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Review of Foreign Policy II - U.S. and Southeast Asia

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Mr. President:

In recent weeks members of the Senate have addressed themselves to the question of the need for a review of the foreign policies of the nation. When I discussed the question here in the Senate on January 20th, I made this statement:

I intend to raise the issues of foreign policy on the floor at intervals throughout the session. I hope to do so in the spirit of national responsibility and without challenging the integrity or the patriotism of any individual or the political party now in control of the Executive Branch of the government. I will be only too glad to give credit, where credit is due. By the same token, however, I do not propose to ignore or gloss over the shortcomings, weaknesses and inadequacies of foreign policy as I see them.

Mr. President, it is in that spirit that I shall attempt to make a contribution to the review today.

Let me begin by saying that I believe that there is only one valid justification for the enormous and costly responsibilities which this country has assumed throughout the world in the last decade. Peace for this country has become increasingly inseparable from peace everywhere. The fate of our freedom is linked to that of freedom elsewhere in the world.

I do not share the views of those who contend that some sort of mystical world leadership compels us to act abroad in every situation. I do not agree with those who hold that we must assert this leadership by flexing our
nuclear or vocal muscles at the slightest provocation. Nor do I agree with those who argue that this same leadership requires us to spend billions simply to prove that we are more generous than the Russians.

On the other hand, I have no common ground with those who ignore the vast changes which have taken place in the international position of the United States. We are in this world -- this small, crowded, dangerous and promising world -- whether we like it or not. No ancient dream of isolated splendor will insulate us from its currents. That was a fine dream and an appealing one, that nineteenth century dream of a safe and contented America, removed from the troubles of the rest of the world. It has not been the leaders -- Republicans or Democrats -- in the White House or the Department of State who have shattered it. Rather, it has been the scientists and the technologists of whom this country has produced its share and of whom we are justifiably proud.

For those -- and I believe only a few remain -- for those who still persist in that dream of isolation, unmoved by the jet planes and guided missiles overhead, I suppose there will be no awakening except for that instant of reality before some nuclear holocaust blasts us all into extinction.

What I am trying to say is that the United States cannot escape from the realities of this era of human history. If we cannot retreat into a nonexistent Fortress America, however, neither can we charge out in every direction with bombast, billions or bombs. If we are to have effective policies, it seems to me that we cannot assume that either action or inaction in foreign policy is of itself good or desirable. We have got to measure every major
activity against two general standards. Does the activity contribute to the preservation of peace and the security of freedom? Does it contribute to these ends in reasonable degree commensurate with the costs?

It is against those two standards that I ask the Senate today to examine with me the policies which we are following in Southeast Asia. We do not lack for information on the situation there. The American press has performed a great public service in keeping the nation informed on developments in the region. It is a region, moreover, which Senators in increasing numbers have visited in recent years so that even from within our own midst we have several first-hand observations.

I recall meeting the distinguished minority leader [Mr. Knowland] there in 1953 and I know that the able Senator from Washington [Mr. Jackson] has only recently returned from the area. Others who come readily to mind as having visited the area in recent years include the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. Green], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. Hickenlooper], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Bridges], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Dirksen], the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. Smith], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Ellender], the Senator from Washington [Mr. Magnuson], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Clements], and others.

Until recent years Southeast Asia has been on the whole remote from our awareness. Except for the Philippines over which this country exercised sovereignty, the area was largely a preserve of the European powers. For decades and in some cases centuries, ancient nations of the region were colonies,
The United Kingdom held Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Ceylon and others. In Indochina, the French were predominant. Indonesia was under Dutch control. The Portuguese ruled in several areas.

Whatever its virtues, colonialism produced the enmities of inequality. It produced these enmities in varying degrees among all the peoples of Southeast Asia. It produced them generally in direct ratio to the reluctance of the European powers to provide avenues to eventual equality and freedom for these peoples.

Let us face that fact in all honesty. The past is past but we shall never bury it until we are prepared to face it. There were reasons why regions of Asia became colonial preserves. It will not serve the cause of present understanding for us in the Western world to delude ourselves with the pious belief that only selfless motives led to the expansion of Western influence into Asia. There were such motives to be sure; but there was also the excessive zeal for gain and power which characterized the Western nations, including Russia, in the nineteenth century.

By the same token, it will not serve the cause of present understanding for this generation of Asians to ignore the shortcomings which existed in their countries at the time they became colonies. Nor will it serve that cause for them to turn their backs now on the real social and economic contributions which the Western nations have made to their societies.

It comes with particular ill-grace to find the present Soviet leaders attempting -- as Messrs. Khrushchev and Bulganin did on their recent Asian tour -- to find them attempting to pour salt on these old sores of colonialism. Have
they forgotten that their forebears were among the most voracious in extending Western domination in Asia? And for all their words about national independence, there is little indication that the present Soviet leaders have abandoned the predatory habits of their fathers. We will look in vain in Central Asia for some tangible evidence that they have. What subject people of the Russians have direct contact with the new Asian nations to the south and east?

Whatever may have been the situation prior to World War II, the fact is that Western colonialism is dead or dying throughout Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asia of yesterday is no more. Where once there were colonies, there are now free nations -- some ten of them within a compass marked roughly by China on the north, the Pacific on the east, Australia on the south and India on the west.

This region of Southeast Asia is the size of Western Europe and is even less populated. It is rich in minerals and petroleum and it contains some of the most fertile agricultural lands in the world.

Although each is a distinct national entity, the countries of Southeast Asia are linked by ties which grow out of a common heritage and many common problems. Together these countries make up one of the major political regions of the world. And together with other peoples in Asia and Africa -- new nations and nations coming into being -- they constitute a powerful force in the flow of world events.

That was the significance of the Bandung Conference of Asian-African nations last year. It was not, as some treated it, a popularity contest.
between the Soviet Union and ourselves. It is true that we were criticized by several of the nations at the conference and we were praised by others. So, too, were the Russians. We were elated at the praise and dismayed by the criticism. So, too, presumably were the Russians. I suppose that is understandable. It seems to me, however, that if we wish to develop sound policies, we would do well to concern ourselves less with applause and criticism which are the food and gall of actors and more with the deeper forces which are operating in these countries. We can hardly hope to compete with the Russians as actors; I trust that those responsible for the conduct of this nation's foreign policy can excel them in statesmanship and sincerity.

The deeper forces which motivate Southeast Asia were clearly revealed at Bandung and they are reflected in the policies of virtually all the nations of that region. They are forces which arise from a deep devotion to national independence, from a desire for progress in a material sense and from a more distant, but nonetheless real, goal of responsible and humane government. These are forces powerful and sweeping enough to drive millions of people into action. There are other factors -- ideologies and dreams of ancient grandeur, for example. These affect the situation in Southeast Asia. They sometimes tend to obscure the basic forces but they do not change them.

National independence, material progress and responsible and humane government -- these are the drives which have spurred the vast changes in Southeast Asia during the past decade. And they will continue to dominate developments in that region in the decades that lie ahead.
The policies of this country must take these forces fully into consideration. They must also take into consideration still another factor. Each government in Southeast Asia has its own concepts of how to pursue its national objectives. Sometimes these concepts will not be in accord with our own. When there are variations between their views and ours as to how to proceed, we can propound, we can propose, and we can palliate. There is one course we cannot afford to take, in all due respect to their independence and our national dignity. We cannot afford to follow a foreign policy based on pique or pleasure with the words of this Asian leader or that. What we do now in our relations with Southeast Asia will have a significance for this country long after the contemporary leaders both there and here have passed from the scene.

More important than current disagreements over methods and personalities is the fact that there is nothing inconsistent as between the objectives of the Southeast Asian people and our long-range interests. Their objectives are in many ways a replica of our own basic national aspirations. We too have struggled through revolution and wars to establish and to preserve national independence. We too have sought material progress from the earliest days of our history. We too have worked to perfect our political institutions.

As the new nations of Southeast Asia progress toward their basic objectives, this nation gains in the process. Why is that the case? To begin with, one of our principal concerns with respect to Southeast Asia is a security interest. It is a legitimate interest, for it was into the weakness of Southeast Asia that the militarists of World War II penetrated as a precondition for their
attack on the United States. As the Southeast Asian nations strengthen the bases of their independence, our own security is increased.

We also have an interest in the material development of Southeast Asia. The people of Asia are not without their genius and creative energy. Their magnificent achievements of the past -- and there are many -- suggest the dynamic contribution which these people can make to the general enrichment of mankind in the modern era. Out of their development, moreover, can come growing opportunities for mutually beneficial trade and exchange. Our total commerce with Western Europe, an area of comparable size and population, was over $7 billion in 1955. With Southeast Asia, it was $3 billion. The difference only begins to suggest the ultimate possibilities of trade if Southeast Asia develops in an economic sense.

We have finally an interest in the political progress of Southeast Asia. Let me emphasize, however, the distinction between interest and interference in these matters. It is one thing to look with sympathy on the adoption of American concepts of democracy by others. It is another to attempt to sell these concepts to them. A number of the new governments of Southeast Asia reflect the influence of the American Constitution, the Declaration of Independence and other great state papers. That is a mark of recognition of the universality of our greatest political minds. It ought to be a source of both pride and humility to this generation of Americans. It is a disgraceful disrespect, however, to talk of exporting our system of government or the American way as though it were some article of commerce to be marketed by Madison Avenue.
Let the Chinese and other communist nations persist in that false sense of mission which requires them to force their own peculiar systems on the unreceptive. It does not serve the interests or the dignity of this country to suggest that we emulate it.

There are signs that over the past decade the Southeast Asian countries have moved towards all three of their basic objectives. I base this observation on my visit to Southeast Asia last fall and on reports by other members of Congress and by press correspondents. There are limited but unmistakable signs of progress. In most countries a tolerable measure of internal order now prevails. The great threat of a communist military advance through Indochina into the balance of Southeast Asia has receded, at least for the moment. Production of crops is rising. New industries are being developed. Commodities from Japan and the Western nations are appearing in the markets of Southeast Asia in increased supply. Perhaps most significant, free elections were held last year in virtually every country in the region. In some cases, these were the first general elections with universal suffrage ever to take place in these nations. Whatever their shortcomings, they typify the zealous search for more responsible government which is going on in most of the Southeast Asian countries.

We shall make a tragic error, however, if we take the first signs of progress as assurance of a secure future for Southeast Asia. The area is a long way from that. The shadow of the militant Chinese colossus still slants across its neighbors to the south. A lull in the conflict in Indochina is no
guarantee that it shall not be resumed by the communists in the near future. A satisfactory rate of economic development by even the most elementary standards is still lacking in most of the countries. Some of the governments in the area are plagued by a corruption and inertia which tend to open rather than narrow the gulf between them and their peoples.

We have, I believe, played some small part in the progress of Southeast Asia. Our policies with respect to Southeast Asia have been effective to the extent that they have been in harmony with the fundamental objectives of the peoples of that area. They have been effective to the extent that they have supported the desire for secure national independence, for material progress, and for responsible political institutions.

Mr. President, I should like now to turn to the major aspects of these policies and to their shortcomings as I see them. Let me say first that I recognize that policy for Southeast Asia cannot be divorced from consideration of policy elsewhere. The Administration, for example, may have reasons for continuing -- as it has done -- for continuing conversations between an American Ambassador and a Chinese Communist representative for seven months in Geneva. There may be reasons, reasons which the Administration has not seen fit to make public, reasons of which the Senate is not aware. Nevertheless, I know that these conversations must be a cause of uneasiness to many members of the Senate.

In the same way, they are a source of uncertainty in many countries in Southeast Asia. Questions naturally arise there as well as in the Senate as to
where these conversations are leading. They have the effect of introducing a note of uncertainty into all of our policies in that area.

The conversations effect also the large overseas Chinese population in Southeast Asia, numbering several millions, who are settled in communities like Singapore, Djakarta and Bangkok. The loyalties of these communities have teetered between Peking and Formosa for a decade. What this country does or does not do respecting the Chinese Communist regime exercises a very great influence on them.

I repeat I do not question the right of the Administration to talk with the Chinese Communists, if it so desires. I merely point to these conversations as one example of how actions by this government presumably made necessary by conditions elsewhere have an inevitable impact on our policies in Southeast Asia. One could also point to others as, for example, the conditions which grow out of our close relations with Western European nations. These relations have sometimes led to actions or statements affecting Southeast Asia which have been -- to say the least -- not well received there.

In the absence of full information, we must assume that the Executive Branch would not make adjustments of this kind if they were avoidable. It seems to me, however, that even when due allowance is made for the unavoidable, our policies for Southeast Asia remain characterized by an inadequacy of understanding and an inertia of ideas.

The principal instrument of policy through which we have attempted to assist the nations of Southeast Asia in maintaining their independence is the
treaty that bears the name of the region. At the request of the President, I was a delegate to the Manila Conference at which the Southeast Asia defense treaty was drawn up. Together with the Secretary of State and the distinguished Senator from New Jersey [Mr. Smith] I signed the treaty on behalf of the United States. The Senate gave its consent to ratification by a vote of 82 to 1.

If the Senate will recall the situation which existed in 1954 when the treaty was considered, its significance will be appreciated. It was signed at a time when the communist drive into Indochina threatened to spill over into the rest of Southeast Asia. The treaty was intended primarily to rally the will of other Asian nations to protect their independence and to resist a further advance of communist totalitarianism.

I signed that treaty and I cast my vote for its ratification. I did so with a full awareness of its limitations.

I signed because I believed the treaty served a useful purpose in terms of this nation's interest in peace and in freedom. I believe it continues to do so. And so long as we remain a party to it, the obligations which we have assumed under it must remain inviolate.

Situations change, however, and as they do we must be prepared to adjust this treaty as well as other policies accordingly. The principal limitation of the treaty when it was signed, as it is now, is that it carries too heavy a reliance for the defense of Southeast Asia on nations outside the area. It has, moreover, yet to secure the participation of nations like India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia whose interests in the area are in many ways more direct than our
own. Finally, it has aroused some fears in Southeast Asia that the old ghost of Western colonialism may emerge in a new form. These fears are unfounded but we cannot ignore their effect on the nations which have them.

The limitations of the treaty have never been a secret. They have been discussed many times in the press. What disturbs me is not so much the limitations themselves as the apparent unwillingness of the Executive Branch to face them and its inertia in taking steps to deal with them.

In addition to the Southeast Asia defense treaty, this country is supplying military aid to a number of countries in the region to assist them in building the defenses of their national independence. I have supported programs of assistance of this kind. On repeated occasions, however, I have stressed the need for extreme caution and responsibility in employing this arm of foreign policy. That such caution and responsibility were not being employed became unmistakably clear to me last summer when I brought to the attention of the Senate the shoddy procedures in allocating funds under these programs. The Senate will recall that of some $3 billion appropriated for the year for military aid, the Defense Department obligated about $700 million, or roughly 25 percent of these funds, in the last 24 hours of their expiring authority to do so.

We have got to face the fact that military aid is a two-edged sword. We have been told many times of its virtues. We have not been sufficiently alerted to its dangers.

I tell the Senate in all candidness that I was dismayed at some of the reports from responsible quarters which reached me while I was in Southeast Asia. According to these reports, not a small part of the weapons used in the Viet Minh
advance in Vietnam and Laos were of American manufacture. They had come into communist hands via defections and defeats of forces we had armed, via the smuggling trade in weapons and by supply from Communist China.

I do not know how significant this factor of weapons supplied by us being turned against us and friendly nations is in the total picture in Asia. Perhaps we shall never know. One thing is certain, however, that it is not without significance and I have yet to see those who are responsible for the administration of these aid programs demonstrate sufficient awareness of its significance.

I believe this body cannot emphasize too strongly the need of extreme caution in tendering military aid to any country. At the least, I believe we must make certain that it goes to governments only in quantities and of a kind that they can use effectively to meet a genuine military threat. I believe further that it should go to governments that are striving, as in South Viet Nam and the Philippines, to base themselves strongly in their own peoples. In the long run, only such governments are likely to survive in Southeast Asia and only such governments make reliable allies.

I turn now to the second major aspect of American policy respecting Southeast Asia which is aid-other-than-military. I apologize to the Senate for the use of this cumbersome term but I can find no other. Aid-other-than-military, as I use it, embraces such euphonies as direct forces support, defense support, development assistance, technical assistance, the President's Fund for Asian economic development, all of which have been coined to describe various activities of the government in providing assistance abroad.
I mention these terms not to embarrass the lexicographers of the Executive Branch but merely to emphasize what I believe to be the major problem in this aspect of our policy. The "aid-other-than-military" program in Southeast Asia, in a phrase, is bogged down in bureaucracy.

I believe assistance programs have a place in the foreign policies of this government, provided the emphasis is on mutuality, provided they fill a genuine need, and provided they are judiciously and expertly administered. I have seen technical assistance programs run on under a million dollars as in Nepal several years ago. There a handful of American technicians were performing an admirable service in the interests of that country and the United States. I have seen others involving tens of millions of dollars which were the height of futility.

I repeat, I believe this country can serve its own interests as well as those of Southeast Asian countries through aid programs but the level of expenditures is not the real measure of utility. It is the manner in which funds are expended that is the critical issue.

I tell the Senate frankly that I am disturbed when I am told -- as I was told several months ago -- by the Prime Minister of a Southeast Asian country that "the improvement in relations between your country and mine dates from the discontinuance at my request of your aid program."

What lies behind a comment like that made in all sincerity by an outstanding Asian leader? How are we to reconcile this fact with requests from the Executive Branch for long-range aid programs and increased expenditures?
I believe we must go back to the fundamental drives in Southeast Asia if we are to understand the Prime Minister's comment and the existing shortcomings in the aid program which, instead of correcting, the Administration appears bent on compounding.

The Southeast Asian peoples seek material progress, it is true. They seek it, however, within the framework of their two other fundamental objectives, within the framework of national independence and responsible government. These objectives -- all of them -- cannot be reconciled unless the initiative for economic development in Southeast Asia comes preponderantly from the peoples of that area. They do not desire a material progress that is made to order for them in the United States, in Soviet Russia, or anywhere else. They do not desire it so desperately that they can be bought by either side. If they could, they would hardly be worth the buying. Aid programs, moreover, no matter how large the amount, no matter how much scintillating surface progress it may produce, will not serve the interests of the people of that area or our interests unless its benefits reach the people. And unless it serves the interests of the people and not the few, it does not serve our interests.

I regret to say so but the argument that is often made to the effect that we must outbid the Russians in offers of aid to Southeast Asia reflects little credit on us or on the nations of that area. I am sure that the argument is made in good faith, out of a genuine desire to help. It is an argument, however, which demean us because it demean the peoples of Southeast Asia. The decent, the self-respecting, the independent in Southeast Asia will resent the implication that they can be bought.
The argument that we must outbid the Russians is as invalid as the
demand that aid be limited only to those who agree with us in every instance or
who speak the words which flatter us. Has this country so departed from its
basic principles, have its citizens so forgotten their training from earliest
childhood that we would make generosity contingent upon a grovelling gratitude?
I do not think we have, but sometimes those who speak of these matters make it
sound as though we have.

If competition with the Russians is not the sole criterion for aid
programs, neither is an absolute alignment with us or an adoration of us -- real
or professed -- the criterion. Policies change. Leaders go on, at most, for a
lifetime. The real interests of this nation -- interests which members of the
Senate must consider and safeguard -- are more enduring than that brief span.

In these terms, the criteria of any aid program is: does it serve our
interests by aligning itself with the desires of the peoples of Southeast Asia for
national independence, for material progress, and for responsible and humane
government. Regardless how amiable the recipients, it does not serve our
interests if it encourages dependence rather than independence; if it becomes
a means for irresponsible governments to become increasingly irresponsible.

In general, I believe rational programs of technical assistance, of
this government or the United Nations, administered without political strings,
serve the long-range interests of this government. Congress sponsored that
type of activity when it established the technical assistance program in 1950. It
is the only type of long-range continuing grant aid which Congress has ever
endorsed.
With respect to other aid programs, however, it seems to me that each situation must be judged on its merits as it arises. In certain cases, as in South Viet Nam for example, where a difficult economic transition is being made under constant communist pressure, additional assistance may be warranted in our interests. Such aid programs, however, must be clearly designed to achieve a given purpose over a set period of time. They should not carry an implication of a continuing, general commitment by this country.

If other foreign assistance in economic development is required by Southeast Asia beyond that which is now available through existing credit facilities, then it seems to me preferable that it be financed by long-term loans of the most generous terms, rather than as grants. Loans carry no implication of dependency, and I believe the Southeast Asian nations would prefer them to grants. It is strange, to say the least, that the agitation for grants seems to arise more in the Executive Branch in this country than in Southeast Asia itself.

I should like to turn now to one other question before concluding. The contention is often made that we must increase not only our military and non-military aid, but also our so-called psychological activity. I am not sure that I understand precisely what increasing psychological activity means but I assume it has something to do with multiplying the output of words printed or spoken since the United States Information Agency is seeking $50 million in additional appropriations, or a 57 percent increase over the current year. It would be interesting to know how many additional words can be produced for that sum.
Some years ago the able Senator from Arkansas Mr. Fulbright and the able Senator from Iowa Mr. Hickenlooper headed an investigation of this program which helped to reorganize it on a sound and reasonable basis. It appears now that the Administration desires to return it to a basis of sound and fury.

There is a place for an intelligent information and exchange program in supporting and disseminating the foreign policies of this nation in Southeast Asia. The Fulbright Program and the Smith-Mundt Program for the exchange of persons, for example, are a credit to this nation and to the farsightedness of the Senators whose names they bear. The American libraries abroad, which the Senator from Iowa Mr. Hickenlooper did so much to safeguard and improve, provide valuable services for the country and its commerce and other relations with these countries. I am sure there is even a place for radio and press and other modern information services in supporting American policies, provided they are handled with intelligence and restraint.

There is no place for any information program, however, regardless of its intent, which suggests, by its very magnitude, a cultural offensive on the part of this nation. To those who would say that we should do more in this connection, I can only reply that in my opinion what we are already doing comes perilously close to the border of excess. Our desire to make them know is understandable but in the process we must not cheapen the finest ideals and the deepest beliefs of this nation.
I ask the members to consider for a moment certain questions which I believe will make this clear. What would be the reaction in your state or in mine to occasional visits of Buddhist priests from Cambodia to study at our universities? I think we would be honored by such visits, that we would welcome them, if the visitors lived -- as they would -- simply and unassumingly in our midst. I should think we would react the same way if they maintained in our midst a small library to which Americans could go to study life and culture in their country. The examples could be multiplied but what I am trying to make clear is that there could be a real utility, an enrichment of our life by activities of that kind and most of us would welcome it.

But suppose twenty or thirty Cambodians descended on your state with the printing presses, the radios and the other paraphernalia of modern communications. Suppose they subjected you day after day, month after month, and year after year to an unceasing flow of words on the virtues of Cambodian life and the evils of some other way. You might agree, I am sure, that Cambodian life was indeed virtuous. But I also believe that you would begin to wonder why these Cambodians had come to your state and after a while you would begin to wonder when they were going home. Should we assume that Cambodians, Burmese, or any other peoples will act any differently to the presence in their midst of a substantial body of foreigners or of an offensive of words whether it comes from the United States, Soviet Russia, or any other country?
To those that would say that this is a cheap way to stop communism
I can only reply there is no cheap way nor is there even an expensive way in
Southeast Asia if it depends primarily on the initiative and energy of this country.

No country in that region or any other region will avoid totalitarianism
primarily through our efforts. Nations find freedom because they have the will
to freedom and the native leaders to guide them effectively towards its promise.
We delude ourselves if we believe that we can substitute either for that will or
that leadership. We will do more harm than good if in Southeast Asia we seek to
supply our words and our deeds for the words and deeds that must come only
from the peoples directly involved.

Mr. President, I have completed my review of the Southeast Asian
situation. I should like now merely to summarize the conclusions in terms of our
policies to which this review has led me.

1. The United States should make clear that it stands solidly behind
our present obligations under the Southeast Asia defense treaty. At the same
time, however, we should also make clear that we are always prepared to con­
sider a reduction in our role in the defense of that area under certain conditions.
The conditions are either a recession in the totalitarian threat to Southeast Asia
or the strengthening of its defenses by the accession of nations more directly
concerned to the treaty or by other defensive arrangements.

2. The Executive Branch should make a careful re-examination of
the premises under which it dispenses military aid. It must bring into its
calculations more emphatically than it has in the past such factors as genuine
need and capacity of recipient governments in terms of their defense and the
degree of responsibility which they show to their own peoples.

Further, the Executive Branch should report as fully as possible
to the American people on the extent to which American equipment has fallen
into the hands of the communists in Asia. If it fails to do so in the near future,
then the appropriate committees of Congress might well consider a complete
investigation of this matter.

3. Non-military grant aid as a permanent element of American
foreign policy should be limited, as was intended by Congress, to the Technical
Assistance or the Point Four Program. If the Executive Branch presents a
prospectus for a useful and effective expansion of this program -- and I am not
at all sure that this is possible -- then I believe Congress should give it sympa­
thetic consideration.

Large-scale grants of economic aid to any country, when necessitated
by unusual circumstances, however, should be considered individually on their
own merits by the Congress.

If the Southeast Asian and other underdeveloped countries seek long­
range aid for economic development unavailable through existing sources, such
aid should be considered as far as possible for whole regions and on the basis of
repayable credits of the most generous terms. The Executive Branch should
present specific proposals in this connection and not seek a permanent blank
check which reveals little of the extent to which this country might be committed
without the clear understanding of the American people and the consent of the
Senate and Congress as a whole.