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SPEECH OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

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SPEECH OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)
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PROSPECTS IN GERMANY

In a few weeks a conference on Germany will be held in Geneva. It will be a conference of the foreign ministers of the Western nations and the Soviet Union. Free Germans of the West and Communist Germans of the East will be present. This Conference is likely to be followed by another in the summer—a conference of President Eisenhower and other Western heads of state and Mr. Khrushchev.

We may expect that these two principal conferences will be supplemented by a great deal of diplomatic exchange and other contacts at all levels and in various combinations. There will be meetings among representatives of the communist nations. There will be meetings among representatives of the free nations. There will be meetings between the free and the communist. In short, we are in for talk, a great deal of talk in the days ahead.

Procedures and the Coming Conferences

We may anticipate that there will be disagreements—serious disagreements—even before the stage of negotiating the problems of peace is reached. There will be arguments over who should talk and who should not; whether talk should begin at the summit and echo down to the base or begin at the base and rise up to the summit. Some of these arguments, indeed, have already taken place. There will be others.

Let me say that I appreciate the importance of these preliminaries. The manner in which they are dealt with will have an effect on the prospects for peace. It is important that procedural questions be discussed fully. It is equally important, however, that they be discussed with one object in view—the facilitating of sound agreements for peace. Procedural questions are not or
ought not to be wrangled over for the purposes of face-saving, propaganda or the evasion of responsibilities. Let us recognize, by all means, that procedural questions are important. But let us recognize, too, that the basic procedural problem which confronts us is not who talks with whom and when. Rather, it is: What kind of talk is likely to produce meaningful agreement?

I believe it is reasonable to say that decent men and women--in Russia or in Poland no less than in the United States or the United Kingdom are not interested in propaganda conferences or face-saving conferences. They are not interested in conferences which merely restate platitudes on the virtues of peace. They are interested in conferences which will get on with the business of peace-making. They will expect of those who participate in these conferences less concern with the problem of saving face and more with the problem of saving civilization. They will pray for the success of these conferences wherever they meet, whoever may participate in them, whenever they are held.

Object of the Coming Conferences

When we speak of praying for the success of these conferences, we ought to have clearly in mind some concept of what we mean by success. Do we mean the kind of success which characterized the Geneva Conference in 1955? That conference produced pleasant generalizations on the virtues of peace. A year later, however, we were back to business as usual, to the business of propaganda war and cold war. Now, four years after Geneva, we are without tangible achievements for peace. On the contrary, we are entering the most critical period in international relations since the Korean conflict.

Nor can we mean, when we pray for the success of these impending conferences, peace at any price. I do not believe the people of this nation are prepared to sacrifice the future of their children in freedom for a moment of
surcease from the pressures and tensions of life today on the brink of war.

No, I do not think we mean either of these alternatives when we say that we pray for the success of these conferences. I believe that we mean we hope for progress towards sensible agreements which will permit us to live and to let live, which will substitute competition in the realm of ideas and human achievement for competition on the battlefields, which will reduce the dangers of hostility among nations now glaring at each other across the black and bottomless pit of nuclear war. In short, we hope for agreements which promise some measure of stability for all mankind. We hope for agreements which will reduce the likelihood of armed conflict not only for today but for tomorrow and tomorrow. We hope for agreements which at least will begin to remove the residual injustices of World War II and its chaotic aftermath—-injustices which, almost fifteen years later, still press upon the backs of the peoples of many lands.

It is one thing to hope, in these terms, for the success of the coming conferences. It will be another to bring the hope to fruition. In international aspirations as in human aspirations, there is, inevitably, a gap between what we would like to do and what we are likely to be able to do.

The best chance of closing this gap, I believe, lies in approaching the impending conference with neither an excess of expectation nor with a cynical disbelief in their prospects of yielding anything constructive. What we need most in the days and weeks of talk which lie ahead is a clear and a specific understanding of what it is that we want to bring about by these talks. We need a positive purpose which is adjusted to the realities of the existing situation in the world. We need ideas, new ideas, realistic ideas, which may help us to realize this purpose. It is important to remember in this connection that in the realm of international negotiation, the search for all is likely to yield nothing. The intelligent pursuit of what is reasonable may lead to more than we dared hope for.
The Need for the Conferences

Before we can clarify our purposes in the impending conferences, it is essential to appreciate the origins of these conferences. Why, we may well ask ourselves, is it necessary to talk with the Russians at all at this time, about Germany or any other subject for that matter? Has Mr. Khrushchev compelled the West to meet? Are we merely responding, reluctantly, reticently, to a changing whim in Soviet policy? Are we going into these conferences as though they were some evil communist brew which we have no choice but to drink?

If that is our concept, if we see the origins of the conferences in these terms then I say, in all seriousness, that it is preferable not to go into them. We do not have to drink of the cup that is proferred. If we can conceive of our participation in these conferences as nothing more than a submission to Soviet threats or an entrapment by Soviet blandishments then I say again it is better not to go into them; it is better, not to delude ourselves.

Seen in these terms, the Conferences will yield nothing worth the having. They may produce propaganda. They may produce platitudes. They may save faces. They will not produce a worthwhile basis for durable peace in Germany and Europe or anywhere else. On the contrary, they may rot even further the shabby platform which now supports the present dangerous international dance on the edge of destruction.

I want to suggest, however, that we need not appraise these coming conferences as merely a Western jump to the snap of the Soviet diplomatic whip. There is another way of looking at them. Some of us have looked at them in this other fashion for a long time, long before Mr. Khrushchev's recent manoeuvres at Berlin. In this other light, the origins of these conferences are seen to lie in very different soil. Seen in this other light, the need for these talks, is a need that has long existed. For some of us who have advocated an American initiative for peace, it is a source of regret that we of the West have appeared
to wait for a prompting from the East to begin these talks.

For us, the origins of these talks do not rest in Mr. Khrushchev's recent statements. The need arises elsewhere. It arises from the vast changes which have taken place in the world during the past decade; more particularly the changes which have taken place on the European continent; specifically, the changes which have taken place in Germany.

Let me point out some of these changes. Think for a moment of the monumental revolution in technology alone. In scarcely a decade, this technological revolution has reposed in the hands of men, at once, the power to light new stars in the heavens and to put out the lights of civilization on earth. That change alone has a profound significance for all humanity and endless implications for the foreign policies of every nation.

There have been other changes of not much less significance. We have witnessed in Russia in the space of a decade the passing of the era of Stalin; the recovery from the devastation of invasion and the rapid development of an advanced science and technology. We have witnessed, during this decade, vast upheavals within China and great transitions in the belt of nations--old nations and new--stretching half way round the world, from one end of the Afro-Asian world to the other. A billion and a half people have been torn loose from ancient moorings. These changes, too, have a profound significance for us, for the Russians, for the entire world.

In Europe, we have witnessed the comeback of a continent. Its people, in the West, at least, are no longer the stunned, war-numbed masses, which the liberating allied armies found wandering in bewildered impotence, in the midst of the rubble and overwhelming devastation of World War II. The Europeans have revitalized themselves, their economies, their political life. What is true of all Western Europe is emphatically true of Western Germany. An old generation has recovered. A new generation has come of age, charged with new vigour, new ideas, seeking new and constructive directions.
Can we suppose for a moment that these changes--these vast, unmeasurable changes and others do not compel changes in the relationships among nations? It is obvious that they do; they alter the facts of the situation with which the policies of this nation, of all nations must deal if there is to be peace. Obviously, policies devised years ago, in another setting, cannot serve in the new situation which is evolving.

It is true that there have been some adjustments in the policies of all the principal nations to these changes. The question is: are these adjustments sufficient; are they coming in good time? Unless they are, not only is there little likelihood of a genuine peace being achieved but even the unspoken truces which have, heretofore, cushioned the principal points of friction in the world, are endangered. In the light of the world-wide transition of the past decade these unstable truces must either be altered by reason, by negotiation, sufficiently and in time, or, sooner or later, they will give way in conflict.

One of these points of friction, of possible conflict, exists in Germany. In fact, it extends throughout Central Europe. It is in this region that the military power of the two nations capable of ultimate war--the United States and the Soviet Union--are in the closest of contact. It is in this region, too, that most of the residual injustices of World War II are to be found.

For years now an unspoken agreement, an unstable truce has existed in this region. The shaky peace has rested on the avoidance of military incidents which go beyond the point of no return. It has rested on the acquiescence of the Germans, no less than the Western Powers and the Soviet Union in a divided Germany and a divided Berlin. It has rested upon the acquiescence of ourselves and the peoples of Eastern Europe in Soviet military domination of that region.
For years this has been the reality, despite talk of unification of Germany, despite talk of liberation of Eastern Europe, despite Soviet threats and blandishments.

It has been a tolerable, if not, exactly, a comfortable arrangement. What we have failed to reckon with, however, or at least to reckon with adequately, is that the pressures of change in the world and, particularly, in Europe and Germany itself, have been building around this point whether we have realized it or not, whether or not we and the Russians chose to look at this reality. We have waited a long time to face this fact. I deeply hope that we are prepared to face it now and that it is not too late to face it now, in peace.

This, then, is the perspective in which the coming conferences ought to be seen. I repeat they may be worse than useless if they are regarded merely as an unavoidable Western response to a Soviet initiative. They can be a God-send if they are recognized by all concerned as an opportunity to begin to replace the outmoded truce in Germany and Central Europe with something more durable, something better for all concerned.

If the beginnings of a stable peace in Germany and Central Europe are to be drawn from the impending Conferences, there will have to be a rethinking of many aspects of the policies which the Soviet Union has pursued in that region, which the nations of the West have pursued. There will have to be give and take, a quid pro quo, concession to match concession. We cannot, at this point, see the details of agreements but the signposts along the road to a rational settlement are beginning to emerge.

1. At Berlin, for example, we can see that there can be no one-sided withdrawal of the forces of freedom from the Western part of the city. That does not mean, however, that there can be no change in the status of that city. It means only that any change in the status of that city must be a total change, which leaves freedom in no less an advantageous position than communism. Perhaps
this total change can be brought about through the interim neutralization of both free and communist Berlin with the help of the United Nations and under its supervision, with free access to the city by all routes guaranteed by that body until Berlin becomes once again the capitol of a United Germany.

2. There needs to be at least the beginnings of the beginning on the problem of German unification, with Germans of East and West contributing more, much more, than they now are doing to the solution of the problems of unification.

3. There must be some evidence of a willingness on the part of the communists in control of the Eastern part of Germany to accept and to extend the principles of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights. In particular, there must be a beginning of the restoration of political rights to all in that zone, rights which can be exercised freely and not under the threat of terror.

4. There must be a willingness to accept the reality that Germany's peaceful ties with Western Europe cannot be ended except by the will of the German people themselves.

5. There must be an equal willingness, however, to accept the premise that the extent and nature of German rearmament is not sacrosanct, that it can be limited or altered in the interests of the security of all nations.

6. There must be a willingness to accept the premise that the numbers of foreign troops, and the nature of their armaments in Germany and in Central Europe is subject to negotiation on a give and take basis. To this end, the Eden and Gaiskall plans and the Rapacki Plan all merit the closest consideration, provided, I repeat, provided that there are reasonable agreements in the Geneva Conferences on the control of nuclear testing and the prevention of surprise attack.

May I say that the points which I have just enumerated are not new. Others have alluded to them. I believe that in part at least they represent the direction in which the Secretary of State was trying to lead the Western nations
when he was stricken. I reiterate tonight what I have said many times, that his illness represents a most serious loss to the cause of freedom and of peace and that I hope deeply that he will recover in time to make his advice, his leadership, and his guidance available.

May I say, too, that the points which I have just enumerated as signposts of peace are drawn from the same nine points which I made in a speech in the Senate two months ago and have repeated in whole or in part on several occasions since that time. I have not altered those points in any significant way because I believed them and I believe now that they indicate the way in which the search for a more durable peace—a worthwhile peace—is likely to prove most fruitful. The discussion which has followed my remarks in the Senate and elsewhere has been very useful. It has helped to clarify and to elaborate. Most of all, it has helped, I believe, to break the moratorium on new thought on this critical problem of the nation. This thought in connection with the German Crisis is coming before, not as in Korea, after the crisis was upon us.

Strengthening the Prospects for Peace

Let me consider, in conclusion, the prospects for peace in Germany and what can be done to strengthen them. I think it is essential to emphasize that peace in Germany depends not on us alone, not on the Western nations alone but on the Soviet Union as well. If the Soviet Union does not seek peace then there will not be peace. It does not follow, however, that even if the Soviet Union does seek a durable settlement in Germany and Central Europe that one will automatically emerge. Peace is a two-way street and we are on one side of it.

We will endanger our own position and the prospects of peace if we become obsessed with the fascinating game of interpreting the ever-changing charades
of Soviet policy. These charades may mean peace. They may mean war. They may mean neither peace nor war. We can only assume as certainty that at any given time they can mean any of these possibilities and that we must be prepared to face any of them. What we can do, beyond this, if we would increase the prospects of peace, is to get clear in our own minds why it is that we stand firm in Germany, as indeed we must. We stand firm, not as an end in itself. We stand firm in order to go forward towards a durable peace. If there is to be peace, we, no less than the Russians, shall have to put aside the dangerous toys of the propaganda war, and the chips on the shoulders of the cold war. We shall have to put aside both the grins and the frowns. We shall have to examine and to examine deeply the problems of peace and see what it is possible to do with them in the light of the new realities of the situation which confronts us. We shall have to apply to these altered problems, new ideas. We shall have to bring to these problems a renewed determination to respond to the deepest desire of our own people and of all mankind, a new dedication to the search for progress towards a durable peace.