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After Geneva: American Policy - Germany and Japan

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Mr. President: Throughout the spring and summer the problem of Indochina has come periodically to the attention of the Senate. It has been, perhaps, the most important question of foreign policy to arise during the 83rd Congress. From time to time I have had occasion to make observations on the subject here on the floor of the Senate. More often I have listened to others and enriched my understanding of the issues involved.

The conflict in Indochina has been stilled by the armistice recently negotiated in Geneva. This conflict is not likely to erupt again in the next few months. Nor is there much likelihood that diplomatic activity now in progress looking to the defense of Southeast Asia will lead to fruitful results in the immediate future.

The tide of international affairs is flowing on in the aftermath of Geneva, to new crests elsewhere on the globe. I would like, therefore, to address myself to the situation in two other areas, areas which in the next few months may become keys of decision in the struggle to turn back the drive of totalitarian communism. These areas are Germany and Japan.

Before doing so, however, if the Senate will bear with me for a few moments, there are some matters of conscience which I should like to set forth. In the heat of debate on the Indochina issue, some of us may have slipped
momentarily into partisanship. For the most part, however, these discussions of Indochina have represented a searching for an honest understanding of the problems which beset us in Southeast Asia and their relationship to our policies throughout the world. They have been an attempt to find answers, the best answers for the United States—not as Republicans or Democrats—but as Americans.

That, in my opinion, is as it should be. While there is no constitutional obligation to compel the majority and minority to cooperate on foreign policy. I think that the preservation of the nation urgently requires us to work together with respect to these vital matters.

I do not mean that we should agree simply for the sake of agreement, even when conscience compels us to disagree. I do say, however, that we should refrain from seeking partisan advantage out of the misfortunes which the entire nation sustains when our foreign policy misfires.

Some sought precisely that type of advantage, perhaps unwittingly, in the fall of China to the Communists several years ago. They may have gained, temporarily, from this course but the nation as a whole is still paying for their thoughtless political profit. I hope that others will not follow this example, and seek similar gain out of the collapse of policy in Indochina. The temptation to take an eye for an eye in this situation is great but it should be resisted.

Both this Administration and its predecessor have made important mistakes in foreign policy. There is no perfection in the conduct of foreign affairs anymore than in any other human activity. Nor has either party a monopoly
on the sincere devotion to the welfare of the country and the wisdom which alone
can guaranty that the policies we pursue as a nation will be the best possible
policies. It is one of the functions of debate in the Senate to bring mistakes
which may be made to light and, as far as possible, to point the way to their cor-
rection. At the same time, however, it is in the interests of the nation to
recognize that both administrations—one Democratic, one Republican—have done
their best to grapple with the present threat to us all from abroad, the threat
of international communism.

It is against this threat which we must direct our common effort
if we are to survive and prosper as a free nation. If we dissipate our strength
in petty internal dissent and fruitless name-calling we shall have little left for
deployment against the real enemy.

One of the basic aims of the Soviet Union is to divide us among our-
selves. Without realizing it, many of our own people have in effect supported
this aim. They have spoken and acted in a manner which tends to bring about an
irreparable cleavage between the two great political parties over issues of foreign
policy. Such statements and actions, if continued, can only lead to the weakening
and the ultimate ruin of the nation.

The way to avoid this catastrophe has been shown by the bi-partisan
manner in which the able and distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. Wiley)
has served as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the cooperation
he has received in this respect from the able and distinguished Senator from
Georgia (Mr. George). It has also been illuminated by the remarks of the
distinguished majority leader (Mr. Knowland) and the distinguished minority leader (Mr. Johnson of Texas). The majority leader, several weeks ago, stated that

"Neither of our great political parties has a monopoly on patriotism... Let us, here and now, Republicans and Democrats alike, recognize that there is only one group that can properly be charged with being 'the party of treason' and that is the Communist Party and the underground conspirators."

The minority leader, answering for those on this side of the aisle, replied by saying

"We are ready to meet the President and the Administration half way. As responsible men, we are ready at any time to cooperate in the preservation of our country."

These two statements contain principles of responsible leadership which set the nation's interest above the transitory interests of either party. If they prevail, the nation will be safe regardless of the perils which may beset us abroad. I trust that the integrity of these principles will be maintained in the political campaign of 1954 as they were not, unfortunately, in the political campaign of 1952.

It would be helpful if these principles were also reflected in Congressional attitudes towards the Secretary of State. Secretaries of State, traditionally, are not expected to be popular, except in historical perspective. Nor have they, I regret to say, as a rule, violated this tradition.

It is time to recognize, however, that they have made significant contributions to the welfare and security of the nation. It is time to stop making
a whipping boy out of the incumbent of this office, whoever he may be, and to recognize that his job is and will always be difficult at best. It is time to recognize that the men who have occupied the office in recent years, whether Republican or Democrat, without exception have striven with deep devotion to their duties to safeguard this nation, within the limits of their capacity and their support.

There is a legitimate scope for criticism of the Secretary of State. There is nothing sacrosanct in that office anymore than in any other in the government. But if the criticism of the Secretary stems from the search for a scapegoat, if it stems from destructive partisan purpose, then it would be better for the nation if it remained unexpressed. Growing out of motivations such as these, criticism can only serve to reduce the Secretary to impotency in the conduct of his office. It will tie his hands at a time when all his skills must be mobilized if he is to deal effectively with the treachery, the force and the trickery of the communist enemy.

With these thoughts--these bi-partisan thoughts--in mind, I should like to proceed now to a consideration of certain aspects of the international situation which are beginning to rise to the surface in the wake of the Geneva Conference. For the first time in many years, the guns are silent on every major front in the world. This unusual quiet does not signify genuine peace. While it lasts, what we have is a period of shaky and uncertain co-existence.

Some may dislike the term 'co-existence'. Some may prefer the word
'truce', or the phrase 'war without guns'. Whatever the preference in idiom, however, the fact is that we are either engaged in war in which Americans and others in considerable numbers are being killed and maimed or we are in a phase of non-war or cold war or so-called co-existence.

The danger in using the world co-existence to describe the present state of world affairs is that the co-existence may be illusory. It may be simply the lull before the storm which gives a false sense of security to some and a sense of oppressive uneasiness to others.

Co-existence in a world stalked by totalitarian communism is indeed illusory unless it is based on the utmost vigilance on our part, unless it is supported by a level of strength among the free nations that discourages aggression and the threat of aggression.

The strength to which I refer is not to be measured solely in terms of atomic and conventional military hardware on hand and ready for use. This is an important element, but strength is also compounded of many other factors. It includes the moral fiber of a people, or to put it another way, their staying power; it includes the diplomatic capacity to win and maintain the willing and active cooperation of other nations and the neutrality of still others; it includes strategic considerations; it includes economic health and vitality.

Strength in an international sense is also a relative term. It is, today, the total strength—moral, diplomatic, military, strategic and economic—of the nations linked together freely in the cause of freedom as against that of the communist bloc, marshalled under the command of Moscow. A relative gain in
any of these factors on our part means a relative weakening of the total strength of international communism. Any relative gain on their part, in any category, similarly means a weakening of our position.

For some time now, it seems to me that the relative strength of the Communist bloc has been increasing in several of the categories to which I have referred. In military preparedness, we have been cutting back and reducing our army, navy and marine corps; the Communists have been increasing theirs. According to a recent newspaper column, the communist camp now contains approximately 430 infantry divisions. On our side, I understand that in addition to our 17 army and 3 marine corps divisions, there are approximately 100 allied divisions extending from Norway through Turkey. Perhaps another 40 or 50 divisions are available in the Far East. The communists already possess formidable air power and it is increasing; they are pushing a vast naval building program. Their arsenal of atomic and hydrogen weapons is expanding rapidly as is their research in scientific developments along these lines.

To a great extent, this growth in Communist military power is based on the rapid development of industrialization, not only in Russia but in the satellites of the Soviet bloc. So great has been this development that the communists are now beginning to move into international markets in considerable force. Newspaper reports indicate that envoys from Moscow and Peking have made their appearances in capitals as far apart as Buenos Aires and Singapore, Oslo and Canberra, seeking wool, chemicals, steel, rubber, machinery and consumer goods. Similarly, many trade missions are visiting the communist capitals.
The greatest potential for a growth in the relative strength of the communists, however, seems to me to be found in the diplomatic field. In practically every major area of the world, they are on the diplomatic offensive. This is especially true in Europe and Asia. Molotov is again pressing for a consideration of a security pact in Europe, and now, after Geneva, his proposal may receive a different reception than similar proposals have obtained in the past.

On the other end of the Moscow-Peking axis, Chou En-lai is attempting to charm the countries of Asia into similar so-called security arrangements aimed at the United States. In view of India's progressive estrangement from this country in recent months, the activities of the Chinese Communist foreign minister contain implications of the most serious nature.

There are great stakes involved in the diplomatic struggle that is now in progress. Here it is not a matter of a few resources, a few strategic positions and a reluctant people being seized by the Communists and dragged into their camp. In this diplomatic struggle, the willing allegiance or the benevolent neutrality of entire nations is involved.

The Communists are striving, by a combination of diplomacy and economic enticements, to drive the free nations further and further apart and to draw as many of them as possible into their orbit or into an intermediate stage of neutralism. The greater their success in this drive, the more inadequate our relative strength becomes, and the more illusory the shaky co-existence that rests upon it.
If this drive goes unchecked by the counter-forces of freedom, then it seems to me that one of two possible results may be expected. A third world war will take place at some time in the not too distant future when the illusion of co-existence dissolves; or the world will witness the gradual surrender without struggle of most of the free nations to totalitarianism.

It is a grim prospect which confronts us and because it is so grim, I want to call to the attention of the Senate, the situation in two areas in which I believe a decisive test of the Soviet diplomatic drive will come. I refer to the countries of Germany and Japan.

These two nations possess powerful sinews of strength of the kind I have previously described. Vast, literate and capable populations give them an enormous military potential. Advanced industrial establishments supply them with great economic and scientific power. Situated, as they are, on the western and eastern fringes of the sprawling communist empire, they have incalculable strategic importance.

Western Germany and Japan are presently linked to the free nations by ties which evolved out of the military occupations following World War II. In the case of Germany, these are still ties of inequality; in the case of Japan, they are ties between sovereign equals. In both cases, however, situations have developed which could bring about a severance of the ties and thrust Germany and Japan into neutral positions or even into close relationships with the communist powers.
These developments have not come about suddenly, although they appear now to be approaching a climax with great rapidity—especially in Germany. As long ago as 1949, however, they were beginning to become evident. I visited Germany in that year and reported to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on my return as follows:

West Germany, in spite of the difficulties it has faced in the postwar years, is on the way up... Although Germany is at the present time in a very weak position with two separate governments... it is potentially the strongest nation in Western Europe... Germany is, in my opinion, the big prize which the U.S.S.R. now wants and, if necessary, she can and perhaps will offer the Germans some of the lands which have been taken away from them and are now occupied by Czechoslovakia and Poland. This, plus the creation of a Russian-dominated East German army, plus the Russian championship of a united Germany—on Russian terms—poses a difficult problem for the West.

That was the situation five years ago. The same situation, intensified, exists today. It is intensified, I believe primarily because of a possible change in Soviet tactics with respect to Germany. The Russians may now be on the verge of offering important concessions, economic and political, to the Germans. They may be prepared to do so on the basis of one or two principal conditions: (1) that the Germans abandon their plans for participating in the integration of the defense of Western Europe; and (2) that the military forces of East Germany, Russian-trained and equipped, be incorporated into the defense structure of a united Reich. In connection with this latter condition, the role of Former Field Marshall Friedrich von Paulus will bear watching. He is the General who surrendered at Stalingrad and subsequently was director of the schools established in Russia to
reindoctrinate German war prisoners.

If the Russians intend to act along these lines, then the appeal of national unity may well prove irresistible to the German people; it may lead them, in present circumstances, away from the West.

Under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Western Germany has accepted the course of western European integration first and national unity later. The Germans have accepted this course in preference to one of national unity, Soviet-style, and absorption into the Communist bloc at the same time. There are signs, however, that Germany may be faltering. Recent local elections suggest a growing strength on the part of those political parties which favor immediate unification, parties which believe they can maintain a kind of German neutralism by restoring relations with Moscow and by returning to the pre-war Locarno treaty system. Two pre-war German chancellors, Dr. Heirrich Bruening and Dr. Hans Luther, have now openly aligned themselves against Adenauer's policies and in favor of this misleading alternative. The recent defection of Dr. Otto John, the security chief of Western Germany, may also be indicative of deep and disturbing political currents. Significant concessions from the Soviet Union at this juncture may be enough to swing the Germans away from the West.

There are dangerous trends in Germany today. In my view, they have developed because of the interminable delays in restoring full sovereignty to Western Germany and in establishing the European Defense Community. E.D.C. promised, at one time, to cap the movement towards western European unity which began in the early postwar years. E.D.C. offered both assurances...
against the return of German militarism and security for Germany against the expanding communist empire. It also promised to provide an avenue for German participation, as an equal in the defense of the west, so that our share in that defense might be reduced.

Months and years have elapsed since French genius produced E. D. C. But E. D. C. still waits on French acceptance. In the meantime the hope for integration slips away. Germany remains in a position of frustrating political inequality. The burden of its defense continues to fall on the occupation forces of the United States, Britain and France.

The Germans are not likely to acquiesce for much longer in their present uncertain and inferior status. They have made a fantastic recovery from the war and now have the most powerful and dynamic economy on the mainland of Western Europe. They are in a position to listen to and to bargain with the East.

After returning from Europe in 1951, I reported to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives that:

In any defense plan for Western Europe, West Germany must be an integral and substantial part. We must meet the West Germans at the council table and decide what part they will accept as their share in men, money, and equipment in the defense of Western Europe...(The Germans) should be allowed to rearm in their own defense and we should recognize West Germany as an equal.

That was, in my view, the need three and a half years ago. It is an even more urgent need now. Senate Resolution 295 which passed by a vote of 88 to 0 just a few days ago indicates the sentiment of this body with respect to restoring equality to Germany and securing their participation in the joint defense of the
free nations of the West. I believe the Administration should act quickly, in
every practicable way, to give meaning to this resolution. It should act by the
end of this month if E.D.C. is not ratified by France. If E.D.C. is ratified by
the French Parliament by the end of this month -- and if Italy joins in -- then
German sovereignty will be restored and German rearmament can begin.

There is very little time left. The next few months may well
reveal whether the Germans are to remain linked with the free nations or go their
separate way, a way which, in all probability, will lead sooner or later into the
totalitarian camp.

On the other side of the globe, in Japan, a second dangerous crest is
developing in the international situation. The causes are not identical with those
in Germany but they are just as serious.

Unlike Germany, Japan has national unity. Full political sovereignty
has been restored to the Japanese. They have been permitted to rearm in their
own defense and are now in the process of doing so.

These factors in the situation, however, are dwarfed by the towering
economic problems which confront Japan. To put these problems bluntly: if
freedom is to survive in Japan and if there is to be peace in eastern Asia, the
Japanese must know with reasonable assurance where the next meal is coming
from. At the present time, they do not know.

To live as a free, peaceful neighbor in the Pacific, Japan must
literally fish and trade. The Japanese have been able to do neither, adequately,
since the end of World War II. The resultant deficit in their economy
has been compensated for by the United States. We provided heavy doles under
the occupation. More recently, we have made up the deficit largely by
expenditures in Japan incident to the Korean conflict and our strategic interests
in the western Pacific.

The Japanese must turn somewhere if they are not to continue to
depend for existence on an uncertain charity or temporary palliatives like
military procurements which, in any event, are beginning to shrink. Trade
outlets in northern Asia and on the Chinese mainland, however, are blocked by
Communist control of these areas as well as by the policies of this country and
the United Nations. These are the traditional avenues of Japanese trade. Efforts
to develop substitutes for them elsewhere have not yet met with notable success.

A government of a free nation cannot expect to remain long in power,
if it can hold out no hope to its people other than slow starvation or unending
dependence on alien hand-outs. The Yoshida government in Japan has been on
the whole cooperative with the United States. It is, however, a Japanese govern-
ment. It will either have to pursue policies which correspond with the needs
of the Japanese people or it will be replaced.

Japan is now aligned with the free nations but the alignment will
grow more uncertain and tenuous under the pressures of economic realities.
Unless concerted steps are taken to meet these realities, where are the
Japanese to turn for survival? There is no reason to assume that, as a
sovereign independent nation, they will not turn away from the present alignment.
There is no reason to assume that they will not veer towards Communist China, towards the Soviet Union or both.

If international communism seeks to sever the ties which presently hold Japan on the side of freedom, it is not without resources to obtain this objective. Vast trading inducements can be offered, particularly with respect to the Soviet Maritime provinces, Manchuria and North China. There are fishing and other concessions which could be made available in and around Sakhalin and the Kuriles. Rice, coal and other resources, desperately needed by Japan, can come from northern Viet Nam.

It is entirely possible that the Communists would be inclined to act with a relatively lavish and open hand if they might expect in return a growing Japanese neutralism and ultimate incorporation of Japan into their system.

There are measures which can be taken in concert with others which may forestall the loss of Japan to totalitarianism. In this connection, the Administration has recently announced that it is exploring the possibilities of closer relationships being developed between Japan, Korea and Formosa. Other possibilities may exist for increasing Japan's trade with non-communist nations particularly in Southeast Asia and in Japanese participation in technical assistance programs in the underdeveloped areas.

Japan can be held in the camp of freedom, provided that this country and other free nations do not ignore the serious predicament in which the Japanese find themselves; provided we act together and in time to deal with it.
The weeks and months that lie ahead, weeks and months in which
the Senate will stand in recess or adjournment, will be dangerous and difficult
ones. We are entering into a period in which the President and the Secretary of
State may be called upon to make major decisions, not only with respect to
Germany and Japan but also in connection with other areas of the world.

I think that the President and the Secretary should know that the
Senate is cognizant of the burden they bear in conducting our foreign policy and
that members of both parties will support them as far as conscience permits.

After the setback at Geneva, a sense of renewed unity on foreign
policy may be reasserting itself in this country. For a period, at the time of
the truce, we were threatened by a wave of partisanship. But the nation may
now be drawing closer together in the face of adversity.

There is already a framework of agreement shared by Democrats
and Republicans alike on which bipartisan policies can be maintained and
developed. There is, for example, little party disagreement on these current
courses of action:

1. No intervention by American armed forces in Indochina.

2. No recognition of Communist China by the United States
   and no admittance of Communist China to the United Nations.

3. No Locarno pact with the communists for southeast Asia.

4. The continued need for a European Defense Community.

5. The granting of sovereignty to west Germany together
   with its right to participate in the defense of Western
   Europe.
Within this framework, we can pursue policies which will build greater strength in the non-communist world -- not solely military but moral, diplomatic and economic strength as well. We can act to maintain the level of the total strength of freedom in the world, at all times, far in excess of that of international totalitarianism. We have the means to do so, if we have the will.

If we are successful we can have more than an illusory co-existence which means running away in fear from every threat of a fight, an illusion which can and will be shattered at the whim of the communist totalitarian bloc. We can have more than the futility of a third world war precipitated by the hotheads among us who by some twisted reasoning believe that the way to stop a war is to act the part of the bully and start one. We can have, if we work consistently and without fanfare to build genuine strength, the peace we seek, a peace without fear, a peace of stability and of faith in the ultimate triumph of human freedom.