

University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana

Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews

Mike Mansfield Papers

9-23-1963

Test Ban Treaty

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation

Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "Test Ban Treaty" (1963). *Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews*. 529.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/529

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

that it does lead us toward a brighter and more peaceful world.

After the consideration of all this testimony—as we stated originally in the report of the Preparedness Investigating Committee, with reference to this phase of our hearings—we concluded solidly that this treaty would deny us the necessary opportunities to test fully and and fully meet our military requirements, and that any of the prospective positive and constructive gains resulting from the treaty did not overcome those losses or disadvantages and did not justify our giving up what we are having to surrender and what we will surrender under the terms of the treaty.

Therefore, Mr. President, I remain of the opinion and the final conclusion that the treaty does jeopardize our security and should not at this time be approved and ratified.

I wish especially to commend the distinguished majority leader [Mr. MANSFIELD] although others deserve commendation, too—for the very fine way in which he has handled this extensive and very important debate preceding what perhaps will be the most important vote in the Senate in many years. So I commend him very highly for the very fine way in which he has performed his duties and carried out his obligations. Certainly he ought to have the greatest confidence and respect of the Senator from Mississippi and of all the other Members of this body. I thank him for yielding this time to me.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield myself 20 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana is recognized for 20 minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. First, Mr. President, I wish to thank the Senator from Mississippi for his kind word and for his unflinching courtesy, consideration, and graciousness during the many difficult days we have had while the Senate has been considering the treaty. It is true that this has not been one of the great debates of the century; but I believe that in many respects it has been of more fundamental significance and of greater importance, because in my opinion no other treaty in which this country has been involved has been gone into so deeply and so thoroughly and by so many Senators, as is evident from the fact that three Senate committees held hearings on the treaty for several weeks, and from the further fact that the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, under the chairmanship of the able and distinguished Senator from Mississippi, held hearings for an even longer period of time on the military aspects of this program.

Now we have been told, if we can believe the news tickers—and I believe the statement is true—that, as of now, approximately 100 nations have formally ratified or signed the test ban treaty. We know that six nations—France, Communist China, Albania, North Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba—have given no indication that they will sign the treaty.

In fact, I believe exactly the opposite will be the case—that they will not sign the treaty.

Now the hour of decision is at hand. Tomorrow, at 10:30 a.m., the Senate will vote on this most momentous treaty, which will mean so much in the lives of the people of this Nation and in the lives of the peoples of the world.

Mr. President, that the record may be straight, let me say that it should show that this treaty reflects the judgment not only of this Democratic administration but of its predecessor Republican administration. It is a tribute to the persistence for peace on the part of Mr. Eisenhower no less than Mr. Kennedy.

The record should show, too, that Members of this body have played an immense role in the conception of this treaty, and in shaping it and in bringing it to this moment of ultimate decision. In this connection, I think of the work of the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the distinguished whip and chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament, of the work of the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN], the ranking Republican member of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER], the senior Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], and others who have observed the actual process of negotiation over the years, on behalf of the Senate and made significant contributions. I think of the work of the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DONN], whose creative conceptions were in accord with the modifications which ultimately produced agreement.

I think of the bipartisan contribution of the Senators who journeyed to Moscow to witness the signing of the treaty—Mr. AIKEN, Mr. SALTONSTALL, Mr. PASTORE, Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. FULBRIGHT, and Mr. HUMPHREY.

I think of the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND], and the Senator from Maine [Mr. SMITH], all distinguished experts in military matters, whose penetrating questions have compelled all of us to sharpen our understanding of this step. The RECORD should reflect their contributions.

And it should reflect, too, Mr. President, the work of the great chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. FULBRIGHT]. In considering this treaty, he guided not only the members of that committee but the Senators of the Armed Services Committee and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in one of the most profound, impartial, and thorough studies ever conducted by an agency of the Senate. I can recall of no other occasion in which the Senate was better equipped by the work of its committee to proceed, fully informed and with due deliberation to decision.

Finally, Mr. President, I wish to allude to the contribution of the great American who sits across the aisle, to the Senator from Illinois, the distinguished minority leader [Mr. DIRKSEN]. He withheld his judgment until he had fully informed himself on this treaty, until he

had pondered its implications, not to his party, not to himself but to the Nation and to the living generations and those yet to come. When he knew in his mind and in his heart that it was right, then and only then, did he decide. And once having decided, he was as a rock of granite, impervious to the storms of criticism which beat about him.

The Senator from Illinois is a great American. And, Mr. President, he could not be a great American unless he were also an understanding and compassionate human being. His guidance, his reassurance, his wisdom, in this instance, increases the debt which the leadership owes to him, and which the Senate and the Nation as a whole owe the Senator from Illinois for his high patriotic public service.

Mr. President, shortly we will vote on the question of advice and consent to the ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty. What needed saying on this treaty has been said again and again in committee and on the floor. It ought to be clear by this time that not a single Senate proponent favors the treaty, because he believes that the Russians have signed it out of love for the United States. There are no dupes in the Senate on that score. The Russians have their own reasons for signing this treaty. They are not necessarily reasons of military advantage at all although that possibility has been discussed thoroughly. Indeed, one does not have to search far for plausible reasons for the Russian signature.

Mr. Khrushchev has his share of internal difficulties. The Soviet-Canadian wheat deal of Canadian wheat for \$500 million is one example. The Russian people are consumers, too, and nucleonics is not yet a substitute for nutrition. The race to the moon is not yet producing edible green cheese. Missiles are not yet delivering milk. Nuclear fallout does not drop as the gentle rain on parched agricultural lands.

And if internal difficulties are insufficient to explain the Russian acceptance of this treaty, we may find other reasons in Mr. Khrushchev's external difficulties and, particularly, in the Soviet relationship with China. The Soviet Union is confronted with a militant and hostile ideological challenge from the Chinese. It is confronted with a China which lays great stress on its racial affinity with all Asians as against European Russia. It is confronted with growing Chinese territorial pressures in Central Asia. In this connection it should be noted that the Sunday papers carry the reports from Moscow that Russia charges that its frontier was violated by China 5,000 times in 1962. And also in this connection I ask unanimous consent that there be printed at the end of my remarks an editorial appearing in the New York Herald Tribune dated September 23 and a statement which I made on September 6 referring to the Sino-Soviet border issue as, possibly, a major motivation in the Russian interest in the nuclear test ban treaty.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibits 1 and 2.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. In short, Mr. President, quite apart from military matters, there are any number of plausible reasons for the Soviet Union to want this treaty with the United States. But that is the business of the Russians. It is not ours.

From our point of view, there are similar valid reasons for seeking this treaty. We do not have to love the Russians to see the advantages of this treaty. We have only to recognize what unrestricted testing of nuclear weapons, let alone nuclear warfare itself, may do to the civilization we know and to the health of the people of the United States, particularly to younger generations here and on the way. Is that in itself not sufficient reason for seeking this treaty?

Let no Member forget that this treaty was proposed and pursued, not by Mr. Khrushchev, but by President Eisenhower and by President Kennedy in succession. And let no Member suggest that they pursued it—and none has—because they are fools or careless or not as wise or as well informed as Senators in these matters. And let no Member suggest—and none has—that these Presidents pursued the treaty for any reason other than that they were convinced that, on balance, it is in the interests of the United States, first and foremost.

Now it is possible to disagree with the judgment of two Presidents in succession. That is what the constitutional practice of ratification is designed to permit, and I question no Senator's motives if, in his judgment, he votes in the end for the rejection of this treaty.

But I would plead with those who are so inclined to consider one last time what the failure to ratify this treaty would mean.

It would mean the resumption of tests in the atmosphere and on the sea, not only by the United States but by the Soviet Union as well, with consequent rise in the exposure to radiation-induced sicknesses of our people as well as others.

It would insure a marked increase in defense expenditures and, hence, in the already heavy burdens of the U.S. taxpayer. For, if we cannot take this step toward security by an instrument of peace, then it follows that we had better put more of our resources into the instruments of war. For that is precisely what others will also be doing, as the fears and antagonisms multiply in the fertile soil of a sanctioned international nuclear anarchy.

To reject this treaty would be to precipitate a worldwide revulsion among the dozens of nations who have followed the leadership of this Nation for many years and who have already signed this treaty in good faith.

To reject this treaty, Mr. President, will be to snuff out that flicker of light which for a brief moment lit the rational and reasonable hopes of the Nation and the world.

It will, in short, bring an end to the hope for a more reliable peace through negotiations, and properly so. For it will make clear that while the President does not fear to negotiate, the Senate fears the consequences of negotiations which are finally successful. It will make clear that we reject these consequences even when they are most cir-

cumscribed, even when we have taken all possible steps to guard against the risks.

These are some of the considerations which I would hope the Senate will bear in mind as we proceed to the final vote on tomorrow morning. And may I say, Mr. President, that the responsibility for this decision is not assignable to any scientist or military or civilian official of the Government. This moment is for elected Senators alone. It is, for us to decide to join with or to refuse to join with an elected President to safeguard through the treaty the interests of the people and the States which we represent.

Will we consent to put this very limited but firm brake upon the headlong race toward the nuclear inferno? Can we afford to take this chance? Indeed, Mr. President, can we afford not to take it?

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of the time.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 23, 1963]

SPARKS ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER

Of all the former imperialist powers which had helped themselves to slices of Chinese territory during the open door free-for-all period, only one remains with extensive holdings on the Asian mainland. It is Russia.

Ideological debates are one thing, but they are largely verbal and intellectual. Real estate is quite another. It is something to which all good Communists, like the capitalists they denounce, attach great value.

Peiping may or may not be sincere in its ideological debate with Moscow. But there is now little doubt that it is deadly serious about its claims to Chinese territory which the czars had conquered and which the present Communist rulers of Russia had inherited.

The Chinese have embarked on a course which, if continued, could lead to a denunciation of the Peiping treaty of 1860, extracted from the Manchu emperor by a wily Russian envoy of the czar. The treaty fixed the present Sino-Soviet frontier—a frontier which the Chinese refuse to honor.

This is proved by the disclosure, in an official Soviet Government statement, that the Mao Tse-tung regime has attempted "to appropriate individual sections of Soviet territory" and had violated the border 5,000 times during 1962 alone.

There have been border clashes between Russians and Chinese throughout their history. It is not unlikely, in the light of the extraordinary Soviet disclosure, that these clashes have been resumed and have grown to serious proportions during 1962 and 1963.

The renewal of physical conflict (as distinct from ideological conflict) goes a long way toward explaining the sudden Soviet interest in coming to an understanding with the Western Powers. We may now have an opportunity to extract concessions which previously were beyond our reach. Let's hope President Kennedy and his Secretary of State make good use of it.