11-3-1961

The Present Crisis in International Relations

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THE PRESENT CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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To Be Delivered at the
Virginia Education Association
To Be Held at the Mosque
Richmond, Virginia
Friday, November 3, 1961, 8:00 P.M.

FOR RELEASE NOVEMBER 3, 1961, 6:30 P.M.
I have recently come back from a visit of several weeks in the state which I serve in the Senate. It was, as it always is, a rewarding experience to leave Washington and to go home.

I do not believe that the people of Montana are much different in their broad concerns than are the people of Virginia. There is, in Montana, and I have no doubt that there is here and elsewhere in the nation, an increasing interest in fall-out shelters and other means of survival in the event of a nuclear war. It is an understandable interest in the light of the intensification of the international crisis.

A nuclear conflict may be unthinkable but it is becoming more and more apparent that it is not impossible. Since that is the case, the people of the nation are wise to consider its implications. It is prudent also to try to anticipate the physical consequences of such a conflict and possible antidotes. People are doing a good deal of serious thinking along these lines despite the frivolity with which the subject is sometimes treated.

I would certainly not wish to discourage sober efforts in the field of civil defense by communities of individuals. Nevertheless, it seems to me essential that we guard against stimulating a national hysteria by a commercial exploitation of this legitimate national concern. It seems to me essential, too, that we guard against accepting the fall-out shelter as an end in itself when it is, at best, a last ditch effort of sheer physical survival. In short, we must avoid developing a national obsession with burrowing in the ground, and, in the process, exclude what may be more fruitful ways of dealing with international difficulties. In the last analysis a cover of earth overhead may preserve the strain of human life but it will scarcely preserve a way of life--the way of life which we and peoples elsewhere have evolved over many centuries of civilized existence.
That is the central fact to which we must hold if we are to live up to our responsibilities as rational men and women in the days ahead. We owe to coming generations a richer heritage than a landscape of fall-out shelters. We owe to them the green fields and clear skies. We owe to them a world which is reasonably safe for the Acropolis and the Parthenon, for Rome, Paris, London and Washington and, in all humanity, for Moscow and Peking. We owe to them a world in which freedom is still a word with meaning. We shall not leave them that heritage if we now abandon hope for a life which is livable above the ground.

I realize, as do you, that the international problems which presently cloud the hope are immense. They are the problems which stand in the way of a decent, durable peace—in many parts of the world. They are, essentially, the same problems which have haunted the globe for many years and, in some cases, for decades. What is different for us is that many of them are reaching, simultaneously, a most critical stage at a time when science has produced capacities for destruction which are already overwhelming and when no part of the earth is insulated against vast, if not, total devastation. In short, the margin for error in major international issues has almost ceased to exist if we mean to preserve, let alone extend in a recognizable and continuing form, the civilization which we now know.

We can see these issues in sharp relief at Berlin. We can see them in Southeast Asia. We can see them in the Congo. We can see them in the United Nations. We can see them in the failure of the effort to end nuclear bomb-tests. And we will sense them, if we cannot see them, in the radioactive fall-out which will continue to rain down on the earth for a long time in the aftermath of the recent Soviet bomb-tests.
I think that as a nation, it is essential that we try to understand these and similar international difficulties in a deeper perspective than that which is normally provided by a radio news brief or a newspaper headline. For beneath each of these and other dramatic clashes is a vast complex of difficulties. The deeper our perspective, the greater the chance that we shall find some answers to the difficulties which will be more satisfactory than fall-out shelters, whether they be simple or deluxe models.

Berlin, for example, is more than a question of an East-West clash over a city, a wall, an escape, a place to test wills. In a far more significant sense it is a symbol of the failure of total victory in World War II to produce the conditions of total peace in Europe. It is also a symbol of a Germany divided against itself. The larger division of Germany is, in itself, a symbol of a divided Europe. All of these divisions, from that of a city to that of a continent intermesh one with another on gears of fear. There are German fears of the East. There are Polish, Czech and other fears of Germany. There are N.A.T.O. fears of the Warsaw Pact forces and similar fears in reverse. There are capitalist fears of communism and communist fears of capitalism and socialist fears of both. There is freedom's antipathy to totalitarianism and the totalitarian hatred of freedom.

All these and other difficulties converge at Berlin in a direct and hostile confrontation of military forces. It is no answer to these deeper difficulties to repeat the phrase "standing firm" as though it were some litany which would exorcise them. Nor is it an answer to them to build a wall as the Communists have done. A wall does not even
obliterate the difficulties much less does it resolve them. It is becoming
clearer each day, as serious incidents multiply, that both the phrase and
the wall act not to reduce but to intensify the difficulties.

It seems to me that there is a responsibility on the part of
rational men and women to think beyond "standing firm," and dividing walls,
visible or invisible. Of course, we must stand firm when we are challenged
but we must not stand, struck dumb, as events erode the very ground on
which we are standing. There is a responsibility to do more than to stand
firm. There is a responsibility to explore ways which might deal with the
unnatural breeches in a city, nation and continent and to try to act on the
basis of what these explorations reveal.

The responsibility is not ours alone. It is a shared responsi-
bility but it is vital responsibility for us no less than others. As it
is discharged and only as it is discharged in all earnestness in contact
and in negotiation, by all the parties concerned can we even hope for a
lifting of the cloud of incipient destruction which hovers over Europe and
spreads throughout the world.

In this connection, may I say that there is just as much danger
of error in the assumption of too great a responsibility by either the
United States or the Soviet Union as there is in the assumption of too
little. The fate of Berlin inevitably depends heavily on the course which
is pursued by this nation and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union
on the other. But the fate of a divided Germany, is not ours alone to de-
cide. It rests in heavy measure, a decade and a half after the war, with
the German peoples in both spheres and on the two governments which
represent or purport to represent them. Nor is the fate of all Europe the
primary responsibility of this country and the Soviet Union which are, in reality, nations on its fringes.

I would suggest, therefore, that there may be room here for two simultaneous conferences of exploration, separate but interrelated, in some such city as Vienna or Geneva. There is room for a conference of the foreign ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on the Berlin situation and other vestigial problems of World War II and the occupation. And there is room for a conference of the nations of Europe on both sides of the divided continent, of the nations of the Warsaw Pact and N.A.T.O. in which they might make their sentiments known on the security and other problems of a divided continent--problems in which their stake is at least as great as is ours or Russia's.

And may I add that I cannot see that it matters very much who takes the first step towards such conferences. What is far more important is the courage, wisdom, restraint and patience with which they are approached. What matters far more is the determination of all those who participate in them to eschew propaganda and to dedicate themselves to reasonable and just solutions which ease the dangers to Europe and to the world.

If we recognize the limitations of all international conferences, if we are not too sanguine in our expectation of results, if we are prepared to try for much but expect little, then I can see no harm in two meetings of this kind at the foreign ministers level. And I can see some possibilities of good emerging from them. At the very least, we shall be able to bring into the consideration of the critical problems of peace in Europe the thoughts and ideas of those important nations of Europe which have been shunted aside in the present concern of the larger powers with firm stands and excluding walls.
If I may turn now to Asia, I would point out that difficulties no less complex than those in Europe stand in the way of a durable peace in that region. Today, we see evidence of them in Viet Nam. Yesterday, it was Laos. Tomorrow it may be Korea. And after that still another of the nations on the periphery of a massive China. Even Outer Mongolia, lying vast and desolate between the Soviet Union and China is not necessarily exempt.

The problem of peace in the region of Asia is not merely one of communism vs. nationalism. That is a significant part of it but only a part of it. It is also the old clashing with the new in these many lands. It is the overweening influence of military force and militant politics in the midst of a peaceful and confused peasantry. It is inadequate and unresponsive government. It is, in a deeper sense, the problem of massive poverty and social antiquation and the need to develop new institutions and effective governments which are responsive to the needs of their people in the 20th Century world.

In a deeper sense, too, it is the reappearance of the historic, if unexpressed assertion of China of its superiority over its neighbors. To put it another way, it is the demand of an awakened, modernizing and Communist-led China for a dominant role in the region and its apparent unwillingness to live in permanent peace with any nation and, I underscore the word, any, except on its own terms.

These, may I suggest, are some of the realities which must be faced and dealt with if there is to be reasonable stability and peace in Asia. For these realities, high school debate topics such as: "Should Communist China be seated in the U.N." or "Shall we continue or discontinue
foreign aid in Asia" have relevance but only limited relevance. Both foreign aid and non-recognition of China have been the cardinal factors of our Asian policy for many years. I have constantly opposed seating Communist China in the United Nations and I have been consistently critical of foreign aid although I have supported it in principle. I have done so because they have been useful policies in many ways. But we should not delude ourselves that they have necessarily brought any closer a solution to the problem of a stable peace in Asia. Nor should we delude ourselves as to the cost of this holding action which in terms of defense and foreign aid expenditures involves many billions of dollars of your money each year and, for the years ahead, promises only a continuance of these expenditures. Nor should we ignore the consequences of the gross misapplication of aid as a substitute for diplomacy in Laos during the years 1954 to 1960 when 350 millions of dollars were spent only to leave us deeply involved in a remote region of Asia, on the brink of war and with a situation more difficult than when we first took note of it six years before.

Coming closer to home, we find in the Caribbean area, in Cuba, still another surface manifestation of deeper difficulties which block a stable peace even in our own neighborhood of the Americas. We give these difficulties a name when we speak of Castro. But, in truth, they existed before we knew that name and they may well exist after that name is gone.

If we reckon with the problem of Castroism as merely the channel of intrusion of communism into the Western Hemisphere, as for a long time we did, then the remedy seems simple enough: block the channel. That comprehension of the problem and that remedy, to a large extent, explains the ill-fated Cuban invasion.
The fact is that Castroism and various facsimiles thereof elsewhere in Latin America are indicative of more than communist intrusion. Castroism was first and foremost the cult of the disenchanted and dispossessed, of the restless, not only within Cuba but in many other parts of the Hemisphere. In their millions, they have known neither the meaning of freedom nor even fringe benefits of modern progress. And because we stand on the edge of this massive discontent, because we are the most powerful exponent of freedom coupled with progress, because we are of the Americas but not Latin American—for these and for other reasons, we and those Latin Americans who are closest to us in outlook have become the natural target of this restlessness.

The question, then, is not so simple as it is almost always put: "What shall we do about Mr. Castro?" The question, in a deeper sense, is what can be done about the disenchantment of millions of Latin Americans which opens the way for Castroism and the intrusion of communist totalitarian doctrines even while it undermines the whole concept of the Good Neighbor Policy of common security and progress in freedom, through intimate hemispheric cooperation.

That is a problem for all the American Republics, not for us alone. In truth, the responsibilities which fall to Latin American leaders are greater and more immediate than ours. The difficulties are within their own countries and in preponderant part can be dealt with only by the Latin Americans themselves. Here, too, as in the European crisis, for this nation to try to do too much can be as dangerous and inadequate as failing to do enough. This realization is inherent in the President's concept of an Alliance for Progress and it must be closely adhered to in administration in the years ahead. There is much that we can and must do in Latin America
in our own interest and in the common interest of the Western Hemisphere. But, in those same interests, there is much that we cannot do and should not try to do.

In the Congo, in Africa we have another visible problem which has come to the surface out of the massive problems of a restless continent. The situation in the Congo is not grasped in full dimension in terms of the newspaper images of Tshombe, Lumumba, Gizenga, Adoula or any other of the new and exotic names which have only recently been brought into our lexicons of world politics. The difficulty is greater than whether one leader seems to lean eastward towards communism and another westward towards Western Europe or the United States.

In all realism, African nationalist leaders worthy of the name can be expected to lean overwhelmingly in the direction of the interests of their own people and only, incidentally, in any other direction. Those interests are, preponderantly, the interests of converting tribal societies into national states—in fact as well as in name. The interests lie in the rapid economic and social progress of their people. The personal brilliance of some of the new African leaders and their extensive knowledge of the world should not obscure the fact that for too long, millions of Africans have been isolated or insulated from the mainstream of modern change and that they have now been projected into its complex cross-currents, with a great and confusing suddeness.

The transition in the African nations will not be an easy one in the best of circumstances. Effective African leadership within the continent of Africa is the essential ingredient. Genuine help from nations
outside the continent in education, health, and other aspects of modernization can speed the transition. But a deep involvement of Africa on either side in the cold war can only delay or deflect it. It will bring further misery to the Africans and, in the end, it will bring no lasting victory for the outsiders. For it will simply transfer to a new and vast arena of the world many of the same difficulties which remain unsolved elsewhere and the immensely costly remedies of war--cold or hot--which they evoke.

It seems to me that Mr. Hammarskjold saw the problem of the Congo and, in a larger sense, the problem of Africa in these terms. He gave his life in the hope of developing conditions of reasonable stability and progress in the Congo and, perhaps, throughout Africa, conditions which would insulate that region from the cold war so that a native genius under its own leadership might come to fruition in peace and make its full contribution to human history.

His death has dealt a serious blow to that hope but it has not destroyed it. In the end, the nations of the world will have to continue to pursue it, if Africa is not to be a potential breeding ground of conflict for decades to come. For that reason alone, it would be imperative that the Secretary-General of the U.N. be endowed with at least some of Mr. Hammarskjold's attributes of objectivity, compassion and dedication to peace.

To a larger extent than we have realized, the strength of the U.N. in recent years was the strength of the patient and wise man who was its Secretary-General. His personal capacities were such that they compensated a great deal for the structural distortions and weaknesses in the organization. In all honesty we must face the fact that even as membership of the U.N. has grown to over 100, its constructive influence has not
necessarily grown accordingly. If we mean it when we say that the U.N. is the last best hope of peace then, indeed, we must be prepared to look long and hard at its structure. We must be prepared to consider major adjustments in its organs to reflect the changing circumstances of the world since the Charter came into existence. In short, we must see far more clearly than we now do what, precisely and specifically, it is that we expect of the United Nations and then we ourselves must be prepared and other nations must be prepared to rebuild that organization in a form that permits it to carry out that assignment. A great deal may be expected from the U.N. or very little. But nations cannot expect a great deal from it and then give it little in the way of effective institutions and effective support. That is the path of indecisiveness, irresolution, irresponsibility and, in the end, of its reduction to impotence.

Finally, I should like to turn to the question of nuclear bomb tests. Recently, I attended a ground-breaking ceremony for the new Yellowtail Dam in Montana. Five and a half tons of T.N.T. were set off and a few seconds later a substantial part of a high mountain-side collapsed in an enormous mass of rock, dirt and dust. Five and a half tons of well-placed T.N.T. did that. Some years ago, we set off a nuclear bomb in the Pacific whose power was not five and a half tons but 15 million tons. Just recently, the Soviet Union exploded in the Arctic a nuclear weapon with the equivalent explosive power of 30 to 50 million tons of T.N.T. And, most recently, in spite of world-wide protests as expressed formally in a U.N. resolution, the Russians tested still another in the range above 50 million tons.

The size of these recent Soviet tests was only one aspect of the travesty on scientific progress which they represented. More
significant is the radioactive fall-out which the explosions produced—the unseen death which will descend to earth for many months and years, as the winds and clouds may carry it around the globe. It will descend with indifference on neutral nations, communist nations and free nations alike. It will result in loss of years of life in uncounted numbers of human beings and some damage to all life-forms. This is not merely a probable consequence of the most recent explosion and the tests which preceded it, which in the current Soviet series have numbered in the neighborhood of 30, it is the results predicted by reputable scientists of all nationalities.

So far only four nations have tested in the atmosphere. But there are at least a dozen other nations and eventually there will be more, each of which might follow the same course if they are so inclined.

Whether they do so now or next year or years hence, it must be clear where the course of an indiscriminate national testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere on the basis of the claim of self-defense must eventually lead. At the very least, it must lead, as it is already leading, to a world which is increasingly inhospitable to human life and this, without war in any formal sense. It must lead to a world in which acts of serious scientific aggression are indulged in the name of self-defense.

By treaty, nations have protected the whale from indiscriminate destruction, the seal, the salmon and other animals and fish. Yet, in this instance, nations have not been able to protect men, women and children from the wanton depredation of nuclear testing in the atmosphere. It is not likely that the more fundamental and complex problem of arms control
are likely to yield to solution unless we are able to meet and prevail over this relatively clear-cut and most glaringly evident aspect of the problem.

There are other difficulties which confront us and the rest of the world, difficulties which must begin to be resolved before there can be any assurance whatsoever that this generation will leave, as its monument, something more meaningful than a fall-out shelter. But I think I have said enough to illustrate the immensity of the task of building a durable peace. Some of these difficulties will be years, even decades in their resolution. But others can and must be faced promptly, as in the case of Berlin, Germany and Europe. We must approach them with great sure-footedness, with quiet reserve, with patience and with resolute courage, for the danger of accident or mistep with catastrophic consequences has never been more pronounced than it is at this moment. But we must face them and we must face them soon.

As for the others, the long-range problems, the fundamental international reality which we, as citizens of this Republic, need to recognize is that we live in a world of rapid, continuous and universal change. The obligation rests on the President first and the government as a whole to adjust the relations of this country to that change in a manner which safeguards the present and future of this nation. In that undertaking President Kennedy is completely dedicated as was his predecessor, Mr. Eisenhower. He deserves and needs the support of the people. What is involved is not a matter of uncritical support. It is, rather, a matter of thoughtful support, whether it is critical or not. It is a matter of all of us seeking to deepen our national perspectives, our understanding of the world and the role of this nation in it. For it is only within that
context, within the framework of the understanding and perspective of the citizen of the nation—that the President can lead effectively in these questions. And it is only in that context, under the leadership of the President, that we will do our share to lift that burden of fear which has begun to drive mankind into burrows in the earth even at that instant in time when the planets are beginning to come within reach.