1954

Mike Mansfield - Our Defense and Security

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Remarks of Senator Mike Mansfield

OUR DEFENSE AND SECURITY

With the truce in Korea and the inconclusive results of the Berlin Conference, another chapter in the book of history must be considered. The future of the United States of America depends on the maintenance of a sound military policy, keyed to the dangers of the atomic age and at the same time tied to the economic and political framework of our capitalistic system. There is no cheap, no easy nor sure solution to the difficulties which confront us in this day and age. There is no single possible weapon which will automatically win wars or by its very destructiveness prevent them. The age in which we live calls for clearer thinking, facing up to realities and sound decisions. This period calls for steadiness in our foreign policy and continuity in our military strength. The age in which we live poses for us the possibility that wars may be recurrent and until a peaceful and secure world is achieved, we must, in my opinion, always operate on that assumption.

I realize full well that the idealists among us think that a better way of life can be achieved for all people to the end that wars will be abandoned forever. I wish that I could hold to this ideal. I pray that it can come true but as a matter of practical necessity, I am afraid that long-sought-for day is beyond the period of our immediate historical future. In line with our responsibilities, we can no longer afford to keep our guard -- that is, our defenses -- down. As the leading nation among the free countries of the world, we must assume the burden of leadership if the peoples in the area are to retain any degree of the freedom which they now enjoy. We cannot afford ups and downs in either our military or
foreign policy and we should recognize the fact these freedoms which we enjoy were paid for with our blood and our treasure. We must realize further that if we are to retain these freedoms, which too many of us accept complacently, that we must be prepared to pay and if need be, to fight for their retention.

In the present world there are two great powers behind which, to a greater or lesser degree, the rest of the world is aligned. Those powers as the world well knows are the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic. The tactical changes in Russian policy do not mean that we can afford to shore up our defenses, bring the boys home and lapse into a period which used to be called "normalcy".

The Soviet's idea to bring America to its knees is two-fold; one, to weaken our economy to such an extent that we will have a depression at home. Two, to cause a split between our allies and ourselves. Honeyed words by the Soviets should not lull us into a sense of false security because unless these words are transformed into deeds, and until these deeds prove what they mean, there can be no let-up in the deep seated friction which exists between the free and slave world. Americans would be foolish to think that the skies above and the oceans on both sides furnish us with a really protective barrier. We know that we are very vulnerable and becoming more so each day as space-devouring, ocean-spanning aircraft and missiles, submarines that can cross the oceans submerged and atomic weapons are developed. The fact that other frontiers are vulnerable does not mean any less security for the vulnerability of our own outer life lines. The possibility of a seriously crippling attack against the shores of
the United States is something we must remember at all times and on that basis we must do all we can to bring about, if possible, awareness of the danger such an attack might inflate.

According to our best informed scientists, we have about a three-year lead in the atomic arms race in relation to the Soviet Union. We know there have been three atomic detonations in Russia. We know that the United States has detonated at least 114 weapons of all types from city-busters to atomic shells fired by cannon. In November, 1952 for the first time a hydrogen device blew an island off the map of the Pacific, created a tremendous crater in the bottom of the ocean of sufficient capacity to comfortably accommodate 14 Pentagon buildings, and released the equivalent in power of more than five million tons of TNT as compared to the 15,000 - 20,000-ton bomb of Hiroshima and the 20,000-ton bomb of Nagasaki. In World War II American Air Force planes all over the world dropped only two million tons of bombs; today 100 B-50 airplanes with one Nagasaki type bomb each would equal that amount. In other words, the hydrogen bomb is to the atomic bomb as the atomic bomb is to TNT. We are now definitely in the hydrogen age and all the armed services of the United States are now beginning to receive production versions of guided missiles and are also continuing to develop still further the terrible German nerve gases, developed in World War II, to even more toxic gases. This technological revolution in weapons has decreased, not increased, our security and this factor should be fully understood by all of us. In practically every field of technological research in the weapons of destruction, we must assume, and I think rightly so, that the Soviet Union is
moving along parallel paths. The Soviet Union today has, it has been estimated, a stockpile of between 100-175 atomic weapons. In the opinion of certain high ranking officials of the United States Air Force, she will have enough atomic weapons by mid-1954 to sustain an atomic offensive against the United States and our allies and the planes to carry the bombs. Our atomic advantage in quantity and quality of weapons will not be of much comfort to us if and when such a time comes, but neither will it be too much of an advantage to an aggressor because the aggressor knows that the retaliation will be terrible and in kind.

In the matter of hydrogen bombs, we might just as well face up to the fact that the Russians have their scientists working on the problem and that its development will be somewhat parallel to ours. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that both the Soviet Union and the free world are working on what is known as the "cobalt" bomb. This advance over the hydrogen missile could be made by "seeding" atom and hydrogen bombs with cobalt. I understand the resulting radiation would be so deadly that it would destroy friend and foe alike. We can see therefore that Russia in the final analysis is not getting weaker but is, in fact, getting stronger all the time. Their tactics may be changed temporarily but not their strategy. Their ultimate goal is still the same, security for the Soviet Union and world conquest. These two objectives can and should be viewed as mutually supporting and identical.

Turning to the economy of our country we can see that even here we are entering a period of danger. In the past few years the United States has changed from "have" to a "have not" nation. For the first time in our history, we are
importing more than 50% of our raw materials from sources outside of our own frontiers. This fact should be borne in mind for a better understanding of the foreign policy of the United States and which should bring home to all of us the continuing need which we will have on other nations as sources of supply for these raw strategic materials. The present administration has, and I believe rightly, abandoned the "crisis year" philosophy of the previous administration and prepared, instead, not for any definite date of danger but for an indefinite continuation of danger.

Because of the reasons enumerated, we should recognize that we face far greater difficulties in the future than we have in the past. We have strength today and that strength must be maintained. We are far better prepared at this moment than we were prior to any of the wars in which this country has been engaged. Our Navy is the strongest in the world. It is larger than all the rest of the world's fleets put together even though 50 of its ships are to be put in mothballs under the "new look". We are operating a total of 25-30 aircraft carriers of all types and we maintain - for the time being at least - an amphibious lift in commission for two divisions. We are fairly well-prepared against any threat by submarine. Of the some 400 Soviet submarines possibly ten are of the modern snorkel long-range type; another 75-100 are conventional ocean-going types; all the rest are small coastal submarines or old medium-range vessels. The United States has more long-range ocean-going submarines than the Russians and our defenses against submarine attacks are by no means weak.
On the question of air power, we are not weaker in number though we may be behind temporarily in the number of modern tactical types. The Navy and the Marine Corps has an inventory of about 13,000 planes of all military types (including trainers); the Air Force has about 21,000 which, under fiscal 1955 budget plans will be increased to 22,000 by mid-1955. We are stronger than the Soviet Union in long-range land-based bombers and in naval planes both carrier-based and patrol-type. The Soviets have greater strength than we do in land-based tactical types for support of ground armies, interception, and day-fighter missions.

The Air Force has activated more than 100 groups -- numbering from 30 to 75 planes each -- but probably no more than 85 of these groups are fully operational at this time. Our air power is in transition from propeller-driven, slow-speed types to jet-powered transonic and supersonic types with only one-fourth of current Air Force flying time in jets. In the latter field the Russians appear at the moment to be at least equal to, possibly superior to us.

The aircraft production of the two countries is probably about the same with the yearly outcome averaging between 12,000 - 14,000 military types. One difference though, and it is an important one, is that we are producing more planes in terms of airframe weight which means more of our output represents heavy complicated jet bombers. Our greatest apparent disadvantage is on land. The Marines have 3 divisions and the Army maintains 20 divisions plus 18 regimental combat teams. Of the Army divisions, six - with two being recalled -- and one Marine division are in Korea; two, plus one Marine division, are in
Japan; five in Europe; seven in the United States -- plus numerous regimental
combat teams and other smaller units here and abroad. Of the seven divisions
in the United States, six are weak -- below strength -- and none ready for combat
except the 82d Airborne Division.

The Russians on the other hand maintain a basic framework of 175
divisions though most of them are not at full strength. On the basis of combat
effectiveness, which includes mobility, fire power, etc., it is estimated that the
175 Russian divisions would approximately equal no more than 70 - 90 American-
type divisions. The Soviet's advantage of land power is very great, particularly
since the Russians could mobilize from 100 - 300 additional divisions in 90 days,
whereas the United States reserve strength is in no sense organized, trained, or
equipped for combat without a long preparatory period after war starts. Furthermore, although the strength of the Soviet Army is practically the same as it was
at the end of World War II -- 175 divisions, numbering approximately 4 million
-- the fact is that almost all the Soviet divisions have been thoroughly modernized,
mechanized and brought up to date. On the basis of what I have said, it is
apparent that at the moment the Soviet Union has a greater advantage on land.
This, therefore, must be compensated for by a continuing American advantage
in the air and at sea -- an advantage which we hold today and which we must, in
my opinion, accelerate to a greater degree in the air. Our air strength is not
sufficient to win air superiority over Western Europe or Northeast Asia. We
are fortunate though in having some highly industrialized nations among our
allies in NATO, allies actually of potential strength in air power whereas in
contrast, the captive countries behind the Iron Curtain are chiefly dependent on Soviet factories for their aircraft and equipment. British design is abreast, or, in some respects, ahead of the world, particularly in fighter types and in medium or short-range jet bombers. Though British air power is weak quantitatively today and dependent chiefly upon U.S. F-86 jet fighters and U.S. B-29 bombers, the future qualitative picture is bright. Thus to our own strength in Europe must be added the strength of NATO. Despite what some people in this country say, NATO is a great asset to the free world and the industrial output of Western Europe, particularly, that of the Ruhr is tremendously important. The divisions, fleets and air forces of the thirteen countries in the NATO alliance, are not to be taken lightly. Exclusive of five United States divisions, the original NATO today can put into the field 49 divisions in Western Europe plus 10 small ones in Greece; 22 large ones in Turkey and 33 in Yugoslavia. This compares favorably with eastern European satellite strength of approximately 80 divisions. Our allies also operate over 4,000 aircraft and more than 1,000 antisubmarine and coastal naval vessels. In contrast in the Pacific there are now 20 South Korean divisions. There are now the beginning of six armed divisions in Japan; Chiang Kai-shek has 21 divisions on Formosa and in Indo-China the French have the equivalent to ten divisions and in Malaya the British have 2 - 3. There are other units all over Asia and the Pacific but even here the back-bone of strength is America. On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Army is estimated at 4 million. In addition in other Asiatic countries there are further forces of guerrillas who are supported and kept in the fight by supplies from Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe.
This, then, is where we stand today -- considerably better off, in a military sense, than where we stood two and a half years ago, but by no means secure. In some ways we have gained by time; in some ways we have lost. We are stronger in conventional arms vis-a-vis Soviet Russia than we were, and we have probably gained relatively in atomic weapons, though this relative gain cannot continue.

Western Europe is no longer defenseless; the days of a Russian blitzkrieg and pushover are gone. Yugoslavia has thrown her lot in with the West in Europe. Our strength is now sufficient to force Russian re-enforcement and thus to give us warning of any attack.

We are no longer in the dire danger in Korea that we were in 1950; and the French -- faced in 1950 with the loss of the whole Red River valley in Indo-China -- certainly are better off today, having gained some advantages in the war of attrition in the past two years. In the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma, the Communist armed struggle has definitely lost strength.

Our ready military strength is considerable, and our tremendous military potential can be far more quickly realized than two years ago.

But to offset these gains is the fact that Communist China has been strengthened, rather than weakened, by the Korean war. This vast Asiatic power seems to be more solidly under control of its totalitarian leadership than it was three years ago, and certainly it has made amazing strides in the development of modern military power -- particularly in the air (there are now 2,500 to 3,000 Chinese planes, furnished by Russia). Thus the Chinese Red Army's weaknesses
in air power, antiaircraft, artillery, communications, and mobility of supply have been to a large extent (though not, of course, completely) remedied, and we may be witnessing in the Orient a historic phenomenon of tremendous importance to our time -- the emergence of China from feudalism into a modern state.

There is another debit in the balance sheet, caused (but only partially) by the frustration of Korea. It is a lack of drive and a declining sense of urgency -- a sometimes apathetic morale -- and the national frictions and differences that weaken the anti-Communist coalition.

Where, then, do we go from here -- with crisis not ended but compounded?

At this time a precise answer is not possible. The first Eisenhower defense and foreign aid budget was undoubtedly indicative of a trend to "stretch out" and "cut back", and yet to maintain a strong military posture. But no firm idea of where we are going -- or how fast -- was possible until: (a) the four new members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had "shaken down" in their duties and functioned as a team; (b) a complete review of strategic plans and levels of armed strength has been made by the new Chiefs of Staff; (c) the Eisenhower defense budget for the 1955 fiscal year has been prepared; and (d) there is further development of the meaning of recent internal events in Russia and clarification of the Communists' "peace" gestures. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs have come up with a "new look" which no one, as yet, fully understands except that it increases air power, places major reliance on the Strategic Air Command -- the "massive retaliatory power" aspect -- and reduces the present strength of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.
There is, however, no doubt that Congress and much of the Republican Party are in an economy mood; that the form of economic isolationism which expresses itself in high tariff barriers and in sharp reductions in foreign aid is gaining strength; and that, while air power still has a great political and popular appeal, many Congressmen believe there is much waste and "fat" in the defense budget. Unless the world crisis sharpens, the armed services and especially the foreign aid program are certainly in for a period of dollar retrenchment.

The 1954 defense budget, prepared by the Truman Administration but hastily revised by Secretary of Defense Wilson and President Eisenhower, showed the trend clearly. Expenditures during the next fiscal year will not be greatly reduced because of prior contracts and a balance on the books of billions of dollars of authorized funds which have not yet been obligated or spent.

However, a deep cut of more than $5 billion was applied to the Truman armed forces appropriation request for fiscal 1954 and the Eisenhower budget for 1955. Such cuts will result in an actual reduction of existing operating units; it will not cut, this year, into bone or muscle or sinew; but it will mean a reduction in deliveries of aircraft and other items in future years. Furthermore, it almost certainly implies abandonment of the 143-group program of the Air Force.

The immediate results are that the services will be reduced this year both in numbers of men in uniform and in numbers of civilian employees; that some orders for new equipment will not be placed; and also that some existing orders will be either cancelled, cut back, or stretched out.
The long-term effects are more important. The cut seems to mean that the expansion and growth of the armed forces -- though not their modernization -- is to be halted below present levels and under the "plateau of strength" which had been the goal of the Truman Administration.

The Truman expansion program, hastily invoked after the Korean war, had as its goals an Army of 21 active divisions (plus 18 regimental combat teams, etc.), a Navy of more than 1,200 active operating vessels and some 15,000 modern aircraft (including Marine aircraft), a Marine Corps of 3 divisions and 3 air wings, and an Air Force of 143 groups, most of them equipped with modern postwar aircraft to a total of about 21,000 planes. The target date for these goals was originally mid-1954; this was stretched out under President Truman to 1955-56.

When President Eisenhower took office, the Army was shy only one of its 21 divisions, though many of its units were incomplete; and the Navy was on the whole in good shape, though it badly needed new jets for its carriers and a program of shipbuilding and ship conversion. Thus the Army and Navy had almost reached the levels of their numerical expansion, though their corresponding modernization program was but half completed.

The Air Force, however, had reached only 110 groups on its way to the 143-group goal, although Secretary of Defense Wilson stated in Indianapolis, on December 7, 1953, that he will ask Congress in fiscal year 1955 for funds to build toward a 137-group Air Force by mid-1956 or 1957. Moreover, only about 85 of these were fully operational, and there was still a high percentage of obsolescent World War II type aircraft.
In sum, the new program seems to mean -- subject to the qualifying factors previously mentioned -- that the Army will stabilize at a strength of 19 divisions (many under strength); the Navy will be reduced somewhat in size; and the Air Force will stabilize at something like 137 groups.

Also, the new "plateau of strength" -- lower than the old -- will probably be reached (insofar as complete modernization of the services is concerned) somewhat later than the previous 1955-56 deadline.

The revised goals, plus the slowdown in the NATO program, may ultimately result in somewhat greater combat effectiveness of the active units even though the total strength will be less. On balance, the calculated military risk has been somewhat increased, for there has been no change in our estimate of Russian military capabilities save the obvious struggle for power now going on in the Kremlin.

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