

2017

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SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTIONS: IDENTIFYING AND INFLUENCING KEY VARIABLES

By

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Undergraduate Thesis/Undergraduate Professional Paper *[choose one]*
presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the University Scholar distinction

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Missoula, MT

December 2017

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ABSTRACT

Campbell, Braeden, B.A., December 2017
Purpose and Intentions
Dean Brock Tessman

Political Science

This research paper was inspired by a desire to see the United States (U.S.) have continued success in the 21st century. The problem that spurred this research was the realization that the U.S. has an opportunistic, short-term, military centric, foreign policy strategy. I believe that in the 21st century, a steady state, balanced, long-term strategy will ensure continued success. This research paper posits that an already strong networked opposition, a repertoire of resistance, and physical infrastructure are both jointly necessary and sufficient for a successful intervention. To test for this pattern, I first explore a common variable attributed to determining the likelihood of success in interventions: Corruption. This is done by analyzing corruption in Afghanistan (2001-present), Vietnam (1955-1975), and the Baltics (1991-2014). This analysis, as well as table 1.1, illustrate the absence of a pattern: corruption is not an effective variable for decision makers to analyze during pre-intervention planning. Following the analysis of corruption, the research paper moves into the three key variables identified above. The first case study focuses on Poland (1979-1989) during the Solidarity Movement. The analysis of Poland illustrates high favorability, or advantageous marks, for the three key variables. This resulted in one of the best examples of successful U.S. political warfare during the Cold War. The next case study focuses on Cuba during the Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose. This analysis shows the reader the result of all three key variables being unfavorable, or disadvantageous, to the foreign actor: defeat. The final case study focuses on Ukraine (1991-2014). This is by far the most important case study as it illustrates the success of the Russian Federation due to two factors: the three key variables were favorable/advantageous and the Russian Federation, over time, influenced these variables to create a higher likelihood of success. This research paper also includes a limited section on recommendations for the U.S. in the 21st century as well as a reflection of shortcomings with this project.

Successful Interventions: Identifying and Influencing Key Variables

The decision to intervene in a foreign nation is a heavy question to contemplate for any nation that exerts its interests on the international geopolitical stage. A decision as such, needs to be realized through the careful analysis of the local realities in the target area: specifically, variables that help to identify the likelihood of success. The variables identified in this study are: 1. An already strong networked opposition, 2. A repertoire of resistance to develop the narrative of resistance, 3. Physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize and distribute information, 4. Corruption, 5. External Actor Strength, and 6. N-Actors. These variables help inform decision-makers on the likelihood of success were they to intervene in a nation. Further, they can help to identify, and limit, the scope of the given intervention. It answers what type of intervention will succeed given the favorability of the variables present in their target nation. These variables also help decision-makers adapt their definition of victory for their intervention.

To illustrate the effects of these variables on the likelihood of success of an intervention, this study utilizes several cases: Afghanistan (2001-present), Cuba (Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose), Poland (Solidarity Movement), Vietnam (Cold War), Ukraine (2000-present), and Indochina (post-World War II). Each case has had the respective five variables mentioned above, applied to them. These variables were then measured on their favorability for the primary external actor involved.¹ These measures applied are as follows: advantageous, advantageous-tolerable, tolerable, tolerable-disadvantageous, disadvantageous. These measures lend important insight into patterns that dictate the likelihood of success for a nation. It is important to remind the reader that these measures are from the view of the primary external actor.

In this study, I aim to show the reader that there are three key variables that are both jointly necessary and jointly sufficient for an intervention to have a high likelihood of success. To illustrate this,

¹ See Table 1.1

I first analyze one of the common variables identified by past literature that has been attributed to dictating level of likelihood of success in interventions. These variables are: Corruption, External Actor Strength and N-Actors. This paper analyzes corruption to illustrate the absence of a pattern, largely due to scope restraints. I neither claim, nor aim to label these variables as unimportant. I aim to show the reader that they do not offer a pattern that can help inform decision makers. These variables are important and do have impacts on the external actor's intervention. Further, the three variables chosen for this purpose are by no means the only variables available to measure. Following the analysis of corruption, the study will move into the analysis of the key variables: 1. An already strong networked opposition, 2. A repertoire of resistance to develop the narrative of resistance, and 3. Physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize and distribute information. I aim to show the reader that these variables are both jointly necessary and jointly sufficient. Further, that if they are present in a nation, and are present in a way that is advantageous to the external actors, the likelihood of success is much higher than if they were not present, or presented in a disadvantageous way. After this analysis, I will move into a brief policy prescription section of the paper. This policy subscription builds off of the three key variables: if they are present and advantageous then the external should move forward using an intervention model that fits their definition of success; if the variables are not present or disadvantageous then the external actor has two choices, either correct the variables or adjust the definition of victory to fit the local realities on the ground.

Introduction to Variable: Corruption

When analyzing prior literature, a reader will realize that there are common variables attributed to both the favorability and likelihood of success for a foreign actor who plans on intervening in a given country. I have chosen corruption to illustrate the lack of a pattern; which *de jure* demonstrates the randomness or inefficiency of using this variable to analyze and predict likelihoods of success.

The analysis of corruption as a variable encompasses the important actors of the given state: the central government; the security apparatuses including the police and military; as well as the informal and traditional sources of power like the tribal leadership, tribal security apparatuses, and various

insurgencies. I will define corruption based on *Transparency International's* definition: "Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain."² This definition includes both the public (politicians, public officials, and civil servants) and the private sector, identifying corruption, amongst many other examples, in embezzlement of public funds and bribery. I will add to this definition: corruption can be political, social, economic, and even ideological. With political corruption, one might look for patron-client relations and the favorability of clientelism over merit. Social corruption can largely also be attributed to patron-client relations. Economic corruption can come in the form of bribery, kickbacks, parallel markets, and patron-client relations. Ideological corruption can best be described as the falsification of, or opportune use of a popular ideology solely to advance one's own personal interests. Further, a major source of corruption in all realms is the political-criminal nexus. This identification opens greater versatility in identifying sources of opportunity and risk for a foreign actor. This variable will largely be

Analysis: Corruption

A common variable analyzed in prior literature is corruption. Corruption does provide helpful insight into the likelihood of success for a foreign actor's intervention into a nation, however, it does not produce a pattern that decision makers can reference with high degrees of assurance. Corruption as a variable is not highly reliable; using it as a measure of success does not give you the same results again and again, indifferent of the number of tests one conducts. To illustrate this, I will take the reader through three examples: two wherein corruption negatively affected the likelihood of success for the foreign actor, and one where corruption presented a higher likelihood of success for a foreign actor.³ This will also shed light on the importance of the reference point of corruption: to a degree, it matters what type of intervention the foreign actor is taking.

The first reference point for corruption is in the context of a counter-insurgency (COIN) intervention. When the variable corruption is present in a target area, specifically in the government the

² "What is Corruption?" *Transparency International*. Accessed November 04, 2017. <https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption>.

³ See table 1.1 for further reference on the low reliability of corruption as a variable.

foreign actor is protecting, propping up, or newly establishing, their likelihood of success diminishes and in many cases, leads to an almost certain failure. Two pristine examples of this are the U.S. efforts during the Vietnam War and the current struggles against the Taliban and radical extremism in Afghanistan. In the Vietnam War, the endemic corruption present in the South Vietnamese government destroyed the pacification process, and in Afghanistan, the corruption emanating from Kabul has hindered the bridging of tribal society with modern society, while simultaneously bolstering Taliban intervention into tribal structure vacuums. Corruption in these cases proved to be disadvantageous. Let us begin with an analysis of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.

The most recent definition of victory provided to the U.S. public on the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan is: “[to] ‘disrupt, dismantle, and defeat’ the terrorist network, al -Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan...’and to prevent the return of al-Qaeda in either country in the future’.”⁴ This statement by President Obama does not go far enough according to Green Beret Major Jim Gant: “My definition of ‘success’ (that is, ‘win’) includes the one currently in use. I would add: ‘. . . to facilitate security and prosperity for the Afghan people.’ In other words, the tribes.”⁵ This definition includes the Taliban, who are the main threat to Afghanistan and U.S. efforts, as well as the answer to future U.S. approach, the tribes. However, the majority of village stability operations (VSOs), civil affair’s projects, hunter-killer missions, and extraction/rendition of high value targets (HVTs) has largely lead to no success.⁶ Yet, at one point the Taliban had been dethroned by CIA teams, Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 555, the Northern Alliance, and Pashtun resistance.⁷ This occurred from November 13, 2001 when they abandoned Kabul to January 2002 when the Taliban officially capitulated.⁸ Yet, they both regrouped and re-infiltrated Afghanistan, and as of today have regained large swaths of the country where they were once

⁴ Gant, Major Jim, *One Tribe at a Time*, PDF, Los Angeles: Nine Sisters Imports Inc., 2009, p. 11.

⁵ Gant, Major Jim, *One Tribe at a Time*, p. 11.

⁶ Mann, D. Scott. *Game Changers: Going Local to Defeat Violent Extremists*. Leesburg: Tribal Analysis Center. 2015.

⁷ Schroen, Gary. *FIRST IN: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan*. New York: Random House. 2006.

⁸ “Timeline: Taliban in Afghanistan,” *News / Al Jazeera*, July 04, 2009, Accessed November 04, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2009/03/2009389217640837.html>.

purged from. Further debilitating the situation is the presence of ISIS-K, which in of themselves control sizable sections of the country.⁹

The problem of our COIN efforts lies in the corruption that is endemic and permeates from the central government in Kabul. Afghan society is largely tribal and rural. Interaction with the state in recent memory has not been favorable to the villagers, who by default are hesitant of central government engagement in tribal affairs. Further, tribal society is largely debilitated and fractured due to soviet efforts in Afghanistan. The vacuums left by the fractured tribal society and the corrupt central government has provided the Taliban and radical extremists ample opportunity to embed themselves within the true power source of the Afghan state. Major Gant, in *One Tribe At A Time*, notes: “The Taliban . . . have been working in the villages for years to establish ‘shadow governments’ of Sharia law courts and other indigenous institutions, providing the justice and fair play that the villagers cannot get from a remote and corrupt national government.”¹⁰ Seth G. Jones, in *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, highlights the negative influence corruption has on COIN efforts: “the most damaging effect of corruption is its impact on the social fabric of society: corruption undermines the population’s trust in the political system, political institutions, and political leadership.”¹¹ According to Jones it also negatively effects three key factors in defeating an insurgency, which were derived from an analysis of 90 insurgencies since 1945: 1. The capability of indigenous security forces, especially police, 2. Local governance, and 3. External support for insurgents, including sanctuary.¹² It is evident that corruption can undermine support for the government and increase support for insurgents, which as Jones notes: “. . . was detrimental to the counterinsurgency campaign and decreased popular support for the Afghan government.”¹³ Corruption was also disadvantageous to U.S. efforts in Vietnam.

⁹ Almukhtar, Sarah, “How Much of Afghanistan Is Under Taliban Control After 16 Years of War With the US?”, *New York Times*, August 23, 2017, accessed October 25, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/23/world/asia/afghanistan-us-taliban-isis-control.html>.

¹⁰ Gant, Major Jim, *One Tribe at a Time*, PDF, Los Angeles: Nine Sisters Imports Inc., 2009, p. 27.

¹¹ Jones, Seth G, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, PDF, Santa Monica: RAND-National Defense Research Institute, 2008, p. 20.

¹² Jones, Seth G, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, p. 15.

¹³ Jones, Seth G, p. 18.

Very similar to Afghanistan, a major source of impediment to U.S. pacification efforts in South Vietnam was the corruption in Saigon. The goal of U.S. efforts in South Vietnam was to keep the pro-West, capitalistic South Vietnamese Government (GVN) alive and free of communist control. This entailed combatting both the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the unrelenting Vietminh/Vietcong.¹⁴ These actors used the corruption to their favor when disseminating propaganda and mobilizing the villagers based on contentious politics. Further intensifying the corruption were both the ethnic splits in South Vietnam and the nationalist fervor left over from World War II and the Second Indochina War.¹⁵ In South Vietnam, the Buddhist majority was suffering the greatest from the corruption of the elites, many converted Catholics. Already viewed as illegitimate in the eyes of many Buddhist citizenry and peasants, the corruption that disproportionately affected them politically, socially, and economically, hindered U.S. efforts. Lending further support to the Vietcong was the nationalist fervor. The Vietnamese, having gained independence in 1954 after defeating the French as they aimed to retake their colonies in Indochina, were prideful. Their champion liberator, Ho Chi Minh, led the Vietminh in the independence struggle and then North Vietnam in their efforts to unify the country.¹⁶ According to William Egan Colby, in *Shadow Warrior: William Egan Colby and the CIA*, many communists in the south were nationalists. They merely joined the communist insurgents because of a mistrust in the Saigon central government, a result of endemic corruption.¹⁷

Lending further insight into the problem of corruption in Vietnam is *Foreign Policy and the Complexities of Corruption: The Case of South Vietnam*, a report issued by the American Foreign Service Association, at the behest of the U.S. Department of State (DOS). This report was compiled through interviews of former GVN officials. The report indicates that these leaders attributed the fall of South Vietnam to “pervasive corruption, which led to the rise of incompetent leaders, destroyed army morale,

¹⁴ Woods, Randall B, *Shadow warrior: William Egan Colby and the CIA*, New York: Basic Books, 2013.

¹⁵ Woods, Randall B, *Shadow warrior: William Egan Colby and the CIA*.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

and created a vast gulf of social injustice and popular antipathy.”¹⁸ Corruption had become a ‘fundamental ill’, taking form in: “racketeering; bribery; buying and selling important positions and appointments; and pocketing the pay of ghost soldiers.”¹⁹ This pervasive corruption resulted in a small elite amassing all the power and wealth while the middle-class’ and poor’s socio-economic footing degraded. Their anger and frustration was then funneled through the lens of social injustice, and channeled through *de facto* and *de jure* support to the communist insurgents. In other words, “corruption was not incidental to the political system of South Vietnam; it was an integral and defining characteristic of that system.”²⁰ The likelihood of success for U.S. efforts in Vietnam were diminished by corruption.

While the past two examples have lent insight into the variable corruption as disadvantageous, the following contemporary example illustrates the variable as advantageous to a foreign actor. The example is the Russian Federation’s (RF) intervention into Ukraine and the Baltics. The lens for the variable in this case is that of a foreign actor intervening in a target area to influence and change the society, political structure, and economy.

Corruption acted favorably for the RF when they began their political warfare (PW) intervention in Ukraine and the Baltics in the early 2000s. The favorability corruption produced for the RF was best seen in their covert diplomatic efforts. Shortly after 9/11, the U.S. bogged down in the Middle East, the RF began to covertly influence the Eastern European regional political apparatus. This effort was highly centralized in Ukraine and the Baltics, and aimed to create a favorable political apparatus for the Kremlin.²¹ The main conduit for this diplomatic effort was bribery. Stephen Blank, in “Web War I: Is Europe’s First Information War a New Kind of War?” notes: “it was discovered that Russian-funded political organizations were buying Latvian politicians.”²² A profound example of this coming to fruition was the resignation of Latvian Prime Minister Aigars Kalvitis in the Fall of 2007. The Prime Minister

¹⁸ Randolph, Stephen, “Foreign Policy and the Complexities of Corruption: The Case of South Vietnam,” *American Foreign Service Association*, <http://www.afsa.org/foreign-policy-and-complexities-corruption-case-south-vietnam>, par. 3.

¹⁹ Randolph, Stephen, “Foreign Policy and the Complexities of Corruption: The Case of South Vietnam,” par. 3.

²⁰ Randolph, Stephen, par. 12.

²¹ Dickey, Jeffrey V., Thomas B. Everett, Zane M. Galvach, Matthew J. Mesko, and Anton V. Soltis. *Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application*. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. Monterrey: Dudley Knox Library, 2015. Accessed August 5, 2017. https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45838/15Jun_Dickey_Everett_Galvach_Mesko_Soltis.pdf?sequence=1, pp. 139-143.

²² Stephen Blank, “Web War I: Is Europe’s First Information War a New Kind of War?” *Comparative Strategy* 27, no. 3 (2008a), p. 231.

resigned following the President's dismissal of the anticorruption Minister's report indicating a cabal of former KGB operatives, Latvian Security Services officers, members of parliament and the Presidential office in cohorts.²³ Further Russian meddling revolved around the 2002 Lithuanian Presidential elections. Pranas Ciziunas notes: "the RF funded Prime Minister Rolandas Paksas's campaign, waged disinformation campaigns, and bought or controlled Lithuanian customs and police officers."²⁴ The success of Russian intervention into the Baltics has continued, with the most recent operation in Ukraine three years ago. The RF once again employed a PW doctrine to destabilize, influence, and change the political landscape of an Eastern European nation, the result was the Ukrainian Crisis. Jasmin Mujanovic of York University notes that the Kremlin aimed to create a "politically immobilized opposition and a corrupt political elite that masquerades [sic] behind ethnic nationalism."²⁵ Again, the core method by which this was achieved was bribery: present only if there is corruption. Andrew Wilson, in the *Ukraine Crisis, What it Means for the West*, illustrates this:

"In Ukraine, the techs orchestrated and...bribed and intimidated state administered resources and personnel (state-owned media)...manipulated voting results through various methods like electoral tourism, hired agent provocateurs to incite anti-Western sentiment, and stage-managed events—directed conflict—to charge the political atmosphere."²⁶

These examples illustrate how corruption enabled the RF to use covert PW to "...subtly shape the political landscape in the near abroad into a construct that enables Russia's strategic goals."²⁷ Corruption, present in the Baltics and Ukraine, presented the Russians with an advantageous likelihood of success.

The analysis of corruption in Afghanistan, Vietnam, Ukraine, and the Baltics illustrates the lack of an established pattern for analysis. This lends insight into the fact that corruption is not a variable that has a high reliability of measure. Therefore, corruption should not be used as a variable to measure and predict the likelihood of success for a foreign actor's intervention.

²³ Stephen Blank, "Web War I: Is Europe's First Information War a New Kind of War?" *Comparative Strategy* 27, no. 3 (2008a), p. 231.

²⁴ Pranas Ciziunas, "Russia and the Baltic States: Is Russian Imperialism Dead?" *Comparative Strategy* 27, no. 3 (2008), pp. 296–297.

²⁵ Jasmin Mujanovic, "Political Trash-Talking is Nothing New, but it's Getting Worse," York University, March 17, 2014, <http://yfile.news.yorku.ca/2014/03/17/political-trash-talking-is-nothing-new-but-itsgetting-worse/>.

²⁶ Wilson, Andrew. *Ukraine Crisis, What it Means for the West*. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, p. 86.

²⁷ Dickey, Jeffrey V., Thomas B. Everett, Zane M. Galvach, Matthew J. Mesko, and Anton V. Soltis. *Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application*. Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. Monterrey: Dudley Knox Library, 2015. Accessed August 5, 2017. https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45838/15Jun_Dickey_Everett_Galvach_Mesko_Soltis.pdf?sequence=1, p. 144.

Key Variables

Corruption does not provide decision makers a pattern upon which to make reliable measures and predictions of success. However, there are three variables that show a pattern, therefore, provide a reliable platform upon which to judge an intervention's likelihood of success, and if necessary to influence these variables to increase this likelihood. These variables are: an already strong networked opposition, a repertoire of resistance to develop the narrative of resistance, and physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize and distribute information. This analysis will also shed light on the nature of these key variables: that they are both jointly necessary and sufficient.

An already strong networked opposition is a vital variable of analysis. When the resistance within a country, prior to the introduction of the foreign actor, is strong in numbers, funding, and arms; and networked throughout various sectors of both society and the state, the foreign actor has a viable partner to work by and through in its intervention. If the resistance in the country is weak and uncoordinated then the foreign actor, at the very least, must commit not only substantive amounts of resources but specialized soldiers and intelligence officers to muster the fighters into a coherent conglomerate. When conducting an intervention in a target nation to subvert the ideology and credibility of an adversarial government, the committing of troops is not ideal as all semblance of deniability can be lost and sentiments of occupation arise as time prolongs. Further, as history shows, if 'advisors' begin to die, conventional troops are not long to follow.²⁸

A repertoire of resistance is best described as a cultural, national, religious, physical, or ontological symbol that a nation has embedded within their collective psyche. For example, a set of historical precedents the US based Tea Party uses is the Gadsden Flag, the Boston Tea Party, and our Founding Fathers. Another term used to describe a historical precedent is the 'repertoire of resistance'. A perfect example of this is the current Zapatista Liberation Army operating out of Chiapas in Mexico. They adopted the name 'Zapatistas' to connect their struggle to the struggle of Ernesto Zapatista and his

²⁸ Woods, Randall B. *Shadow warrior: William Egan Colby and the CIA*. New York: Basic Books, 2013, ch. 9,10.

fighters. This is vitally important to a PW strategy because it creates chords of varying emotion that the foreign agent can stimulate through suggestion; insinuate through subtle hints; and appeal to known desires to influence beliefs; all in order to galvanize varying sentiments that will facilitate the demise of the targeted regime/ideology/etc.²⁹ However, propaganda and information operations are not the only tools to benefit from a historical narrative: all tools of PW, the diplomatic, informational, and economic; as well as the overall implementation of the PW strategy, rely on a historical narrative. Historical narratives lay the foundation upon which men and women stand in defiance of perceived injustice and cruelty.³⁰

Physical Infrastructure prior to the tech-boom was printing presses, journalists, radios and their operators, magazine stands, book stands, video cameras, photo cameras, and other ‘capital’ that could produce leaflets, posters, movies, broadcasts, articles, and books. In contemporary times, physical infrastructure includes the sources mentioned above, in addition to social media, the internet, mobile news, and bloggers. Physical infrastructure is important to any strategy due to access to information. If a target audience is in a denied area for the foreign agent, then it will need to have an already established physical infrastructure if it wants to effectively mobilize and distribute information. If the nation implementing the PW operation must create this infrastructure from the ground- via shipping, smuggling, and other venues- the chances of success dwindle. This is especially true in nations that are denied areas because they tend to have a strong internal security service that is conducting counterespionage, therefore looking for foreign agents. An example to illustrate these would-be US personnel trying to enter North Korea or Iran to set up radio stations, magazines, and printing presses. The CIA experiences firsthand these types of failures in Vietnam and China.³¹ It also restricts the type of information that the populous receives: the more complex the physical infrastructure, the greater the variation of information sources.

²⁹ "What Are the Tools of Propaganda?" *American Historical Association*, Accessed August 19, 2017, <https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/what-is-propaganda/what-are-the-tools-of-propaganda>.

³⁰ Dickey, Jeffrey V., Thomas B. Everett, Zane M. Galvach, Matthew J. Mesko, and Anton V. Soltis, *Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application*, Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015, Monterrey: Dudley Knox Library, 2015, Accessed August 5, 2017, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45838/15Jun_Dickey_Everett_Galvach_Mesko_Soltis.pdf?sequence=1, pp. 136-137.

³¹ Woods, Randall B, *Shadow warrior: William Egan Colby and the CIA*, New York: Basic Books, 2013, ch. 7,8,9,11.

Further illustrating the need of physical infrastructure is the critical role propaganda plays in the long-term success of resistance movements.³²

Successful interventions are predicated on the target area already having a strong networked opposition, a repertoire of resistance to develop the narrative of resistance, and the physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize and distribute information.³³ To shed light on the importance of preexisting conditions being present for an intervention to be successful, I will analyze a political warfare (PW) operation that resulted in favorable outcomes for the US: The Solidarity Movement (1979-1989).³⁴ This analysis will confirm that Poland already had the three key requirements for this intervention to be effective: the existence of a strong networked opposition, a historical precedent to develop the narrative of resistance, and the physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize and distribute information. I will also analyze the efforts to reverse communism in Cuba to show the naivety of conducting an intervention when the three preexisting conditions are not present. My analysis of the Cuban Project will readily note the lack of a strong networked opposition, the absence of a historical precedent to develop the narrative of resistance, and the missing physical infrastructure, necessary to mobilize and distribute information. To further illustrate the necessity of these three key variables, I will analyze the RF intervention into the Ukraine in 2014. This intervention not only had the key variables present, but were influenced by the Russians over time to make their likelihood of success more favorable. This will lend insight into the final section of this research paper.

Case Study: US-Solidarity in Poland 1979-89

The US utilized three levers of DIME while conducting its PW operations in Poland: diplomatic, information, and economic. The military lever, while not directly utilized in an overt or covert manner in Poland, was in Western Europe maintaining its role as a looming threat. The operations were undertaken

³² Dickey, Jeffrey V., Thomas B. Everett, Zane M. Galvach, Matthew J. Mesko, and Anton V. Soltis, *Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application*, Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015, Monterrey: Dudley Knox Library, 2015, Accessed August 5, 2017, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45838/15Jun_Dickey_Everett_Galvach_Mesko_Soltis.pdf?sequence=1, p. 130.

³³ Dickey, Jeffrey V., Thomas B. Everett, Zane M. Galvach, Matthew J. Mesko, and Anton V. Soltis, *Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application*, p. 138.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

under NSDD-32, which stated the 30 year-long US foreign policy objective: “reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world” and “encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries.”³⁵ However, neither the diplomatic, informational, nor economic levers would have been effective had it not been for the existence of a strong networked opposition, a repertoire of resistance to develop the narrative of resistance, and the physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize and distribute information.

For an intervention to be successful there must be the existence of a strong networked opposition. In the case of 1979 Poland, there was a robust, strong networked opposition that was readily available for US ‘aid’. This came in the form of the Solidarity movement, whose birth traces back to the city of Gdańsk on the Baltic Sea. From December 1970 until January 1971 the workers set forth the demand for free trade unions and planned two major strategic innovations: The Inter-Factory Strike Committee and an occupation strike. However, the strikes by the Gdańsk shipyard workers ended in a violent military crackdown.³⁶ Yet, the opposition persisted and in September of 1976, thanks to the Helsinki CSCE, the Polish opposition formed the Workers’ Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników – KOR) and the Movement for Defense of Human and Civic Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela - ROPCiO).³⁷ These organizations “gave rise to the idea of an independent trade union to defend the rights of workers”, which would factor in favorably with the consolidation of Solidary.³⁸ This occurred in August 1980.³⁹ At the time, strikes at the Gdańsk shipyards had begun to expand to mines, factories, and businesses. Solidarity issued a list of 21 demands “including the acceptance of free trade unions independent of the Communist Party; freedom of speech, the press, and publication; access to mass media; the release of all political prisoners; and the selection of management independent of communist

³⁵ Dickey, Jeffrey V., Thomas B. Everett, Zane M. Galvach, Matthew J. Mesko, and Anton V. Soltis, *Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application*, Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015, Monterrey: Dudley Knox Library, 2015, Accessed August 5, 2017, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45838/15Jun_Dickey_Everett_Galvach_Mesko_Soltis.pdf?sequence=1, p. 127.

³⁶ Karabel, Jerome, *The Origins of Solidarity: Workers, Intellectuals, and the Making of an Oppositional Movement*, University of California Berkeley, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment UC Berkeley, August 1, 1992, Accessed August 11, 2017, <http://irle.berkeley.edu/files/1992/The-Origins-of-Solidarity.pdf>, pp. 6-12.

³⁷ *Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application*, p. 123.

³⁸ Dickey, Jeffrey V., Thomas B. Everett, Zane M. Galvach, Matthew J. Mesko, and Anton V. Soltis, *Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application*, Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015, Monterrey: Dudley Knox Library, 2015, Accessed August 5, 2017, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45838/15Jun_Dickey_Everett_Galvach_Mesko_Soltis.pdf?sequence=1, pp. 123-125.

³⁹ Dickey, Jeffrey V., et al, *Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application*, pp. 123.

party affiliation.”⁴⁰ It was at this point that the Kremlin and its cadre in Poland issued the declaration of Marshall Law.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and US government had a strong networked opposition to work with. Therefore, when they began to utilize the diplomatic, informational, and economic levers of PW, their strategy saw effective results. The diplomatic lever was mainly undertaken by the White House, the Department of State, and US representatives at the United Nations. The first step taken by the US was the suspension of Poland’s ‘most-favored-nation’ trade status. They then vetoed its application for membership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Other diplomatic pressures put on by the US were demands for the change in Poland’s political prisoner policy and a move toward political pluralism. It also used backwater channels to the European Socialist International to hasten the creation of a Christian Democratic majority in Poland. This led to the reconstitution of the Polish Socialist Party in 1987. The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL–CIO) also played a crucial role in the US PW strategy as it had long lasting relationships with Polish labor movements since the 1970s. By 1983, however, the AFL-CIO was absorbed under President Raegan’s initiative for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).⁴¹ NED served as an aggressive venture to support prodemocracy movements worldwide. With these forceful US organizations in conjunction with the US government, Solidarity received ample diplomatic backing in its fight against communism.

Solidarity, an already strong networked opposition, was also vital to the CIA and US government during their implementation of the economic lever. Poland in 1980 was heavily weighed down by roughly \$25 billion in foreign debt. This was coupled by a plummeting national income and a stall in foreign investment.⁴² This economic turmoil created a unique opportunity for the US government when it leveled the economic lever against the Polish regime: Solidarity. Solidarity was the ideal economic instrument for the US to pressure the communists into submission and reform: it was made up of mainly shipyard and

⁴⁰ *Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application*, p. 124.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, pp. 127-129.

⁴² Kamińska, Kamila, *The Polish Crisis and the Soviets, 1980-1981*, The Institute of Journalism University of Warsaw, Columbia, Accessed August 18, 2017, <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ece/research/intermarium/vol14/Kaminska.pdf>, p. 9.

coal workers. By 1981 alone, work stoppages and wide-spread labor frustration lead to a 25% decrease in the national income, a plummeting in standard of living, 15% inflation, a lack of base and food necessities, and 1/3 of Poland's industrial capacity was not functioning due to shortages ranging from energy to intermediate goods. Further labor stoppages in shipyards and coal mines would have wreaked havoc upon the already unstable Polish economy as it almost wholly relied upon coal export to pay for its petroleum imports. It also used its coal exports to earn most of its revenue in trade with Western Europe. The US government, in response to the declaration of martial law, stopped all further lines of credit to the Polish government: critically ceasing the supply of grain, restricting access to industrial equipment and technology, and increasing tariffs on Polish goods. These actions were successful as all three demands of the US government were met: amnesty for all political prisoners, official dialogue with the Church, and the recognition/acceptance of Solidarity.⁴³

A successful intervention also requires a repertoire of resistance to develop the narrative of resistance. Poland, a nation with a rich history, has a long historical narrative of resistance that traces back two centuries. In Poland, one of the strongest forms of resistance is the underground press. First noted in the revolt against Russia in 1863, it survived into World War II when it published resistance pieces, and even further into the anticommunist publications under Stalin's subjugation in the 1940s and 1950s.⁴⁴ While the Polish resistance claimed great pride in its underground press, debatably the most powerful historical narrative is that of its Christian roots as a nation. This was further aggrandized in 1978 with the election of Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyla as Pope John Paul II and when John Paul II returned to Poland in June of 1979. This speech was received by millions of civilians in attendance, and many more by intermediary technology. In his speech, John Paul challenged the fundamental premise of communism

⁴³ Dickey, Jeffrey V., Thomas B. Everett, Zane M. Galvach, Matthew J. Mesko, and Anton V. Soltis, *Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application*, Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015, Monterey: Dudley Knox Library, 2015, Accessed August 5, 2017, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45838/15Jun_Dickey_Everett_Galvach_Mesko_Soltis.pdf?sequence=1, pp. 133-135.

⁴⁴ Laurence J. Orzell, "Psychological Operations in Action: Poland's Underground Media," in *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies* ed. Frank L. Goldstein , (Air University Press, September 1996), 279.

and reaffirmed the idea of both human and spiritual freedom. This fit perfectly into the Polish narrative and highlighted the necessity of maintaining trust and faith in God and the resistance.⁴⁵

When the CIA realized the strength of the Polish narrative in its Christian roots, it took advantage to ensure the success of the US PW strategy. This is best illustrated by the meeting between President Ronald Reagan and Pope John Paul II on June 7, 1982. Sharing a common belief that the Yalta Accord of 1945 needed to be rejected, they sought to create a ‘Holy Alliance’ to free the peoples behind the Iron Curtain from communism.⁴⁶ They further believed that Poland, if liberated, would be the first domino in a series of dominos to turn ‘democratic’ therefore rejecting the likes of communism. The Church became both a powerful symbol for the resistance in Poland and a facilitator: it distributed printing machines; gave places for underground meetings; helped organize special demonstrations; and aided in the creation of a Christian Democratic majority.⁴⁷ One National Security Council (NSC) official said that “Church was aiming to modulate the whole situation...They (church leaders) were in effect trying to create circumstances that would head off the serious threat of Soviet intervention while allowing us to get tougher and tougher.”⁴⁸ It also aided in intelligence gathering: envoys of the Pope were on the ground and had radio contact with Jozef Cardinal Glemp in Warsaw. Per Secretary of State Alexander Haig, “The Vatican’s information was absolutely better than ours in every respect.”⁴⁹ While the historical narrative of Christianity in Poland provided the CIA and NSC the opportunity to bring the Catholic Church into confrontation with the Polish Regime, the historical narrative of an underground press aided in both the distribution and mobilization of information due to its physical infrastructure.

A successful intervention also requires physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize and distribute information. If the resistance in Poland had not heard of its support in the US and the Vatican, would it have remained as strong in its will to resist? The propaganda campaign, directed by the CIA,

⁴⁵ Dickey, Jeffrey V, *Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application*, p. 123.

⁴⁶ Bernstein, Carl, “The Holy Alliance, (Ronald Reagan, Pope John Paul II) (includes Article on U.S. and Vatican Policy on Birth Control) (Cover Story),” *Time* 139, no. 8 (1992): 28, par. 2-3

⁴⁷ Bernstein, Carl, “The Holy Alliance...,” par. 4, 39.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, par. 26.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, par. 20.

aimed to “supply uncensored information on political, social, and economic issues, and to maintain a spirit of opposition among the populace.”⁵⁰ The physical infrastructure used by the CIA to mobilize and distribute information was the underground press. Poland’s underground press by the 1980s had 150 years of experience: resisting Russia in 1863; World War II resistance against Communists and Nazis; and anticommunism during Stalin’s reign of the 1940s and 1950s. By the 1970s, the underground press was on the rise again due to internal and external factors.⁵¹

The Polish Regime, hesitant to block the press in fear of further destabilizing society, inadvertently pushed the underground press to vehemently pursue the publication of resistance literature: *Communique*, *Information Bulletin*, *The Worker*, *Solidarity Weekly*, and *NOWA*, an independent publishing house that targeted the demographics of the resistance. These became the ‘media network’ of Solidarity. However, by 1983, Solidarity’s media network was not operating at sufficient levels due to a shortage of equipment and the regime’s strict monitoring and control over printing supplies. Therefore, the CIA began to pump funding, equipment, and supplies clandestinely into Poland through various smuggling channels: a European businessman in Warsaw, Catholic priests, recruited agents, US and European labor organizations, and maritime shipments from Sweden to the Gdańsk shipyards using a Mossad ratline.

The funds and media support infrastructure reinvigorated the underground press. A ‘new’ dissident press came to the forefront: *Komitet Obrony Społecznej*, a journal directed at the intelligentsia; *Fighting Solidarity*, which advocated confrontation; *The Confederation for an Independent Poland*, which advocated aggressive antiregime stances; *Independence*, a journal; and *We Don’t Want Commies*, another journal. The CIA funds were directly funneled into *NOWA*, which supported other dissident ventures.⁵² A good example is the weekly newspaper *Tygodnik Mazowsze*: it had 37 different

⁵⁰ Laurence J. Orzell, “Psychological Operations in Action: Poland’s Underground Media,” in *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies* ed. Frank L. Goldstein , (Air University Press, September 1996), p. 279.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 280-282.

printing locations prior to the actual assembly and distribution steps.⁵³ Émigré journals also played a substantial role in the information lever of PW, mainly the Paris-based *Kultura* and Sweden-based *Aneks*.⁵⁴ By 1985 alone, some 400 underground periodicals were in a circulation in the tens of thousands. Further, documentaries were widely distributed and viewed by millions of Poles, directly challenging Soviet authority and the Polish Regime.⁵⁵ It was ever more robust: Audiocassettes were made and distributed with resistance songs, news, and interviews; Radio Solidarity broadcasted across the nation; Solidarity slogans appeared on television depicting “Solidarity Lives” and “RESIST”; stamps were printed depicting historical Polish leaders, commemorating “150 years of Underground Press in Poland”, and even George Orwell; and a counterfeit currency depicting Lech Walesa instead of communist leaders.⁵⁶

Two other vital instruments in the US information lever were Radio Free Europe and Voice of America. For example, during Pope John Paul II’s visit to Poland in 1979, the radios broadcasted live-time coverage of the events taking place. This helped stress the Pope’s calls for religious and social freedom in Poland.⁵⁷ Another example was Radio Free Europe broadcasting a noncommunist version of a Polish program called *The Poland that Could Be*.⁵⁹ Had it not been for the preexisting physical infrastructure in Poland, the very success of this campaign could have been negligible. The implementation of the information lever in Poland shows that ‘truth’ is one of the best weapons in the US

⁵³ Schweizer, Peter. *Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994, p. 90.

⁵⁴ George Sanford, *Military Rule in Poland: The Rebuilding of Communist Power, 1981-1983* (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), pp. 257–258.

⁵⁵ Bernstein, Carl, “The Holy Alliance, (Ronald Reagan, Pope John Paul II) (includes Article on U.S. and Vatican Policy on Birth Control) (Cover Story),” *Time* 139, no. 8 (1992): 28, par. 51.

⁵⁶ Laurence J. Orzell, “Psychological Operations in Action: Poland’s Underground Media,” in *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies* ed. Frank L. Goldstein , (Air University Press, September 1996), p. 283.

⁵⁷ Ted Lipien, Tomlinson on Voice of America coverage of Pope John Paul II, May 12, 2014, <http://tedlipien.com/blog/category/history-2/cold-war-blog/feed/>.

⁵⁸ Arch Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), p. 269.

⁵⁹ Dickey, Jeffrey V., Thomas B. Everett, Zane M. Galvach, Matthew J. Mesko, and Anton V. Soltis, *Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application*, Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015, Monterey: Dudley Knox Library, 2015, Accessed August 5, 2017, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45838/15Jun_Dickey_Everett_Galvach_Mesko_Soltis.pdf?sequence=1, p. 133.

PW arsenal. Further, ‘truth’ is a dominant force in the information field, given the physical infrastructure can adequately mobilize and distribute it.⁶⁰

The US-Poland case study clearly illustrates the necessity of an already strong networked opposition, a repertoire of resistance to develop the narrative of resistance, and the physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize and distribute information. These three key factors led the US PW intervention in Poland to be one of the premier cases of effective PW conducted to date. The already strong networked opposition allowed the diplomatic and economic levers of PW to work against the Polish Regime in a concerted effort. The historical precedent found in Poland’s underground press and Christian identity aided the CIA and NSC in both developing a narrative of resistance and sustaining its will. Finally, the physical infrastructure found in Poland’s underground press allowed the CIA’s funds and media support infrastructure to mobilize and distribute information. Therefore, the US actions in Poland from 1979-1989 are vital for this analysis: it sheds light on how the three key requirements of PW are preexisting. Consequently, if an already strong networked opposition, a historical precedent to develop the narrative of resistance, and the physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize and distribute information exist, the likelihood of success for a nation’s PW increases.

Case Study: The Cuban Project- Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose

While US actions in Poland illustrate an effective approach to PW, it is important to analyze its antithesis. This allows the reader to identify its sources of weakness, which further illustrates the necessity of an already strong networked opposition, a repertoire of resistance to develop the narrative of resistance, and the physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize and distribute information. A perfect example is the Cuban Project and its subsequent operations. These operations were the Bay of Pigs invasion and Operation Mongoose. The Cuban Project- Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose- failed because there was neither an already strong networked opposition in Cuba, nor a repertoire of resistance

⁶⁰ Dickey, Jeffrey V., Thomas B. Everett, Zane M. Galvach, Matthew J. Mesko, and Anton V. Soltis, *Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application*, Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015, Monterey: Dudley Knox Library, 2015, Accessed August 5, 2017, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45838/15Jun_Dickey_Everett_Galvach_Mesko_Soltis.pdf?sequence=1, pp. 136-138.

to develop the narrative of the resistance, nor the physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize and distribute information.

The lack of an already strong networked opposition in Cuba and Miami made the Bay of Pigs invasion futile. Per E. Howard Hunt, an involved CIA officer, the resistance in the exile community of Miami was not strong and already networked. To begin, in Miami alone, there were three major exile organizations that were supported by a couple thousand members. Under this, however, were hundreds of smaller groups manned by sometimes just a man and a wife. To complicate matters worse, each of these exile groups falsely claimed far more contacts in Cuba than existed. These groups were mainly competing for government moneys, donations, and community interest, and if that meant boosting numbers then so be it.⁶¹ It is important to note the problem: the planners of the Bay of Pigs invasion were using these individuals as not only sources of information to gauge the resolve and seriousness of the internal resistance in Cuba, but as recruits to fight in Brigade 2506.

This problem was brought to the forefront again when the Frente Revolucionario Democrático (FRD), a conglomerate of the Revolutionary Recovery Group (MMR), the Rescate, the Triple A, the Montecristi, and the Christian Democratic Front, was formed and designated as the ‘provisional government’.⁶² This brought together five different factions of the exile community, each with a leader that had his own ideology and end game. This created a situation that led to a factitious provisional government. E. Howard Hunt comments on how the infighting among the Frente only grew as the months went by: there was a dichotomy between the military force training in Guatemala and those whose role was political in Miami. The political group believed that the military force should fall under their auspices, thus the force would be fighting to install them in power when Castro fell. The military force however believed that once they ousted Fidel they would be in an ideal position to prop themselves in

⁶¹ Hunt, E. Howard, and Greg. Aunapu, *American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA, Watergate, and beyond*, Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2007, p. 114.

⁶²Hunt, E. Howard, and Greg. Aunapu, *American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA, Watergate, and beyond*, Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2007, p. 118.

power, thus they had little need for allegiance to the Frente.⁶³ While the events transpiring in Miami did not have as direct of an impact on the Bay of Pigs invasion, they are vital to understand for future US action. Had the invasion seen success, the US would have been dealing with a power vacuum that could have been susceptible to a Soviet counterattack or a pro-Castro resurgence amongst his loyalists. However, this did not transpire because the internal resistance inside Cuba was not strong and already networked.

The two main reasons for this are the counterintelligence abilities of the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) and the lack of a 'K-Program' as seen in Operation PB SUCCESS. The Cuban DGI, per former CIA analyst Brian Latell, is one of the most ruthless, efficient and cunning intelligence services on the planet, especially when it comes to counterintelligence and double agents.⁶⁴ This effected the invasion in two ways. First, due to suspicion, Castro ordered the DGI to round up any known resistance on the island. This resulted in the imprisonment of roughly a thousand additional Cubans with any hint of anti-Castro views.⁶⁵ They merely joined the ranks of thousands of other Cubans who did not owe allegiance to the regime. Secondly, Castro had double agents inside Brigade 2506 that were keeping him updated on the planning, training, and intentions of the CIA and Kennedy Administration.⁶⁶ This had a profound impact on the invasion because not only were their intentions known, therefore they were outgunned, outnumbered, and out strategized before even launching from JMWAVE, but also because the internal resistance had already been decimated by Castro. The entire premise of the invasion was to inspire a revolt, this was outlined in a program review by the Chief of Operations Brigadier General Edward Lansdale: "Basically, the operation is to bring about the revolt of the Cuban people".⁶⁷ However, due to the bloating of contacts on the island by exiles, the success of the DGI, and the vast popularity of

⁶³ Hunt, E. Howard, and Greg. Aunapu, *American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA, Watergate, and beyond*, p. 119.

⁶⁴ Latell, Brian, *Castro's Secrets: The CIA and Cuba's Intelligence Machine*, 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, ch. 1.

⁶⁵ "The Bay of Pigs Invasion," *Central Intelligence Agency*, April 18, 2016, Accessed August 31, 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2016-featured-story-archive/the-bay-of-pigs-invasion.html>, par. 26.

⁶⁶ "The Bay of Pigs Invasion," *Central Intelligence Agency*, April 18, 2016, Accessed August 31, 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2016-featured-story-archive/the-bay-of-pigs-invasion.html>, par. 13.

⁶⁷ US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963, Volume X Cuba, 1961–1962* Washington, DC: Program Review by the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), 18 January 1962, par. 2.

the post-revolutionary regime (discussed later), little to no resistance either rose up against Castro across the country or came to the assistance of Brigade 2506 as they were gunned down and taken prisoner.

The lack of an already networked strong opposition in Cuba can also be attributed to the absence of a 'K-Program'. The K-Program was first utilized in Operation PB SUCCESS when the CIA successfully threw a coup in Guatemala, dethroning Jacobo Arbenz, placing Carlos Castillo Armas in power. A huge reason for the success of this operation can be attributed to the K-Program. Through CIA recruiting and diplomatic efforts, the coup throwers recruited key members of the military to the cause.⁶⁸ This further gave the coup legitimacy but also created a strong networked opposition to Jacobo Arbenz before any actions were taken. In Cuba, there was no K-Program. Had there been a K-Program, efforts would have been made to garner the support of the Cuban Military. Once this was done any number of possibilities could have occurred: on D-Day, imprisoned resistance members could have been broken out or the capitol could have come under siege to divide the Cuban response. While the absence of an already strong networked opposition diminished the likelihood of success in the Bay of Pigs invasion, the lack of a repertoire of resistance to develop the narrative of resistance countered the efforts of Operation Mongoose.

The Cubans did not have a repertoire of resistance, for the U.S. to exploit, to develop the narrative of the resistance. As seen in the Solidarity case study, a repertoire of resistance is vital to developing a narrative of resistance and sustaining its will. In Poland, the CIA and NSC found two areas of exploitation: its historical underground press and its Christian roots as a nation. In Cuba, however, the repertoire of resistance was not owned by the CIA or NSC, instead it was owned by the revolution, embodied in 'Viva la Revolucion', Che Guevara, and Fidel Castro. This diminished the likelihood of success for Operation Mongoose on three fronts: the diplomatic, information, and economic lever.

⁶⁸ "The CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair." *Central Intelligence Agency*. August 03, 2011. Accessed August 31, 2017. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol42no5/html/v42i5a08p.htm>, par. 27-29.

At first analysis one realizes the omnipresent force Cuban history acted as, in the premises of Fidel's revolution, in direct confrontation to the ambitions of the United States. Cuba's history is rife with colonialism, subjugation, and exploitation by foreign powers: In 1511 the Spaniards, led by Diego de Valezquez, began the colonization and conquest of 'Cuba'; In 1762 Havana was captured by a British expeditionary force, a year later it was returned to Spain in the Treaty of Paris; In 1902, despite being independent following the Spanish-American War, the US became the protectorate of Cuba. This was under the auspices of the Platt Amendment which gave the US the right to intervene in Cuban affairs; for a period during 1906-1909 the US occupied the island; They returned in 1912 to put down protests by afro-Cubans against discrimination; and beginning in the 1930s, supported the Fulgencio Batista regime with military aid until 1958.⁶⁹

This history was captured by Fidel, Che, and their *comaradas* when they began their insurrection in the Sierra Miestra Mountains. They were fighting against the very entity that, for hundreds of years, exploited the island. Thus, when they won in 1959, Fidel was the 'tireless defender of the poor', the figurehead of anti-colonial struggles.⁷⁰ This gave Fidel's regime a base advantage over the US in the diplomatic, information, and economic spheres: diplomatically, his regime was anti-colonialist/imperialist; informationally, any 'truth' emanating from the US was that of capitalist/imperialist aspirations; and economically, he gave more to the Cuban people than any other leader in the past. The lack of a repertoire of resistance also affected the US' diplomatic lever in another way: time and the acceptance of Fidel as the sole political entity on the island. Brigadier General Edward Lansdale explains this: "The bulk of disaffected people inside Cuba will lose hope and incentive for futile protests against the regime and start accepting their status as captives of the Communists."⁷¹ Therefore, no matter the diplomatic efforts of the US in the OAS or UN, change would not happen inside Cuba because

⁶⁹ "Cuba profile – Timeline," *BBC News*, August 27, 2017, Accessed September 03, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19576144>.

⁷⁰ Eaton, Tracey, "Cuban leader Fidel Castro's mixed legacy," *Al Jazeera*, November 26, 2016, Accessed August 31, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2016/11/cuba-leader-fidel-castro-dead-90-161126053354637.html>, par. 1,3,20,21,26,44,47.

⁷¹ Lansdale, Brigadier General, *Review of Operation Mongoose*, PDF, Washington D.C.: National Security Archives, July 25, 1962, p. 7.

the Cuban people no longer ‘wanted it’. This was further reiterated in a National Intelligence Estimate: “All our evidence points to the complete political predominance of Fidel.”⁷²

The information lever was greatly hampered by not having a repertoire of resistance to develop the narrative of resistance. CIA officer E. Howard Hunt visited Havana to assess not only the situation on the ground but also if the CIA could count on an uprising by the populace against Fidel. He soon came to find that “the reason why the anti-Castro movement hadn’t taken hold on the island was that the bulk of the populace was either enthralled with their leader or scared to death of him...”⁷³ Further noted were the loudspeakers that blasted radio propaganda into the streets for hours at a time and the constant street rallies where a live commentator would turn the crowd on individuals who appeared more well off than the rest.⁷⁴ Resembling 1984, Fidel clearly had the upper-hand on information dissemination in Cuba. The only historical narrative for information exploitation was monopolized by Fidel. This is also illustrated when analyzing the failures of the economic lever. Two clear cut realities can be seen: the inclusion of the poorest of poor in the revolution and ‘triumphs of the revolution’.

A common adage in Cuba is ‘our wine is bitter, but it is our wine’, this embodies the ability of Fidel to get the poorest of the poor to contribute to the revolution. Maria Antonia Figueroa, a lifelong supporter of the regime, reflects on this: “they [poor] say, ‘I gave to the Revolution.’ Even if it’s 10 cents, they deprive themselves of food for themselves and their children to help the Revolution.”⁷⁵ Traditionally, the foreign powers had gained ‘support’ of the populace by creating an upper-class on the island. Fidel gained the admiration and support of the poor, the very people whose historical precedent was exploited by the rich and foreign. The ‘triumphs of the revolution’ also gave Fidel more control over the historical precedent in Cuba, thus diminishing the ability of the US economic lever. This was represented in the achievements of land reform, education, universal health care, and literacy, that were achieved under

⁷² Intelligence, Director of Central, *Situation and Prospects in Cuba*, PDF, Washington D.C.: LBJ Library, June 14, 1963, par. 15.

⁷³ Hunt, E. Howard, and Greg. Aunapu, *American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA, Watergate, and beyond*, Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2007, pg. 116.

⁷⁴ Hunt, E. Howard, and Greg. Aunapu, *American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA, Watergate, and beyond*, p. 117.

⁷⁵ Eaton, Tracey, "Cuban leader Fidel Castro's mixed legacy," *Al Jazeera*, November 26, 2016, Accessed August 31, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2016/11/cuba-leader-fidel-castro-dead-90-161126053354637.html>, par. 33.

Fidel's auspices. This was the first time in hundreds of years that the economic abilities of the poor and disposed were being treated.⁷⁶ While life on the island was never materially comparable to the US, it was the implication of these reforms that further captured the historical precedence in Cuba. These two factors are noted in countless reports issued in the US during the Cold War: "It is unlikely that...economic difficulties will cause the regime to collapse."⁷⁷ Operation Mongoose's diplomatic, information, and economic levers were futile in Cuba because Fidel owned the repertoire of resistance: the revolution. However, further inhibiting the information lever was the lack of physical infrastructure to mobilize and distribute information.

Not only was Cuba's repertoire of resistance unattainable for the US, but the island also lacked the physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize and distribute information; this greatly affected the success of Operation Mongoose. Countless efforts were made by the CIA, State Department, and USIA to get information to the Cuban populace. This can be seen in Radio Swan, Radio Marti, Voice of America, and the Press Service mentioned earlier. Despite these sources of information, which were broadcasted at Cuba from outside locations, there was never the necessary physical infrastructure inside Cuba to ensure this information reached its target audience. As seen in the Solidarity case study, the Polish underground press had been effectively functioning for hundreds of years. It had presses, undisclosed locations, contacts, followers, and smuggling routes. This made it difficult to silence and easy for the US to supply necessary information and machinery. In total, it facilitated the mobilization and distribution of information. The lack of a physical infrastructure in Cuba is first noted by Brigadier General Edward Lansdale:

"Conditions and events in Cuba have provided many effective themes, which have been promptly and sharply exploited by available means in the Western Hemisphere. However, the U.S. still lacks the capability of effectively getting information to the majority of the Cuban people."⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Pertierra, Andrés S. "How Cubans See Fidel Castro and His Revolution Is Tied to How They See Themselves." *The Nation*. November 30, 2016. Accessed August 31, 2017. <https://www.thenation.com/article/how-cubans-see-fidel-castro-and-his-revolution-is-tied-to-how-they-see-themselves/>, par. 6-10.

⁷⁷ Intelligence, Director of Central, *Situation and Prospects in Cuba*, PDF, Washington D.C.: LBJ Library, June 14, 1963, p. 1.

⁷⁸ Lansdale, Brigadier General, *Review of Operation Mongoose*, PDF, Washington D.C.: National Security Archives, July 25, 1962, p. 4.

He also acknowledges the popularity of US short-wave broadcasts by the Cuban people, which have shown to be highly regarded. However, there was a shortage on the island of short-wave broadcast receivers which are necessary for US messages to be heard. While short-wave broadcasts had shown success, it was not being maximized due to a lack of receivers. The medium-wave broadcasts of the US were competing against far stronger Cuban broadcasts like Radio Havana. The Kennedy administration, in fear of the Cubans jamming more signals emanating from outside the island, did not push harder to get the medium-wave broadcasts heard on the island.⁷⁹ Lansdale summarizes this: “it was felt that greater U.S. competition in medium-wave broadcasts could lead to Cuban interference of U.S. commercial broadcasts over a fairly wide area of the U.S.”⁸⁰ One key information tactic not utilized by the US in Operation Mongoose was the direct injection of leaflets and propaganda (posters, books, etc.) onto the island. It never received policy approval as it went against keeping the US’ ‘audibility’ and ‘visibility’ to a minimum.⁸¹ This showed a reluctance of the Kennedy Administration to be aggressive in getting information to the island, which one can argue also led to no physical infrastructure being built on the island over time.

This could have played favorably in the long-run to the US if it had taken the correct measures to develop a physical infrastructure in Cuba that could mobilize and distribute information.⁸² A good example of this is clandestine broadcasts. Lansdale notes that clandestine broadcasts, meant to give the illusion of being broadcasted by guerillas inside Cuba, were in their infancy during Operation Mongoose. These broadcasts required much more time to develop the credibility necessary for their information to be believed and delivered by word of mouth around the island.⁸³ The lack of physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize and distribute information diminished the information lever of US PW.

In conclusion, the Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose were not effective because Cuba lacked an already strong networked opposition, the US did not own the repertoire of resistance in Cuba to

⁷⁹ Lansdale, Brigadier General, *Review of Operation Mongoose*, p. 4.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid, p. 7.

⁸³ Lansdale, Brigadier General, *Review of Operation Mongoose*, PDF, Washington D.C.: National Security Archives, July 25, 1962, p. 4.

develop a narrative of resistance, and Cuba did not have the physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize and distribute information. By not having an already strong networked opposition in both Miami and Cuba, the Bay of Pigs invasion ended in disaster. This is reflected in the factious Frente, the false reports of contacts on the island, and the diminishing of internal resistance due to the abilities of the DGI. Since the US did not own the repertoire of resistance in Cuba, they were not able to develop a narrative of resistance that could galvanize the populace to rise against the regime in Operation Mongoose's diplomatic, information, and economic levers. This was a result of Cuba's history of being exploited by foreign powers, time's effect on the populace in the form of acceptance, feelings of admiration and fear, propaganda efforts in the streets by way of loudspeakers, radios, and rallies, the inclusion of the poor in the revolution, and the triumphs of the revolution like land reform, education, and universal health care. Lastly, since the US did not have a physical infrastructure in Cuba that could be used to mobilize and distribute information, the information lever of Operation Mongoose was further inhibited. This can best be seen in the shortage of short-wave broadcast receivers, the reluctance to compete against Cuban medium-wave broadcasts, the refusal to directly inject leaflets and propaganda into Cuba, and the impatience to develop clandestine broadcasts.

Case Study: the Russian Federation and the Ukrainian Crisis

To further illustrate that the three key variables are jointly necessary and sufficient, this research paper will now focus on the Russian Federation (RF) and Ukraine. Specifically, the RF's PW campaign starting in 1991, ending in 2013 with the Euromaidan protests, and ultimately coming to fruition in 2014 with the Ukrainian Crisis and its subsequent outcomes. The ultimate definition of victory for the RF in Ukraine is "perfect influence...over Ukraine and its policies to advance Russia's own agenda."⁸⁴ (USN) LT. Jeffrey V. Dickey states that the RF PW campaign from 1991-2013 "demonstrates a steady-state, protracted strategy across all elements of national power designed at altering the social and political

⁸⁴ Alexander Ghaleb, "Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), p. 81.

landscape in Ukraine.”⁸⁵ The RF, realizing the importance of the three key variables set out to influence, change, and control them using a long-term strategy. This set the stage for their 2014 intervention which saw no legitimate effort by the U.S. or European allies to intervene. Consequentially, the RF achieved both its vital interests and national objectives in the Ukraine.⁸⁶ As many European hands would attest: “without Ukraine, it is impossible to speak not only of a great Russia but [of] any kind of Russia at all.”⁸⁷

In 1991, Ukraine had an already strong networked opposition upon which the RF could act. This is largely a result of the fact that the Ukraine was the primary satellite state of the Soviet Union: there is a large ethnic Russian minority in Ukraine, especially Crimea and the Donbass. The Ethnic Russians who live in Ukraine account for roughly 17.3% of the population and are largely concentrated in the southern agricultural and eastern industrial regions of Ukraine. Alexei Miller, in his book *The Ukrainian Question: Russian Nationalism in the 19th Century*, points out that the Ethnic Russians first appeared in southern Ukraine following the Bolshevik Revolution, with the largest import following the Great Famine of 1932-33. These were largely imported collective farmers.⁸⁸ Alexei Miller further states: "Ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, the Donbass area, started arriving at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century when coal and iron were discovered there."⁸⁹ While the Ethnic Russians provided a sound base upon which the already strong networked opposition existed, two other factors are of importance: the Soviet political proxies of the Cold War, and the KGB's networks of informants, agents, provocateurs, and moles. These factors provided the RF with a strong base to work through to achieve their interests and national objectives. However, they did not accept this key variable as it existed; instead, they took a preemptive, pro-active approach to further enhance the already strong networked opposition in Ukraine.

⁸⁵ Dickey, Jeffrey V., Thomas B. Everett, Zane M. Galvach, Matthew J. Mesko, and Anton V. Soltis. Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application. Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. Monterrey: Dudley Knox Library, 2015. Accessed August 5, 2017. https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45838/15Jun_Dickey_Everett_Galvach_Mesko_Soltis.pdf?sequence=1, p. 175.

⁸⁶ Dickey, Jeffrey V., Thomas B. Everett, Zane M. Galvach, Matthew J. Mesko, and Anton V. Soltis. Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application, p. 175.

⁸⁷ Taras Kuzio, *Russia-Crimea-Ukraine: Triangle of Conflict* (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1994), p. 11.

⁸⁸ Conant, Eve, "Ethnic Russians: Pretext for Putin's Ukraine Invasion?" National Geographic. May 02, 2014. Accessed November 15, 2017.

<https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/05/140502-russia-putin-ukraine-geography-crimea-language/>, pa. 13-17.

⁸⁹ Conant, Eve, "Ethnic Russians: Pretext for Putin's Ukraine Invasion?", pa. 16.

One of the first incidents of this occurred in 1992 when Yevhen Marchuk, head of Ukraine's National Security Service, exposed "that influential Russian industrial interests were actively transferring considerable funds to support separatist and pro-Russian movements in the Crimea and the Donbass."⁹⁰ These movements included groups like the 'Republican Movement of Crimea'. This incident shows the benefit of an already strong networked opposition: Russian diplomatic warfare was facilitated at a more effective level. This is also evident when one realizes that the RF was offering dual citizenship to Crimean Russians and "promoted Crimean presidential candidates oriented towards Russia."⁹¹ The RF has also been progressively infiltrating the Ukrainian gas and energy sector. This is largely done by Russian businessmen buying Ukrainian energy companies and infrastructure. This not only gives the RF reign over the most vital sector of the Ukrainian economy, thus allowing it to use economic coercion to force regime change or the abandonment of unfavorable policies, but it provides a covert medium to funnel influence and money to the networked opposition.⁹² The Russians have also both utilized the already strong networked opposition in Ukraine and bolstered it through the laundry list of regional organizations the Russian's lead. These include: The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), and the Common Economic Space (CES). Russian national objectives reflect regional dominance and these organization are some of the primary vehicles upon which this is executed. This is largely the result of the belief that mechanically adding up the resources of its members equals the increase of Russian influence in the member states.⁹³

The bolstering of the opposition in Ukraine can also be largely seen in their effort to implant pro-Russian political appointees and recruit agents from within Ukrainian institutions, which has largely seen success. The first example of this occurred in 1994 when Leonid Kuchma was elected president, and again in 1999 when Leonid Kuchma was reelected President. Kuchma, was openly pro-Russian, and as a

⁹⁰ Taras Kuzio, *Russia-Crimea-Ukraine: Triangle of Conflict* (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1994), p. 12.

⁹¹ Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, "BACK IN THE USSR": Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy toward Russia," *Ethnic Conflict Project*: Harvard University (January 1994), p. 68.

⁹² Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), pp. 14, 20.

⁹³ Yuliya Nikitina, "Regional Security Cooperation in the Post-Soviet Space," *Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security* 17, no. 4 (October 2011): 50. doi: 10.1080/19934270.2011.609729.

result both received and continued to receive ample political and economic support from Moscow.⁹⁴ The influence of Russia in the political affairs of Ukraine continued into the 21st century as well. The best example of this is the 2004 elections wherein they crafted and recruited Yanukovich to run for president. Yanukovich, the leader of the Russophone Party of Regions, in return for economic, diplomatic, and information support from Moscow, vowed to making Russian an official language, allowing dual citizenship, and abandoning all moves toward NATO.⁹⁵ Further evidence includes the precedence of Viktor Medvedchuk, leader of the Socialist Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU), and Ukraine's most pro-Russian oligarch Gleb Pavloski, who together helped coordinated the Russian political technologists as they aimed to shape the political environment in favor for Russia.⁹⁶ The links to Moscow are profound: Medvedchuk was Kuchma's chief of staff (1994-2005) and his daughter's godfather is Vladimir Putin⁹⁷; Pavloski is the owner of the esteemed Russian Club in Kiev⁹⁸; and \$600-\$900 million, given to Yanukovich, can be traced back to Moscow "including a \$200 million payment from the Kremlin-controlled energy giant Gazprom."⁹⁹ Two other examples of political penetration by Moscow, thus bolstering the opposition network in Ukraine, are the Railway's Minister Hyhorii Kirpa and Yurii Liakh, the head of the Ukrainian Central Bank.¹⁰⁰ According to Mark Galeotti the intelligence penetration of Ukraine's institutions is ever-present, only increasing under the tenure of Yanukovich:

"Russian operatives...permeate Ukrainian police and intelligence agencies. Russia sympathizers and agents, many of whom belong to the GRU...fill the Ukrainian army ranks...The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service and Ministry of Internal Affairs, likewise, have also built extensive networks in the country...Under the Yanukovich regime, deep Russian involvement in the SBU had been an open secret. The organization's former deputy head, for example, admitted in 2010 that not only were there Russian agents among the SBU's ranks, but the organization had an official agreement with the FSB, spelled out in a 2010 cooperation protocol, that allowed Moscow to recruit agents from within the Ukrainian government."¹⁰¹

⁹⁴ Adrian Karatnycky, "The 'Nearest Abroad': Russia's Relations with Ukraine and Belarus," in *Russia: A Return to Imperialism?* ed. Uri Ra'anan and Kate Martin (New York, NY: St Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 79-80.

⁹⁵ Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, "Introduction: Perspectives on the Orange Revolution," in *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*, ed. Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2006), p. 89.

⁹⁶ Taras Kuzio, "From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine's 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution," *Problems of Post-Communism* 52, no. 2 (March/April 2005), p. 37.

⁹⁷ Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis: What it Means for the West* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), p. 138.

⁹⁸ Taras Kuzio, "From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine's 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution," p. 37.

⁹⁹ Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis: What it Means for the West*, p. 119.

¹⁰⁰ Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), pp. 6, 109.

¹⁰¹ Mark Galeotti, "Moscow's Spy Game: Why Ukraine is Losing the Intelligence War to Russia," *Foreign Affairs* (October 2, 2014).

This passage highlights the extensive network of opposition the RF has both identified and influenced since 1991.

The final area wherein the RF has influenced the variable ‘an already strong networked opposition’ is the political-criminal nexus. The RF, has actively coordinated with and operated with transnational criminal organizations to achieve their interests and national objectives. This willingness to work with these groups has provided the RF with an indirect, covert way to influence the internal state of Ukraine as well as recruit, arm, and fund the already strong networked opposition. Further, transnational criminal organizations are an already strong networked opposition in their own right; the RF used these individuals as provocateurs during the Euromaidan 2.0 protests to incite violence to a level wherein the RF could move in to protect its interests. Dr. Lada Roslycky highlights their specific purpose: “[to] impede the rule of law and the state’s de facto control over its territory and population.”¹⁰²¹⁰³ To further elucidate how this political-criminal nexus is both an already strong networked opposition and a medium through which the opposition can be strengthened, one needs to look at its composition: “[in Crimea] the Russian Community of Choice and Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia Group (which includes over 100 NGOs), Moscow State University, the FSB (the successor to the KGB), the GRU (Russian military intelligence), former Moscow mayor Luzhkov, Konstantyn Zatulin and the Russian Orthodox Church.”¹⁰⁴ The RF has extensive reach into the affairs of Ukraine, a result of both the presence of an already strong networked opposition in Ukraine as well as their persistent influence of the variable.

Ukraine also has a repertoire of resistance which the RF has largely been able to capitalize on, further destabilizing the internal affairs of the country by strengthening the resolve of the already strong networked opposition. The repertoire of resistance was both present in Ukraine prior to Russian involvement and is the result of extensive information operations: the RF identified natural cleavages in Ukrainian society and further amplified them to sow mistrust in Kiev and with any bettering of relations

¹⁰²See section titled: “Separatism, Imperialism, and Transnational Crimes.” Lada L. Roslycky, “Organized Transnational Crime in the Black Sea Region: A Geopolitical Dilemma?” Trends in Organized Crime (2009).

¹⁰³The Strategic Foresight Institute 2012 Speakers Series with Dr. Lada L. Roslycky. 2012 Speaker Series session.

¹⁰⁴ The Strategic Foresight Institute 2012 Speakers Series with Dr. Lada L. Roslycky. 2012 Speaker Series session.

with the West. These messages, various operations, and overall influence are largely aimed at the Ethnic Russians. The repertoire of resistance utilized by the RF is largely a reflection of three items: *Novorossiya*, the mistreatment of Ethnic Russians, and anti-Nazi sentiments.

Novorossiya is best explained as “New Russia”. Moscow is aiming to protect its diaspora in its ‘near abroad’. This largely reflects the idea of irredentism: the RF wants to unite all the Slavic peoples, especially those who are Ethnic Russians and speak Russian, under a new federation wherein regional supremacy emanates from Moscow. In other words, “[the] reconstitution of Slavic heartlands.”¹⁰⁵ Putin is specifically advocating for a reconstitution of the once great Soviet Empire, however, renamed a Eurasian Empire. This reflects the vision of a Russian community and civilization.¹⁰⁶ The RF has provoked this sentiment amongst its diaspora by extensive information warfare that stresses the diaspora’s role as compatriots to the Russian cause. This has largely been done by constructing the image of a “virtual Russian supra-state populated with compatriots.”¹⁰⁷ To further stoke the idea of *Novorossiya* in the minds of the opposition, Moscow has been identified on multiple counts of offering dual citizenship to citizens in Crimea.¹⁰⁸ Another example is Russian television. National stations broadcasting within Russia, but largely watched in Ukraine, have been including Sevastopol with other major and minor Russian cities in weather reports.¹⁰⁹ This manipulation of a shared common memory to raise separatist sentiments has also been largely a part of the RF’s use of the Russian Orthodox Church as a political instrument.¹¹⁰ This came in many forms: Leaders of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine blessed Yanukovich and publicly endorsed him in the media; Priests politicized their sermons; and the Church’s opaque finances helped fund several covert operations for Yanukovich.¹¹¹ The permeation of *novorossiya* has amply provided the

¹⁰⁵ Wynne Russell, “Russian Relations with the ‘Near Abroad,’” in *Russian Foreign Policy since 1990*, ed. Peter Shearman (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 56.

¹⁰⁶ The vision for Eurasia vice Europe is Russia’s newly revised strategy to counter the West. Jolanta Darczewska, “The Information War on Ukraine: New Challenges,” *Cicero Foundation Great Debate Paper 14*, no. 08 (2014): 3–17.

¹⁰⁷ Heather A. Conley and Theodore P. Gerber, “Russian Soft Power in the 21st Century: An Examination of Russian Compatriot Policy in Estonia,” *Center for Strategic & International Studies* (August 2011), 12.

¹⁰⁸ Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, “‘BACK IN THE USSR’: Russia’s Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy toward Russia,” *Ethnic Conflict Project: Harvard University* (January 1994), p. 68.

¹⁰⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Ukraine’s Critical Role in the Post-Soviet Space,” in *Ukraine in the World*, ed. Lubomyr A. Hajda (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 6.

¹¹⁰ The Strategic Foresight Institute 2012 Speakers Series with Dr. Lada L. Roslycky. 2012 Speaker Series session.

¹¹¹ Wilson, Andrew. *Ukraine Crisis, What it Means for the West*. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, p. 93.

RF with a revamped and renewed legitimacy in the eyes of Ethnic Russians in the near abroad, which in turn has stoked pro-Russian, separatist sentiments in Ukraine.¹¹²

Another area of the repertoire of resistance exploited by the RF is the pervasive narrative that the Ethnic Russians are being discriminated against, and, coincidentally, that it is the endowed responsibility of the RF to protect its diaspora. The Russians strongly believe they have the right to protect Ethnic Russians that span the former Soviet Empire: Russia's NSCs declared it to be Russia's area of privileged interest and pledged to provide comprehensive assistance, including military force, to protect Russian citizens wherever they were.¹¹³ To create a situation wherein this is possible, the RF has used its information warfare abilities to amplify the east-west split within Ukraine, a reflection of their overall message of mistreatment of Ethnic Russians in Ukraine. To make the economic divide between the Ethnic Russians in the East and the rest of the Ukrainians in the West, the RF used its economic leverage over the Ukrainian gas and energy sector to foment instability. It then "trumpeted the economic grievances of ethnic Russians in Ukraine's eastern provinces, particularly miners in the Donetsk region" resulting in "a new wave of strikes."¹¹⁴¹¹⁵ Further evidence of this occurred in 1994. Ukraine's economy was in dire straits and a Russian puppet, Kuchma, had recently gained office. To keep the Ethnic Russians in the East angry at the Western Ukrainians and their support for Western ideals, Russia's PW machine blamed the West's market economy. This, combined with NATO operations in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Croatia, resulted in soaring approval ratings for Russia.¹¹⁶ In 2014, in the midst of the Euromaidan 2.0 protests, the Russian foreign ministry ethnic Russian minority was being persecuted, that the post-Yanukovich government was illegitimate, and that the Ukrainian parliament was "imposing decisions and laws aimed at repressing the human rights of Russian and other national minorities," to include a ban

¹¹² Stephen Blank, "Russian Information Warfare as Domestic Counterinsurgency," *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy* 35, no. 1 (January 2013): doi: 10.1080/10803920.2013.757946, pp. 31-44.

¹¹³ Sherr, James. *Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia's Influence Abroad*. London: Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Washington, D.C.: Distributed worldwide by the Brookings Institution, 2013, p. 59.

¹¹⁴ Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, "'BACK IN THE USSR': Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy toward Russia," *Ethnic Conflict Project: Harvard University* (January 1994), p. 68.

¹¹⁵ Ilya Prizel, "Ukraine Between Proto-Democracy and 'Soft' Authoritarianism," in *Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 347.

¹¹⁶ Thomas Klobucar and Steven A. Grant, *Ukraine and the World (R-3-00)* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State Office of Research, 2000), pp. 3-4.

on the Russian language.¹¹⁷ The RF, through information and economic warfare were able to create the image that the Ukrainian government criminally discriminates against ethnic Russians and Russia as a whole.

The final area of the repertoire of resistance utilized by the RF was anti-Nazi sentiments. This was largely stoked by illustrating the West, pro-West Ukrainian politicians, and Ukrainian nationalism as the embodiment of Nazi ideals. The vast majority of this occurred during the 2014 elections between Yanukovich and Yushchenko. Adrian Karatnycky notes on this: “In Ukraine, a common narrative Russia uses is to label the Ukrainian government in Kiev as incompetent fascist stooges of the West.”¹¹⁸ Petrov and Ryabov reflect on this: “The historical East-versus-West platform was constructed and lent to demonizing Yushchenko and his coalition, Our Ukraine, as evil fascists—Nazis—and stooges of the West, particularly of the U.S., nicknaming Yushchenko as “Bushchenko.”¹¹⁹ This also came in the form of propaganda posters. One poster showed Hitler next to Yushchenko, with subtitles: “Does the Nation need a new FURER?”, “National Liberation Front for YUSHENKO”, “Cleanse Donbass – Cleanse Ukraine.”¹²⁰ This clearly aimed to illustrate Yushchenko as a figure equal to the fanatical fascist Hitler; instigating fear and hatred in the Ethnic Russians of Ukraine. The RF, Yanukovich, and the political technologists also aimed to discredit NGOs by illustrating them as “destructive forces, extremists, and fascists.”¹²¹ A prominent example of this is the raiding of PORA offices, and the subsequent planting of explosives and weapons to further the claims made against NGOs.¹²² There were even cases wherein during the Euromaidan 2.0 protests ‘organized-crime “skinheads” started appearing at protests’.¹²³ As if this was not enough, provocateurs were hired to spray paint Nazi graffiti on Ukrainian buildings.¹²⁴ Not

¹¹⁷ Ian Traynor, “Russia Denounces Ukraine ‘Terrorists’ and West Over Yanukovich Ousting,” *The Guardian*, February 24, 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/24/russia-ukraine-west-yanukovich>.

¹¹⁸ Adrian Karatnycky, “The ‘Nearest Abroad’: Russia’s Relations with Ukraine and Belarus,” in *Russia: A Return to Imperialism?* ed. Uri Ra’anan and Kate Martin (New York, NY: St Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 72-73.

¹¹⁹ Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov, “Russia’s Role in the Orange Revolution,” in *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough*, ed. Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), p. 149.

¹²⁰ *Romaninukraine Blog*, The. <http://romaninukraine.com/nazis-everywhere/>.

¹²¹ Taras Kuzio, “From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 52, no. 2 (March/April 2005), p. 40.

¹²² Taras Kuzio, “From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution,” p. 40.

¹²³ Kuzio, p. 38.

¹²⁴ The Strategic Foresight Institute 2012 Speakers Series with Dr. Lada L. Roslycky. 2012 Speaker Series session.

only did the RF identify and control the repertoires of resistance within Ukrainian society, especially amongst Ethnic Russians, but took proactive measures to amplify them; destabilizing Ukrainian society.

The final variable, ‘physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize and distribute information’, was also ripe for the RF and its political technologists in Ukraine. In addition, like the past two variables, the RF sought to influence it to further mold it in their favor. To begin, the RF has primacy in the Ukrainian media. This is largely the result of the raw popularity Russian news has accumulated. Karatnycky illustrates this: “some 70 percent of the Ukrainian population watches Russia’s Ostankino Television, which transmits the strongest signal inside Ukraine,” and “Russian newspapers . . . are among the most popular periodicals in Ukraine.”¹²⁵ The RF also has resolute influence in major Ukrainian newspapers, this has allowed them to indirectly promote propaganda. For example, in the early 1990s, the Ukrainian newspaper *Pravda* was used as a medium of transport to illustrate the Ukrainian government as ultra-nationalist and incompetent, and to create hysteria on the international stage about the danger Ukraine posed since it held a stockade of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal.¹²⁶ While traditional modes of physical infrastructure were largely used, like the newspaper *Pravda* and the propaganda posters mentioned in the previous section, the most influential and damaging modes were electronic: television, media, and the internet. The Russian political technologists were the individuals who orchestrated these into an efficient information warfare machine. Not only did these individuals bribe and control Ukrainian administrative personnel in the state-owned media, but have “created a network of websites, each which reprinted news from the others” creating a cyclical metastasizing effect over the Internet by concealing the initial source and providing “other media (television or newspaper) to use the information (usually disinformation).”¹²⁷ One example of the effect this had occurred in the 2010 presidential elections:

Yanukovych received 80% more television time than Yushchenko and spread a largely popular belief in both Ukraine and Russia that since Yushchenko’s wife is American, logically he is both a stooge of the

¹²⁵ Adrian Karatnycky, “The ‘Nearest Abroad’: Russia’s Relations with Ukraine and Belarus,” in *Russia: A Return to Imperialism?* ed. Uri Ra’anana and Kate Martin (New York, NY: St Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 72-73.

¹²⁶ Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, “‘BACK IN THE USSR’: Russia’s Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy toward Russia,” *Ethnic Conflict Project: Harvard University* (January 1994), pp. 81-84.

¹²⁷ Olena Prytula, “The Ukrainian Media Rebellion,” in *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough*, ed. Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), p. 109.

West and she is a CIA agent.¹²⁸ The political technologists were also able to use their extensive network of internet sites, social media pages, and connections in the Ukrainian media to facilitate a radical change in Ukrainian opinion¹²⁹. Jakob Hedenskog and Robert L. Larsson explain this: In the 2006 parliamentary elections, the ‘For Yanukovych Bloc’ took control of the Crimean parliament. As a result, anti-U.S. and anti-NATO demonstrations occurred, and that led to the first cancellation of NATO joint military exercises in Crimea.¹³⁰ This was largely the result of the political technologist’s ability to wage sophisticated information warfare across both traditional and modern mediums of physical infrastructure and their ability to orchestrate social movements.¹³¹ The final mode of important physical infrastructure used by the RF was their own *Russia Today*. Organizations like *RT* are important physical infrastructure in the 21st century because it is internationally popular. As a result, its ability to bury Russia’s Kremlin line in a myriad of alternative views, to perturb or outright confuse audiences is amplified. In Ukraine, this modern Russian information warfare distorted the truth and fabricated outright lies to cause psychological impotence or lack of clarity¹³². The most prominent example is the cover-up job of flight MH-17 which was shot down by a Buk radar-guided, surface-to-air system, shipped into Ukraine by Russia.¹³³ In reactance, the Kremlin created a torrent of counternarrative deception and propaganda. This effectively turned the incident into a spectacle of conspiracy theories. This deception operation involved pushing multiple false narratives across Russian-controlled media channels. Reports from countless news sites illustrate this situation: reports of CIA involvement, an attempt to shoot down Vladimir Putin’s personal jet, and a plane filled with cadavers.¹³⁴ The RF saw large success in Ukraine from 1991-present

¹²⁸ Taras Kuzio, “From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 52, no. 2 (March/April 2005), p. 38.

¹²⁹ Alexander Ghaleb, “Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), p. 79.

¹³⁰ Jakob Hedenskog and Robert L. Larsson, *Russian Leverage on the CIS and the Baltic States (FOI-R2280)* (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2007), 38.

¹³¹ Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), pp. 92, 108.

¹³² Wilson, Andrew. *Ukraine Crisis, What it Means for the West*. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, p. 22.

¹³³ Wilson, Andrew. *Ukraine Crisis, What it Means for the West*. Pp. 139-141.

¹³⁴ “Reports that Putin Flew Similar Tour as MH17, Presidential Airport says ‘Hasn’t Overflown Ukraine for a Long Time,’” *RT news*. <http://rt.com/news/173672-malaysia-plane-crash-putin/>. Taylor Wofford, “Russian State Media Says CIA Shot Down Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17,” *Newsweek*, July 22, 2014. <http://www.newsweek.com/russian-state-media-says-cia-shot-down-malaysian-airlines-flight-mh-17260381>. Julia Loffe, “The Russian Public Has a Totally Different Understanding of What Happened to Malaysia Airlines Flight 17,” *New Republic*, July 20, 2014. <http://www.newrepublic.com/node/118782>.

as a result of controlling the physical infrastructure in Ukraine, mobilizing and distributing information, and using their own physical infrastructure to amplify this information internationally and regionally.

The RF was successful in the Ukraine because it had an already strong networked opposition, a repertoire of resistance to develop the narrative of resistance, and physical infrastructure necessary to mobilize and distribute information. While these variables were already strong, the RF implemented proactive measures to further strengthen the already strong networked opposition, to intensify the repertoires of resistance within both Ukrainian society and the Ethnic Russian communities, and to amplify the information being produced by the physical infrastructure in both Ukraine and Russia.

Recommendations: What Should the U.S. Do?

Given the case studies in this research paper, I would argue that the three key variables are vitally important, if not jointly necessary and sufficient. Thus, it is critical for decision makers to identify and analyze these variables for future U.S. action. As stated earlier, upon identifying and analyzing the strength of these three key variables, a foreign actor should look at three options: 1. Abandon the proposed intervention, 2. Change the definition of victory to fit the realities on the ground, and 3. Target the three key variables in a preemptive manner to influence them in your favor. This section will focus on option three.

Option three is to target the three key variables in a preemptive manner to influence them in your favor. This option is the best route to take as it is emblematic of a foreign policy that demonstrates a steady-state, protracted strategy across all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—or DIME) designed to alter the social and political landscape of a target area. The best example of this option playing out was the case study of the Russian Federation in Ukraine from 1991 until 2014. The U.S. has at times used various forms of this option to achieve its interests abroad. However, it has not actively employed a disciplined, all-encompassing strategy as such.

If the U.S. wishes to preemptively and proactively influence an opposition in an area of interest to make it strong and networked; to identify, exploit, and amplify repertoires of resistance; and to build, manage, and expand physical infrastructure, then it must intensify its Advanced Force Operation (AFO) ability, increase its human intelligence (HUMINT) penetration and scope, revamp a new U.S. Information Agency (USIA), and use U.S. based Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and NGOs as tentacles of its foreign policy apparatus.

U.S. AFO ability has increased in kind with the expansion of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). To date, this has largely been carried out by the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (1st SFOD-D), the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), as well as the CIA's Special Activities Division (SAD). AFOs are largely described as the 'preparation of the environment.' Given this definition, the various other entities in the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) that conduct Foreign Internal Defense (FID) should be included in AFO planning since they are creating contacts and relationships in the foreign militaries they train, let alone the realization that many of these officers they train will become higher ranking politicians in their respective governments. What would these AFOs look like? I would highly recommend that they create what many in the Cold War called the fifth column. This was essentially a 'stay behind', guerilla resistance that would fight Soviet occupation if X country was invaded. This is still applicable today. These individuals can recruit and train foreign military officers and security service officers; recruit and advise politicians; infiltrate NGOs and social movements; set up front companies and safe houses; and largely act as the interlocker of the various factions in society so that there is networking, coordination, and strength amongst them. These AFOs should be conducted in both a covert-direct and covert-indirect manner. To ensure a covert nature, they should be issued a non-official cover. Therefore, they can work with relief agencies in South West Asia or Africa, merchant companies in South East Asia, or business companies in Latin America or Europe. The direct nature of these AFOs will be the U.S. personnel on the ground actively recruiting, training, advising, and operating to establish the already strong networked opposition, exploit and amplify

repertoires of resistance via pseudo operations, and to set up physical infrastructure. The indirect nature of these AFOs will be activated after the already strong networked opposition gets on its feet. At this point, the U.S. personnel and decision makers can work through this fifth column to further alter the social and political landscape of a target area.

An increase in HUMINT penetration and an expansion of the scope of HUMINT is vital to influencing all three variables. This effort should be largely undertaken by the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO). The Operations Officers (OOs) will be the medium through which the increase and expansion of HUMINT occurs. As of now, OOs are largely stationed overseas in U.S. embassies under official covers: USAID, DOD, and the DOS. This extensively limits the ability of the OO to do their job: recruit and handle sources, as well as conduct covert action. Which in turn inhibits their ability to penetrate foreign governments, militaries, political parties, corporations, social movements, NGOs, and other non-state actors (NSA) like terrorist and criminal organizations. The ability to have viable sources within these sectors of a target area is vitally important for two reasons: it gives insight into the machinations of the social and political landscape and it provides channels of influence for the U.S. Therefore, the CIA should take greater steps to issue non-official covers to its OOs. When these individuals can operate in a clandestine nature they can increase their penetration as it is not obvious that they are employees of the U.S. embassy. The OOs also need to expand the types of individuals they recruit. Today, it is far more beneficial to one's career, if they recruit and upper-echelon members of society. However, this is a huge mistake. OOs must also recruit and handle others in society: taxi drivers, hackers, radio hosts, news anchors, journalists, bloggers, merchants, smugglers, drug dealers, gun runners, terrorists, organized crime members, street vendors, etc. These are the individuals who are actively engaged, one way or another, with the actual forces that create and influence the social and political landscape of a nation. Who is going to know about the appearance of foreigners in an area first? Of gun shipments? Of terrorist movements? Of upcoming protests? Who is going to deliver the news of riots, anti-government movements, corruption in the government, or human rights abuses to the people?

The list goes on and on. To do this, OOs must work with individuals who are viewed in the eyes of the U.S. as criminals, terrorist, and narcos. This can be an upsetting feeling, however, the power and influence of NSAs is vital to formulating an already strong networked opposition.

The U.S. must revamp the once USIA into a 21st century version of its former self. This new USIA should focus on the U.S. image abroad, specifically informing the masses about our promotion of democracy and human rights in those areas; i.e. our position points. This should largely be done through the various levels of propaganda- white, silver, and black-, information operations, and the direct/indirect control of various broadcasting infrastructure like *Radio Free Europe*, *Radio Liberty*, and *Radio Free America*. There should be sections in this agency for specific geographical regions, housed by specialists in the given area's culture, history, economics, and politics. There should also be an international news agency that is very similar to *Russia Today* that actively participates in information warfare and disinformation to counter the influence operations of other nations. Lastly, there should be a section of the USIA that covertly works abroad as journalists, bloggers, TV hosts, radio hosts, etc. in other nation's media infrastructure. This agency will actively allow the U.S. to influence all three variables. It will create contacts within the media infrastructure of various nations, therefore further networking and strengthening the opposition; it will actively promote a pro-U.S. message to important target areas as well as identify, exploit, and amplify repertoires of resistance in these areas; and it will set up and manage physical infrastructure both in these areas and on the internet so the mobilization and distribution of information is effective.

U.S. must also use its MNCs and NGOs as tentacles of its foreign policy apparatus. This sentiment reflects an important tenant of political warfare: the blurring of the line between politics and conflict. Both MNCs and NGOs are by nature political, interact with foreign governments and civil societies, and therefore, offer a private sector medium through which the U.S. can achieve its interests abroad. In terms of MNCs, the best example would be the use of our energy corporations like Exxon Mobile. The RF uses its primary energy corporation, Gazprom, in this manner and has achieved much

success. Exxon Mobile has immense influence in regions of the world where the U.S. has vital interests. If the U.S. wishes to keep its interactions within a target area covert, then Exxon Mobile, a private enterprise, can be used as a vehicle: to buy politicians, ship money and arms to the opposition, to conduct economic warfare, to purchase media infrastructure, energy infrastructure, and so on. On the other side of the equation are NGOs. The U.S. since the creation of NED, in the 1980s, has been accused of using NGOs to promote democracy and human rights, interfere in elections, and to destabilize foreign societies by promoting and supporting social movements. If this is true, then this must be expanded. NGOs have vital insight into the social and political landscape of target areas: in many cases they are the fabric which both makes up and holds a nation's civil society together. NGOs can be used to covertly support political movements and candidates, to amplify repertoires of resistance so civil society is mobilized by contentious politics, and to act as physical infrastructure to mobilize and distribute pro-U.S. messages to the social landscape.

Closing Remarks: Shortfalls of this Research Paper

I will readily admit that this paper has shortfalls, many of which I would argue were a result of the timeline I was given, the page limit, and the scope upon which I based this research paper. The shortfalls of this paper are: the number of cases I could analyze in this report, the literature available on given variables, the accompanying analysis of these variables, and the recommendation section.

The first shortfall is the number of cases I could analyze in this report. In *Table 1.1* you will note more cases than appeared in this research paper. Given both the timeline and page limit restriction, I was unable to provide an in-depth case study analysis of all the cases in the table. I believe this takes away from the research because five cases is not enough, in my opinion, to show really strong, clear relationships between variables.

The second shortfall is the lack of extensive literature on the first three variables analyzed in this research paper. Despite my database searching, I could not find specific academic research into these

variables. I therefore had to search for them in the literature I had noticed them mentioned in, compile these various accounts, and draw conclusions based on the available information. This shortfall affected the third shortfall: the analysis of the first three variables is not as strong as the last three. With less information, I was unable to provide as strong of an analysis as I did with the final three variables. This took away from the research the ability for the reader to see the lack of a pattern between the first three variables and the dependent variable.

The fourth and final drawback was the limited recommendations I provided at the end of my research paper. If I was not limited on page requirements, I could have written an extensive, long recommendation on how I think the U.S. should operate in the various geographical regions of the world. I feel strong in the recommendations I gave, but do not feel as strong in the explanations of how they would operate and why they would be able to do what I said they could do. This takes away from the research paper a clearer identification and understanding of why I spent so much time deeply analyzing the three key variables, especially under the Ukrainian case study.

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<i>Table 1.1</i>	Afghanistan	Cuba	Poland	Vietnam	Ukraine	Indochina
Already Strong Networked Opposition	Tolerable	Disadvantageous	Advantageous	Tolerable-Disadvantageous	Advantageous	Disadvantageous
Repertoire of Resistance to develop the narrative of resistance	Advantageous	Disadvantageous	Advantageous	Tolerable-Disadvantageous	Advantageous	Disadvantageous
Physical Infrastructure to mobilize and distribute information	Tolerable	Disadvantageous	Advantageous	Tolerable	Advantageous	Tolerable-Disadvantageous
Corruption in modern social, economic, and political institutions	Disadvantageous	Disadvantageous	Advantageous	Disadvantageous	Advantageous	Disadvantageous
Strength of Primary External Actor	Advantageous	Advantageous	Advantageous	Advantageous	Advantageous	Advantageous
N-Actors	Disadvantageous	Advantageous	Advantageous	Disadvantageous	Advantageous-Tolerable	Disadvantageous