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## Berlin and Germany

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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BERLIN AND GERMANY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have read partial texts and news accounts of Soviet Premier Khrushchev's recent addresses. These reports are sufficient to make clear that Mr. Khrushchev has a view of the attitudes of this Nation regarding peace, Berlin, and Germany which is not accurate. Further, they indicate that his views on these questions require elaboration if we are to appreciate the peaceful intent which is professed in them. The recent intensification of the danger of a blow-up in the divided city, with incalculable consequences, emphasize the need for a prompt clarification.

Mr. Khrushchev is wrong, if he mistakes the voice of any fraction of the people of this Nation for the voice of the Nation on the issues of peace and war. The right of peaceful dissent is an inherent part of a system of freedom. But in the last analysis, the voices to which Mr. Khrushchev needs to pay attention in this Nation are those of the President and the Secretary of State. For regardless of dissent, belligerence, or whatever in other quarters, it is the President who will determine the critical courses of action of the entire Nation. And under the President, only the Secretary of State is equipped to interpret his decisions in policy.

The President and the Secretary of State speak not for war, but for peace—not merely at Berlin and Germany, but everywhere on the globe. And they speak, too, for the defense of our rights which our national self-respect, no less than the grandeur of Russia of which Mr. Khrushchev spoke, requires us to preserve against threats or the hostile acts of others.

If Mr. Khrushchev means no harm to those rights at Berlin—and he insists in his statements that he does not—then there can be peace at Berlin. Beyond the defense of those rights against unilateral change by others, as I have said many times, I am not wedded to any particular situation at Berlin. I am personally persuaded that other situations can be developed, situations far better than that which has now existed for so many years despite the enormous changes in Germany and Europe and the world since World War II.

Indeed, Mr. Khrushchev has taken the initiative in this matter. He has insisted that the situation in Berlin must be changed. He has also insisted that the changes will not infringe upon our rights in that city, including the rights of access to West Berlin. Unfortunately, until now at least, he has indicated the changes which he desires, but he has not set forth in specifics how Western rights would be protected. What we really need, if there is to be peace as well as change at Berlin, is an elaboration on what the changes which Khrushchev proposes may mean. For example:

First. Mr. Khrushchev has contended that the East Germans can succeed to Soviet occupation rights in East Berlin by unilateral action. Does he recognize equally, then, that West Germans can succeed to Western rights of occupation in and access to West Berlin by unilateral action of the Western Powers?

Second. Since all of Berlin has been a common occupational responsibility of the Allied Powers; that is, the Soviet Union, France, Britain, and the United States, does it not follow that any peaceful change in the status of a part of Berlin to that of a free and neutralized city, must be coupled with a change of the status of all of Berlin, Soviet, and Western occupied enclaves, to that of a free city? I think that Mr. Khrushchev will recognize that unless he is prepared to extend his proposal of a free city to the entire city of Berlin—which he has never suggested—what he proposes is a unilateral change which is at least a political and ideological act of aggression even if it does not involve an act of military aggression.

Third. Mr. Khrushchev insists that the routes of access to Berlin will remain open after he signs a peace treaty with East Germany. He says that there will be any guarantees necessary to achieve this end. But what kind of guarantees? Will East Germany have control of the routes of access after a peace treaty is signed? Will Russian forces remain in control of them? Will they be transferred to the Western Powers whose forces remain in West Berlin, which would be most logical inasmuch as the Soviet Union is the nation which desires to withdraw from its occupational responsibility? Or, if control is transferred to the East Germans, will the Soviet Union recognize and support the right of the Western nations to use whatever means may be necessary to guarantee access to Berlin if it should subsequently be impeded?

These, Mr. President, are some of the questions which must be faced and answered now, if there is to be a change at Berlin, a change in peace. These are some of the questions which must be answered to give substance to the assertions of peaceful intent which emanate from Moscow.

Mr. Khrushchev has said that we should sit down at a table and negotiate. I should like to think that these are the type of questions, Mr. President, at least as regards Berlin, which would form the substance of negotiations. I see little virtue at this time in trying to deal with these questions in a full-dress conference with all the theatrical trappings of an international melodrama. But I see much virtue in quiet, sober, preliminary discussions of these questions. I would suggest that we have an outstanding Ambassador in Moscow, and the Russian Ambassador in this city is most capable. The task might well begin with an exploration of the questions by these men and the diplomats of other nations involved. Or, if this means of communication is inadequate, others can be devised. It is not so important, Mr. President, who may initiate negotiations or in what circumstances they may be initiated; I should think the people of the