National Security and International Peace

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001
Matters involving the nation’s security and international peace cannot be put off. Every day of drift in this realm multiplies our difficulties. Every day of delay in facing the issues increases the cost and intensifies the dangers to ourselves and to all the world’s inhabitants.

It behooves us to waste no time. We need to resume the sober public consideration of the interrelated issues of foreign policy and security which was set in motion in earnest by the U-2 incident. If there were any lingering doubts at the beginning of May as to the need for this consideration they should certainly have been dispelled by what has transpired since that time.

The feeble cement of stability in the world is fast crumbling. In scarcely three months, we have witnessed the collapse of the President’s planned trips to Russia and to Japan. There has been further deterioration in Cuban-American relations; and, with that development, strains and challenges to the inter-American system have begun to appear. We have seen the development of a grave crisis in the heart of Africa. We have witnessed a retreat from negotiation on disarmament, nuclear testing and other questions. In the Far East a deadly assault on the former premier of Japan has followed on the heels of an attack on a leading member of the opposition party and the specter of government by assassination raises its head again in that key Far Eastern nation. In Soviet-American relations, the resumption of overt hostility which dates from the U-2 incident is highlighted by the RB-47 incident just a few days ago. And among our allies, the United Kingdom has tightened up on the use of its air
bases by our forces, a development presaged by similar Norwegian action after the U-2 incident.

Nor is the end in sight. We are in a drift away from peace throughout the world. We are in a drift away from a state of reasonable international security for our own people and for the rest of the world. I do not believe that this trend is yet irreversible. But unless it is checked in the near future it may become so.

That is why we cannot afford an interregnum until the next President is installed in January. We cannot permit these matters of national security and peace to drift while we lose ourselves in a political campaign as usual. It is incumbent upon those who have public responsibilities in connection with these problems to stay with them. That applies to the present Administration. It applies to the Congress when it reconvenes next month. It applies to the permanent civil servants in the Executive Branch who will be pursuing their duties under the next administration regardless of its political complexion. It applies to the candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency and I am delighted that arrangements have been made by the President to keep them informed. It would be more helpful, I believe, if these arrangements went beyond mere briefings of the candidates by the C.I.A. The need is for the candidates to touch base from time to time with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and the President in order to exchange views on where we stand on foreign policy and national security and where we ought to be heading. If conferences of this kind can be arranged, the President can rest assured that Senator Kennedy will be speaking with full authority for the Democratic Party. Contact between the candidates and the incumbents at this time might help to insure a smooth transition in policy from this administration to the next. It might also serve to minimize partisanship during the heat of the election campaign.
The problems of national security and international peace are legitimate subjects for discussion in the campaign. But I hope members of my own party, no less than the opposition, will avoid any attempt to paint these problems with a broad political brush. We are all in this together. These problems do not end when one administration replaces another. The flow of national life is continuous and the heritage of wise decisions and foolish decisions passes from one administration to the next, regardless of party. Our problems did not begin with the missile gap, the Cuban revolution, the U-2 incident, the riots in Japan over the President’s visit. Nor did they begin with the Korean Conflict or Yalta. Equally our successes did not begin with the armistice in Korea anymore than they began with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan or even the victory in World War II.

Our problems began with the beginnings of the American republic and so, too, did our achievements. Both have accumulated, interrelated, in the stream of our history and the incoming administration becomes the heir and custodian of both.

We have reached a moment in time when, as a nation, we cannot afford that form of political indulgence which would trace the origins of all our present difficulties to one party and the origins of our present adequacies to the other. We have reached a moment when we need to say what is past is past and get on with the business of today and tomorrow.

New forms, new directions are clearly and urgently needed in the vital matters of security and peace. Those needs will exist whether the next administration is Republican or Democratic and whatever the political complexion of the next Congress. For that reason, if for no other, it is incumbent upon us to proceed now to examine the needs and to begin now to act to meet them.
For my part, I intend to continue to pursue specifics of this issue of security and peace. I shall do so by statements in the Senate. I shall do so by the introduction of resolutions, as appropriate. And, as a Member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I shall, as necessary, seek through hearings and in other ways to remind the Executive Branch of certain recommendations on foreign policy and administration which have been made through the years. In this connection, I note the recommendations on the foreign aid program in Vietnam which were advanced by a subcommittee under my Chairmanship last February. I note also other recommendations in connection with German and European problems advanced last year and still others set forth in a speech in the Senate on June 23.

In my approach to these problems of national security and peace, I proceed from this premise: I do not believe, in all reason, that we can expect absolute guarantees of national security and of peace from this or any other administration. There can be no such guarantees in a world already fused in many places for massive destruction. There are no absolute guarantees against madness, miscalculation or accident. Against these uncertainties no system of military defense can operate to guarantee absolute security to this country, to the Soviet Union or to any other nation. Against these uncertainties the most that can be offered by adequate military power and, I stress the word adequate, is the empty comfort of a capacity for retaliatory massive destruction. Without military adequacy we do not have even that comfort.

It is within our capacity to make ourselves stronger in a military sense. It is within our capacity to close the missile gaps, the intelligence gaps, the research gaps or whatever. In short, if we will, we can tip the balance of military assets in our favor and, in so doing, discourage a deliberate aggression. But let us get it straight once and for all--this approach,
whatever its necessity or merit, does not protect this nation and cannot protect any nation against destruction by irrationality, accident, or miscalculation. We have spent almost half a trillion dollars on this concept of deterrence. Other nations, too, have spent heavily in the same fashion. Yet, I daresay, the degree of insecurity among peoples everywhere and, particularly among those who have spent most heavily is now higher than ever before.

That is the reality with which we live. That is the reality against which bold words are blunted.

So I repeat, let us not expect of this administration or any other absolute guarantees of national security. There are none.

What the people of the United States have a right to demand of this administration or any other, of this Congress or any other, is the courage to face this reality. They have a right to demand that measure of wisdom and energy in political leadership which alone may lead us around this deadly impasse, if indeed, it can be circumvented at all.

What is involved, first and foremost, I believe, is a revision of the present incomplete but widely accepted concept of national security, the concept that the state of this nation's or any nation's security is measurable almost wholly in terms of military manpower and materiel and the capacity to deploy and use them. This concept, valid to some degree in time of war, is not enough for the present era.

We must recognize that there is another side to this coin of national security. We must recognize that military power is no longer, for any nation, the first line of defense of its security. It is, rather, the last ditch stand of bare survival. The only victory, the only security it can guarantee is that others shall suffer at least as much wholesale devastation and death, as ourselves, if military power is finally invoked as the arbiter of the world's difficulties.
That concept of national security which is dominated almost exclusively by military equations is plausible and persuasive but it is seriously shallow and incomplete. Because it is, it has failed to serve the needs of the nation. If a rational security for the nation can be found at all, it is not going to be found in the military equations through which it has been largely sought during the past decade and a half with steadily diminishing returns. The key, if there is one, is likely to lie in perceptive foreign policies and their effective administration. That key is even now a neglected essential in maintaining the kind of relationships between ourselves and other nations which make it possible for military power to act even as a deterrent. And that key, alone, holds promise of defusing the world situation before it is ignited by irrationality, accident or miscalculation.

The effective use of foreign policies to increase the national security depends on an acute honesty in observing and interpreting the ever-changing patterns of the world situation. It depends on a wise, courageous and prudent leadership which will act with dispatch, within the capacities of the nation, on what is observed. It depends finally on a sensitive, integrated and responsible administration of our relations with others. The task requires skill and dedication; for our foreign relations are conducted in a world of complex hopes—reasonable and unreasonable, a world of complex fears—rational and irrational—a world of both dark design and human decency, a world of steady nerves and frayed nerves.

To bring about the effective use of foreign policies for national security, the first need is to recognize once more and reassert here at home that foreign policies and their administration constitute the first line of defense of our national security and the primary channel through which we
project the doctrines of human freedom as we grasp them and live them. Until that is understood and acted upon, we may anticipate a continued erosion of that international environment most conducive to our safety and to the growth of freedom. That will be the case whether we add 2, 10 or 20 billions to the budget for defense. The overriding significance of effective foreign policy to national security and to freedom and to peace, I am confident, will come to be recognized through a widespread discussion and debate which is reasonably free of cant and campaign capers. As the national recognition grows, a responsible President and Administration supported by a responsible Congress will proceed to the essential revisions in policies and administration which will restore this nation to a position of security in a world more secure. We shall make this nation again, not in mere words but, in fact, the repository of the hope and trust of mankind.