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New Insights, New Insights, New Policies

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Statement of Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Montana)

NEW INSIGHTS - NEW POLICIES

Something has gone wrong. That much, at least, is clear from the recent rapid succession of visible crises. First, there was the U-2 incident then the summitt-collapse and the withdrawal of the invitation to the President to travel to Russia and, most recently, the forced cancellation of the President's visit to Japan.

Recent events, particularly, in Japan are a source of regret and concern. But we shall only intensify the difficulties by a hostile and intemperate reaction. Japan is going through an hour of great trial. We can best serve the cause of peace and our joint interests by exercising patience and restraint at this time. It is not for us to judge in anger and to talk of boycotts and retaliation unless we seek to propel the Japanese nation in the direction of the Soviet orbit. It is for us to try to preserve the decent and cooperative relations which were born after the bitterness and exhaustion of World War II. It would be well for us to remember that Japan is critical to freedom and peace in the Far East. Unless its ties with this country are maintained the positions in Korea and Okinawa lose much of their meaning and the security of the entire Far East will be endangered.

In any event, little is to be gained at this time by angry
speculation on what has gone wrong elsewhere either in Japan or in the Soviet Union. As for what has gone wrong in our own house, that is our business. It is the business of the President, the Senate, and the Congress. It is the business of the people of the United States.

If we are to understand what has gone wrong, we have got to go back to the point where the difficulty first became apparent. That point, Mr. President, is the U-2 incident. We have got to face the facts of that incident, honestly and bluntly. We have got to face them before they fade into the obscurity of time.

I have intentionally reserved this comment until the President had returned from the Orient and the Committee on Foreign Relations had completed its inquiry into the U-2 affair. But it is appropriate, now, to try to put the incident into perspective. Enough facts for that purpose are now public information.

It is possible to draw reasonable conclusions on the U-2 affair in terms of our national security and welfare, but it is not easy or painless to do so. The incident occurred in connection with Soviet Russia and is, therefore, heavily charged with emotion. A natural tendency exists to describe the affair in the best possible light, to see its consequences in the most optimistic fashion. Moreover, delicate questions of national unity and national security are interwoven with the affair. We are compelled to measure what we say against possible misinterpretation. And, finally, Mr. President,
the facts of the incident which occurred in May have more and more become confused with the fancies of November.

So, I repeat, Mr. President, it is neither easy nor painless to draw reasonable conclusions on this incident. Nevertheless, we must make the effort. As responsible officials, we owe that much to the people whom we represent. We owe it to the people whose lives and fortunes were cast into the incident. We must make the effort in order to gain new national insights. We must make the effort in order to recast both our policies and their administration for the greater security and welfare of the nation.

I speak for myself and only for myself, as one Member of the Senate of the United States, in making these remarks. I should like to emphasize that the remarks are based solely on the public record, as it is to be found in various official statements, in the reports of the press, radio and TV and in the published hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

There is more than enough information in this public record to reach reasonable conclusions. The American press and other communications facilities have performed an exceptional public service in connection with the coverage of the U-2 incident. In these past few weeks, we have seen and heard American journalism in breadth, in depth, and at its best.

I should also like to commend the able Senator from Arkansas (Mr. Fulbright) for his contributions to our understanding of the U-2 affair. His chairmanship of the inquiry into the incident, exemplary in every
way. Without jeopardizing security or unity, he saw to it in accord with the Administration, that adequate and dispassionate information on these proceedings was made public.

Irrelevant Questions

Mr. President, it has seemed to me that our principal responsibility, as Senators, has been to try to understand the facts of the U-2 incident in the hope that out of the experience might come new and better ideas as to how to proceed more effectively in the future. I assume that all Senators, all officials, who are discussing this matter in public forums have had similar purposes in mind.

For that reason, Mr. President, I should like to deal first with what I believe are three extraneous questions which have been insinuated into the debate and discussion. If we permit ourselves to be side-tracked into matters such as these, we shall gain little of use to the nation from the experience despite the great price that has been paid for it.

Irrelevant Questions: Why the Summit collapsed?

The first is the question of why the Summit collapsed. Since responsible officials of this government have stated for the record that they expected little from the meeting long before it was torpedoed, then I can see little relevance in the question of who fired the tube. Indeed, if we are to go into such conjectural matters, we might find it far more profitable to ask why we agreed to go to the meeting in the first place. Why, indeed, should
we have participated, if, U-2 or not, the Summit was going to be of so little value?

For my part, I am prepared to accept what is apparently the thesis of this Administration that Mr. Khrushchev dealt the coup de grace to what was destined to be, in any event, a somewhat fruitless meeting. One might, I suppose, on the basis of this thesis, commend Mr. Khrushchev for saving the American taxpayers a good deal of money. For conferences of this kind are most costly, involving as they do, the travel expenses and pay of a large delegation of officials; and the costs pile up, the longer they remain, uselessly, in session.

Irrelevant Question: Should we have apologized?

The second question which I regard as irrelevant to the discussion is whether we should have apologized to the Soviet Union in Paris. It is true that nations from time to time infringe the rights of other nations. Sometimes they apologize for these infringements and even pay damages. Sometimes they deny the infringements or, at any rate, do not apologize for them. As a nation, we are not an exception. We have done both. On occasion, we have ignored the complaints of others and on occasion we have apologized.

Oddly enough, during this Administration, long before the question was posed after the events in Paris, I believe we had already apologized to the Soviet Union for an infringement. Oddly enough, it was an infringement which grew out of the flight of an American plane. I read
to the Senate, in full, a dispatch in the New York Times, February 2, 1958, page 25:

"U. S. Apologizes on Jet Flight"

"BERLIN, Feb. 1 (AP) -- The United States has apologized to the Soviet Union because a United States Air Force jet made an accidental flight over East German territory Thursday. A United States mission spokesman said the apology had been made in an oral exchange between the Soviet and United States members of the Air Safety Center, the Big Four body that controls air traffic to Berlin."

So, Mr. President, when the question is asked should we have apologized or expressed regrets let no one associated with this Administration throw up his hands in horror at the mere thought. This Administration, apparently, has already apologized to the Soviet Union and to other nations for infringements of one kind or another and notably for plane flights.

It so happens, Mr. President, that I agree with the attitude which Mr. Eisenhower took in not apologizing to Mr. Khrushchev. I agree with it, in the light of the circumstances which prevailed at that time. I agree with it on the basis of the manner and place in which the demand was made. I agree with it on the basis of the publicly-known facts. If the intrusion of the U-2 had been an accident--if it had been an oversight rather than an overflight--then, indeed, an apology or an expression of regret immediately after the incident had occurred might have been in order.
But these circumstances did not prevail. The explanations given out after the incident emphasized that neither an accident nor an oversight was involved. Further, the explanations indicated that we were pursuing some fixed policy in these flights, based upon national and free-world necessity. Finally, the world-wide impression was created and allowed to stand until the Paris meeting, that these flights would be continued. To have apologized in those circumstances would have had no meaning. It could have served only to subject us to the world-wide ridicule. Therefore, I agree, on the basis of the known facts, with the President's decision not to apologize.

It is possible, of course, that all the facts have not been made public. It is conceivable that on the basis of all the facts, another course might have been indicated. After all the Administration had a precedent, as noted in the New York Times dispatch that I have just quoted. It may be that there is still a feeling of doubt in the minds of some that we did take the right course. It may be this doubt which prompts some to continue to raise this question, this question of whether or not we should have apologized in Paris. If that is the case, then, I suggest those who are still perplexed should address the question to the Administration. But if the question is addressed to the American people or to the candidates for the Presidency, it has no relevance to an understanding of the U-2 incident. By obscuring the facts of the incident, it will inhibit the nation from understanding the incident and profiting from it.
Extraneous Question: Do we want another Pearl Harbor?

The third extraneous question, Mr. President, is whether or not we want another Pearl Harbor. This question has something in common with one which is asked in a famous play. Most Senators will remember the question from their childhood. The question is asked by Peter Pan, as Tinker Bell, the devoted but errant pixie lies desperately ill, its light flickering dimly. Peter Pan addresses the audience and asks whether or not they wish Tinker Bell to die. The response of the audience, through generations of children, has invariably been a resounding "no".

In the same fashion, Mr. President, I cannot conceive of any American in his right senses answering anything other than "no" to the question of whether or not we want another Pearl Harbor. But since this question has been raised, I am sure, not with any desire to appeal to an audience, but out of a deep concern for the security of the nation, I shall take the time of the Senate to analyze it.

If the question is going to have more relevance to our understanding of the U-2 incident then Peter Pan's, it is necessary to determine what is inferred by it. After all, it is two decades since Pearl Harbor.

I assume, therefore, that the inference of the question is that the U-2 flight-program was vital in preventing a catastrophic military attack on the security of this nation.
Secretary of Defense Gates, indeed, seems to have used the word "vital" to describe the kind of information which the flights were producing.

**Importance of the U-2 Program and the Ill-fated U-2 Flight**

I am most anxious, Mr. President, that President Eisenhower decide and do what is "vital" for the security of this nation. I have tried in the past, at all times, to give him my full support in such decisions and actions. It is his primary responsibility. National unity requires that he be supported in exercising this responsibility in vital matters.

All we may reasonably ask is that the President in fact does decide and that he does watch closely every aspect of these vital decisions. If the U-2 flights were "vital" to prevent another Pearl Harbor then they should have been made. But, equally, they should have been made under the continuous scrutiny of the President and the coordinated scrutiny of Members of his Cabinet.

The facts in the public record show clearly, however, that while politically-responsible officials knew generally of this program of U-2 overflights they did not subject them to continuous and coordinated scrutiny. The facts indicate that the control and timing of them was in the hands of various obscure employees of the bureaucracy. It is quite clear that Mr. Eisenhower did not push any button to set the particular ill-fated U-2 flight in motion, nor did Mr. Gates, nor Mr. Herter.
Since that is the case, Mr. President, we must question either the degree of attention which these officials were paying to their duties in vital matters or we must conclude that it is misleading to create the impression that these flights, in themselves, were vital. The word, vital, as the Senate knows, means essential to life. I have the highest respect for the President and the Members of his Cabinet. I am sure none was negligent in his responsibilities. I can only assume, therefore, that while the flights were important, they were not regarded as really so important as to command the continuing attention of the politically-responsible officials of the Administration. I can only conclude that the word "vital" is too strong to use in describing their importance.

That such may be the case is indicated by the suspension of the flights by the President and his assurance to Mr. Khrushchev that they would not be resumed. Obviously, if they were vital to prevent another Pearl Harbor attack upon our security the President would never have made that decision.

The fact is, Mr. President, that the security of this nation, any nation, in this uncertain and dangerous world is safeguarded not by any single factor but by many factors. These factors of security fall into two general categories: (1) foreign policies, which should act to reduce the dangers and uncertainties which confront us abroad; and (2) the total capacity of the nation for defense. These categories include far more than intelligence-operations and far--far more than any single intelligence operation such as the U-2 program. Our security depends on the morale and determination of the people of the nation. It depends on the attitudes of peoples in the Communist nations.
as, for example, whether or not they are militant in their hostility to us or whether, persuaded that we intend them no harm, the militancy is tempered. It includes the state of trust and confidence which exists between ourselves and friendly peoples. Particularly, it includes the attitudes of those nations which stand firm and independent in their own right, but nevertheless are allied with us against common dangers. It includes the efficiency of our Defense Establishment, its weapons and its state of readiness. It includes our scientific creativity and our technical ingenuity. It includes—this base upon which our security stands—all these elements and many others.

It is in terms of all these elements that any reasonable evaluation of the U-2 program and the ill-fated flight in particular must be made, not in terms of the spectre of a Pearl Harbor attack two decades ago. Even as an intelligence-operation, without regard for the other factors on which our security depends, we must weigh the risks and cost of the U-2 flights against the availability from other sources of the kind of information which they produced. In this connection, I would point out that much has been made of the fact that the U-2 flights obtained data on the location of Russian missile sites, submarine bases and nuclear centers. That is clearly information of a most significant nature for the defense of the nation. But to illustrate that there are sources of information other than U-2 reconnaissance flights, even on such significant matters, even in countries which made a fetish of secrecy, I call to the attention of the Senate an article from the magazine "Missiles and Rockets." In an issue, published early this year, it lists and
pin-points on a map ten Soviet I.C.B.M. sites and 30 I.R.B.M. sites which were located from public sources in Europe and from technical journals. I ask unanimous consent that this article appear at the conclusion of my remarks.

I also call to the attention of the Senate an article by Harrison Salisbury in the New York Times, September 30, 1954, and an article in the "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists" (October 1959) by Arnold Kranish. These articles reveal a great deal about certain Soviet atomic centers and contain information on them which no aerial photograph could possibly supply. I ask unanimous consent that both articles be printed at the conclusion of my remarks. I also refer the Senate to the fuller treatment of this subject as it appears in a book by Mr. Kranish entitled "Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union" (Stanford University Press, 1959).

I call to the attention of the Senate the reference work, "Jane's Fighting Ships (1959-1960)," which lists, with photographs, submarines of the Soviet Navy. Finally, I refer the Senate to the book "The Soviet Navy" edited by Commander M. G. Saunders of the United Kingdom (Frederick A. Praeger, 1958). On pages 161-163 there is a detailed table of the location and capacity of shipyards throughout the Soviet Union, specializing in naval work. I ask unanimous consent that the table referred to be included in the record at the conclusion of my remarks and I strongly recommend to those whose work may require a more detailed picture of the Soviet navy this book edited by Commander Saunders.
I do not wish to leave the impression, Mr. President, that I believe these and similar publications are the equivalent in military value of the aerial films of Russia produced by the U-2 program. So far as I know, in some respects, they may be more complete, more valuable and in others less complete, less valuable. All I am trying to suggest, Mr. President, is that while obviously we cannot ignore the importance of secret intelligence-operations, we must recognize equally that they are not always the only source and they are not necessarily always the best source of information. They are a part of or should be a part of a total pattern of defense which takes into consideration all aspects of foreign and defense policy.

I cannot bring myself to believe that anyone who raises the question, do we want another Pearl Harbor, seriously wishes to leave with this Senate or the people of the United States the impression that the C.I.A. and, in particular, one aerial-reconnaissance operation of the agency, alone, stands between us and a repetition of that catastrophe.

Cost of the U-2 Flight

On the basis of the public record we can assume that these flights produced information--probably very important information--for certain aspects of our military defense. On the basis of the public record, we know that they produced this information at an enormous price. And it is only in an information to cost ratio that they can be properly evaluated. I am talking,
now, not of the monetary cost of the flights, which were undoubtedly high, but of the full cost, in terms of damage to the total pattern of the foreign and defense policies by which we seek to safeguard our security. It is difficult to estimate that cost, Mr. President, if for no other reason than that all the bills have probably not yet been submitted. On May 9th, as the facts of the U-2 incident began to clarify, I stated in the Senate:

"The President has been undercut on the eve of a major international conference at a moment of world crisis. The world-wide adverse repercussions for the foreign policy of the United States have only begun but they will be heard loudly and ominously from Norway to Japan."

If we cannot measure the cost of this flight in any specific fashion, we can, nevertheless, gain some indication of it by observing the events which have transpired in the nation and in the world since May 1, less than two months ago. Let me stress that there are many factors which explain each of the developments which I am about to list. Nevertheless, I know of no serious evaluation of the present international situation which would ignore the U-2 incident as one of the factors in each of them.

(1) The collapse of the Summit whose value only the Administration can estimate since it was responsible for pursuing it.

(2) The intensification of anti-American sentiment, the cancellation of the President's visit, and the sprouting of seeds of deep opposition in Japan to the Japanese-United States security treaty.

(3) The shock at home and in many friendly nations at the confirmation of the fact that we were engaged in activities which, theretofore, many tended to associate almost wholly with Soviet behavior.
(4) The embarrassment of certain nations allied with us, around the periphery of the Soviet Union and, in consequence, the institution by them of more stringent control over the use of their defense facilities by the United States.

(5) The intensification of the threat of war by accident or miscalculation growing out of the order to Soviet military authorities to rocket the bases in surrounding nations from which unauthorized planes might intrude and the restatement of our determination to fulfill our defense commitments to these nations.

(6) The strengthening of the hand of hard-line communists within the Soviet Union and the communist bloc, notably the Chinese communists, against those in Communist countries who might believe it possible to live at least without military conflict, if not in harmony with us, on this globe grown so small.

(7) The partial resumption of the tactics of the cold war, thereby rendering more difficult all efforts to deal with international problems by rational negotiation.

(8) The intensification of pressure on the Congress for increased foreign aid appropriations, notably military aid, and increased defense spending in the light of the increased tensions flowing from the U-2 incident.

**Origins of the Ill-fated U-2 Flight**

It is all very well for Mr. Eisenhower to assume personal responsibility for this costly program of overflights which contributed in greater or
lesser degree to all of these developments. In an ultimate sense, he is responsible for everything that transpires in our relations with other nations. It would not be in keeping with his character to shirk that responsibility. Nevertheless, it is clear from the public record, as I have already noted, that not a single Member of the Cabinet nor the President exercised any direct control whatsoever over the ill-fated U-2 flight at the critical moment at which it was launched. It ought to be made clear that this particular flight was apparently set in motion on the basis of a law passed in 1947, an executive order issued about 7 years ago and by what, apparently, was a routine clearance some weeks before the flight itself. If we can draw any conclusion from the public record it is that this particular flight owes its origin more to bureaucratic inertia, lack of coordination and control and insensitivity to its potential cost than it does to any conscious decision of politically-responsible leadership.

Lack of Fixed Responsibility and Coordination

That conclusion is reinforced by the confusion which surrounded the release of official explanations of the flight. At least three Departments or agencies—Defense, State and N.A.S.A., without adequate and continuing consultation—one with the other—contributed statements by way of explanation. Add to that the comments emanating from the White House. Add to that, the C.I.A.—prompting from behind the scenes. Add to that, the words of the Vice President who, stepping into the matter at the 11th hour, tried to rescue the situation with speeches in New York.

Mr. President, we do not have to wait for Mr. Khrushchev to ask the question. We need to ask it ourselves: Who runs this Administration in the vital matters of foreign policy and defense?
It is not a new question. The shocking disarray of departments, agencies and sub-agencies through which this nation tries to conduct the foreign relations and defense of the nation, at best, borders on a national disgrace and, at worst, courts national disaster.

In a speech in the Senate during the closing days of the last session (September 4, 1959), the problem was alluded to in these terms and, I shall quote at length from my remarks at that time because they apply most directly to the U-2 incident:

"... We—not others—determine for what purpose we have a State Department, an aid-administration, a Central Intelligence Agency, an Information Service and a host of other agencies which carry on activities abroad on the basis of appropriations from public funds and on behalf of the entire nation. We alone decide how they shall function.

"When I use the term 'we,' I mean, of course, the people of the United States. In matters of foreign relations, however, the responsibility for interpreting what we want and how we are to pursue it rests, in a theoretical sense, with the elected President, acting in some instances with the advice and consent of the elected Senate and in others with the concurrence of the elected Congress.

"That is the Constitutional theory, Mr. President, but what is the fact? The fact is that the power to interpret the will of the nation in respect to our vast and complicated relations with the rest of the world has been diffused through the enormous labyrinth of the Executive Branch of the government. The power to decide, in short, has been scattered and diluted to the point where it has become virtually impossible to use the public power effectively to bring about adjustments in policy and its administration at somewhere near the time that these adjustments are needed.
"In these circumstances, national interests frequently become so interwoven with bureaucratic interests and conflicts that we are less and less able to adjust the total needs of the nation to the changing circumstances of the world. More and more we have a policy determined by Executive agency accommodation and less and less by the leadership and decision of the responsible political officials of the Administration and the Congress.

"I realize that this problem has been with the nation for a long time. It is not amenable to easy solution. Nevertheless, Mr. President, we must deal with it, if responsible government in the field of foreign policy is not to degenerate into a catch-phrase. We must stay with this problem--the President and the Congress--until it yields to rational solution."

And, I repeat now, almost a year later that, indeed, we must stay with this problem until it yields to rational solution. That, in my opinion, is the most significant conclusion which can be drawn from the U-2 incident.

In short, the most pressing need of this government is a more effective, a more responsible and responsive system of administration of its foreign relations and its defense. And, at the same time, in the wake of the collapse of the summit we need to get straight, once and for all, that personal magnetism and the personal contacts of heads of states are not a substitute for policies continually attuned to the ever-changing realities of the world.

I reach this conclusion notwithstanding the President's, and Vice President's continued endorsement of summit conferences and personal diplomacy as reported in the New York Times (June 18, 1960) by Harrison Salisbury and the Washington Star (June 19, 1960) by David S. Broder. I ask unanimous
consent that these reports from the Times, and the Star be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The basic questions remain: Can we develop a more responsive, more responsible administrative system? Can we devise the new policies which are essential and keep them adjusted to ever-changing realities?

I am firmly convinced that, to do so, is in the "vital" interest of the freedom of this nation. May I say that I use the word "vital" here advisedly, with full awareness of its literal meaning. In this connection, I wish to note the outstanding contribution that is already being made by the special committee under the Chairmanship of the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. Jackson) on the question of administration.

As the Senate knows, over the years, I have made suggestions—as one Senator, along with other members of this body—both with regard to policy made and its administration. Sometimes suggestions which I have entered into policy, in whole or part, and often they have not. In any event, I have tried to be constructive in the past. That is my intention, today, in setting forth additional and specific proposals on our policies and their administration.

The needed changes cannot be brought about by glittering generalities. All of us desire a durable peace. All of us wish to safeguard the nation. All of us seek more efficient, effective and responsible administration of the nation's foreign and defense affairs. The problem is not to state and restate these generalities. The problem now, is to set forth specifics which may act to bring us closer to these desired ends.
I am persuaded that the problem is primarily one of new ideas and of action on ideas. We need ideas on how to improve our policies and their administration. We need ideas set forth now; ideas to be amended; ideas to be adopted or rejected; but as of this moment, above all, ideas to be discussed.

I believe the thoughts which I am about to express contain some promise of a more effective, efficient and responsible administration of our international affairs and our defense. I believe they may help to lead us to a more rational and secure position in the world than the position of quicksand on which we now stand. The Senate may find that they do not hold any such promise. Nevertheless, we must begin in earnest on this problem in its specifics and I shall present these thoughts, as a beginning, for whatever they may be worth.

Possible Administrative Changes

The first set of suggestions which I lay before the Senate, Mr. President, deal with administrative changes in the conduct of foreign relations and aspects of defense. They are prompted by the U-2 incident and its handling but they represent many years of study, experience and observation of the operation of this government. I present the suggestions, at this time, in outline form, sufficient only to indicate the channels in which improvement might be sought.

(1) Consideration should be given to the dissolution of the National Security Council staff structure and the transfer of the functions of that body to the regular cabinet departments of the Executive Branch.
(2) The importance of the Cabinet as the principal source of advice to the President should be reasserted. Within the Cabinet, an Inner Council consisting of the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense under the Chairmanship of the President should meet on a continuing basis on all matters of critical importance to the peace and security of the nation.

(3) The function of the Vice-President should be confined to that defined in the Constitution which is to preside over the Senate and to such ceremonial functions as the President, with the concurrence of the Senate leadership, may assign from time to time to the office.

(4) The independent status of all agencies with predominantly international functions—in particular, the International Cooperation Administration and the United States Information Service should be terminated promptly. The functions of these agencies and personnel should be fully incorporated into the Department of State, with due recognition of the contribution which the employees of these agencies have made and with due regard to their right to fair treatment. Any large-scale reductions in personnel which these mergers may entail should be brought about, primarily, through normal attrition and special adjustments in the retirement system, with personnel in the Department of State and in the agencies, considered on the basis of equality.

(5) Full control over all international policies and activities of agencies with predominantly domestic functions, such as the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Defense and the Department
of Commerce should be lodged with the Department of State.

(6) A drastic reduction in the major decision-making and, hence, decision-delivering personnel should be made in the hierarchy of the Department of Defense and in the three services and in the Department of State.

(7) Justification before the Congress of the military budget and the division of appropriations among the services should be the exclusive responsibility of the Secretary of Defense and the civilian Secretaries of each service. As a general practice, our highest military officers should be permitted to concentrate on the problems of military defense and should not be involved in the politics of budgeting or the process of appropriations.

(8) The functions of the C.I.A. in the gathering of nonclandestine intelligence information should be integrated into already existing intelligence branches of the Department of Defense and the Department of State in order to limit what, at present, appears to be a great duplication of effort. Further, intelligence-gathering operations by the Department of Defense should be confined to military matters and, by the Department of State to non-military matters. Finally, a select committee of the two Departments should be established to evaluate and advise the President and the Inner Cabinet Council on all intelligence matters. C.I.A. personnel who may be affected by this change should be treated on the same basis of fairness and as already noted in connection with the proposed integration of the U.S.I.S. and the I.C.A. into the Department of State.
(9) A Special Joint Committee of Congress on the C.I.A. should be established on the pattern of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and should be kept as fully apprised as possible in relation to the national interest, of any remaining functions of the C.I.A.

(10) The Secretary of State should be assigned responsibility by the President for establishing and enforcing policies on public speeches and public pronouncements of all officials—military and civilian—of the Executive Branch which deal with questions involving our relations with other nations. And, in general, all Executive Branch personnel outside of the Department of State should avoid public remarks in these matters.

(11) The entire Committee-structure within the Department of Defense and the Department of State and among the Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch, involved in foreign and defense affairs, should be reviewed from top to bottom, by a Presidential-Congressional Commission with a view to a drastic reduction in their numbers.

Proposals in Policy

Let me outline next, Mr. President, certain suggestions relative to the content of foreign policies. These changes are required now more than ever, for the bubble of peace by public relations has burst and we need promptly, to fill the void with new policies for peace. I shall confine my comments, today, to those aspects of policy which I believe to be most
critical, the most urgent. If I do not make mention of the foreign aid program in these suggestions, it is because my views on this matter are well-known. They are to be found in detail in a report issued this year by a Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Aid-Program in Viet Nam, many of the conclusions of which have a far wider applicability than to that one nation. My views are also expressed in speeches to the Senate last year and in amendments offered at that time to the aid-bill.

1. Overflights

The American Ambassador in Moscow should be instructed to invite consultations with his colleagues from those nations on the periphery of the Soviet Union and with officials of the Soviet foreign office with a view to clarifying the implications of the order to the Soviet military forces to rocket the bases from which planes may intrude into the Soviet Union. The need is to eliminate, at once, the possibility of a sudden ignition of massive nuclear conflict, by accident or inadvertence. This possibility is dangerously inherent in the Soviet military order and our response to it. By the same token we should clarify our own position on planes which may intrude, by accident or inadvertence, into the air-space of the United States.

This question is the most pressing matter facing the nations of the world today. Some international agreement on an accepted procedure for dealing with accidental overflights is essential and it is urgent. Until the
fingers are removed from the hair-triggers, we are not justified in assuming that a single human being in this country, in Russia or anywhere in the world has a minimum degree of rational security against sudden, inadvertent destruction. This problem, of border intrusions, is part and parcel of the whole question of surprise attack. If we can conceive of any greater or more futile disaster to mankind than a deliberate attack which ignited a nuclear war it would be an accidental and unnecessary attack which ignited a nuclear war.

2. Disarmament and Nuclear Testing

It should be recognized by all concerned that there are not now and there are not likely to be any absolute, 100% guarantees of fullproof inspection of anything. Similarly, it should be recognized that total disarmament down to the level of sticks and stones in the circumstances in which the world finds itself is a fantasy. Therefore, the conferences on disarmament and nuclear testing should either be abandoned or the positions of all nations concerned in these matters should be revised, so that they are no longer wedded to absolutes that cannot, rationally, be met. If there is to be any approach which offers hope of progress in this field, it must be one of weighing the risks of rational inspection coupled with the beginnings of international disarmament, on one hand, against the consequences of an uninterrupted, an intensifying and a spreading armament competition on the other and this approach must be accepted by all the participants.
3. Berlin  

Our policy should go beyond a mere holding of West Berlin and, apparently, a willingness to make concessions by limiting weapons and men in that half-city. Our policy should embrace and advocate the neutralization and internationalization of all of Berlin—both Soviet and Western zones—on an interim basis, until it is once again the capital of a unified Germany. To that end we should seek, through diplomatic negotiations, United Nations control and policing of the entire city and routes of access, with the cost of the undertaking borne by the governments of both parts of Germany in appropriate shares.

4. Far East  

Congress should, in the next session, consider a substitute or a revision of the Formosa resolution of 1955 which would: (a) Alter the status of this resolution from an Act of Law into a resolution of Congressional advice to the President, without force of law; and (b) make clear that, as far as Congressional advice in this matter is concerned, it applies only to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores by American military forces. One condition should be attached to this clarification. It is that the Chinese Communists shall not seek to hamper the peaceful adjustment of the military positions of the Chinese National government outside Formosa and the Pescadores, positions which it may have been led to take on the assumption...
that the American commitment extended beyond these islands. I should like to note that this is not a new view but one which I have held since this resolution was first considered. I had doubts then about its constitutional implications and vagueness. I still entertain the same doubts. I should like, also, to call to the attention of the Senate the views of the President on this matter as he expressed them in Formosa and to that end ask unanimous consent to include at the conclusion of my remarks an article by Harrison Salisbury in the New York Times, June 19, 1960.

5. We should begin now in diplomatic exploration, to seek to channel our efforts in space exploration into a joint program with the other N. A. T. O. members. Our objective should be to marshall the full scientific and technical talents of the West and to spread the enormous costs of this enterprise. Ultimately, the world should act as a unit in the universe but the time to begin to move towards that goal is now and the logical place for us to begin is in concert with the NATO nations.

6. China and Soviet Russian-Chinese Relations

Windows of contact and legitimate first-hand observations should be opened on developments in China and along one of the most critical borders in the world, the Soviet and Chinese convergence in Outer Mongolia in Central Asia. To that end, the possibilities of an exchange of missions with the government of Outer Mongolia should be seriously explored. A
renewal of efforts for the exchange of newsmen with China on a quid pro quo basis should be undertaken. A revision of trade restrictions with the Chinese mainland to bring them into line with those which apply to the Soviet Union should be considered. May I say, parenthetically, that these suggestions do not imply recognition by this country of Communist China. To the best of my knowledge we have never offered it nor have they sought it and there is nothing to indicate its desirability or even its possibility at this time.

7. Middle East

The Congress should consider a revision or substitute for the Eisenhower resolution on the Middle East which would: (a) Alter the present legal status of the resolution as an act of law to that of a resolution of Congressional advice to the President; and (b) make clear that, within the over-all purpose of seeking to help nations in that region defend themselves against communism, our policies are now based squarely on the following premises:

(1) Stabilization of existing frontiers, except as they may be altered by peaceful agreement;

(2) Dissolution of the refugee problem by the joint principle of repatriation, as practicable, and just compensation;

(3) Full freedom of passage of Suez now and a gradual reduction of the other practices of economic warfare in the area;

(4) Full support of the use of U.N. emergency forces for the safeguard of the borders of any nation which fears for its security, with all U.N. membe: bearing reasonable portions of the cost of such operations;
5. Internationalization of the Holy Places in Jerusalem;

6. Efforts to control and reduce the flow of armaments to all nations of the Middle East, coupled with international guarantees of support to any nation which may be victimized by an act of aggression.

These principles are close to those which are contained or implied in our present policies. They favor neither Arab nor Israeli. They favor those who mean it when they talk of peace and are prepared to begin now to work for it. The important need is to spell out these principles, by a vigorous adherence to them not only in official public statements, but in diplomacy, in aid-activities and in all other aspects of the conduct of our politics in the Middle East.

8. Cuba

Governor Munoz-Marín, an outstanding citizen of this nation as well as Puerto Rico, one of the most respected leaders of the Western Hemisphere, should be requested to undertake a mission to Havana. If he is able to assume this responsibility, he should engage in frank discussions with Premier Castro and submit in private or public, as he deems desirable, his analysis of the present deplorable state of Cuban-American relations and his recommendations as to what may be done to improve them.

9. Personal Diplomacy and Summits

A moratorium should be declared on official visiting and conferences of Heads of the States, (particularly as this practice may involve nations with which we have major problems at issue. This moratorium should last at least until it is clear that specific problems have been pre-negotiated to the
brink of agreement. Further, we need to conserve the strength and time of the Secretary of State and, to that end, a greater use of ambassadors, adequately instructed is clearly indicated.

Concluding Comments

As I have already noted, Mr. President, the thoughts which I have expressed today touch, not upon all, but only upon the most immediate and the most pressing questions which confront us in our foreign relations. Nevertheless, I have set forth these thoughts, not without trepidation, not without a sense of my own inadequacies but, withal, with a recognition of my great responsibilities as a Senator of the United States.

For the matters with which I have dealt in these remarks are those in which no man can aspire to certain knowledge. They are matters of paramount importance to people of the United States. They are matters which, when taken together, not only relate to the kind of life we shall have in this decade but matters which may well be critical in determining whether there shall be a recognizable civilized life, at all, for ourselves and for much of the human race.

Against this monumental background, questions of how soft or how tough we are intalking to the Russians or to any other people have little relevance to our survival or welfare. How wise we are and how dedicated we may be to the interests of the nation and to freedom, beyond all personal concern, are central to the problem which confronts us.
A looming shadow is on the nation and on the world; a shadow cast by serious questions, too long deferred; a shadow cast by serious thought too long evaded. It is for this President and the next, Democrat or Republican, and for the Congress to recognize this shadow, to define its dimensions and to act to lift it. It must be lifted. It can be lifted. Let us, now, all of us, begin in earnest the work of lifting it.