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Foreign Relations: Late Summer

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FOREIGN RELATIONS: LATE-SUMMER 1959

Mr. President:

It may seem at this moment a remote possibility, but at some point the first session of the 86th Congress will come to a close. The first snows of winter will undoubtedly have settled on the mountains of Montana by the time the final gavel falls. It may be that the first snows will have even descended in Washington. Sooner or later, however, we shall finish the work of this session. And sooner or later we shall adjourn.

I have sought the floor today in the expectation—perhaps unwarranted—that adjournment may come sooner rather than later. I have sought it in order to make certain summary remarks on the international situation and the present state of the nation's foreign relations.

It is not easy to draw up a balance sheet of this kind. Yet the attempt to do so on other occasions, I believe, has been helpful and it may prove to be helpful now.

In broad terms, I suppose, one might say that since the nation is not fighting a war in this late-summer 1959, the balance sheet is fine. That sort of observation, comforting though it may be, tells us nothing of the stubborn international realities with which we must live, with which we must continue to contend.
It may be good politics to say that the absence of fighting on our part proves how successful our foreign policy has been. It may make for happy headlines. It may be good politics, but I do not know that it is good government. This superficial observation produces a false sense of security in the nation. It masks the very likely possibility that we may be at a peace of sorts—not necessarily because of our policies, but in spite of some of them, and that pieces may now be falling into place in the complex pattern of international relations which, when fully assembled, may fuse in the full fury of nuclear war.

The observation that we have peace, moreover, shunts aside the domestic implications of present international policies. It completely ignores the grave burden of taxation, and the inflationary pressures which arise from the enormous cost of the defense establishment and overseas activities of various kinds which are involved in maintaining this so-called peace. We do not know, really, with any degree of precision the needs of any of these operations or how efficiently any are run. All we know is that these defense and other operations—as much as the Congress will allow—are pressed upon us on the grounds that they are required to maintain this so-called peace. At the same time, the Administration has admonished the Congress to limit the buildup of essential domestic services and activities in education, housing, road construction, social security, slum clearance, law enforcement, resource development and countless others under a budget which goes overwhelmingly for defense and international programs of one kind or another.
In short, to maintain this peace of sorts, we are eating into—or at any rate, not building adequately—our capital investment in the social structure of the nation. That may be unavoidable in present circumstances but when we talk lightly of having peace—let us not lose sight of what we are doing and of the monumental problems which the neglect of domestic needs is building up for the years ahead.

Who can speak, in all honesty, of the existence of peace in this late-summer of 1959 when the continent of Europe remains divided by hostile and unreconciled ideologies and other spawns of conflict? When the concept of live and let live which encourages men and nations to rational settlement of their difficulties has still so little depth in that key region? When Western Europe shows evidence of serious fissures in its essential unity?

Who can speak, in all honesty, of peace when a wall of ignorance builds ever higher between this nation and China and behind it there develops a new and explosive power nurtured heavily on hatred of the United States? While this situation prevails, to talk glibly about the existence of peace today may be to exact a terrible price out of our children's tomorrow.

Who can speak, in all honesty, of peace when in the great arc of nations extending from Korea, around the rim of Asia, through the Middle East and Africa and even into the nearby Caribbean, there are only scattered oases of stability? When in this vast area, too often there exists a seething violence just beneath the surface of daily life? When whole peoples grow restless in the search for new roots to feed their survival and growth?
Mr. President, by ignoring such realities as these, I suppose one may concoct a bright balance sheet of the world situation and find in it reason to pride ourselves on the success of our foreign policies and their administration. Unfortunately, it also gives us cause for national self-delusion and I, for one, cannot certify to any such balance sheet. Equally, I cannot join those who, seeing only such realities as I have just enumerated, are plunged into a cynical gloom, a deadening hopelessness over the fate of the nation and mankind.

No, Mr. President, I do not believe that we can conclude, from the present situation, either the certainty of a durable peace and continued progress, or the inevitability of retrogression and tragic war. The international situation in late-summer 1959, as it has been for some time, is neither black nor white but many shades of gray. It would be best to dispell any illusions that we have peace in our times and count mankind lucky that we even have peace for this day.

As a nation, we are still in the midst of a gigantic and enormously expensive holding action throughout the world. At some critical points in this action there are rays of hope that potential conflicts will yield to reason or, at least, that the vast cost of the holding action can be reduced. At others, we are staging merely a rear-guard action in which the way to a durable peace is not yet even dimly seen.

We will do well, therefore, to put aside the glib evaluation of the state of the world as being one of peace in this late-summer of 1959 and the state of our foreign policy as being one of
success. At best, the world and this nation as a part of it, has just barely got its head above water. If there is any broad generalization that is applicable, it is that we are in a period of change in which we may go down or up but one in which—in any event—we cannot remain just where we are. In these circumstances we shall increase our prospects of finding the way up, the way to peace, only as we turn our attention to the specifics, to the principal problems which confront us in the world. We shall find our way only as we try to gauge accurately the changing content of these problems, only as we examine and reexamine honestly the present policies by which we are seeking to deal with these problems and weigh and re-weigh the effectiveness of the administration of these policies. In short, in an era of change in international relations we need to understand clearly the possibilities of the change and be prompt to act on them. If we fail to do so we shall be left high and dry as the tide of change moves on and away from us.

Germany

In one critical area, Mr. President, in Germany, the pressure for change is great and it is rising. It is fed by developments within Germany, within Europe, perhaps even within the Soviet Union itself.

We may now be in a position to deal more successfully with these pressures than in the past. By successfully, let me add, I mean we may be able to deal with them in a way that leads towards a more durable peace without prejudice to freedom. Certainly, Mr.
President, during the 86th Congress we have sharpened the tools of foreign policy for coping with the complex German situation. Our policies have been recast. Without alteration in basic principle, they have been redesigned more closely in line with the realities of the Germany and Europe of 1959 rather than of 1950 or 1945. In a phrase, we have refurbished these policies and brought them up to date.

True, the division in Berlin, Germany and, in a larger sense, in Europe has not yet ended. But at least, the revisions of our policy have helped to deflect, for the present, the headlong plunge towards open conflict in Berlin. At least, there is now some chance that the exchanges of heads and near-heads of states may set in motion more tangible action on peace than the generalities which emerged from Geneva in 1955. There is no guarantee that such will be the result but at least the hope is alive.

There is credit enough for all in this achievement. It is due in no small measure to the final efforts of the late Secretary of State. In his last visit to Europe and in his final press statements Mr. Dulles set the stage for what has become a fresh, a positive Western approach to the problems of Germany.

This Congress has also made its contribution. For one thing, the Senate took the German question out of the deep-freeze. It opened the question to full discussion and let in new thought and new ideas where for years there had been only ritualistic repetition of the old, the tired and the increasingly unreal. Distinguished Members of this body, the outstanding Chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee (Mr. Fulbright), the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Byrd), the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Clark), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Dodd), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cooper), the Senator from New York (Mr. Javits), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. Sparkman), and others joined in these discussions at various times. And out of this many-sided debate emerged, I am sure, much that was useful for those charged with administering foreign policy.

The work of the President of the Senate (Mr. Nixon) on the occasion of his voyage to Russia and Poland was also of the greatest importance. He made an outstanding effort to bridge the almost unbridgeable gap in understanding between Russia and the United States and to enlarge the measure of civility in the relations between the two nations.

Mr. Herter's work at Geneva, in difficult circumstances, was skillful and dedicated. In cooperation with other Western nations he succeeded in reinterpreting Western policies with respect to Germany in the light of today's realities rather than yesterday's expectations. He set forth new proposals whose significance is not likely to be lost on the rest of the world, even though they may have fallen on deaf ears as regards the Soviet Foreign Minister at Geneva. One may hope, even, that their significance will not be lost on Mr. Khrushchev. Only last February he indicated that very similar proposals which I had listed in a speech in the Senate could form the basis for reasonable negotiation.
As for Berlin, Mr. President, that city was and still is the crux of danger in Germany. I say that notwithstanding the fact that the crisis-date which was originally concocted by the Soviet Union has come and long since gone without serious incident. I say that because Berlin in its location, in its continued division and uncertain status still contains live seeds of conflict. I say that because a divided alien occupation of that city--Soviet and Western alike--is an anachronism almost a decade and a half after the end of war. I say that because the close proximity of antagonistic forces in the legal no-man's land of Berlin constitutes a serious source of accidental or spontaneous military combustion.

Whatever it may appear to be from the Soviet point of view, from the Western point of view, I believe, it is time for a change in Berlin. But let me stress, Mr. President, that when I suggest that it is time for a change I do not mean a change in West Berlin alone, as the communists would have it. It is time for a change in all Berlin.

Because I believe that in any give and take negotiation, both parts of Berlin must be involved, I find it disconcerting to discover that Western diplomacy has permitted the discussion of the Berlin issue to center more and more on the status of West Berlin alone. I do not see that this issue--this issue of a dangerously divided Berlin--is an issue of Western troop levels in the city. Nor is it one of the type of arms which Western troops may bear in that city. It is not one of whether the Russians will or will not
guarantee our rights there for one year, five years or forever. Yet, these matters were the center of discussion regarding Berlin at Geneva. It seems to me that if we mean it when we say we shall stand fast in West Berlin, these are not matters for discussion.

To permit talks with the Soviet Union to center on them seems to me to reveal a temptation to buy the continuance of our presence in Berlin at the price of unilateral concessions. I do not believe that will work, for the price once paid is likely to go higher and higher. And even if it did work, what would we have bought? We would have bought nothing more than an indefinite and expensive prolongation of the present unsatisfactory, costly and unstable occupation. We would not have advanced one step towards a more rational, a more durable peace. Until when would this occupation continue, Mr. President? Until 1970, 1980, until the year, 2000?

If the issue is not negotiable by a change in the status of West Berlin alone, is it negotiable by a change in the status of all Berlin--of West Berlin and East Berlin? It will not be negotiable in these terms if those who use the words of peace are not prepared to act for peace. We shall not know whether that is the case, however, unless we are clear in our own minds that we seek, as a positive act for peace, a new status for all Berlin. If we are clear on that point then I believe we may, with profit to all, assume the advocacy of internationalization of the entire city, on an interim basis, until it is once again the capital of a unified Germany.
Again, let me stress, it is one thing to internationalize only West Berlin under the auspices of the United Nations as the Russians have proposed. It would be an entirely different matter to internationalize the entire city of Berlin--East and West--under those auspices, as an interim arrangement. In that there might well be a valid quid pro quo.

In recent days there have been reports that the Russians are prepared to accept West Germans as replacements for the non-German garrisons now in West Berlin. I have no way of telling whether these reports are accurate. If there is any truth in them, I do not see that the idea should be rejected out of hand. On the contrary, the idea may well be advanced for exploration by the Western nations themselves even if the Russians have not done so. If West Germans can replace other Western forces in Berlin and if Soviet troops are withdrawn from the city, at least the rudiments of an all-German administration of Berlin will exist. If this administration operated, on an interim basis, under ultimate U.N. or other international control, with guaranteed rights of free access to all from all directions, a new and more durable situation might exist in Berlin than that which now prevails.

I should be less than frank, Mr. President, if I did not state my view that we have not yet sufficiently explored the potential role of the United Nations and West Germans in the Berlin situation. I think there is time to remedy that shortcoming. Indeed, it might well be done in conjunction with the coming exchanges between Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev.
Turning to another major aspect of the international situation, I should like to consider briefly the state of relations among the Western European nations and among the N.A.T.O. members. There have always been differences among these nations; that is not in itself the problem. The problem is that in recent years short-range differences have threatened increasingly to overbalance the long-range cohesive forces which hold the Western nations together.

That is the danger, Mr. President. It is a danger, ironically, which does not come primarily from the Russians although they have long sought the disruption of the alliance. Rather it comes primarily from developments within the Western alliance itself. And, ironically, the danger comes in part from the very success of the alliance.

The sense of restored security, the prosperity and progress of recent years has permitted national clashes of interest within the very institutions which did so much to bring about the improvement in the Western nations. This is evident in the decline of respect for the military command of N.A.T.O. and it is evident in the clash of economic purpose as between the Inner Six of the European Common Market and the outer ring of European nations which is forming in self-defense or for the purposes of economic countermeasures. It is evident, too, in the tendency of a legitimate national pride sometimes to give way to a questionable national conceit which sees itself as the sole source of wisdom and leadership for the West.
If present tendencies in the Western alliance persist, I am afraid it will not be long before the handwriting will be very evident on the wall. Increasingly, individual states or inner groups of states, in pursuit of their own immediate national advantage and oblivious or indifferent to the needs of others will spur the rest to the same course. The short-range interests of each shall take precedence over the long-range needs of all and to the degree that they do so the house of Western unity, built with great care and at great expense, will be threatened. To be sure, the institutions are likely to remain but they will be, increasingly, stripped of substance.

I do not know whether present trends can be reversed. I do not know how much influence the United States can exert to that end. The fact is that major changes have taken place within Western Europe in recent years. The effect, perhaps the inevitable effect, of these changes has been to reduce the influence of the United States and to heighten that of the Europeans themselves in European affairs.

It will serve no useful purpose to wring our hands over this situation, to look for scapegoats, or to continue to bury the problem in words of unity and immodest presumptions of American leadership as usual. Rather, it will be better to learn to live with the changes in Europe which we did so much to bring about with the Marshall Plan and our actual postwar leadership. What is important now is to try to preserve what needs to be preserved, to try to preserve the essentials of Western unity.
It is helpful, I believe, that the President has gone to Europe. He is, in his person, one of the great symbols of Western cooperation. I do not think, however, that symbols are enough. Not even well-spoken words of unity are enough. We have had those at every conference of the Western nations but the differences have continued to accumulate.

I believe the time has come to put aside the generalizations on unity and to look squarely at, and talk frankly to, the points of disunity in the Western alliance. I think the time has come for a blunt conference which puts the cards on the table with respect to the condition of N.A.T.O. We need to delineate the extent of the erosion. We need to determine what revisions are necessary to revitalize this organization and other institutions of Western unity in the light of the changing European situation. In short we need to face what it is that is bothering the members of the Western alliance if we are to do anything constructive about the difficulties.

I think the time has come, especially, for a frank conference on the economic rivalries which are beginning to plague the European nations and which, sooner or later, will make their effect felt on this country.

It may be, finally, that the time has come for us to move out of the full glare of the spotlight of NATO activity and to welcome from the Europeans--British, French, Italians, Germans, and others--the assumption of a greater measure of leadership in its undertakings, a greater measure of responsibility and contribution
commensurate with their growing strength and the evolving situation in Europe. I trust that this observation will not be interpreted as an advocacy of American withdrawal from Europe. It is not intended as such. Rather, it is intended as a frank recognition that circumstances have changed in Europe and, in consequence, a change in the position of the United States in Western European affairs may also be warranted and desirable.

The Americas

Turning next to Latin America, Mr. President, it seems to me that the situation, particularly in the Caribbean, is a most uncertain one. It is going to require patience and great effort by all of the American states if a series of little wars spawned by dictatorship and revolution is not to plague that region for months or, perhaps, even years to come.

When a revolutionary fervor, nurtured on years of oppression and brutality achieves its ends, perhaps counter-excesses are inevitable. Tyranny is grim business and it is not surprising that it produces revolutions which are also grim in their consequences.

But, Mr. President, there comes a moment for an end to excesses. There comes a time to settle down to construction of the new after destruction of the old, a time to put aside the fury, if the high ideals which drive men to understandable revolt are not to be lost in a continuing flow of blood and hatred.

I hope that moment will not be lost in the situation in the Caribbean. If it is not lost, there is reason to believe that
we are at the beginnings of a beginning of a new and promising era in inter-American relations.

This new stirring, I believe, found official expression in the recent Declaration of Santiago. Unless I misinterpret that document, it points to a further evolution in inter-American relations. The Americas, I believe, may be on the verge of bringing into the Good Neighbor concept--into the doctrine of non-intervention--another concept, that of the Conscience of the Americas. If this interpretation is correct, it means that as the Hemisphere deplores intervention in the affairs of one nation by another, it deplores equally the brutal denial, by dictatorship, of basic human decency anywhere in the hemisphere.

Good Neighbors normally stay out of each other's family affairs and those who meddle or intervene are rightfully condemned. But sometimes the affairs in one house reach such a point of tyranny that good neighbors can no longer be indifferent to the agony of injustice and brutality which emanates from it. No single American nation can decide when that point has been reached. Not even two or three. But, it seems to me that when two-thirds or three-quarters of the American republics reach such a conclusion, then the good conscience of the entire community is involved and the community has a responsibility to do something about it. In time, Mr. President, we shall find ways, common ways, inter-American ways, to make the distaste and indignation of the Americas felt by those who outrage the conscience of the Americas. Perhaps, then, we shall see an end to the cycle of dictatorship, revolution.
dictatorship which for, too long, has been the curse of many parts of this hemisphere.

For our part, Mr. President, I believe our policies are evolving to adjust to the changing concept which I have just outlined, as well as to other new needs of inter-American relations. The change comes in good time because, for years, we have been consuming the goodwill which the Good Neighbor policy of another generation created. The intentions of the people of the United States, as expressed in the Congress these past few years, have been good. Where we have failed is in the administration of policy. In that connection, we have shown a singular lack of awareness of the changes in attitudes, hopes, needs and values in Latin America. In consequence, we failed to develop the new ideas, the alert leadership and the inspired official representation in Latin America which would permit us to act in accord with these changes. Now that defect is, I hope, in the process of being remedied.

The initiative has come largely from the Congress. I have in mind particularly the work of the Subcommittee under the Chairmanship of the Senator from Oregon (Mr. Morse), and the bold and constructive ideas of the Senator from Florida (Mr. Smathers) who has shown such a consistent and intelligent interest in that area. I believe, too, that the increasing currency which has been given in this country to the views of the distinguished Governor of Puerto Rico (Mr. Muñoz Marín) and to the Puerto Rican experience generally has been most helpful.
Mr. President, I should like to add one further observation to these remarks on the Americas. When we talk of the Americas, scarcely, if ever, is Canada included in our thoughts. That is not merely oversight. It is a habit of mind with decades of usage behind it. It seems to me that it is high time to raise the question as to whether this habit of mind continues to have validity in the mid-twentieth century or whether it survives on sheer inertia alone.

Personally, I believe that it is the latter. Congress has taken a significant initiative in recent years, in remedying this situation. I am thinking now of the work of the Canadian-United States Interparliamentary Group. On the Senate side, this work is being carried out under the Chairmanship of the able, constructive, and conscientious Senator from Vermont (Mr. Aiken) and his contribution has been an outstanding one.

Mr. President, I recognize that Canada has far flung commitments, in the Commonwealth, in the United Nations and in other associations. I wonder, however, whether the time has not come for the American Republics to recognize that Canada is also of the Americas and may have much to offer and to gain by closer association with the other nations of this hemisphere? What I am suggesting, Mr. President, is that it may be desirable to undertake in the Canadian-United States parliamentary meetings and in other appropriate ways, a preliminary exploration to determine whether or not Canadian membership in, or association with the Organization of the American States may not be of benefit to all concerned.
Other Areas

Our attention of late, Mr. President, has been fixed on Germany, Europe and Latin America. But the scope of our relations being world-wide, we may anticipate that from time to time other nations, other areas will move into the forefront of our awareness.

Rarely in the spot-light, yet never far from it is the emerging continent of new nations in Africa. Since 1951, six independent countries have appeared in regions which were formerly colonies. I believe that we have a good chance to get off on the right foot with these new nations. Certainly, the Department of State in response to the initiative of Congress, has reorganized in a fashion which creates a better opportunity to bring about that result. Heretofore, African affairs were buried in separate niches in the various European Desks. Now, however, on the basis of legislation pressed by the distinguished Chairman-Emeritus of the Foreign Relations Committee (Mr. Green) there is an Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. This means among other things, Mr. President, that official information and evaluations with respect to the African nations no longer are passed through the viewpoint of other countries and areas before they flow into total United States policy. In short, Mr. President, the independent nations of Africa now stand on an equal footing with those of Europe, Asia and elsewhere, as far as the machinery of our foreign policy is concerned.

Elsewhere in the world, Mr. President, with rare exceptions, we are just muddling along in the patterns of past policy,
at great expense to the public and with few tangible evidences of achievements leading to a greater stability and progress in those areas and, hence, to more beneficial relations with them in the future.

In the Middle East, for example, we find the same tendencies, as in the past, to transfer high official hopes, almost in desperation, from ruler to ruler, from nation to nation, as the sands of international political intrigue in that region shift first in one direction and then in another. The Eisenhower Doctrine, as many of us anticipated at the time it was enunciated, lies almost buried in these sands. The Baghdad Pact acquires a new name but even less content.

And still, the real problems of the Middle East remain: The refugees; the denial of the use of Suez on an equal basis to all; the monstrous poverty and ignorance of the many in the midst of the vast wealth and culture of the few; the border questions and the smoldering hatred and suspicion between Israeli and Arab. None of these--the real problems of the Middle East--appear to be any closer to solution than they were a decade ago. Nevertheless the outpouring of public funds for the region goes on in the bland assumption that we are doing something about these problems. How much longer, Mr. President?

Sooner or later, in the administration of policies with respect to the Middle East we are going to have to make up our minds. Sooner or later we are going to have to face the fact that, for this nation as a whole, there are some things more important
than Middle Eastern oil, military bases or the soothing of the ultra-nationalistic tantrums of one nation or another.

Sooner or later, we are going to have to decide who in the Middle East works sincerely and with forebearance to end the state of fear and incipient war which prevails in that region and who intrigues to perpetuate it. We are going to have to decide which governments render a decent measure of justice to their peoples and act for their peaceful progress and which governments exploit their passions for selfish or destructive ends.

When we have made these decisions then, perhaps, we may be able to devise policies for which we need not apologize, policies which will have some strength to stand in the midst of political intrigue and against the inroads of communism into the region—policies which will begin to bring to an end the largely indiscriminate use of public funds for what are often self-defeating purposes.

Further to the East, Mr. President, moving towards the Pacific, there is little in the situation in which to find comfort. We go on, as we have been doing for years, spending, with little question, vast sums of public funds, at best to hold a line against communism. Yet despite this outpouring, the line shows signs of breaking down in a Laos just a few months after we have been told that foreign aid had built the line solid in that country. And when a situation of that kind arises, when it catches us unaware, what is the answer, Mr. President? More of the same; more aid in the same pattern as in the past.
As for stability and progress in any of these nations, except in Japan and in India and one or two isolated spots, there is little evidence of it. The lot of vast populations remains just about as miserable as ever; the enticements of authoritarianism are as intense as ever. I repeat, Mr. President, as far as United States policies in Asia are concerned, they constitute, largely, an enormously costly holding action from Korea to Pakistan and a holding action of very dubious reliability. Moreover, Mr. President, they constitute a holding action which is developing disturbing overtones. I refer to what is, apparently, a trend towards military or quasi-military authoritarian dictatorships in southern and southeast Asia. Those who administer our policies seem inclined to look the other way, to find the rationalizations which put off the facing of the realities inherent in this trend. To be sure, one can find good in the development. Military dictatorships produce more stability and order, at first. They are easier to deal with, at first. They even promise a measure of progress away from the corruption, the inertia, the inadequacy that characterized many of the predecessor governments, at first.

But, Mr. President, no person bred in this nation--alive to its premise that man is fit to govern himself--no person bred in that tradition can look with equanimity, much less with eagerness, on the appearance of military or quasi-military regimes in so many lands with which we are intimately associated. I must ask, Mr. President, is this the only answer which freedom can pose to communism?
I can only express the hope that those who are responsible for the administration of our policies and particularly our aid programs know that they are doing. I can only express the hope that this military-authoritarian trend in non-Communist Asia is a temporary phenomenon, that it is a step towards responsible and popularly responsive government in these lands.

There are things worse than instability in this world and one of them is the iron hand of tyranny—communist or any other. I cannot look with pride on any action of this government, advertent or inadvertent, that acts to close that hand on any people—no, not even in the mistaken zeal that this will somehow save them and us from communism.

Administration of Policy

In my remarks so far, Mr. President, I have been discussing matters over which, for the most part, we do not—as a nation—exercise unilateral control. What happens in the Far East, the Middle East, in Europe, the Americas or elsewhere is not within our capacity alone to determine. Nor is the responsibility for developments there uniquely that of this Administration or any other. In most parts of the world our influence ranges from important to peripheral but, in a practical sense, it is not absolute anywhere and the sooner we disabuse ourselves of any idea that it is, the sooner we shall use with greater deftness, with less waste of public resources, such influence as we do possess.
There is an aspect of foreign relations, however, which is wholly within the province of the United States, wherein responsibility rests solely with this nation. I refer to the manner in which we make up our minds in foreign policy and, after we have made it up, what we do and the way we do it. In short, I refer to the formulation and administration of policy.

Other nations do not tell this nation what to decide, as regards its foreign relations. To be sure the attitudes of others, the circumstances abroad, our relationships with others influence our decisions. Indeed they should, for we are not a nation in a pressurized nose-cone somewhere off in space. But awareness of the rest of the world, notwithstanding, in the last analysis, we decide for ourselves. We act for ourselves. We make right decisions or wrong decisions. We act intelligently or foolishly as a result. And we bear the responsibility for these national decisions and actions. In short, the buck-passing stops or should stop at the water's edge. We—not others—determine for what purpose we have a State Department, an aid-administration, a Central Intelligence Agency, an Information Service and a host of other agencies which carry on activities abroad on the basis of appropriations from public funds and on behalf of the entire nation. We alone decide how they shall function.

When I use the term "we," Mr. President, I mean, of course, the people of the United States. In matters of foreign relations, however, the responsibility for interpreting what we want and how we are to pursue it rests, in a theoretical sense,
with the elected President, acting in some instances with the advice and consent of the elected Senate and in others with the concurrence of the elected Congress.

That is the Constitutional theory, Mr. President, but what is the fact? The fact is that the power to interpret the will of the nation in respect to our vast and complicated relations with the rest of the world has been diffused through the enormous labyrinth of the Executive Branch of the government. The power to decide, in short, has been scattered and diluted to the point where it has become virtually impossible to fix responsibility. It has been scattered and diluted to the point where it has become virtually impossible to use the public power effectively to bring about adjustments in policy and its administration at somewhere near the time that these adjustments are needed.

In these circumstances, national interests frequently become so interwoven with bureaucratic interests and conflicts that we are less and less able to adjust the total needs of the nation to the changing circumstances of the world. More and more we have a policy determined by Executive agency accommodation and less and less by the leadership and decision of the responsible political officials of the Administration and the Congress. I believe the able Senator from Minnesota (Mr. Humphrey) illustrated this point most forcibly a short time ago on the floor with regard to policy formulation on the testing of nuclear weapons. He showed how agency conflicts were producing a situation that undercut our
negotiators in Geneva. His statement apparently was heard at the White House for the President made a decision on this question shortly thereafter. But, Mr. President, this is the kind of decision which should be forthcoming promptly within the Administration on the basis of need. It ought not to require prodding from the Senate.

I realize that this problem has been with the nation for a long time. It is not amenable to easy solution. Nevertheless, Mr. President, we must deal with it, if responsible government in the field of foreign policy is not to degenerate into a catchphrase. We must stay with this problem--the President and the Congress--until it yields to rational solution.

The able Senator from Washington (Mr. Jackson) has recognized the deplorable creakiness of the decision-making machinery of the nation in critical matters of foreign relations and defense. He has supplied the initiative and set in motion a special Senate investigation of the problem which has been promised the cooperation of the Administration. That cooperation is essential because responsibility for this problem rests primarily and preponderantly with the Administration.

I should like to suggest, Mr. President, that we may find the way to a reasonable solution to this problem in a diligent assertion of the primary authority of the Presidency in matters directly or indirectly related to foreign policy and a reassertion, under the President, of the responsibility of the Secretary and the Department of State for the conduct of foreign relations.
If the Department of State is not organized to handle these matters in their totality, then let us reorganize it. If it is not equipped, then let us equip it. If its personnel is not properly trained, then let us seek to provide the training. If it has not sufficient resources, financial or otherwise, then let us make these resources available to it.

But let us not, in an effort to compensate for the real or imagined shortcomings of the Department of State so scatter responsibilities in foreign relations through the military departments, the agricultural department, the I.C.A., the C.I.A., the Commerce Department or whatever, that the costs of administering foreign policy rise enormously and, in ratio, the constructive results decline drastically. We have already carried this process so far that in our official representation abroad, the employees of the Department of State, numerous as they may be, are in many instances far outnumbered by the representatives of other United States agencies. And although the Department of State bears ultimate responsibility for relations abroad, it exercises only the most nominal influence over the use of the resources and the actions of the personnel of these other agencies.

I believe this session of the 86th Congress has made a highly significant advance which can act to bring about a major improvement in the administration of foreign relations. I refer to the authorizing legislation which the Congress has passed in the field of foreign-aid. If it is reasonably interpreted by the
Administration, this legislation, as extensively amended by Congress, can act to fix authority and responsibility for this significant undertaking much more decisively, than is now the case. One amendment provides for an inspector-general in the Department of State to probe the weaknesses in every aspect of the aid-program. A second provides for the ending of the non-security related secrecy which has surrounded this program. Still another separates military aid from other forms of aid but provides for close control over the entire program by the Secretary of State. Finally, Mr. President, a fourth amendment requires the Executive Branch to submit plans for the gradual termination of massive grants, as the program moves more and more to a loan basis. These amendments, Mr. President, can do much to end aid by force of habit and to give to the program more purpose and direction within the context of our total policy. They can reduce the waste and any tendencies towards corrupt practices.

The Congressional action on foreign aid, Mr. President, is only a first step in bringing about a more integrated, streamlined and responsible administration of the nation's international affairs. Much remains to be done in regard to other agencies which have injected themselves or have been injected into these matters without adequate coordination under the Secretary of State and without adequate control by the elected officials of this government.
Concluding Comments

Mr. President, I have talked at great length today. But there is much that needs saying on this subject of the nation's foreign relations and their administration, much more than I have said. I wanted these thoughts, however, to be on the Record at this time. For, in the near future, discussions will be taking place between the President and Mr. Khrushchev and others of the highest importance to the nation. It is possible to question the wisdom of these meetings at this point in time and circumstance, as has been done. But the decision to hold them has been made by the President and, at a recent press conference, he put the significance of these meetings in proper perspective when in response to questions as to their propriety he stated: "We are talking about the human race and what's going to happen to it" and "any President that refused finally to use the last atom of prestige or the last atom of his energy /In this quest for peace/ ought to be condemned by the American people.";

Yet these impending discussions--however self-intentioned--are but a part of the search for a better road for this nation and mankind. The work of securing the well-being and the peace of the people of the United States will not end with the impending exchanges. We shall be better prepared to do what still needs to be done if we understand more clearly the worldwide dimensions of the undertaking which confronts us, if we ready our spirits and determination for the tasks which the impending conferences may make possible.