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PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
MUTUAL SECURITY ACT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on May 15, I advised the Senate that I intended to propose several amendments to the Mutual Security Act, S. 1451. A few days later the Acting Director of the International Cooperation Administration appeared before the Committee on Foreign Relations to argue for the foreign-aid program. His testimony had much to do with why the Senate should vote against the amendments which I had intended to propose.

I regret, Mr. President, that the Acting Director of ICA, for whom I have a very high regard, saw fit to react in this fashion. He had not seen the amendments for the simple reason that they had not been introduced. Nevertheless, he assailed them. His statement was not so much an expression on S. 1451 as it was an impassioned insistence that nothing must change in the way the executive branch proposes to dispense almost $4 billion in public funds under this legislation. Any change, he implied, would be a futile attempt to "legislate away the problems of this mid-20th century."

Had I the desire to engage in that sort of polemics, I suppose I might say this in return: If you cannot legislate away the problems of this mid-20th century, much less can you spend them away with never-ending grants of foreign aid.

But, Mr. President, I am not interested in winning debates. What I am interested in is the recasting of the foreign-aid program in a fashion which will gain for it a greater measure of acceptance among the people of this Nation and among recipient peoples abroad, a recasting which will make it more useful and effective.

Some may ask, Why not leave the aid program alone? That question has been asked many times. Why not follow the usual procedure of inflicting a sizable cut in the administration's request for foreign aid and let it go at that? I cannot accept that course any longer, Mr. President. I cannot accept it because it does not come to grips with the basic problems of this program. I cannot accept it because, at best, it merely puts off until tomorrow the day of reckoning. I cannot accept it because, in the end, that course threatens to destroy what is essential to the Nation, what is desirable in this program along with much that is nonessential and undesirable.

I believe I have a deep awareness of the importance of foreign aid to the welfare and safety of the United States. Certainly I have accepted and supported the concept and practice of this program as a part of the Nation's foreign relations since its inception. But I have not in the past, and I do not, now accept the foreign aid program in an uncritical sense. No part of this program, as far as I am concerned, is sacrosanct. Some of it is damaging and costly. Much of it can be improved. In my opinion, it must be improved if it is to survive as a useful instrument of the foreign policy of this Nation and of the expansion of human freedom in the world.

Those who are immersed in the administration of foreign aid may indeed have been shocked by my remarks of May 15. It is rarely easy to recognize and accept the necessity for change in matters which affect us most closely. However, I can assure them and the Senate that the remarks which I made May 15 were not intended to be shocking, except in a constructive sense. The remarks which I make today are, I trust, cast in the same mold.

PROPOSED CHANGES

These remarks, Mr. President, are preliminary to the offering of five amendments to S. 1451. If these amendments are adopted by the Congress and administered with a cooperative spirit by the executive branch, they should produce these visible effects in the foreign aid program.

First. Information on the total cost of the aid program in any recipient country, now in large measure classified, will be public information.

Second. Those who administer foreign policy and the aid program will plan for the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of massive and continuing grants. I emphasize that I am talking only about grants under the categories of defense support and special assistance. I am not talking about loans or point 4. These massive grants of defense support and special assistance will not be terminated in a single stroke, with all the dangers of chaos which might ensue. Rather, they will be reduced, gradually, progressively between now and 1963.

Third. The ICA—the present aid-administering agency—will be dissolved as a distinct official personality of this Government. Its necessary functions and personnel will become fully integrated parts of the Departments of State and Defense.

Fourth. The control of the Secretary of State, under the President, will be strengthened over all forms of foreign aid, including military assistance.

Fifth. The budgeting of military assistance will henceforth be juxtaposed with the budgeting for the domestic Defense Establishment to make certain that each dollar spent for such aid is better spent abroad than at home.
Mr. President, I do not want the Senate to have any misunderstanding about the significance of these changes. They are not intended to be minor. They are not intended to alter form but leave the substance of the program unchanged. They are designed to work in harmony with the concept and operation of foreign aid.

Take, for example, the amendment which is designed to aid recipient countries—now officially classified secret—can frequently be obtained from public sources both here and abroad if one has the time and patience to search them out. In the light of these observations, is "preposterous" too strong a term to use to describe the security classification of "secret" on the amount of military aid which goes to any recipient country?

The principal effect of the present classification practice, as I see it, is to deny to the people of the United States the essential information on the use of public funds, information needed for the development of rational judgments on specific aid legislation.

I do not question the necessity for continuing military aid in some countries. I most certainly question it in others; and, in still others, I question its present level.

In general terms, it is not difficult to justify the concept of military aid as an instrument of international relations and, thus, the executive branch has done. But, Mr. President, it is time to go from the general to the specific. We must begin to ask ourselves not, is military aid necessary, but leave the question of the need for military aid in aid figures—any which will have it, at almost any level of expenditure which Congress will tolerate, with less and less specific relationship to the establishment of national security and foreign policy.

I should be reassured, Mr. President, as to the rationality with which the military aid is administered, if I could find evidence that once in a while, the executive branch turns down requests of other governments for the establishment of military aid missions and military aid programs—just once. A search of readily available sources, however, indicates that in all the years of this program, with one or two possible exceptions, no nation so requesting, has been refused a regular military aid program. There may be others, Mr. President, but I have not been able to discover them. In the meantime, the aid program has sprawled into 40 or more nations, large and small, and, all pressure on the interests of our national security.

**Termination of Grant Aid**

I turn now, Mr. President, to another of the changes which may be brought about by the amendment I am submitting today. The executive branch will be required to submit for each recipient country a plan for a progressive reduction in massive grants of nonmilitary aid. Will the point 4 program, with its warm and friendly appeal of helping them learn the modern techniques of helping themselves be affected by this amendment? No, it shall not, unless it is affected in the sense of receiving increased emphasis and importance. Will the lending functions of the Development Loan Fund, the Export-Import Bank, the International Bank and other worthwhile mutually beneficial undertakings of this kind be affected? They shall not, Mr. President, unless, again, the effect is to give them added impetus.

What then will be the impact of the amendment? It will affect the nations which receive the bulk of the heavy grants in any year in the point 4 under the aid program. Will they be adversely affected? They need not be. On the contrary, those of them that are anxious for national independence, in an economic as well as a political sense, will be benefited by this amendment. For what it will require, Mr. President, is a rethinking of the aid program, a reshuffling from top to bottom of the aid program in those countries. This rethinking, this reshuffling will be aimed at ending the state of one-sided, endless dependence in which they now find themselves.

If it is properly administered this amendment will act to establish mutually agreed upon, integrated economic goals for each recipient nation. It will set annual increasing productivity, for closing the foreign exchange gaps, for reducing excess military forces where possible, for increasing investments, and tax and other economic reforms. In short, it will set specific goals for evoking the full energies of the people of each land for the economic progress of their nation. It will require the use of grants in a positive fashion to release that outpouring. It will bring about exploration of new ways, such as broad international participation in foreign aid, for helping to bring about economic progress. It should do much to place these recipient peoples, 4 years hence, in a position to go forward on their own momentum, with their needs for outside assistance limited to point 4 type aid, loans, and orthodox methods of international financing.

Mr. President, to those who say it is illusory to think in terms of a time schedule for ending grants and for achieving substantial self-sustaining economic progress in recipient countries. I can only reply: Look at the results of the Marshall plan. Look at what that plan did to help to meet the problem of self-sustained progress in Western Europe. Let us ask in retrospect: Would it have worked without specific goals, with a cutoff date?

I must ask, further, of those who say it cannot be done: What is the alternative? What has been done in these countries toward a self-sustaining economic base? How much progress has been made? Are they a quarter of the way? A half way? Three quarters? How many more years, how many more decades, will it be before subsidies to Pakistan, Bolivia, Cambodia, Vietnam, Tunisia, and the others must come to an end? In the meantime, what is the result of these subsidies? Do they not tend to create bitterness and estrangement between our peoples and the peoples of the recipient nations? On our part because we see no end to the one-sided giving? On theirs, because they see no way out of an endless dependency? On theirs, because a conspicuous alien privileged few inevitably creates suspicion and hostility when stationed indefinitely in the midst of a native-privileged many?

Mr. President, I recognize that there may be some nations which despite the new dedicated efforts of the United States to stand on their own without grants, beyond the 4 years contemplated by this amendment. Taken on the whole, however, I question the result of the recipients' resources. The real gap between self-support and subsidy grows out of the inability to organize and utilize these resources for the benefit of their people. Let the executive branch plan seriously and in an integrated fashion with the recipients to bridge this gap. If they try and cannot bridge the gap in two or three countries then, I, for one, will be happy to reexamine those particular situations. Certainly, the Senate or Congress can have them reexamined individually. Adjustments, if found necessary, can be made. What is important, however, is that there be the decision and the determination to bridge the gap in a reasonable period of time. We do not have the balance of the 20th century, Mr. President, to get these nations on their own feet.

**Termination of ICA**

Mr. President, the other major change in foreign aid which I hope that these amendments will produce is the termination of the ICA as a quasi-independent
agency of the executive branch. I am fully aware that in a theoretical sense the aid-agency is already a part of the Department of State. In a theoretical sense the entire State exercises supervision over the aid program. But what is the situation, not in theory, but in practice? Mr. President, if you wish to telephone someone about aid matters in Laos, do you pick up the telephone directory of the Department of State or do you pick up the telephone directory of the ICA? If a person seeks a job in aid administration does he go to the personnel office of the Department of State or does he go to the personnel office of the ICA? If you ask a person employed in aid administration where he works, what will his answer be? The State Department? Or will it be the ICA?

I need not labor the point, Mr. President. The fact is that regardless of what the organization charts may show, there is a morale administrative personality, the ICA, which is heavily responsible for operating the aid program and for the making of significant decisions affecting it. That is what I am trying to change. I seek to do so not in any spirit of anti-pathy to the people who are employed by the ICA. The great bulk of them, both at home and abroad, are able, decent, conscientious, and hard working. They are a great credit to the Nation. That is one of the reasons why I am seeking this change. These employees warrant an assured official status of equality, both at home and abroad which can be obtained only if they are included in established agencies of the Government. They are entitled to a measure of stability and security in employment, which can never be theirs so long as the agency with which they are associated totters each year on the brink of extinction as it inevitably will continue to do.

But beyond concern for the personnel of the aid program, Mr. President, there is another consideration which suggests to me the desirability of a termination of the ICA. Involved in aid programs, particularly in massive grants of aid, are not only economic questions. Also involved are questions of international political relations—questions of the most complex and difficult nature. It is essential, therefore, that aid programs be fully integrated into the overall foreign policies of the Nation. I do not believe we are going to get that kind of coordination until those who devise these programs and administer them are not merely State Department employees on the organization charts, but are executives and employees of the Department in fact and in spirit as well.

OTHER CHANGES

The remaining two changes which are contemplated in these amendments, Mr. President, refer to the control of military aid policies. One reasserts and emphasizes the authority of the Secretary of State over the military aid programs. The other is the distinction I have drawn between the personnel employed in the aid program and the estate of the De-
ment was to apply to the foreign aid program the same budgetary procedures which we now apply to the domestic programs; in other words, to have representatives of the State Department or other executive agencies engaged in the foreign aid program come before the Congress, submit specific items, and state what they intend to spend in each country, and for what purpose, and have those items go through the same procedure of approval by the appropriate committees—in this case, the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives for authorization—and then to the Appropriations Subcommittees to pass on the appropriations requested, then to the full Appropriations Committees, and finally have those appropriations voted on by the two bodies of Congress. I believe in that way the Senator may be assured that if the amendments are adopted—and I hope they will be—compliance with them will be obtained.

I think there is a possible hiatus between the desire to have Senator Mansfield's amendments adopted and their actual fulfillment; and I leave that thought with my colleague, for his consideration.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I appreciate the statement the Senator from Alaska has made. I assure him that his proposal will be given every consideration by the committee. I do not know whether it will be possible to go as far as the Senator from Alaska has indicated; but certainly I think the General Accounting Office should take a continuing look at these operations, as it is its duty to do; and I believe it would not now be reluctant to do that, although it seemed to be reluctant to examine the operations of the program in the Indochina area in the first years of the aid program in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, following the withdrawal of the French and the assumption of independence on the part of those three States themselves.

It seems to me that a good many good amendments will be offered. Although I have offered one, which has to do with removing the label of secrecy, it is my intention to support the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), who has offered an amendment covering the same field. I believe his amendment is more meritorious than the one I have prepared.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I wish to say that in my opinion there is no Member of the Senate, and probably no Member of the entire Congress, who does not have a sense of uneasiness about this program. Many of our fellow members who have been voting against the program in recent years, will, I believe, if they can be assured of a greater degree of stability and security in regard to its administration, once again come back into the fold and accept the responsibilities which go with voting for a program of this kind.

All of us know that it is hard to explain foreign aid to the folks at home. But we can well comprehend their feelings when, under questioning, they indi-
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THE STATE OF OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS

Address of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)

58th Annual Session of the
Inland Empire Education Association

Spokane, Washington
April 8, 1960

An invitation such as you extended to me is an invitation to come home. It is an invitation to think through old questions in the fresh but familiar perspective of this wonderful part of the nation.

Of these questions, that of foreign relations is most compelling. As Americans, we need to understand the problems of foreign relations because none of us escapes their consequences. As teachers—I am still one of you although my membership in the club has temporarily lapsed—as teachers, we need not only to understand these problems but also to stimulate the capacity of others to understand them. We need especially to convey something of their meaning to the young people who must live in the world which our foreign policies now are doing much to shape.

Let me say, at the outset, that foreign relations are not the products of alchemy. They are the consequences of human acts. As such they are not beyond normal human comprehension. To be sure, the conduct of foreign relations is largely in the hands of specialists and that is as it should be. But in a nation such as ours, the work of these specialists needs the understanding and broad guidance of our people if it is to be done most effectively.