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Germany and the Future of Europe

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GERMANY AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE
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In the interim between the rejection of the European Defense
Community by the French parliament and the London-Paris Conferences,
I had a conversation with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in Germany. Mr.
Adenauer made a significant comment in discussing the collapse of EDC,
a comment which he has since repeated in public. "The best Europeans,"
the Chancellor said somewhat despairingly, "live in the United States."
The remark expressed the disappointment of many dedicated Europeans at
the failure of EDC. It was also an acknowledgement of the strenuous but
unsuccessful efforts of this country to secure its acceptance.

It seems to me that the observation, pointed as it is, obscures one
important fact. Removed as we are from the fears and pressures of the
continent, it is easier to be a dedicated "European" in the United States.
It is easier to ask and even to ask with some impatience, "Why don't they
get together?" It is as easy as a member of Congress urging the elimination
of the tariff on wool, provided his district is in the city of New York.
I am afraid, therefore, that I must take issue with Chancellor Adenauer's observation. His great contribution to the cause of western unity in itself, is evidence that the best Europeans live not in the United States, but in Europe.

If that were not the case the future would hold little promise for the free nations. For it is in Europe that there has unfolded one of the principal challenges to freedom in our times. It is in Europe that it must be faced and it is primarily by Europeans that it must be overcome.

The challenge is the challenge of unity. The nations of Western Europe are confronted with the necessity of developing a pattern of progressive integration within the larger but looser unity of the North Atlantic Community. If Western Europe does devise such a pattern, we may look forward to an era of peace and material progress and we may anticipate a steady growth of those concepts of the freedom of man which give meaning and dignity to human life.
If Western Europe fails, however, the future promises little more than an extension of the decade of fear through which we have just passed.

Sooner or later, in the years ahead lies inevitable war, an age of chaos and an enlargement of the totalitarian void which already spreads over vast areas of the globe. It is possible that the price of failure may even be the extinction of human life itself.

I have deliberately stated the challenge to Europe in the positive terms of unity rather than in terms of defense against the communist threat as it is usually defined. I do so with a full awareness of the destructive implications of communism. Few movements in history have been more erosive of the foundations of our civilization.

The growth of totalitarian communism, however, is more a measure of the weakness of the free nations, particularly in Western Europe, than of the inherent strength of the Communist ideology. I think it essential to recognize and to emphasize this distinction. Failure to do so, is to concede the superiority of totalitarianism over freedom as a motivator of man-kind, a concession which I, for one, cannot make.
Communism has intensified the need for European integration within the larger community of free nations. It has highlighted the challenge of unity that confronts the west. But only a dangerous mis-reading of history would suggest that communism created the need. Even if communist pressures should abate, as they well may do for the moment, the urgent necessity for unity would remain.

Twice in this century, our civilization has skirted the edge of doom. Twice our heritage has been tossed recklessly into the fires of war. Both conflicts began within Western Europe and both spread great damage in that region. Communism fed on these conflagrations. After the wars had burned themselves out, the communists probed among the charred and smoking ruins. They tore down nations and ideals which had been severely weakened by the conflicts; some might have been salvaged had they not been subjected to this second onslaught. That is the destructive role which communism occupies in the contemporary world and we must not lose sight of it. By the same token, however, it is essential not to permit this destructiveness to
obscure the fact that the greatest damage to the free nations has been largely self-inflicted. It has resulted from their own inner disunity, and particularly the disunity of the Western European region.

Both great wars of this century, in the first instance were attempted suicides on the part of Western Europe. The critical danger of communism came after, not before, these massive assaults which the region launched upon itself. And only as a way is found to cope with tendencies of this kind will the free nations develop real security against communism and other forms of totalitarianism.

The most dangerous of these tendencies is associated with the inability of modern Germany to find a stable place in the common destiny of Western Europe. Many explanations have been offered for this phenomenon. Historians have attributed it to the policies of the Germans, the French and the British and to numerous other causes. Regardless at what door or doors responsibility is laid, however, there can be little doubt that this failure more than any other has gnawed at the vitals of our civilization during the last half century.
It is to this problem, the problem of Germany's place in the European community that I wish to address the main body of my remarks tonight. More specifically, I want to consider with you the solution to the problem which is proposed in the recent London-Paris accords. On this solution hinges the future of Europe and, in a larger sense, the fate of all the free nations.

The London-Paris accords are primarily mechanisms by which Western Germany is to be brought into the Western European and North Atlantic communities on what is hoped will be a stable and enduring basis. In this respect, in principal objective, they do not differ substantially from the EDC. The differences that do exist are essentially those of method and degree of integration. In the present accords, the links are not as tight as were contemplated in the EDC. They are not as clearly the ties of a supranationalism.

The retreat from that ideal has been deplored by many in Europe and in this country. It is understandable that men of the caliber of Speak of
Belgium and Schuman of France who had done so much to further Europeanism should be deeply disappointed by this development. The concept, however, is not dead and will not die. Europeanism is a force which will make itself felt in everything that happens in Europe. But Europeanism, like all great ideals, to grow strongly must be rooted in the acceptance of the people who are to live by it. And the simple fact is that European integration of the depth and degree contemplated in EEC was not possible at this time.

At the London-Paris Conferences, therefore, a shattered promise of far-reaching unity was exchanged for a new promise of lesser dimensions. In substituting the recent accords for the EEC, the Europeans did not abandon the ideal of Europeanism nor did they give up anything which had actually been achieved towards its realization. The retreat, if it may properly be called that, was from a hope not an actuality. Viewed in this light, the present agreements are not necessarily a step away from unity. They may yet prove to be a step towards it.
The speed with which the London-Paris accords were reached after the rejection of MAC is a tribute to the Europeanism of the present leaders of the continent and particularly to Adenauer, Eden and Mendes-France. It is also striking evidence of the vitality of the European idea. Most significant, perhaps, it may indicate widespread recognition in Europe that the time to move positively towards integration is now or never.

Under the terms of the London-Paris accords the people of Western Germany will regain sovereignty and so achieve co-equal national status with the other free nations of Europe. Western Germany will adhere to the Brussels Treaty of 1948, thereby becoming a full-fledged member of the Western European community. The Germans will also enter directly into the larger grouping of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Each of these provisions is an interlocking part of a grand design. Taken together they hold the promise of providing a stable and more permanent place for Germany in the Western world.
Also involved in the design, however, is the rearment of Western Germany. This question, more than any other, has heretofore stood in the way of the integration of Western Europe. To put the problem bluntly, many Europeans including Germans have had doubts as to the wisdom of German rearment. These are not solely "Communists doubts," the purposes of which are clear—to keep Western Germany defenseless and ripe for totalitarian absorption. They are for the most part the doubts of sincere people who in this generation have learned first-hand to associate the appalling devastation of war with a militant Germany on the march. The grim reminders of this association are still to be seen in many cities of Europe. A decade of rebuilding has not fully obliterated the scars of war.

From our vantage point in the United States we should not dismiss such fears lightly. It is to the credit of the European countries that in spite of these fears they have recognized the more immediate and overwhelming menace of Soviet expansionism. They have understood that a disarmed
Germany is a greater danger to peace than a Germany with some capacity to defend itself.

In the London–Paris accords, Western Europe now has a plan for West German rearmament with certain safeguards. A new German national army of 500,000 men will join those of other continental powers under the NATO commander in the common defense of the west. Western Germany pledges never to employ these forces to change existing frontiers or to achieve unification with eastern Germany.

There are technical safeguards against a resurgent German militarism in these accords which take the form of maximum level of forces and prohibitions on the manufacture of certain types of offensive armaments in Germany. Perhaps the most significant deterrent however, is that provided by the United Kingdom. The British have committed 4 divisions and a tactical airforce to the mainland of Europe. In doing they have clearly bound their future with that of the continent for the first time in centuries. It was a transcendent decision and they made it courageously and unequivocally.
For the first time in modern history the three great powers in the core of Europe—the United Kingdom, Germany and France—will be linked in specific arrangements for the common defense. These ties are reinforced by the pledges of continuing concern in Europe’s future which the President and Secretary of State have made on behalf of this country. Partnership.

I am glad to say, is now the keynote in our relations with the Western European countries.

That, in bare outline is the substance of the London-Paris accords.

In part, the significance of the agreements lies in the provision they make for the creation of 12 German divisions. I do not mean to suggest that this increase in the armed power of Western Europe will be decisive in discouraging a massive Soviet assault on that area. The deterrent to aggression of this type remains, as it has been since the end of World War II, the superiority of the total strength of the free nations as against that of the Soviet bloc. In this broad equation of power, the German divisions will not make a substantial difference, for total strength is measured not only in conventional military factors, but in atomic, economic, diplomatic and others as well.
In many ways we have been prepared for a decade to deal with a massive Soviet assault, a test of total strength. In the present Administration the phrase "instant retaliation" has been coined to describe at least the atomic aspect of these preparations. But while the Communist advance has continued in a confounding fashion, there has not been a situation in which to retaliate instantly.

What is the explanation of this dilemma? It is simply that the pattern of postwar Soviet expansionism has not been by massive assault which we have spent billions in preparing to meet. Rather, the pattern has been, as I mentioned previously, an expansion by scavenging among war-weakened nations. It is an advance carried out largely, not by Russian soldiers—few have died in combat since the end of World War II—but by millions of the disinherited, the discontented and the driven of many lands who have been caught up in the growing web of international communism.

It is with this kind of an advance that we have had the greatest difficulty in coping in the past and it is evident that the Soviet Union had
hoped to employ the same techniques throughout a war-devastated Germany.

The chosen instruments were the satellite government in the eastern zone and the German communist party. Both have failed miserably in their mission. In the eastern zone, the Berlin riots of 1953 suggest that the very existence of the satellite government depends upon Russian bayonets. In Western Germany, the remarkable recovery from the war appears to make the area increasingly invulnerable to communists tactics of erosion and infiltration.

There is, however, in the East German communist army and police still another potential instrument of communist advance. It is in deterring a sudden coup by this force of 250,000 armed men in a Korean-type internal aggression, that the proposed West German divisions can be most effective.

In this limited sense and in linking the German divisions with NATO, the London-Paris accords add to the military bulwark against further communist penetration of Western Europe. Important as this contribution may be, however, it is not the principal promise of the agreements.
I began my remarks tonight by stressing that the issue facing Western Europe and in a broader sense other free nations is the positive challenge of unity. It is in this connection that the London-Paris accords may eventually make their most significant contribution. The agreements of course must first be ratified. Ratification alone, however, is not enough. They must be carried out with some sense of the cooperation and national forebearance that characterized their formation.

If these conditions are fulfilled, then the accords can and should lead first towards a unified Germany. No issue in Germany is more compelling. It has so far been held in reasonable perspective by the leadership of Chancellor Adenauer. Even during the difficult months of drift on the ratification of EDC, Adenauer insisted that a united Germany before firm ties had been established with Western Europe could mean only a satellite Germany. He stood firm in the face of mounting political pressure on the principle of first things first.
Once the London-Paris agreements have been ratified, however, it may be expected that the demands for unification will grow rapidly inside Germany. Unification will inevitably become the primary objective of any sovereign German government. It is a valid objective, as valid today as in the days of Bismark. The reasons why it must be sought are sound in a political, economic and moral sense. Until it is achieved, there can be little hope of stability in Europe.

What is of primary concern to Western Europe and to this country is the way unification is pursued. We have a right to insist that the Germans seek their unification peacefully and patiently, with full recognition that what is at stake is not only their own future but the future of the entire continent; in short, that they continue to follow the course which has been set by Adenauer.

So long as they do so, the West Germans warrant the full support of Western Europe and ourselves in their quest for unification with their eastern provinces. Nor is it sufficient in our policies to pay lip service to the principle of unification. It must be clear to the German people that
the western nations are prepared to go far in settling this issue with
the Soviet Union. All proposals should be explored which offer promise
that a unified Germany shall be a peaceful and independent Germany able to
participate in the common development of Europe and to cooperate with free
nations everywhere.

So far the Soviet Union has shown no inclination to negotiate German
unification on these terms. This does not mean that the objective must
be abandoned. Nor does it mean that the only alternative to its abandonment
is a western equivalent of the Communist war of "liberation" to regain the
eastern provinces.

It is possible that the Soviet Union may be impelled to accept genuine
German unification by a rising tide of public insistence in Germany and by
other pressures. A development of this kind however, will not come easily.
It is likely to appear only if the policy of the West German government
and the Western powers with respect to unification is just, restrained and
compassionate.
In the pursuit of such a policy, time can be on the side of the free nations. There are indications that the weight of disunity, disillusion and discontent is being felt on the communist side. That this is so is suggested, for example by the Berlin voting last year and the incessant flow of refugees. So long as a high rate of economic, political and social progress is maintained in the western zone, it is bound to act as an attraction to those Germans living in the east and the difficulties of the Soviet Union in maintaining totalitarian control over them will multiply. A situation could develop where the Soviet pattern of advance into weakness may operate in reverse. The Russians may be compelled to withdraw from the eastern zone and permit unification not because of military pressure from outside but because of the crumbling of their position from within.

It is possible that the Russians may risk the resurgence of German militarism rather than face the inevitable prospect of a unified Germany integrated with Western Europe. If they choose this course, they are in a position to make important economic, territorial and other concessions.
to the Germans. Moreover, they could withdraw their occupation forces and expand the nucleus of German militarism which already exists in the East German communist army. They could, in other words, offer Germany a unification with real nationalistic inducements and ask in return only that the Germans separate themselves from Western Europe.

I do not know if a Soviet attempt of this kind to split the Western nations and lay the groundwork for a new world conflict would succeed. It would depend, I suppose, ostensibly on the German people since they would make the final decision for unity or chaos, for peace or ultimate war. The decision, however, would not occur in a vacuum. It would be governed by many factors none more significant than the London-Paris accords.

That is a principal reason why these agreements must be something more than an ingenious device to create 12 German divisions against a Soviet advance. They must begin at once to fulfill their larger promise, the promise of progressive European integration within the larger grouping of the North Atlantic community.
Under the agreements immediate progress in this direction will have been made in the integration of the military power of the Western European nations and of the members of NATO. It is essential to perfect these military relationships but that alone is not enough. The hope of free men is not only to die together in the defense of freedom if that should be necessary but to live together in its light.

In this sense, the challenge of unity is much broader than integrated military defense. It means a deepening of the integration of the Western European nations in the economic field, in the political field, in all matters in which governments can better serve their citizens by working together rather than separately. It means, above all, a willingness to face common problems together and to work together with national restraint in their solution. The need for an approach of this kind is urgent in Western Europe; it is necessary throughout the western world; it is desirable with all nations who are free to cooperate wherever they may be on the globe.

On my return from Europe several months ago, I reported to the Foreign
Relations Committee of the Senate that the immediate need was for a series of special economic conferences which might serve to define boldly and clearly the economic problems which must be overcome if the nations of Western Europe and the North Atlantic Community are to maintain sound economies, and to lay the groundwork for their solution. I reiterate that view tonight.

In doing so, I am aware that most free nations are in a relatively prosperous state, but that is precisely the time to act to avert a collapse. And an economic collapse could be the shoal on which the hope for unity would flounder.

What, then, if this challenge of unity is met? Where does it lead?

If this challenge is met we shall see, in my opinion, an end to the erosion of western civilization. We shall see a vast growth in the strength of free nations built not primarily on a military base, but on the power of their creative accomplishments and the power of their ideals to inspire the faith of mankind. We shall see a positive but patient leadership in the world, a leadership of free men who will not concede that any part of the
human race, regardless of its present status is forever beyond the reach of liberty. We shall see, in short, the beginning of a new cycle and I trust a peaceful cycle, in the never-ending struggle between tyranny and freedom. This cycle will belong to freedom.