Towards a Durable Peace II - Europe and the U.S. Policies

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TOWARDS A DURABLE PEACE

II. Europe and United States Policies

Mr. President:

A short time ago I discussed with the Senate what I regard as
some of the principal points of potential conflict in the world. I
suggested that, despite any appearances to the contrary, pressures
exist in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East which, if unrelieved,
could precipitate war.

If we wish to act, to act for peace it will do no good to
ignore these situations. It will do no good to propagandize ourselves
into the belief that the tensions which they contain will be forever
held in check. The fuses are set and any one of them, at any time,
can be ignited by accident or by design and blast this misleading
illusion in our faces.

If there is to be a firmer base for peace in Europe, the Middle
East and the Far East, it seems to me essential that we see these regions
as they are, not as they were yesterday or as we might like them to
be, but as they are now. It is necessary to determine whether any
changes can be made in our policies which may serve to reduce the danger of conflict in one or more of these regions. I may add that it is equally necessary that the Russians and the nations of the regions themselves do the same.

To those who say that the Russians will not act for peace in these dangerous situations, I must point out that if they do not do so, then by some perversion of reason, they have concluded that their interest lies in their extinction along with the general destruction of human society. For, it is that, rather than Soviet aggrandisement or American gain which is the promise of the failure to act for peace in these situations. Against madness, if such it is that governs the Soviet Union, there is no safeguard except alertness and defense and it goes without saying that we must maintain both.

To those who say, however, that the attitude of the Soviet Union is the sole factor underlying the tensions at the pressure-points of Europe, the Middle East and the Far East I can only point out that history and a modicum of reflection tells us that that is a deceptive oversimplification. It is almost as wrong as the Soviet
view which it parallels, the view which holds us solely responsible for
these tensions. It completely ignores the inner difficulties of Europe,
the Middle East and the Far East, difficulties which exist quite apart
from the Soviet Union and ourselves.

I must point out, further, that this nation's greatness
was not built by reacting to what others do or fail to do but in doing
what we ourselves hold that it is right to do. If we believe peace is
right - and I know of no member of this body who professes otherwise - then
we must, in good faith, work for peace. We must work for it wisely,
prudently, and cautiously but we must work for it. We must work for
it not only as an abstract ideal but as a practical and compelling
necessity. We must work for it, not as a concession to the Russians
but as a duty to ourselves and to mankind.

It is within this basic approach, Mr. President, that I shall
consider, today, the situation in Europe as one of the major pressure-
points of potential conflict in the world. It may seem strange to the
Senate that I list Europe in this fashion. Certainly, if there is any
on the globe where American policies over the years have been helpful in building a relatively high degree of stability for freedom, it is Europe. Certainly, Western Europe has come a long way from the depths of hopelessness and helplessness to which it had sunk by the end of World War II. Certainly, we have been reassured that the recent NATO Conference of Ministers in Copenhagen attests to the vitality of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Certainly, Western Germany has reached new heights of achievement in peace and in freedom. Certainly Soviet totalitarianism is having its troubles in Eastern Europe.

That is all to the good, Mr. President. Unfortunately, it is not the whole picture. There is another aspect of the European situation which does not come so readily or pleasantly into view. Nevertheless, it exists and it constitutes a threat to Europe's peace and, hence, to our peace and to the peace of the world.

This other aspect, this darker side, of the European situation, Mr. President, is composed primarily of three problems: the uncertainty as to the permanence of European integration and NATO cooperation; the delayed unification of Germany; and the unfinished business of a transition
to independence and responsible government in Eastern Europe. Until patterns are firmly established through which these problems can be solved, patterns which promise reasonable stability and reasonable opportunity for freedom to survive and to grow, it is premature to conclude that Europe is on the road to lasting peace.

It is erroneous to conclude, too, that either the Soviet Union or the United States or the United States and the Soviet Union together constitute the sole cause of the difficulty. Yet, that is the type of the conclusion which, today, is being widely drawn, respectively, in this country, in Russia and in Europe.

Of these inner problems of Europe, Mr. President, that of the integration of Western Europe within the larger cooperation of the NATO grouping is the most advanced towards solution. The Europeans themselves have moved a long way towards unity in the Coal and Steel Community, in Euratom, in the Common Market and in other mutual undertakings. They have built a great complex of integrating mechanisms in the past decade, a constructive political achievement which rivals any
other in European history. Further, NATO for all its shortcomings, still maintains around the core of a uniting Western Europe, the basic machinery for the defense of a still-wider arc of free nations.

But this integrating process, Mr. President, however successful it has been to date, is not yet a fully established, self-sustaining one. It cannot stand still in a world which does not stand still. The process must either go on to new heights of common progress and greater security for the participating nations or it will falter and sink back. We may well ask, sink back to what? To the national rivalries of Europe preceding the two great Wars and the isolation of one free nation from another? To the attempt to achieve security for one's own state while others are insecure? Free nations have tried that formula before and they have paid and are continuing to pay an enormous price for the folly.

The truth is that there is no road back to a past. The only retreat is a retreat to disaster, for ourselves and for other free nations.

What disturbs me, however, is a tendency in this country and in others to believe that since such is the case, the nations of the West will not succumb to the temptations of retreat. Unfortunately, Mr. President,
nations in panic, in anger or in desperation have been known many times
to abandon their long-range welfare, and it is a highly dangerous assumption
to hold that they will not do so again.

I do not believe that the concepts of European integration and
Western cooperation - for all the progress of the past decade - have yet
passed the point of no return. The pursuit of these concepts may well
be approaching a crisis at this very time, a crisis brought on largely
by the cumulative attrition of the issues of Cyprus and North Africa,
the impact of the Soviet peace-offensive on the peoples of Western
Europe and the still-unmeasured impact of the recession at home on
ourselves and all free nations.

If the integration of Europe and the cooperation of free
Western nations - this effort to which many nations have given so much -
if it is vital to us and to others, then it is incumbent upon others
and upon us to leave no stone unturned in seeking to assure its continuance.
I realize, of course, that in some respects, the problems of Western
cooperation are such that the policies of this country can have, at best, only a peripheral influence.

That is certainly the case with respect to Cyprus and North Africa. This country has offered Good Offices in the Cyprus issue and the able deputy undersecretary of State [Mr. Murphy] has made a distinguished attempt at reconciliation between France and Tunisia, an essential step in the solution of North African crisis. Both attempts have been unsuccessful. With these measures, however, surely we have not exhausted the possibilities of policy.

I presume that at present we are continuing at every appropriate opportunity to remind the disputants in Cyprus and to remind France with respect to North Africa of the desperate need of all the free Western nations for a peaceful solution to these problems. Perhaps, Mr. President, the time has come to go beyond mere reminders of the obvious. Perhaps the time has come to urge Greece, Turkey and Britain to seek an interim solution in Cyprus along the lines of a condominium of all three over the island and to assist them, if they wish, in finding this solution. I am aware that many avenues have been explored in an effort to settle
the Cypriot dispute but I am not aware that that of condominium has been seriously considered. Nevertheless, an interim status of that kind could assure the continued security of the defense facilities of that strategic island, at least during the present critical time. It could also provide an opportunity to work out a permanent solution to the problem of ultimate sovereignty in an atmosphere of greater stability and shared responsibility. Certainly, it is not presumptuous on our part, as an ally to allies, to put forward this proposal in their interest, in our interest and in the interest of all the NATO members.

Perhaps, Mr. President, it is also time to state frankly to the French that whenever they apply in full the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity which they did so much to give to the world, when they apply these principles to all of the peoples of North Africa, we stand with them and until that time, in all honesty, we cannot. Perhaps, it is time to state to the French that if they move towards a solution in North Africa similar to that devised between the United States and Puerto Rico, towards the commonwealth concept, then we are prepared to join with other NATO members in assisting in what
inevitably will be a difficult transition. Lest we be accused of moral prattle or even of more sinister behavior, however, I must stress that it is for the French to take the initiative, to indicate to us how, if at all, we may support their efforts in this situation.

As I have said, Mr. President, there is a severe limit on what the policies of this country can do in the Cypriot and North African questions. The power and the responsibility of decision lie primarily and properly, elsewhere. We cannot act on our own to remove these dangers and I fully appreciate the difficulties of the Secretary of State in trying to deal with them.

That is not the case, however, insofar, as other jeopardies to Western cooperation are concerned. I refer, first, to the impact of the Soviet peace offensive on the peoples of Western Europe. We may think of this offensive as astute and unscrupulous propaganda. Among people, however, who know, first-hand, war's most agonizing personal tragedies, among people weary of war and the constant threat of war, it is, to say the least, powerful and highly effective propaganda. It creates an extremely difficult dilemma for all responsible European political
leaders who see through the propaganda and who are attempting to align their nation's policies with those of the United States.

The answer to this Soviet propaganda, astute and unscrupulous as it may be, is not to seek to emulate it or outdo it. We may, possibly, win verbal battles with the Russians by out-shouting or by out-spacing them. We will in the process, however, lose something much more important - the nation's integrity. And we will not win something that is far more important than these hollow victories of propaganda.

We will not win and hold the hearts and confidence of the peoples of the world. We had that confidence twice, at the end of World War I and World War II and twice we have allowed it to slip away. We can regain it now, not by better propaganda but by better policies; not by words of peace but by acts of peace.

Let me try, Mr. President, to illustrate this point as it involves Western Europe. It is important for the defense of the free western nations that the NATO military command evolve in an orderly fashion to keep pace with evolving military technology. To that end, Mr. President, we took the initiative a few months ago and obtained
a limited concurrence from other NATO members on the placement of missile bases in European countries. More recently, an Administration bill was placed before Congress which permits the transfer of information on nuclear weapons and components of the weapons to certain NATO nations.

Mr. President, I am in no position at this time to comment on the military necessity or wisdom which prompted these moves. Granted their military importance, however, I must ask what kind of an answer are they to the Soviet peace offensive? How do they look to ordinary people in Europe who like ourselves, have little knowledge of the needs of modern military operations? Standing alone, I submit, they are no answer at all. Yet so far as I know they are the only new significant acts of policy directly affecting Europe and NATO which have been initiated by this country since the Soviet peace offensive began.

Where was the initiative which might have demonstrated that if the cooperation of free men means to us a willingness to die together with others in the common defense of freedom, it also means to us a willingness to live together and to work together with others in common constructive effort? There were measures - companion measures
to those involving missiles' placement abroad and nuclear weapons transfers - which might have been taken to make this point clear. There are measures which can still be taken to make it clear - in our interest and in the interest of the Europeans.

We will not regain the confidence and the support of the peoples of Western Europe merely by proposing to supply their military commands with parts and information on how to put together a nuclear weapon and how to use it - a do-it-yourself kit for destruction. Let us do that, if we must, for the common defense of freedom, but let us not, in all common sense, expect that act, in itself, to fill the longing for constructive action for peace which fills the hearts of ordinary Europeans, ordinary people everywhere. The action which might have begun to fill that longing, the action which was not taken, would have been a concurrent proposal to dig deeper channels of cooperation between ourselves and other western European nations in the development of peaceful nuclear energy and in the exploration of space, these two great scientific achievements of mankind.

Such clumsy official gestures which have so far been made in this connection suggest that when it comes to supplying military missiles
and nuclear weapons to the Europeans we regard them as close and essential allies but when it is a question of cooperation for peaceful progress, either we regard them as dangerous competitors or, in any event, take no notice of what they have contributed and can contribute in these fields.

I cannot see, Mr. President, what is keeping this Administration even now from an active policy of cooperation with Euratom in the more rapid development of the peaceful uses of nuclear power. I cannot see what is keeping this Administration from a policy of cooperation with Western Europe in meeting one of the great constructive tasks of this century - the exploration of space. I cannot see what the block is, Mr. President, unless it is that the Administration may regard as futile an effort to cooperate with Europe on problems of this kind when it cannot even get cooperation among the interested civilian and military agencies within the Executive Branch of the government.

Mr. President, the development of nuclear power and the exploration of space require scientific brains, technical skills and organization, and money. Needless to say, we do not have unlimited resources in any of the categories. Each Western European country alone
does not have an adequate supply of these resources. It seems to me desirable, therefore, beyond all possible doubt, for our own sake as well as for theirs, to work together in the closest possible way with them on these matters. More important, a common focus on these matters cannot help but stimulate the process of European integration and Western cooperation in all of its ramifications. Most important, an American initiative in these matters will be an act, a positive act of peace.

Finally, Mr. President, in this discussion of the threats to Western cooperation - to this keystone of peace in Europe - let me mention the possible adverse impact of the recession here at home. The present period in Europe, is one of intense but uncertain economic activity. To Europe, this period has all the earmarks of prosperity, perhaps the greatest Europeans have ever known, but it is a brittle prosperity.

In the present complex of international trade relations, it is the United States which is the key to a high level of economic activity in Western Europe. The impact of the present recession which is already having serious consequences at home, cannot be contained within our borders. If the recession is prolonged, the consequences abroad
may well be disastrous, not only in an economic sense but in the political
sphere as well.

That is because prosperity in Europe is a thin crust built on
economies which have little, if any margin of reserve. Should the
crust give way finally - and there are already signs of cracking - it
may well destroy the stability of free political institutions in Western
Europe and undermining the cooperation of the countries of that region
one with another, as well as their cooperation with the larger framework
of NATO.

Nothing could be more disastrous to peace and to freedom. I
refer those who doubt this assertion to the sorry history of Europe
between the wars, to the intimate relationship between economic stagna-
tion, economic nationalism, the rise of dictatorships, and the gathering
clouds of war in that period.

In 1954, Mr. President, on returning from Europe, I suggested
in a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations that

"an immediate need would seem to be for the Western
nations to give serious consideration to convening one
or more special economic conferences. Such conferences
might serve to define the problems which must be overcome if the nations of Western Europe and the North Atlantic Community are to maintain sound economies. They could also point the way to common action in meeting these problems ..."

In 1955, on returning from Europe, I alluded to this matter again in these terms:

"the need for a facing of economic facts in the Western Community is essential. This should come in an open and frank conference and it should come before the shortsighted 'each one for himself' practices of the prewar period once again threaten the free nations with a repetition of the economic disaster of the thirties."

Mr. President, I made these observations at a time when we were booming along in a booming prosperity, as was most of Europe. I made them because it seemed to me that a rational solution to problems is more likely to be obtained by acting, not after, but before the stage of crisis is reached.

So far as I know, these observations, made several years ago, were ignored by the Administration. In any event, we have not had the conferences which might have provided the kind of understanding of the international ramifications of present economic difficulties which we now need, the kind of understanding which would have facilitated a more rational consideration of our trade and other international
economic policies. Now, when we are in an economic crisis at home, Congress is presented with the urgent pressures of the Administration to push through a Reciprocal Trade Act and Foreign Aid Bill. It is the same old story, Mr. President, the story of drift and delay until deadline, crisis action in preference to rational action.

To conclude this discussion of the threat of disunity among the Western nations, this threat to peace in Europe, let me reiterate what I said in 1955, for it is, I believe, even more applicable today,

"If we continue to ignore the common responsibilities for building a genuine peace and preserving freedom then we should not be shocked when we awake one day to find both in jeopardy."

I turn now, Mr. President, to the second major problem of peace in Europe, to the problem of a divided Germany. It seems to me that there is one kind of settlement of this problem which is no settlement at all. That is a settlement which would open the way to a unified Germany, whether it be communist-oriented or capitalist oriented, to become once again the military scourge of all Europe, east and west alike. The best, perhaps the only way, to guard against the possibility of a revival of militarism in Germany is the path chosen by
the great majority of the German people at the moment when their revulsion against militarism was greatest. That is the path of peaceful fusion with Western Europe.

Germany is of the west and must remain in the west. Any peace which requires a severance of those ties would be no peace at all. It would not even be appeasement. It would be an act of unmitigated folly, for Germany, for Russia and for Western Europe. On that point, in any settlement of the problem of unification, there can be no yielding.

Within that framework, however, there can be room for negotiation. While Germany's ties with Western Europe must remain intimate and unbroken I cannot see, for example, that the present form and the extent of Germany military participation in the defense of the West need be regarded as sacramental. Security needs are ever-changing needs and West German rearment is not an end in itself. It is for the purpose of contributing to the defense of the Western community and not for the purpose of frightening Europe or keeping tidy, rigid military tables of organization. This is one area of the unification
problem, therefore, in which it seems to me that reasonable proposals for
negotiation ought never to be rejected out of hand. On the contrary,
they might even be advanced by the Western nations. Present policies
on German rearmament ought to be regarded as amenable to change, provided
always, that the changes do not envision a Germany separated from Western
Europe, provided that they are carefully related with the problem of
general international disarmament.

There is another aspect to the problem of German unification,
Mr. President, which seems to me to require elaboration in the light of
the changing situation in Europe. Our position, Mr. President, is that
the way to peaceful unity in Germany is through free all-German elections,
in effect, under the general sanction of Russia, France, Britain, and
the United States. This position requires that virtually all the initia-
tive for unification, in effect, come from outside Germany.

Events, Mr. President, have moved a long way since this policy
was devised and the bell no longer has an altogether realistic sound
when it is rung over and over again in the same fashion. A new Germany
has emerged in the West since that policy was devised. It has grown
into the most dynamic nation of Western Europe. A new Germany has appeared in the East and, whatever we may think of it, it is not the same as the Germany of the past or the Germany of the West.

There are now military and para-military forces in both West and East Germany. How are these forces to be integrated in peace in a unified Germany? Is this a problem which can be solved primarily by outside powers, even with the best of intentions? Can free elections, without advanced and extensive preparations by Germans themselves solve it?

There are differing economic structures functioning in Western and Eastern Germany. Can these structures be harmonized in peace by outsiders? Will free elections without advanced and extensive preparation by Germans themselves harmonize them?

I raise these questions, Mr. President, as examples of the inescapable realties of the present situation in Germany. There are countless others of a similar nature which might be cited. It seems to me that in the light of these realties we do not begin to have the basis for German unification in peace and for peace, without a vast enlargement of contact between the peoples of Western and Eastern
Germany themselves.

Further, Mr. President, it seems to me most desirable, that, before we try to deal with the massive problems of unification of Germany as a whole, that this problem be tested in microcosm. What better place is there to develop valid techniques for the process of uniting Germany than in Berlin? Certainly, if unification in peace and for peace cannot be obtained promptly in Berlin, to which all Germans undoubtedly look as the Capital of a unified nation, there is small prospect that it will be obtained in peace and for peace, for the whole of Germany for a long time to come.

I wish finally, Mr. President, in these remarks today, to deal with the volcanic situation in Eastern Europe, with the third major threat to the peace of Europe. The Russians may say that the book is closed on this region, but they know better. They are not ignorant of history. They know that so long as the principal national groupings of Eastern Europe do not have a reasonably secure, independent national existence, so long as these people lack reasonable internal freedom and the right to live in full association with other nations of the
the world - so long as these basic rights are denied them, the book will not be closed /Eastern Europe.

It matters only in degree how these rights are denied, whether it is by direct Soviet or some other alien suppression or by indigenous tyrants who fear the wrath of their own peoples. The instability is there and it will not go away. As long as it finds no peaceful outlet in progress towards establishing a secure national independence and responsible political institutions, this insecurity will threaten the peace of Europe and the peace of the world. The situation is not new; it is an old situation in new dress. Have we forgotten 1914 and Sarajevo? Have the Russians? Have we forgotten 1939 and Poland? Have the Russians?

The circumstances of World War II, Mr. President, projected the Soviet Union into Eastern Europe. There can be little quarrel, Mr. President, with how the Russians entered Eastern Europe. They were projected into that region by World War II and, if we are honest, we will remember that we were delighted to have them there at that time. The quarrel is not so much with that as it is with what they have done or failed to do since they have been there. They have not yet met the
responsibility which was primarily theirs to meet, to encourage the
emergence from the ruins of Nazi conquest and domination, the emergence
of free and stable states and equitable societies in Eastern Europe.

Nor can there be much quarrel with any legitimate desire of
the Russians to make secure their border with Eastern Europe from whence
they were invaded in World War II. The quarrel, Mr. President, is with
the manner in which they have gone about it, by the discouraging of
national independence and stable and responsible internal political
orders in the latter region. If legitimate security is really a
major concern of the Russians in Eastern Europe, I can only regret the
fact that they are doing precisely what, in the long run, will jeopardize
it.

The ultimate objective of American policy respecting Eastern
Europe is, and must remain, the establishment of full national independence
of the major national groupings of that region and the encouragement of
stable and responsible political institutions within them. May I say,
Mr. President, that as we seek this objective for peace, then it is essential not to seek it out of a negative desire to embarrass the Russians or to jeopardize their security. We must seek this objective for positive purposes, for peace, for their peace as well as the peace of Europe and our own.

We can look for progress towards this objective via the route of the Hungarian bloodbath and then pour out tears of regret, and pour millions of words into the propaganda war, but back away from painful military involvement when revolution is thwarted. That is an easy and painless way, except for the thousands of martyrs whose blood is shed, and except that there is no reason to believe that it will produce results. Unless, Mr. President, we are prepared to mix our own blood with that which will flow in Eastern Europe via this route, it seems to me that basic human decency requires that we seek some other way.

I do not know whether in present circumstances there is another way to independence and to stable responsible government in Eastern Europe. If any does in fact exist, it seems to me that there is
a chance that it be found eventually in the course which this Administra-
tion is now pursuing in Poland. It is the way, not the cold war, but the
way of gradually reopening the channels of peaceful contact between the
West and the peoples of Eastern Europe.

If it is valid to maintain diplomatic relations with Russia, Poland and Hungary and other countries of Eastern Europe, as presumably it
is since we are doing so, then I cannot see the logic in not maintaining
such relations with all these states of Eastern Europe. If it is desirable
to expand culture, trade, and other contacts between the Soviet Union
and this country, as the President has said that it is, then equally
or more so, it would seem desirable to expand these contacts with
Poland, Czechoslovakia and all the countries of Eastern Europe.

No one can say with certainty whether this policy will work.
One can only ask, what is the alternative?

It is possible that a beginning of the peaceful evolution of
Eastern Europe towards genuine national independence and responsible
government may lie, not in turning our backs on the peoples of that
region, not by the lusty verbal attacks in the propaganda war, but by
opening up more windows through which Western concepts may resume their
peaceful flow into Eastern Europe. It is possible that visits by the
Secretary of State and other officials of this government to Eastern
Europe may assist in this process. Such visits might provide more
convincing evidence than verbal charges and retreats that we have not
forgotten the peoples of that region.

Finally, I believe it is in order to suggest to the Russians
that in the pursuit of their pronounced desire for peaceful coexistence
and peaceful competition they join with us in an effort to persuade the
governments of the Eastern European countries to provide some opportunity
for the practice of western concepts of political freedom within their
borders. I do not say that freedom, if it is to have a chance, requires
as much opportunity to compete as communism enjoys in Western Europe,
but it does require some opportunity. Unless it has that opportunity,
we can hardly begin to talk of bonâ ﬁde competition between the two
systems.

I urge that this proposal, if it is made, be made in the
spirit which I advance it, not out of any desire to win another meaningless
victory in the propaganda war but in the spirit of peaceful political competition, for the sake of Europe, for the sake of the world.

Let me suggest, finally, Mr. President, that beyond the problem of the unity of the western nations, beyond the problem of the unification of Germany, beyond the problem of instability in eastern Europe, there still exists a need for a broad reconciliation between the Western European countries and those of Eastern Europe. There is a need for a full resumption of cultural contact, trade and other appropriate international intercourse. That is an essential step in the reduction of fears and the burden of armaments which fears entail.

Perhaps the directions of this reconciliation can be laid by a conference of the leaders of the European countries - East and West - to undertake a general review of intra-European relations. I think it would be a good idea, too, if such a meeting is held, for the Soviet Union and the United States to sit at the back as observers rather than in front, as the principal participants.

Mr. President, in concluding my remarks today, I remind the Senate that I do not have access to all the facts which must go into
decisions to incorporate suggestions such as I have been making into policy. The President and the Secretary of State presumably have those facts. In any event, they have responsibility for making the decisions. It does seem to me, however, that if the world is to break out of the dangerous impasse, if it is to move towards peace, then the path of accommodation to the realities of the European situation must be fully explored. I believe there is at least a chance that we can move along this path towards a more durable peace. I believe we can do so without relative loss of security for ourselves and with a positive gain for the security of all nations. What I am suggesting here, Mr. President, are possible steps along this path away from the abyss of the ultimate war. I am suggesting that we consider these steps not as a concession to the Russians but as an initiative for peace for the benefit of this nation, Europe and mankind.