1-12-1967

Congressional Record S.J. Res. 18 - Voting: Lowering Age to 18

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I send to the desk a resolution and ask that it be read, along with the names of the cosponsors.

S. Res. 49

WHEREAS the foreign policy and military strength of the United States are dedicated to the protection of our national security, that is, the liberties of the American people, and the maintenance of world peace; and

WHEREAS the United States in implementing these principles in Europe have deployed 300,000 of its armed forces in Europe, together with air and naval units, for twenty years; and

WHEREAS the security of the United States and its citizens remains intertwined with the security of other nations signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty as it was established by the full cooperation of all member countries of the organization to provide forces to resist aggression has significantly improved since the original deployment; and

WHEREAS the commitment by all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to maintain their dependents in Europe are now undergoing substantial change and the leadership decided not to press the matter to a conclusion during the last session. Notice was served, however, that the matter would be re-opened in January.

Just prior to the convening of the 90th Congress, the original sponsors of the resolution decided to consider it a matter of high priority. After a thorough discussion, it was decided once again, with 12 of the 13 Members of the Committee on Armed Services present, that the resolution on U.S. troop deployment in Europe should be reintroduced with delay. It was also agreed that the President should be advised of the intention to do so and that, on this occasion, all Members of Senate should be invited to cosponsor the resolution if they so desired.

I find it regrettable, Mr. President, that nothing has happened since the close of the last session to indicate that this resolution is any less necessary today than it was several months ago. At that time, I expressed the hope that the introduction of the resolution, of itself, might prove to be helpful in bringing about adjustments in U.S. troop numbers in Europe. However, what looked like a hopeful move in that direction last fall has apparently turned out to be merely another exercise in marking time.

It is my personal belief, therefore, that the resolution on U.S. troop deployment in Europe is more timely, and perhaps more necessary, now than it was during the last session, and that the Senate is more than ever justified in coming to grips with the matter in this session. Let me review some of the specific considerations that have led me to this conclusion.

The request that our forces be withdrawn from France seemed to provide an important opportunity to bring home approximately 70,000 of the American defense personnel and dependents now stationed throughout Western Europe. Instead, the Department is in the process of moving at least two-thirds of these forces along with their dependents who have been in place not back to France but on to the Kingdom, West Germany, and the Low Countries. Thus, the reduction of overall U.S. personnel levels in Europe will be inferior. United Kingdom-West German talks on troop deployment, strategy, and offset arms purchases. These tripartite talks seem to have taken on an almost prophylactic quality in light of the burdening of NATO.

Most disturbing, in my view, has been the revelation of the rigidity of our policy with respect to NATO, as it emerged recently. Indeed, the Defense Department still clings to the 90-day concept, and we pay heavily in terms of the number of supporting troops and skeptics which are required to maintain it.

It is also difficult to understand why we will not face up to the fact that the Western European allies are interested in seeking supplies of line of communications to sustain forces for a hypothetical 90-day conventional war on the Continent. Indeed, their posture that it is not sufficient to sustain their NATO forces for 30 days or even, in some instances, for 10 days. Nevertheless, the Defense Department still clings to the 90-day concept, and we pay heavily in terms of the number of supporting troops and skeptics which are required to maintain it.

Two months ago by an unnamed source in this Government as a move to get the Europeans to take a greater share of NATO's burdens, has produced precisely the opposite results. Indeed, it is ironic that the principal decision of the recent tripartite Conference involves a new U.S. commitment to buy $15 million worth or arms and services from Great Britain in order to stave off the reductions in the British Army of the Rhine which London had previously announced it felt compelled to make.

To put it bluntly, this Conference reveals a disconcerting tendency to be or to slip, the winds into a conventional NATO defense which is based on a conviction of urgency that they do not necessarily share.

It has been said before, Mr. President, but it bears repeating: the United States is the only member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which has met its commitment to the continued defense of West Berlin. No member of NATO spends as much of its gross national product on defense as does the United States. No NATO member has as large a share of its available manpower in uniform as does the United States. The costly...
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standards of training, equipment, staffing and logistics which have been maintained for the six U.S. divisions on the European Continent and for our own forces and the U.S. military presence on the European Continent. The U.S. forces stationed in Europe are a cornerstone of stability and confidence of our own national security and of the security of our NATO allies. Indeed, I believe that the number of U.S. forces in Europe should be substantially reduced in present circumstances. It would supercede in this fashion the advice on the same subject which the Senate gave to another President in 1951—and on which he acted—that the U.S. commitment of forces on the European Continent should be increased from two to six divisions in the circumstances then prevailing. In short, this resolution calls upon those who remain shackled to an unwise past policy based on a Europe that was yesterday to face up to the fact that tomorrow will always seem to be a better time to take the action which is urgently required today.

In this connection, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record an excellent research paper done at my request by Miss Elizabeth Stabler, analyst in Western European Affairs, of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. It covers NATO force goals, the contributions of NATO members, and the conscription policies of NATO members, as well as other pertinent information.

I urge Senators to look over this outstanding study by Miss Stabler, because I think they will find much to digest in it, and much Europe-wide and ponder about.

I further ask unanimous consent that on page 18 of the research paper which I have heretofore read, at the end of the paragraph on Luxembourg, a story carried in the New York Times on January 18, 1967, as amended at that point. Furthermore, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, so that it will
France: In 1952, France had about five somewhat understrength divisions assigned to the Mediterranean Command. In 1954, following the outbreak of the Algerian rebellion, France in 1955 and 1956 withdrew three of these divisions and all units for service in Algeria, with the understanding that they would be returned as soon as possible. The deployments in France and the Algerian war amounted to about 1/2 divisions. These divisions were brought up to the strength of two divisions when the Algerian war came to an end in 1962. They were modernized but were never moved to the forward positions required by NATO strategy. Other French forces stationed in Algeria were brought back to France but were not reassigned or earmarked to NATO command.

On July 1, 1966, the two French divisions stationed in Germany—about 60,000 men—and tactical air units stationed in Germany—about 10,000 men—were withdrawn from NATO command. Other French personnel assigned to the integrated NATO commands were withdrawn. Some of the French forces stationed in Germany have since been employed in France and in West Germany.

In recent months, there have been reports that the French military authorities have yet to agree on a mission for these forces. The steps taken by the French Government on July 1 completed the withdrawal of French air, naval, and ground forces from the Mediterranean Area, and other NATO commands. No French forces are at present assigned or earmarked to these commands. In March 1959, the third of the French Mediterranean Area had been earmarked to NATO's Mediterranean Command. In June 1966, France announced the withdrawal of naval units earmarked to NATO's Channel Command and Atlantic Command. In 1963, the French Government announced the replacement of French naval officers assigned to these commands by liaison officers. In recent months, the French Government also indicated that permission for NATO military planes to fly over French territory will be granted on a monthly rather than a yearly basis, that France will no longer participate in NATO's Military Committee, and that France will continue to make financial contributions only to a selected few NATO infrastructure projects. The French Government has contemplated liaison arrangements with various NATO and national commands. These arrangements as well as providing for French participation in an integrated air defense system covering a sector of northeastern France have yet to be worked out with NATO commanders.

At present, France has about three active divisions stationed in France in addition to those stationed in Germany. From 1952 to 1956, the French army numbered over 800,000 men. By 1966, it had shrunk to about 330,000 men. This reduction in size was in large part a result of heavy expenditures on the development of nuclear weapons.

The present striking force, consisting of supersonic planes carrying 60 kiloton atomic bombs, is not far ahead of the capabilities of the strategic forces of either Great Britain or the United States.

West Germany: When West German forces in Germany were withdrawn, there was reason to fear that West Germany would have only a small number of troops stationed in West Germany. In 1954, West Germany and France signed the London and Paris accords, the United Kingdom undertook to maintain on the Continent the two divisions stationed in Germany—about 40,000 men—and would contribute 12 divisions to the Mediterranean Command. These force goals were carried over into the London and Paris accords of 1954 under which West Germany was invited to agree to a NATO's command. Force goals for the West German army have been postponed or tactically revised downward a number of times, partly because West Germany's 12-month period of service under the draft—changed to 18 months in 1959—was insufficient to train and equip sufficient manpower. At present, West Germany's 12 divisions still suffer from a shortage of manpower, and especially from lack of trained and skilled technical specialists. For lack of training areas in West Germany, West Germany's armed forces have also been obliged to send trained personnel to other European countries. Some West German military authorities acknowledge that West Germany probably has the equivalent of only eight full divisions at present. They dispute the claims of some American officials that Germany armed forces suffer from serious deficiencies in equipment. With the exception of a small territorial force—20,000—and an even smaller reserve for local defense, all of West Germany's armed forces—total about 460,000—are assigned to NATO.

Luxembourg: Luxembourg's army has shrunk from about 17,000 men in the last 5 years. The artillery battalion of 500 men attached to American forces in Germany consists of volunteers who would presumably be available to NATO after mobilization. In recent months, there has been pressure to disband the army entirely or to rely on neighbors for defense.

Netherlands: In the late 1950s, the Netherlands reorganized its army to provide two active divisions instead of one active division, and two reserve divisions instead of four reserve divisions. In recent years, the size of the army has shrunk from about 70,000 to 45,000. In addition to two assigned divisions, the equivalent of about two divisions is earmarked to NATO command.

United Kingdom: In 1954 London and Paris accords, the United Kingdom undertook to maintain on the Continent the four divisions—about 77,000 men—and to reduce them to eight at that time in Germany, unless overseas emergencies or a heavy strain on external finances dictated otherwise. Withdrawals on this scale could be central to our security and a majority of the Brussels Treaty powers. In its 1957 white paper on defense, the British Government announced, without apparent preliminary conference, that it intended to reduce the British Army of the Rhine—BAOR—to 64,000 men within the next 12 months and ultimately to 45,000 men. At that time, it was predicted that Great Britain would maintain its armed forces by almost one half by 1962, and that it would rely more heavily on nuclear deterrent power. The Government indicated that further expenditures on strategic nuclear forces would require reductions in expenditures on conventional forces. It assumed that steady improvements in relations between France and Germany made the presence of large numbers of British troops on the Continent less urgent. After lengthy negotiations with NATO military authorities and West Germany, Great Britain agreed to limit its withdrawals from BAOR to 22,000 men. At the same time, the British tactical air force stationed in Germany was cut by one half. Britain's present commitment of 50,000 men to the BAOR has been described as seven or eight new divisions of 2 1/2 or 3 divisions. Commitments to the defense of Malta and disorders in some African members of the Commonwealth are taken into account. Britain reduced its force stationed in Germany by about 51,000 men in the BAOR.

In recent years, British spokesmen have indicated that if the U.S. pressing for its own force guidelines should be adjusted downward from supplies and supporting troops to sustain 90 days of conventional combat to supplies and supporting personnel to sustain 10 to 30 days of conventional combat. In recent months, British authorities have been reported to have decided on cuts of from 15,000 to 20,000 men in the BAOR unless West Germany agreed to increase substantially its contribution to offset the costs of maintaining the BAOR in Germany. The redeployment of some supplies and support troops to England would apparently enable the British to cut as much as from 10,000 to 15,000 men in the BAOR. For the time being, however, it has been reported that all cuts have been postponed in view of the fact that the United Kingdom is now spending approximately $35 million more than planned on arms and services in Britain in 1967 while United States-United Kingdom-West German talks on troop deployment, strategy, and offset agreements continue.

The strength of Great Britain's army in 1959 was about 324,000 men. In 1966, it stood at about 218,000 men.

United States: In 1950, the United States had troops amounting to about 1 1/2 to 2 divisions stationed in Europe, most of them stationed in West Germany and in Norway. In September 1950, President Truman announced that he had approved substantial increases in the strength of U.S. forces stationed in Western Europe. In April 1951, the Senate passed Senate Resolution 99 expressing "the belief of the Senate that the threat to the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners makes it necessary for the United States to station abroad such units of our Armed Forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute substantially to the forces needed for the joint defense of the
be easier reading for Members of the Senate, that the entire study be printed, not only as an official paper, but in the usual size print.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there any objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

There being no objection, the research paper was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

DECEMBER 23, 1966.

TO: Hon. Michael Mansfield.

From: Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, the Library of Congress.

Subject: NATO force goals, the contributions of NATO members, conscription policies of NATO members.

There are several difficulties in estimating NATO force goals and the extent to which NATO members have met their commitments. First, it has been the long-standing policy of the various NATO commands and of the individual NATO members to classify NATO force goals and the extent to which these goals have been met. In recent years, the United States and Great Britain have not always followed this policy in respect to individual NATO commitments.

West Germany's commitment in respect to ground forces is known because it was written into agreements preceding West Germany's admission to NATO. Nevertheless, the commitments and actual contributions of some NATO members have been the subject neither of official statements nor of unofficial speculation.

Second, to the extent that some NATO ground force goals and the contributions of NATO members are known, they are usually expressed in terms of divisions. But the number of men assigned to a division and the number who contribute support to a division vary widely. For example, Secretary McNamara recently pointed out in a divisionslice the U.S. 7th Army stationed in West Germany amounted to about 45,000 men whereas a West German division slice amounted to about 17,000 men. Therefore, a NATO member may well have met its commitments in terms of the number of divisions assigned to a NATO command. But these divisions may fail to meet logistic requirements. It is generally believed that with the exception of the U.S. 7th Army, most NATO divisions show deficiencies in many of these respects. Available information, however, does not permit detailed documentation of this point.

Third, whereas NATO ground force goals for the central European sector—Afri—Are forces have been the subject of many official published reports, force goals for northern Europe—Afri—have been for southern

Europe—Afri—appear to be largely unreported. Similarly, the desired strength and deficient forces in the NATO naval and air forces are difficult to establish. And further complicating the task of measuring national contributions against force goals is the distinction between forces assigned to NATO—those coming under the operational command or control of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and serving under continuous peacetime training and during emergencies under conditions agreed by each country—and forces earmarked for assignment to NATO—which forces which nations have agreed to assign to a NATO command at some future time—many cases, reserves which would presumably be available only within specified periods after mobilization. The only forces at present assigned to NATO are most ground forces stationed in Europe and some tactical air units. Force goals and commitments for "earmarked" forces are hazy. The extent to which NATO commands can count on some of these forces as firm commitments is unclear.

The following report relies on publicly available and therefore necessarily incomplete information. It presents, first, a table giving a detailed breakdown of reported NATO force goals and the commitments and current strength of NATO members only for the ground forces assigned to the crucial and central sector—that is, to Afri—second, tabulations of the ground forces at Afri—third, a listing of NATO countries that gives available information on changes in conscription policies; fourth, a table showing defense expenditures as a percentage of gross national product for NATO members; fifth, a table showing approved NATO infrastructure cost-sharing formulas.

A. SUMMARY—FORCE GOALS: MINIMUM REQUIREMENT 1954 TO 30 ASSIGNED COMBAT-READY DIVISIONS STATIONED IN OR NEAR GERMANY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>At least 2 divisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
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</tr>
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<td>West Germany</td>
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Note—Current total: At the very most 25 to 25.4 divisions, none of which are at full strength.

2. AFRICAN FORCE GOALS

In February 1952, the North Atlantic Council meeting at Lisbon is believed to have approved 1954 ground force goals for Afric of between 20 and 30 combat-ready divisions and between 30 and 35 reserve divisions capable of mobilization within 1 month. These goals were not even close to being met in 1954, or in 1957.

- Afri—of the Military Committee in 1956-57—ME-70—Afri—force goals for the end of the period 1956-63 were reported to be 17.30 combat-ready divisions and considerably fewer reserve divisions. It was also reported that ME-70 set out a requirement for the stocking of supplies and equipment to sustain these 30 divisions in the field for 90 days. It is generally believed that only U.S. divisions have met this requirement.

Following a report by the NATO's Military Committee—MC-96—Afri—force goals for the period 1961-66 were reported to be set at 28.5 combat-ready divisions stationed on the central front. It was also reported, however, that military authorities at SHAPE continued to regard 30 combat-ready divisions as the preferred objective for the central front. Neither the 28.5 requirement nor the 30-division requirement have ever been met in divisions. In April 1965, when West Germany was organized and committed to NATO its 12th division, and when France still assigned only two divisions to NATO command, Afric might be said to have had about 27.5 assigned divisions. No information has been found on present requirements for these five divisions.

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C. NOTES ON NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFRIC

Belgium: Belgium's army has shrunk in size by about 10,000 to 90,000 men in the last 5 years. In 1963, four battalions—about 2,000 men—were redeployed from Germany to eastern Belgium. There have been several recent reports that the Belgian Government has decided to request a reduction in its military commitments to NATO from six to four brigades, or from six to two divisions at present strength, plus two reserve divisions at half present strength. Two reserve divisions are earmarked for NATO.

Canada: Canada has maintained an infantry brigade group in West Germany since the winter of 1951-52. The strength of this brigade appears to have remained constant. Canada maintained 12 air squadrons in Europe in the 1950's. Canadian jet squadrons in Europe now number eight and will be replaced by six within two years. Three squadrons stationed in France are absorbed into six squadrons stationed in West Germany. Two infantry brigade groups stationed in Canada are earmarked for deployment to Europe.
North Atlantic area," approving "the understanding that the major contribution to the ground forces under General Eisenhower's command should be made by members of the North Atlantic Treaty," and approving plans to send four additional divisions of ground forces to Western Europe. By the end of 1953, the equivalent of four additional U.S. divisions had arrived in Europe, with the bulk of them stationed in Germany.

In March 1954, and again in March 1955, President Eisenhower declared that it was the policy of the United States "to continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists, and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with the North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area in a manner to ensure that our participation in the common defense effort. I am convinced that the maintenance of U.S. military strength in Europe is essential to the security of the Atlantic Community and the free world as a whole." President Johnson, in a similar message to the Permanent Council of NATO, noted: "While relying also on the growing strength of all, the United States continues to give persistent and effective participation in the common defense effort."

In March 1965, President Johnson, in a similar message to the Permanent Council of NATO, said: "The United States is committed to the maintenance of a balanced defense posture - pledge my country's will and resources. We will work to strengthen the Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area under the range of the Atlantic Treaty." The United States "to keep in Europe the equivalent of six divisions deployed in a theater of operations in Europe by the end of 1952-for as long as they are needed." This statement referred to "the U.S. commitment as five divisions and to the authorized strength of U.S. Army forces to support this commitment as 225,000 men."

The strength of U.S. ground forces assigned to AFRICOM has remained relatively constant since 1952. During the 1961-62 Berlin crisis about 40,000 more U.S. divisions were sent to Europe and reportedly bringing the total number of U.S. divisions stationed in or near Germany to about 280,000. These reinforcements were withdrawn in the spring of 1966. In the 1961-62 Berlin crisis, the United States sent additional U.S. divisions to Italy. Secretary McNamara has since said that the sending of replacement for these withdrawals would be completed by the end of 1966. Official reports in the spring of 1966 placed U.S. withdrawals from the 5th Army in the range of 30,000 to 45,000 men. The present strength of the five U.S. divisions and three armored cavalry regiments stationed in Germany is believed to be between 210,000 and 225,000 men. A large number of the 56,000 U.S. airmen stationed in Europe are also believed to be attached to U.S. forces in Germany.

C. ICELAND AND PORTUGAL

Iceland: Iceland has no national military establishment.

Portugal: Portugal has earmarked one division of 18,000 men stationed in Portugal to NATO command. It is believed that this division is at present only at half strength. Most of Portugal's army, totaling about 120,000 men, is stationed in the Portuguese provinces in Africa. One air force reconnaissance squadron is assigned to NATO.

III. CHANGES IN CONSCRIPTION POLICIES OF NATO MEMBERS

Efforts have been made at various times in the past 15 years to persuade NATO members to accept an 18-month term of service for men drafted into the armies of NATO countries. There appears to have been no success, however, with the United States. There is talk of a 18-month term of service in the United States, but the minimum service length required is 24 months, in view of the time needed for the adequate training of troops in modern warfare.

Belgium: Military service was extended from 12 months to 24 months in March 1951, reduced to 21 months in August 1952, reduced to 18 months in May 1954, reduced to 15 months in September 1956. Military service is currently required for 12 months, and for 15 months for certain categories of specialists.

Canada: No compulsory military service since the end of World War II.

Denmark: Throughout the 1950's, Denmark appears to have had a 16-month term of service for men drafted as soldiers with a 16- to 18-month period of service for drafted noncommissioned army officers. In September 1965, the term of service was reduced to 12 months for men serving in the armed forces and signal units, for which formations there were enough volunteers. Recently, the 12-month period of military service has apparently been reduced to 12 months for military conscripts and 14 months for drafted noncommissioned officers.

France: In December 1950, France increased the period of military service from 12 months to 18 months. During the height of the Algerian war, the term of required service was 27 months. This was reduced to 24 months in 1955 following the reestablishment of peace in Algeria. In 1965, France replaced its system of universal military service with a system of selective service as part of its program to modernize and reduce the size of the army. The present term of service is 18 months with the possibility of renunciation of the 18-month service.

West Germany: West Germany established a system of conscription in 1956. The term of service was set at 12 months. In September 1961, this term was extended by 3 months on an emergency basis. In February 1962, the serv-
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army emergency reserve of 11,000, in which some men who completed their national service under the old system will serve until voluntary recruitment satisfies the current need. Otherwise a small voluntary military service is completely in effect.

United States: Under the Selective Service Act, draftees were required to serve 21 months. This period of service was increased to 24 months in 1951, and has remained at 24 months ever since.

IV. Defense expenditures of NATO members as percent of gross national product 1953, 1958, 1964, 1965

<table>
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<td>United States</td>
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<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 This table is based on a standard NATO definition of defense expenditures which does not necessarily cover the same items as national defense budgets. These figures for 1953 are projected expenditures and not actual expenditures by percent of gross national product. The United States, percent highest given increasing expenditures in excess of the United States.

Neither military establishment.

V. Approved NATO infrastructure cost-sharing formulas—Six programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Cost-sharing factor</th>
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<tr>
<td>Program F</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Washington Post.

PART IV


PART V


Mr. JACKSON, Mr. President, will the resolution yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I understand that the able and distinguished majority leader for his action today in suggesting the referral of the Senate resolution to the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Armed Services Committee.

As far as I am aware, all of us in this body do not agree on the issues raised by this resolution which go to the very heart of the military balance that the West has worked so long and hard to construct, and we might all agree, however, that these vital matters cannot be settled hastily, and should not be considered lightly, and that it is wise and proper to follow the regular procedures of the Senate.

I therefore support the suggestion of the majority leader that this resolution be referred to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee. In that way, the resolution can be considered along with other policies, and not isolated resolutions and in the light of full testimony from the appropriate officials of the executive branch, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In this connection, I ask unanimous consent that a speech which I made before the Military Committee of the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference on November 14, 1966, entitled “The Will To Stay the Course,” be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

The WILL TO STAY THE COURSE

(Speech by Senator Henry M. Jackson, before the Military Committee, NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference, Paris, France, November 15, 1966)

My home is in Washington—not Washington, D.C. but the State of Washington. Tokyo is an overnight flight from Seattle, Saigon is a few hours further south. To us who live along the Pacific the war in Vietnam, like the war with Japan that began 25 years ago next month, seems very close, and our stand there very important. I do not ask you to agree, but I hope that as a friend among friends I may ask you to try to understand our position.

We are deeply committed. We have committed our very large military and, more importantly, many thousands of our young men. We have not lightly asked them to make their sacrifice. We and the others with the past may be misleading and I would not argue that this is the 35’s all over again. With the pain back there we are in fact many of you do, that it is wise to stop aggression before the aggressor becomes strong. Let us all do with small successes. We think the world might have been spared enormous misfortunes if Japan
had not been permitted to succeed in Man-
churia, or Mussolini in Ethiopia, or Hitler in
the Rhineland, or in the Balkans. And we
think that our sacrifices in this dirty war in
little Vietnam will make a dirtier and
greater history. It is on this basis that we
ask young Americans to fight in the Jungs
and jungles of Vietnam.

It is true that there are small groups about
Vietnam, as most of you are and as most
Americans are. We have honestly tried to
come to grips with the problem of stopping
the fighting on terms as consistent with the
integrity of Nasser as they are with the integri-
ty of South Vietnam. We would much rather
make peace than war.

In a long run sense, however, I am not
anxious about the outcome in Vietnam. Our
goals are limited and our forces are
strong. I am confident that in time the ad-
versary will see the advantage to him in a
settlement that involves neither the conquest
nor the surrender of either side.

I am certainly not anxious about the At-
lanic Alliance, but in the long view this is
at the center of our concerns, for it is on what
happens here, in this community, that the
validity of prospects for peace with freedom and
justice chiefly depend.

The strength and confidence of the At-
lantic Alliance is the single most decisive
factor in world affairs.

It was with this fact in mind that a United
States-Soviet subcommittee, which I have the
honor to chair, this year held a major set of
hearings before our Senate. The purpose of our
hearing was to assess the prospects for peace
from the point of view of the Atlantic Alliance. It
was with this same fact in mind that I opposed
the Senate the hasty passage of any resolu-
tion relating to American forces in Western
Europe that might be interpreted—by allies
or adversaries—to mean a reduced American
interest in Europe.

The member states of the Atlantic Alli-
cy take justifiable pride in their basic
principles in the years since World War II.
Their historic association In the Marshall
Plan and in the North Atlantic Treaty have
transformed the weakness of the late 1940's into
the strength of the 60's. North America and
Western Europe have enjoyed an un-
paralleled period of prosperity and growth.
They have seen their strength on several
eventualities to resist aggression against the
small and the weak; they have used their
prosperity to support large programs of as-
sistance to the poor. They have taken long
strides toward the creation of a European econo-
my that is as much as possible far from a
crisis, where the enemy has developed an inter-
mixed actualism of international monetary
cooperation. The strength of the European
Economic Community has also history in the
making.

During these years the defenses of the At-
lantic Alliance have been greatly strengthen-
ed, both absolutely and relatively. The
shift in the balance of power since 1949,
coupled with firm reaction to Soviet testings
of our resolve—from the first Berlin crisis to
the Cuban missile crisis—has produced a
remarkable and hopeful stabilization in Euro-
pe. The fears that seized sober men less than two
decades ago have quieted down. No armed
attack has been made on Western Europe, and
if we maintain an appropriate balance of force,
response, none is likely. We hope that a genuine
European settlement will one day be attained rest
on Soviet recognition of our right and our
interest, for, the durability of this balance, the
constancy of our resolve, and, it should be added, the restraint we have
compulsions. But in the use of our capabilities.

A traditional saying has it that "where
there's a will, there's a way." Our experience
in the Senate confirms it. We hope that the
time will turn weakness into strength and we
have. We had the will to be both firm and
flexible in the test to which we have subjected.
Combination has been the foundation of the peace in the Western

The question now is whether we have the
will to persist in our efforts. If the wind
should come out of the East instead of cold, will we shed our NATO cloak? We
see among some young people and even
among passing politicians a desire to know
what it is better to be: a temptation to assume that because no attack has been made, no
defense is necessary. I would like to present a
logic that concludes that because what we have been
doing has worked, we can safely quit doing it. Security, after all, is not a
condition; it is a process.

The events since 1945 are not the cir-
cumstances of 1949. As times change, the
Alliance can and should adjust. But the all-
lies have been greatly strength
ened, both absolutely and relatively. The
Atlantic Alliance confirms it. We
are certain that our
power and the reality of our
goals are a genuine European settlement
be attained rests on Soviet recog-
nition of our
strength and of our determination not the
surrender of either side.

In the years since World War
II, the balance of power since 1949,
the Atlantic Alliance can and should adjust. But the all-
lies have been greatly strength-
ened, both absolutely and relatively. The
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Our
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January 19, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 593

Three. It is less the head-count of NATO's conventional forces than their combat capability that counts. As the 14 adjust to the French withdrawal from NATO air defense, they can make no significant contributions in British and American logistics and support elements in Europe without sacrificing the readiness of their own forces.

Moreover, in time, technological advances may permit some reduction in the number of American forces garrisoned on the continent. But the need to retain a sufficient number of forces to meet the political necessities of the Atlantic Alliance will probably mean that we must retain a substantial United States presence in Western Europe for the foreseeable future.

The essential naval role of the Atlantic Alliance is to protect the sea-lanes of communication that are necessary to the flow of supplies and materials for the Alliance's own needs and defense as well as the legitimate needs of Third World countries. But our naval forces cannot solve many of the other problems we face in Europe. In particular, I regard the problem of the return of Germany to the Western Alliance as one of the central issues before us.

Six. The mix of forces is closely related to the problem of achieving a more reasonable allocation of defense burdens among the allies. The more the United States bears the economic burdens of defending the North Atlantic area, the more likely it is that the others will not bear their fair share. The burden of a heavy defense role for the United States increases the political cost of its relations with other western nations and the cost in terms of the United States' international image. It is the proper role of the United States to work with other nations to reduce the burden on us, but we must also be realistic about what is possible. It is important to have a frank discussion with the Germans about their willingness to bear their fair share of the burden.

In the months and years that lie ahead, the Atlantic Alliance will undergo many changes. It must increase its capacity to serve the purpose and interests of the members. It has often been said, not always with justice, that the Allies have not been able to agree on questions of defense policy. But the Allies are constrained by their history, and it may be true that the issues cannot be resolved quickly. The Allies must continue to work together, and they must be ready to adapt their policies to the changing circumstances in Europe.

In conclusion, I am convinced that the Atlantic Alliance is a positive force for peace and stability in Europe. It is essential to our national security and to the security of our European allies. I am confident that the Alliance will continue to be a powerful instrument for promoting stability and prosperity in Europe.

I personally cannot imagine a time when, or circumstances in which, the Alliance will be obsolete—an anachronism. I believe that it will continue to serve the needs of Europe and the world as we move into the future, as I see it, will be filled with tasks and challenges we can best meet not in isolation but in association.

Let me conclude, therefore, with the profound hope that the dialogue among all the Allied peoples will continue in the spirit of generosity and goodwill that should be found among friends, and that is the vital spark of an association that has done much good for all of us—and, we may add, for the world—and that can accomplish much more, nay, must accomplish much more if we are all to play our part in creating a world in which individual liberty can survive and flourish.