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Congressional Record - The Situation in Laos

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peaceful, political situation had been created in Laos; third, how is it, that after spending hundreds of millions on aid to Laos, after being assured by the executive branch just a short time ago that this aid had built stability and kept out the Communists, the defense of the entire country can be so rapidly undermined by a battalion or two of Viet-minh forces? This development, coming as it does, just a few months after the adverse report of the Hardy Committee on the Aid Program in Laos, highlights again the concern which has been expressed over and over again in Congress on shortcomings in the administration of foreign aid.

Most of all, we have got to ask ourselves, How have we been making the policy and administrative decisions on Laos? On September 4, I suggested to the Senate that "the power to interpret the will of the Nation in respect to our vast and complicated relations with the rest of the world has been diffused through the enormous labyrinth of the executive branch of the Government. The power to decide has been scattered and diluted to the point where it has become virtually impossible to fix responsibility."

Is that what has happened in Laos? Has it, in fact, been the President and the Secretary of State who have made the decisions on Laos in the past few years? Or, do we have, in that country a policy based on executive agency accommodation, with the Defense Department, the ICA, the CIA, or whatever, each putting in an ear and the State Department trying to guide the boat while it does not really have the power to control the rudder.

Regardless of what has happened in the past, this administration had better see to it that in the present delicate situation, it is the President and the Secretary of State and the Department of State—they alone—and no one else in the executive branch who calls the shots and makes the decisions and that the rest of the executive branch falls in line. Otherwise we are going to be in grave danger of stumbling into what may be an avoidable military involvement.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I wish to express my full support of actions taken up to this time by the Department of State in trying to bring about an alleviation of the present situation in this unhappy, this remote, this faraway country.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, as one who has visited Laos briefly, and has studied and watched the situation ever since that visit, I agree with the Senator from Montana that this is a serious situation. It involves Cambodia, Thailand, and South Vietnam. It certainly should have the attention of the highest authorities of our Government.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator.

Mr. MORSE. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the Senator from Montana, as a member of the

Committee on Foreign Relations, has laid down a set of principles with regard to the protection of freedom in that area of the world where freedom is under such severe attack with which I wish to associate myself. I think the Communists are going to find the American people united in support of the State Department and in support of the principles just enunciated by the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator.

Mr. WILEY subsequently said: Mr. President, after hearing the fine statement this morning by the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), I caused to be prepared a short statement on the same subject, as follows:

Mr. President, as you know, the United Nations Security Council is scheduled to meet this afternoon on the request of Laos to send U.N. observers to that strife-torn country.

The United Nations, I hope, will take expeditious action upon the request of this beleaguered nation.

Yesterday, the United States declared its support of the Lao plea for a U.N. observer mission.

The position, which I believe is a sound one, again represents our willingness to assume obligations as a responsible member of the United Nations Charter.

We can, of course, expect the Communists to attempt to throw roadblocks in the path of any effort to effectively investigate the violation by them of the territorial integrity of Laos.

However, every effort must be made to not only point the finger of blame at the Communists—where it belongs—but also to develop more effective machinery for dealing with this kind of aggression.

At this time, I request unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the text of the statement issued by the State Department on the Lao situation.

In addition, I request to have the State Department comments followed by a statement by myself issued yesterday. The release cites the Lao crisis as one more bit of evidence on the need for an effective United Nations police force to curb such violations and to provide for a more secure peace.

There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Times]

U.S. STATEMENT ON LAOS

WASHINGTON, September 5.—Following is the text of the State Department statement today on Laos:

"The United States as a member of the United Nations will fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by it under the charter. One of these obligations is to take appropriate measures in support of the charter. To this end the United States will support United Nations consideration of the Royal Lao Government's appeal.

"The U.S. Government has repeatedly announced its strong support of the royal Lao Government in its determination to resist Communist efforts to undermine the security and stability of Laos.

"On August 28, 1959, the United States announced that, in response to specific and urgent requests from the Lao Government for improving its defense position, additional aid was being authorized to permit emergency increases in the Lao army and

militia to cope with the threat posed to that government by the Communists.

"The United States announced at the same time that it would continue to support reasonable approaches to achieve a peaceful solution of the current situation in Laos.

"NORTH VIETNAMESE ACCUSED

"On August 30 a strong attack from the northeast was launched against royal Lao army units in the northeastern border area of Samneua province. The small Lao forces in this province had been reinforced and had begun to push back an earlier Communist salient which had extended about 50 miles from the North Vietnam border in an area northwest of the town of Samneua.

"The August 30 attack against the northeastern border area provides further evidence of the active support of Communist rebel forces within Laos from Communist North Vietnam. The attack could not have been supported nor coordinated without such outside collaboration.

"It is now clear that the Communist bloc does not intend to permit the sovereign Lao Government to remain at peace. The Communist bloc apparently intends to foment and direct a rebellion within Laos and to give extensive support to the attempt to seize important areas and otherwise to prevent the establishment of those peaceful conditions necessary to implement basic economic and social programs.

"In short, the Communist intervention is apparently aimed at preventing the Lao people from realizing their just hopes for a better life.

"EVIDENCE OF INTERVENTION

"That outside Communist intervention exists is demonstrated by:

"1. The assistance evidently being received by the Communist forces within Laos, including supplies and military weapons that could be provided only from Communist territory.

"2. The false—and ridiculous—Communist propaganda emanating simultaneously from Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow to the effect that the Lao Government has been instigated by the United States to 'stir up a civil war' within its boundaries.

"3. The continuing flow from Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi of propaganda and false information about the situation in Laos aimed at confusing world opinion and stating that the United States is using Laos as a military base.

"4. The fact that the military outbreak in Laos has followed conferences in Moscow and Peking between Ho Chi Minh and Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders and also conferences in Moscow between two members of the North Vietnam Politburo and Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan.

"The latest attack upon the Lao Army in Samneua Province has resulted in an appeal by the Royal Lao Government for United Nations assistance. It is appropriate that this matter be thus brought to the world's attention.

"It is obvious that a further augmentation of the invading force or continued material support thereof by Communists in North Vietnam will require a major change in the nature and magnitude of the Royal Lao Government's need for support.

"The United States is confident that the free world would recognize such a new danger to peace and would take the action necessary. For its part, the United States supports that view."

LAO CRISIS CREATES MORE EVIDENCE FOR NEED OF U.N. POLICE FORCE

Senator ALEXANDER WILEY, Republican of Wisconsin, ranking Republican of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, today cited the Lao crisis as one more bit of evidence on the need for a United Nations police force.

"Around the world, the Communists—in Laos, on the India-China border, and elsewhere—continue to engage in infiltration, attempts at subversion, and outright aggression, to attempt to accomplish their goal of world conquest.

"The establishment of an effective U.N. police force, I believe, could do much to control and/or prevent such situations," Senator WILLY said.

"Overall, the nations of the world must increase their efforts to encourage respect for territorial integrity, international law, adherence to high standards of conduct, and more particularly, to discourage such infiltration and aggression as is now occurring in Laos.

"Until enforcement machinery is provided, however, we can—in view of the Communists' pursuit of their goal of world domination—expect this kind of outlawry to continue to create threats to the security of countries.

"We recall that, in 1958, the U.S. Congress, by resolution, expressed its support for establishment of such an international force. Unfortunately, opposition by the Soviet Union has, until now, prevented the creation of such a force within the United Nations.

"The Lao crisis—as well as the India-China border dispute and other such Communist-inspired crises—furnish additional evidence of the need for establishment of an effective U.N. police force to curb such violations and provide for a more secure peace," Senator WILLY concluded.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we have the usual morning hour for the introduction of bills, petitions, and memorials, and the transaction of other routine business. For the convenience of

all the membership, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a limitation on statements not to exceed 3 minutes.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. MORSE. Is the Senator from Oregon to understand that this request—

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we have the usual morning hour for the introduction of bills, petitions, and memorials, and the transaction of other routine business with the limitation on statements of not to exceed 3 minutes. The exact form of the request is found in the Record each morning when the Senate assembles. I make that same request.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry. Let me assure the majority leader that I understood the request. I was raising a parliamentary inquiry about the request. It is my understanding—

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, may we have order? I cannot hear the Senator.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. MORSE. Is my understanding correct that if the request is granted, then the morning hour called for by the request will be conducted outside of the unanimous-consent agreement with regard to the pending business before the Senate?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MORSE. I have no objection.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The request is agreed to.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of the regular morning hour, this being Monday, it be in order to call the calendar for the consideration of measures to which there is no objection.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection?

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I object.

REPORT OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON REDUCTION OF NONESSENTIAL FEDERAL EXPENDITURES—FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT AND PAY

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, as chairman of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonesential Federal Expenditures, I submit a report on Federal employment and pay for the month of July 1959. In accordance with the practice of several years' standing I ask unanimous consent to have the report printed in the Record, together with a statement by me.

There being no objection, the report and statement were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

FEDERAL PERSONNEL IN EXECUTIVE BRANCH, JULY 1959 AND JUNE 1959, AND PAY, JUNE 1959 AND MAY 1959

PERSONNEL AND PAY SUMMARY
(See table I)

Information in monthly personnel reports for July 1959 submitted to the Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonesential Federal Expenditures is summarized as follows:

Total and major categories	Civilian personnel in executive branch			Payroll (in thousands) in executive branch		
	In July numbered—	In June numbered—	Increase (+) or decrease (—)	In June was—	In May was—	Increase (+) or decrease (—)
Total	2,370,461	2,366,991	+3,470	\$1,042,832	\$998,224	+446,608
Agencies exclusive of Department of Defense	1,292,699	1,288,755	+3,934	552,201	530,870	+21,331
Department of Defense	1,077,762	1,078,236	-264	491,531	467,354	+24,177
Inside continental United States	2,188,934	2,183,667	+5,267
Outside continental United States	181,727	183,324	-1,597
Industrial employment	668,636	569,101	+99,535
Foreign nationals	185,182	188,617	-3,435	22,997	22,164	+833

† Exclusive of foreign nationals shown in the last line of this summary.

Table I breaks down the above figures on employment and pay by agencies.

Table II breaks down the above employment figures to show the number inside continental United States by agencies.

Table III breaks down the above employment figures to show the number outside continental United States by agencies.

Table IV breaks down the above employ-

ment figures to show the number in industrial-type activities by agencies.

Table V shows foreign nationals by agencies not included in tables I, II, III, and IV.

TABLE I.—Consolidated table of Federal personnel inside and outside continental United States employed by the executive agencies during July 1959, and comparison with June 1959, and pay for June 1959, and comparison with May 1959

Department or agency	Personnel				Pay (in thousands)			
	July	June	Increase	Decrease	June	May	Increase	Decrease
Executive departments (except Department of Defense):								
Agriculture	98,254	97,240	1,014	\$38,296	\$35,927	\$2,369
Commerce	32,289	32,304	15	18,558	14,438	4,120	1,099
Health, Education, and Welfare	90,467	89,101	1,366	27,039	25,995	1,044
Interior	55,552	54,962	590	25,748	23,659	2,089
Justice	39,282	39,987	705	16,996	16,120	876
Labor	5,963	5,937	26	3,171	2,972	199
Post Office	352,964	349,961	2,143	218,438	212,129	6,319
State	33,811	33,770	41	15,762	15,494	268
Treasury	75,097	76,011	914	38,557	37,231	1,326

Footnotes at end of table.