BEYOND FORMOSA

During recent years the United States has been confronted with a succession of crises in Asia. None has been more complex than the one which we now face in Formosa. I should like to begin this discussion therefore by reviewing the background of our present involvement in that region.

When the Chinese Communists came to power on the mainland in 1949, the government of the Republic of China moved to Formosa. The United States continued to recognize that government and only that government. Since the outbreak of communist aggression in Korea, almost five years ago, our military forces have been committed to preventing the Chinese Communists from seizing Formosa. This policy, instituted by former President Truman, has had the continuing support of Congress. It has also had the overwhelming support of both great political parties.

Last year, in December, the Secretary of State concluded a defense treaty with the Republic of China which had the effect of formally acknowledging this policy. For some reason, which in my opinion has never been satisfactorily explained, the President saw fit not to wait for the Senate's consent to ratification of that treaty. Instead, in the interim, he sent to the Congress a joint resolution on the Defense of Formosa. The resolution neither added to nor subtracted from the terms of the defense treaty which was subsequently ratified.

In debating the Formosa Resolution in the Senate there was no question of the determination of that body that Formosa should be defended. That was
never at issue. The debate, rather, centered on two other questions. One was the question of whether Congress should endorse in advance a possible American military action in the Formosan Straits and on the Chinese mainland, acts over which Congress could have no control and the validity of which it could have no way of determining. I stated at the time that in my judgment under the Constitution only Congress had the power to declare war but that short of war the President had powers to act as Commander-in-Chief and in the execution of foreign policy. I further stated that his powers and his responsibility in the latter connection could not be diluted, obscured, transferred, or divided, resolutions of Congress to the contrary notwithstanding. After the President gave assurances, in effect, that he alone would assume responsibility for any use of force in the Formosan region, without a declaration of war, the resolution was accepted by the Senate. Had we not had those Presidential assurances, that resolution would have been an open invitation to irresponsibility and might very well have been rejected by the Senate.

The second side-issue in the Formosan debate was the relation of the coastal islands of the Quemoys and the Matsus to the safeguarding of Formosa. In this discussion the Senate was attempting to place the defense of the coastal islands -- in the perspective of our national interests rather than those of the Chinese nationalist government. In consequence, it was clear by the time the resolution passed that Congress supported the defense of Formosa and nothing more. We were not approving any military crusade on the mainland of Asia or any defense of the off-shore islands for the sake of the off-shore islands. I know
that my own vote was cast with that understanding and I so stated. Many other
members of the Senate expressed similar sentiments.

The responsibility for carrying out the defense of Formosa -- and it is
a heavy burden -- remains the responsibility of the President. It seems to me
that the best way that Americans can lighten that burden is by refraining at this
time from attempts to whittle away at his responsibility. The President is
entrusted with the defense of Formosa. It is for him to decide whether to defend
the coastal islands or to engage our forces in their defense. He is accountable
to the American people for whatever action he may or may not take. But to
attempt to tie his hands now, in advance, either for or against their defense,
will serve only to deepen the difficult crisis in which we find ourselves.

It is unfortunate, in my opinion, that the Formosan resolution, if it
had to come to Congress at all, came in the vague fashion that it did. Once
having been made public, however, Congress was faced with little alternative
but to accept it in that form or weaken the President's position in dealing with
the Far Eastern crisis.

My concern today is not with predicting the outcome of the Formosan
crisis. I do not know whether the vagueness of our position on the coastal
islands will either avert war or plunge us into war. No one can make a meaning-
ful prediction of that kind. I believe that remains the case despite the growing
prospects of peace talks between the United States and the Communists. These
talks, in my opinion, should not be ruled out but they should be approached with
the greatest caution,
I would address the main body of my remarks today to the proposition that the difficult situation in which we find ourselves, respecting the Quemoys and the Matsus is merely an external symptom of our problems in the Far East. The underlying causes for these problems are to be found in forces and pressures which exist inside the body of Asia. They are also to be found in pressures and forces which are exerted from outside Asia. If there is to be peace in that part of the world -- if there are to be long-term solutions in Asia, it is to these causes that our attention must be turned. It is of importance that we understand not only what these forces are but what happens in Asia when the pressures from outside the Continent collide with those from within. In particular it is of importance that the role of military force in our policy in Asia be examined -- not so much from the standpoint of its use as an ultimate recourse in war but its role as a deterrent before war breaks out. That is the way we have been called upon to use it, except in Korea, since the end of World War II.

The crisis in the Formosan Straits is not an isolated incident. It is part of a chain reaction identified with last year's crisis in Indochina and before that with the crisis in Korea. In dealing with the crisis in Formosa our attention is easily diverted from developments which next year may result in a crisis in Laos, Thailand and Indonesia. By the following year, if not sooner, the crisis of Japan may be full upon us.

The inter-related problems in Asia include the conspicuous threats of communist territorial expansion, in Korea, Indochina, and Formosa. It also is interwoven, however, with less-evident threats. There is pressure within Japa
for an expansion of trade. To the extent that this pressure seeks an outlet in
closer economic and cultural relations with the Chinese mainland, it affects
the unity of policy among members of the free world with respect to Communist
China. There is also a mounting pressure among the so-called neutral states
of South Asia for peaceful relations with Communist China. The attitude of
these states towards developments in Formosa must be seen in the context of
that broader consideration. In considering the totality of our situation in Asia,
moreover, we cannot ignore the possibility that the outbreak of hostilities in
the Chinese coastal islands could signalize a resumption of hostilities in Korea
and Indochina. Finally, behind the complex of these factors in Asia we must
also reckon with the relationship between the actions of Communist China and
the policy of the Soviet Union.

During recent years we have been attempting to deal with these various
pressures largely by economic and military means and sometimes in a seemingly
disconnected fashion. We have contributed to the economic development of the
free countries of Asia. We have attempted at the same time to strengthen the
defenses of the free-Asian countries. These positive efforts have been dimmed,
however, by the recurrent crises. From the Korean crisis we rushed too late
to Indochina to quench a fire which had spread beyond control. We now have
rushed to the fire in Formosa. We may be blinded by the glare in Formosa to
the fire which is being kindled in Japan. We have exercised in recent years a
kind of "chain reaction" diplomacy, a kind of crisis-foreign policy. We have
jumped from the effects of one crisis to its successor. We have, in short, never
been ahead of the game. That the crises continue to occur seems to me evidence that either our positive measures have been insufficient or the situation has been beyond our control by measures which we could support at that time. I think it is probably a little of both. There are limits to what we can do to control the flow of events in Asia, short of war and even with war.

That does not mean our answer is to pick up our marbles and go home. Asia is too important to us, to our security and to our other national interests to permit that kind of response. That would simply amount to postponing the day of reckoning.

We have not exhausted our possibilities of dealing with the situation when we employ measures of economic aid and military aid. It seems to me we have overlooked another which costs far less and yet can be more far-reaching in its effect.

That ingredient I believe lies in the realm of attitudes and ideas. I am not talking about psychological warfare which holds that you can win with tricky words and slick advertising slogans battles which cannot be won with infantry rifles. I think the lesson of the unleashing of Chiang has put to rest that fallacious concept. But if the battle in Asia is essentially a struggle of ideas it is in the spirit as well as in the economic and military arena wherein peace and long term solutions may possibly be found.

What I am suggesting is that we examine the Asian attitudes or states of mind which give rise to many of the basic pressures with which we must deal. I am suggesting, too, that we examine Asian reactions to our own state
of mind and our actions. Perhaps, then, we will find some of the answers to the peace we seek. Such answers will not lead to a purchased peace, or a power peace. They could, however, lead to a peace based on mutual understanding and common interest.

We have grown too accustomed to wrapping all the ills of Asia into the single package marked "militant communism". Of course this threat exists; we have seen over 500 million Chinese brought under the potential influence of that ideology. Countless millions more are threatened with it. We have spent blood to prevent the conquest of Korea by communist aggression. Too late, we saw Vietnam north of the 17th parallel brought within the orbit of communism. We have seen militant communist expansionism accompanied by political penetration, by organized propaganda, by the activities of disciplined cadres of intimidators and by calculated economic penetration. Military offensives have been alternated with the allurements of the peace offensive with its offers of trade, industrialization and cultural exchanges. Today in Free Vietnam we see Vietminh agents using blackmail, bribery and intimidation in attempting to undermine the Diem government. We see the Communist created shadow government of Pathet Lao in northern Laos and another communist penetration headed by a former Premier of Thailand, Pridi, in Southeast Asia. We see the new maps of China which brazenly incorporate territory from its southern neighbors. We see new military highways under construction in south China. In Indonesia the Communist party has recently been reorganized and its activities accelerated. The trade offensive directed at Japan is beginning to cause a wavering in that
country. In North Korea the truce has been violated and the area has been placed within a stranglehold of Communist control. And now, the Communist sword is pointed at Formosa. It is all too evident that militant communism is a force in Asia. But why, we may well ask ourselves, has it not met with more resistance? Why hasn't Asian nationalism which in great measure was stimulated by our own revolution interposed a more formidable bulwark to the communist advance? We have assumed in recent years that by taking measures to alleviate the extreme poverty of Asia, we might guide Asian nationalism toward our own precepts of democracy. We have also assumed that by arming it heavily we could prevent a communist penetration. These efforts have not been conspicuously successful. Perhaps, in part, the difficulty lies in the failure to recognize the spiritual basis of Asian nationalism.

The peoples of Asia, looking out on the West, see the high material standard of living which has followed in the wake of the industrial revolution. Asia was left in the backwash by the sweep of western industrialism. The surge of democracy which spread through Europe and the Americas following our revolution and the French Revolution by-passed Asia at that time. In consequence, as the decades passed the differences between eastern and western standards of living widened, as did the gap between the political controllers and the controlled in Asia. For more than a century these differences burned deeper and deeper in the hearts and minds of the peoples of the Orient. The bitterness was fed not only by the desire for the material achievements of the West but also by the demands of pride and prestige. Although the West brought some benefits, the era of
colonialism was widely viewed in Asia as hampering the development of the peoples of Asia in their own right. Colonialism was backed by western force and in the minds of many Asians, force is indelibly identified with their ancient and deep-seated grievances against that system.

Although the era of colonialism is almost over in Asia, its after-effects remain. There is extreme sensitivity among Asians and especially among Asian leaders about being recognized and dealt with on a basis of absolute equality by the West. There is an urge to express their new-found independence in independent action. An enthusiasm also exists for rapid economic development -- a desire to bridge the wide economic gap -- between the East and West. At the same time, however, dependence upon the West for economic aid contradicts the underlying urge of the Asian nations to prove their independence and equality. There exists most of all an ever-present sensitivity, an often unreasonable sensitivity, to any action which resembles a return of the colonial relationships of an earlier era.

In this context it is understandable that Communist China's defiance of the West finds considerable emotional support from many Asians including those who staunchly oppose communism. It explains in part the support of some Asian governments for the recognition of Communist China and for its admission to the United Nations. It is an important element in explaining the initial successes of the Vietminh in Indochina. The deep-seated attitudes of Asia toward the West form an emotional and psychological base which is readily exploited by Communist propaganda. An understanding of this fact is pertinent to any under-
standing of the behavior of the uncommitted states of Asia, behavior which sometimes appears and is hostile to us.

As Asians look at the West from these attitudes, and particularly as they view the United States there is a tendency for many of them to interpret present U. S. policy as a policy of force. To them we exaggerate the value of force.

And they identify force with the era of foreign domination in Asia against which present Asian nationalism rebels. When we announce a policy of massive retaliation it places force in the forefront rather than in the position of an ultimate recourse where it should rightly be. In the minds of many people throughout Asia our emphasis on force rules out of the foreground the normal and accepted processes of negotiation in human relations. It undermines our dignity and our prestige. For the mightiest power on the face of the earth to flaunt its strength in this manner is readily interpreted in Asia in the light of a man who threatens to shoot his neighbor, if the latter's cow comes into his pasture rather than to discuss the problem of mending the fence. To be sure the reactions vary in different parts of Asia but I think it is correct to say that Asians in general, including the Chinese people -- in spite of the recent actions of their rulers -- are a peaceful people and they tend to admire the strong who are also peaceful. Much of the great respect which this country enjoyed in the past derived from that fact; President Theodore Roosevelt's admonition to "speak softly but carry a big stick" won us a great backlog of goodwill in Asia. This sensible advice seems to have been forgotten by a great
number of Americans who otherwise have every cause to admire Theodore Roosevelt.

Those who know the peoples of Asia can attest to the great emphasis which they place on negotiation. A spirit of negotiation permeates their everyday life; it involves adjustments and give-and-take and inevitably is accompanied by prolonged discussion. Those who know Asia will also attest to the lack of the visible use of force in the everyday relations among Asians.

Closely related is a concept found in many parts of Asia which in effect holds that there is a positive force in a negative action. We see this in the philosophy of Chinese Taoism -- we see it in what often appears to us to be the retiring or reticent traits of many Asian peoples -- we see it in the Chinese concept employed even by the Chinese Communists, of "advancing by withdrawing" -- we have seen it in India in the passive resistance doctrine of Mahatma Gandhi. It is reflected now in the arguments of the Asian neutrals. We see it in the Jiu Jitsu sport and the doctrine of Judo in Japan in which one utilizes the offensive force of his opponent to his own advantage. There are, of course, counter-doctrines in Asia which place great emphasis on force, and we should not forget them, but examples serve to illustrate an attitude which is of the highest importance in understanding the international policies of the Asian nations.

The mention of the possible use of atomic tactical weapons in the defense of Formosa is often interpreted there as further evidence of United States reliance on force. Instead of enhancing the strength of our position it has the effect of an admission that we are incapable of coping with the situation on a
plane of reason and have been driven in the first round to dependence upon an ultimate recourse.

If there is any one factor responsible for disagreement in our relations with India, Burma, Indonésia and Ceylon it is the view of their leaders that primary reliance on force is not the best means of gaining solutions in Asia.

They advance the view that we can prevent communist aggression but in preventing the aggression it is not necessary to exercise pressures which rule out a climate of negotiation. We may find this attitude unrealistic and in some cases, I believe, correctly so. What is important, however, is to recognize its existence and, if we are not intent upon isolating ourselves, to accommodate our policies, wherever possible, to it. There is no sense in getting furious about it or losing our temper over it. To do so may give us a momentary sense of satisfaction but it is not going to serve our national interests.

Most Asian nations acquiesced in the action of the United States in neutralizing the Formosa Straits at the beginning of the Korean War. At the beginning of 1953, however, neutralization was replaced by a boastful policy of "unleashing" the Chinese nationalist forces. With few exceptions this second step was interpreted by the free states of Asia as provocative -- as putting the United States in position of reliance on force to the exclusion of other means.

What then should be the role of force in our policy in Asia? We know that in all realism no great power, least of all the United States, can afford at present to abandon or weaken its military power. We must continue the system of military alliances in the western Pacific, Southeast Asia and the Near East.
Let us by all means continue to maintain and strengthen our military defenses in the Far East. Is it not however in the interest of peace in Asia, and in our own national interest, that we relegate the use of force to the background? Is it not in our interest to explore measures which offer some hope of leading to long-term solutions? Are there measures which will obtain these solutions? I believe there are.

As a first measure it seems to me essential that we keep clearly in mind that our national interest in the Formosan area is the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores not that of the off-shore islands of the Quemoys and the Matsus. Any defense of the coastal islands, which always have been a part of China and so involved in the Chinese civil war is incidental to our primary aim. President Eisenhower, in submitting the Formosa resolution to Congress, only hinted at a possible defense of the coastal islands while urging that a cease-fire be negotiated. That should remain our immediate objective and there are signs now that we may be moving towards its achievement.

We cannot fail to recognize in this situation that threats to peace are posed by the Chinese on both sides of the Formosa Straits. The Republic of China on Formosa has repeatedly avowed its intention of regaining the mainland. The United States must come to grips with that threat since we are linked in a defense alliance with the Republic. Assuming that liberation of the mainland by force were militarily feasible -- and it is not even conceivable short of committing this country to an all-out war on the continent of Asia -- would the people of the United States support the use of force as an instrument of national policy for
the liberation of China? I think not. Is it beyond our imagination to conceive of China being ultimately freed from totalitarian communism by other means? Have we so little faith in the power of freedom? The Chinese people have turned out their oppressors many times. Is it inconceivable that they will not do so again?

The national government of China deserves every reasonable consideration from this country. First consideration must be given, however, to our national needs and our needs are not served by an embroilment in a war to liberate the Chinese mainland. I think it is time to recognize the tragic blunder of "unleashing" Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and building up his expectations that we would return him to the mainland. That was a cruel and misleading thing to do and I think we ought to acknowledge the error. I do not think we ought to compound it.

Once we have returned to the policy of neutralization, the policy adopted in 1950, we will have laid the groundwork for international action to counter the threat of the Chinese communists.

The United States can then and only then, on sound moral and legal grounds, insist that other free nations join with us in opposition to the use of any aggressive force in the Formosa area. Such a declaration made perhaps by the United Nations Assembly could call on both the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists to abstain from the use of force. Once our own purposes are clear, I believe that many, if not most countries outside the Communist bloc would support a declaration condemning an attack by either side in the Chinese conflict.
Such a declaration would unite those nations who now oppose Communist military action against Formosa but who are unwilling to give either moral or actual support to the defense of the island so long as the Chinese national government continues to threaten to invade the mainland. Such a declaration having been made, the question of the defense of the coastal islands would become a question for international determination. It would no longer be a responsibility for the President of the United States alone. By taking this action the peoples of Asia would be given a clear and forthright commitment that our position respecting Formosa involved resort to force not in a trigger-happy fashion but force as a last recourse. At the same time, we would not have budged one inch in our determination to prevent Communist seizure of Formosa.

Neutralization of the Straits, however important, is only a first positive step toward a solution of the problem of Formosa. A determination of the status of Formosa is complicated not only by questions of international law but by considerations contained in the regrettable but realistic fact that the Republic of China on Formosa is not now and short of total war has little hope of becoming the government of the mainland of China. So long as two Chinese governments, one on Formosa and one on the mainland claim jurisdiction over all of China, there exists not only civil war but a threat to world peace -- the seeds of total war.

A number of possible solutions to this problem have been advanced. The establishment of an independent republic on Formosa by declaration of the present government would be realistic but is not a likely development. A plebiscite of
the people of Formosa has been suggested to determine their wishes in this matter. Further proposals have been made to the effect that Formosa be placed under a trusteeship with its integrity guaranteed for a designated period of years. These envisage a trusteeship either by a single Pacific nation, by a consortium of powers or by the United Nations. In addition to these proposals there are undoubtedly solutions as yet unexplored. All such proposals require patient and thorough examination.

A settlement of the status of Formosa would permit our full energies to be directed toward the many problems of our peaceful relations with the Asian nations. For many years now we have thought of the world as being divided into two parts -- the Free World and the Communist World. These words have become a part of our everyday language. Yet we are now coming to recognize the width and depth of the chasm which exists within the free world. There is a gulf which may be of greater long-range significance than the immediate threat of communism. In terms of economics the gulf is between those states which have a high material standard of living and those which are struggling to rise from the level of recurrent famine; it is an abyss which separates automation from the man-drawn plow.

It is not enough that we build a wall to contain communism, for while we build the wall the chasms within the free world deepen. I am suggesting that we continue to maintain our defense system in the Far East but that in the foreground our energy and intellect and resources be directed toward building bridges across the chasms in the free world.
It will take more than what we now call technical assistance and economic aid. If the gap is to be bridged the concept of "aid" must be replaced by a unity of purpose. The challenge is to move into spheres of economic and cultural cooperation in which the common progress of all free nations becomes possible. If we are equal to that challenge, and if we have the patience and understanding to stay with it, we need have no fear of the outcome of this contest between totalitarian communism and freedom -- in Asia, in Europe or anywhere else.