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American Security Interests in the Middle East

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AMERICAN SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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TODAY, OUR GOVERNMENT LACKS AS NEVER BEFORE AN OVERALL CONCEPTION OF WHAT OUR INTERESTS ARE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WHAT WE HOPE TO ACCOMPLISH THERE.

IN THE PLACE OF A COHERENT POLICY CRAFTED TO ACHIEVE BROAD AND ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES, WE HAVE A MAKESHIFT SERIES OF PIECEMEAL INITIATIVES, TRIED ONE MOMENT AND ABANDONED THE NEXT.

WE APPEAR TO BE GOING DOWN ONE DARK, UNCHARTED STREET AFTER ANOTHER, NOT TO FIND A NEW PATH TO PEACE, BUT MERELY TO CONFIRM COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT IT IS A BLIND ALLEY.

FROM PRESIDENTS TRUMAN THROUGH CARTER, THERE HAVE OF COURSE BEEN MISADVENTURES AND FAILURES IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES AROUND THE WORLD.

BUT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, FOR DECADES OUR POLICY WAS ESTABLISHED ON THE PURSUIT OF TWO OBJECTIVES: 1) MAINTAINING AND STRENGTHENING OUR STRATEGIC ALLIANCE WITH ISRAEL; 2) AND ACHIEVING A PEACE SETTLEMENT EMBRACING MUCH, IF NOT ALL OF THE REGION.
NOTHING WAS TO INTERFERE WITH THOSE OBJECTIVES. SECONDARY GOALS MIGHT GROW FROM THEM, BUT THOSE OBJECTIVES WERE THE ROCK, THE CORNERSTONE OF OUR POLICY THERE BECAUSE THEY BEST PROTECTED OUR INTERESTS.

AFTER YEARS OF EFFORT BY PRESIDENTS NIXON, FORD, AND CARTER, WE AT LAST SUCCEEDED IN 1979 IN ENDING YEARS OF STRIFE AND ANTAGONISM BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL THROUGH THE SIGNING OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORD.

THE AGREEMENT SIGNALLED MORE THAN JUST A PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN TWO LONG-TIME ADVERSARIES IN A SENSITIVE PART OF THE WORLD.

IT SIGNIFIED IN FACT AN END OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE STRONGEST POWER IN THE REGION, ISRAEL, AND THE ARAB STATE WHOSE CULTURE, LOCATION, HISTORY, AND MILITARY PROWESS PLACED IT FAR AND AWAY AS THE LEADER OF THE ARAB WORLD.

EGYPT, FOR DECADES THE GREATEST OBSTACLE TO PEACE, HAD BECOME A BROTHER IN THE EFFORT TO CONVINCE ALL NATIONS OF THE REGION THAT MILITARY SOLUTIONS COULD NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEMS THAT HAVE FOR SO LONG TROUBLED THE MIDDLE EAST.
IT MEANT EGYPT HAD AGREED TO ABANDON THE POLICY THAT HAD BEEN ITS DRIVING FORCE: THE SHAPING AND THE SPURRING FORWARD OF AN ARAB FRONT THAT WAS AGREED ON ONE GOAL -- THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL.

ONE AND ALL AGREED THAT THE NEXT LOGICAL STEP AFTER CAMP DAVID WAS TO SHAVE OFF ONE ARAB STATE AFTER ANOTHER FROM THE REMAINING -- AND WEAKENED -- COALITION OF THOSE WHO BELIEVED THAT ISRAEL MUST BE BROUGHT TO ITS KNEES.

BUILDING ON THE PEACE AGREEMENT -- AND THE GROWING FRIENDSHIP -- BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT BY BRINGING IN THE SECONDARY STATES OF THE REGION, BY PERSUADING THEM THAT THEIR TROUBLED SOCIETIES COULD HAVE A CHANCE TO PROSPER IN PEACE, WOULD BE A DIFFICULT BUT CERTAINLY NOT IMPOSSIBLE TASK.

AFTER ALL, THE MOST DIFFICULT STEP, THE FIRST STEP, OF THE PEACE PROCESS HAD ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.

BUT IN THE PLACE OF SUCH A STRATEGY FOR PEACE, THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION HAS SUBSTITUTED A QUILTWORK OF JAGGED POLICIES THAT DO NOT SORT OUT INTO ANY COHERENT AND ORDERLY WHOLE.

IN THE PLACE OF ACTING AS THE TRADITIONAL BROKER IN SETTLING DISPUTES IN THE REGION, WE HAVE NOW SETTLED DOWN IN LEBANON ON THE SIDE OF ONE ARAB FACTION AGAINST MANY OTHERS.
IN THE PLACE OF TRYING TO MAINTAIN CONTACT, OF KEEPING THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION OPEN TO ALL ARAB STATES POTENTIALLY INTERESTED IN PEACE, WE HAVE FOR THE FIRST TIME PUT OURSELVES INTO COMBAT AGAINST AN ARAB PEOPLE.

AND IN THE PLACE OF DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES -- INITIATIVES THAT ONCE BROUGHT US CAMP DAVID AND NEUTRAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES IN SENSITIVE AREAS -- WE HAVE OPTED FOR MILITARY SOLUTIONS.

WE HAVE OPTED FOR A POLICY OF ARMS SALES -- MEANT NOT TO PROTECT A TROUBLED NATION'S THREATENED BORDERS, BUT TO ENHANCE ITS CAPACITY TO STRIKE BEYOND ITS OWN TERRITORY.

THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS FOLLOWED POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH ARE ALMOST COMPLETELY DETACHED FROM A HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED.

INSTEAD OF PURSUING THE OBJECTIVES OF CAMP DAVID WHICH PUT AS A FIRST PRIORITY THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS, THE PRESIDENT EMBARKED UPON POLICIES TO BUILD A "STRATEGIC CONSENSUS" IN THE REGION AS SOON AS HE CAME INTO OFFICE.

THE "STRATEGIC CONSENSUS" WAS TO BE EXPRESSED IN A HEAVILY ARMED PERIMETER OF ARAB STATES, A MIDDLE EASTERN MAGINOT LINE, CONSTRUCTED TO WARD OFF A RUSSIAN INVASION THAT ONLY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAW COMING.

THIS POLICY WAS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH CAMP DAVID. HOW COULD THE PEACE PROCESS BE GIVEN FIRST PRIORITY AT A TIME WHEN ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS WERE BEING ARMED BY THE COUNTRY WHICH SO SHORTLY BEFOREHAND HAD PRESSED BOTH ARABS AND JEWS TO LAY ASIDE THEIR WEAPONS AND REACH A LASTING SETTLEMENT?

ISRAEL INEVITABLY FELT ISOLATED, BECAUSE IT KNEW THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THE MIDDLE EAST AND DIDN'T IN PARTICULAR UNDERSTAND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTIES THAT THE HOLOCAUST HAD BRED IN EVERY CITIZEN OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL.

YET ISRAEL'S COMMITMENT TO CAMP DAVID REMAINED STRONG.

AT A TIME WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS PURSUING HIS "STRATEGIC CONSENSUS", ISRAEL WAS HONORING A CRITICAL PROVISION OF CAMP DAVID -- THE RETURN OF THE SINAI TO EGYPT, A STEP WHICH REMOVED AN IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL SHIELD AND STRATEGIC BARRIER BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS STRONGEST POTENTIAL ADVERSARY.

CAMP DAVID WAS POSSIBLE ONLY BECAUSE ISRAEL FELT SECURE AND BECAUSE ANWAR SADAT WAS A MAN OF IMAGINATION AND ROBUST COURAGE.

THAT SENSE OF SECURITY HAS BEEN LOST.

IT HAS BEEN LOST IN LARGE PART BECAUSE THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS ENTERTAINED UNREALISTICALLY OPTIMISTIC NOTIONS ABOUT THE ARAB WORLD.
THE ADMINISTRATION THOUGHT THE AWACS SALE WOULD "MODERATE" SAUDI ARABIA. IT DIDN'T.

THE ADMINISTRATION THOUGHT THAT THE ARAB SUMMIT AT FEZ WOULD LEAD TO A MODERATE ARAB POSITION. IT DIDN'T.

THE CURRENT POLICY IN LEBANON HAS EVOLVED IN THE SAME CONFUSED ATMOSPHERE OF UNREALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS.

ONE OF THE CASUALTIES HAS BEEN THE GROWING UNCERTAINTY OF MUTUAL EXPECTATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES.

TODAY, WE ARE IN DANGER OF SEEING THE LONG-HEARD PHRASE "U.S.-ISRAELI FRIENDSHIP" BECOME A SLOGAN RATHER THAN A FACT.

WE HAVE PURSUED POLICIES THAT HAVE HAD THE EFFECT -- THE UNINTENTIONAL EFFECT, TO BE SURE -- OF THROWING INTO DOUBT OUR STEADFAST STRATEGIC, POLITICAL, AND MORAL ALLIANCE WITH ISRAEL.

THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION HAS LOST SIGHT OF THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES AND WANDERED OFF THE COURSE.

OUR CURRENT INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON HAS PULLED US OFF ONTO A SIDE TRACK THAT IS UNDERCUTTING EVERYTHING THAT PAST ADMINISTRATIONS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
WE HAVE PLACED MARINES IN LEBANON WITH NO CLEARLY DEFINED OBJECTIVES. THEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN OPEN-ENDED ASSIGNMENT WITH NO HOPE OF ANY CONSTRUCTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH MARINES TO MAKE THE SYRIANS BACK OFF, YET IN ORDER TO SURVIVE IN AN EXPOSED POSITION OUR FORCES MUST CONTINUOUSLY ENGAGE IN EXCHANGES OF FIRE WITH FACTIONAL ELEMENTS WHO NO LONGER IDENTIFY US AS PEACEKEEPERS, BUT AS INTRUDERS ON THE SIDE OF THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT.

LAST FALL, SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID THE MARINES WOULD REMAIN IN LEBANON UNTIL THERE WAS "STABILITY" IN THAT COUNTRY.

THAT "STABILITY" IS NOWHERE IN SIGHT.

THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SECURITY PACT BETWEEN GEMAYEL AND THE OPPOSING FACTIONS ARE STALLED, AND A SPIRALLING PATTERN OF RENEWED CONFLICT HAS EMERGED.

GEMAYEL AND THE CHRISTIAN PHALANGISTS ARE UNWILLING TO SHARE POWER WITH OTHER LEBANESE FACTIONS TO ANY EXTENT ACCEPTABLE TO THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

EVEN SAEB SALAM, THE MODERATE LEADER OF THE SUNNI MOSLEMS AND ONCE A SUPPORTER OF GEMAYEL, NOW SAYS THAT GEMAYEL CAN NOT BE TRUSTED TO SHARE POWER.
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS PUT US SQUARELY IN THE CENTER OF THIS DISPUTE. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS APPEARS TO BE THAT SYRIA IS A GREAT THREAT TO AMERICAN AND TO ISRAELI SECURITY INTERESTS.

I DO NOT UNDERSTAND SUCH REASONING.

SOME YEARS AGO, SYRIA WAS THE ARAB STATE CHARGED WITH MAINTAINING A SEMBLANCE OF ORDER IN LEBANON. SYRIA OCCUPIED TERRITORY IN LEBANON AND HAS THE DE FACTO ADMINISTRATOR OF SECTIONS OF THE COUNTRY. IN FACT, FOR WELL OVER A CENTURY SYRIA HAS EXERCISED GREAT INFLUENCE OVER LEBANESE AFFAIRS.

NOW, SUDDENLY, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS DECLARED SYRIA'S ROLE UNACCEPTABLE AND THREATENING TO BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND TO ISRAEL, AS IF THE SITUATION IN LEBANON TODAY HAD NO RESEMBLANCE WHATEVER TO THE SITUATION THAT HAS BEEN THE NORM THERE FOR DECADES.

WHY DID WE NOT FIND OUR INTERESTS SO THREATENED THERE TWO YEARS AGO, BUT TODAY HAVE MADE THE EFFORT TO TERMINATE SYRIAN INFLUENCE IN LEBANON THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE OF OUR MIDDLE EAST POLICY?

BUT MORE THAN THAT, PRESIDENT REAGAN, SECRETARY SHULTZ, AND NSC ADVISOR McFARLANE HAVE BEGUN TO DEFINE THE PROBLEM IN GLOBAL TERMS. WE HAVE UPPED THE ANTE BY HINTING OF SOVIET DESIGNS -- WHAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS REFERRED TO AS THE OBJECTIVES OF "AN OUTSIDE POWER" -- IN LEBANON.
THE ADMINISTRATION HAS SPOKEN OF LEBANON AS A MEETING GROUND OF BOTH THE VALUES AND THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EAST AND WEST. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SUCH IS ISRAEL'S UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN LEBANON.

ISRAEL SEeks DISENGAGEMENT FROM LEBANON, AND WISELY UNDERSTANDS THAT LEBANON IS ABOVE ALL A CONTINUING BATTLEGROUND OF RIVAL SECTARIAN ELEMENTS. LEBANON CAN BECOME A FIELD FOR EAST-WEST ENGAGEMENT ONLY IF WE AND THE SOVIET-BACKED SYRIANS FALL INTO A BUILDING PATTERN OF RECRIMINATORY MILITARY STRIKES.

AMERICAN INTERESTS ARE NOT SERVED BY SUCH A POLICY, ISRAELI INTERESTS ARE NOT SERVED BY SUCH A POLICY, AND THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS NOT SERVED BY SUCH A POLICY.

FOUR YEARS AGO, CAMP DAVID WAS POSSIBLE, FIRST, BECAUSE NO ONE DOUBTED OUR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL, AND SECOND, BECAUSE WE WERE ON GOOD TERMS WITH THE MOST RESPECTED ARAB LEADERS.

BUT TODAY, WE HAVE THROWN OURSELVES IN THE MIDST OF FACTIONAL DISPUTES IN THE ARAB WORLD AND HAVE DIRECTLY EMPLOYED FORCE AGAINST AN ARAB MILITARY FORCE.

OUR ENGAGEMENT IN CONFLICT WITH SYRIA HAS MERELY GIVEN A NEWLY FOUND POSITION OF LEADERSHIP AND CREDIBILITY TO A REGIME PREVIOUSLY SEEN BY MANY ARAB LEADERS AS REPREHENSIBLE. SYRIA HAS SEEN ITS STATUS RAISED IN THE ARAB WORLD, PARTICULARLY AMONG EXTREMIST ELEMENTS.
For each step further into conflict, we take a step away from our hard-earned role as a mediator in the Middle East peace process.

The administration even seems to invite problems, to bring chaos out of order. Just when Arafat was weak and had succeeded in discrediting himself with so many of the factions of the Palestinian movement, the State Department two weeks ago characterized him as a "key figure" in the peace process after his meeting with President Mubarak.

Arafat had proved to the world that he could not command the allegiance of a significant portion of the Palestinians. His defeat in Lebanon should have been the beginning of the end.

Why, after his years of effort to thwart the peace process at every turn, do we now regard him as key to the resolution of existing problems?

And now the administration has re-opened yet another can of worms.

Three weeks ago, King Hussein of Jordan reconvened his parliament and made what was billed as a major address. In it, he made overtures to Arafat to negotiate a Middle East peace settlement.
THE ADMINISTRATION TREATED THIS AS A WELCOME INITIATIVE, RAISING
ONCE AGAIN THE PROSPECT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SEPTEMBER 1982
PLAN COULD BE SUBSTITUTED FOR CAMP DAVID.

THAT PLAN SOUGHT TO BRING KING HUSSEIN INTO TALKS TO SHIFT THE
WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP OUT OF ISRAELI CONTROL, WHEN ALL
QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO THOSE AREAS WERE TO BE DEALT WITH INSIDE
THE FRAMEWORK OF CAMP DAVID.

I DID NOT READ ANYWHERE IN KING HUSSEIN'S "MAJOR ADDRESS" A
CALL TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL.

I DID NOT READ ANYWHERE IN HUSSEIN'S "MAJOR ADDRESS" A CALL TO
LIVE IN PEACE WITH ISRAEL.

I DID NOT READ ANYWHERE IN HUSSEIN'S "MAJOR ADDRESS" A CALL TO
NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH ISRAEL.

WE HAVE HEARD KING HUSSEIN'S SONG BEFORE. LAST SUMMER HUSSEIN
WENT THROUGH THE MOTIONS OF NEGOTIATING WITH ARAFAT IN AN EFFORT
TO BRING HIM TO THE BARGAINING TABLE. THOSE MOTIONS -- AND THAT
IS ALL THEY WERE -- WERE CONINCIDENTALLY FOLLOWED BY A REQUEST
FOR ARMS.

WE ARE NOW SEEING A RE-PLAY OF THIS SAME THEME. FOR SUDDENLY THE
ADMINISTRATION HAS RESURRECTED ITS PROPOSAL FOR A JORDANIAN STRIKE
FORCE -- KILLED LAST NOVEMBER BY THE CONGRESS.
THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSES TO EQUIP AN 8000-MAN JORDANIAN FORCE WITH $220 MILLION OF C-130s, TOW ANTI-TANK MISSILES, BRIDGE-LAYING EQUIPMENT, AND OTHER ASSORTED ITEMS. THE PURPOSE: TO QUELL POSSIBLE INSURRECTIONS IN IMPORTANT MODERATE ARAB STATES THAT ARE ON GOOD TERMS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

KING HUSSEIN HAS ENOUGH DIFFICULTY KEEPING ORDER IN HIS OWN COUNTRY, MUCH LESS MOVING HIS ARMY TO FAR-FLUNG REACHES OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

AND IT DOES NOT TAKE MUCH IMAGINATION TO SEE THE USES OF TROOP-CARRYING C-130s AND BRIDGE-LAYING EQUIPMENT SHOULD HUSSEIN BE MOVED ONE DAY TO COME ACROSS THE JORDAN RIVER.

WE HAVE A SECURITY AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT THAT HAS GROWN OUT OF EGYPT'S COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS.

IT IS MY FEELING THAT A MORE EXTENSIVE SECURITY AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN, ENTAILING TRAINING AND SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY, IS TOTALLY UNWARRANTED UNTIL KING HUSSEIN DEMONSTRATES HIS COMMITMENT TO PEACE BY RECOGNIZING ISRAEL, JOINING THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, AND TAKING CONCRETE STEPS FOR PEACE.

AT THAT POINT AND AT THAT POINT ONLY SHOULD WE EVEN BEGIN TO THINK ABOUT A SECURITY ARRANGEMENT WITH JORDAN. LET JORDAN FIRST DEMONSTRATE A SUBSTANTIVE DEDICATION TO THE PEACE PROCESS.
IT IS TIME TO REFORMULATE OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST SO THAT THEY ARE REBUILT ON WHAT ONCE BORE FRUIT: A STRONG STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL, AND A COMMITMENT TO THE IDEALS OF CAMP DAVID.

WE MUST PUT ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN FRIENDSHIP BACK AT THE CENTER OF OUR POLICY AND MOVE FORWARD FROM THERE. WE MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT THOSE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE PEACE PROCESS ARE AT THE CENTER OF OUR CONCERNS, AND THAT EVERYTHING ELSE IS SECONDARY.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON ONCE SAID THAT "NOTHING ASTONISHES MEN SO MUCH AS COMMON SENSE AND PLAIN DEALING."

IT IS TIME TO RETURN TO COMMON SENSE AND PLAIN DEALING.

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF THINGS WE MUST DO IF WE ARE TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND RETURN TO POSITIVE AND PRODUCTIVE OBJECTIVES.

FIRST, WE MUST OPPOSE ARMS SALES TO JORDAN. IF KING HUSSEIN JOINS THE PEACE PROCESS, AND PROVES HIS COMMITMENT TO ITS FURTHERANCE, THEN AND ONLY THEN SHOULD WE BEGIN TO CONSIDER JORDAN'S SECURITY NEEDS, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVES BASED ON ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN FRIENDSHIP AND SECURITY.

SECOND, WE SHOULD BE VOCAL IN OUR AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND KEEP ANY DIFFERENCES PRIVATE. DISAGREEMENTS ARE INEVITABLE. I BELIEVE IT IS A SIGN OF THE HEALTH OF THE RELATIONSHIP THAT LEADERS OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL CAN ARGUE FRANKLY AND WITHOUT HESITATION.
BUT IT IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS TO CARRY OUT SUCH ARGUMENTS IN PUBLIC AND THROUGH THE MEDIA.

THIRD, WE MUST TAKE ISRAEL'S CASE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. FOR ISRAEL IS OF GREAT VALUE TO THE UNITED STATES BOTH AS A STRATEGIC ALLY AND AS AN OUTSTANDING EXAMPLE OF HOW DEMOCRACY CAN FLOURISH EVEN WHEN SURROUNDED BY HOSTILE NEIGHBORS.

ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE FORGED A STRONG RELATIONSHIP SINCE ISRAEL'S FOUNDING AS A STATE. IN TODAY'S WORLD, SUCH RELATIONSHIPS ARE DIFFICULT TO BUILD, AND EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO NOURISH ONCE ESTABLISHED.

THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY THE LANGUAGE OF MILITARISM AND OF PERSUASION THROUGH FORCE. IT CAN NOT SUCCEED.

WINSTON CHURCHILL, REFLECTING ON THE STRIFE-TORN YEARS OF THE 1930s AND 1940s, ONCE WROTE:

"THOSE WHO ARE PRONE BY TEMPERAMENT AND CHARACTER TO SEEK SHARP AND CLEAR-CUT SOLUTIONS OF DIFFICULT AND OBSCURE PROBLEMS, WHO ARE READY TO FIGHT WHENEVER SOME CHALLENGE COMES FROM A FOREIGN POWER, HAVE NOT ALWAYS BEEN RIGHT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THOSE WHOSE INCLINATION IS... TO SEEK PATIENTLY AND FAITHFULLY FOR PEACEFUL COMPROMISE ARE NOT ALWAYS WRONG. ON THE CONTRARY, IN THE MAJORITY OF INSTANCES THEY MAY BE RIGHT, NOT ONLY MORALLY BUT FROM A PRACTICAL STANDPOINT."
TODAY, THOSE WORDS RING TRUE WITH EQUAL FORCE. WE WOULD DO WELL TO KEEP THEM BEFORE US IN SEEKING TO BRING PEACE TO THE MIDDLE EAST.