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Germany and the Initiative for Peace

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GERMANY AND THE INITIATIVE FOR PEACE.

Mr. President: Several days ago I shared with the Senate some reflections on the Big Four Conference which is soon to open in Geneva. In substance I said that the President and the Secretary of State would be able to negotiate with strength and conviction if they went into the Geneva meetings with the united support of the nation.

There is no reason why they should not have that support. Our participation in the Conference does not bear a party label. It is a logical development of policies that began with a Republican Congress and a Democratic Administration. They are bearing fruit with a Democratic Congress and a Republican Administration.

Should the Geneva Conference move the world closer to a desirable peace, it will be largely because of the sacrifices which all Americans have made over the past decade will have helped to lay the groundwork for a successful conference. It will be because for ten years this
nation has worked patiently and cooperatively with other nations to build the conditions of peace. A major part of the success, I may add, will be due to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Some weeks ago, he had the wisdom and the initiative to suggest that the moment might be ripe to explore the prospects for relieving world tensions, and he had the courage to speak some honest words on the realities of international life. And in so doing he has reawakened our faith in ourselves and in our leadership. He has reminded us of our enormous capacity, when we are united, to deal with the problems of peace no less than those of war.

In the Austrian Treaty we have had the first evidence that the efforts of the past decade may be bringing into conditions of peace, at least in Europe. It is a tangible indication that the shadow of totalitarianism can be made to recede without bombs when the will to freedom is unyielding and the strength to sustain it is adequate.
The Austrian treaty is a compromise as are all bloodless settlements. For our part, the treaty is satisfactory because in the judgment of the President, the Secretary of State and the Senate it serves the peaceful purposes of the nation and is acceptable to the Austrian people. It also sets to move back an advanced position of Russian military power in Western Europe which may be a prelude to further withdrawals.

If the Austrian Treaty serves our purposes, however, we must face the fact that the Russians believe it serves theirs as well. If they did not, it would not have been signed. In that perspective, the Austrian treaty becomes one of a series of highly significant moves which have characterized Soviet policy in recent months. Why, we may well ask ourselves, have the Russians renounced their treaties of reciprocal assistance with France and the United Kingdom which were directed against German militarism? Why have they shown a more amenable attitude on disarmament? Why did the leaders of the Soviet Union pay homage to Marshall Tito in Belgrade? How are
we to explain their fabulous welcome for Prime Minister Nehru when just
two or three years ago he was being denounced as a tool of the western
nations? Most significant, why have they invited Chancellor Adenauer
to establish diplomatic relations and commercial agreements between
the Soviet Union and Western Germany?

I think it is now generally recognized that each of these actions
and others elsewhere are part of a tremendous diplomatic offensive
which the Soviet Union has been developing over a long period of time.

In August 1954, in remarks in the Senate I referred to this drive
in these terms:

There are great stakes involved in the diplomatic struggle...
Here it is not a matter of a few resources, a few
strategic positions and a reluctant people being seized
by the Communists and dragged into their camp. In this
diplomatic struggle, the willing allegiance or the benevolent
neutrality of entire nations is involved.
The communists are striving by a combination of diplomacy
and economic enticements to drive the free nations further
and further apart and to draw as many of them as possible
into their orbit or into an intermediate stage of neutralism.

What we have seen of the Soviet diplomatic offensive so far,
in may judgment, is mere prelude. The real drive is now only
beginning to unfold and its great test is coming in Germany. This
will probe for weaknesses in every part of the structure of
peace which together with other nations we have built over the
past decade and on which rests the future of Western civilization
and the security of this country. The great test of the drive
is coming in Germany.

For many years, it has been apparent that Germany would
recover and would become once again a decisive power in Europe, the
pivot on which the question of war or peace would turn.

In 1949, I visited Germany and reported to the House Foreign Affairs
Committee that

Although Germany is at the present time in a very
weak position with two separate governments...it is
potentially the strongest nation in Western Europe...

Germany is the big prize...

Even as long ago as 1944 the Soviet Union was attempting to
draw Germany away from Western Europe. The Soviet Union
already recognized that unification was the one great temptation it
could offer to the German people. The Russians get nowhere with
their
efforts then they were based on German unification on Soviet
terms. Their demands were for a united Germany that would fit into the
Communist bloc of Eastern Europe. The people of West Germany were immunized
against Soviet demands of that kind to subvert them. They were exhausted
by the war. They had seen the excesses of the Soviet occupation in the
eastern zone which had driven millions of refugees into the west. And they
were protected by the Allied armies of occupation. The Russian demands for
German unification on Soviet terms got nowhere.

The situation now has changed essentially. Western Germany has
made a remarkable recovery from the war. It is independent once again and
it already has the power to act as a separate factor, like France or the
United Kingdom, in the affairs of Europe. It is now more than ever immune
to the appeal of unification on Soviet terms.

But as Germany has changed so has Russian policy. That policy has gradually
been shifting from German unification on Soviet terms to German unification
on terms more acceptable to the Germans. Although this shift has long been in the making it has
taken the shock of the sudden Russian reversal on the Austrian treaty and
the Soviet invitation to Chancellor Adenauer to visit Moscow to bring the reality of it home to this country.

Until these two events occurred, our policy on Germany appears to have been based on two assumptions. The first was that the Soviet Union would never permit German unification except on Soviet terms and the German people would never accept it on Soviet terms. The second was that Chancellor Adenauer could keep Western Germany with Western Europe no matter what else happened. Just a year ago, or even a few months ago, the air was filled with an incredible optimism about the German situation which stemmed from these two assumptions.

Now, however, the assumptions seem to have been reduced to one; that Chancellor Adenauer will not let us down. The optimism on the German situation has been shaken but not entirely dispelled.

The assumption that Chancellor Adenauer will not let us down is a safe assumption. I have a deep admiration and respect for the understanding, integrity and humanity which characterize the German Prime Minister. He is a great statesman in the finest
traditions of Western Europe. He understands, perhaps, as few other
men do how vital it is that Germany remain linked with the western
nations.

Chancellor Adenauer will not let us down. The

faith which President Eisenhower expressed in him a few weeks ago
was not misplaced. I know that I speak the thoughts of many other
members of the Senate who are acquainted with Adenauer when I say
that I share the President's faith.

Because I do, however, I am disturbed by an American policy

respecting Germany which rests in so many essentials on the

shoulders of the German Chancellor. To me, it seems like a search

for an easy way out where there is no easy way out. It is not

only unfair to Adenauer, it is an unsatisfactory way of dealing with

the forces that are at work in Germany and Europe today. Those

forces have historical roots that go back decades and centuries. They

will be in operation long after the Chancellor and every member

of this Chamber have gone.
If our policies are to serve the nation on Germany or any other nation are to serve the nation, they must be developed around one man, however great he may be, but largely on the basis of the historical and other forces that are at work. Chancellor Adenauer has given unparalleled leadership to his people and to the development of Western European unity. He has done a great deal and he can do more, but he cannot be expected to perform miracles.

The danger in our present course, as I see it, is that it perpetuates the optimistic belief that Germany is with us no matter what happens, that the Germans are now linked inextricably with the other nations of Western Europe. It is true that we have moved a long way in that direction in the past decade. Economic bonds of coal and steel have been developed under the European Community, the European Payments Union and other cooperative arrangements. The London-Paris accords have provided a framework for military integration and the dim outlines of political collaboration in Western Europe.
These measures, however important they may be, constitute a promise that Germany will remain with the western nations. They are not a guarantee, and they are not a justification for optimism.

Twice in this century, our civilization has skirted the edge of doom because the western nations assumed that the western world would hold together largely of its own accord. Twice our heritage has been tossed recklessly into the fires of war because of unwarranted optimism and sheer political inertia. Both conflicts which began within Western Europe spread great damage in that region but both reached out to engulf this nation in their tragedy.

Communism fed on these conflagrations. After the wars had burned themselves out, the communists tore down nations and ideals which had been severely weakened by the conflicts. That is the destructive role which communism occupies in the contemporary world and we must not lose sight of it. By the same token, however, it is essential not to permit this destructiveness to
obscure the fact that the greatest damage to the free nations has been
largely self-inflicted. It has resulted from their own inner disunity,
and particularly the disunity of the Western European region.

Both great wars of this century, in the first instance were attempted
suicides on the part of Western Europe. The critical danger of communism
came after, not before, these massive assaults which the region launched up-
on itself. And only as a way is found to cope with tendencies of this kind
will the free nations develop real security against communism and other
forms of totalitarianism.

Let us face the fact that the
most dangerous of these tendencies is associated with the inability
of modern Germany to find a stable place in the common destiny of Western
Europe. Many explanations have been offered for this phenomenon. Histor-
ians have attributed it to the policies of the German, the French and the
British and to numerous other causes. Regardless at what door or doors
responsibility is laid, however, there can be little doubt that this
failure more than any other has gnawed at the vitals of our civilization
during the last half century.
The failure need not be repeated a third time. But can we say now that it will not be repeated? Can we say with assurance that the Soviet drive to destroy the developing integration of Germany and Western Europe and thereby establish the conditions for a third war in the west will not succeed?

The Russians are not without extensive resources to make a powerful attempt in that direction. They can combine an offer of German unification on German terms with numerous concessions to the force of neutralism. That force is strong and is spreading not only in Germany but on the continent of Europe as a whole.

In remarks which I made last December and appended to the record I suggested the possibility that

the Russians may risk the resurgence of German militarism rather than face the inevitable prospect of a unified Germany integrated with Western Europe. If they choose this course, they are in a position to make important economic, territorial and other concessions to the Germans. Moreover they could withdraw their occupation forces and expand the nucleus of German militarism which already exists in the East.
German communist army. They could, in other words, offer Germany a unification with real nationalistic inducements and ask in return only that the Germans separate themselves from Western Europe.

There are now signs that they may be prepared to even further. It is possible that the Russians will consider abandoning the puppet government in East Germany and relaxing their monolithic control over the satellite countries of Eastern Europe. These nations lie along the road from Berlin to Istanbul, a traditional line of German commercial and political interest. A two-pronged drive of this kind may create almost irresistible pressures in Germany towards neutralism, pressures which may be beyond even the capacity of Adenauer to control.

I do not know how far the Russians will go. I believe, however, that they will go to great lengths to dissolve the bonds which hold together the free nations, from Greece and Turkey to Scandanavia and to reduce the influence of the United States on the European continent and in surrounding areas. Far they go, provided they will not succeed, regardless of how/the United States and other Western nations do not sit on the sidelines as dispassionate spectators while
the Russians go about these destructive tasks. As it is now, they hold the
diplomatic offensive on the two most important fronts in Europe. By their
invitation to Chancellor Adenauer, they have gained a real advantage on
the question of German unification. By their sudden shifts on disarmaments
and the Austrian treaty, their long-time championing of a Big Four meeting
and the play on the neutralist theme, they have touched the deepest emotion
that affects all Europe today, the fear of war.

The need for the Western nations is to act, but to act not simply
in reaction to what the Soviet Union does. Too many of our actions in the
past suggest that they are under the hypnotic spell of Russian policy. We
follow instead of leading. We become so fascinated by the
of Soviet policy that we forget the potentialities of our own policy and the
policies of the western European nations.

The need is to act, not in reaction to what the Soviet Union does, but
to act because it is right and desirable to do so.

In the case of German unification, we have paid lip-service to the idea
but we have been disposed to think of it primarily as a Big Four problem.
It seems to me that unification is also a unique German problem and the time is over-ripe for the German people as a whole to examine this question. I hope therefore that the West-German government will give serious consideration to convening a conference of representative political
labor, religious and commercial leaders from all Germany, both East and West to consider the problems of unification. After all, it is the Germans themselves who must live together in peace in a unified country and it is they who must be satisfied with the political conditions which will make that possible.

With respect to the appeal of peace in Europe, I think that the President by curbing warlike talk in his own Administration and by his statements in the field of atomic energy has made an important contribution in clarifying to the world the pacific intentions of this country. There is one problem, however, which required special consideration insofar as it applies to Europe. That is the matter of German rearmament. In the London-Paris accords, Western Europe has accepted the necessity for German rearmament. We would be closing our eyes to reality, however, if we believe that it has been accepted other than with fear and uncertainty in every country in that region, including Western Germany. The fear and uncertainty are not communist-
inspired, although the communists undoubtedly profit by them. They are the fears of ordinary Europeans who twice in a generation have had to live in the wreckage left by the marching boots.

German rearmament must proceed according to the formula of the London-Paris accords. There must be no retreat from that principle, because a disarmed Western Germany, in the context of the present distribution of power in Europe, is a greater danger to peace than an armed Germany. However, the size of the German army as stipulated in the London-Paris accords need not be sacrosanct. If at any time, the Soviet Union is prepared to deal realistically with disarmament, then there is no reason why the contemplated size of the German army cannot be adjusted downwards as other nations including Russia and the satellites reduce their military potential. That approach would put to rest any genuine fears the Russians may have of Germany and it will also relieve the uncertainty on the same score in Western Europe.

Finally, there is one great area in which the nations of the western world can and must act now instead of waiting placidly for Soviet policies to drive wedges between them. They can act to fulfill the deeper
The real meaning of those agreements is not simply the addition of 12 German divisions to the defenses of
the free nations, however important that might be. {marker in their

promise of greater unity

That promise is much broader than integrated military defense.

It means a deepening of the integration of the Western European

nations in the economic field, in the political field, in all matters

in which governments can better serve their citizens by working

together rather than separately. It means, above all, a willingness

to face common problems together and to work with national restraint

in their solution. The need for an approach of this kind is urgent

in Western Europe; it is necessary throughout the western world; it

is desirable with all nations to be free to cooperate wherever they

may be on the globe.

If we can maintain and perfect that kind of an approach, it will

matter far less to us and to others what the Soviet leaders may

think or do in any given situation. For that kind of an approach could

bring a vast growth in the strength of free nations built not only

on a military base, but on the power of their creative accomplishments

and the power of their ideals to inspire the faith of mankind.
GERMANY AND THE INITIATIVE FOR PEACE

Mr. President: Several days ago I shared with the Senate some reflections on the Big Four Conference which is soon to open in Geneva. In substance I said that the President and the Secretary of State would be able to negotiate with strength and conviction if they went into the Geneva meetings with the united support of the nation.

There is no reason why they should not have that support. Our participation in the Conference does not bear a party label. It is a logical development of policies going back many years. They began with a Republican Congress and a Democratic Administration. They are bearing fruit with a Democratic Congress and a Republican Administration.

Should the Geneva Conference move the world closer to a desirable peace, it will be largely because the sacrifices which all Americans have made over the past decade will have helped to lay the groundwork for a successful conference. It will be because for ten years this nation has worked patiently and cooperatively with other nations to build the conditions of peace.

No small part of the success, I may add, will be due to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Some weeks ago, he had the wisdom and the initiative to suggest that the moment
might be ripe to explore the prospects for relieving world tensions. He had the courage to speak some honest words on the realities of international life. And in so doing he has reawakened our faith in ourselves and in our leadership. He has reminded us of our enormous capacity, when we are united, to deal with the problems of peace no less than with those of war.

In the Austrian Treaty we have had the first evidence that conditions of peace may now be coming into being, at least in Europe. The Austrian settlement is a tangible indication that the shadow of totalitarianism can be made to recede without bombs when the will to freedom is unyielding and the strength to sustain it is adequate. Under the treaty an advanced position of Russian military power in Western Europe will be moved back towards the East in what may be a prelude to further withdrawals.

The Austrian treaty is a compromise as are all bloodless settlements. For our part, the treaty is satisfactory because in the judgment of the President, the Secretary of State and the Senate it serves the peaceful purposes of the nation and is acceptable to the Austrian people.

If the Austrian treaty serves our ends, however, we must face the fact that the Russians believe it serves theirs as well. If they did not, it would not have been signed. Viewed in that perspective, the Austrian treaty becomes one of a series of highly significant moves which have characterized Soviet policy in recent months. Why, we may well ask
ourselves, have the Russians renounced their treaties of reciprocal assistance with France and the United Kingdom which were directed against German militarism? Why have they shown a more amenable attitude on disarmament? Why did the leaders of the Soviet Union pay homage to Marshall Tito in Belgrade? How are we to explain their fabulous welcome for Prime Minister Nehru when just two or three years ago he was being denounced as a tool of the western nations? Most significant, why have they invited Chancellor Adenauer to establish diplomatic relations and commercial agreements between the Soviet Union and Western Germany?

I think it is now generally recognized that each of these actions and others elsewhere are part of a tremendous Soviet diplomatic offensive which began at least as far back as the death of Stalin in 1953. In August, 1954, in remarks in the Senate I referred to this drive in these terms:

There are great stakes involved in the diplomatic struggle... Here it is not a matter of a few resources, a few strategic positions and a reluctant people being seized by the Communists and dragged into their camp. In this diplomatic struggle, the willing allegiance or the benevolent neutrality of entire nations is involved.

The communists are striving by a combination of diplomacy and economic enticements to drive the free nations further and further apart and to draw as many of them as possible into their orbit or into an intermediate stage of neutralism.

What we have seen of the Soviet diplomatic offensive so far, in my judgment, is mere prelude. The real drive is now only beginning to unfold. It will probe for weaknesses in every part of the structure of peace which
together with other nations we have built over the past decade and on which rests the future of Western civilization and the security of this country. The great test of the Soviet diplomatic drive is coming in Germany.

For many years, it has been apparent that Germany would recover and would become once again the decisive power in Europe, the pivot on which the questions of war or peace and freedom or totalitarianism would turn. In 1949, I visited Germany and reported to the House Foreign Affairs Committee that

Although Germany is at the present time in a very weak position with two separate governments...it is potentially the strongest nation in Western Europe...Germany is the big prize...

Even in those days the Soviet Union was attempting to draw the whole of Germany away from Western Europe. The Soviet Union had already recognized that unification was the one great temptation it could offer to the German people. The Russian efforts then were based on German unification on Soviet terms. Their demands were for a united Germany that would fit into the Communist bloc of Eastern Europe. The people of West Germany were immunized against Soviet demands of that kind to subvert them. They were exhausted by the war. They had seen the excesses of the Soviet occupation in the eastern zone which had driven millions of refugees into the west. And they were protected by the Allied armies of occupation as evidenced by the success of the Berlin airlift. The Russian demands for German unification on Soviet terms got nowhere.
The situation now has changed. Western Germany has made a remarkable recovery from the war. It is independent once again and it already has the power to act as a separate factor, like France or the United Kingdom, in the affairs of Europe. It is now more than ever immune to the appeal of unification on Soviet terms.

But as Germany has changed, so has Russian policy. That policy has gradually been shifting from German unification on Soviet terms to German unification on terms more acceptable to the Germans. Although this shift has long been in the making it has taken the shock of the sudden Russian reversal on the Austrian treaty and the Soviet invitation to Chancellor Adenauer to visit Moscow to bring the reality of it home to this country.

Until these two events occurred, our policy on Germany appears to have been based on two assumptions. The first was that the Soviet Union would never permit German unification except on Soviet terms and the German people would never accept it on Soviet terms. The second was that Chancellor Adenauer could keep Western Germany with Western Europe no matter what else happened. Just a year ago, or even a few months ago, the air was filled with an incredible optimism about the German situation which stemmed from these two assumptions.

Now, however, the assumptions seem to have been reduced to one: that Chancellor Adenauer will not let us down. The unwarranted optimism on the German situation has been shaken even if it has not been entirely dispelled.
The assumption that Chancellor Adenauer will not let us down is a safe assumption. I have a deep admiration and respect for the understanding, integrity and humanity which characterize the German Prime Minister. He is a great statesman in the finest traditions of Western Europe. He knows, perhaps as few other men do, how vital it is that Germany remain linked with the western nations.

Chancellor Adenauer will not let us down. The full faith which President Eisenhower expressed in him a few weeks ago was not misplaced. I know that I speak the thoughts of many other members of the Senate who are acquainted with Adenauer when I say that I share the President's faith.

Because I do, however, I am disturbed by an American policy respecting Germany which is allowed to rest in so many essentials on his shoulders alone. It is not only unfair to Adenauer, it is a dangerous way of dealing with the tremendous forces that are at work in Germany and Europe today. Those forces have historical roots that go back decades and centuries. They will be in operation long after the Chancellor and every member of this Chamber have gone.

If our policies on Germany are to be effective, they must not be built solely around one man, however great he may be, but largely on the basis of the historical and other forces that are at work in the situation. Chancellor Adenauer has given unparalleled leadership to his people and to the development of Western European unity. He has done a great deal and
he can do more, but he cannot be expected, nor should he be asked to perform miracles.

The danger in our present course, as I see it, is that it perpetuates the optimistic and unsound belief that Germany, or at least Western Germany, is with us no matter what happens, that the Germans are now linked inextricably with the other nations of Western Europe. It is true that we have moved a long way in that direction in the past decade. Economic bonds have been developed under the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Payments Union and other cooperative arrangements. The London-Paris accords have provided a framework for military integration and the dim outlines of political collaboration in Western Europe.

These measures, however important they may be, constitute a promise that Germany will remain with the western nations. They are not a guarantee.

Twice in this century, our civilization has skirted the edge of doom because the western nations assumed that the western world would hold together largely of its own accord. Twice our heritage has been tossed recklessly into the fires of war because of unwarranted optimism and sheer political inertia on that score. Both conflicts which began within Western Europe spread great damage in that region but both reached out to engulf this nation in their tragedy.

Communism fed on these conflagrations. After the wars had burned themselves out, the Communists tore down nations and ideals
which had been severely weakened by the conflicts. That is the destructive role which communism occupies in the contemporary world and we must not lose sight of it. By the same token, however, it is essential not to permit this destructiveness to obscure the fact that the greatest damage to the free nations has been largely self-inflicted. It has resulted from their own inner disunity, and particularly the disunity of the Western European region.

Both great wars of this century, in the first instance were attempted suicides on the part of Western Europe. The critical danger of communism came after, not before, these massive assaults which the region launched upon itself. And only as a way is found to cope with tendencies of this kind will the free nations develop real security against communism and other forms of totalitarianism.

Let us face the fact that the most dangerous of these tendencies is associated with the inability of modern Germany to find a stable place in the common destiny of Western Europe. Many explanations have been offered for this phenomenon. Regardless at what door or doors responsibility is laid, however, there can be little doubt that this failure more than any other has gnawed at the vitals of our civilization during the last half century.

The failure need not be repeated a third time. But can we say now that it will not be repeated? Can we say with assurance that the Soviet drive to destroy the developing integration of Germany and Western
Europe and thereby establish the conditions for a third war in the west will not succeed?

The Russians are not without extensive resources to make a powerful attempt in that direction. They can combine an offer of German unification on German nationalist terms with numerous concessions to the force of neutralism. That force is strong and is spreading not only in Germany but on the continent of Europe as a whole.

In remarks which I made last December and appended to the record I suggested the possibility that

the Russians may risk the resurgence of German militarism rather than face the inevitable prospect of a unified Germany integrated with Western Europe. If they choose this course, they are in a position to make important economic, territorial and other concessions to the Germans. Moreover they could withdraw their occupation forces and expand the nucleus of German militarism which already exists in the East German communist army. They could, in other words, offer Germany a unification with real nationalistic inducements and ask in return only that the Germans separate themselves from Western Europe.

There are now signs that they may be prepared to go even further.

It is possible that the Russians will consider abandoning the puppet government in East Germany and relaxing their monolithic control over the satellite countries of Eastern Europe. These nations lie along the road from Berlin to Istanbul, a traditional line of German commercial and political interest. A two-pronged diplomatic drive of this kind may create almost irresistible pressures in Germany towards neutralism, pressures which may be beyond even the capacity of Adenauer to control.
I do not know how far the Russians will go. I believe, however, that they will go to great lengths to dissolve the bonds which hold together the free nations, from Greece and Turkey to Scandinavia and to reduce the influence of the United States on the European continent and in surrounding areas.

They will not succeed, regardless of how far they go, provided the United States and other Western nations do not sit on the sidelines as dispassionate spectators while the Russians go about these destructive tasks. As it is now, they hold the diplomatic offensive on the two most important fronts in Europe. By their invitation to Chancellor Adenauer, they have gained a real advantage on the question of German unification. By their sudden shifts on disarmaments and the Austrian treaty, their long-time championing of a Big Four meeting and the play on the neutralist theme, they have touched the deepest emotion that affects all Europe today, the fear of war.

The need for the Western nations is to act, but to act not simply in reaction to what the Soviet Union does; too many of our actions in the past suggest that they are performed under the hypnotic spell of Russian policy. We follow instead of leading. We become so fascinated by the enigmatic twists of Soviet policy that we forget the potentialities of our own policy and the policies of the western European nations.

The need is to act, not in reaction to what the Soviet Union does, but to act because it is right and desirable to do so.
In the case of German unification, we have paid lip-service to the idea but we have been disposed to think of it primarily as a Big Four problem. It seems to me that unification is also a unique German problem and the time is over-ripe for the German people as a whole to examine this question. I hope therefore that the West German government will give serious consideration to convening a conference of political, labor, religious and commercial leaders from all Germany, both East and West to consider the problems of unification. After all, it is the Germans themselves who must live together in peace in a unified country and it is they who must be satisfied with the political conditions which will make that possible.

With respect to the appeal of peace in Europe, I think that the President by curbing warlike talk in his own Administration and by his public statements in the field of atomic energy has made an important contribution in clarifying to the world the pacific intentions of this country. There is one matter, however, which requires special consideration insofar as it applies to Europe. That is the problem of German rearmament. In the London-Paris accords, Western Europe has accepted the necessity for German rearmament. We would be closing our eyes to reality, however, if we believe that it has been accepted other than with fear and uncertainty in every country in that region, including Western Germany. The fear and uncertainty are not communist-inspired, although the communists undoubtedly profit by them. They are the fears of ordinary Europeans who
twice in a generation have had to live in the wreckage left by the marching boots.

German rearmament must proceed according to the formula of the London-Paris accords. There must be no retreat from that principle, because a disarmed Western Germany, in the context of the present distribution of power in Europe, is a greater danger to peace than an armed Germany. However, the size of the German army as stipulated in the London-Parisaccords need not be sacrosanct. If at any time, the Soviet Union is prepared to deal realistically with disarmament, then there is no reason why the contemplated size of the German army cannot be adjusted downwards as other nations including Russia and the satellites reduce their military potential. That approach would put to rest any genuine fears the Russians may have of Germany and it will also relieve the uncertainty on the same score in Western Europe.

Finally, there is one great area in which the nations of the western world can and must act now instead of waiting placidly for Soviet policies to drive wedges between them. They can act to fulfill the deeper promise of the London-Paris accords. The real meaning of those agreements is not simply the addition of 12 German divisions to the defenses of the free nations, however important that might be. The real meaning lies in their promise of greater unity among the free nations.

That promise means more than integrated military defense. It means a drawing together of the Western European nations in the economic
field, in the political field, in all matters in which governments can better serve their citizens by working together rather than separately. It means, above all, a willingness to face common problems together and to work with national restraint in their solution. The need for an approach of this kind is urgent in Western Europe; it is necessary throughout the western world; it is desirable with all nations free to cooperate wherever they may be on the globe.

If we can maintain and perfect that kind of an approach, it will matter far less to us and to others what the Soviet leaders may think or do in any given situation. For that kind of an approach could bring a vast growth in the strength of free nations built not only on a military base, but on the power of their creative accomplishments and the power of their ideals to inspire the faith of mankind.