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Review of Foreign Policy X - International Situation and U.S. Foreign Policy

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REVIEW OF FOREIGN POLICY - X

The International Situation and
United States Foreign Policy

Mr. President:

I conclude today the series of remarks on the international
situation and foreign policy which I began last January. This final
statement is the tenth in the series. It is in the nature of a summing up.

When I initiated this series some months ago, I knew that time would
not permit me to discuss this subject as fully as it ought to be discussed.

While the sum of these remarks is extensive, as the Members who have
listened patiently to them are well aware, there are, nevertheless, gaps,
important gaps.

I have passed over many details in the previous statements on
Southeast Asia, North Africa, the Middle East, the African Continent, Latin
America, Europe, the Far East and the Soviet Union. Moreover, lack of time
has made it impossible for me to survey our relations with Canada, South
Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Yet each of these areas is the scene of
developments that are of great significance to the United States.
In this, as in so many other matters which confront us, the press of Senate business leaves us little choice. We do the best that we can and then hope that it is not too little.

I do not know whether this series of statements has done justice to the question of the international situation and our foreign policy. It is only one Senator's effort. While I do not regret the effort, I recognize its limitations.

Even the limited attempt may be regarded as unwarranted. I know that there are some who hold foreign policy to be of little concern to the Senate or Congress. Foreign policy, they say, is too remote from the interests of ordinary citizens. But, Mr. President, if World War II could cost Montana the grief of 1,000 casualties, as it did, then foreign policy is not remote from the interests of the citizens of my state. If the Korean conflict could inflict 5,000 casualties on my state, as it did, then foreign policy is a matter of vital importance to the Senators from Montana. If, in a decade, national defense requirements can extract $300 billion from the earnings and wages of the American people and aid programs place on them an additional charge of $50 billion, as they have, then foreign policy is of the greatest significance to every citizen of this country.
If foreign policy can influence the course of world events towards peace or war, as it does, then the Senate of the United States has more than a casual concern in the matter.

This body has a deep obligation. We have a profound obligation to make what contribution we can to improving the nation's foreign policy. In a nuclear age, with the dangers of sudden atomic annihilation ever-present, it is perhaps an obligation beyond all others.

The Constitution reminds us of that obligation if, in our concern with pressing and important domestic issues, we are prone to forget it.

From the Constitution, the President derives the power to conduct the foreign policy of the United States. And from the Constitution, the Senate derives the responsibility "to advise and to consent" in foreign relations.

The President's power is not expressed in the Constitution but it is clearly implied. The Senate's responsibility is not expressed but it, too, is clearly implied.
I have upheld the powers of the Presidency in foreign policy even when it has seemed to me that the President was intent upon delegating them to the Congress. I shall continue to do so. In the same fashion, I have sought to uphold the responsibilities of the Senate in foreign relations whenever, in my opinion, the Executive Branch has tended to overlook or circumvent them. And I shall continue to do so.

This government, Mr. President, functions best when neither branch -- the Executive or the Legislative -- encroaches on the powers of the other. It functions best when neither branch abandons its responsibilities to the other. It functions best in foreign relations when there is cooperation coupled with independence on the part of both branches in seeking to serve the interests of the people of the United States.

It was with these thoughts in mind, Mr. President, that I began this series some months ago with an initial statement entitled "A Review of Foreign Policy is Needed". Now, at the conclusion of the series, I am convinced that such was the case. A review has been needed. It has taken place in part and is continuing to take place. The people of the nation is heavily engaged in the process. Many members of the Senate and the House
have made outstanding contributions to it. There are signs that the Executive Branch is finally awakening to its necessity.

This general review, Mr. President, is helping to clarify the international situation and the needs of foreign policy to which the situation gives rise. It has already shown that throughout the world we are dealing today with a set of facts that is vastly different from those of a few years ago or even a year ago. It has shown, too, that while the facts have changed, our foreign policy has not changed at any rate, that it has not changed sufficiently to keep pace with shifting international developments.

I have had no desire to be critical of the Executive Branch in this review. I have said many times that the President and the Secretary of State do the best they can with the enormous responsibilities in foreign policy which rest on their shoulders. I have pleaded many times on this floor for an understanding of their problems and the difficulties which confront them. On many occasions I have given support to their efforts when they desperately needed support in this Chamber.
It is one thing, however, to recognize that the national interest requires a non-political approach of this kind. It is another to equate a non-political approach in matters of vital importance to the nation with a blind and uncritical acceptance of the views of the Executive Branch in foreign relations. If we differ with that branch, if we perceive in good conscience weaknesses in our policies, we have an obligation to speak out.

Mr. President, that is what I have been trying to do in this series of statements. My understanding of the international situation has differed in important respects from that of the Executive Branch. I believe I have perceived weaknesses in the policies which we pursue in connection with that situation. And I have spoken out freely and frankly.

I have tried to avoid a partisan approach in this matter. I have tried to be objective and constructive in these statements. But I have not tried to avoid facing the facts as I see the facts, or the logic, in terms of our policy which flows from the facts.
Mr. President, a total picture emerges from the type of review I have been pursuing these past few months. In this picture, the world situation is neither black nor white. It is many shades of gray. It contains elements which give hope for peace, freedom and human progress. It contains others which clearly threaten these goals. It contains still others whose significance is yet unknown.

On the one hand, there is no question that Western Europe has recovered in an economic sense from World War II and in some respects is more prosperous than ever. There is no question that Latin America is in the midst of a vast economic expansion. There is no question that massive colonial areas have emerged into national independence in Asia and that this transition is now extending into Africa. There is no question that the enemy states of World War II, principally Germany and Japan, have been restored and for the present remain linked with other free nations. There is no question that the Soviet system is in the grip of obscure but powerful internal forces released by the death of Stalin and that, in consequence, the danger of war in the West has receded, at least for the moment.
All of these developments and others provide hope for the future. We ought to welcome them. We ought to take comfort in whatever part our foreign policies of the past decade may have played in bringing them about.

Reassuring though they may be, however, these developments do not provide cause for optimism, unless it is a "whistling-in-the-dark" optimism.

Reassuring though they may be, however, these developments do not provide occasion for the fatuous assumption that all is well with the world and our foreign policies have made it that way.

There is another side to the coin, another side of the international situation. It is a dark side. The fact is that for each positive, encouraging aspect of the international situation, there is a negative, discouraging aspect. Furthermore, there are some negatives for which I have looked in vain for positives.

If we take, for example, the positive fact of the recovery of Western Europe, we find that it has a negative. The European nations and, in a larger sense, all of the Western nations are not acting to reinforce the unity which made recovery possible. What, as a result, is happening to European unity? What is happening to NATO? Both these and other bases for
the common action of the free nations are crumbling. As they crumble,
what will happen to the recovery and new-found strength of the Western
nations? I may be wrong, Mr. President. I hope I am wrong. It seems to
me that the Western nations may be entering into a new era of devil-take-the-
hindmost, not too dissimilar from that which preceded World War II. We may be
entering into it in a blind binge of prosperity that is taking place on the
brink of disaster.

Turning to the Western Hemisphere, what of the tendencies toward an
estrangement of neglect as between ourselves and the other American
Republics? Are these cause for optimism especially when the Soviet Union
moves rapidly to fill the widening gaps? I was delighted that the
President was able to attend the Pan-American Conference recently
and that of the growing pressures within Germany to separate from
Western Europe? What of similar separatist pulls on Japan?

The achievement of national independence in most of the former
colonial areas of Asia is a step towards freedom and, as such, is to be
welcomed by this country. But what of the vast array of social, economic
and political problems in these countries which demand solution even if they are totalitarian solutions? What of the growing Soviet and Chinese Communist influence in these newly independent states? Are these, too, causes for optimism?

And what of the turmoil within the Soviet empire itself? This turmoil may have relaxed for the moment the tyranny of a Stalin and the aggressive threat which it posed. That is a development which is to be welcomed and encouraged. At the same time, however, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that this very change has enabled Soviet totalitarianism to penetrate more effectively abroad by increasing the acceptability of communism.

In the light of these negatives, it would be wise, Mr. President, for the Executive Branch, for all of us, to restrain our optimism. It would be wise to temper our optimism with the sobering realities which I have just summarized. And in the light of the unsettled conflicts in Korea, Formosa, Indochina, the Middle East and Kashmir, it would be wise to temper our optimism a great deal. For these negatives, the positives are, as yet, non-existent, or, at best, only dimly discernible.
Let me make clear, Mr. President, that I am not suggesting that we go from a fatuous optimism to a bleak pessimism in our approach to foreign relations. One is as meaningless as the other and an effective foreign policy has little to do with either.

An effective foreign policy has to do first with an accurate perception of the facts of the international situation, with an understanding of the world as it is and not as we would wish it to be. It has to do with an evaluation of those facts in terms of our national interest in peace, freedom and progress. It has to do finally with intelligent action calculated to serve the national interests in the light of the facts and their evaluation.

An effective foreign policy, Mr. President, is one which recognizes that there is no virtue in action for the sake of action but does not use this principle as an excuse for inaction when action is essential. It is one which recognizes that there are some situations in which to do less is better than to do more, to say less better than to say more.
An effective foreign policy is one which recognizes human limitations. It is one which contains sufficient humility and religious faith to recognize that history is not shaped by one nation alone and cannot be reshaped by one nation alone.

This review, Mr. President, has led me to the conclusion that our foreign policy is deficient in all of these characteristics of effectiveness. I say this, Mr. President, not in criticism of individuals but in the hope that we may reduce the deficiencies. I do not believe we shall ever eliminate them as long as policy is made and conducted by human beings, Republicans or Democrats.

There are, however, degrees of deficiency, and it is the responsibility of this government to take all reasonable measures to reduce the deficiency.

There is a road to a better foreign policy, Mr. President. I have tried to indicate where that road is to be found. Throughout this series, I have pointed to many situations in which I believe weaknesses exist.
I have advanced ideas which I believed would help to correct them. Other members of the Senate have done the same. It is a hopeful sign to me as I know it must be to them to see evidences of an awakening awareness in the Executive Branch to weaknesses in policy, to see a gradual incorporation of some of the ideas into policy.

The need, however, is very great. It cannot be met from the Senate alone, or from Congress alone. The responsibility for meeting it, the responsibility for improving our policies lies largely within the Executive Branch. It is that branch which must strive to make certain that the international facts which go into the formulation of policy are actually facts and not the fiction of bias, wishful thinking, or fear. It is that branch which to a large extent must interpret these facts into countless decisions which safeguard the total interest of the people of the United States. It is that branch which must act on these decisions — act honestly, act intelligently, act promptly, act firmly and with a singleness of purpose.
Mr. President, if that is the case, it is clear that unless the Executive Branch, and particularly those parts of it involved in foreign policy, function with efficiency and with confidence, our policy will suffer. It is of concern with shortcomings in this connection that I have sought to establish a Joint Congressional Committee for Central Intelligence. Out of the same concern I have been attempting to restore some measure of confidence and morale in the Department of State. Out of the same concern, I have many times stood here in the Senate and denounced the multiplicity of voices in the Executive Branch which take unto themselves the responsibility for speaking for the nation on foreign policy. We have, as a result, come very close to talking ourselves into a war on a number of occasions. We shall not have an effective foreign policy until it is clear that it is the President and, on his behalf, the Secretary of State, who speak for this country to other nations.

Mr. President, the questions which I have been discussing concern essentially the mechanics of foreign policy. There is another factor, the
fundamental factor. That is the attitude of this people and how it is expressed in our relations with other peoples. In the last analysis, we shall have the kind of foreign policy we desire and deserve. If we are fearful, if we are arrogant, if we are indifferent, if we are petty, sooner or later our foreign policy will reflect these characteristics and no matter what artful words or how many words the policy may be clothed in, these characteristics will not be concealed. If, on the other hand, as a nation, we proceed at home with a sure faith in ourselves, in our institutions, and in the spirit of human freedom which gave birth to them, we need not fear for the effectiveness of our foreign policy. We shall have a foreign policy dedicated beyond the power of words to dedicate — dedicated to peace, to freedom and to human progress.

In the last analysis, the choice does not lie with the President or with Congress. The choice lies with the people of the United States.