Berlin: A Strategic Area

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001
ion were provided in the regular bill for 1961.

REGULAR ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT

For the regular activities of the Department, the committee recommends an appropriation of $1,397,822,500, an increase of $49 million over 1961. This is $12 million under the estimates, and $18.9 million over the amounts carried in the bill as it came to us from the other body.

RESEARCH AND COOPERATIVE EXTENSION PROGRAMS

The committee recommends some modest changes in the appropriations for research, for the Federal research and the "Payments to States" item.

The bill provides $78 million for the Agricultural Research Service, an increase of $6,782,500 over the 1961 appropriations.

I may say that this is one item which is over the budget estimate and the amount recommended by the other body.

The committee also recommends a number of increases totaling one and a half million dollars for what it considers urgent research needs.

PAYMENTS TO STATE EXPERIMENT STATIONS

For the research payments to the State experiment stations, an increase of $4 million over 1961 is proposed. This makes the total $36.5 million. One million dollars of this is directed toward investigations of research on the elimination of weeds. This has become a very serious problem.

For payments to States for cooperative extension work, $95,780,000 is provided. This is an increase of $32 million of new funds for distribution to the various States under the formula.

SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION PROGRAMS

For the agricultural conservation programs, the committee recommends an advance authorization for the 1962 program of $250 million, this being the amount that has been authorized for this program for the last four years.

For soil and water conservation programs administered by the Soil Conservation Service, the committee recommends $176 million, an increase of $30.8 million over 1961. This increase is principally for installing works of improvements in the watershed programs.

SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM

The committee recommends an appropriation for the school lunch program of $125 million, an increase of $15 million over 1961. I am sure all the Members of the Senate are aware that a much larger amount has been authorized for the program through the allocation of surplus commodities and the expenditure of section 32 funds.

LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS

The committee recommends loan authorizations totaling $318 million for the lending programs administered by the Farmers Home Administration. These authorizations are $51 million over 1961 and were $32 million over the amounts provided in the bill as it came from the other body.

For rural electrification loans, the committee recommends the full budget estimate of $195 million, plus a contingency authorization of $50 million, making a total $245 million of new loan authorizations for 1962.

For the rural telephone authorizations, a total of $162,500,000 is recommended, of which $12,500,000 is for contingency and later consideration.

I believe that brief statement covers the larger items in the bill.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, I am a member of the Subcommittee on Agriculture Appropriations, I commend the senior Senator from Georgia for the excellent work he has done in handling this complicated and exceedingly important bill now before the Senate. Only modest increases have been made over the House figures. These are mainly increases in authorizations for the REA, RTA, and the Farmers Home Administration, all of which were well justified in the hearings.

The bill as a whole represents a very sound approach to the fiscal problems of agriculture, and the amount that is being asked for is needed.

I support the recommendation reported by the Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I should like to ask the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee about a matter that has been mentioned in this letter, which appears at page 1090 of the hearings.

I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the letter be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Hon. Richard B. Russell, Chairman, Subcommittee on Agriculture, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR Mr. CHAIRMAN: There is a small fruit-breeding station at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Ill., and in connection with the work they have been doing, there is a building that would be very good for greenhouses to good advantage.

It is estimated that the cost of such greenhouse would be approximately $100,000. I repeat approximately, $70,000 and an easy way to join the greenhouses in the sum of $30,000.

Representative Robert Michel, a member of the House Subcommittee on Agriculture Appropriations, has also made comments in support of this project when hearings were held.

One of the reasons for the $30,000 request for alleys is that due to the nature of the project it is necessary to isolate the greenhouses.

Any consideration the subcommittee can give to this need will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, U.S. Senate Minority Leader.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I may interpolate at this point by saying that the matter relates to the building of greenhouses for a fruit-breeding station proposed at the University of Southern Illinois. The whole amount involved would have been $100,000, but it is my understanding that the committee would have to be built on State, rather than Federal property, and that the committee is apprehensive about setting a precedent that could have no end if that were done. I understand that the committee actually did approve the item, and then decided to take it out because of the present membership of the Senate. I should like to have a little amplification as to what the committee would do if the State or University did surrender sufficient property to the Federal Government for this purpose.

Mr. RUSSELL. The committee was very anxious to provide for this item. I understand that the distinguished Senator from Illinois does not request a great deal from the Committee on Appropriations. We are familiar with his long record of dealing with the agricultural appropriations bill when he was a Member of the other body. He handled it for years. I do not know whether I should say it was at that time my "privilege" or "misfortune" to meet him in conference on many occasions, because in those days he was a very hard man to convince about the appropriation of money.

The committee considered this item. We approved it provided the funds were to be expended on Federal lands. The clerk of the committee investigated and ascertained that the university owned no lands at this installation. It is, I understand, a worthwhile State station, but we did not feel we could appropriate funding for the building of greenhouses on State land without yielding in the future to the numerous similar requests which the committee frequently receives. So we were compelled, regretfully, to deny the Senator's request.

There are instances, I understand, when title is conveyed to the Federal Government to lands on State stations. But in this instance we were powerless to assist the Senator on this item.

Mr. DIRKSEN. The Senator may or may not be able to answer, but in the event of Title 17 being referred to the Federal Government for this purpose, what, in the Senator's judgment, would be the action of the committee?

Mr. RUSSELL. It is always difficult to predict what any committee of the Senate will take; but this was a cooperative project—and I understand that State experimental land is carried there with both State and Federal funds—I know of no reason the committee should not approve a very modest request, if the greenhouses were to be constructed on lands owned by the Federal Government.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I thank the distinguished Senator from Georgia.

BERLIN—A STRATEGIC AREA

Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, the city of Berlin today occupies in world affairs one of the great strategic areas of the world.

I intend to discuss this issue from a bipartisan point of view. As the senior Republican in the U.S. Senate, it is my judgment that the paramount question between the Berlin issue and all the many aspects is that of national survival—and the survival of this Nation.
transcends all consideration of partisanship.

The safety and protection of the American people transcend all considerations of political parties. The least we can do for the American people is to tell them all the facts and let them know where they stand in this hour of continued crisis.

We have had a desperate need for a foreign policy which Americans understand; and which our allies understand; and—most of all—which our enemies can understand.

In our approach to some of our foreign relations we have seemed at times, to blow hot, and then to blow cold. During those times in the past we did not assume a clear, concise position which the world could understand. We have had a clear position on Berlin in the past, but now, because of a suggested new proposal, we need to emphasize the firmness and clarity of our position.

Last Wednesday, the distinguished Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], delivered in the Senate an important address during the course of which he advanced one solution to the Berlin problem. While he made clear that he was speaking for himself, still he is known by America's spokesman in the Senate. His proposal was that Berlin, East and West, might be reunited as a free city, to be held in trust by an international authority.

Under his plan, the free city would be guaranteed jointly by the Western Powers united in NATO and Eastern Powers united in the Warsaw Pact. Entrance to the city from the West would be controlled by what he termed "international peace teams."

The highly respected majority leader, as we all know, made the proposal in all good conscience. I also know he will welcome the opinions of others.

Mr. President, I am strongly opposed to the proposal that has been suggested.

The proposal, in some respects, resembles the short-lived Trieste agreement. It might work if Mr. Khrushchev were to agree. It seems quite obvious that if he actually desired any settlement on Berlin he would not have been using it to make trouble for so long a time.

The importance of the proposal suggested by the distinguished majority leader has raised questions in newspapers, on TV and radio, and among people generally as to the extent to which someone else might try to use it as a trial balloon for the President and his Department of State. The Senator was speaking on his own, but I know he recognizes what importance is attached to his suggestion.

The Trieste agreement, for example, was made in February 1947, and is recognized as a free territory under United Nations supervision. By October 5, 1954, it was divided between Yugoslavia and Italy, and Yugoslavia acquired all of the territory of Trieste.

Under four Presidents—Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy—the United States, as well as other Western Powers, has been committed to defend the independence of the western part of Berlin and to maintain contact with it. Of course, this formula could, I suppose, be interpreted in varying degrees by the world diplomats. But the position of the United States has been absolutely firm; we spent millions of dollars and sacrificed many of our young men in the famed airlift, which went on as a symbol before the world that we act on what we say.

This is no time for weakness. It is a time for a cold, realistic clarification of where we stand, what we propose to do, and what we expect the U.S.S.R. to do.

Mr. Khrushchev continues to make the cold war colder, and abuse of the United States has been one of the principal methods he has used to discredit and belittle the United States.

At all times we must maintain our honor, respect, and prestige. We cannot for a moment back down on Berlin. American leadership in world affairs would be greatly weakened if we were to retreat on this point.

If history has taught us anything, it has shown that where peace is concerned there can be no vacillation or retreat.

Mr. President, it seems to me that now is the time to take a forceful step in the direction of respect by making it definitely known, once again, that our position on Berlin has not changed.

Berlin represents one of the few remaining symbols of the free world's determination not to be cowed by the bully tactics of the Communists.

Briefly, our position on the future of Germany and the issue of Berlin has been that:

First. East and West Berlin should be united by free elections, and the city's freedom should be guaranteed by the United States, France, Britain, and the Soviet Union until such time as Berlin becomes the capital of a reunited Germany.

Second. German reunification would become a fact with the election of an all-German parliament, formation of an all-German government, conclusion of a peace treaty, the freedom of all foreign troops under adequate supervision. By that time, a free Germany would have been re-established.

Again, I point out, these have been basic objectives of our foreign policy through the administrations of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy.

In reporting on his Vienna talks with Premier Khrushchev, Mr. Kennedy reaffirmed our intention not to be intimidated into backing out of Berlin. What Mr. Kennedy told us sounded like tough, straight-from-the-shoulder talk, as indicated by this excerpt from his remarks:

I made it clear to Mr. Khrushchev that the security of our people and therefore our own security are deeply involved in our presence and our access rights to West Berlin; that these rights are based on law, not on suasion; and that we are determined to maintain these rights at any risk and thus our obligation to the people of West Berlin and their right to choose their own future.

The President, in those words, upholds the same principles on Berlin that were maintained by the three previous Presidents.

In the suggestion of the distinguished majority leader ever came to pass, it would be a definite change. I, for one, see no reason why a Russian threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany should cause us to change our course.

Of course, I have no quarrel with the majority leader's right to express his opinion. In our justly cherished free society with opportunity for debate and free expression, all viewpoints must be explored and given due weight. This country of ours is the greatest and strongest on earth. It was made that way through the qualities of courage, intelligence, morality, and plain common sense of individual Americans.

We are, perhaps, sometimes slow to act, and too often leave the impression that we are soft. But the world is beginning to understand that humanity is beginning to understand that the United States is no less strong than it was in 1776.

Our military posture, our domestic prosperity, in fact, our very survival as we know it, are affected by success or failure in the conduct of our foreign relations. In my opinion, any weakening of our position on Berlin would constitute a major foreign policy failure.

Regardless of the zigs and zags of Russian diplomacy, regardless of their frowns and smiles, we must never forget that the Communist goal always remains to make the world bow down before the hammer and sickle. So, in my judgment we should not retreat on Berlin.

If we back down in any degree on Berlin, I doubt that many nations of the earth will count on our word again. And, in my opinion, we cannot afford to do that.

First things must come first. The urgency of the moment, I repeat, is survival itself. The people of this country must prepare themselves for a rough and tumbly road ahead, and we need to have the confidence that America is no less strong than it was in 1776.

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the ranking Republican Member of this body, my deep appreciation and thanks for the speech he has made this afternoon, and in compliment for the high tone in which it was delivered.

Whether one speaks for or against the proposals advanced by the senior Senator from Montana is immaterial. The point is that we ought to speak and think and cogitate while there is still time to do so and in an unemotional way. Time is of the essence in connection with this matter. In my opinion, the distinguished senior Senator from New Hampshire has rendered the country and the Senate a service, today, in bringing to our attention his views on this question, the most important immediate question of our time.

The Senate from New Hampshire was gracious enough to tell me ahead of time that he was going to make his speech, and to furnish me with a copy of his remarks.

If I may, I should like to make a few comments on what he has said, and the remarks of my own.

For example, the Senator from New Hampshire stated:

"The safety and protection of the American people, let us not consider all considerations of political parties. The least we can do for the American people is to give them all the facts and let them know where they stand in this hour of continued crisis."

We have had a desperate need for a foreign policy which Americans can understand—and which our allies understand—and most of all, which our enemies can understand.

I agree completely with the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire.

A little later he said:

"Last Wednesday, the distinguished senior Senator from New Hampshire, has said relative to his acknowledgment of the fact that I was speaking for myself, because I was; and, as a matter of fact, to this day I have not discussed this matter with either the President of the United States or the Secretary of State, because I feel that I have some responsibilities as a Senator of the United States."

A little later, the Senator made reference to the Trieste agreement. He said:

"The Trieste agreement, for example, was signed on February 10, 1947, and held as a "free territory" under United Nations supervision. By October 5, 1954, it was divided up between Yugoslavia and Italy and the "free territory" is no more. Yugoslavia got what it wanted of the "free territory."

Let me call to the attention of the Senate the fact that that treaty, which some of us have been agreed to by both Italy and Yugoslavia as being eminently satisfactory at that time, came about because of the outstanding work done in Italy by the late Lady Lucy Hanes, and that time was U.S. Ambassador to Italy, and by Llewellyn Thompson, who at that time was U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Austria. In fact, Ambassador Thompson spent so much time on the treaty that he was almost always in London working out the arrangements, and rarely was in Vienna.

Later in his remarks the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire said:

"This is not wrong, it is a time for cold, realistic clarification of where we stand, what we propose to do, and what we expect the U.S.S.R. to do."

I agree completely.

Further on in his speech, the Senator from New Hampshire stated:

"If history has taught us anything, it has shown that when peace is concerned there can be no vacillation or retreat."

Again I wholeheartedly agree.

Further on in his speech my friend had the following to say:

"The distinguished majority leader's suggestion if I may, I should like to make a few comments on what he has said, and the remarks of my own.

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of that he does. I happen to differ with treat from where we now stand but in an
tor from Montana occupies the position attempt to find a third way, not in re­
tion about the integrity or patriotism of offered a proposal for a possible approach
that of any other Senator. But if per- re gar d it as an inescapable respons ibilit y
be paid for full public discussion of this the question of Berlin
marks; but as far as my collea g ues in threatened, for it would still be backed
New Hampshire has expressed hims elf, B erlin, Mr. President , are not what de­
to do what he considers in his conscience was neither the way suggested by Mr.
the Senator from Montana, or his effort to solution of the Berlin question.
which I have no doubt by allied guarantees. as is now the case,
I do not now believe and have never believed in change for the sake of change in public policy any more than in automobiles. But I believe it is essential to the security and welfare of the people of this Nation that we do not doom ourselves to the mental prison of equating all change with retreat and defeat. For in foreign policy, no less than in all other aspects of human existence, an ordered change is the key to rational survival and progress. Unless we are not afraid, first, to consider changes in a world of change and, second, to make changes if reason tells us they should be made, we shall find ourselves, in foreign policy and elsewhere, in pursuit of the last car of a train that is always pulling away from us.

Mr. President, again I commend the Senator from New Hampshire. In my opinion he has performed a real public service this afternoon.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a number of editorials both for and against the proposal advanced by me last week in the Senate be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 1961]

If Moscow Really Wants a German Treaty?

Premier Khrushchev’s report to the people of the Soviet Union on his talks at Berlin with President Kennedy is a new statement of old pretensions. These pretensions do not take on any more validity from the fact that they have been voiced for 2½ years, but there is danger of their becoming partly accepted by familiarity.
The head of the Communist bloc says, "The absence of a peace treaty with Germany and the independence of the other Western countries, will create a dangerous situation in Europe." He adds the charge that Britain, France, and the United States also agreed the former Germany, which the U.S.S.R. charged was turning Germany into a militarist state, whereas the facts are the Soviet authorities, that the division of the country, and the beginning of paramilitary forces under the Soviet Army.

The President of a divided Germany and of a Communist puppet regime in East Germany which has no basis in the will of the people. But it was the fall of the Berlin Wall that would have led the world to consider the possibility of a two-party system in Berlin.


**REAL INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY NEEDED**

Even that would be far enough to assure the security of the city's government and the ultimate security of its citizens. Earlier statements have suggested that some international authority guarantee the neutrality and self-government of West Berlin. The only authority remotely capable of doing this—and its capability in such a great and beneficial task—would be the three-party version has accepted, he threatened that the Berlin would be laid, therefore, in the hands of some International authority guarantee the neutrality and self-government of West Berlin.

**BERLIN DILEMMA**

Senator Mansfield has contributed a letter to the latest battle over Berlin. He says Nikita Khrushchev's proposals to convert Berlin into a free city and to kick out the Western powers unacceptably. But he adds that the Western policy of standing on the status quo is not necessary the way to peace.

A third way, he suggests, might be to convert the entire city—East and West—into a free city, to do so by some international authority until such time as it is again the capital of Germany.

In analysis, a Berlin leader also calls for widespread discussion and debate about the Berlin problem. The best place to start would be to refresh the world's memory on why Berlin exists today in an extremely abnormal state. The fact is that the Soviets, in 1948, walked out of the four-power (United States, Britain, France, Russia) Kommandatura, after they got the short end of a free, Berlin-wide election. They set up their own puppet regime in East Berlin and thus divided the city into two. They even cut the telephone cables between the two halves of the city. This makes a telephone call between East and West Berlin.

There is going to be a lot of shoutings about Berlin, the chances of which the world should be reminded how the present situation developed.

It is to be believed that anyone who knows the facts about Berlin—or who has had the fascinating experience of seeing that divided city—ever could have given even second thoughts to Khrushchev's outrageous proposal.

[From the Washington Post, June 16, 1961]

**SONG BY THE FIREPLACE**

It's all very simple. If the United States and the West will just agree to Soviet policy in Berlin, Laos, the United Nations, nuclear tests and disarmament, we'll all coexist splendidly. Last one to give in is a warmonger.

That, in essence, represents the chatty content of Mr. Khrushchev's fireside chat to the Soviet people. He expressed satisfaction over his talks with President Kennedy in Vienna; but the satisfaction, if any, must have derived principally from the opportunity of coming to terms with Moscow. The USSR has let him have his way on some of the most important and more necessary ones.

Only on this basis should the Western three powers, if organizing a new meeting of the Berliners about Berlin. Not one cardboard kopeck should be given up without full value for the security of West Berliners in return. If any one calls his intransigence, let him remember that the Berliners' own security dealt with any other basis.

Viewed as an exercise in analysis of what guarantees the Communists sought to be willing to give in return for what they now are brazenly and brazenly demanding, the foreign policy of the Western nations has not been regarded in any other light, certainly not as any weakening of Western resistance to attempted intimidation.

[From the Washington Daily News, June 16, 1961]
The Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield of Montana, Senate minority leader, proposed accepting the "free city" idea from West Berlin. It was endorsed Wednesday in a speech to the Senate by the Senate minority leader, Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican, of Arizona. The Senate adopted the plan, which would make West Berlin a free city, in an effort to end the Cold War.

The American reply to Mr. Khrushchev is firm. The American reply is firm. The American reply is firm. The American reply is firm.

The American reply is firm. The American reply is firm. The American reply is firm. The American reply is firm.

The American reply is firm. The American reply is firm. The American reply is firm.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE
June 20

This was a WRDW-TV editorial, Jack Bell, speaking for WHHD Television.

[From the Washington Evening Star, June 15, 1961]

BERLIN

If, as Premier Khrushchev says, the lack of a German peace treaty "keeps alive the smoldering coal of World War II," the Berlin situation looks that could enflame the world in another conflagration.

During the last Germany and Berlin have been divided, the Russians have had only to squeeze the bellows and world tensions have flared anew. Premier Khrushchev fanned the flames again last week in calling for a peace treaty which would recognize formally the existence of two German states and end the West's occupation rights in West Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev said if the West was willing to sign such a treaty then he would help ensure West Berlin's existence as a free city, with necessary access routes.

The United States supports the Soviet Union, however, in signing such a treaty, he said the Russians would sign unilaterally with the other before the end of the year. This would force the West to make its own arrangements with the East Germans, a situation which might become intolerable. But the East Germans try to block access routes to the city.

In a West speech, Premier Khrushchev said "the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany cannot be postponed any longer. A peaceful settlement in Europe must be achieved this year."

The Premier's haste is due apparently to a fear that West Germany might become too strong it would be willing to start a war to liberate East Germany or to reclaim land which it lost at the end of the war to Poland.

To the West, Mr. Khrushchev's fears seem groundless, but as any visitor to the Soviet Union can testify, the fear in Russia of a rearmened Germany is real indeed.

Premier Khrushchev said a treaty formalizing the borders could help prevent hostilities which he said would "mean war—and a thermonuclear war at that."

With little compromise visible in these conflicting views, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield brought a fresh approach to the subject in urging that all of Berlin be made a free city under international protection.

This, he said, would be a third way between those positions. He said it was his own idea, and not Senator Kennedy's. The concept, however, met strong opposition.

West Germany immediately rejected the idea, because it would "deepen division of Germany." Observers also doubted if the Mansfield proposal would be acceptable to the United States. Senator Kennedy had said no peace treaty would be signed until free and universal elections were held throughout East Germany.

President Kennedy said 2 weeks ago that, "we are not seeking to change the present situation, because if the Russians are stationed in West Berlin and have constant guaranties by treaty with the Russians. In a Soviet-East German treaty there is an implied threat that war might break out over access rights if the East Germans try another Berlin blockade.

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trusteeship as a free city makes good sense. That would be a practical solution to the renewed threat of a suicidal East-West arms conflict over the Berlin trouble spot, now building up.

MANSFIELD’s warning that “we are not engaged in the fast lane of T.V. wax bullets any more than the Russians are engaged in a harmless game of chess” is in line with President Kennedy’s report on his exchange of views on Berlin with Khrushchev at Vienna.

The President put it: “Our most somber talks were on the subject of Germany and Berlin.” MANSFIELD has reaffirmed the U.S. determination to maintain at any risk Western access routes to West Berlin and the freedom of the city’s 2 million inhabitants.

Khrushchev, in turn, was emphatic in expressing his determination to change the existing arrangement at Berlin.

As MANSFIELD sees it, “sooner or later the Western nations and the Soviet Union must seek a new way”—an alternative to war—for settlement of the Berlin controversy. Few informed observers disagree with his further statement that unless a search for a peaceful settlement of the Berlin controversy and dispatch, sooner or later, “Berlin is likely to become the pivot of a new dwarf to mankind.”

[From the Providence Evening Journal, June 17, 1961]

SENATOR MANSFIELD’S PLAN TO EASE THE BERLIN CRISIS

As a counter to the Kremlin’s demand that West Berlin be turned into a free city under United Nations protection, U.S. Senator Mike Mansfield has revived his proposal that the free-city status be applied to all Berlin.

Set for approach to the future of the former German capital, now split in two by the cold war and the source of a new crisis threat, has not excited any more cheers in Bonn than it did the first time Senator MANSFIELD advanced it 2 years ago. Indeed, the proposals have been greeted in West Germany with even more disfavor than in 1959 since in the interim Mr. MANSFIELD has become Senate majority leader, exercising greater influence than before.

From one point of view, the West German perturbation has some basis in fact. Any attempt by the U.S. and West sectors of Berlin, one side a free society supported economically by the West and the other side to the former German national capital, split in two by the cold war and the source of a new crisis threat, would be increasing hard for him not to demand recognition of a free city of Berlin which would be under international control.

The bill would allow 72 judges who served in the Senate yesterday by Senator MANSFIELD and other Democrats were “made out of a clear sky.”

Senator MANSFIELD told reporters, “It was a trial balloon, but a development of suggestions, I have been making for many months.”

[From the Providence Evening Journal, June 17, 1961]

PERIL OF RETREAT?

This week’s speech by Senator Mike Mansfield, the Democratic floor leader in the Senate, is illustrative of one of the gravest weaknesses in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War II.

Senator MANSFIELD, who is normally the administration’s spokesman on such matters, suggested as a third alternative that the Berlin crisis be solved by converting the prewar German capital into a free city governed by an unnamed international authority.

The Mansfield proposal is strikingly like Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev’s long-standing advocacy of United Nations control of Berlin. In view of the dismal record of the U.N. as an impartial arbiter in the Congo, a situation in which the U.N. sent a contingent to a total surrender to the Soviet Union and its East German satellite. Quite apart from the question of nonbelligerence, there are two particularly amusing features in the Mansfield plan for Berlin.

First of all, Senator MANSFIELD told the Senate that he was speaking simply as one

The issue of Germany Itself.

majority leader, exercising greater influence has turned Berlin into a powder keg by de­

dangerous deadlock over Berlin that did not even more dismay than.

Western nations and the source of a new crisis threat, has some basis in fact. Any perturbation has some basis in fact.

The M ansfield idea, on the other hand, would be to maintain at any risk Western access routes to West Berlin and the freedom of the city’s 2 million inhabitants.

The appeal, aimed at the beginning of talks on Berlin with the Eastern bloc, also called for a “normalization of the situation in West Berlin.”

West Berlin is occupied by the United States, Britain, and France. The fourth part of the city, that which under wartime agreements was occupied by the Soviet Union, now has been turned over to East Germany. Chiang Kai- Shek’s rejection of normalization never include that portion of the city in the text.

The East German resolution was ap­proved by the Communist Central Commit­tee, the State Council, the Council of Min­isters, and the National Assembly. In all of these organizations except the National Front, Walter Ulbricht, former Red army colonel and the MANSFIELD’s proposal as “parrot talk.”

The spokesman said there is no reason to believe that the Western Powers are retreat­

There is no hope here, however that the Soviet Union would yield up any of the territory if the hope of gaining more.

Meanwhile, in Bonn, the Bundestag ap­proved a bill which recognizes the status of the West German judiciary.

The bill would allow 72 judges who served under the Hitler regime and are known as “chasing judges,” to ask for retirement in the next year. If they retire voluntarily, they will retain full pension rights even if they are not yet at the pensioning age of 65. If they de­cline, they will be removed from office through a change in the Constitution. The enforced retirement would deprive the judges of pension rights.

[From the Cincinnati Enquirer, June 16, 1961]
lawmaker. But a majority leader never speaks as a mere lawmaker. Whether he was right, he is warmed by the prestige that his role as an administration spokesman affords him. Every word he utters, every position he takes will be interpreted throughout the world as having at least the foreknowledge of the White House.

This is why so many of Russia's opponents could scarcely have chosen a less opportune time to suggest that the United States is thinking of a Berlin resolution to rely on the Big Four to set up a new international crisis. After all, Russia, in the past, has approached an international crisis apparently united, apparently committed, apparently determined not to backtrack. And at that crucial moment, someone steps forward with an intimation that the United States might settle for far less than its official spokesmen have sought. This procedure is like advertising in advance that we don't mean what we say. Our enemies are encouraged to stand pat, to enlarge their demands.

The entire U.S. position in Berlin rests on the occupation agreement concluded between the Big Four at the end of World War II. We have been insisting all along that the Russians fulfill their obligations under that compact and that they permit the Western powers to fulfill theirs. Entering into any new agreement would immediately nullify the 1945 agreement. Our rights in Berlin would be wiped away. So would the obligations of the Russians.

Senator Mansfield now seems to think, would please Khrushchev more. The administration should lose no time in replying in Berlin, according to the Times, seeking to repair the damage that inevitably accompanied the Mansfield proposal. Even with the démarche from the White House, the Western position will be seriously impaired.

[From the Dallas Morning News, June 16, 1961]

No Mistake: Mansfield's Plan

Senator Mike Mansfield's proposal that all Berlin be turned over to an international trusteeship as a free city immediately raises a question: Does President Kennedy approve?

Only recently the President said flatly, "We will fight for Berlin.

Then, at the summit conference, Khrushchev slammed the issue of West Berlin directly and issued an ultimatum to the Western Powers to get out of the city within 6 months. While this now appears to have been the most important thing that happened at the conference, the President did not mention it in his report to the Nation. This creates speculation as to whether the suggestion of the Senate Democratic leader is a move to open the way for the President to back down from his bold statement, "We will fight for Berlin."

Mansfield's proposal is utterly without merit. It would merely strengthen Russia. The original proposal for administration of Berlin was through a four-power agency, including Russia. But Russia would never cooperate and has schemed constantly to put Berlin under Communist control. This would be Russia's strategy under any such program as Mansfield now suggests.

Russia desperately wants control of West Berlin. Consequently, the Senate Democrats have been pressuring us to accede to the West German proposal that unification of Western freedom under Soviet slavery. A large majority of West Berlin citizens have been fighting to maintain the city. If the Western alliance is to stand any such program as Mansfield now suggests.

[From the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, June 15, 1961]

The Future of Berlin

Premier Khrushchev has now served warning, for the third time, that the problem of Berlin and a divided Germany must be solved without delay.

In 1956 he set the limit at 6 months, but took no action to implement his threat. Last year he set it as "in 1961." Now he has repeated this warning, in a speech to the Russian people reporting on his Vienna meeting with President Kennedy.

His speech contained little that was new, and his manner was not belligerent. He simply restated the Russian contentions for a settlement—utterly unacceptable to the West—but he stated them with a firmness that left little doubt. East and West this year will see a test of courage and determination centering on Berlin.

His speech confirms President Kennedy's report that the meeting at Vienna was a somber one. What is worse, it gives little support to the one hope that President Kennedy brought home: that as a result of the meeting the chances for a dangerous misjudgment of one kind or another less.

The President's principal concern at Vienna was to impress upon Khrushchev, first, that the White House had not approached an international crisis apparently united, apparently committed, apparently determined not to backtrack. And at that crucial moment, someone steps forward with an intimation that the United States might settle for far less than its official spokesmen have sought. This procedure is like advertising in advance that we don't mean what we say. Our enemies are encouraged to stand pat, to enlarge their demands.

The First Amendment

The future of Berlin raises an important question. Does President Kennedy approve?

President Kennedy's difficulties, in showing that the West will not retreat at Berlin, have been multiplied by the fact that Senator Mike Mansfield has now proposed, for the second time, exactly such a solution for Berlin.

The danger that lies in the scheme itself, since it's not likely to get far. What's dangerous is the fact that it has been put forth by the Senate leader, and that some of our European allies (and perhaps Russia) are already wondering if it is a trial balloon sent up by the administration.

Senator Mansfield proposes that East and West Berlin be united in a single free city, which could better be called a defenseless city. It would be held in trust by an international authority. Both Soviet and Western garrisons would be withdrawn, and the city and its access routes would be guarded by international peace teams.

The bugs in his plan are dragon size. Khrushchev, for one thing, has repeatedly declared of late that he will insist on a three-sided makeup of an international control group, with a built-in Soviet veto to paralyze its work. If this were agreed to here, Berlin would be set free in the teeth of the tightly organized, determined, and firm will of the Eastern bloc, Russia, and the United States, as well.

Senator Mansfield has ignored some important questions: How long would West Berlin have to be freed? How would the Soviet Union be restrained from the determination of international troops from, say, India, to resist aggression or an encroachment on the life and livelihood of German people? Does he seriously believe that the Soviet Union is prepared to let West Berlin and German citizenship be suddenly exposed to all the freedoms and prosperity now enjoyed by West Berliners? If he does, he is entirely without recollection of the Potsdam and Berlin agreements of 1941.

The President's Invitation to Misscalculate

Senator Mansfield's proposal for making a free city of Berlin was promptly, no doubt, by that irresponsible desire to be helpful which so frequently animates Members of Congress when they happen to ponder great international problems.

Whether from vanity or discretion, he insists that this is his own idea, and not that he is the leader of a majority program whose majority he leads in the Senate.

But surely had he stopped to think, Senator Mansfield might well have considered the immediate background of events against which this proposal was paraded, President Kennedy's meeting with Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna disclosed that Berlin is to be the target of a fresh onslaught by Soviet diplomacy.

The fact that the Senate majority leader openly suggests a Berlin solution radically different from the position taken by the West, and halfway toward Mr. Khrushchev's own, is a serious diplomatic blunder.

We may well be too used to Senator speaking only for themselves, but nobody else is. Indeed, one of the oldest ruses of diplomacy is to characterize as purely personal something which is later to be unmasked as official. We cannot blame Mr. Khrushchev, or even Dr. Adenauer, if they see a trial balloon in Senator Mansfield's suggestion. Nor will the foolish impracticability of its details influence their judgment; trial balloons all, are not meant to stay aloft very long.

[From the New York Times, June 16, 1961]

The Trouble Russianladesh Seldom Mentions

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, June 15—There is an odd distinction in the present Premier, Khrushchev, report. Today on his Vienna talks with President Kennedy.

In discussing what the West might do if Moscow made a separate peace treaty with the Communist regime of East Germany, and said: "Some threaten they will not recognize the treaty and will use force to oppose it. Any force against us will be answered by force. We have the means."

The odd distinction, of course, is that President Kennedy personally reassured Mr. Khrushchev on this point in Vienna. He drew a sharp distinction between the legal position taken by the United States with East Germany and the practical problem of getting supplies through to West Berlin.

The President emphasized that the United States would continue to meet its obligations to supply the 2,200,000 people of West Berlin by force if necessary, but that it was not particularly concerned about who stamped the papers at the East Berlin border, just so the supplies went through.
Nevertheless, in his fireless-side chat tonight, the Soviet leader set up the strawman and threatened to use force under circumstances not of his choosing, and President Kennedy found he could not accept. In fact, when Presi­dent Kennedy went on to London from Vienna, Khrushchev's threats to destroy Western nations were not going to war over the color of the stamp on scraps of paper but that they were determined to get the support they needed.

Khrushchev, however, is setting the stage for summoning a big peace conference on Germany at the October meeting of the Communist parties. Washington won't like this and won't participate in such a confer­ence, but nobody here is going to mobilize the troops to bang through Helmstedt toward West Berlin just because the Soviet leader needs to sign a peace treaty with East Ger­many for internal Communist reasons.

Having had previous problems with his own allies, President Kennedy understands Mr. Khrushchev's political problems. There is plenty of trouble in the Communist par­adise. Their agricultural policies have been a spectacular failure. This was supposed to be Khrushchev's specialty when he came to power in the first place. It has been a dis­appointment. In China the food situation is desperate and may prove by the end of this year to be the biggest flop and tragedy of 1961.

One result of this is that China is con­sidering a new United Nations resolution that would give Moscow more supplies than Moscow wishes to give and at the same time challenging Khrushchev's ideological leadership. Moscow has turned on him and vice versa. Iraq has not fallen into his lap as the Communist brethren anticipated. Albania, his supposed ally in the Middle East and in the Far East, has made it clear that it is working with the West. There is an official change in the color of the stamp on scraps of paper that sometimes appears to be in the Soviet Union.

In fact, Khrushchev's whole campaign to unity Europe and to force Moscow and has for­ced Khrushchev to summon a big peace conference on Germany. It is the Soviet Union's specialty when he came to power in the first place. It has been a dis­appointment. In China the food situation is desperate and may prove by the end of this year to be the biggest flop and tragedy of 1961.

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Congressional Record — Senate

June 20

Speaking in East Berlin, U.S. President Gerald R. Ford addressed the United States, Britain and France to start immediate negotiations if the Berlin crises over Berlin, or should they attempt to stand firm? Ford praised the West for its patient patience and its lack of new agreements with East Germany.

GERMAN RAPS “FREE CITY”

The proposal by Senator Mike Mansfield, Democratic majority leader, to turn Berlin into a free city would make the German metropolis an island in a troubled world. Senator Karl T. Gutschen, member of the German Parliament, declared yesterday. He spoke at Waddy, promising commemorating the 8th anniversary of the East Berlin uprising, an uprising crushed by Soviet military might.

Gutschen said that replacing the occupying power in Berlin, United States, Great Britain and France—by any international authority—would mean setting up an instrument for Eastern intervention.

[From the Washington Post, June 17, 1961]

RUMORS OF CONCESSIONS: WEST AGAIN FACES ISSUE OF ACTION ON BERLIN

(By Chalmers M. Roberts)

Once again the United States and its Western allies face this decision over Berlin: should they attempt to stand firm on the present arrangement; should they try to get out in a way which could lead to no new agreement with the Soviet Union; or should they take the risk of new proposals?

Officially, the United States is standing pat. But everyone who went through the last Berlin crisis, knows that a precipitated German change must face this decision over Berlin: should they attempt to stand firm on the present arrangement; should they try to get out in a way which could lead to no new agreement with the Soviet Union; or should they take the risk of new proposals?

Yesterday the State Department and the British Foreign Office flatly denied a London Daily Telegraph report that Western experts were working on a plan to change the status of Berlin in the way to a German peace treaty on the terms of the conference table once again to avert a military showdown.

The real question, then, is whether the West, in agreement with some small countries or whether it will try for a settlement on the basis of some major new proposals.

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cause he said it after seeing the American President.

Although Germans admired the firm way President Kennedy presented the West's case, they are not entirely convinced that the President will stick it out. They read with amazement of Senator MANSFIELD's suggestion for a dialogue in Berlin. Although they cannot be certain from this distance whether Senator MANSFIELD reflected the President's views, they are pleased that he represents a current of thought.

What will happen if the Russians put through their plan?

In Vienna President Kennedy was exceptionally forthright in telling Premier Khrushchev the Western allies were ready to do to maintain their access to Berlin. But the feeling is that the President did not make clear enough what the West would do if the Russians sign a separate peace treaty with Communist East Germany.

It is felt, provided Premier Khrushchev with an important opening that could allow him to sign a treaty without fear that the West would offer any vigorous military response.

Now the prospect is that Premier Khrushchev speaking before an East German audience is out to proceed with a treaty for East Germany. The West, as has been indicated, will not favor such a treaty.

Once the treaty is signed, Germans feel, a period of quiet may follow to settle nerves and allow the West to get accustomed to the idea before the squeeze is put on. The squeeze could take several forms.

Firms could demand the right to stamp the papers of the Western allies using the access routes to Berlin.

PERSONNEL CHECK

Even if the West took the view that it would not be worthwhile to go to war over rubber stamps or even if the late John Foster Dulles' theory was followed—that the West would have to consider the safety of air safety over Berlin.

Then there are the more than 2 million Berliners who have remained free because they had the protection of the allies. A cutoff from West Germany would bring back old hardships even if a new airlift—if that is still feasible—would keep open a lifeline.

Although present supplies of vital foodstuffs, coal, building materials, gasoline and so forth are so huge that West Berlin could get by for up to a year, immediate problems would arise in other fields.

Before the city is not self-sufficient Bonn transports about 2400 short tons daily ($375 million) into Berlin each year. Bonn also buys more than 60 percent of the city's manufactured products.

If the money were cut off, the city's budget would be unbalanced and it would have no more business credits, hardship pensions, or restitutions to Nazi victims.

An isolation of Berlin also would shut the gateway of the thousands of East Germans who come to West Berlin. For the West, as has been noted, the most effective step-by-step way to gain recognition for East Germany, could go on indefinitely but surely a point would come where the West would have to decide how much it wants to take.

One cannot judge from here what this point is. The West, however, has shown that the Western contingency planning is going on in Western capitals.

But this is clear. Premier Khrushchev's apparent conviction that he can get away with a separate peace treaty and its consequences is reflected in all Western thinking has made a deep impression on Germans and has disturbed them.

Although the West has said no to Premier Khrushchev's formula, people here feel that a negative response alone is no policy. What is more, they ask themselves: "How determined is the West?"

[From the Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1961]

THE BONE IN KHRUSHCHEV'S THROAT

Berlin, the bone Khrushchev says must come out of the Soviet throat, is usually regarded as the one object above all that the United States will not release. Yet a good many Americans have long felt that, because the United States, West Germany, The West, as has been indicated, will not favor such a treaty.

With that resolve, we can meet Khrushchev's provocations, whatever they may be.

And if he should throw at us the ultimate provocation of war, then we must face that in the realization only surrender could have avenged it. The worst thing that could happen to America is not war but the despairing notion that nothing is worth fighting for. The firmer we are, the less chance of war.

Fundamentally, Berlin is Khrushchev's problem, not our problem. It is not possible to make the West nimbler and seek to negotiate it out; we need only stand fast. It is not up to us to offer new arrangements to accommodate his greed; it is up to him to begin acting civilized.

If he ever should, then it might be possible to make a safe and more peaceful settlement of the status of Berlin. But if he persists in belligerence, our first duty is to make clear there is no third way out of our commitment to freedom.

The reality, we suspect, is that it is all but impossible to negotiate a safe new arrangement with the Soviets along these lines. We are in Berlin by our rights of conquest; we remain by force; and does this make it an intolerable situation?

Let us remember that Berlin is in truth a bone gagging Khrushchev's throat; to that extent, his discomfort should be a comfort to us. West Berlin is the gateway to freedom for millions from the East. It is living proof, day in and day out, of the lie of the Communist promise. No wonder Khrushchev can't stand it. But we can.

Khrushchev is expected to make more trouble in Berlin later in the year—interfering with traffic and a lot of other things. Certainly the harassment and complications he can cause are almost limitless, as we know from the Berlin blockade and lesser annoyance since then. This prospect has led some to fear that he may be able to nibble us out of Berlin, somewhat as he is doing in Laos.

It could happen—but only if we let it happen. Berlin is not Laos. Rightly or wrongly, we let Laos go because everything, including the apathy of the people, seemed against us; and we could let it go without our losing face. If the dividing line was long since clearly drawn, and Berlin is the outpost. Our determination to maintain our position there is so awkward and potentially dangerous, as it must be in an enclave like Berlin, that we have to be prepared for a new arrangement.

It is certain that the Russians sign a separate peace treaty and its consequences is reflected in all Western thinking has made a deep impression on Germans and has disturbed them.

Although the West has said no to Premier Khrushchev's formula, people here feel that a negative response alone is no policy. What is more, they ask themselves: "How determined is the West?"

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