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Congressional Record - The Situation in Vietnam

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001
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administration, through the President's Adminis-
terative Commission (PAC), is recommended that more Federal emphasis be placed on the
first Hoover Commission strongly recom-
mendations of the study to the Nation were made
power transmission lines on public lands: Since
Western States the super-
7. Veto power on the dispatch of elec-
trical energy. The extent
of transmission results
in virtual
9. Coordination among Federal agencies: Under the Eisenhower administration, a sig-
nificant step forward was taken in coordinat-
ing the numerous Federal agencies concerned with generating electrical power, through the
creation of PACWEP (see above)

RECOMMENDATION NO. 6
The Congress should promptly establish a Federal policy on such license renewals, and this pol-
could not discriminate against private industry over Government ownership.

10. The new emphasis in RIA on trans-
mision and generation facilities: The
Norris-Rayburn Act, establishing the Rural
Electrification Administration (the RIA), was approved by Congress in 1936 with the
announcement purpose to bring the advantages
electricity to rural areas. A
was defined as any portion of the Nation
which was not included within the bound-
aries of a city, village, or borough with a population of more than 1,500 persons. This
definition of area is now construed to cover
much of suburban or outer suburbia. Senator
George Norris, of Nebraska, author of the act, convinced the Congress that the law was needed to make electricity available
to farms and at reasonable prices. The pri-
vate power industry had naturally concen-
trated where land was greatest and where the demand would make the
financing of facilities feasible.
It is generally believed that only four de-
cades before the enactment of the Norris-
Rayburn Act virtually all of the United States was lighted and fueled by coal, gas, kerosene, and the like. The private
electric generating industry rose during the
first three decades of the 20th century from insignificant beginnings into the most
important industry in the United States.

7. Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 42, Folder 61, Mansfield Library, University of Montana

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In 1936, 89 percent of all farms were without
central service electricity. In 1964, the situation has completely reversed itself; 98 percent
of all American homes were served through central station service, and most of the remaining 2 percent could be so
served with little difficulty. In this paper, we believe the RIA has realized its purpose.

In recent years, however, the RIA has placed a new emphasis on transmission and generation facilities and on
generating electrical energy to suburban and outer suburbs. This was not the purpose of the Norris-Rayburn Act. Now
that nearly all of the farm population has been supplied with electricity, the RIA, as
is the common experience with bureaucracies, has sought new ways of spending money and expand-
ing itself. In the few years since the Eisen-
hower administration left office, borrowings
from the RIA to set up facilities for generating
and transmission of electrical energy have greatly increased and the trend is sharply upward.

If rural areas are lacking in generation and transmission facilities, they should by all means have them, but it
is wise to finance such facilities with Federal funds only when adequate private funds already exist. Numerous examples
bear out this point; for instance, the Patten power project was not undertaken by the Indiana. In both cases, taxpayers' money
was unnecessary because private facilities were available. These recent activities of the RIA are not the purposes of the law as expressed by its original congressional sponsors.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 9
The President should insist upon coordina-
tion among executive agencies concerned with generating and transmitting electrical energy.

We recommend that the Congress by reso-
lution or the President by Executive order
issue a comprehensive directive: to re-
view the original purposes and present activ-
ities of the RIA. Farmers are entitled to reasonable protection of their farms from
the generation and transmission of electrical energy for consumers not engaged in agri-
culture. One aspect of this is certainly open
to question. On repeated occasions, the Con-
grress has refused to appropriate funds for
dedicated power projects because
private facilities were available. The Con-
gress has also refused to appropriate funds even to allow hydroelectric power swimming
in the lake. The fact that hydroelectric power is often sporadic, depending upon rainfall, and that therefore hydroelectric power usually needs to be supplemented with stand-by steam-generated power. The questionable point is that RIA
loans have been made apparently to build
steam plants for which the Congress had re-
frused to grant funds. Here are examples:

1. 1962—-Pennsylvania: Cooperative
\$21,602,000 toward financing a
150,000-kilowatt steamplant to firm up power
from the Colorado-Rio Grande storage project.
2. 1962—-Bain Electric Power Cooperative:
\$56,600,000 loan was made to build a 200,-
000-kilowatt steam plant in the Dakota's, from
which will be disposed of to firm up Missoula Basin power.
3. 1963—-Upper Missouri Electric Cooperative:
A RIA loan of $0,170,000 was made to build a
3,000-kilowatt steam plant and transmission lines. This Power Authority will buy most of the power and lease the transmission lines.

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 11

The Congress should, by suitable legislation, restrain the REA from financing the construction of power projects involving facilities as supplements to hydroelectric projects in cases where the Congress itself has refused to appropriate funds specifically for such facilities.

12. Comparable rates: Consumers located where they may buy power from Federal projects usually obtain it at a price well below its true cost of production. This is unfair to power consumers who are not so fortunately situated, yet who pay taxes to subsidize the power for others. This inequity to taxpayers and to privately owned utilities is a consequence of several factors. First, power projects are usually tax exempt. Consumers of electricity supplied by investor-owned electric companies must pay through their electric bills a significant tax burden. In most instances, this amounts to about 23 to 25 percent of the cost of electricity, yet those who obtain their power from Federal projects, in most instances, do not have to pay such taxes.

Second, rates charged to consumers for power from most Federal projects are considerably below rates charged by investor-owned companies, in part because the unamortized power investment at only 3 percent. Since 1958, the Federal Government had 4 percent to borrow money of a comparable maturity, the result is a subsidy to power consumers at the expense of many others.

The Comptroller General of the United States has repeatedly found that major Federal power projects from the Missouri Basin power projects, from their inception to the end of fiscal 1969, had lost a total of $51,778,000. The Southeastern Power Administration and its appended power projects lost $78,778,000. The Columbia River Power System, on its power operations, lost $60,000,000 between 1938 through 1963. The Southeastern Power Administration, on its power operations from 1958 to 1963 lost $30,000,000. The sum of these losses was a gift to the users of this power, paid for by taxes collected from citizens in other areas.

Thus, the General Accounting Office has found that major Federal power projects in general do not charge rates sufficient to cover the modest interest charges imposed on them.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 12

The rates charged to users of Federal power projects supported so that users of such power do not receive an unfair advantage as opposed to those who do not receive their power from federally subsidized projects.

13. The nuclear energy source materials:

Coal: In terms of tonnage, the coal industry is unique in that it has relatively equal reserves. In 1961, the use was as follows: industry 24 percent; coke 20 percent; electricity 48 percent; retail 8 percent; remainder, ammonia and other special chemicals. Recent U.S. production of coal is 440 million tons per annum (1963), about one-seventh of the world production.

Coal and natural gas are almost perfectly competitive for the cost of electricity production, about 25 cents per million B.t.u. averaged over the United States (local factors favor coal), in 1961. The use was as follows: industry 24 percent; coke 20 percent; electricity 48 percent; retail 8 percent; remainder, ammonia and other special chemicals.

Natural gas: Probably one of the fastest growing areas of energy source in natural gas, which is increasing about 30 percent per annum. In 1961, and (sum of) 13.6 x 10^12 cubic feet were sold. In 1960, the breakdown was 3.5 x 10^12 industrial and commercial; 3.3 x 10^12 field (i.e., losses, etc.). In the year 1961, proven reserves (economically and technically recoverable) were 271 x 10^12 cubic feet. Under present use rates, this is a 20-year supply but both use rates and new finds are increasing so rapidly that this figure does not have much meaning, as is also true in the coal industry.

Petroleum: In 1962 the petroleum-use picture was: gasoline, 1.9 x 10^12 barrels; distillate, 74.4 x 10^12 barrels; residual, 5.8 x 10^12 barrels; kerosene 18.5 x 10^12 barrels (mostly jet fuel); other, 9.4 x 10^12 barrels. Including losses, export, etc. The total demand was 3.5 x 10^12 barrels, and the world supply was 8.5 x 10^12 barrels, so that U.S. use runs around 40 percent. Net 17.3, imports are around 70-100 percent per year or less than 8 percent of use.

The present U.S. proven reserves (under present technology) is 1.4 x 10^12 barrels. It is generally believed that large reserves of both oil and gas probably lie elsewhere awaiting discovery on this continent and on the coastal shelf. The proven reserves at the end of fiscal year 1960 were 9.5 x 10^12, but those at the end of fiscal year 1969 were 9.5 x 10^12.

14. Atomic energy: As previously noted, the Eisenhower administration gave particular encouragement to the peaceful uses of atomic energy, with successes achieved. The first nuclear reactor to produce electrical energy for commercial use was initiated during the Eisenhower administration and built at Shippingport, Pa., with large contributions from private industry.

15. The cost per kilowatt-hour of electrical energy derived from the fission of uranium, which was 28 to 35 cents in 1961, the cost of conventional power in 1954, had been reduced by the ingenuity of American scientists and at the end of the Eisenhower administration plants were under construction whose output was competitive with steam-generating plants in the same areas of the Nation.

Thus, while no early exhaustion of fossil fuels appears to threaten us, and while technological progress will make nuclear energy economical, the cost of nuclear energy will stimulate a healthy competition to make electricity still cheaper for consumers.

An important research project in the area of nuclear power development is the theoretical feasibility of producing electrical energy from the fusion of light elements such as hydrogen. This project, research upon which was meagerly supported until 1958, was given the encouragement of needed associated research in that year. Very great progress has been made since, but much has been accomplished in technology is yet to be achieved.

On 6.0, the British and Soviet Governments are now believed to have comparable or superior position of leadership in this area of research. The British effort is said to exceed ours, whereas the Soviets are reported to be 200 percent greater than ours.

The significance of power from fusion, if it can be achieved, is (a) the fuel supply is unlimited since it exists in all bodies of water, and (b) the cost of power so produced would be a fraction of present power costs. We understand that this line of research in our own laboratories has been reduced both in priority and support. We believe this to be short-sighted.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 14

We recommend a new review of the peaceful uses of atomic energy to determine the areas in which research can be effectively and increasingly supported and to restore the sense of urgency which seems to have yielded to the more glamorous and costly demands of space exploration.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, this is pertinent to my considered practice of having introduced all of their reports into the Congressional Record.

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, a group of outstanding Republican leaders in the other House, and in the Senate, are fit to deliver themselves of a tirade on policy in Vietnam. I am not surprised that the political, the military, the diplomatic situation as such is a issue on this issue. What amazes me is that they have come out of the shadows so early. I can only conclude that they are to be used in any neat rumble in San Francisco as a warm-up to the political war later on.

Let me make clear, Mr. President, that I am not depleting discussion of the Vietnamese situation. It is a serious situation. Any light which can be shed on the Vietnamese situation, and at a cost of many American lives, a "why win" policy is not serious discussion.

Any statement which classifies the complex problem of Vietnam, which has confronted us through the Eisenhower, the Kennedy, and the Johnson administrations, as one peculiarly associated with the latter alone, is not serious discussion.

Any statement which describes a policy that has seen 16,000 American troops, with a naval effort, as forces deployed in southeast Asian waters, and billions of dollars spent in a region of limited unilateral American interest, as a policy of "pervasive softness," is not serious discussion.

Any statement which assumes that this Government can take operational control of the forces of another nation without assuming, at vast cost in lives and resources, total responsibility for what happens in that nation. In short, any statement which assumes that the purposes of freedom can be achieved in an alien land with an army of foreign elements, and billions of dollars spent in a region of limited unilateral American interest, is not serious discussion.

Any statement which speaks of the maintenance of free elections in an alien land at the cost of American taxpayers' money is not serious discussion.

Any statement which, in the manner of those who would pretend that the mountains, sea, jungles, and rivers—thousands of miles—of the external South Vietnamese borders and of the borders of Vietcong-held areas within
that nation can be sealed off, not with tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of U.S. forces, but with a wave of a statement, is not serious discussion.

Mr. President, there are Republicans who understand the situation in Vietnam from a firsthand experience with it. I refer particularly to our recent Ambassador in Saigon, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge. He knows the meaning of what we are attempting in Vietnam and in southeast Asia. He knows the realities of the situation which confronts us. He knows the course of policy which offers the best hope of success.

We shall not hear from him any comment about "why win" or "persuasive softness." Here is what we shall hear from him—and I quote from Associated Press dispatch No. 52, on June 30, 1964:

In Vietnam the aim of the struggle is to create a proper political atmosphere. That’s how you beat the Communists there. The minute you’ve created a proper political atmosphere, the Communists won’t be encouraged by the report I received just before I left Saigon that people were no longer fighting for the Communists. I don’t see the need for more troops in Vietnam. I think we should focus on the Vietnamese to win with our help the right policy.

Mr. President, the statement of the House Members to which reference has been made is not an invitation to serious discussion. It obscures the real questions with respect to Vietnam which confront the people of the United States. These questions do need, and should have, discussion. We do need public clarity on rational objectives of policy, not only for Vietnam, but also for all of southeast Asia. We do need public discussion of the means for achieving these objectives—of the military and the diplomatic channels which may be open or can be opened for dealing with the problems of that region which involve not only the United States, but, first and foremost, the people of the region itself, and, in a larger sense, the Chinese, the Russians, the Australians, the British, the French—indeed, in an ultimate sense, all of the people of the world.

And I confidently predict that strength will continue to grow more rapidly than the might of all others.

The first area of this increasing strength is our ability to deter atomic destruction. In the past 3 years we have increased our nuclear power on alert 2½ times, and our nuclear superiority will continue to grow until we reach agreement and the threat.

We have more than 1,000 fully armed ICBMs and Polaris missiles ready for retaliation. The Soviet Union has its large reserves, and none ready to be launched beneath the earth. We now have more than double the strength of the Soviet Union. And I confidently predict that strength will continue to grow more rapidly than the might of all others.

The second area of increasing strength is our ability to fight less than all-out war. In the past 3 years we have raised the number of combat ready divisions 45 percent. They can be moved swiftly around the world by an airlift capacity which has increased 75 percent. The supporting tactical aircraft have been increased over 30 percent, and the number of tactical nuclear warheads in Europe has been raised 80 percent. We, and our NATO allies, now have 5 million men under arms.

And we are continuing to build our forces. In a few years our airlift capacity will be five times what it was in 1961. Advanced weapons and equipment are flowing to our armies. Our fleet is being modernized through a decade-long program. And new tactical aircraft are being built.
A third area of increasing strength is the subversion. Our adversaries, convinced that direct attack would be aimless, today resort to terror, subversion, and guerilla warfare. To meet these threats we have begun a large effort to train special forces to accomplish effective subversion. Since January 1961 we have increased these specialized forces eight times. We have trained more than 100,000 officers in these techniques. We have given special emphasis to this form of warfare in the training of all military units.

Our Army now has six Special Action Forces on call around the world to assist our special forces in subversion. They are stationed. The Navy and Air Force have several thousand men whose abilities, training, equipment and mission are designed to combat clandestine attack. And behind these groups are five brigade-size backup forces ready to move into instant action.

But just as subversion has many faces, our responses must take many forms. We have won battles and integrate all the resources, political and social as well as military and economic, needed to meet a threat which bears at the entire fabric of a society.

But success in fighting subversion ultimately depends on adequate funds being made available to the military. When funds are not adequate, when the war is not finished, when the outcome is in doubt, the enemy will look to his subversion, and the outcome of the nation. We are developing a new aircraft, the best antiballistics missile available to any nation. We are developing new techniques of internal defense.

Subversive warfare is often difficult, dirty, and dangerous. Its success depends on the cooperation of all forces behind the front lines with the desire to protect their own freedom. But such conflict requires weapons as well as will, ability as well as aspiration. And we will continue to increase this strength until our adversaries are convinced that this course too will not lead to conquest.

The fourth area of increasing strength is in the development of new weapons. This is a war in which we have a large investment, a war we will win, a war we are not prepared to lose. The Chief of Staff has said: "I am convinced that the Army's position today is far superior to where it was a year ago, in the capability of the equipment it has, and the guidance it has." The new Nike X, when its development is complete, will give us the option to deploy, if national security requires it, the best antiballistics missile attack available to any nation. We are developing a new aircraft, the F-III. With much greater range, payload, and ability at air combat than present tactical bombers or fighters. The Lanc, the missile, the EX-10 torpedo, the AAM, a new main battle tank, new antitank missile systems, are the emerging products of development that we are carrying forward. We hope that it can now produce the power and the effect that we have twice the accuracy of the best Minuteman. The new Nike X, when its development is complete, will give us the option to deploy, if national security requires it, the best antiballistics missile attack available to any nation.

DEPLORABLE FINANCIAL STATUS OF CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I offer for the Record a brief statement describing the deplorable financial condition in which the Children's Hospital of Washington, D.C., finds itself. It is a result of inadequate funds being made available to it, both through charity and through public sources.

The story is relatively complicated, but I have prepared a chronology as of Friday, June 26, which I think unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, June 14, 1964]

HILL CONFEREES REJECT PLEA FOR AID TO DEFLICT-HIT CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL

(By Dorothy Gilliam)

House-Senate conferees rejected a bid for public medical aid. The hospital loses about $300,000 a year in the unpaid bills of children who are indigent by every definition but the Health Department's. Unlike the city's own clinics, the hospital cares for sick children regardless of their eligibility for medical aid. The hospital's deficit is currently running above half a million dollars a year, and within a few months the hospital will be in a position to the least prosperous of its patients.

Out of every 100 children whom the hospital admits as indigents, the Health Department covers only about 50 to be eligible for public medical aid. The hospital cares for the others, certainly, but the whole cost of the hospital care for each indigent patient.

Thirty out of every one hundred indigent patients are ineligible because the Department's unit rule creates a void of responsibility. Under the law, a child's parent is responsible for the hospital bill. Under the family unit rule, any relative living in the same house is responsible. In a