western Europe by capitalizing on economic misery and social unrest have been thwarted by the European recovery plan. The menace of Communist armed aggression has been counteracted by the North Atlantic defense program. The Berlin airlift was a dramatic demonstration of the manner in which western determination and technical ability can create a situation in which bona fide negotiations with the Russians became possible.

The record of our foreign policy in Europe is a record of accomplishment, written in spithe of the dire predictions of a few in our midst who continue to ignore the responsibilities of the hour while they read and re-read the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam agreements.

Or if it is not these agreements, then it is the Far East that occupies them practically to the exclusion of the rest of the world. It is as though the sun of international events not only rises in the east but also sets in the east.

This is the region that has given rise to most of the conflict over our foreign policy. The typhoon now raging about Capital Hill in Washington originated in the vicinity of Formosa. Typhoon is one of the few words in the English language that is derived from the Chinese. It is taken from two Chinese characters—"die" and "fung" which, together, mean "big wind." It is quite a typhoon—this controversy over far-eastern policy—and, like most of the storms that blow out of the China Sea, it is full of sound and fury.

This sound and fury, unfortunately, conceals a wide belt of calm—an area of substantial agreement upon which a stable far-eastern policy can be conducted. There is, for example, practically no disagreement among responsible persons in the Government as to the fundamental facts of the Asian situation today. The administration and qualified Members of Congress have long recognized them and General MacArthur, in his farewell address to both Houses, reviewed them.

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and in the religious strife that marked the partition of the Indian subcontinent. Millions more have been uprooted and are on the move. They are seeking new roots to sustain life and to give it meaning and direction.

These, then, are the facts of the Far East of 1951. Half the world is in transition, and often, in violent transition. This transition holds tremendous possibilities for good but it also carries the seeds of a potentially enormous evil.

If the new nations of the Far East can maintain their independence and the new governments can deal effectively with the accumulated problems of their people, there is every reason to believe that they will make a profound contribution to their own development, to the cause of peace and to the general advancement of mankind. If, on the other hand, they fall victims to a new imperialism—whether it be of the type recently advanced by Japan or the more subtle type now emanating from the Soviet Union—if this should occur, then the rest of the world and we as a part of it, would be exposed to a grave danger.

There is a real prospect of this happening because in the confusion and frustrations of the hour, men often turn to the easy way out, the quick and unreasoned solution to their difficulties. Communism or other reactionary movements, based on such slogans as “Asia for the Asians” offer very real enticements, however delusive, to the hungry and discontented.

Some may wish that the facts in the Far East were otherwise. Some may long for the old days of the “changeless East” and its “unspoiled charm,” but these cannot be recalled.

The fact is that we must conduct far eastern policy within the framework of a “changing East”—a rapidly, erratically and, frequently, violently “changing East.” To imagine that the situation is otherwise will lead us to build a policy on sands of unreality and to court, thereby, its repeated collapses.

But recognition of the facts of the situation in Asia is only one prerequisite to sound policy. For the Far East is only a part of the larger framework of foreign policy which is the globe itself. And far eastern policy, if it is to serve the Nation, must be viewed in that total perspective. We cannot concentrate our attention exclusively on Asia. To do so, is to ignore regions which, at this moment in history, are at least as vital.

In the Far East we can bring to bear a prudent part of the resources which we have available for international purposes in an effort to influence developments in the direction of peace, freedom, and progress. We cannot deploy all our resources to that area without leaving others, such as Europe and the Middle East, dangerously exposed.

There are some situations in the Far East with which, by working constructively with others, we can deal effectively. In these situations we should act, and we are acting. But under no circumstances ought we to assume unilateral responsibility for everything that happens in Asia or for the future of that vast continent. Under no circumstances should we overcommit ourselves, even in the name of an anti-Communist crusade.

Korea is not the only country in the world that lives in the shadow of Communist imperialism. Communism, itself, is not the first form of tyranny that has threatened the world, nor is it, necessarily, the last. The way to a world of freedom and international decency is long and difficult and we will do well to draw judiciously upon our strength as we move along it.

In general, that is what we have done in the Far East and that is what we are doing now. Mistakes have been made and others may be expected. Foreign policy is made by human beings and human beings make mistakes. As I have already pointed out, all of us contribute directly or indirectly to our foreign policy and we share responsibility for its success or failure.

I think, however, that we need not be ashamed of the course we have pursued in the Far East for 5 years. When it is viewed
in its entirety, within the framework of the facts of Asia and the larger framework of the global situation—the record is good. I go further and suggest that beneath the sound and fury of the present controversy, it will be found that most persons in this country—regardless of party—generally have supported and will continue to support that policy.

Let us examine this thesis against the record of our activity in the Far East since 1945.

In the Philippines we fulfilled promptly our long-standing pledge to grant independence to the islands. We kept our wartime promise to aid in reconstruction, providing for this purpose technical assistance, hundreds of millions of dollars of direct compensation to those who suffered losses, and surplus property of enormous value at a negligible price. In 1946, we also worked out mutual defense arrangements that are designed to safeguard the Philippines from a repetition of invasion as well as to enhance our own security.

As far as I can determine, there has been no serious opposition to any of these measures in Congress or out of Congress. They had wide bipartisan support. It is not over the Philippine policy, then, that the present controversy rages.

But in spite of our efforts and those of many conscientious Filipinos, the islands have not made the progress which might have been expected.

Last year there were alarming reports that the Philippines might go the way of China. The reasons advanced were much the same—corruption in government, unfair economic advantage to a favored few at the expense of the many, and the growth in strength of a Communist-led revolutionary group in the countryside.

What could we have done in these circumstances? Reverse the independence granted a few short years ago and reoccupy the islands? To illustrate the difficulty in such a course, I might point out that when we requested permission to post marines as guards at our Embassy in Manila because of the tense situation, the Philippine Government hotly rejected the request as an affront to its sovereignty. But even if the course of reoccupation were feasible, the direct control of the Philippines would require an enormous allocation of our economic and military resources. What would be left for other areas? Are the American people willing to assume an increased tax burden and new casualty lists for this purpose?

A second alternative would be to abandon the islands to their fate and risk their falling into unfriendly hands. One consideration—and there are others—indicates how dangerous this course would be. We regard Formosa as vital to the security of the Pacific. How much more so are the Philippines.

Confronted with a set of facts of this kind, our Philippine policy has taken the only direction that is practical. We have not assumed primary responsibility for the political administration, the internal security or the domestic economy of the Philippines. The Filipino people were demanding, in effect, the right to deal with these problems themselves when they sought independence. We conceded them that right when we set them free. These problems, properly, are the primary responsibility of the Filipinos. Our role, necessarily, is that of a neighbor who has had a long and close relationship with the islands. In this role we have increased our military assistance and our technical aid to help them meet the present abnormal situation. The President has gone a step further and has called upon the Philippine Government to undertake certain basic reforms as a condition for additional economic help. The Filipinos have given evidence of a willingness to make the necessary improvements and Congress is now considering a measure which will provide that help.

We cannot be certain that this policy will succeed. There is no assurance that as a result of it the Philippines will emerge as a progressive and stable member of the free world. In the planning and execution of foreign policy there are rarely certainties.
The most that we can hope for is that we have chosen the best possible course of action in the light of a given set of circumstances. Many people have complained about the situation in the Philippines but no one, so far as I am aware, has offered a policy approach differing basically from the three I have suggested here. That is—get in, get out, or help out. The way we have chosen is neither the way of imperialism which is to get in, nor the way of isolationism which is to get out. It is the American way, which is to help out.

I have dwelt at length on the Philippines for it illustrates the complex problems which confront our policy-makers elsewhere in the Far East. In southern and southeast Asia we have also sought to deal with the facts of the situation in the same way—neither by getting in nor getting out, but by helping out. We have cooperated with many friendly nations in this region.

In the case of Indonesia, we contributed through the United Nations, to its relatively peaceful transition from colonial status to independence. We are now attempting to bring about a similar transition in Indochina in the face of a Communist-led revolt. Throughout this vast area of southern and southeast Asia, we have in operation, today, programs of economic, technical and military assistance and cultural exchange. Only recently Congress passed legislation to make available grain for India in an effort to forestall a threatened famine.

These programs represent a judicious use of the resources which we are able to allocate to this region. They are gestures of sincere friendship, evidences of our willingness to help in deeds as well as words. They are, as all measures of this kind ought to be, a mixture of generosity and reasonable self-interest.

As in the Philippines, there is no assurance that all of them will accomplish the purposes for which they are intended. As in the Philippines, primary responsibility rests where it belongs—with the peoples and governments of the various recipient nations.

Taken as a whole, policy in southern and southeast Asia has had overwhelming support in both Houses of Congress. This is another area of substantial bipartisan agreement that the present controversy conceals.

With respect to Japan, World War II projected us into a situation of primary responsibility. As the power principally responsible for the Japanese defeat, we were compelled to occupy the vacuum which that defeat produced and to exercise the primary authority which that occupation entailed.

After V-J-day, policy for Japan, conceived and prepared by the State and Defense Departments under the President’s direction was carried out by General MacArthur until his replacement by General Ridgway as Supreme Commander. Most available reports indicate that the occupation has been admirably conducted. The Japanese have made considerable progress in democratizing their social and political institutions and, with substantial American assistance, have done much to restore their battered economy. We are moving, now, toward a peace settlement with or without Soviet participation. Once a treaty has been signed, we hope that Japan will make a contribution to the maintenance of peace and orderly international progress. We will, then, get out of that country but still will be in a position to help out, if necessary, particularly with respect to defense against aggression from the mainland.

There have been scattered criticisms of our occupation of Japan under General MacArthur’s direction. Some have said that it was “too soft” and some that it was “too hard.” The balance of informed opinion, however, has been favorable. Certainly, there has been little criticism of it in Congress by either party. In this case, too, the sound and fury of partisan criticism of far-eastern policy had drowned out an extremely important area of agreement.

Having passed through a belt of calm encircling the Philippines, southern and southeast Asia and Japan, we come to China which is at the very core of the storm. I should like to state at the outset that I do not believe any reasonable person would
have conducted China policy very much differently than it has been conducted since 1945. We have had three Secretaries of State since the end of World War II—James Byrnes, General Marshall, and Dean Acheson. All three were confronted with a given set of facts. All three approached these facts in substantially the same manner.

To make the point clearer, let us go back to VJ-day. At that time, we had air and naval power in the Western Pacific. We had a small force in China, mostly service troops. General MacArthur had advised General Wedemeyer who was then in command in China that he could not spare additional men from his armies which were scheduled to serve in the Japanese occupation.

In China there were two major opposing military forces, one under the control of the Communists and the other under the control of the Nationalists. The Communists were spread all over the North China countryside ready to move immediately on the great eastern cities and into Manchuria. If civil war came, they had a decided positional advantage.

The Nationalist armies were in west and south China, far from the major strategic centers. They had overwhelming superiority in numbers and equipment but because of China's incredibly poor transportation system, they could not get this superiority into position to make it effective.

In these circumstances we had to choose a course from among three alternatives—the same three which we have faced all over Asia: To get in, to get out, or to help out. In this case, to get in would have meant stopping the impending civil war at whatever cost to ourselves, using our soldiers in whatever number required, and assuming full responsibility for restoring all of China to Chiang's rule. Would the Chinese people, whose suspicion of foreign interference in their internal affairs is traditional, have welcomed this move? Would we, ourselves, in 1945 have tolerated committing an unknown number of our men to China for an indefinite period? To get in, in this sense, even if desirable, was manifestly impracticable.

Could we have gotten out? We could have; but it would have meant leaving 3,000-000 Japanese soldiers and civilians in China, since the Nationalist Government was incapable of handling their repatriation. It would have meant abandoning the Nationalist Government which we recognized and had supported throughout the conflict without an opportunity to restore stability to war-torn China. Furthermore, the evidence we had, then, indicated that most of the Chinese people still looked to this Government for leadership in bringing all the factions together, in preventing civil war, and in reconstructing the country.

Therefore, we took the third alternative. We helped out—not the Chinese Communist but the legal, Nationalist Government of China. We transported by sea and air 400 to 500 thousand of Chiang Kai-shek's troops over and around the Communist forces. These troops went into key strategic sectors in east and north China. Fifty thousand American marines held such vital centers of communication as Peiping, Tientsin, and Tsing-tao to prevent their seizure by the Chinese Communists.

Furthermore, we continued to supply the National Government with lend-lease aid for months after the conclusion of the war. By the end of 1945, we had delivered sufficient tonnage to equip 39 divisions of ground forces and an 8½-group air force.

In December 1945, Chiang Kai-shek held a numerical superiority over the Communists of 5 to 1. He had a monopoly of heavy equipment and mechanical transport and an unopposed air arm. He held the key communications centers. Yet by December 1946, exactly 3 years later, this preponderance of strength had been so dissipated that General Barr, head of our military advisory mission in China, was forced to conclude that without direct involvement of the United States with its combat forces, the defeat of the Nationalists on the mainland was inevitable.
What lies behind this amazing failure? You will hear it blamed on General Marshall's attempt to mediate between the Nationalists and the Communists. The fact is that the Nationalists occupied more strategic military positions when General Marshall left China at the end of 1946 than when he arrived at the beginning of 1946. The fact is that in mediating, General Marshall was following the established policy of the Nationalist Government. For years Chiang had claimed that he was trying to settle the Communist question by political methods and not by civil war.

You will hear that the failure came about because General Marshall tried to force the Nationalists to take Communists into the government. The fact is that Communists had been brought into the government by Chiang, himself, long before Marshall ever arrived in China. The fact is that no single Communist was added to that government as a result of General Marshall's mediation. The fact is that the Marshall mission was welcomed by Chiang with open arms and he prevailed on General Marshall to remain as mediator when the latter wanted to withdraw.

If any prominent American in 1946 opposed Marshall's trip to China to mediate the Chinese conflict between the major opposing groups, he gave no public and, as far as I can determine, private expression of his disagreement. In December, 1945, General MacArthur, General Wedemeyer, and Admiral Spruance sent the following message to Washington from the Far East before General Marshall's departure:

"It is suggested that United States assistance to China be made available as a basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a unified democratic China."

In June 1951, Admiral Spruance says that the negotiations between the "major opposing groups" in this message meant between the Communists and Nationalists; General Wedemeyer first implied that it didn't and then that it did. General MacArthur, however, dissents and speaks of the Communists as "but a nebulous threat" at the time. You can understand some of the difficulties of conducting foreign policy when there is disagreement among three prominent military leaders as to who the "major opposing forces" in China were in 1945.

Another reason advanced for the Nationalist collapse on the mainland is the inadequacy of American aid. We are asked, in effect, to be ashamed of ourselves and to feel guilty for failing to be more generous towards Chiang Kai-shek.

But since VJ-day this country has extended military and economic aid valued at about two billion dollars to the Chinese Government. Two billion dollars of taxpayers' money to Chiang Kai-shek. It is possible, of course, to argue the precise amount. Millions of words have been wasted in proving that it was closer to one billion or three billion. Can anyone honestly believe that one billion or two billion or five billion dollars more aid would have held the lid on the gigantic upheaval that has taken place in China these past 5 years? As it was, an enormous part of the military equipment given to Chiang wound up in the hands of the Communists. In the Communist victory parades during October 1949 in Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, and other cities, captured American arms and equipment streamed past the reviewing stands hour after hour. Where did this equipment come from? From Nationalist armies which surrendered or went over to the Communists. Where is it now? A lot of it is in Korea—in the hands of our enemies. Yet, the administration is scolded for not having done more of the same thing.

Can anyone honestly believe that more arms and a thousand American military advisors in place of the 500 that served Chiang would have saved the National Government on the mainland? Would additional aid have curbed that government's disastrous strategy? Would it have created a fighting morale? Would it have put an end to corruption and misrule?
The fact is that our help failed because there was missing in the Nationalist Government at that time, the will and ability to use our help effectively. We could not supply the will, and if we had tried to supply the ability, in all probability we would have had to get in completely.

Only since it has been confined to the island of Formosa has Chiang's government begun to take the necessary measures to make itself truly responsive to the needs of the ordinary Chinese people. In these circumstances, there is some hope that the economic and military assistance which we are still supplying to the island of Formosa can prove effective. We are justified in continuing that aid, just as we are justified in continuing to recognize the National Government, because it is becoming more representative of the real aspirations of the Chinese people as the Communist regime in Peking grows less representative. Since it emerged from the countryside, the latter has steadily drawn away from the people of China and their real interests. It has become more and more a tool of Russian foreign policy, permitting itself finally to be led into a course of tossing thousands of Chinese lives to senseless slaughter in the Korean aggression.

Despite the complexity of the Chinese situation, I believe that once the facts are fully appreciated, there will be little real disagreement on the part of most Americans that the course we followed in China was about the only reasonable one we could have followed. There was not too little American support for the National Government. If anything, in the light of known circumstances, there was too much.

The same is not true for Korea. In that country, on June 25, 1950, Communist imperialism, for the first time since the end of World War II, resorted to the tactic of armed invasion. The issue immediately became larger than Korea. It became, in the final analysis, the issue of peace or general war.

The response of the free world to this issue was immediate. On June 27, the President ordered fleet and air units into action as the UN called upon all nations to assist the victim of aggression. Americans gave their spontaneous and wholehearted support to the decision.

The objectives which we had in going into Korea, and which we still have, is to preserve the South Korean Republic; to stop and to punish the aggression against that Republic; to make clear to all would-be imperialists, as we failed to make clear to Japanese and Nazi imperialists in the thirties, that the force of tyranny will be met by the force of freedom; that there will be no cheap conquests of the weak by the strong; that the greater the aggression the greater will be the fearful retribution. By stopping a local aggression we hope to prevent a general war later; by fighting in Korea now we hope to save this land of ours from attack in the future.

When Capt. James Jabara, the leading pilot of the United Nations in Korea, landed back in the United States, he was greeted first by a reporter from his home town of Wichita, Kans. The reporter asked: “Why are we fighting in Korea?” Jabara answered: “So that we won’t have to fight in Wichita.”

These are the reasons we are in Korea. They are fine and decent and sensible reasons. Those who speak disparagingly or cynically of them prostitute the finest part of the American ideal—a willingness to sacrifices now so that our children and our children’s children shall live their lives in a better and more satisfying world.

What we did not set out to do in Korea, what we were not required by any mandate of the United Nations to do, was to unify all of Korea by force. The task of unifying Korea, is a task for the Korean people themselves with whatever help may be given them by the United Nations. What we did not set out to do was to conquer Manchuria. What we did not set out to do was to carry Chiang Kai-Shek back to the mainland on the shield of the United States. What we did not set out to do was to begin world war III.

We failed once to distinguish what we set out to do and what we did not set out
to do in Korea. I trust that we shall not fail again. Last November, United Nations forces had scored the remarkable victory that carried them from practically a beachhead at Pusan back to the thirty-eighth parallel. At that point we had accomplished what we had set out to do. We had met the aggressors, punished them severely, and all but destroyed their armies. The security of our forces made it necessary to advance some distance beyond the thirty-eighth parallel.

When these forces had reached the narrow defensible neck of the Korean peninsula, some miles south of the Chinese border, I urged that we call a halt to the advance and try to create a buffer zone along the Chinese Manchurian and Korean frontier. But, apparently, in the mistaken belief that the Chinese Communists would not enter the war, that we could “end the war by Christmas” our troops were sent probing, in dangerously extended lines, towards the Chinese border.

The rest is too well known to you to bear extensive repeating. The Chinese Communists entered the conflict. We suffered a major defeat. Some of those who just a few weeks before had been most vociferous in urging our advance to the Chinese border now began to press for two alternatives—either the complete abandonment of Korea or the extension of the war all the way into Manchuria and beyond. This “get in or get out” extremism would have profited no one but our enemies.

To have abandoned Korea, at that moment, would have been to sacrifice the very purposes for which we entered the conflict. It would have meant laying not only all of Korea but all of the Far East open to new attacks by Communist imperialism. To have extended the war to the Chinese mainland, on the other hand, would have meant an involvement—when considered in the light of the critical situations elsewhere—far beyond our military capacity at the time to support. The latter course could have had only two outcomes. If the Soviet Union chose to back the Chinese Communists, it would have meant the beginning of world war III. If, on the other hand, the Russians chose to stay out, it would have meant a unilateral involvement of this country on the Chinese mainland.

In the first case we would have had the very thing which, in our own interests and in the interests of civilization, we are trying to prevent. In the second case, we would have had what General Bradley so aptly termed “wrong war, wrong place, wrong time, wrong enemy.”

Suppose we gained this cheap and easy victory over the Chinese Communists which some seemed to think possible by the use of our air and sea power and Chiang's troops. What would we have gained except the continuing responsibility of trying to keep the Generalissimo in power in a devastated China at untold billions of dollars in costs?

And if we did not defeat the Chinese Communists easily, what then? We would do as we have done in Korea, send Ground Forces in after sea and air power had failed to bring an immediate victory. The vast maw of the Chinese mainland can absorb millions of ground troops. We could tie up the bulk of our military resources in a secondary arena of combat, leaving Western Europe—the real prize—and other vital areas bare to Soviet conquest. If world war III must come, it will not be won or lost in south China.

We have to keep our eyes on the objective, and the place to do this at the present time is in Korea. Under General Ridgway's command, the United Nations have once again returned to a position roughly comparable to the one held last December. Once again a moment of decision is at hand.

It is a moment to restate the aims of our foreign policy. That policy is and must continue to be based on the principles of no appeasement and peace—not peace at any price, but peace as long as it is humanly and decently and honorably possible to strive for it. To achieve that peace we must be prepared to negotiate, provided the aggressors recognize the error of their ways and, provided, the negotiations lead to a settlement that achieves our purposes. Appeasement and
negotiation are not the same things. To use means other than military to achieve reasonable international objectives is in keeping with our best traditions. We would do well to be wary of partisan tongues in this country that are quick to lick the label of appeasement on every nonmilitary action we take. Such tongues could lead our foreign policy into repeated blind alleys and, ultimately, into chaos, unnecessary war, or confused retreat.

As to specific policy based on these principles of no appeasement and peace, I believe the facts of the situation suggest that the wisest course in Korea at this time would be for the UN forces to remain in the vicinity of the thirty-eighth parallel so that the South Korean Republic can be reestablished in its own right. Beyond that, South Korean forces should be sent farther northward to the vicinity of the thirty-ninth parallel so as to increase the defensive strength of South Korea and to establish a status quo that can be maintained. In my opinion this move will be a long step toward stopping Stalin's plans to involve us in all-out war in Asia; it will allow South Koreans, with UN help, to start rebuilding their country, and it will have accomplished our original purpose of making clear that aggression does not pay. South Korea should assume an increasingly active role in its own defense and we should seek greater military commitments for Korea from other UN members with a view to reducing the size of the American contingent. The Chinese may quit Korea in time, but it is necessary, at this stage to draw our plans as though they will not. As long as they continue to attack, they must be opposed.

Moving south to Japan, present policy calls for the signing of a peace treaty at the earliest possible time. We are trying to enlist as many as possible of the World War II Allies in this policy. Since the Russians continue to make impossible demands as the price of participation, we are going ahead without them. In general, the peace with Japan which is planned will be a peace of reconciliation, with provision made for defense of the country before the occupation terminates. This policy must be pushed with vigor.

With respect to Formosa, we cannot permit it to fall into the hands of a Chinese Communist regime which is operating in the interests of a foreign power and is pursuing a reckless course of aggression against the United Nations in Korea. On the other hand, under present circumstances and at the present time, I do not believe we ought to back Chiang Kai-shek in an adventure on the mainland. Chiang, himself, has indicated that even with full American assistance, it would take 6 months to make ready for an attack.

It is true that all the Nationalists seek now is a little logistical support and some American technicians for an invasion of the mainland. On the surface that seems like a cheap price to pay for a diversionary attack on the Chinese Communists, and some Americans have been attracted by it. It is enticing, but it is also dangerously illusory. As you probably remember, we began the Korean conflict by supplying only logistical support to the South Koreans and, in a year, we have built up our commitment there to 250,000 men plus extensive sea and air forces. There may be circumstances in which the use of Chiang's forces are warranted. These circumstances do not now exist.

For the present, the National Government has more than enough problems to keep it fully occupied on Formosa. If it can do a thorough overhauling of itself, perhaps some day the Chinese people may be prepared to give it another chance on the mainland.

With regard to the Philippines, our policy in the future must continue to be based on the idea of helping the Filipinos find their way to stability. We will not, as we did not in 1941, tolerate any attack on these islands.

For the rest of the Far East, our principal effort must be coordinated with the efforts of others in assisting these countries of southern and southeast Asia to overcome the accumulated ills of centuries. We must help
them, as decent neighbors, with little fan­
fare and within our means, to produce more
food and other necessities, to improve the
education of their children, and to elimi­
nate the many health hazards to which they
are exposed—malaria, typhus, cholera, and
other epidemic diseases. Projects of this
kind cost, comparatively, very little money,
but they engender a lasting good will which
military action can rarely do. Such projects
also attack some of the basic causes of unrest
and instability.
The problems which exist in Asia, in Eu­
rope, throughout the world, are immense.

They are, in the last analysis, the problems
of peace or war, the problems of progress or
retreat. We cannot eliminate these prob­
lems by closing our eyes and striking out
blindly at them. Nor can we eliminate them
by denying that they exist. We can meet
them only by striving to understand them;
by closing ranks among ourselves and with
friendly nations the world over and by bring­
ing to bear on them our united strength
and determination; by reaffirming, as each
generation must reaffirm, that it is not in
tyranny but in freedom that mankind finds
his destiny.