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Chinese Russian Convergence in Asia

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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TRIBUTES TO SENATORS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for the second time this week I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Clark) and the distinguished Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Randolph), both of whom have once again shown their skill and knowledge of two vitally important measures which are for the welfare of the people. I only wish that this kind of record could be maintained week in and week out. But I am happy once again to congratulate the Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator from West Virginia for the great service they have rendered.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend for his kind words. I should like the RECORD to note the great contribution made by members of the Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare for bringing the bill to the Senate for passage. I express my appreciation also to members of the staff, who worked conscientiously and ably to help prepare the bill and expedite its passage.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I also extend congratulations to other Senators on the majority side, and to the distinguished Senator from Vermont (Mr. Proctor), who offered worthwhile amendments, the distinguished Senator from New York (Mr. Javits), and other Senators who made contributions to the bill and helped make it a better and stronger bill than when it was introduced.

CHINESE-RUSSIAN CONVERGENCE IN ASIA

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for some time, I have been attempting to follow developments in Sino-Russian relations in central Asia. Although the public information is sparse and not necessarily always accurate, it has been possible to obtain from it, against the background of history, a glimmer of the situation which is evolving in that region.

Several weeks ago, I put together some observations on the central Asian situation which I had intended to discuss in the Senate on August 13. But I was hesitant to do so at the time because of a lack of any recent substantiating evidence of the tentative conclusions which I had reached.

In today's press, however, there are significant reports out of Tokyo which relate directly to the subject of my observations. I ask unanimous consent that a selection of these reports be included at the end of my remarks; and at this point, Mr. President, I ask the Senate's indulgence that I may proceed with the observations on the Chinese-Russian convergence in Asia to which I have previously referred.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request by the Senator from Montana? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there are obvious reasons of health and
skyrocketing costs of armaments which provide common or parallel motives for the Soviet Union and the United States to hasten the test ban treaty. Beyond the obvious, other interests have undoubtedly entered into the search for agreement by each nation. These are not necessarily related only to arms, but in most instances they are a part of the calculations of the balance of benefit on which the treaty rests.

It is to me that the Senate should explore all of these factors in an effort to understand fully what is at stake in the act of ratification. Reference, for example, has already been made in the hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee to the growing estrangement between Russia and China. That the question has been raised suggests an awareness of what may be a most significant factor in the Soviet position on the nuclear test ban treaty. Yet our knowledge of the Russian-Chinese estrangement is too limited to permit a full comprehension of its implications either for Soviet policy or our own. For one thing, the bulk of the information which the U.S.S.R., particularly eastern Asia, is extremely limited and spasmodic. For another, our knowledge of which Russia came to us largely second or third hand.

It is understandable, therefore, that the Sino-Soviet estrangement has been analyzed in the press and elsewhere largely in theoretical terms. Scholars, journalists and intelligence technicians pore over the documentation and statements and arrive at their conclusions which emanate from Russia and China. And in this fashion, the estrangement is interpreted to the Nation almost wholly in terms of ideological differences and the struggle to claim the high priesthood of orthodoxy in the International Communist movement and with it, the right to preside over the eulogy of the burial of capitalism.

These ideological factors are undoubtedly deeply involved and I would not for a minute minimize them. Yet, it may be so bold as to suggest it, it seems to me that the great emphasis which is given to them in the information which reaches us, and indeed in the statements themselves, may produce a serious distortion of our concept of the actual situation. We may see the problem largely as a clash of Marxist theories or Communist personalities which is destined to disappear as soon as the theories are straightened out or the present leaders, in time, go the way of all leaders.

I should like to suggest that other, more mundane and enduring considerations are involved in present Sino-Soviet difficulties, considerations which will not easily be exercised either by new theories or new leaders.

It is to one of these considerations that I direct the attention of the Senate today. I refer to the most significant factor, in the Russian-Chinese estrangement, largely overlooked in the overwhelming emphasis which has been given to ideological differences between Moscow and Peking. I refer to the geographic and cultural convergence of Russia and China in the inner recesses of the Asian Continent.

This convergence, Mr. President, has been a source of intermittent friction between the two countries for a very long time. I direct the attention of the Senate to the ideological inclinations of Moscow and Peking at any given time in history. It long predated the advent of communism in Russia. Indeed, it predated the birth of Karl Marx by at least a century.

The first recorded clashes between Russians and Chinese go back to the 17th century. Three hundred years ago, Russian traders and Cossacks first made contact with the Chinese-Manchus to gain Manchu imperial power in the region north of Manchuria. The early zone of Russian influence and authority in this desolate northeast corner of Asia, as against China, was established by a series of treaties beginning with that of Nerchinsk in 1689, and followed by Bur and Klasha in 1727, Kiakhta in 1768, and the Klakhta protocol in 1792. A half century later the Russian press southeastward was resumed under Count Nikolai Muravyev-Amursky, the first governor of Siberia, and his chief military aide, Capt. Gennadi Ivanovich Neselkof. Again there followed a confrontation of the Russian position, in the Treaty of Aigun of 1858. This agreement brought into Russian possession large areas of Northeast Asia which had previously been under Manchu control.

Subsequently, Russia as well as other European powers and Japan exacted by guile, bribery or naked power, special economic privileges which were concessions from weak and corrupt imperial officials of China. By this process, the Russians penetrated south into Manchuria, establishing themselves at Dairen and Port Arthur on the Yellow Sea by the end of the 19th century and penetrating Korea which had been for a long time in a tributary relationship with Peking.

Since that high-water mark, Russian influence in northeast Asia at the expense of China has been so vast as to overwhelm the face of a Japanese advance and the weakness of the early Soviet state, it receded. Under the communists it was progressively extended, and by the end of World War II. And under the communism of Khrushchev it receded once more after the Chinese Communists came to power in Peking.

Our sources of information are insufficient to provide a clear delineation of where the present line of convergence may lie, as between Russian and Chinese influence in northeast Asia. We are not even sure of what the precise situation in this connection may be in Korea, where we are deeply involved, let alone in Manchuria, of which we know very little. One thing is reasonably certain however, the actual Russian-Chinese convergence does not bear much relationship to the border-demarcations as shown on ordinary maps. It is also clear, in any event, that the convergence in the northeast is still much further south and east than which would have been recognized by a Ching emperor of the Manchu dynasty in the 17th century, the 18th or early 19th century. The recent history of the Chinese-Russian convergence in northeast Asia has been affected, of course, by the appearance of Communist ideology in Asia. But the changing scene of other influences, and the recent, historical experience is now accumulated to suggest that the future history of the region will hardly be dominated by this factor.

An addendum: In the same way, a history of Russian advance and recession and advance—sometimes warlike and imperious and sometimes peaceful and conciliatory—finds parallels elsewhere in Asia. During the last century, for example, Mongolia was entirely under nominal Chinese sovereignty. It was largely the efforts of Russians under the czars coupled with the weakness of the later Manchu-Ching emperors which brought about a loosening of Chinese control over the vast stretches of land now identified as the Outer Mongolian People's Republic. And it was largely the same combination of Soviet strength and Chinese weakness under the Chinese National Republic which resulted in 1922, in the establishment of an Outer Mongolia, not under Chinese, but under Soviet rule. Thus, in the last century, the southwest edges of Sinkiang were chipped away and added to what is now the contiguous territory of the U.S.S.R. And even as recently as World War II the Russians exercised for a time something close to indirect domination over principal trading centers and caravan junctions in Sinkiang.

Especially, since the advent of Chinese Communist control over the mainland, the nature of convergence as between Russia and China in the Sinkiang region appears to have been pushed back westward once again. But how far and how firm this recession of Soviet influence has been is not something we do not really know with any degree of accuracy.

To recapitulate, Mr. President, I have sought to point out to the Senate, that, historically, there has been not a fixed, but a shifting and uncertain line of convergence between Russia and China in the inner recesses of the Asian Continent. This line, Mr. President, is not necessarily the border as shown on contemporary maps but rather the changing extremity of the eastward and southward reach of Russian influence and westermost and northermost extension of enforceable Chinese control.

Further, history indicates that while there have been periods of stagnation and recession, the overall pattern in the region for several centuries was that of Russian advance. It was an advance which exacted mainly the spastic but steady decay of the Manchu-Ching dynasty through the reigns of a number of emperors. And it drew strength from the debilitation of the successor Chinese
Republic in World War II and the collapse of the Japanese invasion on the Asian mainland in that conflict.

What prompts me to make these observations at this time, Mr. President, is that they may be of more than historic interest, as they may presage the present Soviet estrangement. This break comes at a time when there has emerged in Peking once again, a strong centralization of power. To be sure, the government which wields this power proclaims its Marxism. Indeed, it claims to be more Marxist than Moscow. Yet insofar as Chinese Marxism still concerns itself in practice on the borders of China, it appears to bear a remarkable resemblance to classic Chinese dynastic policy. Korea, Siam, Annam, and the Chinese-Indian border regions? Are these, such is the case is indicated by the Chinese assertion against the Chinese claim to Korea, in Vietnam, in Sinkiang, in Outer Mongolia, and in Tibet. This conception has been taken not merely from China and subject, therefore, to Chinese claim.

Now, Mr. President, I do not wish to leave the impression that China is about to embark upon a general war with Russia to bring back into the historic embrace of Peking, certain lands along the inner frontier. But I do suggest that the arrow that Russian intrigue are already pointed outward from Peking into these sparsely inhabited regions where a predominant population is neither Chinese nor Russian but Mongol and other tribal peoples. Many techniques are already operating against this end, including the Chinese aid programs in Outer Mongolia and the organization of autonomous tribal groupings on Chinese territory. Certainly, such limited information as we have with respect to the region hints at the likelihood that the Chinese arrows have begun to prick the Russians in these remote regions.

I would suggest further, Mr. President, that Soviet foreign policy is not formed in ignorance of these recent developments or the history which I have just recounted, or of the reactions of the Chinese in southeast Asia and on the Indian border. And there is no reason to assume that, because it is Communist, Russian foreign policy is concerned any less with such considerations than might be the case with the foreign policy of any other nation.

I would suggest, finally, that it is becoming apparent that we have been in error in assuming for so long that the iron hand of Moscow was so unshakably fixed on Peking that it had superceded all other considerations in the considerations of the Communist leaders in China. Theoretic Communist world unity, whatever its weight, has not replaced certain enduring factors in the relationships of Russia and China as they are indicated to us by history.

And one of these factors, perhaps the most significant, as I have tried to explain to this body, is the convergence of Russian and Chinese influence in the vast inner recesses of Asia. The problems which are posed by the Sino-Soviet convergence are not essentially those of Marxist theory. And they certainly are not those of a common border dispute, that is, whether to move the border in one direction or the other. What is involved is the ultimate disposition and utilization of a reserve of, millions of square miles of territory largely devoid of human habitation.

This land and its contents constitute an enormous and largely unexplored and unexploited resource. Heretofore, it may have been of minor importance because of the inadequacies in techniques of modern development and transportation, particularly in that part of the world. But with the rapid dissemination and multiplication of these techniques, the region grows rapidly in significance to the two great peoples which converge upon it. And it grows, too, in significance as the population of China, already in the vicinity of 700 million, has been increasing at the rate of about 15 million a year, expands explosively and presses ever more heavily on limited resources even for a bare minimum of food, clothing, and shelter.

So, Mr. President, if we wish to understand fully the motives of the Soviet Union in seeking a nuclear test ban treaty, we ought now to consider the factor of the Sino-Soviet convergence, a factor which is clearly indicated by history but which cannot be weighed accurately without a better understanding of what is presently transpiring in interior Asia.

In any event, it would be unwise to dismiss the likelihood of a growth of tension at various points of contact along the thousands of miles of this vague frontier. Some might anticipate with real prospect of these clashes, even if they were nuclear. That prospect might be bent and twisted, I suppose, into an argument against the proposed test ban nuclear treaty.

But that, Mr. President, would be a most distorted view of nuclear realities and contemporary international relations. For if the threat of nuclear confiscation are lit, it will matter little who holds the match or where in the world it is struck. Even the vastness of central Asia would be insufficient to contain the holocaust or to confine it to the two massive Communist powers of Eurasia. No, Mr. President, the probability of increasing tension in the Sino-Soviet convergence, as in the case of all significant international tensions, is one more reason for seeking to bring about rational control over the growth and spread of the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons.
PEIPING ACCUSES MOSCOW OF PLOT TO SPREAD UPRISING IN CHINA AREA, SEEKS TWO NATIONS ON BRINK OF SPLIT

TOKYO, September 6.—The Chinese Communist Party today accused the Soviet Union of trying to foment an uprising in Red China with the aid of thousands of Chinese Communist underground operatives in Sinkiang, the Chinese province in the far west which forms the Soviet border. They said Soviet-Chinese relations have reached "the level of a split." The Chinese reported the alleged Soviet Trojan horse plot against Red China in broadcasts which said differences in the international Communist movement have reached "a new stage of unprecedented gravity."

A broadcast monitored here said the Russians admitted tens of thousands of Chinese agents came a few years ago to Takia Kuldja, on the border of Sinkiang-Soviet borderland, in order to overthrow the Chinese government at Ill, a district bordering the Soviet Union in Sinkiang Province. The southern part of Sinkiang, in central Asia, was occupied by imperial Russia in 1861-1870.

The accusation was the first mention of incidents along the thousands of miles of border separating the squabbling giants of communism.

The radio said the Chinese were "allured" or "threatened" to induce them to join a plot to subvert Sinkiang in order of the Soviet Communist Party. It gave no other details of the alleged treachery, except to say that the Chinese Government had made several protests to the Russians for the return of the Chinese and had been refused.

The matter has not been settled, it added. Peiping accused the Kremlin of fostering a "two Chinas" policy. In the new massive verbal attack on the Soviet leadership the Chinese also took the credit for the crushing of the Hungarian revolt in the fall of 1956.

SOVIET TAUNT

From the Moscow side of the border-bombing barbed-wire line, Premier Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet writer, that the Chinese are bent on instigating a global nuclear conflict which they would sit out as spectators and hope to survive as "victors."

Peiping's charges were in broadcasts of a statement published in both the official People's Daily and the Communist Party's theoretical journal, Red Flag. The statement was published under the heading "Communist Party of Sinkiang Province" and said that China was trying to set up a new world headquarters for communism in Peiping and split the world along racial lines.

The Chinese charged that in 1956, "at the critical moment when the Hungarian counterrevolutionaries had occupied Budapest, "the Soviet leaders for a time "intended to adopt a policy of capitulation and abandon Socialism [Communist] Hungary to counterrevolution."

"We insisted on the taking of all the necessary measures to smash the counterrevolutionary rebellion," the Chinese said.

Soviet tanks and troops crushed the revolution with an attack on Budapest in November 1956.

The Chinese claimed Premier Khrushchev proposed 4 years ago that they accept the "two Chinas" theory and acknowledge the rule of the Nationalists on Formosa. As far as the record shows at the United Nations, however, Russia has violently opposed the "two Chinas" formula for resolving the question of Chinese representation.

The Chinese charge was contained in a little-noticed section of Peiping's reply Sunday to a joint statement by China and the United Nations. The statement China's emnity resulted from a Soviet refusal to give that country atomic weapons.

The statement also repeated claims that Soviet leaders, on a personal quarrel from the Communist Party to Government level. The border troubles, recall of Soviet specialists and testing of hundreds of contracts proved this, it said.

It also repeated charges of "great power chauvinism" possibly written. "To say what I know because I'm stronger than you checkboxes against the Russians and accused them of otherwise violating the norms of interparty relations.

There was no immediate Soviet reply to the Chinese charges and the grave accusation of the two sides.

The official Government newspaper Izvestia, however, kept up the drumfire on Sunday. The statement bitterly accused the Soviet Union wanted "to adopt a policy of capitulation" in the 1956 Hungarian revolution, but gave up the idea under strong Chinese pressure.

FIRST REVELATION

The border row, the first to be formally revealed by neither nation, involved tens of thousands of Chinese who were admitted into Soviet territory, it was alleged, in April and May 1962.

The article said the Chinese were "allured" or "threatened" to induce them to join a plot by Soviet officials in Sinkiang under order of the Soviet Communist Party. It gave no other details of the alleged plot except to say that the Chinese Government had made several protests to the Russians for return of the Chinese and had been refused.

The matter has not been settled, it added. The radio quoted an article jointly published by the editorial departments of the official People's Daily and the theoretical journal Red Flag.

The statement answered Moscow's July 15 accusation that China was trying to set up a new world headquarters for communism in Peiping and split the world along racial lines.

FLIGHT WAS REPORTED

The Washington Post reported last June that between 50,000 and 70,000 refugees from Communist China had fled into the Soviet Union in the spring of 1962. At the same time, reports of Communist activity in the Soviet consulate at Kuldja, in Sinkiang Province, demanding arms to fight the Peiping government, were given them. Kuldja is the main city in the Ill district. The Chinese border district of Ill was occupied by Imperial Russia for 10 years, 1861-70, and then reverted to central Asian sovdominence. The district was attached in 1944-50 to a makeshift East Turkestan Republic. The main town, Kuldja, home of about 150,000 people, is a trade center in the region, with industries such as tanning and textiles, and there are iron and coal mines about.

The Chinese article also claimed that for a time during the 1956 Hungarian revolt, the Russians "intended to abandon Socialism Hungary to counterrevolution."

"The Chinese Communist Party at that time resolutely opposed these erroneous methods and advanced correct suggestions," it said.

"The Russian leaders, it said, adopted these suggestions, "but subsequent events showed that they nursed rancor against the Chinese Communist Party."

"CHAUVINISM" CHARGED

It said the Soviet Party had also committed the "error of great-power chauvinism" in

middle school students who couldn't get into middle schools because of limited accommodations, he said.
Hsinhua said the article exposed the "error of great power chauvinism" committed by the Soviet leadership in attempting to suppress the liberalization movement in Poland in the face of 1968. At that time, Premier Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders made a hasty flight to Warsaw in an attempt to prevent Wladyslaw Gomulka, a nationalist, from taking over the leadership of the Polish Communist Party.

CAPITULATION CHARGED

The article accused Moscow's capitulation in its shortlived acceptance of the Imre Nagy regime set up during the Hungarian revolt in 1956. After several days the Russians violated their pledge to negotiate an agreement, crushed the rebellion and arrested Mr. Nagy. He was executed in 1958. "With regard to the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Hungary," the article said, "for a time Soviet leaders intended to adopt a policy of capitulation and abandon Socialist Hungary to counterrevolution." The Chinese Communist Party at that time resolutely opposed these erroneous methods and advanced correct suggestions.

The article said the Soviet leaders had accepted the Chinese suggestions "but subsequent events showed that they nursed rancor against the Chinese Communist Party and regarded its perseverance in proletarian internationalism as the biggest obstacle to the Soviet party's wrong line."

The article was the first indication by Peking that it had urged the use of force to put down the Hungarian rebellion.

The latest attack on the Soviet leadership by Peking repeats many of the accusations made in the course of the deterioration of relations between the two countries, but it did give a few new glimpses of behind-the-scenes developments.

ISSUES DISCUSSED IN 1961

Referring to the Soviet party's 22d congress in 1961, at which the Albanian Communist leaders were publicly attacked by Soviet bloc leaders, the article said that Premier Chou En-lai, who defended the Albanian-Soviet leadership, criticized the errors of the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party in subsequent conversations with Khrushchev.

"But Khrushchev flatly turned down these criticisms and advice," the article added, "and openly stated that 'We shall go our own way,' showing not the slightest intention of mending their ways."

The agency said the article listed 10 main facts to show that since the 22d congress the Soviet leadership had been "in violation of the principles guiding relations among the fraternal parties and countries and in pursuing policies of revisionism, sectarianism and splitism to promote its own line of revisionism."

The article appealed to the Soviet leadership to 'correct its errors and return to the path of Marxism-Leninism.'

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 6, 1963]

BATTLING RED GIANTS—AT THE BrINK

Tokyo—Communist China harshly accused the Soviet Union yesterday of pushing the two Communist giants "to the brink of split" by committing "a whole series of errors of principle."

Crowning its charges in the peculiarly stilted language of Marxism-Leninism, Peking broadcast a detailed and lengthy indictment of Moscow and warned that differences within the International Communist movement have reached "a new stage of unprecedented gravity."

The 2-hour radio broadcast, monitored in Tokyo, was a translation of a 20,000-character editorial statement printed simultaneously yesterday by Peking's official People's Daily and the theoretical journal Red Flag.

As news of the double-barrelled attack on the Kremlin reached the West, there were also reports of an unprecedented anti-Chinese demonstration in front of Peking's Embassy in Moscow.

Hearing the list of Chinese grievances against the Soviets was the charge of "provoking troubles on the Sino-Soviet frontier." This was the first official acknowledgment of incidents along the thousands of miles of shared border between the two countries. But there have been rumors of trouble in China's Sinkiang Province, and Peking yesterday accused Moscow of attempting to overturn the local government at Ili, a district bordering the Soviet Union in the northwestern corner of Sinkiang.

The radio said tens of thousands of Chinese were admitted to Soviet territory in furtherance of the plot in April and May of 1962. Peking's request for the return of the Chinese who had been refused, it added.

In Hong Kong yesterday, the English-language South China Post published a report from a Red Chinese refugee that 900,000 students have been sent to Sinkiang to build defenses.

But the Sinkiang question was only one point in a bill of particulars stretching back to 1956. The joint article yesterday was the first in a series catchily entitled "The Origin and Development of Differences Between Ourselves and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."

Moscow's "errors of principle" began, according to the Peiping broadcast, as long ago as 1956, at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. "From the very outset," it said, China opposed "the complete negation of Stalin and the thesis of "peaceful transition" as "groze errors."

Yesterday's broadcast also charged that Soviet Premier Khrushchev was ready to compromise with the rebels in Hungary in 1956 but yielded to Chinese insistence that the uprising be put down: "The Chinese Communist Party at that time resolutely opposed these erroneous methods and advanced correct suggestions."

The broadcast continued: "The past 7 years have amply proved that the road taken by the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the course of allying with imperialism against socialism, allying with the United States against China, allying with the reactionaries of all countries against the people of the world and allying with the renegade Tito clique against fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties."

The entire sweeping denunciation of Soviet policy was a counterchallenge to Moscow's open letter of July 14, which accused Peking of trying to split the Soviet bloc and subvert China. Since then, of course, Premier Khrushchev has gone out of his way to mend his fences with the "renegade" President Tito of Yugoslavia.

"Having failed to subdue the Chinese Communist Party," yesterday's broadcast continued, "the Russians moved 'to extend the ideological differences to the sphere of state relations.' Besides the border provocations, this stage included the withdrawal of Soviet experts in China and the 'tearing up of hundreds of agreements and contracts.'"

The broadcast also gave broader emphasis to a charge the Chinese first made last Sunday—that Premier Khrushchev proposed 4 years ago that Peking settle for "two Chinas" and acknowledge Nationalist control of Formosa. The proposal was made, the Chinese said, after Mr. Khrushchev visited the United States in 1959.

In Moscow, where there was no reply to the Chinese propaganda fusillade, the Chinese Ambassador's limousine was parked outside the Soviet Foreign Ministry yesterday. The Chinese earlier had protested a demonstration at the Embassy by a score of Moscow University students urging the Chinese to sign the partial nuclear test ban treaty. "The Chinese labeled the demonstration an "organized organization."

Mike Mansfield Papers: Series 21, Box 42, Folder 4, Mansfield Library, University of Montana.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE
September 6

[From the New York Times, Sept. 6, 1963]

Pappu Accuses Moscow

Today September 6, Communist China accused the Soviet Union today of having marshaled tens of thousands of Chinese in a new stage of unprecedented size. According to the report, the Chinese accused the Soviet Union of being engaged in a new campaign of aggression against China.

The charge was made in a statement by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which said that the Chinese government had evidence that the Soviet Union was planning a new attack on China. The statement said that the Chinese government had been informed by its intelligence services that the Soviet Union was assembling large numbers of troops and armor near the border with China.

The Chinese charge comes just weeks after the United States and China announced a new truce in their long-running trade dispute. The truce was seen by many as a sign of growing cooperation between the two countries.

The Chinese statement also accused the Soviet Union of being involved in a new campaign of propaganda and disinformation aimed at undermining China's stability.

The Chinese government said that it had evidence that the Soviet Union was using propaganda to spread fear and mistrust among the Chinese people. The Chinese government said that it had evidence of Soviet infiltrators and agents operating in China.

The Chinese statement said that the Soviet Union had been involved in a new campaign of economic subversion, with the aim of weakening China's economy and destabilizing its government.

The Chinese government said that it had evidence that the Soviet Union was funding various Chinese dissidents and opposition groups in an effort to undermine China's internal security.

The Chinese government said that it had evidence that the Soviet Union was using its military presence in the region to exert pressure on China and exert influence over its internal politics.

The Chinese statement said that the Soviet Union had been involved in a new campaign of military subversion, with the aim of undermining China's military capabilities.

The Chinese government said that it had evidence that the Soviet Union was providing military equipment and training to Chinese dissidents and opposition groups, with the aim of weakening China's military strength.

The Chinese statement said that the Soviet Union had been involved in a new campaign of political subversion, with the aim of destabilizing China's government and undermining its internal stability.

The Chinese government said that it had evidence that the Soviet Union was funding various Chinese political groups and organizations, with the aim of destabilizing China's government and undermining its internal stability.

The Chinese statement said that the Soviet Union had been involved in a new campaign of cultural subversion, with the aim of undermining China's cultural heritage and identity.

The Chinese government said that it had evidence that the Soviet Union was providing financial and cultural support to various Chinese opposition groups and organizations, with the aim of undermining China's cultural heritage and identity.

The Chinese statement said that the Soviet Union had been involved in a new campaign of diplomatic subversion, with the aim of destabilizing China's diplomatic relationships and undermining its international standing.

The Chinese government said that it had evidence that the Soviet Union was funding various Chinese diplomatic organizations and agencies, with the aim of destabilizing China's diplomatic relationships and undermining its international standing.