7-8-1954

Geneva: Failure of a Policy

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Mr. President: The war in Indochina appears on the verge of ending in a truce. The blood-letting of the past eight years will probably come to a close very shortly. There will be no more Dien Bien Phus, at least for the present. The danger of armed involvement of American forces in Indochina, once so close, has receded.

These are welcome by-products of the Geneva Conference. There is little else. The situation in Korea, presumably the principal reason for our participation in the conference, remains unchanged; thousands of American soldiers are still committed there on the mainland of Asia.

With respect to Indochina, a serious defeat has been inflicted on American diplomacy. And in the process vast new areas have been opened for potential conquest by communist totalitarianism.

Last spring, in two speeches in the Senate, I expressed the view that our consent to participate in the Geneva proceedings was a mistake. I did so because it was clear at the time that the communists
would enter the conference, for all practical purposes, as a bloc; that the
communists, whether from the Soviet Union, Korea, China or Indochina
would possess a singleness of outlook. It was not clear that the non-communist
nations shared any such unity of objective. The British wanted to stay out of
Indochina. The French wanted to get out of Indochina and for a while it
seemed that we were on the verge of getting into Indochina.

In these circumstances, how could negotiations lead to anything but
failure for the non-communist powers?

These were the consequences which I felt might flow from a failure
at Geneva, as I stated them last April 14th on the floor of the Senate:

Patterns may be set which might influence the entire
political fabric of the French Republic and touch on every
aspect of Western European unity. Patterns may be set
which will determine whether aggression shall again
gather force on the shores of the South China seas to be
hurled at this nation from across the Pacific.

Certain of these results are already apparent. The Geneva conference
has served to increase vastly the stature of the Chinese Communists in Asia
and throughout the world. Their influence now takes firm root in northern
Indochina. All the rest of southeast Asia lies before this totalitarian wave which has spilled over the borders of south China. The path of advance to the west unfolds through small nations and points ultimately to India. Southwards and eastwards, over the intervening islands of the Pacific, the path stretches towards New Zealand, Australia and the Americas.

These grim prospects are not likely to materialize tomorrow or next month. It may be years or decades before the full effects of the loss of Indochina will be fully felt or understood.

Political waves are pulsating forces, not unlike those of the sea. They change shape and form, and their power ebbs and flows as they move through history.

This may be the case with the new totalitarian wave which has flown out of China to the south. It may undergo profound changes as it moves outward. It may lose or gather momentum as it mixes with the political cross currents of southeast Asia.

For the present, however, the unescapable fact is that totalitarianism
and not freedom has emerged triumphant from the murky waters of the war of the deltas. Its triumph has been confirmed by Geneva and the pattern for a further advance in the Far East is set.

Nor are the consequences of Geneva confined to Asia and the Pacific area. Europe, too, will feel the impact of this conference. Until Geneva, there was a chance that the great peoples of Western Europe would continue to move their national heritages in the direction of a United Europe.

Thanks to the courage, and the wisdom of a sincere American and a great Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, and thanks to the financial sacrifices of the American people who bore the cost of the Marshall plan willingly and generously, Western Europe had been able to lift itself out of the mire of a disastrous war. It had begun the long slow ascent towards unity. It was on the verge of reaching the most elusive goal of all, the formation of a common European army. Had this goal been achieved France and Germany would have ceased to revolve in age-old, separate and suicidal orbits. The intelligence, the skills, the strengths of these and other great nations of Europe would no longer have been pitted against each other in senseless destructive rivalry. They would have been united for mutual benefit and for the benefit of the entire world.

This was a dream worth having and it was shared by great and small alike in Europe and in America. It was the hope of a century and it
stood on the very edge of achievement in the proposed creation of the
European Defense Community, the common European Army. But now the
dream is ending; the hope is dimming.

These results were not expected when the Secretary of State, at
the Berlin Conference last February announced that this nation had been
committed to the Geneva meeting. I say this without reflecting on the
intentions or the capacities of the Secretary of State. The Secretary is
an able and devoted public servant. Some have even waxed lyrical in
their appreciation of his exceptional qualities. It has been said, for
example, that it is "wonderful" to have at last "a Secretary of State who
isn't taken in by the Communists, who stands up to them."

I cannot hope to match such eloquence in the expression of my re-
gard for the Secretary. That he did stand up to the Communists, however, is
beyond doubt. The Secretary refused to participate in the Geneva Conference
unless Mr. Molotov agreed that the Conference would in no way
constitute American recognition of Communist China. He refused quite correctly even to accept Mr. Molotov’s word in this matter. He insisted that Mr. Molotov sign a piece of paper making clear that the Geneva meeting would in no way constitute recognition of Communist China. The Secretary fought Mr. Molotov day after day at Berlin on this issue of the piece of paper. And finally, because he had refused to be taken in by the Communists, because he had stood up to them, the Secretary triumphed. Mr. Molotov capitulated. And in a climax worthy of the best of our current television dramas, Mr. Molotov signed the piece of paper.

The Secretary is to be commended for not being taken in by the Communists, for standing up to them, for obtaining this piece of paper.

We still have the piece of paper in our archives, I presume and meanwhile the Communists have obtained at Geneva all they set out to acquire at Berlin a few months ago.
The Secretary of State was hopeful of the possible results of Geneva when he returned from Berlin to prepare for the conference.

"Berlin," the Secretary of State said on his return, "cleared the way for other things to happen."

These were prophetic words.

Berlin cleared the way for Geneva and a failure of American policy. At Geneva, international communism obtained by diplomacy what it had failed up to then to obtain by threats, bluster, propaganda, intimidation and aggression.

It obtained international stature for the Chinese Communist regime.

It obtained a firm and perhaps decisive foothold in southeast Asia.

It obtained the undermining of the cooperation of the free nations in Europe and the West. These are the visible consequences of Geneva. Beyond them are others, still only dimly seen. The repercussions of the Geneva
Conference will echo throughout the world, in events in Germany, Japan, France, North Africa and many other areas, in less-audible ways for years to come.

Geneva was a mistake; and the result is a failure of American policy. It is a profoundly humiliating result.

I do not call attention to the mistake without an appreciation of the many difficulties which confronted the Secretary of State at Berlin and Geneva. He had to deal with reluctant allies and obstinate enemies. He had to stand in the forefront and seek to negotiate a settlement for peace while others in this Administration beat the drums for war behind his back.

The job of the Secretary of State is an extraordinarily difficult one at this time. It is not made easier by those in high official positions who, by offering public statements at inappropriate moments, in effect tell him how to run it. Nor is the job made easier by those
who in contemplating his "wonderful" qualities, do so in a partisan framework which tends to encourage disunity on foreign policy at a time when the Secretary should have the widest possible support in Congress and the country.

Geneva is even now fast receding into history. Before it disappears and becomes a mere name, it is essential that we grasp the full implications of this conference because it leaves behind, in dangerous disorder, the foreign policy of the United States.

We cannot conceal this disturbing fact by a repetition of the cliches of past years. Even Yalta, which for so long has served as a substitute for facing living realities, cannot be stretched and pulled far enough out of the dim past to conceal the impact of Geneva. The attempt to do so, if I may paraphrase a lucid expression from the rich anthology of the distinguished and able majority leader, the attempt to do so is like "trying to cover an elephant with a donkey".
Even a visit from the Prime Minister of Britain and the issuance of cordial joint statements cannot conceal the fact that the policy of the United States has been gravely damaged by Geneva.

Much less can this fact be concealed by glib phrases. The dominoes are falling. The cork in the bottle has popped. The parlor-game era of foreign policy is over. Either we face this reality or we risk the commission of other errors even graver than Geneva.

All that has been done at Geneva cannot be undone. We are not, however, even at this late date, without resources. We can still have a foreign policy that will keep this nation safe and free and at peace. But we can have it only if we recognize the errors that have been made and act to correct them.

We can do nothing or worse than nothing if we cling to the illusion that television performances are a substitute for sound foreign policies;
that eleventh hour flights to foreign capitals are a substitute for carefully
cultivated, carefully maintained cooperation with friendly nations; that
strong words, even massive words, equate with a strong policy -- that they
take the place of genuine strength and conviction.

The Secretary of State used an eloquent phrase some time ago
when he spoke of an "agonizing reappraisal." Reappraisals of foreign policy
should go on continuously. The world changes and policies must be adjusted
to fit the changes. There can be only one fixed constellation in the foreign
policy of the United States: the welfare of the nation under God; the preserva-
tion of the free institutions which give us the promise of a meaningful
life.

Beneath this constellation, it is entirely proper and necessary
that reappraisals of foreign policy should go on continuously. This is a
function which normally pertains to the executive branch of the government.
If, however, the time has come for something extraordinary, for an "agonizing reappraisal" then the Senate of the United States should participate fully in it. We have a sworn constitutional duty to do so.

Out of this body can come guides which may assist the President in extricating our policies from the bog of confusion in which they now flounder.

This "agonizing reappraisal" of policy seems already to have begun. In my opinion, it has begun on a note of irresponsible partisanship. A few weeks ago, the Postmaster-General of the United States, a member of the President's Cabinet, found time from his duties of delivering the mails to deliver some political remarks in Indiana on the subject of foreign policy. He began his reappraisal by going back a decade or more in search of the causes of the loss of Indochina. He discovered these causes, like long-lost letters, in such places as Yalta, Teheran and Potsdam.
As I recall, there were resolutions introduced in Congress last year to repudiate the Yalta and other wartime agreements. The Administration, only condemnation of the violations; however, has never sought repudiation/nothing has ever come of these resolutions. Unless the Administration has changed its position, unless it now proposes to seek repudiation of these agreements, I cannot see any value in beginning a reappraisal with them. If we are to have a meaningful review of the situation in which we now find ourselves it can hardly start in the remote past. Much less can it begin with place-names like Yalta, Teheran and Potsdam, pulled out of a mail-bag.

A few days ago, in a different vein, in a responsible vein, the able majority leader raised the question of seating Communist China in the United Nations. He made clear his opposition to any such attempt with all the vehemence and eloquence of which he is capable. I have the highest regard for the sincerity and the consistency of the distinguished majority leader and I can appreciate his sentiments in this matter.
But with all due respect to the distinguished majority leader,

I do not believe that a reappraisal of policy ought to begin with an

event that has not happened. The President has not indicated, so far as

I am aware, that he is about to change the policy pursued by the previous

administration, the policy of opposing the seating of Communist China in

the United Nations. That policy has kept the Peking government of Communist

China from gaining a seat in the United Nations.

Does the President plan to change this policy? Is the
distinguished majority leader aware of such an intention? If so, it

would be most helpful if he would enlighten the Senate on this matter.

It seems to me that this agonizing reappraisal, if it is to

be useful to the nation, can only begin, not in the past, not in the

future, but in the present. To be sure, it may lead us step by step
to events in the past and it may point the way into the future. We

live, however, not in the world of yesterday or the world of tomorrow,

but in the world of today. If we wish to survive in that world, we
will do well to deal with its problems. In the realm of foreign policy, this can only mean that the agonizing reappraisal should begin with the failure of policy on Indochina and its implications.

We have got to find out what went wrong with this policy or its administration and determine the ways to prevent a repetition of the errors in the future. If we fail to do so, if we lose ourselves in the past or the future, we shall go on collecting pieces of paper signed by the Communists while they continue to fatten their influence throughout the world.

I should like to address myself first to the role of the Senate in the Indochinese situation. So far as I am aware, the Senate cooperated fully with the Administration from the very beginning of the gathering crisis. Not a single request in connection with Indochina was made by the Administration which was denied by this body or, for that matter, by the Congress.
The Administration did make requests. It made repeated requests for military and economic assistance to Indochina. These were all honored by the Senate, perhaps more liberally and more promptly than they should have been. In 1953 alone, over a billion dollars in aid was provided for Indochina on the plea of the Administration that such assistance was in the vital interests of the United States.

It is true that some members of the Senate differed on one point with the Administration. They would have preferred that the United States avoid participation in the Geneva proceedings and said so in debate. Those of us who took this position -- and there were a number of Senators on both sides of the aisle -- were not necessarily opposed to negotiations as such. Some of us were aware, however, that the free nations were divided and confused on the issue of Indochina.

Before the United States participated in a conference with the cohesive forces of communism, we wanted the division and the confusion eliminated on our side.
In the light of what has happened was this preference unfounded?

Is it not true that in the end the Administration was forced to accept the validity of this position? Did we not, for all practical purposes, abandon the Conference long ago? Could the terms of the settlement which is about to be achieved have been any less favorable if we had not become involved in the first place? On the contrary, there is reason to believe that the terms are likely to be more unfavorable than they would otherwise have been, had this country steered clear of the entire business.

The Senate, however, was not consulted on the decision to participate in the Conference. We were not, again to borrow a lucid expression from the distinguished majority leader, "in on the take-off" even though all of us and the entire nation are inevitably "in on the crash landing." Had this body been properly consulted from the outset and not simply at the last moment, it is possible that the error of participation might never have occurred.
As it was, the debate in the Senate which preceded the Geneva Conference may have helped to prevent a compounding of the error. It may have helped to prevent what, in my opinion, would have been a far more serious mistake -- armed involvement of the United States in Indochina.

Just prior to the opening of the Geneva Conference, it became apparent that persons close to the Administration had forgotten what the President had said on February 10th. On that date, he had told a conference of newsmen that:

no one could be more bitterly opposed to ever getting the United States involved in a hot war in that region (meaning Indochina) than I am.

But a short time after, some of the leading figures in the Administration began to act as though they had not heard the President. It fell to members of the Senate to inform them of what he had said. As I recall, there were many cross-currents of opinion in the debate that took place in the Senate prior to the opening of the Geneva Conference. Almost all opinions, however, converged on one point: The United States should not become involved alone in a shooting war in Indochina.
Was this an erroneous position to take? Who would quarrel with it now? Should the members of the Senate have urged the Administration, instead, to add to the unsettled conflict in Korea still another in Southeast Asia? Should the Senate have sat in silence while the Administration stumbled into the war in Indochina? Into a war without preparation, without popular support, without any concept of where it would take us or where it would end?

What would this nation have used to carry an involvement in Indochina to a decisive conclusion, even assuming that it did not lead to the atomic holocaust of World War III? I have seen one estimate which was published in U.S. News and World Report some weeks ago. It should be a reliable estimate since it is attributed to the Chief of staff of the Army, General Matthew B. Ridgway.

In this estimate, it is calculated that to have won the war in Indochina would have required 5 to 10 American combat divisions at the outset. More divisions had the French reduced their forces or had the Chinese Communists entered the conflict in force.
Where would these divisions have come from? They were not available then nor are they available now. We have a "new look" in the armed forces but we do not have new divisions. We do not even have some of the old ones. To have obtained the necessary manpower for use in Indochina would have involved, according to the estimate I have just summarized, an increase in draft calls from 25,000 to 100,000 men per month. And these men would have been sent into a conflict for which even the French were not drafting men.

I do not know whether the President himself ever seriously considered committing this nation to an armed involvement in Indochina. Nevertheless, the air around him was full of military sound and fury just prior to Geneva.

There was much talk of involvement, even though Indochina would have been in every sense "a nibbling war".

The terrain of the Indochinese conflict--the flooded deltas, the thousands of scattered villages, the jungles--is made to order for the "nibbling" of mechanized forces. The French have been nibbled and chewed for eight years.
"Nibbling wars," however, we have been told are worse than atomic wars. Yet those who have laid down this principle carried this country to the brink of engagement in the "nibbling war" in Indochina.

It may be that those who were seriously considering this course and publicly hinting at its adoption, had not seen the terrain in Indochina. Perhaps they believed that the United States could have easily obtained a victory in Indochina. Perhaps they felt that Indochina was a bargain-rate war, that the cost could be calculated, not in men's lives but in painless-sounding abstractions like naval power and air power.

But surely they must remember what happened in Korea. In Korea we were able to bring to bear the massive retaliation of naval and air power in circumstances far more favorable than those that exist in Indochina. Four years after we have no victory in Korea. We have a tenuous temporary truce.

Even this truce was not achieved with the painless-sounding abstractions of naval and air power alone. These played their part, but the enemy was convinced of the futility of his aggression only after hundreds of...
thousands of Americans and others had struggled back and forth in the mud, the snow and the blood of a war-battered land.

The truce did not come until after a grueling bitter conflict. It did not come until thousands, in the air and on the sea as well as on the land, had given their lives.

I do not say that the Administration should refrain from considering the military aspects of any international crisis with which we are confronted. Such considerations are absolutely essential in a world from which war, unfortunately, has not been banished. The Administration, however, ought not to pursue these considerations in public. We ought to be spared the ludicrous spectacle of this great nation being led to the brink of war in public statements and actions on one day and backed away from it the next. If this diplomacy of bluster and retreat is designed to confuse the enemy, it succeeds only in confusing the American people. This country has not achieved greatness under the guidance of bluffers, blusters, and buffoons. We can lose it if we cease to say what we mean and mean what we say in foreign policy.
The Senate, in debate on Indochina thought through soberly and fully the implications of involvement in Indochina. If the debate helped to turn the Administration from the course of involvement which at least at one time in the crisis, it appeared bent upon, then the debate, in my opinion, was a useful one.

Had the Administration undertaken adequate, proper and timely consultation with the Senate in this matter, it is entirely possible that a consistent American policy could have been obtained before the Indochinese situation reached the stage of crisis. In my remarks of April 14th, however, a few days before the opening of the Geneva Conference, I found it necessary to call attention to the fact that the administration has not yet seen fit to include the chairman and the ranking minority members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its trust (on Indochina policy).

Other members of Congress were consulted shortly before that time, but for some unexplained reason these distinguished members were overlooked. Several days later the error was rectified and subsequently consultation improved markedly. But by then, the damage had been done.
The Administration and presumably those who spoke for it had already scattered to the four winds such diplomatic resources which we possessed to deal with the situation. They had spoken bold but futile words. The administration had already staked our diplomacy on the hasty creation of an ill-conceived alliance for southeast Asia which refused to be born. The nation, in short, had already been gambled into an untenable position on Indochina. When the withdrawal from this position came, it left the Viet Namese and French resistance in Indochina exposed and undercut and ready for the collapse.

The consequences were inevitable. A French government which had staked its life on military aid from this country to rescue Dien Bien Phu was forced to resign. The French began to draw in their forces in the northern delta. Viet Namese nationalist troops supplied with weapons and equipment paid for by the American people began to go over to the enemy in increasing numbers, taking their equipment with them. The truce which is now being negotiated is only the last act in this tragic drama.

How did this sequence of events develop? Why were the policies of this nation gambled into virtual bankruptcy in Indochina? There is a
background to this tragedy and it began about a year ago in Indochina.

A year ago, the French devised a plan for a solution to the stalemated war of the deltas. This was the Navarre Plan. It was designed to eliminate the communist threat in Indochina and to insure the independence of the three Indochinese states of Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam.

The Navarre Plan involved certain changes in military strategy to make possible offensive rather than defensive action against the communist-led forces of the Viet Minh under Ho Chi-Minh. It involved a massive training and equipment program for the local nationalist armed forces, notably those of Viet Nam. It involved a continued French military effort in Indochina until such time as the local nationalists could themselves carry the burden of the conflict. It involved vastly expanded military and other aid for Indochina from this country.

Beyond these essential elements, the key to the plan lay in the political realm. The key, upon which success or failure turned, was the finalizing of the grant of independence from France to the three Indochinese states.
For years, the French who had gone a long way in granting independence, hesitated to turn this key. Last summer in conjunction with the request for additional aid for Indochina, we were assured that the moment of full independence was at hand. If that had been the case, then the Navarre plan offered prospects for a successful solution to the Indochinese situation. As I pointed out in a report to the Foreign Relations Committee on my return from Indochina last fall, however, the plan could not succeed unless all parts were effectively carried out and, further, that lasting success depended on still another factor which had not at that time been noted in official statements. It seemed to me that the nationalist governments of the three Indochinese states and especially that of Viet Nam had to put down firm roots in their own peoples. Only by so doing could they expect to win away the active support or at least the benevolent or fearful neutrality which at that time was held by the Communists masquerading as nationalists.
The Navarre Plan failed. It failed, not because the change in military strategy which it involved was necessarily ill-conceived. Not because the French shirked their military responsibilities. Not because American aid was inadequate.

The Plan failed because the principal nationalist leaders of Viet Nam were unable or unwilling to make the effort necessary to rally the peoples of Indochina against the Communists.

It failed because the French were unable or unwilling to take the decisive political steps which would have made the independence of Viet Nam clear-cut and unequivocal. Instead, negotiations for this purpose dragged on interminably and the precious hours which were needed to galvanize the struggle for independence slipped away. These negotiations began last year and by the time the Geneva Conference began, they were still going on inconclusively.

I think it is of the greatest significance that in the truce which is now being arranged Laos and Cambodia will probably manage to retain/independence
even though they possessed, relatively speaking, the smallest military establishments in the area. Viet Nam, whose defense forces numbered several hundred thousands and included skilled troops of the French Union has passed partially into Communist control. The answer to this apparent paradox may be found in part perhaps, in the fact that the finalizing of the independence of Laos and Cambodia was not delayed as in the case of Viet Nam. It may also be found, perhaps, in the fact that the rulers of these two countries stayed in their homelands and led their people.

Certainly, evidence that the nationalist leaders in Viet Nam were not developing roots in the populace must have been visible months ago.

Certainly the failure of the French to move decisively to grant independence to this state was evident months ago. What action did the administration take to counter these failures? Did officials in the Administration receive accurate reports on developments in the field? Did they know what was happening? If they did know, why was there no report to the Senate and the American people on the true situation? If they knew,
how is it possible to account for the optimism that seemed to prevail
almost until the last hour before the crisis? If they knew, how could the
Secretary of Defense be quoted as late as February 9th as saying "I
would think that a military victory would be perhaps both possible and
probable."

If they knew that a failure was impending, as they should have
known, why did responsible officials go on piling up military supplies and
equipment in the warehouses of Indochina? Part of these supplies are now
going to the Communists by defection of troops or abandonment, and may
very well be turned against American forces at some time in the future.

The Navarre Plan, if I may reiterate, died not from military weak-
ness but from political causes. At no time until the battle of Dien Bien Phu
did the French or the Viet Namese indicate in any way that the military
aid being supplied by this country was inadequate. They were opposed,
I believe, even to the sending of a training mission from this country.
At all times, at least until Dien Bien Phu, the France-Viet Namese forces far outnumbered the Viet Minh divisions. The non-Communists had absolute control of the air and, by far, a superiority in naval craft and heavy equipment. In these circumstances how can the failure of the Navarre Plan be attributed to anything other than political causes?

But in what fashion did the Administration react when it finally realized that the Navarre Plan was failing? It reacted as though the causes of the failure were military. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces on March 22d still insisted, in his words: "The French are going to win. It is a fight that is going to be finished with our help." This was a military answer to a political problem.

At the same time, the Secretary of State set out to seek united action in the form of the ill-dated Southeast Asia alliance. This, too, had he been successful, would have been a military answer to a political problem.

The nations which the Secretary tried to bring into the alliance were the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom.
and the Indo-Chinese states. Had the alliance been established, its power
would have rested largely on non-Asian states. It was an ill-conceived
alliance. It was based on the premise that the defense of Asian nations against
communist tyranny rests in the first instance on the West. That, in my
opinion, is a false premise. Asian freedom must be defended primarily by
Asians.

A people, whether in Asia or in the Americas, can preserve their
independence only if they have it in the first place and if they are willing to fight
to keep it. Beyond this initial responsibility which every nation must accept,
nations can combine among themselves for a joint defense of freedom. If they
are threatened by aggression, singularly or jointly, they can seek recourse
through the United Nations. But from the beginning to the end of this process of
defense, the key factor is the determination of the people of each nation to defend
their freedom. This factor was lacking in the Secretary of State's eleventh hour
attempt to set up an alliance to save Indochina.

His attempt failed and the wreckage of American policy in Southeast
Asia now lies among the ruins of the war of the deltas. We are confronted with
the urgent necessity of raising up a new, a sounder, and more durable policy for
that area.

Southeast Asia today is no less important to the security and welfare
of free nations than it was a few months ago when the Secretary of State said:

Under the conditions of today, the imposition on
Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist
Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever
means would be a grave threat to the whole free community.

As long as the threat of totalitarian aggression remains in southeast
Asia, the danger to the United States and other free nations will also remain.

The loss of part of Indochina does not diminish this danger; it increases it.

But in remaining alert to the danger in Southeast Asia we cannot
ignore other areas of great importance to our security. Southeast Asia is only
one front in the many-fronted struggle between freedom and tyranny. All of them
have a bearing on the security of the United States. We can use our strength
effectively in this many-sided conflict, only if we deploy it within this broad con-
text. In determining policies for Southeast Asia, its relative significance must
be weighed against that of other fronts.
The primary decisions in such matters rest with the President. It is his responsibility to reconstruct policies in Southeast Asia within the world-wide framework, which will serve to safeguard the nation.

It seems to me, however, that if such policies are to prove more durable than those which have been pursued in the past, they need to be constructed on certain principles. These are principles which can be found in the fundamental values of our own society as well as in the values of an awakened Asia.

I am led to make certain suggestions along these lines. I claim no originality in these suggestions. I am stating them only because I believe there is a need to consider a clear-cut course of action to end the weak, aimless drift and the futile expediency into which our foreign policy for Southeast Asia appears to have slipped. If we are to avoid precipitate action or a blind retreat in Asia, either of which might be disastrous, we must somehow re-establish guideposts to action in that area.
I make the following suggestions without in any sense regarding them as immutable. I make them with a full awareness of their imperfections and their inadequacies. I hope they will be challenged, debated, discussed and improved, but I make them now in the hope that they may help to put up the guideposts that are so urgently needed.

1. Colonialism—Chinese Communist or any other—has no place in Asia and the policies of the United States should in no way act to perpetuate it.

2. The United States should look with favor on governments in Asia which are representative of their people and responsive to their needs; but this nation should not intervene in the internal affairs of any peaceful country.

3. The defense of freedom in Asia must rest in the first instance on the will and determination of the free peoples of that region.
4. Systems of alliances for the defense of free nations in Asia against aggression must draw their primary and preponderant strength from the Asian countries; the association of the United States, if at all, with such alliances should be indirect, through the machinery of Anzus or similar combinations of non-Asian countries.

5. The United Nations should serve as the only world-wide marshalling center for resistance, in the event of aggression or threat of aggression in Asia.

6. The economic development of the nations of Asia is preponderantly the responsibility of the peoples of that region, to be pursued in accord with their individual national genius and objectives; any assistance rendered by this country, whether directly or through the United Nations or other agencies, should be peripheral in scope and should be rendered only when genuinely desired.
The erection of guideposts such as these is only one requirement for a policy that can succeed in Asia. This step will be futile unless the conduct of our foreign policy is restored to the dignity and orderliness which the people of this country have a right to expect.

What transpired in the weeks of the gathering crisis before and during the Geneva crisis came close to being a shameful spectacle. The conduct of policy in that period spread fear and uncertainty throughout this country and seriously damaged the prestige of the United States abroad.

The time has come to put a stop to the multiple voices which apparently speak for the Administration on foreign policy. One part of the Administration cannot indicate publicly that we are about to intervene in a war and then another part suggest the opposite course on the following day.

The people of this country elected a President to conduct their foreign policy, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The President can delegate his authority if he so chooses. But for the sake of the orderly processes of government, it ought to be clear to whom he has delegated it when he does so.
Presumably the President has a Secretary of State to assist him in matters of foreign policy. If that is the case, then the only official voices we should hear in these matters ought to be the voice of the President and the voice of the Secretary of State. If that is not the case, then it would be most helpful if the President would enlighten the nation as to whom and at what particular moment others are speaking in the name of this country on foreign policy.

Before concluding my remarks today, I want to say only one thing more. The Geneva Conference, I believe may mark a major turning point in the tide of world affairs. We may well be entering a period of great change and flux. The change is already suggested by the "agonizing reappraisal" which has begun and which, before it is over may lead to agonizing readjustments. In these circumstances, it seems to me that the temptation to assume an "all or nothing" posture with respect to foreign policy is ever-present. The tendency will be to blame friendly nations for all that has gone wrong. We will be tempted to insist that they play the game our way or we will pick up our marbles and go home.
If this attitude prevails, if it is the decisive one, I believe we will end up, not with "all" but with "nothing". The tremendous economic sacrifices which the people of this nation have made in the last decade will have been made in vain. The lives that were given in World War II and in Korea to construct a more orderly and decent world will have been given in vain.

If we choose the course of all or nothing, we may perhaps secure a few years respite from the international responsibilities which we have been carrying. Then, the world will once again close in on us. We will end up with nothing, nothing but our own bitterness. It has happened before.

We need not choose this course. There is another open to us. If the present reappraisal is conducted with recognition not only of immediate interests, immediate passions, but also with a sense of responsibility to the generations of Americans that will come after us, then I believe we shall take this other course. I believe we shall find much worth preserving in what has been done in the last decade, much that can be built upon. We will not obtain "all" but neither will we settle for "nothing".
The choice is ours to make. Ultimately, it is a choice between shouldering day-in and day-out a part of the responsibility -- however, burdensome and irritating -- of maintaining freedom in a world from which tyranny has not yet been banished; or of abandoning this responsibility today only to have to pick up tomorrow the crushing burden of a third world war.