1960

Miscellaneous Statements - Carbon Copies of Speeches in Blk.

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Recommended Citation

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.
June 16, 1969

Statement of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)

President Eisenhower has been compelled to cancel his visit to Japan at the request of Premier Kishi. The cancellation has nothing to do with the President's willingness to take risks for peace, to do whatever, properly, can be done to cement friendly relations with other nations. It most certainly has nothing to do with the United States putting its tail between its legs and running, as only recently someone or other suggested that a cancellation might indicate.

There is a matter before the Japanese and American governments which is far more significant than the visit and its cancellation. That is the signed treaty between the United States and Japan which is awaiting ratification by both nations. It ought not to be confused with what has now transpired.

The President was not on a journey of ratification. He was on a goodwill tour which, before the U-2 incident, was planned so as to take him through the Soviet Union on his way to Japan. One phase of that trip had already had to be changed. Now another phase of it, regretfully has had to be changed.
The treaty, however, is another matter. It is an improvement over existing arrangements with Japan from the Japanese point of view, I believe, as well as from ours. The Committee on Foreign Relations has recommended unanimously that the treaty should be ratified. I see no reason, therefore, why the Senate should not proceed with due deliberation this session to consider the treaty and to approve or to withhold ratification as it sees fit. For my part, I believe the treaty is a proper one at this time and I have every intention of supporting its ratification.

As for ratification by Japan, that is for the Japanese to decide. If the Japanese government moves to complete the process as we do that will bring the treaty into effect. If, in the light of their circumstances, they decide to postpone or to move more slowly on ratification, there is no reason for us to feel affronted. They have their internal problems and difficulties with which they know best how to deal. If ever there has been a time when patience and understanding on our part has been necessary, it is now. The less said about what the Japanese should or should not do would be the best policy, I believe, for us to follow.
Our consideration of the Treaty at this time had nothing to do with the internal situation in Japan or the President's trip but only came about because of two factors:

1. The Japanese wanted to consider and debate the Treaty first.
2. We waited, deliberately, and approved it because we thought it was good for the United States and would better U.S.-Japanese relations.
3. It is better than Treaty now in effect.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize that if there has ever been a time when patience and understanding on our part are necessary it is now.
Mr. President:

In the November, 1959 issue of Harper's Magazine there appears a brilliant article by an excellent writer about an outstanding Member of the Senate. I refer to the article by William S. White entitled "Medicine Man from Alabama." It concerns our distinguished colleague, the esteemed Senator from Alabama (Mr. Hill) and what he has done for the nation's citizens by his quiet, intelligent and persuasive legislative leadership in the field of health. Mr. White's article is a great tribute to the Senator from Alabama. It is a tribute in which, I am sure, Members of the Senate and millions of Americans who have benefited from his labors are happy to join. I ask unanimous consent that the article previously alluded to be inserted at this point in the record.
MEMORANDUM ON SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT WOULD TEST-FIRE LONG RANGE MISSILES IN CENTRAL PACIFIC BETWEEN JANUARY 15 and FEBRUARY 15, 1960.

The argument has been made that the Soviet Union unilaterally has the right to test-fire missiles in the Central Pacific because the United States has already done so, not only there but in the South Atlantic as well.

The arguments against this are:

1. In the Central Pacific we always made complete arrangements for evacuations and always cordoned off the area of a test with naval vessels.

2. This is an area in which we have a vital interest because of its closeness to Johnston Island some 500 miles east, the Hawaiian Islands some 1,100 miles east, and the UN Trust Territory immediately east and north which is administered by the United States.

3. The Soviet Union made its announcement ten days before the first missile test date was to go into operation.

4. In this area prior and detailed consultation should have been had with the United States, for reasons enumerated above; with Japan because of its fishing fleets in the area; and with Australia, because of its interest in navigation in the area.
(5) The delineation of a 27,000-square-mile area, roughly 300 miles by 270 miles on a unilateral basis is, in my opinion, unwarranted, highhanded, and, depending on the type of missiles used and where they land, potentially dangerous.

(6) The argument vis-a-vis our use of the South Atlantic for missile testing purposes can be counter-balanced by the fact that we have entered into agreements with various countries to set up tracking stations in the Dominican Republic, on an island off the coast of Brazil, and with the British for the use of Ascension Island. There has been no protest of any kind that I know of from any country bordering in that area. Furthermore, the testing does not take place over areas of population, a UN Trusteeship is not involved in any way, and this policy has been in effect for several years.

(7) It would appear to me that if the Soviet Union wants to continue long-range missile testing, it would be more legitimate for them to consider the Arctic, rather than the Central and South Pacific as a proving area.

(8) No negotiations of any kind, to my knowledge, were entered into, discussed, or considered before the Soviet announcement of November 7 that they alone had decided to set aside 27,000 square miles of international waters in the Pacific.
There are many questions in the plane-incident which Khrushchev did not face. For example, we would hardly send a single-engined one-man reconnaissance plane over the border if our intention was to frighten the Russians as he contends; nor would we paint out its markings. Further, did the Russians who shot down the plane first, order it to land, as any civilized people might be expected to do? Did it occur to Mr. Khrushchev that the plane might have been engaged in perfectly legitimate pursuits and inadvertently had gone off course and over the border? If the Russians are going to shoot first and complain later then, indeed, the prospects for the coming summit are grim. It is they who are being provocative and it is they who are jeopardizing the prospects for peace.

While we are asking questions, however, we need to ask a few of our own Administration. What was the plane if, indeed, it was ours, doing close to the Soviet border at a time like this? First reports indicate that the President had no knowledge of the plane incident. If that is the case, we have got to ask whether or not this Administration has any real control over the federal bureaucracy? Can any agency of this government, without the knowledge of politically responsible officials, assume for itself the right to probe for scientific or whatever purposes along a dangerous border and, hence, endanger the policies of the President? If that is the case, we had better get an Administration which is able and
willing to maintain controls over the bureaucracy if we intend to act as a responsible, free government in the basic questions of war or peace which are clearly involved in incidents of this kind.

As for the political shifts and the economic changes which Khrushchev announced, first reports suggest, if anything, that transitions in the Soviet Union are becoming more routine and orderly, that Khrushchev's personal power is more stable than ever. We had better face the fact that the Soviet system is not just going to fade away, but rather, that the Russians are probably improving the techniques for giving continuity to their institutions.
Mr. President:

President Syngman Rhee, by his resignation, has demonstrated his basic patriotism. Whatever his personal idiosyncrasies, he has been, in moments of crisis, broad enough to recognize that Korea's independence is the essential. It was this realization which drove him into exile many decades ago. It was this realization which prompted him to return at the end of World War II and to stay on through the difficult days of the Korean conflict. It was this realization which has prompted him to step down at the present time.

Syngman Rhee's resignation does not end the crisis in Korea; it merely provides an opportunity to end it and it must be acted upon promptly and decisively. A situation of chaos curbed by martial law will not stand for very long in circumstances such as exist in Korea. The chief consequence of a failure to act promptly and decisively may well be a renewal of civil and even international strife and the end of the prospects for the unity in independence of Korea in this generation.

The first responsibility rests with the Korean people and their leaders—in education, in the professions and in religion no less than in politics and in the armed services. If ever there was a time when all the Korean people have needed to cleave together that time is now. If ever
there was a time when prompt action was needed in reorganizing and
strengthening the processes of democratic and responsible government
that time is now. If ever there was a time when Koreans ought to speak
and act in an orderly fashion and with a new dedication to freedom and
independence that time is now. If ever there was a time for soul-searching
on the part of all those who have been involved in the affairs of the
Republic of Korea since the truce of 1953 that time is now.

(1) For the Koreans, the immediate need is to work out promptly
what constitutional reforms may be necessary to prevent the abuse of power
and to insure its responsible exercise. Then, the need is for free and
secret elections without intimidation, in the villages no less than in the
cities, and if United Nations assistance is essential to that end it should
be forthcoming promptly.

(2) For the United Nations, as a whole, the need is to recognize
that it has coasted with the Korean issue since 1953 and has contributed
little if anything through sterile and repetitious debates on this issue
year in and year out in the General Assembly to a solution to the problems
of Korea.

(3) For ourselves, the need is to ask ourselves what, if any-
things, our policies on Korea—direct or through our leadership in the
United Nations—and billions in aid to the South Korean government have
produced since the truce of 1953. Have these policies, this aid, built
conditions conducive to a durable peace or have they served merely as a
holding action and one that is now, apparently, in danger of failing even
to hold? The inadequacies of these policies, the misuse of this aid have
long been apparent but we need to ask ourselves why it has taken bloody street demonstrations and this grave crisis to bring us to the point of even acknowledging, in an official sense, that something was amiss.

First things must come first and, at this moment, every effort will be required to bring about minimum stability and responsible government through constitutional reform and honest elections in the Republic of Korea. The present white-hot concern should not stop there. I would hope that the new Korean leaders who may emerge, our own policy-makers and aid-administrators and the United Nations will look ahead and develop an integrated and determined approach to the inner problems of the Republic of Korea. We need to free this joint effort from any tendencies to accommodate to and to abet political stagnation and corruption. This joint effort and, particularly, any further aid must be used to develop not only an apparently stable situation, as in the past, but a situation which is actually stable because it provides the benefits and hope of responsible progressive government to the Korean people and hence is supported by them.

I would hope, finally, that all nations most intimately affected by developments in Korea, including the Soviet Union, Communist China as well as ourselves and the other members of the United Nations forces in Korea would also look ahead to the end that the entire Korean nation might be reconciled to unity in independence and in peace and, in time, freed of the presence of the forces or the pervasive influence of all outside countries.
Mr. President:

I should like to join in extending greetings to the distinguished members of the Canadian parliamentary delegation who honor the nation and the Senate by this visit. It is a great pleasure and a privilege to have you call on us.

May I say that, for too many years, we have had a paradox in the relations between the people of the United States and the people of Canada. Between us there has been no significant geographic or political barrier. Between us there has been no significant cultural or linguistic barrier. On the contrary, in all these basic matters, the two nations are in every sense neighbors and very close neighbors. In spite of this, our knowledge of each other as people, our awareness of each other’s human hopes, human interests and human problems has been remarkably limited. In short, we have been close in the abstract but rather distant in the specifics.

I do not think the people of the United States have wanted it that way. I do not think the people of Canada have wanted it that way. It has been one of those things which just happens without anyone knowing why it happens.

I believe that this paradox may now be drawing to an end. I believe that those of us who, as representatives, are closest to our respective peoples, can do much to bring it to an end. We can do so by
not only reaffirming, in these bi-national meetings, our obvious but
abstract closeness but also by trying to bring about a similar closeness
in the specifics.

Once again, I join in bidding you a warm welcome. I hope your
stay among us will be pleasant and that the deliberations of the Inter-
Parliamentary group will be most fruitful.
Mr. President:

I do not wish this day to pass without noting that it is the anniversary in office of Mr. Christian Herter. One year ago, Mr. Herter was sworn in as Secretary of State.

He assumed this most difficult assignment at a most difficult time. He has acquitted himself admirably, amply confirming the confidence which the Senate manifested when his appointment was endorsed by this body by unanimous vote.

This comes as no surprise to those of us who have known Mr. Herter through the years. Mr. Herter and I both came to Congress in 1943 and it was my privilege to serve with him on the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the other House for many years. He brought to his work in that group, particularly in connection with the Marshall Plan, the same exceptional and penetrating understanding of international problems which he has displayed in connection with his duties as Secretary of State. He had then, as he has now, a great sensitivity to the ever-changing needs of foreign policy and the courage to advocate and pursue new approaches.

I should like to congratulate the Secretary of State on this occasion and express again my admiration and appreciation for his exceptional service to the nation.
Tribute to Senator Richard L. Neuberger

It is with a heavy heart that I join in this tribute to our late colleague from Oregon, Richard L. Neuberger. My thoughts go first to those who were closest to him, to his wife and family, and I extend to them the poor comfort which words of sympathy are at such a moment. The loss which they have suffered is deep and personal.

Others will feel this loss. The Senate will grieve it. The people of the State of Oregon and elsewhere mourn it.

Richard Neuberger brought a special contribution to the public life of the nation. He gave us a great personal integrity tempered with human warmth and understanding and a gentle touch of humor. He gave us, in his life, an example of courage in the face of pain and adversity. He gave us in his work an example of service to the welfare of the people of the nation, a service which was as dedicated as it was modest and unassuming. He did more than any other man of his time to awaken the Congress and the nation to the priceless treasure of the rivers and forests—the wilderness around us. He worked to preserve this treasure for all Americans against the ravishes of the selfish and the neglect of the unthinking.
For these things and more, Richard L. Neuberger will be remembered. He will be remembered for these efforts especially by those of us from the Northwestern states from whence he came, from Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana and Wyoming. We would regard it as a fitting tribute if a federal wilderness area in that region were named after this great Senator who did so much to save them.

Had he lived longer, Richard Neuberger would have done more, much more, for Oregon, the Northwest and the nation. Yet even in death his presence will be felt. For he was as a quiet star among us burning for a brief moment, a star whose light remains after it is gone.